In This Issue

Semper Vigilis
The U.S. Army Security Agency in Early Cold War Germany
By Thomas Boghardt

The Road to Berlin
From The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949
By Donald A. Carter and William Stivers

U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

NMUSA Feature
The Winter 2018 issue of Army History offers its readers something a bit different from the journal’s usual content. While we still present two article-length pieces, the second of these is actually a “preview chapter” from a recently released Center of Military History publication.

The first article, by Dr. Thomas Boghardt, examines the little-known history of the Army Security Agency, Europe (ASAE), during the early years of the Cold War in Germany. The piece draws on numerous sources, including Army materials at the National Archives, memoirs of ASAE veterans, official histories of the U.S. Army in Europe, and some secondary sources. Most importantly, the author has mined thousands of recently declassified Army Security Agency records.

The next piece is an excerpt from CMH’s recently published volume, *The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949*, by Donald A. Carter and William Stivers. Chapter 3, The Road to Berlin, chronicles the Army’s movement into the city at the conclusion of World War II and the establishment of a military government. In early July 1945, two months after the German surrender in World War II, American troops entered Berlin to take over their assigned sector as part of the occupation forces of the German capital. That action concluded a long and complex negotiation among the victorious Allies and led to a series of confrontations that would turn the conquered city into a symbol of the emerging Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West.

This issue also includes an Artifact Spotlight, which continues the story of Bashford Dean and the development of uniquely American helmets and armor during World War I that was featured earlier in the Summer 2017 issue. Additionally, we provide a construction update on the National Museum of the United States Army as four large, or “macro,” artifacts were recently installed as the structure is built around them.

In his Chief’s Corner, Mr. Charles Bowery discusses the Center’s education and commemoration efforts as the Vietnam War fiftieth anniversary is upon us. Mr. Jon Hoffman, in his Chief Historian’s Footnote, talks about the implementation of a new process for writing and producing books at CMH. Additionally, we present an excellent crop of engaging book reviews.

As usual, article submissions are highly encouraged, as are requests to review books from our list of available titles (http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/books.html). I look forward to receiving your constructive comments about this issue and *Army History* in general.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
Features

4 Chief's Corner
5 News Notes
30 U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight
32 NMUSA Feature
52 Book Reviews
63 Chief Historian’s Footnote

Articles

6 Semper Vigilis

The U.S. Army Security Agency in Early Cold War Germany

By Thomas Boghardt

38 The Road to Berlin

From The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949

By Donald A. Carter and William Stivers
As we prepare to turn the calendar over to 2018, the U.S. Army enters the most meaningful phase of the fiftieth anniversary of its service in the Vietnam War. Fifty years ago, we were heading toward the peak of American participation in the war, with 543,000 men and women of all services—the vast majority of whom were Army personnel—in Vietnam by 1969. The year 1968 saw two significant events in our Army’s history, the Tet offensive in January and the My Lai Massacre in March, making the next six months especially poignant.

During this upcoming anniversary period, the Army Historical Program will mobilize a variety of resources to ensure that our force learns from the Army’s experience in Vietnam, while remembering and honoring the service of thousands of men and women. The Center of Military History’s (CMH) official account of the Army’s role in the Tet offensive will be published in late December as you are reading this issue of Army History, and the new Virtual Army Museum gallery on Ia Drang 1965 will continue to be available on the National Museum of the United States Army’s Web site, www.thenmusa.org. This online museum experience gives visitors access to some of the most precious Army artifacts and documents from the Vietnam era and builds awareness of our National Museum. Our Vietnam campaign pamphlet series will keep expanding, and the authors of the final volumes in our Vietnam War series—covering combat operations from 1969 through 1973, Army logistics in Vietnam, and advisory support to South Vietnam in the mid-1960s—continue to research and write. The latter topic is especially relevant as the Army forges ahead with establishing Security Force Assistance Brigades in our force structure.

Over the next few months, CMH will host three seminars on Vietnam topics. In January, we will introduce the Tet volume, authored by Erik Villard, and examine the offensive and the aftermath from a distance of fifty years. In March, CMH, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Lt. Gen. Charles N. Pede, and the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic at West Point will host a discussion of My Lai. CMH and the Chief of Army Public Affairs, Brig. Gen. Omar Jones, will conduct a seminar in April examining the Army and the news media in Vietnam. We hope that these publications and events will further the Army as a learning organization. Finally, in late June, the Army Birthday Week and Army Birthday Ball will have a Vietnam Fiftieth Anniversary theme, with numerous opportunities to honor and remember the Vietnam generation.

I encourage all of the members of our community, whether involved in training and education, or in direct support to the operational and generating force, to work to foster interest and discussion within your commands about the Vietnam War, especially as we still have so many members of the Vietnam generation still with us. We should not let this teachable moment pass us by. Let’s continue to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve!
**New Publication Coming Soon from the Center of Military History**

In early January 2018 the Center of Military History will publish the latest addition to its U.S. Army in Vietnam series. *Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967–September 1968*, by Erik B. Villard, describes the twelve-month period in which the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies embarked on a new and more aggressive strategy that shook the foundations of South Vietnam and forced the United States to reevaluate its military calculations in Southeast Asia. Hanoi’s general offensive—general uprising brought the war to South Vietnam’s cities for the first time and disrupted the allied pacification program that was just beginning to take hold in some rural areas once controlled by the Communists. For the enemy, however, those achievements came at a staggering cost in casualties and materiel; more importantly, the Tet offensive failed to cripple the South Vietnamese government or convince the United States to abandon its ally. As the dust settled after the Viet Cong attacks, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered his military commanders to press ahead with their current strategy unchanged apart from some short-term tactical adjustments and a modest increase in the U.S. troop deployment. His decision to stay the course seemed to bear fruit as the allies repaired their losses and then forged new gains throughout the summer and autumn of 1968. Even so, the allied situation at the end of this period appeared to be only marginally better than it had been in late 1967; the peace talks in Paris had stalled, and American public opinion had turned decisively against the war. This book is 748 pages and contains numerous maps, illustrations, and an index. It will be issued as CMH Pub 91–15 (cloth) and 91–15–1 (paper) and will also be available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

**Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History**

The Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History will be held 5–8 April 2018 at the Galt House Hotel in Louisville, Kentucky, and is being hosted by the University of Louisville’s College of Arts and Sciences and Department of History. The theme of the conference is “Landscapes of War and Peace.” Additional information, including registration instructions, hotel reservations, and points of contact, can be found at the society’s Web site, http://louisville.edu/history/events/smhc.

**Army Historical Foundation 2017 Distinguished Book Awards**

The Army Historical Foundation is currently accepting nominations for its 2017 Distinguished Book Awards program. Candidates may be nominated in one of seven general categories: Biography; Journals, Memoirs, and Letters; Operational/Battle History; Institutional/Functional History; Unit History; Reference; and Reprint. Nominees’ submissions will be judged against other books in the same category. The recipients of a Distinguished Book Award will receive a distinctive plaque and nominal cash prize. The winners will be publicly recognized at the annual Army Historical Foundation members meeting in June 2018. To nominate a book, please send two copies to the Army Historical Foundation, Attn: Awards Committee, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201. Nominated books must be received by 15 January 2018.
Dr. Thomas Boghardt is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received his Ph.D. in modern European history from the University of Oxford, was a visiting professor at Georgetown University from 2002 to 2004, and served as the historian of the International Spy Museum from 2004 to 2010. Dr. Boghardt has published extensively on contemporary and historical aspects of intelligence. He received the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence Award for his work on Soviet and East German intelligence operations during the Cold War. His two most recent books are *Spies of the Kaiser* (New York, 2005) and *The Zimmermann Telegram* (Annapolis, Md., 2012). He is currently working on an official history of U.S. Army intelligence operations in early Cold War Germany.
The interception and decryption of foreign communications, or signals intelligence (SIGINT), provided the U.S. government with vital knowledge about the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War. As the historian Matthew M. Aid has argued, SIGINT "was not only the most important source of intelligence—it was practically the only reliable intelligence source for the United States and its Western European allies about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain." Even though documents pertaining to SIGINT are among the most highly classified government records, historians and journalists have managed to publish numerous accounts of the Cold War operations of America's biggest SIGINT agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland. The NSA, however, was not established until 1952, and even after that date it only gradually assumed authority over the American SIGINT community.

During the early Cold War years, the SIGINT services of the U.S. Army and the Navy provided the type of information that NSA would produce in later years. Of the two, the Army Security Agency (ASA) was the larger service. The ASA had two regional headquarters, the Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAP), in Manila, Philippines (later, Tokyo, Japan), and the Army Security Agency, Europe (ASAE), in Frankfurt, Germany. Due to its strategic location on the edge of the emerging rift between East and West, ASAE found itself in a unique position to collect information on developments in Europe and on Soviet capabilities and intentions behind the Iron Curtain. By the 1950s, the agency had grown to what probably amounted to the largest Western intelligence service in Europe, and it engaged in wide-ranging intercept operations inside and outside Germany. However, in spite of its size and its central role in U.S. intelligence collection activities in early Cold War Europe, the agency has attracted very little attention from historians.

The absence of literature on ASAE may be partly due to the fact that the public generally is more interested in human intelligence operations, including espionage, than in the technical and impersonal world of SIGINT. The recent large-scale release of intelligence records in the United States and Germany, intended to shed light on the subject of Western intelligence cooperation with former Nazi officials, has further stimulated research on early Cold War human intelligence. Because American SIGINT agencies, including ASAE, played only a peripheral role in the collaboration of U.S. intelligence officials with former Nazis, few of their records were included in these releases. For many years, the
inaccessibility of primary sources has remained the biggest obstacle to the compilation of a comprehensive, unclassified history of early Cold War U.S. SIGINT operations in Europe.

This article is intended as a first step to write such a history for the early years of ASAE. It draws on scattered documents: Army SIGINT records in the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; memoirs of ASAE veterans; official histories of the U.S. Army in Europe; and occasional references to the agency in secondary literature. Most important, this article uses several thousand recently declassified original ASA records that the NSA released to this author in response to a mandatory declassification review request. These documents include the annual histories of the ASA for the 1940s and early 1950s as well as a special ASA study on the agency’s first three years. Based on those records, this article seeks to give readers a general sense of the agency’s broad scope of operations at a time and place that defined the Cold War in Europe.

THE WORLD WAR II ORIGINS OF ARMY SIGINT

World War II revolutionized American SIGINT. Before the war, the military regarded the interception and decryption of foreign communications as an arcane and technical intelligence subspecialty. In 1939, the U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service focused on breaking the codes and ciphers of less than a handful of foreign governments, while the U.S. Navy ran its own separate SIGINT service. The two organizations were small, had few resources, and rarely exchanged information. These factors contributed to the lack of advance warning about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. After the United States had entered the war, the military began a major overhaul of its SIGINT apparatus. While the Navy focused on foreign naval radio traffic, the Army took the lead on intercepting and decrypting foreign army and diplomatic communications.

In the spring of 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recruited a New York attorney, Alfred McCormack, to reform the Army’s SIGINT organization. Stimson had deliberately picked a government outsider for this job, and in due course, McCormack introduced sweeping organizational changes. With regard to operations, he insisted that the United States could not afford to limit itself to monitoring only the military communications of its enemies, but that the nation “must know as much as possible about the objectives, the psychology and the methods of our enemies and potential enemies (and of our Allies as well).”

The Army embraced McCormack’s all-encompassing approach to SIGINT. As Col. Carter W. Clarke, a senior military intelligence officer who worked closely with McCormack, noted, “our primary task is to paint for our superiors as completely a realistic picture as possible of the activities ‘behind the arras’ of all those associated with and against us.” Putting words into action, by the end of the war the Army’s Signal Security Agency (SSA) operated eleven major intercept stations around the world, processed over 380,000 intercepts in a month, and eavesdropped on the secret communications of nearly every government in the world, including those of several American allies such as the Soviet Union and the Free French government under General Charles de Gaulle.

American codebreakers also showed a passing interest in the ciphers of its closest ally, Great Britain, but given their cordial intelligence partnership with London the Americans had no need to spy on the British. Indeed, the strategic wartime alliance with Britain’s Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park became another key element in the Army’s global SIGINT dragnet. Because the British had entered the war before the Americans, they were several years ahead in technical expertise, and their global empire allowed them to operate intercept stations around the world. In 1943, the U.S. War Department and GC&CS signed the Britain–United States of America Agreement that provided for an exchange of personnel, expertise, and intercepts between the two nations. While the British aimed their efforts principally against German and Italian communications, the Americans directed their main codebreaking effort at Japan. Army SIGINT personnel detached to Bletchley Park worked closely with their British counterparts and had access to their intelligence products. They also formed the organizational nucleus of the Army’s postwar SIGINT organization in Europe.
U.S. and British codebreaking of Axis communications made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, considered the intelligence derived from communications intercepts “of priceless value.” Since SIGINT operations had proven most effective when conducted on a comprehensive, continuous basis, the Army saw little reason to abandon its vast intercept and cryptanalytic organization when hostilities ended. In fact, leading Army intelligence officers began contemplating the peacetime role of SIGINT in Europe well before the end of the war. In September 1944, the chief of the Military Intelligence Service, Brig. Gen. Ross A. Osmun, suggested to the Army’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, the establishment of a large, permanent postwar SIGINT organization that would adopt the same “vacuum cleaner” approach to SIGINT the Americans had employed so successfully during the war. Postwar operations, Osmun argued, ought to target not only “clandestine traffic throughout the occupied territories of Europe,” but also those of “all the [European] governments [currently] in exile.” Moreover, Osmun noted, “the question of studying and researching the traffic of some of our present Allies merits deep consideration.” In effect, Osmun’s target list included the communications of most European nations.

Allied victory enabled the Army to realize this ambitious goal. Impressed by the accomplishments of the codebreakers, President Harry S. Truman sanctioned the continuation of their activities in the postwar period. On 15 September 1945, the War Department replaced the wartime SSA with the Army Security Agency (ASA) under Brig. Gen. W. Preston Corderman. The transformation formalized the central role into which SIGINT had grown during the war. While the SSA had operated under the dual supervision of the Signal Corps and the Army’s intelligence division, the ASA reported exclusively to the latter. The new agency also assumed control of the various tactical signal intelligence units that had been under the theater commanders during the war. The ASA thus consolidated all Army signal intelligence and signal security functions into one agency that was fully integrated into the Army’s intelligence organization.

The ASA had a strong interest in continuing the wartime SIGINT exchange with the British, who operated intercept stations throughout their global empire. In March 1946, the two sides signed the so-called UKUSA agreement that extended their cooperation into the postwar period. To coordinate the exchange of SIGINT between the two nations, the ASA set
up the U.S. Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in London in the spring of 1946. Meanwhile, the ASA continued to operate its own fixed intercept stations: Vint Hill Farms Station in Virginia; Two Rock Ranch Station in California; Helemano on Oahu, Hawaii; Fairbanks in Alaska; Las Piñas in the Philippines; and Asmara in Eritrea. In Germany, where a number of mobile Army SIGINT units had moved at the end of the war, ASA intended to operate "as long as possible."

**Establishment and Early Operations of ASA**

Running an intelligence agency in a foreign country generally carries the risk of exposure and legal complications, but in postwar Germany, American intelligence encountered an ideal operational environment. With the Third Reich defeated, the Allies took over the administration of the country, and the U.S. Army assumed control in the zone assigned to the United States. Under military government, a U.S. State Department memorandum noted, "the Occupying Powers could, simply stated, conduct whatever intelligence activities they deemed advisable." This included control and exploitation of German communications networks for intelligence purposes. As early as January 1945, the Allies banned German telephone and telegraph operations, and placed the mail under strict censorship. In addition, the Americans built their own communications network. Because the Allied bombing campaign had destroyed much of the German telecommunications structure, the U.S. Army Signal Corps ran hundreds of miles of new telephone, teletype, and telegraph cables, all connected to the United States Forces in the European Theater (USFET) headquarters in Frankfurt. By the end of the war, therefore, the Army legally and logistically controlled a major telecommunications hub at the center of Europe.

Taking advantage of the unique operational opportunities provided by the defeat of Japan and Germany, ASA established two regional theater headquarters. On 25 November 1945, it activated ASAP in Manila (later moved to Tokyo). Two days later, it activated ASAE, with Col. Earle F. Cook as its first chief. A West Point graduate, Cook had served as director of the Army’s Signal Intelligence Division in Europe during World War II. Like many other Army agencies in occupied Germany that set up shop in existing buildings, ASAE headquarters moved into the huge I.G. Farben Building in Frankfurt. According to the recollections of an ASAE veteran, the agency occupied the seventh floor of the building’s west wing next to the main entrance. Most of the staff was billeted in the Gutleutkaserne, a former Wehrmacht (German Army) installation near the Frankfurt central railway station, about two miles south of the Farben Building. In line with the ASA’s centralized structure, ASAE operated under the command of the ASA director, rather than the European theater commander, however, the agency was attached to the Army’s European Command (EUCOM) for administration and discipline. Because EUCOM had specific SIGINT requirements, ASAE collaborated closely with the European theater commander and his intelligence division. An ASAE representative regularly participated in the executive council meetings of EUCOM, and some ASAE units were expressly allocated to the command. ASAE headquarters included two divisions, the Administrative and the Operations Divisions. The latter, in turn, consisted of two branches.
The Security Branch was in charge of communications security for Army organizations throughout Europe and operated a cryptologic repair school for the maintenance of the agency’s technical equipment. The Intelligence Branch was responsible for the collection of SIGINT. The branch received intercepts from field stations in Germany and Europe and scanned them for items of immediate intelligence value. ASAE then forwarded all intercepts to ASA headquarters at Arlington Hall in northern Virginia where analysts collated messages from Army intercept stations across the globe, sought to decipher those that were encrypted, compiled summaries of the collected intelligence, and forwarded this information to the Army’s intelligence division at the Pentagon.\(^\text{18}\)

Upon its activation, ASAE took over all Army SIGINT units in Germany. In February 1946, the agency also temporarily assumed responsibility for SIGINT in the Mediterranean and Austria. ASAE had five operating units at its inception: the 114th Signal Service Company at Sontra in northeastern Hesse; the 116th Signal Service Company at Scheyern in central Bavaria; the 2d Army Air Forces Squadron Mobile at Bad Vilbel near Frankfurt; the Signal Intelligence Service Division at Caserta in Italy; and Detachment A at Gross Gerau near Frankfurt. Over time, ASAE added and expanded units in the American zone of occupation. The ASAE units at Gross Gerau moved to Herzo Base in Herzogenaurach, a former German Luftwaffe installation, where the Army completed construction of a large intercept station in 1948.\(^\text{19}\)

The number of soldiers and civilians working for ASAE underscores the importance of SIGINT in Europe to the United States and the Army, especially when put into the context of the overall American presence in Germany. Postwar demobilization put pressure on all Army agencies to release personnel. Although the Office of Military Government, United States, employed nearly 12,000 soldiers and civilians in Germany in September 1945, this number had fallen to 2,104 by the end of the occupation four years later. Similarly, the Army’s European Theater command shrank from nearly 2.5 million soldiers at the end of the war to a little over 83,000 in July 1949. Demobilization affected the Army’s intelligence agencies as well. At Arlington Hall, the ASA had to let go of a large portion of its military personnel, even though the agency managed to soften the blow by rehiring many of them immediately as civilians. Nevertheless, civilian strength at ASA headquarters dropped from 5,720 in July 1945 to 2,317 a year later.\(^\text{20}\)

In November 1945, the commanding officer of USFET in Frankfurt wrote that the authorized strength of three ASAE units outside headquarters amounted to a total of 28 officers and 572 enlisted men.\(^\text{21}\) By the end of the occupation, the ASA annual history gives the per-
sonnel strength of the agency as 90 officers and 840 enlisted; in addition, Herzo Base employed 524–580 German civilians, and the 116th Signal Service Company used 102–121 local employees. Thus, while the Army’s overall presence in Germany shrank significantly during the occupation, ASAE personnel strength increased.

Even though ASAE bucked the downward trend of postwar demobilization in terms of numbers, the retention and recruitment of qualified personnel posed a significant challenge. During the war, Army SIGINT drew on recruits who scored in the highest percentile of the Army’s aptitude test. Consequently, the wartime draft swelled the ranks of Army SIGINT with highly intelligent individuals, but many conscripts returned to civilian life as soon as they were eligible for discharge, and ASA could not easily replace their linguistic and cryptologic skills. In Europe, many slots remained unfilled due to the lack of qualified recruits. In 1949, all ASAE units together had only 72.6 percent of operational strength because, as the ASA’s annual history for that year notes laconically, “[i]t was difficult to get the personnel for operative missions.” In the 1950s, ASA mitigated this problem somewhat by aggressively recruiting civilians. For example, when ASA officers received word that the General Electric Company in Schenectady, New York, was reducing its staff, they made plans to approach affected engineers and entice them to join the agency. Moreover, the Korean War (1950–53) once again expanded the draft, and ASA attracted some of the brightest Army recruits, many from the ranks of those who preferred peacetime service in Europe over combat duty in Asia.

ASAE personnel received their training before being deployed to Europe. In 1942, the Army’s SIGINT service opened a cryptographic school for enlisted men at Vint Hill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia. Officers received training at Arlington Hall. When the ASA was established, it assumed control of the school, and in 1948, the agency consolidated training for officers and enlisted men at...
Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania. When the school outgrew the available facilities there, the Army moved it to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in 1951. The school trained students in communications analysis, communications security, radio intelligence, Morse and nonmorse interception, and cryptography equipment maintenance. In 1955, it added training in electronic intelligence and electronic warfare. In addition to these technical skills, ASAE personnel could attend language courses at the U.S. Army Language School in Monterey, California. While this school taught mostly Japanese language skills during World War II, it offered over thirty languages in the late 1940s, with Russian having the largest enrollment.26

Moreover, France still had aspirations of being a global power, and its internal communications promised to deliver information that was of more than regional significance. Also, ASA noted that, because “of the penchant of the French for discussing their affairs, their communications contained considerable information of interest.”32

The American interception of French communications quickly yielded results. By 1948, the ASA was reading traffic on several French diplomatic and intelligence circuits. Summaries of the messages were regularly circulated to American policymakers, and provided them with firsthand information on French policy objectives and French assessments of American policy. ASA also gleaned information from geographic areas in which France had a stronger diplomatic presence than the United States, such as the East European and Balkan countries.33

Besides France, international conferences provided another convenient target for American codebreakers. The reconfiguration of the international order in the wake of World War II generated a host of such gatherings, and the Army’s SIGINT service eavesdropped on the communications of foreign delegations at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco (April–June 1945), the Potsdam Conference near Berlin (July–August 1945), the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in London (August 1945), the Peace Conference in Paris (July–October 1946), and several others. These broad cryptanalytic attacks on the diplomatic communications of foreign officials served a dual purpose. First, ASA provided the decrypts to the U.S. Department of State, and American diplomats thus learned a great deal about the negotiating position of other delegations, secret conferences they arranged, and sub-rosa agreements they entered into. The State Department valued this assistance greatly. In September 1946, when a shrinking military budget threatened personnel cuts at ASA, the State Department expressed its concern over this possibility to the War Department, noting that the SIGINT product “was of the highest

The American interception of French communications quickly yielded results. By 1948, the ASA was reading traffic on several French diplomatic and intelligence circuits. Summaries of the messages were regularly circulated to American policymakers, and provided them with firsthand information on French policy objectives and French assessments of American policy. ASA also gleaned information from geographic areas in which France had a stronger diplomatic presence than the United States, such as the East European and Balkan countries.33

Besides France, international conferences provided another convenient target for American codebreakers. The reconfiguration of the international order in the wake of World War II generated a host of such gatherings, and the Army’s SIGINT service eavesdropped on the communications of foreign delegations at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco (April–June 1945), the Potsdam Conference near Berlin (July–August 1945), the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in London (August 1945), the Peace Conference in Paris (July–October 1946), and several others. These broad cryptanalytic attacks on the diplomatic communications of foreign officials served a dual purpose. First, ASA provided the decrypts to the U.S. Department of State, and American diplomats thus learned a great deal about the negotiating position of other delegations, secret conferences they arranged, and sub-rosa agreements they entered into. The State Department valued this assistance greatly. In September 1946, when a shrinking military budget threatened personnel cuts at ASA, the State Department expressed its concern over this possibility to the War Department, noting that the SIGINT product “was of the highest

In August 1945, U.S. SIGINT officials singled out the communications of France as a target of particular value.30 On 15 January 1946, the Army’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence assigned “the French military cryptanalytical problem” to ASAE.31

The Americans had several reasons for singling out one of its wartime allies. For one, France presented a target of particular interest, as ASA easily intercepted messages from the far-flung French communications network and American cryptanalysts had little trouble decrypting them, having completely mastered French codes and ciphers. About British policy and intelligence know-how. Similar restraints did not apply to France, however.

In August 1945, U.S. SIGINT officials singled out the communications of France as a target of particular value.30 On 15 January 1946, the Army’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence assigned “the French military cryptanalytical problem” to ASAE.31

The Americans had several reasons for singling out one of its wartime allies. For one, France presented a target of particular interest, as ASA easily intercepted messages from the far-flung French communications network and American cryptanalysts had little trouble decrypting them, having completely mastered French codes and ciphers. About British policy and intelligence know-how. Similar restraints did not apply to France, however.
importance in the conduct of foreign relations." Second, the interception of foreign diplomatic communications provided the ASA with a Rosetta stone that helped them break into previously unsolved cipher systems. Because conference speeches were delivered in public, ASA codebreakers could compare the plain text to the intercepted enciphered version. The juxtaposition of the plain and enciphered texts provided cryptanalysts with important clues about how a cipher system was constructed, facilitating future cryptanalytic operations.34

At its inception, ASAE assumed two additional duties not directly linked to its SIGINT mission. One included the exploitation of German SIGINT expertise, the other, the support of the Army’s civil censorship activities in the American zone.35 The Allied targeting of German SIGINT began before the end of the war. In the summer of 1944, after the successful Allied invasion of Normandy, American and British SIGINT agencies began planning for the exploitation of German cryptologic knowledge. They created the so-called Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) that identified targets of cryptologic interest to the Allies in Germany. When ASAE was established, it became the Army’s lead agency at TICOM, and it directed this effort through 1949.

TICOM formed several teams that followed the victorious American and British armies into Germany and captured enemy SIGINT documents, equipment, and personnel. The first team entered Germany in April 1945. In short order, the teams collected 4,000 documents of the German SIGINT services, captured numerous cryptographic machines and devices, and compiled nearly two hundred reports on the interrogation of German SIGINT personnel. When ASAE was established, it became the Army’s lead agency at TICOM, and it directed this effort through 1949.

The captured documents and cryptologic hardware, and the interviews with former German SIGINT personnel revealed that the Allies had been superior to the Germans in this realm. Although the Germans had been able to intercept numerous unencrypted telephone conversations between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for the most part they had not succeeded in breaking U.S. and British ciphers. Moreover, they had remained unaware of the extensive and successful Allied effort to break into German communications. In particular, they had failed to detect the Allied success in breaking the most widely used German military communications system, the Enigma machine. The Allies were careful not to publicly disclose the vulnerability of the Enigma as other nations or companies might continue to use the machine to encrypt their communications after the war, thus opening them up to cryptanalytic attacks by the Americans and British. Probably with this in mind, ASAE in the late 1940s began making discreet inquiries about the activities of German companies that had produced Enigma machines before 1945.37

Through its work with former German SIGINT personnel, ASAE contributed directly to the resurgence of Germany’s postwar SIGINT capabilities. In 1946, the Army’s European intel-
ligence division set up an intelligence organization staffed with former German intelligence personnel and headed by Reinhard Gehlen, a lieutenant general who had run the analytical section of the German army’s intelligence service on the eastern front (Fremde Heere Ost, or Foreign Armies East). Operation RUSTY, as the Army code-named the project, constituted an espionage organization that sent agents into the Soviet zone of occupation, however, ASAE officers selected, equipped, and trained a small group of German SIGINT personnel in postwar interception and cryptanalysis. Eventually, this group joined Gehlen and his men. By 1947, Operation RUSTY’s cryptoanalytic section intercepted and decrypted radio traffic from the Soviets as well as “possibly” from other European countries, according to American intelligence. Several of these German SIGINT veterans, including Hütttenhain and Fenner, would make up the core of the cryptoanalytic branch of RUSTY’s successor organization, the West German federal intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND). 38

ASAE’s other special task in postwar Germany pertained to American civil censorship operations and the monitoring of communications in the U.S. occupation zone. Shortly after Allied troops entered Germany, the Army set up a censorship branch to control German communications and collect information of interest to the occupation authorities. This measure included the monitoring of mail as well as telephone and teletype lines. In July 1945, the Army’s intelligence division assumed responsibility for this task, establishing the 7742d Civil Censorship Division as its executive agency. In 1947, the division handed this responsibility to the 7746th Communications Intelligence Service Detachment (CISD), headquartered in Frankfurt. After the Federal Republic attained sovereignty in 1955, the unit was officially renamed U.S. Army Operations and Research Detachment in December 1956, although the previous designation also remained in use.39

Even though censorship remained organizationally separate from SIGINT, ASAE participated in this effort from early on. For several months in late 1945 and early 1946, the agency detailed specialists to the censorship division to help them examine suspicious mail for secret inks and cryptographic messages.40 ASAE broadened its participation in the operations of the censorship division as the latter expanded its activities against the backdrop of growing U.S.-Soviet tensions. By 1948, CISD had deployed teams in German telecommunications centers and repeater stations in Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart. In the span of three months, they monitored 681 telephone circuits and 27,134 phone calls while examining 45,271 telegraphic messages and 3,684 postal communications.41 The detachment was especially interested in “subversive” communications, which increasingly meant those pertaining to the German Communist Party. Because many international telephone and telegraph wires passed through Germany, censorship also provided an opportunity to collect intelligence on developments in other countries, especially from the Soviet zone and subsequently, the German Democratic Republic (GDR).42

**The Soviet Target**

At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union remained allies, and the U.S. administration expected to shape the postwar order in collaboration, rather than in competition with Moscow. Inter-allied cooperation appeared particularly urgent in Germany, as the victorious powers had agreed to govern and determine the future of the defeated Reich jointly. In the months and years after the end of the war, however, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western powers deteriorated as the two sides’ vision of the postwar order proved incompatible. While Moscow installed pro-Soviet regimes in territories liberated by the Red Army, and sought to expand its sphere of influence as far as possible into Western Europe and South East Asia, the West strove for an internationalist order that opened the world to democratic ideas and free trade. Within two years of the end of the war, intense suspicion and a strident rivalry had replaced the U.S.-Soviet alliance. In March 1947, President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States must “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The containment of the Soviet Union and international communism became official U.S. policy, and the military capabilities and political intentions of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union emerged as the principal target of American intelligence.

The operations of ASA and its European headquarters reflected this change in American foreign policy from World War II through the late 1940s. During the war, the Axis powers constituted the principal targets of Anglo-American SIGINT, and the monitoring of Soviet communications played only a minor role in the war effort. Only in February 1943 did Army cryptanalysts begin focusing on encrypted Soviet messages that the Americans had intercepted since 1939 from various sources. Few original records shed light on the Army’s decision to initiate this intrusion, but according to an official history of American SIGINT, the Army took the decision to target Soviet communications after codebreakers had read a reference in a decrypted Japanese message that discussed the vulnerability of Soviet ciphers.43 This would suggest that Army cryptanalysts did not primarily seek to break Soviet communications because they regarded the USSR with suspicion, but rather, that they seized an opportunity that presented itself. In other words, the Army targeted Soviet cables because it could, a policy in line with McCormack’s demand that American SIGINT cast a wide net.44 Initially, the work of Arlington Hall’s Russian section remained of little importance to the American war effort, and the unit was smaller than other sections dealing with non-Axis communications, such as the Spanish-Portuguese and the French-Swiss desk.45 Given the complexity of the Soviet ciphers, Army cryptanalysts did not break the first intercepts until 1946. The decrypted messages turned out to be wartime instructions by Soviet intelligence to some of their spies in North America, a finding that retroactively confirmed the wisdom of the Army’s decision.
to examine the secret communications of a wartime ally. The discovery prompted American codebreakers to continue working on the encrypted Soviet messages. This project, code-named Venona, eventually produced approximately 3,000 decrypted Soviet spy messages and ended only in 1980.46

As the war drew to a close, the Western powers began coordinating their SIGINT efforts directed at the Soviet Union. In February 1945, the SIGINT services of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army initiated Project Rattan, a joint operation aimed at the interception and decryption of Soviet communications. Five months later, the British joined this effort, and the project name changed to Bourbon.47

For ASA, the Soviet Union quickly emerged as the principal target in the postwar period, a prioritization reflected in the agency’s personnel policy. Even though ASA personnel strength dropped from 27,000 at the end of the war to 4,000 by the summer of 1946, the section devoted to solving Soviet communications tripled its strength to 283 personnel in the same time period. By 1949, about two-thirds of American SIGINT personnel were working on decrypting enciphered Soviet communications.48

Although the ASA’s European headquarters found itself ideally located to monitor Soviet communications, initially ASAE contributed little to solving the “Soviet problem.” One of Arlington Hall’s top cryptanalysts, Stephen Wolf, who was assigned to ASAE from August to November 1946, noted that, while the agency’s intelligence branch had a Soviet analysis section, none of the field stations intercepted Soviet traffic.49 The lack of intercept activities against Soviet communications had technical as well as operational reasons. For one, by late 1945, the United States was interested in gaining access to a broad range of European communications, an approach that diffused the limited resources of ASAE. Moreover, having relied mostly on the British for wartime cryptanalysis in Europe, the Americans in late 1945 lacked the technical equipment and adequately trained personnel to intercept communications from deep within Soviet-controlled areas of Europe. Therefore, the ASA Pacific and the British Government Communications Headquarters produced the bulk of Soviet intercepts processed at Arlington Hall in 1945 and 1946.50

Overall, the intercept operations of ASAE in late 1945 and 1946 lacked a certain focus, and were rather low-key. According to the ASAE annual report, the intercept station at Gross Gerau monitored some European military circuits as well as suspected German clandestine radio traffic in late 1945, though this activity tapered off in November. Detachment A produced radio intercepts from nine rather disparate sources, including France, Russia, Syria, and Germany. Presumably, this was unencrypted, low-level traffic of little intelligence value. For the most part, ASAE limited itself to intercepting wireless traffic within easy reach, refrained from attempts to decrypt enciphered messages, and forwarded the raw intercepts to Arlington Hall. The French military cryptanalytic problem, assigned by ASAE to its European headquarters in January 1946, represented a notable exception to his low-level approach.51

One of ASAE’s most important contributions to solving the “Soviet problem” in the immediate postwar period derived from its involvement with TICOM. While initially American and
groups a month. At Scheyern, the 116th Signal Service Company operated a direction finding and intercept station that handled another 171,000 to 251,000 cipher groups. In addition, ASAE prepared three panel trucks for mobile intercept operations along the borders. ASAE headquarters at Frankfurt also expanded and, in addition to collecting and exchanging raw intercepts with Arlington Hall, began to decrypt intercepted messages locally. ASAE processed messages from a wide range of sources, including the Hungarian border police; the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav police; the Yugoslav Air Force; as well as low-level Red Army and Soviet Air Forces communications intercepted from the Soviet occupation zone.

ASAE intercepted different types of traffic from Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. While the agency forwarded highly encrypted messages for decryption to Arlington Hall, analysts at European headquarters quickly developed an ability to work on low-grade intercepts in Frankfurt. In addition, American codebreakers intercepted large amounts of so-called plaintext messages: unencrypted traffic from nonmilitary and nonpolitical organizations in the Soviet Bloc. A single message from a low-level Soviet trade agency might not reveal much about the state of affairs in the Soviet Union, but when analyzed en masse, these messages became a valuable source for estimating economic and administrative trends in the Soviet Bloc. ASA and ASAE also managed to produce a good deal of information on the force structure and movements of the Red Army in Eastern Europe by studying patterns of Soviet military communications, even if they were unable to read the content of the messages. As the Soviets and their allies tightened their communications security procedures in the late 1940s, this approach, known as traffic analysis, emerged as a particularly valuable source of information on Soviet forces in Germany.

The year 1948, when several crises roiled Europe and brought the Soviet Union and the United States to the edge of war, demonstrated the importance of, as well as the need for improving, the capabilities of SIGINT. In February, the Communist Party staged a coup in the previously neutral Czechoslovakia, aligning that country firmly with the Soviet Union. For the most part, Western intelligence did not see this event coming. The American military attaché in Prague, Col. Egmont F. Koenig, had warned in general terms in June 1947 about the deteriorating situation in Czechoslovakia, and raised the alternate possibility of a right-wing coup d’état, a “civil war, followed by Russian intervention,” or “a forceful seizure of power by the Left.” The coup itself, however, took the Americans by surprise. SIGINT had not provided any advance warn-
nings. As the Communist Party seized power in Prague, the U.S. Embassy had difficulty informing Washington of events in a timely manner. American authorities in Germany first learned of the coup on 24 February, when agents of the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps in Bavaria stationed along the border reported that the Prague government had prohibited any border crossings for persons without clearance from Czechoslovak authorities.

SIGINT acquitted itself slightly better during a crisis in Germany that erupted shortly thereafter, the Berlin Blockade. Having failed to reach agreement over the future of Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted conflicting policies. The Americans were keen on stabilizing the Western sectors of Germany through economic reform, including a new currency. Afraid of seeing their influence in Germany diminished, the Soviets reacted in early 1948 by tightening access of the Western Allies to their sectors of Berlin, which were enclosed by the Soviet occupation zone. On 24 June 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade on the Western sectors. In response, the Allies established an airlift to supply their garrisons and the population of Berlin. During the following months, as Western diplomats sought to find a way out of this standoff, the U.S. government worried about Soviet plans to interfere with the airlift, or to launch an attack on West Berlin, which could easily escalate to a global war.

In March 1948, the American military governor of Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, wrote to the director of the Army’s intelligence division at the Pentagon, Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, that he (Clay) had hitherto considered war unlikely, but that within the last few weeks, “I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me the feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness.” The message “fell with the force of a blockbuster bomb” in Washington, according to the journalist Walter Millis. Some historians have argued that Clay sent the telegram in response to pressure from military leaders in Washington, who had solicited a fear-mongering message from Clay as a tool in the congressional fight for the reintroduction of universal military training. Others have suggested that the message reflected real concerns of the general about heightened Soviet aggression. Whatever prompted Clay to send this explosive telegram, his reasoning could not have been based on SIGINT. The Allies had multiple SIGINT sources on the Soviets during the crisis. The ASAE listening posts at Herzo Base and Scheyern had monitored low-level Soviet military communications in Germany since 1947, and in March 1948, ASAE ratcheted up...
Soviet Air Force traffic. By the same month, ASA began issuing highly classified “Berlin Intelligence Warning” messages, conveying the latest intelligence estimates concerning the Berlin crisis to top military leaders, including General Clay in Berlin and Generals Bradley and Chamberlin at the Pentagon. An ASAE-trained and -equipped group of former German SIGINT officers, operating from Kranzberg Castle as part of Operation Rusty, intercepted Soviet Air Force traffic. CISD secretly intercepted Soviet and East German landline traffic passing through the repeater station in Frankfurt and the main telephone exchange in western Berlin. Moreover, ASAE asked CISD to intercept international telegraph traffic on ten circuits at their section in Nuremberg. The detachment obliged, and within a few weeks, sent twenty-seven rolls of tapes with intercepted telegraph messages, consisting of 24,000 feet. In addition, the British provided intercepts from Soviet communication systems in Europe, and ASA Pacific kept an eye on the location of Soviet units in East Asia, whose transfer westward might indicate that Moscow was preparing for a military confrontation in Germany. According to former U.S. Army and SIGINT officials, ASA headquarters at Arlington Hall, where all this data was collected and analyzed, produced “moderately good to excellent intelligence reporting on Soviet military activities in East Germany prior to and during” the blockade.65

To be sure, SIGINT did not constitute the U.S. government’s only source of information on Soviet capabilities and intentions during the Berlin Blockade. By 1948, the intelligence division of the U.S. Army had an extensive network of agents in the Soviet Zones, which delivered a wide range of information on political, economic, and military matters. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) at Potsdam proved a particularly valuable source during the blockade. Established in April 1947, the mission consisted of fourteen U.S. military officers who resided in Potsdam inside the Soviet Zone. Originally set up to facilitate a liaison between the Soviet and U.S. military forces in Germany, members of the mission could travel freely across the Soviet Zone, and used their special status to monitor and report on Moscow’s forces there. During the blockade, officers from the mission conducted daily “field trips” to determine the location and strength of specific units.65

Intelligence collected by spies, USMLM officers, ASAE, and other sources suggested that the Soviets were indeed moving military units across their occupation zone in the spring of 1948. Some American officials construed these moves as indicators that the Soviets were preparing to attack Berlin or interfere with the airlift, however, U.S. intelligence sources indicated that the Soviets were not adding any troops to their forces from outside Germany, but were simply moving units across their occupation zone. Throughout 1948, Army intelligence estimated the strength of Soviet forces in Germany at 324,000 to 350,000. These numbers were remarkably close to actual Soviet troop strength, which amounted to 350,000 during this time period.66 Since Moscow was not increasing its troop strength in Germany, the shifting of forces across their zone suggested that the Soviets were trying to create the impression of imminent military action in order to force the Allies out of Berlin, while in reality they had no intention of attacking. Careful monitoring of Soviet communications confirmed that the Soviets were neither preparing for an attack, nor for interference with the airlift. In the words of one intelligence historian, therefore, the blockade represented “a Russian hoax from beginning to end.” General Clay later wrote in his memoirs that intelligence that came to his desk did not suggest the Soviets were planning an attack, and two former NSA officials recalled that decrypts of Soviet military traffic were important in helping convince senior White House and Pentagon officials that Soviet military threats in Germany and around Berlin “were nothing more than a highly elaborate bluff.”67 Indeed, when Stalin realized that the blockade had failed to force the Allies out of Berlin, he chose to end it, rather than resort to military action.

Putting ASAE on a Permanent Footing

The U.S. State Department replaced the Army as the top American occupation authority in 1949, but in the context of the Cold War, Army leaders were keen on maintaining their extensive intelligence collection apparatus in Germany beyond that date. Already in the spring of 1947, General Chamberlin asked General Clay to ensure that “certain communication intelligence facilities [would remain] under American control” after the military occupation had ended.68 In February 1948, ASA chief Col. Harold G. Hayes referred to the “paramount importance” of ASAE, and urged “that every effort should be made to continued functioning of these installations.”69 These efforts bore fruit. The occupation statute of May 1949 ensured that U.S. intelligence agencies, including ASAE, would not be restricted by local laws when the Army handed over the reins to the civilian Allied High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG), and
the Federal Republic of Germany was established, in September 1949.\textsuperscript{71}

With its institutional and operational continuity under HICOG assured, ASAE set about expanding its facilities and increasing its personnel. In 1950, ASAE established a permanent intercept station at Rothwesten in northern Hesse, about ten miles from the border with the GDR.\textsuperscript{72} Two years later, the agency stood up a unit at Bad Aibling, which in 1955 absorbed ASAE personnel who left newly independent Austria.\textsuperscript{73} During this time ASAE also set up minor stations in Heilbronn, Bamberg, Heidelberg, Mt. Schneeberg, and Seckenheim. In 1955, the agency established the 22d ASA Detachment in West Berlin, inaugurating the long-term presence of American SIGINT in that city. Initially consisting of five officers and thirty enlisted men, the detachment identified, intercepted, and processed electronic intelligence.\textsuperscript{74} In 1950, ASAE had a personnel strength of 84 officers and 1,177 enlisted men.\textsuperscript{75} In 1952, the number of agency personnel totaled 3,800 persons,\textsuperscript{76} and by 30 June 1954, this figure had increased to about 4,500.\textsuperscript{77} This made ASAE one of the largest, if not the largest, American intelligence agency in Western Europe. By comparison, the Central Intelligence Agency, the organization nominally in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence community, purportedly had 1,700 staff employees in Germany in the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{78}

As HICOG prepared for West German sovereignty, American authorities began negotiating the legal framework of U.S. intelligence in West Germany with the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. From these talks resulted two secret memoranda of understanding that spelled out the legal authority of Allied intelligence operations after the Federal Republic gained limited sovereignty in 1955. In them, the Adenauer government agreed that the Western Allied intelligence agencies would have the ability to continue their operations with few restrictions. This authority included the conduct of SIGINT operations on West German territory. The need of the Allies to protect their military forces in Germany served as the legal rationale for this agreement. As the Army’s European Command noted with satisfaction in its annual report for 1952, the two secret memoranda “provided for the retention of most of the rights considered essential in intelligence operations.”\textsuperscript{79}

Indeed, the formal end of the Allied occupation in 1955 hardly disrupted or restricted Allied SIGINT operations in Germany. In the 1950s, ASAE established fixed and mobile radio intercept stations in the British Zone, along the border of the newly established GDR, while the Americans granted the British permission to establish a high-frequency direction-finding station in Landsberg in southern Bavaria, in the U.S. Zone.\textsuperscript{80} Likewise, CISD and ASAE continued their intercept operations inside West Germany and Berlin. In the month of October 1954 alone, CISD intercepted almost 700,000 cable and teletype messages on behalf of ASAE. In 1955, the detachment tapped more than 500 telephone lines and 250 teletype machines in West Germany.\textsuperscript{81} By 1957, the Allies monitored over 5 million telephone conversations in West Germany per year. In addition, they greatly expanded their mail interception operations, which they carried out with the help of local Deutsche Post offices. In 1960 alone, they checked 4.6 million mail items.\textsuperscript{82} Cold War tensions led ASAE to continue focusing its resources on the Soviet forces in Germany throughout the 1950s. On 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea launched a surprise attack on the pro-Western Republic of South Korea. Given the division of Germany into a pro-Western and a pro-Soviet state, many West Germans feared a similar attack from the East, causing widespread fear and panic among the population. German citizens begged the American high commissioner for air tickets out of the country, and in Bonn, the capital of the Federal Republic, Chancellor Adenauer requested 200 automatic pistols to defend his office building.\textsuperscript{83} Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence sought to detect any signs of an impending attack from the East. As it turned out, the Soviet troops stayed in their barracks, but in the wake of the Korean War the Army’s European intelligence division directed ASAE to build a system for early warning indications of the imminence of hostilities based on Soviet troop movements. The agency established rapid means of communications to quickly relay any signs of an impending attack, and assigned a special liaison officer to the Army’s intelligence headquarters at Frankfurt.\textsuperscript{84}

By the mid-1950s, ASAE had become one of the most powerful tools of the U.S. government for the gathering of intelligence from Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. Events
in Hungary in 1956 illustrated the agency’s value. In that year, an uprising shook the Communist government of Hungary, and the political future of the country came to depend on the reaction of the Soviet forces based there. As the riots in Hungary continued, the ASAE listening post at Bad Aibling on 24 October picked up an order to the 2d Guards Mechanized Division of the Soviet forces in Hungary. The message ordered the unit, stationed fifty miles outside Budapest, to move on the capital and use its tanks’ cannon against the rebels. Other intercepts suggested that, after heavy street fighting in Budapest, Soviet forces pulled back before regrouping and, with massive reinforcements, moved once again on the capital on 2 November, this time crushing the rebellion for good. 85

**East German Communications**

In addition to Soviet communication networks in Eastern Europe, the GDR emerged as another important ASAE target during the early Cold War. Established in 1949, the state was home to the largest concentration of Soviet forces outside the USSR, and in case of war, the West expected the main thrust of a Soviet attack to come from East Germany. By monitoring the communications of East German institutions and organizations, the Americans sought to collect military, political, and economic intelligence in this strategically important Soviet satellite country.

ASAE profited from the fact that East German government organizations generally failed to practice good communications during the early Cold War. For example, the East German police (Volkspolizei) used the World War II era Enigma machine to encipher its radio traffic until at least 1956. Because the Allies had broken this system during the war, Western codebreakers had no difficulty reading intercepted police messages. 86

The structural weakness of the East German communications network provided another opportunity for ASAE interceptors. Many telegraph and telephone wires in Germany had been destroyed during the war. In the American occupation zone, the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps quickly rebuilt critical facilities and landlines, creating a secure communications network for the American occupation authorities. In the Soviet Zone, the opposite happened. The Soviets removed machinery and other hardware on a grand scale from their occupation zone after the war. This effort included parts of the telephone communications network. An East German engineer who had fled to the West told the Americans that the Soviets had systematically dismantled telephone and telegraph cables, and shipped them to the USSR, without replacing them. 87 For several years, therefore, East German authorities had to rely on what little remained of the severely damaged wartime wire network for internal communications. A popular uprising against Communist rule in the GDR in 1953 demonstrated the inadequacy of this system when government communications broke down in many places, hampering the regime’s ability to deal with the rebellion. As the East German security apparatus buckled under popular pressure, Soviet forces had to move in to squash the uprising.

In the wake of the 1953 uprising, the Communist East Berlin government decided to establish its own, wireless communications system that would be less vulnerable in times of upheaval. This network, known as *Richtfunknetz der Partei* (RFN, “directional transmission network” of the Communist Party), rested on a series of so-called “A-Towers” across East Germany. The towers enabled party headquarters in Berlin and local centers to communicate with each other by means of microwave links that relayed telephone and teleprinter signals, so they did not have to rely on the damaged and partially dismantled cable wire system. The RFN system allowed for reliable and instantaneous communications, and in the 1960s, the East German Army adopted its use as well. 88

The Americans quickly learned of the existence of the RNF, and ASAE managed to intercept transmissions between individual A-Towers from locations in West Berlin and West Germany. ASAE voice operators supervised large numbers of voice-activated tape recorders that sprang into action as soon as a Communist official in East Germany picked up their phone. As a Berlin-based ASAE voice intercept operator recalled: “Any time someone in the Central Committee picked up a phone, one of the recorders in my bank of recorders would click on. I didn’t totally understand how they did it, but we were warned that if the East Germans found out they could shut it down very easily.” 89 Eventually, the East German Ministry for State Security became aware of these
activities. East German officials limited their use of the system, however, they apparently did not end it altogether. The RFN thus continued to provide the Americans with information on a range of aspects of East German political, economic, and military issues for much of the Cold War.90

Other Western intelligence agencies operating against East Germany also profited from ASAE expertise. In the mid-1950s, the CIA and the British intelligence service, SIS, dug a tunnel from West Berlin into East Berlin, in an effort to surreptitiously tap East German and Soviet communication cables (Operation Gold). The operation was the brainchild of the CIA’s Berlin station chief, William King “Bill” Harvey. Although the National Security Agency provided SIGINT support to Operation Gold, Harvey considered a former ASAE officer, detailed to the CIA, his most important asset. As Harvey’s biographer noted, the former ASAE man “was Bill Harvey’s soul mate. They worked almost literally hand in glove.” For over a year, the tunnel produced a steady flow of intercepts, until the East Germans “accidentally” discovered it after a British double agent betrayed the operation to Soviet intelligence.91

Communications Security

The value of an intelligence agency is measured not only by the amount of information it collects, but by how well it protects its operations from foreign penetrations. Most intelligence services have counterintelligence departments designed to do just that, and ASAE was no exception. Its Operations Division included a security branch, headquartered at Frankfurt, and small security detachments were attached to ASAE units throughout Germany. The branch maintained a cryptologic repair school for the maintenance of the agency’s technical equipment. Its mission included the monitoring of communications security of ASAE as well as of Army organizations throughout Europe. The branch reported to the ASAE director and worked closely with the security branch at ASA headquarters, Arlington Hall.92

Security started at the most basic level with the physical protection of ASAE sites. Military police and the 4086th Labor Supervision Company, made up of Polish nationals, guarded ASAE’s biggest installation—Herzo Base. The company manned guard towers constructed at intervals along the perimeter fence and equipped with floodlights. Enlisted Army personnel secured ASAE headquarters at Frankfurt. Regular checks ensured that the guard system worked satisfactorily.93

The maintenance of physical security included the safeguarding of the agency’s cryptomaterial. The ASAE’s Command Issuing Office at Frankfurt served as the central repository of ciphering equipment for Army units across Europe. In times of peace, this location was considered secure, but as the outbreak of the Korean War in July 1950 conjured up the specter of a sudden Soviet invasion, the Army in October decided to move its sensitive SIGINT equipment to London, into a block of buildings near Grosvenor Square.94 In the following years, ASAE drew up plans for an emergency evacuation of its headquarters and three field stations, in Herzogenau-rach, Scheyern, and Baumholder, to London. As the Korean War crisis subsided, however, the agency did not activate this plan, and remained in Germany.95

Monitoring the loyalty of its personnel constituted another safeguard.
against penetrations by foreign intelligence services. During the immediate postwar period, the security branch did not investigate ASAE personnel who had previously served in the military for ten years or more. As ASAE grew, however, the agency adopted stringent security regulations.

As of 18 September 1946, military ASAE personnel were barred from having an “intimate connection” with a foreigner. Employees had to be U.S. citizens, “preferably native born, with trustworthy character and unquestioned financial habits.” In September 1949, a new regulation mandated that all personnel assigned to SIGINT duties undergo a thorough security review, and that the security clearance of an individual be revoked as soon as they applied for marriage to a foreign national. Moreover, while other American intelligence agencies operating in Europe employed a fair number of Germans or individuals with a German background, ASAE preferred to recruit American-born individuals and train them in language and cryptanalytic skills before they came to Europe. As one ASAE veteran recalls: “ASA never trusted any German nationals. Absolutely no Germans were allowed in any ASA activities, duties, etc. linguistic-oriented or non-language-oriented jobs. The only jobs I ever saw where Germans worked were in security such as guarding outward perimeters of installations.” In addition, the agency barred U.S. intelligence personnel with a foreign background from access to its product. Peter M. F. Sichel, the German-born postwar deputy chief of the CIA station in Berlin, notes: “I was never cleared for signal intelligence, no one who was foreign born was at the time.”

The central mission of the security branch focused on the maintenance of the Army’s cipher equipment and making sure that units practiced good communications security. To ensure this, the branch regularly intercepted unenciphered and encrypted Army messages to determine whether communications personnel handled their equipment according to regulations and whether they enciphered messages properly. These checks revealed that breaches were common. For example, in the first half of fiscal year 1949 alone, security violations totaled 2,359 out of 3,745 intercepted messages. The fact that the number declined in the second half of the fiscal year, to 710 out of 2,841 messages, suggests that the checks helped improve the situation. In early 1947, the branch also examined unenciphered messages sent between the War Department and European headquarters at Frankfurt to determine how much an adversary might be able to learn from this information.

As part of its security mission, the branch monitored not only communications of the Army in Europe at large, but those of ASAE personnel as well. These monitoring operations, too, revealed or confirmed security breaches. For example, a communications security intercept operator with the 319th Army Security Agency Battalion at Würzburg recalled that “we caught a sergeant in the Division Signal unit providing Signal Security codes to an East German spy via wiretap.” Occasionally, ASAE security personnel used their tools to fix issues that lay outside the realm of national security. The same specialist of the 319th Army Security Agency Battalion recalled the following incident:

> I was doing a wiretap at one of the Kasernes [military installations] of 3rd [sic] Div Signal units and one of the lines I was monitoring was of an individual that had been giving us a little “grief”. The wiretap board that I was using had cords and jacks that allowed me to select different lines and had a toggle switch arrangement to sync into my head phones. If I happened to flip a toggle on one line say “up” and another line “down” the two lines could hear each other. Well, this particular individual received a phone call from his wife and the company clerk who received the call put her on hold. I happened to note that this individual was on another line talking to his German girlfriend. Yep, so I “accidently” [sic] on purpose flipped the toggles so that his wife was able to listen to him speaking to his Girl Friend.

All these security measures, however, would have counted for little if the intelligence services of the Soviet Union or one of its satellites had managed to insert a spy into ASAE, who could have betrayed the agency’s modus operandi and its ciphers. Soviet bloc penetration would not have been extraordinary as Soviet and East German intelligence agencies succeeded in penetrating several major Western secret services during the early Cold War. Soviet intelligence ran high-level spies in the British service, and both the Soviets and East Germans had several sources within West Germany’s federal intelligence service. The CIA, too, quickly fell victim to Soviet espionage when its first station chief in Moscow succumbed to the lures of his Russian housemaid, who turned out to be a Soviet intelligence operative. Neither did ASAE’s parent organization, the ASA, remain immune to foreign espionage.

Sometime before World War II, Soviet intelligence recruited a Russian-born American Communist sympathizer, William Weisband, as a courier for Moscow’s agents in New York. During the war, Weisband joined the Army’s SIGINT service, and in 1945, he transitioned to the Army Security Agency where he became a lead translator for decrypted Soviet messages. The Soviets broke off contact with Weisband at the end of the war, for fear that he might be exposed, but they reactivated him in early 1948, and handled him under the codenames “Zhora,” “Link,” and “Vasin.” The revival of Weisband’s espionage career coincided with one of the biggest Western SIGINT setbacks of the early Cold War. For several months, ASA had noted that the Soviets were continuously improving their communications security, making it harder for American codebreakers to read Moscow’s traffic. Between Friday, 29 October, and Monday, 1 November 1948, the Soviets then suddenly changed virtually all their ciphers on their military, naval, and police networks. In addition, they shifted much of their communications traffic from radio to landlines, placing it out of reach of Western interceptors. This move constituted the shutting down of a major source of information, and became known as “Black Friday.”
among U.S. SIGINT personnel. In a damage assessment, the chief of ASA, Colonel Hayes, suspected that "leakage of information"—that is, espionage—"had been the primary cause." Subsequent investigations identified two spies inside Western intelligence, including Weisband, who had knowledge of ASA’s cryptanalytic work against the Soviets. In 1950, the ongoing decryption of Soviet wartime intelligence messages (Project Venona), led the FBI to identify Weisband as a wartime Soviet spy. Since the government feared that Weisband would reveal top secret intelligence in court, he escaped a trial for espionage, but he had to leave government service, and eventually served one year in prison for contempt of court when he failed to appear for a federal grand jury hearing on the Communist Party of the USA.

If Weisband’s case demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. SIGINT to foreign espionage, to date no comparable case has come to light with regard to the European headquarters of the ASA. In fact, there is a good amount of circumstantial evidence to suggest that Soviet intelligence and their allies had only a hazy sense of ASA’s existence and mission. For one, available Soviet intelligence documents make no mention of ASA. Although the number of accessible Soviet intelligence records remains decidedly limited, they do confirm many cases of penetration of Western secret services, including the CIA, the NSA, and MI6, but not ASA. Moreover, no documents have yet emerged from the archives of the East German intelligence service that would suggest a successful penetration of ASA. In their book on U.S. intelligence operations in Germany during the Cold War, two former East German counterintelligence officers mention ASA only in passing. They reveal that their service managed to recruit a source inside ASA’s successor, the BND. As early as 1954, Gehlen himself made it onto the front page of the Federal Republic’s premier weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, a dubious accomplishment for the chief of a secret service. Yet one looks in vain for explicit references to ASA in the proliferating stories on intelligence in the West German press of the 1950s. Only in 1960 did the press in Germany refer directly to U.S. SIGINT activities, after two employees of the National Security Agency had defected to Moscow, and gave a press conference. They revealed nothing publicly about ASA operations in Europe, however. Not until 1963 did the West German press refer obliquely to U.S. SIGINT activities in Germany.

In that year, the weekly magazine Die Zeit published an article that took aim at the Federal Republic’s domestic security service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), for employing former Nazi officials as well as for monitoring mail and telephone calls. In an aside, the article noted that the Allies had the contractual right to intercept mail and telephone calls in West Germany, however, Die Zeit did not pursue this angle, and mentioned neither CISD’s nor ASA’s involvement in these activities.

Ultimately, the answer to the question how much Soviet and East German intelligence agencies knew about the operations of ASA in early Cold War Europe lies in the Soviet and East German intelligence archives in Moscow and Berlin. Until records surface that indicate otherwise, the available evidence suggests that they...
knew very little about the agency’s operations in Europe. Several reasons may account for the comparative impenetrability of ASAE. First, ASAE practiced better security than other Western agencies, and these measures might have worked. Second, ASAE avoided exposure to Soviet bloc espionage by keeping heavily penetrated West German intelligence agencies, such as the BfV and the BND, at arm’s length. Third, human intelligence agencies such as the CIA and the Gehlen organizations relied heavily on German nationals in their operations, and the Soviets and East German services excelled at recruiting and turning some of these individuals into double agents. Since SIGINT collected information by technical means, not through humans, it remained largely immune from this vulnerability. Fourth, the Soviets and East Germans themselves greatly favored human intelligence over SIGINT collection. Therefore, they may have been more inclined to penetrate their foreign counterparts, rather than a SIGINT service whose modus operandi they did not fully comprehend. Whatever the case, until proven otherwise, it appears that ASAE managed to keep its operations secret to a larger degree than its various Western sister services.

**Mission Accomplished?**

Established in 1945, the ASAE held a near-monopoly on American SIGINT operations in Europe for seven years. Following the creation of the National Security Agency in 1952, ASAE continued to staff and operate intercept stations, while the NSA gradually assumed control of and integrated the American SIGINT effort. The life span of the ASA and its European headquarters as America’s premier SIGINT agency was thus limited. Nevertheless, the agency functioned during a momentous and dangerous time period, during which the wartime alliance collapsed, and the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves on the edge of war as each side sought to shape the new postwar world order to its own advantage.

ASAE did not run flawlessly. Originally, the agency had not been designed to focus its capabilities almost exclusively on the Soviet Union and its satellites, and it took ASAE several years to produce intercepts on a large scale and on a regular basis from behind the Iron Curtain. Moreover, especially in the late 1940s, the agency faced personnel issues, as it struggled to find and retain qualified cryptanalysts and interceptors to staff its stations in Germany. And while ASA and NSA worked closely with their British counterpart, they kept German intelligence agencies at a distance, leading West German government circles to grumble about American uncooperativeness.

Yet for all their imperfections, ASAE and ASAE managed to produce large amounts of accurate, timely, and pertinent intelligence on the Soviet Union and its armed forces just as the Cold War in Europe was heating up. Moreover, the agency provided the critical link that ensured organizational continuity between the American SIGINT effort during World War II and its Cold War operations led by the NSA. By 1952, Western observers had few illusions about the longevity of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, and thanks to the continued operations of ASA and ASAE, the NSA did not have to start operations from scratch, but could draw on the facilities and trained personnel of its Army predecessor. If SIGINT constituted one of the most important providers of secret information to American policymakers during the Cold War, ASAE should be considered one of the most relevant American intelligence agencies in early Cold War Europe.

**Editor’s Note**

The author and managing editor wish to thank Dr. Joseph R. Frechette, a historian with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command History Office, for his invaluable assistance in acquiring some of the images that appear in this article.

**Notes**

1. Semper Vigilis (Vigilant Always) was the official motto of the Army Security Agency.
8. Memo, Brig Gen Ross A. Osmun for Maj Gen Clayton L. Bissell, 7 Sep 1944, folder 350.01-385 (1944), Records of the Army Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), Military Intelligence Division (MID), Decimal File, 1942–1952, RG 319, NACP.
13. Ibid., p. 6.


21. Msg, CO USFET Frankfurt, Germany, to CO USFET Rear, Paris, France, 27 Nov 1945; Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946, appendix. ASAE employed additional personnel at headquarters and other field units, but exact numbers for the first few months are hard to come by because personnel strength fluctuated widely due to the consolidation of Army signals intelligence units in Germany and large-scale demobilization.


28. ANCICC Subcommittee on Intercept [sic], 20 Jun 1945, National Security Archive. This target priority list included “Great Britain, Russia, France, Netherlands, China, Argentina, and colonies” in the top category (“A”), and Germany and Japan in the second-last category (“C”).


32. Ibid., supplement D.


35. Post War Transition Period, p. 33.


37. Msg, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Hqs., EUCOM, to Deputy Director of Intelligence, OGMUS, sub: Location of Former German Firms (Enigma-Cipher Device), 20 Aug 1947, folder Former German Enigma Cypher Firms D190213, U.S. Army Investigative Records Repository, Selected Printouts of Digital Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers – Impersonal Files, 1933–1958, RG 319, NACP.


56. Memo, Col Egmont F. Koenig, military attaché Prague, sub: Political Tension in Czechoslovakia, 10 Jun 1947, folder 926793, Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Formerly Top Secret Intelligence Documents, 1943–59, RG 319, NACP.


70. Msg, Col. Harold G. Hayes, chief, ASA, to Asst. Exec. For Plng. & Coord. 4 Feb 1948, sub: State Department Assumption of Responsibility in Occupied Europe, folder 350.09 (1948) Germany, Records of the Army Staff, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Analysis and Research Branch, General Correspondence, 1945–49, RG 260, NACP.


78. Tom Gilligan, CIA Life: 10,000 Days with the Agency (Guilford, Conn.: Foreign Intelligence Press, 1991), p. 211.


80. Msg, Joint Chiefs of Staff to U.S. CINCEUR, 23 Jun 1953, National Security Archive.


82. Foschepoth, Überwachtes Deutschland, pp. 55–56.


86. Ibid., p. 225.


88. I am grateful to Professor Jonathan R. Winkler and Col Joachim Kampe (ret.) of the former East German Army for information on the Richtfunknetz.

89. Information provided by former ASAE voice intercept operator Chuck Thompson. See also Thompson’s autobiographical novel, McCurry’s War (Bloomington, Ind.: iUniverse, Inc., 2012), p. 21.

Bundeswehr im Kalten Krieg (Berlin: Köster, 2014).


95. HQ, ASA Europe, to CINC, EUCOM, sub: Emergency Relocation of ASAE Units, 6 Mar 1953, National Security Archive.

96. Post War Transition Period, p. 51.


98. Information provided by former ASAE voice intercept operator, Specialist 5th Class Jeffrey Van Davis.


101. Information provided by former ASAE communications security intercept operator, Specialist 4th Class Patrick C. Stein.


109. Paul Maddrell, “What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: Julius Mader and the Western secret services during the Cold War,” Cold War History 5, no. 2 (May 2005): 236.


Coming soon from CMH...

STAYING THE COURSE
October 1967 to September 1968

ERIK B. VILLARD
THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN VIETNAM
BY CARRIE GABARÉE

After the American entrance into the Great War, the Army General Staff was determined to outfit doughboys for this new industrialized warfare by reintroducing body armor. Professor Bashford Dean, the curator of arms and armor at New York City’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, was commissioned as an Army major in the Ordnance Department and named chairman of the National Research Council’s Committee on Helmets and Body Armor. At the time, Dean was a leading American expert on armor and metallurgy.1

Although the committee’s primary mission was to create a practical and uniquely American helmet that maximized protection, Dean also set out to create a full body suit of armor, which would be the first time since the 1600s that such suits had been utilized. Dean worked with the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s armorer, Daniel Tachaux, to create prototypes. General John J. Pershing, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, supported the development of body armor and, consequently, the Ordnance Department reviewed approximately thirty prototypes, a select number of which were sent overseas. However, research does not indicate that any of the armor received successful ratings.2

The two main types of armor were heavy and light. The advantage of the heavy was that it protected the wearer from rifle and machine gun fire, however, its weight restricted movement, making it primarily useful for sentinels, machine gunners, and those defending shell holes. The heavy armor illustrated here is .185 inches thick and weighed about twenty-seven pounds. The reverse shows the bands that held the armor pieces in place and helped distribute that weight across the torso. The light body armor was more comfortable but only offered protection against shrapnel and pistol fire. It consisted of multiple plates connected by leather straps and was considered to be custom fitted with the potential removal of a plate. The steel was not more than .04 inches thick and weighed less than eight pounds.3

Designers also created leg and arm (not pictured) coverings because of the high number of wounds in the extremities that were occurring with trench warfare. However, only about fifty pairs of leg armor were made; they received negative feedback, which halted further efforts. The armor that covered the entire leg could stop a revolver bullet from a distance of ten feet and weighed seven and a half pounds. For each arm the armor was made up of five individual plates, which weighed a total of about eleven pounds. Like the armor for other parts of the body, the sections were connected by strips of leather. In terms of protection, the arm defenses provided the same security as the leg armor. Arm armor was tested in limited numbers overseas and, similar to the leg armor, received poor marks.4

None of Dean’s body armor prototype designs were officially approved or issued during World War I, but his work created a foundation for successors who continued the mission of creating an ideal body armor for U.S. troops.5

Carrie Gabarée serves as a museum curator at the Museum Support Center on Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

NOTES

Light Body Armor and Upper Leg Armor

Heavy Body Armor

Light Body Armor

Front

Back

Front

Back

Front

Back
Once completed, the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) will host nineteen large artifacts referred to as “macros,” or “macro-artifacts,” that will serve as cornerstones in telling the Army’s history. Over the summer, during the early stages of the museum’s construction, the four largest of these artifacts were installed.

The Renault Light Tank known as the “Five of Hearts” is the only surviving U.S. tank that saw combat in World War I. In October 1918, it participated in an attack near Exermont, France. Due to strong enemy defenses, fresh troops had to replace wounded crewmen twice during the intense action. Today, the “Five of Hearts,” scheduled for display in the museum’s Nation Overseas gallery, shows scars from hundreds of enemy rounds. Its first driver, Cpl. Horatio Roberts, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism during the battle.1

The experiences of the U.S. Army Tank Corps in World War I were not dismissed with the end of that conflict. During World War II, the Army was quick to learn the strengths and weaknesses of its armor doctrine and designs. Tanks were modified in both the factory and field to improve their performance. One of the final products of that innovation is the M4A3E2 Sherman tank. The tank, named “Cobra King,” was the first to break through German lines surrounding the beleaguered soldiers at Bastogne in the winter of 1944. “Cobra King” is displayed in the Global War gallery as part of a tableau showing the moment of the breakthrough.2

Another iconic artifact from World War II is the flat-bottomed boat known as a Landing Craft Vehicle–Personnel (LCVP), or simply the “Higgins Boat.” Designed to be built quickly and cheaply, it was used in every theater of World War II. A veteran of the landings at Utah Beach on 6 June 1944, the LCVP featured here is displayed in the Global War gallery and is marked as a vessel from the troop transport USS Joseph T. Dickman (APA-13).3

The next macro placed on site is the ubiquitous M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, assigned to Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry. In 2003, this M3 led the advance from Kuwait to the edge of Baghdad. From there, Troop A swept north of the city to screen the now famous “Thunder Run.” There they destroyed twenty enemy T72 tanks and blunted all enemy counterattacks, thus allowing the Army to secure the Baghdad airport and open the door to Iraq’s capital city. This M3 is on display in the Changing World gallery.

NMUSA refers to these artifacts as “the Big Four,” and they are currently encased in protective structures as the museum is being built around them. Although important to the construction timeline, they are just four of more than 1,300 items that will be on display in the six Fighting for the Nation galleries and the adjoining Army and Society gallery; each artifact is as important as the next in helping tell the story of the U.S. Army. Construction of the museum is progressing and it is slated to open in late 2019.

Dr. Patrick R. Jennings is the chief of programs and education at the National Museum of the United States Army.

Notes

This August 2017 photo of the NMUSA construction site shows the macro artifacts in place and protected by the white box-like structures. /Aerial photography courtesy of Col. Duane Lempke (USA, Ret.)
Renault FT17 Tank, “Five of Hearts”
M4A3E2 Sherman Tank, “Cobra King”
M3 Bradley
Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
On 4 July 1945, an epilogue to World War II in Europe unfolded in Berlin. Assembling on the grounds of the former Prussian Military Cadet Academy, the onetime home of Hitler’s SS bodyguard regiment in the western district of Steglitz, one company of American armored troops lined up opposite one company of Soviet infantry. Having arrived just the day before, the Americans symbolized the larger force that would enter the U.S. Sector over the following days. Soviet Brig. Gen. Nicolai Baranov was the first to speak. He lavished praise on the “great American democracy,” extolled its role as “arsenal of the United Nations,” and lauded the “gallant American forces” who destroyed the enemy on the Western front. He tempered his encomiums, however, by claiming that the Soviets had guaranteed that success when they “broke the back of the German Army” in 1943–1944 and “nailed down” its “chief forces” in the East. He then relinquished the sector to the United States. General Omar N. Bradley, who had flown from Frankfurt especially for the occasion, accepted on behalf of General Dwight D. Eisenhower with words of praise for the Red Army and hopes of lasting friendship.

forces from the Normandy beachhead into the enemy’s capital. At the same time, it marked a symbolic transition into their postwar mission of occupation and political control. The preparation for that mission had been underway many long months before the fighting ceased.

**MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR BERLIN**

In October 1944, Civil Affairs Detachment A1A1, then serving in Paris, received the mission of forming the U.S. military government for Berlin. After learning the news, the unit’s commander, Col. Frank L. Howley, decided to transfer his men to the countryside for a period of training and classroom education. Already familiar with the Paris region from his years as a student of art at the Sorbonne, Howley selected an exclusive resort chalet in the village of Barbizon, near Versailles. The motive for this action, as Howley put it, “was to live like gentlemen, study like scholars, and train like soldiers,” while “recovering physically from the joys of Paris.” After billeting in Troyes in November and December, Howley’s unit first occupied the facility in early January and remained until the end of March 1945. During their sojourn in the two French towns, the detachment’s officers studied German politics, history, society, and language as well as the administrative organization of Berlin, its public utilities, and its system of food handling. Walter Dorn, a civil-
ian adviser to the Office of Strategic Services, helped to design the program of instruction and furnished a library assembled from materials confiscated in the occupied eastern Rhineland.³

An advertising executive in civilian life, Howley was no obvious choice to lead the U.S. military government in Berlin. Although fluent in French, he spoke no German and had little prior knowledge of German affairs. Nonetheless, he was politically shrewd, quick to learn, and a talented propagandist. As he led his unit from its first assignment in Cherbourg, then to Paris, and ultimately to Berlin, he attracted glowing mention from American newsmen and diligently saved his clippings. In Paris, he even managed good reviews from the Communist Party newspaper L’Humanité.⁴ Throughout 1945 and into 1946, Howley would cast himself as a tough dealer who got on with the Russians and made quadripartite government work by meeting them on level ground with lusty drinking and roughhouse give-and-take.⁵

While in Barbizon, the detachment grew toward its authorized strength of 227 officers and enlisted personnel. Although no one was as flamboyant as the commander, the men resembled him in several key respects. Most were professionals in early middle age—on average 42-years-old. Few were career soldiers, and fewer still possessed expertise on Germany or a workable command of the German language. Instead, their strengths lay in technical areas—medicine, justice, law enforcement, journalism, education, and engineering—generically useful in managing a city. To help compensate for language deficiencies—scarcely remediable in only six months of part-time instruction—Howley took special pains to requisition a troop of interpreters and translators before leaving Barbizon.⁶

The unit’s organization paralleled the administrative structure of Greater Berlin. Its main sections—Economic Affairs, Public Safety, Public Works and Utilities, Education and Religious Affairs, Communications, Finance, Justice, and Public Health—corresponded to the executive departments of the city’s government, while six local subdetachments, consisting of four to eight officers, corresponded to the district administrations of the American Sector. The only sections with no parallels in city government were Intelligence and Information Services Control.⁷

For guidance on the objectives and conduct of the occupation, detachment members could look to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) December 1944 “Handbook on Military Government in Germany.” Written under General Walter Bedell Smith’s direction during the autumn, it drew in part from the earliest iteration of the Treasury, State, and War Department joint directive on Germany, JCS 1067, and in part from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Field Manual, FM 27–5.⁸ Because the former source emphasized punishment and control and the latter restoration, the handbook itself displayed a strain of inconsistency. Following JCS 1067, it called for the elimination of “Nazism, Fascism, German militarism, the Nazi hierarchy and their collaborators,” prescribed the retention in office of “active Nazis or ardent sympathizers” even for the sake of expediency, and ruled out steps toward economic rehabilitation. “Germany,” it declared, “will always be treated as a defeated country and not as a liberated country.” By contrast, in line with Army civil affairs doctrine, it promulgated the principle of “indirect rule.” After the removal of all objectionable officials, military governments would utilize “the civil administrative, judicial and law enforcement structure . . . to the full extent possible.” Accordingly, detachments would “have the responsibility of controlling the German administrative system, not of operating it themselves,” and in discharging their functions, German provincial and municipal officials would “be given full responsibility, and in consequence must be accorded some freedom in the selection of their associates.”⁹

The handbook offered no instruction on the ultimate goal of the occupation—and had no basis for doing so. The first iteration of JCS 1067, dated 24 September 1944, was intended to provide short-term guidance pending the formulation of long-term policies by the Allied governments, and the field manual was a primarily a guide to the maintenance of order and public services. Whether the occupation government would retain an essentially negative character, as opposed to fostering a positive reconstruction of German society, was an unsettled question. Arguably, the answer emerged more through action and experience than through formal policies and principles.

With the preparations of military government already three months in progress, on 31 January 1945, Smith issued a directive to the commander of the Fifteenth Army, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, naming him commanding general (designate) of the Berlin occupation force, to be termed the Berlin District. A U.K.-U.S. “nucleus staff” would draw up plans for Berlin while providing the kernel of a future headquarters. Initially, this headquarters would operate jointly before splitting into separate U.S. and British organizations on the dissolution of SHAEF. Two divisions—one British, one American—would garrison the Western sectors of the city. Smith requested that the nucleus staff, designated Plans Group G, submit an outline plan by 15 March. He wanted preparations for four different cases: (1) an Anglo-American capture of Berlin in combat operations; (2) a Soviet capture of Berlin in a “fighting advance”; (3) an airborne entry into Berlin after Germany’s surrender; (4) an Anglo-American overlaid entry into Berlin after German surrender, preceded or followed by the Soviets.¹⁰

After moving into office space in Versailles on 8 February, the nucleus staff went to work on the plan. Two officers made the forty-mile trip to Barbizon twice a week to coordinate their drafts with Howley.¹¹ On 22 February Smith issued revised instructions. Instead of preparing for four cases, the planners should assume “that the Russians would occupy Berlin before ourselves.”¹²

The staff submitted its finished work to SHAEF on 13 March. After restating Smith’s assumption that the Soviets would initially occupy Berlin, the paper proceeded to assess the situation in Germany’s capital. While admitting the impossibility of foreseeing the consequences of a battle inside the city, the planners presumed that Berlin would
still be functioning despite the devastation of the air war. Unlike intelligence analysts alarmed over possible German resistance in an Alpine redoubt, they anticipated no organized resistance in the capital. To the contrary, Berlin’s citizens would “probably turn to the Allies to help them out of their difficulties.” In such a case, however, they proposed to limit assistance to medical supplies and soap. An estimated 400,000 displaced persons—mainly conscript workers—lived in the Western sectors, and they would have sole claim to imported food, blankets, and clothing. The Germans would have to feed themselves, asserted the planners; only in case of famine would Anglo-American relief goods be released to the general population. The normal provision of external supplies “required to maintain the essential life of the city” would be a responsibility of the Soviets.14

The plan went on to describe the structure of Berlin’s government. Berlin, it explained, was Reichsregierungsbezirk (at the same time a municipality, a Prussian province, and a prefecture) of the Reich. It foresaw appointing an acceptable Stadtpräsident (the chief of the prefecture) as the supreme German official in Berlin. The Allies would charge him with responsibility for the civil government, which he would constitute according to German law. The military government would supervise German officials “at all levels.” However, if the Soviets had been in the city for “some weeks” before arrival of Western forces, they might have already set up administrative machinery. In that event, the Western Allies would “fall in” with the Soviet arrangement.15

The plan specified four stages of movement into Berlin: preliminary reconnaissance, detailed reconnaissance, relief of Soviet troops in the Western sectors, and the final buildup. Depending on the initial availability of housing in the U.S. Sector, some troops might have to bivouac in the city park until they moved into permanent structures. In view of the anticipated length of the occupation and “the need to impress Germans,” accommodations should be “the best available.”16 Engineering parties would earmark building materials for Allied use, and the military government would conscript German laborers to repair damaged buildings, paying them at the official wage rate.

As a scheme of deployment, the outline plan checked all the requisite boxes. But in other respects the porridge was thin. The plan’s laissez-faire attitude in respect to food presumed not only that the city’s distribution system would continue to operate, but also that Pomeranian and East Prussian farms would remain productive despite the flight of population before the Red Army. Where it derived the notion that the Soviets would take sole responsibility for external supplies was anyone’s guess. The section on Berlin’s administration was especially weak. Only three paragraphs long, its chief prescription was to appoint an acceptable prefect to restore municipal government. The plan failed to account for the probability that all authority would have collapsed, and that the Allies would have to reconstitute the governmental bodies themselves.

On 28 March, Plans Group G expressed further thoughts on the timing of Allied movements. The planners had hitherto envisioned that the Western powers would be entering Berlin almost immediately after its capture by the Soviets. But much had changed in the two weeks since they had submitted their paper. Following the Allied breakthroughs over the Rhine, Western armies were driving toward Central Germany. Thus, in light of that new situation, the entry of Anglo-American forces into the capital would, they thought, depend on a Soviet invitation that might not appear “until the whole of Germany is overrun and the three Allied forces have met in the middle.”17

This prediction of delay was prescient, even if the reasons were more complicated than the planners imagined. When the fighting stopped, just five weeks later, Eisenhower’s armies held one-third of the Eastern Zone of occupation. The movement of Western troops into Berlin, therefore, could occur only as part of a mutual redeployment into assigned areas. Yet, it was not apparent how and when the movements should begin—and no one was willing to start the shift without clear certainty that the other side would follow suit.

Redeployments

Franklin D. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945. President Harry S. Truman had been in office a scant six days when a cable arrived from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The issue of Allied withdrawals from the Soviet Zone of occupation weighed on the prime minister’s mind, and he sought Truman’s ear. He began with some dubious history: “These occupational zones were outlined rather hastily at Quebec in September 1944 when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower’s armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany.” Although the zones could be altered only with Soviet consent, Churchill asserted, one condition should be filled before the Allies withdrew their armies, for the Americans had a “not very satisfactory proportion of food to feed the conquered population. And we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts which are, like ours, in normal times large importers of food.” Therefore, until the powers had resolved this “tiresome question,” the Western armies should not “move from tactical positions we have at present achieved.”18

Churchill’s message elicited a furious riposte from Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. In a memorandum to the White House chief of staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, Stettinius drew attention to the “disturbing” implications of Churchill’s words. The zones of occupation, he noted, had resulted from “long and careful study and negotiation.” If the U.S. or British government refused to withdraw to the agreed boundaries of their zones pending either a modification of boundaries or an agreement on food, the Soviets would consider such a bargaining position a “repudiation of our formal agreement and the resultant Soviet course of action and Soviet policy would be difficult to foresee.”19 Stettinius urged that the president and prime minister contact Joseph Stalin to settle on a date and procedure for withdrawal.20

Churchill bridled at the idea of retreat. In a cable to Truman on 24
April, the prime minister abandoned the pretense of being concerned about food. Instead, he invoked naked geopolitics: “It is your troops who would suffer the most by this, being pushed back about 120 miles in the centre and yielding up to unchecked Russian advance an enormous territory.” He continued his barrage into early June. Coupling apocalyptic imagery with proposals for a strategic master stroke, he pressed Truman to hold U.S. forces in their “tactical” positions. Whereas a withdrawal would unleash a “tide of Russian domination,” the use of those forces as “powerful bargaining counters” could force a “peaceful” settlement on Western terms. Therefore, he insisted, American forces should not retreat until the Western powers had gained satisfaction over Poland, had assured themselves of the “temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany,” and had ensured acceptable conditions in “Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans.”

In the end, Churchill could not persuade Truman to risk the repercussions of scrapping Allied commitments. When the president and his secretary of state designate, James F. Byrnes, read the minutes of the Yalta negotiations in order to determine the substance of the agreements on Poland and Eastern Europe, they perceived many ambiguities and concluded that the Soviet interpretation was at least partly credible. The Yalta communiqué, which obligated the signatories to “assist” states of Central and Eastern Europe in the establishment of “broadly representative governments,” appeared to be an especially elastic document. The need to transfer troops and materiel from Europe to the Pacific theater spoke for caution as well, as did a Soviet promise, at Yalta, to enter the war against Japan.

Unconvinced of Churchill’s arguments, Truman sent Roosevelt adviser Harry Hopkins to Moscow for talks with Stalin. In wide-ranging discussions over a twelve-day period beginning 26 May, the two men managed to paper over the Polish dispute. Stalin made a welcome concession on the issue of procedural vetoes at the United Nations, and Truman and Stalin set the place and date—“the vicinity of Berlin” around 15 July—for a tripartite summit. Although Churchill desired an earlier date, he reluctantly agreed with the decision for July. Nonetheless, because Truman had still proposed no date for withdrawals, the prime minister continued to hope for some way to use the American armies as a political hammer in Central Europe.

In the end, it took the intervention of Eisenhower to bring an end to Churchill’s scheming. Accompanied by his deputy for military government, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Eisenhower had flown to Berlin from his headquarters in Frankfurt on 5 June, just as Hopkins was wrapping up his discussions with Stalin. The British and French Commanders in Chief, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, arrived at the same time. Eisenhower’s mission on his first trip to the capital was twofold. He would meet with Soviet General Georgy Zhukov to sign declarations, prepared in the European Advisory Commission, on the assumption of supreme authority in the absence of a German government. He would also convene an immediate meeting of the commanders’ deputies for military government—Clay, General Vasily D. Sokolovsky, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Weeks, and Lt. Gen. Louis Marie Koeltz—to establish the Allied Control Council.
Zhukov signed the declarations but bridled over establishing the control council. Any such measure, he asserted, “must await withdrawal into the agreed zones,” for he could not discuss administrative problems in Germany when he did not control his own zone and was unfamiliar with its problems.

In a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff written by Clay, Eisenhower expressed understanding for Zhukov’s position. He stated flatly that until the Allies had resolved the question of withdrawal, any further discussion of control machinery would be pointless. On 8 June, Eisenhower expressed his concerns to a receptive Hopkins, who had stopped in Frankfurt on his way home from Moscow. Hopkins dashed off a message to Truman, urging a quick end to the uncertainty. He warned the president that the indeterminate status of the withdrawal date had exposed Eisenhower to considerable embarrassment because it would be inevitably misunderstood by the Soviets. In that light, he urged Truman to send a cable to Stalin stating his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from the Soviet Zone on 21 June, subject to concurrent movement of American forces into Berlin, plus guarantees for access to Berlin by air, rail, and highway.

With Eisenhower pressing for action, Truman finally dictated a course to the prime minister. In an 11 June message he reminded Churchill that the zones of occupation had been approved “after long consideration and detailed discussion with you.” In view of this, the United States could no longer delay the withdrawal of American troops to exert pressure on other issues. Instead, following Hopkins’s approach, Truman proposed sending a message to Stalin calling for a definite date of 21 June for the start of Allied withdrawals into their own zones, coupled with simultaneous movement of national garrisons into Berlin and the provision of free access to Berlin for U.S. forces. Replying three days later, Churchill bowed to the inevitable: “Obviously we are obliged to conform to your decision.”

On 14 June, Truman conveyed his proposals for mutual redeployments to Stalin. Within two days, Stalin accepted, subject to a minor postpone-ment; Marshal Zhukov, was going to be in Moscow along with all other commanders for a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, followed by a victory parade. Because the marshal would not be back before 28–30 June, and mine-clearing work still remained, Stalin requested that the removal of troops begin on 1 July. In a message to the Soviet leader on 18 June, Truman confirmed the date of 1 July. At the same time, he said, he was assuming that a “sufficient number” of American troops would be in Berlin at an earlier date to prepare for the upcoming conference.

All this time, with scant knowledge of the diplomatic battles being fought at higher levels—and with no inkling of an actual date for redeployment—U.S. planners and field commanders had been working feverishly to prepare the movement of American occupation forces into Berlin. On 7 May, one day before the German surrender, SHAEF relieved General Gerow from his responsibilities as commander of the Berlin District. Selected in his stead was General Lewis H. Brereton, now head of the purely American “First Airborne Army,” which, despite its name, was no more than a headquarters staff. Over the next week, Brereton reshaped and expanded that staff into the Headquarters and Headquarters Command, Berlin District, with the addition of personnel from Plans Group G. At the general’s insistence, the newly formed organization bore the designation, “U.S. Headquarters Berlin District and Headquarters First Airborne Army.”

Officially organized on 15 May at Maison-Lafitte in France, the Berlin District moved by steps toward Berlin, stopping in the Westphalian city of Bielefeld on 22 May. There, it joined up with Howley, who had already moved his detachment in late April. At this point, the military government became the political affairs (G–5) section of the Berlin District’s general staff. From 15 to 25 June the command moved to its final staging area, the Soviet Zone city of Halle in U.S.-occupied Saxony-Anhalt. Over the next four days, it rapidly assembled subordinate units from other locations to constitute the much larger force that would enter Berlin. By 29 June, around 26,000 soldiers—comb-bat and support units combined—had arrived in Halle. The 2d Armored Division, which had no association with the First Airborne Army, provided the nucleus of combat forces eventually numbering some 16,000 troops.

Brereton left for the United States just as the headquarters staff reached Bielefeld. Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks succeeded him. In addition to the customary duties of military command, Parks would soon be serving as Eisenhower’s negotiator with the Soviets, as first U.S. commandant in the Kommandatura, and as commander of the occupation force.

**PoTSAd iNTERLUDE**

On 15 June, three days before President Truman’s last message to Stalin confirming their agreement of mutual evacuations, U.S. officials in Moscow passed on a request from General Eisenhower for permission to send an advance party to Berlin to initiate preparations for the Big Three conference. The request was reasonable on its merits, as was Truman’s “assumption,” expressed in his message, that a “sufficient number” of Americans be allowed into Berlin to begin the work. Both men ignored, however, the sticky matter of reciprocity. Under the terms of Truman’s agreement with Stalin, the entry
of U.S. forces into Berlin would be part of a simultaneous movement of all forces into their assigned areas of occupation, and that movement would begin on 1 July after Marshal Zhukov had returned from Moscow. The Americans, however, wanted to dispatch troops to Berlin to begin preparing for the conference prior to 1 July. On 16 June, before the Soviets had responded to Eisenhower’s request, General Parks received instructions to proceed with a staff by air to the German capital. His job was to confer with Soviet representatives on the use of a “neutral meeting area” for the tripartite meeting scheduled for 15 July. In the absence of a general agreement on the entry of U.S. forces in Berlin, he would “induce” the Soviets to set aside an area to accommodate the U.S. delegation. Because the writers of the instruction assumed that this location would lie in the American Sector of the city, they suggested that the advance group should find and prepare for the delegation facilities that the Americans could later use as headquarters for the occupation. This, they argued with some innocence, would accomplish two tasks at once and save a lot of future work. In other words, in addition to preparing for the conference, Parks’ men would be reconnoitering the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

On 19 June, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman sent a letter to Assistant Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Andrei Y. Vishinsky elaborating on General Eisenhower’s plans for the mission: General Parks would head a party of 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 trucks, with the trucks and enlisted men motoring up the Dessau-Berlin autobahn while Parks and the officers traveled by air. After first replying that the matter could await Zhukov’s return to Berlin, the Soviets relented in face of a White House threat to postpone the conference. Meeting with Harriman on 21 June, Vishinsky grudgingly agreed to let Parks embark on his assignment. Vishinsky tendered a letter stating that the Soviet command would meet the American party and render all necessary assistance.

In his communications with Truman, through Vishinsky, Stalin never mentioned Berlin as the conference venue. He used instead the terms “suburbs of Berlin,” “vicinity of Berlin,” and “Berlin area.” Exactly what he meant by these expressions remained unclear until Vishinsky’s discussion with Harriman on 21 June, when the commissar finally named specific sites. Each delegation, he explained, would stay in separate zones in the town of Babelsberg; the negotiations would take place in Cecilienhof Palace—the home of the Hohenzollern Crown Prince—in nearby Potsdam. The American advance party, he continued, would learn more when it arrived. A quick parsing of Vishinsky’s words shows that he was talking about a party arriving in Babelsberg, not Berlin. The Americans, it turns out, set off with different expectations.

At 0900 on 22 June, Parks, in Frankfurt, received a phone call from SHAEF informing him that the Soviets had authorized his reconnaissance mission, to comprise exactly the number of men and vehicles requested by Eisenhower. This was Parks’ first knowledge of the intended size of the group. Shortly thereafter, he got another call directing him to set off by air that same afternoon. Parks promptly phoned his headquarters staff in Halle with orders to send the ground party toward Berlin at 0600 the following day. At 1100 he met with Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks from SHAEF. Rooks instructed him to negotiate with the Soviets over the accommodations President Truman would occupy at the conference. If it proved impossible to enter the American Sector of Berlin, he was to agree to any adequate arrangement and to leave the matter of entering Berlin for the future. This was the first intimation Parks received that he might not be reconnoitering the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

Parks took off from Frankfurt at 1600 in a delegation totaling fourteen officers. Two hours later, he landed at Berlin’s Tempelhof airport. Only then did he learn for certain his destination. Soviet Lt. Gen. Nicolai S. Vlasik escorted the U.S. visitors to Babelsberg, making a circuitous tour over the Unter den Linden, the Brandenburg Gate, Tiergarten, and the Grünwald Forest. Once in Babelsberg, Parks conferred with Col. Gen. Sergei N. Kruglov, an internal security commissar. Kruglov announced that the Soviets had selected the town house the official parties because it was lightly damaged, contained many commodious residences, and was near the Crown Prince’s palace. Leaving nothing for inference, Kruglov went on to assert that his authority extended only to arrangements for the conference and was thus geographically confined to the area of Babelsberg-Potsdam. He could not discuss the entry of American forces into the U.S. Sector of Berlin.
The motor convoy departed for Berlin the morning after Parks’s arrival in Babelsberg. As convoy commander, an exuberant Howley sought to stage a “spectacular” movement. He assembled a cavalcade of some 500 officers and men and 114 vehicles—jeeps, trucks, and machine gun-armed half-tracks. The vehicles had been newly painted with a glossy lacquer to replace the wartime flat finish; the personnel were scrubbed up to look sharp—“everyone in natty Eisenhower jackets with ribbons in place, equipment and vehicles all shined up, fender flags flying.”

Accompanied by the Berlin District headquarters commander, Brig. Gen. Stewart Cutler, who hitched a ride at the last minute to participate in the excitement, Howley rode at the head of the column in a gleaming black Horch roadster—a vehicle he selected “because of its flashy appearance.” His men had discovered the car, the former property of a high Nazi official, hidden in a barn. No one had informed Howley of the size limits of the convoy. Nor did Howley know its true mission. As far as he was concerned, his party would be preparing the American Sector for the arrival of U.S. occupation forces several weeks later.

Howley’s convoy made its way on schedule to the Elbe crossing at Dessau, around thirty-two miles from Halle. After a Soviet guide brought it over a one-lane pontoon bridge into Soviet-occupied territory, it proceeded to the local Soviet headquarters, located “in a shabby German house.”

There it remained for seven hours. The commander, said to be one “Colonel Gorelick,” first offered a toast with German champagne but then raised a problem: The party had too many men. Allowing for the 14 officers already in Babelsberg with Parks, the Americans could bring in only 36 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles. While many hours passed in trying to establish telephone contact with Babelsberg, Cutler and Howley remonstrated that they had orders to go to Berlin and could not be delayed. Two higher ranking Soviet officers, a major general and colonel general, joined the altercation. Cutler warned of “international repercussions” if the Americans did not proceed. At last, word came from Babelsberg. According to the Soviets, General Parks had ordered Cutler to take the convoy excess back to Halle; Howley was to proceed to Berlin with the prescribed 36 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles.

Parks’ diary reveals that the Soviets had, in fact, correctly transmitted his instructions. Parks had spent the morning of 23 June surveying the American billets in Babelsberg. While conferring with General Kruglov at 1130, he learned of the problem with the size of Howley’s convoy. Parks, who—unlike Howley—understood the formal terms of the mission, told Kruglov to pass only the approved number of vehicles and personnel. Thus ended the first Soviet-American standoff over Berlin. It had been more parody than drama, but it was still a harbinger of future misunderstandings.

After surveying the Cecelienhof Palace in the early afternoon, Parks left for Tempelhof for his return flight to Frankfurt. Marshal Zhukov’s chief of staff, Col. Gen. Mikhail S. Malinin, met him in the airport in order to discuss conference logistics. Although Malinin could let no more than fifty vehicles into Soviet-occupied territory, he would permit the fifty trucks arriving in Babelsberg to operate a shuttle in order to bring in more supplies and rations. Parks departed at 1600, taking a route that passed directly over the highway toward Dessau. Looking from his low-flying C-47, he recognized Howley’s vehicle, the Horch, at the head of the convoy, now some four miles east of the Elbe.

Howley’s party proceeded toward Berlin, so Howley thought, led by a ramshackle Soviet car along a secondary road parallel to the autobahn. Its members saw a countryside empty of Germans. As they approached Berlin, wrote Howley in his diary, “Russian troops were all around, and the dirtiest I have ever seen . . . a mob . . . the army of Genghis Khan.”

A the end of the journey, around 1830, Howley found himself in Babelsberg. He was met by a colonel from SHAPE, part of Parks’ group, who had remained in Babelsberg to begin work on the conference. At that point he learned that he was not leading a reconnaissance party to Berlin but had come to Babelsberg to “do a housekeeping job.” He scoffed: “Everyone was in a dither wondering how they could get it ready for the Big Three party . . . . This seemed much more important to them than the Berlin District Military Government job.”

Having arrived in Babelsberg with three of his men, Howley saw no reason to stay if he could not reconnoiter Berlin, and he was concerned lest the
American “higher echelons” as well as the Soviets. Thus, the moment he returned from Babelsberg, the colonel instructed his officers to “locate some big estate or some chateau to which A1A1 could be moved where we could live in comfort based on the fact we would not be ordered into Berlin.” They found a huge chateau six miles from Halle—“magnificent,” declared Howley, “the most luxurious of all A1A1 establishments.” The detachment received authorization to move in on 1 July. 

Howley had, however, drawn false conclusions from his frustrations, mistaking legalism for hostile intent. The Soviets were adhering precisely to agreements, granting no more than the wording allowed but also no less. Truman and Eisenhower had asked to send an advance party only in connection with the tripartite conference, not to begin the occupation of Berlin. The numbers of men and vehicles approved for passage to Babelsberg were contained in Eisenhower’s request to Moscow. Soviet insistence that deployments to Berlin await Zhukov’s return simply matched the terms of the Stalin-Truman correspondence of 14–18 June. That correspondence had also spoken of “simultaneous” movement. Because no Soviet advance parties had entered the U.S. Occupied Eastern Zone, an advance movement of U.S. forces into Berlin, however reasonable and appropriate, would have violated strict reciprocity by giving the Americans something for nothing.

The Move

From 27 to 30 June, just as Howley was preparing to plant himself in his “magnificent” chateau, Clay and Parks were pursuing critical negotiations with Marshal Zhukov. These talks would end the deadlock over deployments and trigger a hurried rush of U.S. forces into Berlin. On 27 June General Parks returned to Babelsberg to continue preparations for the Big Three conference. At 1730 he learned that Marshal Zhukov had returned from Moscow and would see him at 2000. Parks made the thirty-mile trip to Karlshorst—Zhukov’s office was just a few steps from the scene of Germany’s surrender—in the company of Colonel General Kruglov and Lieutenant General Vlasik.

Zhukov said he had still not received any information on his forthcoming meeting with Clay and the British representative, General Weeks. He had obtained the U.S. agenda but nothing from the British. Parks offered to help get the information to him the following day and to work out a date and time with the U.S. and British conferees. Zhukov expressed a preference for 29 June but could also meet late on the evening of 28 June. Parks said that U.S. forces had orders to move on 1 July, and that roughly 25,000–30,000 troops would occupy Berlin. Zhukov accepted this date, “providing an agreement on all points could be reached at the conference and the move could be begun simultaneously.” Before then, no troops could enter the U.S. Sector. The conversation then shifted to preparations for the Big Three conference. Parks asked for more space to accommodate American service and communications personnel; he also wanted to add another 125 vehicles and 750 men to those already in Babelsberg. Zhukov instantly granted both requests. The speed of his approval suggests that Howley might have been able to bring in a larger party from the start if Eisenhower had initially asked for it.

Shortly after noon the next day, Parks received a call from SHAEF. Generals Clay and Weeks would be arriving at Gatow airport, on the outskirts of Berlin, at 1130 on 29 June. The British had combined their agenda with the U.S. agenda and would send it by wire later in the day. Parks instructed his interpreter to ask Soviet commanders in Babelsberg to telephone Karlshorst and arrange a conference there with Marshal Zhukov for 1430 on 29 June. General Clay would soon be stepping onto the stage of high diplomacy, far exceeding the scope of purely military affairs. He was fully disposed to the task. During his long service in the Corps of Engineers, he had distinguished himself in multiple capacities as a manager and or-
ganizer skilled in political maneuver. In the early 1930s, he had thrived in the hothouse of New Deal innovation, acting as the Corps of Engineers contact officer with Congress, the White House, and the National Emergency Council, Roosevelt’s coordinating body for domestic affairs. In 1940 the Corps reassigned him from an enormous water management project in Texas to head Roosevelt’s emergency airport construction program. When the United States entered the war, he became chief of Army procurement and the Army’s representative to the War Production Board. After a brief time in Europe, where he served as chief of logistics in Normandy, Eisenhower sent him back to Washington to grapple with munition shortages. James F. Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, promptly snatched him into service as his deputy responsible for war production. Clay’s role was to decide resource allocation issues in Byrnes’s name. He became virtual czar of the American war economy.

Clay brought three key attributes to his talks with Zhukov. The first was an impatiently analytical mind that got to essentials, abhorred cavil, and sought quick results. The second was a determination to make the quadripartite system work. The third was the lack of preconceived anti-Sovietism. All these distinguished him from America’s career diplomats, whose legalism and hard-line views might well have precluded agreement, if negotiations had been left to them.61

The delegations arrived at the appointed time. Eschewing small talk, Zhukov went straight to the agenda. The first and principal item was the shift of Allied forces into Berlin and the Soviet occupation of Germany to the west of the capital. After Zhukov inquired as to the anticipated strength of the U.S. and British garrisons—30,000 for the United States, a maximum of 25,000 for the U.K.—he began a discussion of dates. Clay stated that the United States could start its withdrawal from the Soviet Zone on 1 July and complete it in nine days. Zhukov asked whether the Americans could not vacate the Soviet area more rapidly. Clay agreed, subject to General Bradley’s approval, that the United States would evacuate in four days. There followed a discussion of coordinated, phased movements. The Soviets would send reconnaissance parties into their zone on 1 July to survey ground installations; airfield reconnaissance would occur on 2 July; and on 4 July, the exchange of territories would be complete. Correspondingly, the United States would conduct ground reconnaissance in Berlin on 1 July and airfield reconnaissance the next day. The main body of troops would start moving from Halle on 3 July and finish its move on 4 July. British movements into Berlin would follow a similar timetable.62

Having obtained Bradley’s concurrence, Clay confirmed these arrangements the following day. General Parks communicated the news in a meeting at Soviet headquarters with Zhukov’s deputy, General Vasily D. Sokolovsky. At Parks’ request, Sokolovsky agreed to extend the withdrawal deadline to 7 July. While the 2d Armored Division would have to clear the Halle area on schedule, U.S. service troops could stay in Halle another three days and retain the use during that time of the Halle-Berlin autobahn.

**Access to Berlin**

After briefly discussing the treatment of displaced persons—Zhukov’s main desire was to rid himself of responsibility for the care of non-Russian returnees—the three generals turned to the issue of Western access to Berlin. Zhukov brought up Anglo-American requests, contained in the U.S.-U.K. joint agenda, for two autobahn routes, two railway lines, and two air corridors. He declared that all roads and lanes cut across Soviet Zone territory and involved significant administrative difficulties; moreover, one autobahn and one railway line seemed enough to supply a garrison totaling 50,000 American and British troops. Zhukov offered an autobahn route through Magdeburg, a railway line through Magdeburg, and an air route through Magdeburg and Goslar. Although allied vehicles would be subject to Soviet traffic regulations and document checks, there would be no inspection of cargo and no limitations on the amount of vehicular traffic. If the Americans did not like the route
through Magdeburg, they could choose another, Zhukov said. He had proposed it because it was a central lane, reasonable to both the Americans and British, and the most economical. Besides, at a later time, the Allies could change “possibly all points” discussed at the present conference.63

Clay briefly defended the request for several routes on the grounds that the Americans were spread between a port in Bremen, an occupation area in the southwest, and an administration in Berlin, but he dropped the argument, accepting Zhukov’s offer while reserving his right to reopen the question at the Control Council should the single routes prove unsatisfactory.64 The alacrity with which he yielded to Zhukov’s views manifests not only his willingness to compromise, but also suggests that Zhukov had persuaded him on the technical merits of the Soviet position. If so, experience validated both Zhukov’s assertion and Clay’s judgment. The single routes met all Allied requirements, from the initial phase of the occupation until its very end.

Toward the end of the meeting, the conferees discussed control over airports. Weeks and Zhukov could not agree on who should have Staaken or Gatow—Staaken’s buildings were in the British Sector but not the landing field—and decided to consider the issue later. The parties readily agreed, however, to give the United States exclusive use of Tempelhof.65 Although this massive facility—the largest in the world—lay in the American Sector, it was not self-evident that Zhukov would relinquish it entirely, for it was Berlin’s main airport.

Weeks and Clay then agreed on Zhukov’s offer of an air lane from Berlin to Magdeburg. From that point, the lane would fork into two paths, one turning southwest to Frankfurt and the other toward Hannover. The single route soon proved unsatisfactory from the standpoint of flight safety. Hence, on 30 November 1945, the Control Council approved the recommendations of its Air Directorate to establish three corridors over the Soviet Zone to Berlin and to develop strict flight rules for all aircraft using them.66 Unlike the earlier agreements, the decision over air corridors was a formal act of the Control Council, and thus became a solemnized obligation.

The land access arrangement, however, remained a gentlemen’s accord between Zhukov, Weeks, and Clay. It never took shape as a protocol. The U.S. record of it was contained in notes prepared by General Parks. Clay and his political adviser, Robert D. Murphy, kept copies in their office files, but few others saw them. Parks first sent his notes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 April 1948, and Murphy followed with a copy to the State Department six days later. In his letter of transmittal Murphy wrote:

A number of decisions were taken regarding the practical features of the quadripartite occupation of Berlin and the use of the corridor to Berlin-Helmstedt by railroad and air. As you understand, this agreement was never formalized, each party having made its own notes. However, during the interval that has elapsed since June 29, 1945, the lines of agreement have become established by daily usage and practice.67

The very lateness of the access talks—two days before the initial movement of allied forces into Berlin—as well as the informal nature of the agreement, are perplexing, and beg the question as to why the European Advisory Committee had not settled the issue as part of the agreement on zones. The answer is threefold. First, the War Department regarded the matter as a military issue that should be resolved by commanders on the basis of prevailing circumstances. How could anyone foresee American military requirements or know which roads would be most suitable or even passable? In effect, lacking
War Department approval to settle the matter in advance, the U.S. delegation in London had no leave to negotiate. Second, the Soviet delegation’s head, Ambassador Gousev, worked to keep the access question off the commission’s agenda. At the same time, he asserted that access across the Soviet Zone was already implied in the zonal protocol and stated flatly that “arrangements for transit facilities will be made, providing the United States and United Kingdom forces and control personnel full access to the Berlin zone across Soviet-occupied territory.”

Third, Ambassador Winant was eager to complete the zonal protocol and did not want further complications. He vehemently rebuffed an effort by Murphy to define access rights through the protocol. Free access to Berlin was implicit in the U.S. right to be there, Winant argued, and to raise the question at that point would upset the hard-won agreement and impede additional settlements.

Murphy revived this argument when his memoir, Diplomat Among Warriors, appeared in 1964. He asserted: “[T]he deliberate decision not to seek a specific understanding on the Berlin access question had a disastrous aftermath.” He laid the greatest blame on Winant—a Republican supporter of the New Deal, three-term governor of New Hampshire, and first head of the Social Security Board—but insinuated that the ambassador had Roosevelt’s explicit backing. Murphy attributed the failings of both men to their misplaced desire to build trust with the Soviets and to their theory that individual relationships—Roosevelt’s with Stalin and Winant’s with Gousev—could somehow “determine national policy.”

Murphy’s critique had the air of personal score-settling, tinged, as it was, with a professional’s disdain for political interlopers. Apart from its tendentious groundings, however, its chief shortcoming was its reference to a “disastrous aftermath” that never occurred. In fact, for most of the Cold War era, the access regime functioned smoothly and met all military and civilian requirements in Berlin. The Soviets challenged it twice—once physically, during the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949; and once verbally, during the Berlin Crisis of 1958. These two confrontations had political origins and ramifications unrelated to the existence or nonexistence of written access guarantees for Allied forces in West Berlin, and in neither case were the outcomes disastrous. In extremis, the Soviets could have violated a written protocol just as quickly as a gentlemen’s accord. The geography was the same in either circumstance, and pretexts were always available.

THE AMERICANS ARRIVE

On 29 June the military government detachment A1A1 was preparing to occupy its new quarters near Halle. An avid equestrian, Howley discovered two big stables with many fine horses, which he dreamed of taking to Berlin as part of “my horse-show team.” Maginnis took the day to survey Leipzig. While there, he claimed two Opels and one Mercedes from a collection of automobiles gathered by U.S. officers who were combing the countryside for “prise de guerre” before the Soviets arrived.

In the morning of the following day, 30 June, Parks issued orders for U.S. forces to start moving out of Halle on 1 July, with all main units to be completely clear of the city within three days. For those who had never been privy to the high-level discussions, the order came like a bolt of lightning. It had “caught us in the middle of many schemes and plans,” wrote Howley, who was still astounded by the wealth of the area the Americans were leaving. Because the movement involved not only the Berlin District Headquarters but also the 2d Armored Division and all supporting troops, the units were submerged in a roar of activity, packing equipment, coordinating departure times, and planning road movements. This frenetic surge of effort resembled a Soviet practice known as “storming”—waiting until the last day to do a whole month’s work. Truman, after all, had informed his commanders on 18 June of the date of redeployment.

A preliminary reconnaissance party, which numbered approximately 2,000 men and 434 vehicles, departed Halle at 0600 on 1 July, just as Soviet reconnaissance units were arriving. The military government detachment, with light vehicles, took the lead, once again with Howley’s prized Horch. The convoy operated under quartermaster rules, with all vehicles moving down the autobahn in a tightly packed line at

A U.S. military government detachment camps in the Grünewald after the initial convoy into the city.
twenty miles per hour, the speed of the slowest trucks. Unlike Howley’s trip to Babelsberg ten days earlier, the journey was uneventful, slowed only by crossings of the Elbe and Mulde Rivers. The lead group reached Berlin at 1700.

A humorous entry to Maginnis’ personal diary described the first night American occupation forces spent in Berlin:

With no billets to go to, we would end up in the Grünewald, that great forest park in the southwestern area of the city. We had to set up pup tents in the mud and rain, and crawl into them for the night. . . . I had managed to avoid pup tents throughout World War II, yet here I was, with the war over and making a triumphal entry into Berlin, established in that dreaded form of shelter under the most dreary and uncomfortable conditions.

“This was,” as Maginnis wryly noted, “undoubtedly history’s most unimpressive entry into the capital of a defeated nation by a conquering power.”

**Notes**


7. For organization and personnel, see Rpt, Office of Military Government, Berlin District, Six Months Report, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, pp. 5–6, Historians files, CMH.


11. Howley Diary, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 7

12. Memo, Smith, for Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, 22 Feb 1945, sub: Planning Directive for the Organization of Berlin District, file AGTS/8/6, OMGUS, BAK.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford,
German Affairs, to H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, 15 Jun 1945, in FRUS, Potsdam, 1945, 1:100.
40. History Rpt, HQ, Berlin District, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, part 1, chapter 2, p. 3; and see also p. 2.
41. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
45. Howley Diary, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 112.
46. Ibid., p. 117.
47. Ibid., p. 121.
48. Ibid., p. 122; see also Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 28–32.
51. Ibid., p. 127.
52. Ibid., p. 129.
53. Ibid., p. 131; and see also pp. 129–30.
54. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, p. 259; and see also pp. 257–58.
55. Howley Diary, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 132.
57. Howley Diary, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, pp. 133–35.
58. Telg, Truman to Stalin, 14 Jun 1945, in FRUS, Potsdam, 1945. See also, Telg, Churchill to Stalin, 15 Jun 1945, in FRUS, Potsdam, 1945.
60. Parks Diary, 28 Jun 1945.
63. MFR, Parks, 29 Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 3:359; and see also p. 358.
64. Ibid., pp. 358–59.
65. Ibid., pp. 360–61.
67. Lt. Murphy to Charles Saltzman, Asst Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, 7 Apr 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 3:353.
68. Gousev cited in Telg, Nicholas Gallman, Chargé in the United Kingdom, to Stettinius, 6 Nov 1944, in FRUS, 1944, 1:384.
70. Ibid., pp. 230–32. See also Telg, Gallman to Stettinius, 6 Nov 1944; Philip E. Moseley, “The Dismemberment of Germany,” Foreign Affairs, 28 Jul 1950, pp. 580–604.
71. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 233.
72. Ibid.
73. Howley Diary, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 135.
75. Howley Diary, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 135.
Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. A manuscript, preferably in Microsoft Word format, should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take, or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable Army History to obtain permission to reproduce the images, if necessary.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images on readable electronic media (DVD, CD, USB flash drive) by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Collins Hall, Bldg. 35, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.
Review by J. Britt McCarley

Virginia is famous for military history sites, especially American Civil War battlefields that contribute to the state’s acclaimed tourism. By contrast, virtually unknown are Virginia’s numerous Revolutionary War sites. Thanks to historian John Maass and his study of the British invasion of Virginia of 1780–1781, we now have an insightful narrative packed with primary source citations (many useful for staff rides), dozens of maps of roads and byways traversed by the adversaries, and abundant modern photographs of key locations. The author’s compilation of this information has produced the best, most concise history of Lt. Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis’ campaign that spread havoc across the Tidewater and Piedmont regions in the spring and summer of 1781.

Maass begins by assessing the war’s Southern Campaign strategy. Despite expectations of timely and decisive victory in Georgia and the Carolinas beginning in 1778–1779, the British war effort there deadlocked by 1780. The crown’s North American commander-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, and his second-in-command, Cornwallis, held diametrical visions of Southern strategy, with the former favoring crushing leftover resistance in the Carolinas and Georgia, and the latter advocating turning northward and overrunning Virginia and the Middle Colonies, ending with the New England seat of rebellion. After failing to win a decisive battlefield victory in the Carolinas and without coordination with Clinton, his superior in New York City, Cornwallis marched from North Carolina in April 1781, entered Virginia, and immediately began a campaign of despoliation over much of the southeastern and central parts of the state, intending to knock it out of the war and deprive American forces to the south of the logistics sustaining operations there. Earlier British raids and expeditions had targeted the Tidewater’s tobacco economy, which financed supplies and weapons not otherwise available or produced.

When Cornwallis arrived in Petersburg in mid-May, the British had been operating along the lower James River since the previous autumn. Largely untouched by war since 1779, Virginia was now unprepared to defend itself, with the few militiamen and Continentals scattered around and Governor Thomas Jefferson unable to coordinate the state’s government for defense. Lt. Gen. George Washington, the Continental Army commander checking the British garrison at New York City, sent Maj. Gen. Marquis de Lafayette and most of the American light infantry south in March to oppose Cornwallis. Too weak to resist the British directly, the Frenchman wisely chose, Maass asserts, to “keep his distance from his powerful foe while retiring toward [Brig. Gen. Anthony] Wayne’s expected line of march [of his southward trekking Continental line infantry]” (p. 57).

As the Americans put central Virginia’s numerous rivers between themselves and the British and protected the state’s manufacturing resources around Fredericksburg, Cornwallis dashed westward against two American centers of gravity: state politicians gathered around Charlottesville and supply caches along the upper James River, feebly protected by Maj. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben’s understrength and undertrained Continents and militia. While Cornwallis succeeded only partially in both cases, Lafayette and Wayne united and gave chase to the British. Maass maintains that, needing to retain access to the Tidewater and the Royal Navy’s succor, “Cornwallis’s operations [now assumed] a defensive quality compared to his destructive expedition in May and June” (p. 135). For the rest of the Virginia Campaign, American and British forces continued their cat-and-mouse game, fighting the state’s largest, yet indecisive, battle at Green Spring on 6 July 1781—all ending with Cornwallis holing up at the Yorktown tobacco port futilely awaiting reinforcement or redirection from Clinton, and Lafayette again remaining safely distant and waiting for reinforcement from Washington and his French countrymen allied with the Americans. Maass’ history ends anticipating the 1781 Siege of Yorktown, which essentially ended the military phase of the American War of Independence and provided the precondition for peace negotiations that led to the creation of an independent United States of America.

One of the author’s greatest contributions to the Virginia Campaign’s historiography is his clarification of how many of the state’s enslaved people were attached to the British Army, either because they ran away from their masters or because Corn-
wallis’ men freed them. Other histories put that number upwards of 10,000–12,000, which Maass concludes is “inconsistent with the enormous logistical burden this would have placed on the British Army providing the runaways with even meager provisions” (p. 100). Employing convincing evidence, he reduces the likely total to a more sustainable 3,000–4,000.

This reviewer found only two secondary sources that could add depth to Maass’ study. Robert Fallaw and Marion W. Storer’s “The Old Dominion Under Fire: The Chesapeake Invasions, 1779–1781” chapter in Ernest M. Miller’s (ed.) Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution (Centreville, Md., 1981) covers the indecisive but significant “tobacco wars” preceding Cornwallis’ 1781 arrival. Also, Charles E. Hatch Jr.’s 1945 article in The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, “The Affair Near James Island (or, “The Battle of Green Spring”) July 6, 1781,” details the selfsame engagement. These bibliographic quibbles notwithstanding, Maass’ campaign history of Virginia’s 1781 tribulation expertly fills a critical gap in the American Revolution’s historiography.

**Review by Mark L. Bradley**

Fought on 28 July 1864 during the American Civil War, the Battle of Ezra Church was the third sortie for Atlanta launched by the Confederate Army of Tennessee since General John Bell Hood assumed command ten days earlier. Starting in early May, Hood’s predecessor, General Joseph E. Johnston, had conducted a fighting retreat from Dalton in north Georgia to the gates of Atlanta. Hood knew that his reputation for audacity was the reason President Jefferson Davis had chosen him to replace the more cautious Johnston. So far, however, Hood had failed to defeat Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s army group in the assault at Peachtree Creek on 20 July or in the Battle of Atlanta two days later. At Ezra Church, Hood hoped to block Sherman’s movement to capture East Point, where the Atlanta and West Point Railroad met the Macon and Western Railroad. The loss of those key supply lines would mean nothing less than the loss of Atlanta itself.

The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta is Earl J. Hess’ second book on the Atlanta Campaign, following his 2013 study on the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. In addition, he has written almost two-dozen books on other Civil War topics. In his latest work, the author notes that the commanders of the Union and Confederate forces converging west of Atlanta were both new to their jobs. The commander of Hood’s old corps, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, was young, inexperienced, and a recent arrival in the Army of Tennessee. Just two weeks before Ezra Church, Lee had launched a series of disjointed attacks against a Federal force at Tupelo, Mississippi, only to incur heavy losses for no gain. Hess notes that “the Battle of Tupelo was an eerie foreshadowing of what was to come at Ezra Church.” As a corps commander, Lee was thrust into a position for which he was, “at the least, not prepared and, at the worst, ill-suited to fill” (p. 21).

Lee’s adversary was Union Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, the newly promoted commander of the Army of the Tennessee (named for the river, not the state for which the Confederate Army of Tennessee was named). Historians tend to be critical in their treatment of Howard, but Hess is a conspicuous exception. While conceding that Howard had blundered at Chancellorsville and Pickett’s Mill, Hess counters that “every commander, Sherman included, committed a mistake or two for every success he achieved in the war” (p. 16). There was also the matter of Maj. Gen. John A. Logan, the acting commander of the Army of the Tennessee, whose long association with that organization made him the obvious choice in the eyes of his soldiers. But Hess observes that Sherman regarded Logan as a politician first and soldier second, whereas the West Point–educated Howard was a thorough professional who “had all the qualifications for handling both the administrative and the operational tasks associated with the command” (p. 18).

Hood’s orders to Lee were to check the enemy “and not to attack unless the enemy exposes himself in attacking us” (p. 54). Instead, Lee “made a snap decision to launch a major attack on the Federals and drive them away.” Hess condemns Lee’s decision as a “tragic mistake” that generated thousands of casualties “in a battlefield endeavor with dubious
prospects” (p. 56). Lee did not bother to inform Hood of his decision, nor did he seek the advice of his subordinates. Worse yet, he did not know his command, the strength of the Union position his men were about to attack, or even the terrain they were about to cross.

Lacking entrenching tools, Union troops constructed a rude breastwork of rails, logs, stones, and even knapsacks, giving them a distinct advantage over the Confederates, who attacked across mostly open ground. In his eagerness to strike the enemy, Lee fed each of his units into the assault as they happened to arrive on the field, a modus operandi that all but ensured failure. This piecemeal deployment resulted in about 3,300 Confederate casualties compared with just 632 Union losses. Despite the 5-to-1 disparity, some Federal soldiers claimed that Ezra Church “was the most stubbornly contested and bloodiest battlefield of the campaign.” Hess notes that one of the rebel brigades briefly captured a portion of the Federal line, while other Confederates “engaged in hand-to-hand combat across the Union breastwork” (p. 195). In any event, the hotly contested fight was a lopsided defeat that cost the Confederates dearly, knocking out heavy skirmish lines instead of launching full-scale assaults, but he partially absolves their judgment by noting the repeated failure of the Army of Tennessee to “skirmish properly” during the Atlanta Campaign (p. 197). On the other hand, the author praises Howard for his skillful handling of his new command, and he notes that the skirmishers of the Union XV Corps dominated the opening phase of the battle, buying invaluable time for the troops on the main line to fortify their position.

Hess is of that rare breed of author who manages to be prolific while maintaining a uniformly high standard of scholarship. Yet even the best scholars sometimes overreach, as in the case of Hess’ contention that “the rate of Union rifle fire at Ezra Church dwarfed that of nearly every other battle in the Civil War” (p. 199). He bases his argument on the statement of a Union Army chaplain that the 26th Illinois Infantry fired a total of 40,000 rounds during the battle. He then multiplies this figure forty-three times to reflect the number of Union regiments that participated in the battle, and arrives at a total of 1,720,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. This tenuous extrapolation is a slender reed on which to base such a sweeping argument, but its chief strength is that it cannot be disproved without more concrete evidence. This is a minor lapse in an otherwise excellent study, however, and this reviewer hopes the author will continue his outstanding work on the Atlanta Campaign.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina (Lexington, Ky., 2009). His current book project is the official Army history of logistical support in Vietnam.

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

As 1917 began, the British Empire had been at war with the Central Powers for almost two and a half years, but the bloody fighting in the main theater—the Western Front—had yielded little more than horrendous numbers of casualties, and not much was going right in the outlying theaters as well. As the losses mounted, Britain alone could hardly replace the large numbers of new soldiers, sailors, and airmen required, so the “young lions”—countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—composing the empire were called on to help the “old lion” defy his foes (note the illustration on the book’s dust jacket). In April, the old lion’s spirits were also greatly bolstered when the United States declared war on Germany. Turning Point 1917: The British Empire at War, a collection of nine essays edited by two faculty members of the Royal Military College of Canada, examines several of the problems that faced the Imperial war effort in 1917.

An interesting piece titled “The Africanization of British Imperial Forces in the East African Campaign,” written by Canadian historian Tim Stapleton, looks at how the British
began using more African troops in their fighting in German East Africa (modern-day Burundi, Rwanda, and mainland Tanzania). The British initially depended on white troops, primarily raised in South Africa, but these soldiers did not respond well to the hot and humid environment and were ravaged by disease. For example, the 9th South African Infantry Battalion started with 1,135 men in February 1916, but had only 116 effectives by October. The solution was to begin using black soldiers of the King’s African Rifles (KAR), who were better able to survive in the jungle conditions. The KAR had been raised before the war “to patrol the frontiers and provide internal security for the British territories of Uganda, Kenya, and Nyasaland” (p. 146). The force was greatly expanded with black soldiers recruited from communities with imagined martial traditions, and their white officers were seconded from the British Army. The KAR was officially an all-volunteer force, but colonial officials assigned quotas to local chiefs, who used some forms of coercion to gather sufficient recruits. African carriers (porters) were also essential to logistically support military operations, and by the end of the war almost one million carriers had been employed. Sadly, around 100,000 of these men died, mainly from disease and exhaustion. The British chose not to use African troops in Europe, but the French used about 130,000 black soldiers from western Africa on the Western Front.

New Zealand Defence Force historian John Crawford provides an engaging essay with “The Willing Horse is Being Worked to Death: New Zealand’s Manpower Problems and Policies During 1917.” Although New Zealand’s population was only just over one million in 1917, the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) ended the year with a strength of almost 63,000 men (an infantry division and a mounted rifle brigade), even after suffering almost 24,000 casualties that year (more than the previous years of the war combined). The NZEF wound up substantially overreinforced, and New Zealanders began to feel that they were contributing disproportionately to the Imperial war effort. This led their government to limit further manpower commitments. The author concludes: “New Zealand did not cease to be a willing horse, but it was a horse that balked at being ridden too hard” (p. 133).

“The Egyptian Expeditionary Force [EEF] in 1917” is a contribution from the late Australian historian Jeffrey Grey. The Middle East was the second-most important British theater of operations throughout the war, and Grey writes that “1917 provides a dividing line for understanding the British war in the Middle East” (p. 102). Unfortunately, the senior officer in Egypt “could never be certain that he either had resources sufficient to complete the tasks and directions that London assigned or that he could rely upon keeping what he did possess for any period of time” (p. 104). In 1917, success finally came to the EEF after General Sir Edmund Allenby arrived in Cairo from France in June. Allenby effectively worked with what resources he had, reorganized his Australian, British, and New Zealand troops into three corps (two infantry and one mounted), and was able to successfully defeat his Ottoman enemies, advancing northward through Palestine and capturing Jerusalem before the end of the year. In addition to being an outstanding leader who cultivated excellent relationships with his notoriously ill-disciplined Australian and New Zealand troops, General Allenby also benefited from the gradual degradation of the Ottoman Army.

The remaining six essays examine other diverse facets of the Imperial war effort in 1917: the challenges of the seemingly interminable war, the Admiralty’s naval blockade of Germany (strengthened by the U.S. Navy’s entry into the war), the Imperial Munitions Board and merchant shipbuilding in Canada, the relationship between the British General Headquarters and the Dominions, Montreal’s anticonscription disturbances (May–September), and how the British media handled the image of the Empire. All of the writings are well chosen, and they underscore the fact that there is much more to properly understanding World War I than just focusing on the Western Front. The volume would have benefitted from more illustrations and maps—four of the essays have none—but for aficionados of the Great War, Turning Point 1917 is a must-read.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901 (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.

Review by Peter L. Belmonte

Since 1918, numerous memoirs, diaries, and letters of World War I veterans have appeared in print. Through those
writings, we may learn a little about what it was like to be an infantryman, artilleryman, or engineer. However, an interested reader will be hard pressed to find firsthand accounts of military chaplains. A notable exception is Father Francis Duffy, the well-known chaplain of the U.S. Army 165th Infantry Regiment, 42d Division, who wrote his memoir in 1919. Otherwise, one must search through regimental histories or other records to glean bits of information, and even in those chronicles, chaplains, if they are mentioned at all, are either praised or vilified; rarely are they given their own voice.

Michael E. Shay, a senior superior court judge in Connecticut with family connections to the 26th (Yankee) Division, has written several books about the unit and its controversial commander, Maj. Gen. Clarence Edwards. His latest effort, *Sky Pilots: The Yankee Division Chaplains in World War I*, begins to fill the historical lacuna about U.S. military chaplains in the Great War. Shay mined public and private archives and uncovered chaplains’ correspondence and other pertinent documents. He also scoured a wide variety of unit histories and memoirs to find references to Yankee Division chaplains. The author used these sources, along with newspaper articles and military records, to give the reader an idea of how the chaplains worked, what they thought about their mission and their men, and the struggles they faced.

In the first chapter, Shay relates a brief history of the U.S. Army chaplaincy. Like most other aspects of national defense, the chaplain corps was not prepared for the onset of war in 1917. During that year, according to the author, “in the Regular Army itself, there were a total of seventy-four chaplains, along with an additional seventy-two in the National Guard” (p. 3). Indeed, it wasn’t until 3 March 1918, that the first Army Chaplain School class convened. A large number of patriotic ministers joined the military, and others served through private religious organizations. Still, the Army was not able to recruit enough chaplains to adequately serve its men during the war.

In subsequent chapters, Shay highlights the experiences of many of the Yankee Division chaplains against the backdrop of the general history of the division, with chapters based on events in the Toul Sector, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Troyon, and Verdun. A chaplain’s typical duties included conducting religious services, addressing the men’s spiritual and physical needs, comforting the sick and wounded, and burying the dead. While tending to the wounded under fire, chaplains were exposed to the same hazards as the men they were accompanying. One cleric, Captain Walton Danker, assigned to the 104th Infantry Regiment, was killed in action in June 1918 when he was hit by a shell fragment in the Toul Sector. Other chaplains were wounded, including 1st Lt. Ray Anderson, who described his encounter with mustard gas while serving with the 103d Infantry Regiment: “My eyes were slower in swelling, but Monday night I couldn’t lie down, and I just about went wild and more from the mustard gas in my eyes. It was just like two red hot stove pokers being pushed into your brain” (p. 103).

There was no doubt that some chaplains blurred the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. During part of the action in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1st Lt. Robert Campbell Jr., with the 101st Field Artillery Regiment, “went from gun to gun, loading the shells and pulling the lanyard” (p. 102). Campbell likely was not alone in giving way to his zeal and excitement in the heat of battle.

Many World War I chaplains were recorded as having great affection for their “boys.” Writing to a fellow minister, Anderson said, “I wish you could know my men; they are outward ‘bums’ but inward saints and all heroes. I never knew God made such wonderful fellows before” (p. 92). Of course, such feelings and experiences were not universal. Consider the address given by Father (1st Lt.) John Tucker to soldiers of the 103d Field Artillery Regiment soon after the Armistice: “You ought to be ashamed to go home and face your friends and families after the sort of lives you have been living over here” (p. 116).

The book’s final chapter is devoted to giving brief accounts of the postwar lives of thirty-two chaplains. Most of the men returned to the ministry in some form; several, their health compromised by their strenuous wartime service, died within a decade or so after the war. Especially interesting is an account of Guthrie Speers, who served as a chaplain in the 102d Infantry Regiment. The unit had received many replacements who were draftees from the Midwest, and Speers spent a great deal of time traveling throughout the region to visit the families of his men who had been killed in action.

Any book that deals with some aspect of the 26th Division in World War I must inevitably address the controversy surrounding General Edwards, the division’s commander during most of the war. Shay, an overall advocate of Edwards, addresses the general’s removal from command in October 1918 with a single paragraph. Admitting that Edwards was “opinionated, often critical of fellow officers, including his superiors, and sometimes [Edwards] ignored orders” (p. 106), Shay concludes “there was no excuse for [General John J.] Pershing’s vindictive action at that stage of the war” (p. 106).

The book contains thirty-five illustrations, including photographs of many of the chaplains. Shay also includes a roster of thirty-five men who served as chaplains with the Yankee Division in France, and another three who served with the unit stateside. He gives each man’s religious affiliation, rank (if military), unit of assignment, and some other biographical information. Of these, thirty-two were military officers, and the others were associated with a civilian religious organization such as the YMCA, Knights of Columbus, or Jewish Welfare Board. Most were Catholic or Protestant, but there also were two Jewish chaplains (one a commissioned officer, the other a civilian). At least thirteen were cited for gallantry or earned medals ranging from the Distinguished Service Cross and Croix de Guerre to the later-awarded Silver Star and Purple Heart. Ten chaplains were immigrants, an indication of the demographic makeup of the Army itself.

Shay has not intended this work to be a scholarly treatment of the Army chaplaincy in the 26th Division during
the war. Rather, he tells the chaplains’ story largely in their own words, and in the words of those whom they served. The 26th is well covered by division and regimental histories and memoirs, and this book is a fine addition to that historiography.

**Review by Panagiotis Delis**

The 1940s are the most researched period of modern Greek history, and the fact that Spiros Tsoutsoumpis’ book *A History of the Greek Resistance in the Second World War: The People’s Armies* offers new insights makes it a meaningful contribution. Until recently, scholars have tried to analyze the phenomenon of resistance as a political process and have viewed guerrillas as the apostles of a new era that fought explicitly for ideology. In contrast, Tsoutsoumpis writes about Greece’s two largest World War II resistance organizations, the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), and the Greek Democratic National Army (EDES), but neither idealizes nor demonizes them. The main goal of his study is to depict a more nuanced image of the resistance on the mainland and to underline the specific circumstances that made those groups the leading forces in Axis-occupied Greece. The author attempts this by trying to understand the everyday life of the guerrillas, their perceptions, and their relations with the social context in which they operated.

Chapter 1 outlines the chief reasons for the delay in the creation of an armed resistance movement and describes how the first year of the occupation shaped the situation in favor of the peasantry. Famine, the dependence of the urban centers on the countryside, social disintegration, and the collapse of the prewar elites for the first time gave the upper hand to the people living in villages. The penetration of the resistance networks in these closed communities would have been impossible without kinship, regional affiliation, and family ties. The gradual involvement of the villagers in the resistance shaped their initial motives, and the exercising of political agency gave it new meaning. Nevertheless, one of the main differences between the peasants and the guerrillas was that the sole concern of the former was to preserve the safety of their families, and this might explain their reluctance to support ELAS and EDES. The effort by the resistance to monopolize violence and protect the villagers from the numerous bands that flourished in the first year of the occupation gave them a degree of legitimacy. The instrumental role of mayhem altered the old ties of the communities and created a climate of fear that, in the end, allowed the guerrillas to dictate their own terms.

The second chapter addresses the issue of recruitment and how the resistance proliferated. Territorial expansion and the militarization of ELAS and EDES gave them an initial boost. On a personal level, ideology and access to material wealth and prerogatives were important incentives for potential enlistees. Becoming a guerrilla also entailed a rise in prestige because these fighters saw themselves as superior to ordinary civilians. As the gap between various resistance organizations intensified, the people found themselves in a precarious position that left them no choice but to align with the one or other faction.

Chapter 3 is perhaps the most groundbreaking because it covers the neglected aspect of the popular culture of the fighters. The author analyzes the language of symbolism in detail and carefully follows the process of creating new identities. The new warrior, in the tradition of the Greek Revolution of 1821, was the ideal man who cannot be compared with the simple peasant. He wears a specific uniform and embraces a special code of honor. Masculinity was the key element of acceptance, and the resistance provided an opportunity for many youth to escape the traditional confines of their families for the first time. The complete disregard for civilian life and the constant transgressive actions underpinned the resistance’s sense of superiority toward ordinary people. The brutalizing effect of combat generated a culture that celebrated violence and ultimately downgraded the role of the common people even more. These groups possessed their own rituals, and their violent nature could also be explained by their composition. Unlike the regular army, they included a large proportion of people who came from the criminal underground and found the prospect of violence appealing. Inevitably, the whole process of expansion of the resistance resulted in large-scale social mobility, and for the first time, many lowland peasants came in contact with people from the mountains.

In the fourth chapter, the author explores the world of rituals and the
role of religion, as well as the ties that were forged among the guerrillas. The common misconception of the resistance armies as political forces has led scholars to marginalize the role of Christianity. Tsoutsoumpis defends the importance of religion, which he presents through several examples. He explains the organic role regarding the bond that Christianity offers between old and new members. Music also played an important role, likely because many songs presented an idealized image of the future, giving meaning and a sense of purpose to people living in extremely harsh conditions. The absence of a home front and increasing isolation further enhanced personal ties and rendered each individual responsible for the primary group. The turning point that reversed this process occurred when ELAS and EDES were transformed into regular armies, and the detrimental effects of this transition were multiple: it deprived the junior cadres of the necessary freedom of movement and it nearly destroyed the regional character of the units. As the war was intensifying, influential leaders were more prone to use their power to access benefits, while new factors such as coercion, fear, and religion became the forces that made men resilient to hardship.

The last chapter deals with the establishment of control in the areas run by the guerrillas. In contrast to the approach that sees the formation of the resistance authority as the end of the clientelist networks and patronage, the author demonstrates that the corruption of National Liberation Front (EAM) officials not only involved clientelism, but reinforced it. Both ELAS and EDES created their own systems of justice—mainly in the form of the peoples’ or revolutionary courts—and their own police, which consisted of reserves until 1944. One of the central qualitative differences between ELAS and EDES regarding the state building process was that EDES operated with a more decentralized model. Its leaders remained loyal to their regional priorities until the end, and it did not have a unifying ideology. In contrast, EAM possessed a more coherent ideological framework and was more willing to use violence because it was legitimized as a means to bring about a social revolution. The author identifies the fierce antipartisan operations of the Wehrmacht and the failure of the guerrillas to protect locals as the main reasons behind two crucial outcomes: a growing resentment toward the resistance and the emergence of a series of collaborationist formations. In particular, the second outcome created a series of new problems for the peasantry because it intensified local fragmentation and violence—a result of all sides demanding unconditional support and equating neutrality with treason. Nevertheless, the resistance’s role in free Greece sparked ground-breaking social transformations, enabled women and young people to participate as political agents, and permanently destabilized the power relations within the conservative rural communities.

Overall, Tsoutsoumpis’ work is an important study that offers a social “history from below” and successfully manages to illuminate themes that have hitherto not attracted scholars’ attention. The book is a must-read for researchers and students interested in World War II, modern Greek history, and guerrilla warfare.

Panagiotis Delis is a Ph.D. candidate at the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Centre for Hellenic Studies at Simon Fraser University. He holds degrees in history and finance from the University of Athens. He also has a master’s degree in the history of international relations from the London School of Economics and a master’s degree in comparative history from Central European University. His current project is focused on a comparative analysis of the participation of Greece and Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.

Review by Chris Buckham

The War in Indochina is perhaps best remembered today for the decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. However, the conflict that led up to that rout was protracted, brutal, and new—new in terms of the style of warfare being fought and the impact the result would have well beyond the borders of Indochina. In A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945–1954, author Charles R. Shrader has approached the war from an unconventional perspective—one that has been heretofore a facet but not a central theme of works on the war—that of logistics and its role in the victory of the Viet Minh and the defeat of the French. This was a war won and lost entirely on the strengths and weaknesses of the combatants’ respective logistics capabilities and doctrines.

Shrader has effectively woven an insightful evaluation and analysis of the operational doctrine of both parties while maintaining his central theme of the key impact of logistics. Commencing with a strategic view of the conflict, he looks at the psychology and hubris of the post-World War II French and their assumption of superiority over the Viet Minh. This mindset, combined with an unstable national approach of the French government, precluded the assignment of manpower and material that ultimately were required for success.
The author leads into the Viet Minh’s successful recognition of the need to not only outfight the French, but also to outlast them. The three-stage operational approach combined with a successful utilization of the strength of the Vietnamese people—human capital—enabled a flexible and dynamic asymmetric approach to conflict that the European approach of the French struggled to counter.

Shrader discusses at length how heavy weapons and combined arms operations heavily based on the lessons learned during European conflicts served as the French forces’ central method of engagement. Artillery, armor, aircraft, and naval contingents enabled the French to control set points, but they surrendered the countryside—and by extension, the initiative—to the more mobile and agile Viet Minh. The nature of the French approach to warfare resulted in a heavy logistics requirement that was difficult to meet. Strategically, long lines of support stretching back to France or Japan due to a lack of an integral industrial capability in Indochina meant long delays in the meeting of demands. Operationally, the French need to establish isolated forward operating bases to counter the inflow of the Viet Minh forces and supplies required a reliance on air or naval resupply methods that were costly, inefficient, and resource intensive.

Conversely, the Viet Minh acknowledged their inability to counter the French in set piece battles and, for the most part, did not allow themselves to be drawn into fights where they may be subjected to superior French armament. Shrader identifies how Viet Minh leaders played a superior international hand by securing their lines of support from China. In addition, their requirements were far less extensive. The author has undertaken extensive in-depth research that backs up his conclusions. The typical Viet Minh soldier, for example, required approximately half of the daily weight of requirements of his French counterpart. The depth to which the author goes in his analysis of the typical demands of the respective forces is enlightening to the reader; the French demands far outstripped their capability while the Viet Minh adjusted their tactics according to their logistics capability and expertise.

The book also illustrates the flexibility of the Viet Minh logistics methodology compared to that of the French. Being far less technologically encumbered, they were significantly more agile in their mobility and much less rigid in their operational doctrine, and thereby able to manipulate their procedures far faster than their adversary. Unlike the French, who were, for the most part, confined to preexisting Indochinese transport infrastructure and vehicles, the Viet Minh developed a national level mobilization process whereby noncombatants were obliged to support operations through their use as porters. Regional command structures were created to facilitate the uninterrupted flow of supplies from one section to the next through transfers between regionally assigned porters. The Viet Minh also developed the science of camouflage to previously unseen levels and maintained field craft discipline rigidly. The French were never able to develop a counter strategy to effectively undermine this tactic.

Shrader makes it clear that the French were not incompetent, merely hamstrung through a lack of logistics flexibility, an unresponsive doctrine, an inaccurate paradigm of their adversary based on preexisting hubris, an unsupportive national government, and a logistics dogma rooted in a European operational theater. French forces were able to achieve some successes against the Viet Minh, and their use of air and riverine resupply systems supported off-road operations well. Unfortunately, the depth of capacity was heavily in favor of the Viet Minh because their effort was viewed as a national struggle and, consequently, given the support required through a more universally supported approach. The French certainly had the upper hand during some periods of the conflict—most notably, when they successfully cut off Viet Minh access to critical rice growing regions (which served as a trade currency as well as supply for the Viet Minh). However, the logistics limitations suffered by the French were simply too great to enable them to follow up on their local successes.

Shrader’s book is an excellent study of the critical importance that logistics plays in the effective execution of tactical operations and strategic campaigns. For a vast majority of the conflict, French technology heavily outweighed the Viet Minh; that the French were unable to defeat them is testament to the ability of the Viet Minh to offset French advantage through nontraditional tactics and supply doctrine. The author has presented a balanced and in-depth study of this conflict and his conclusions are well supported through the use of primary source material from both sides. This is a book well worth reading for operators and supporters alike.
produced a great work on insurgencies, insurgent groups, and how to counter them. Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State is intended to “better understand how [insurgent] groups start, wage, and end insurgencies” (p. 4). The book focuses on four main points that include the rise of insurgent groups, key components of insurgencies, factors that contribute to ending insurgencies, and what all this analysis means for counterinsurgency and counterinsurgents. Jones is correct in stating that there is a massive divide between academics (and their theories) and practitioners (p. 4). Waging Insurgent Warfare is an attempt—and successful one—in narrowing that gap.

While the author is well versed in the current state of insurgencies, the scope of the book covers the end of World War II to 2015. This timeframe is more manageable for the reader and serves as a guide for academics and practitioners alike. Since the end of the Second World War, 181 insurgencies have been fought, each lasting an average of twelve years. It is interesting to note that following the end of the Cold War, the number peaked, but by 2015, the total had dwindled to thirty-eight (p. 5). Of those events occurring since 1945, the insurgent group has won 35 percent of the time. Twenty-nine percent of insurgencies ended in a draw, while 36 percent concluded with the rebels’ defeat (p. 9).

The author takes great care in defining what constitutes insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. While his definitions are not perfect, they are simple and free of buzzwords and other conjecture. He defines an insurgency as “a political and military campaign by a nonstate group (or groups) to overthrow a regime or secede from a country” (p. 7). Likewise, counterinsurgency is “a political-military campaign to prevent insurgent groups from overthrowing a regime or seceding from a country” (p. 9). These straightforward definitions are an example of Jones’ ability to take agile and complex issues and make them easy to understand. This is a vital element that will certainly help shrink the divide between academics and practitioners and make the book more appealing to readers.

The majority of the book is spent analyzing both successful and unsuccessful insurgencies, their strategies, and tactics. The author does not focus on one or two events, but instead writes in generalities and offers copious amounts of data to support his arguments. While some will take issue with what he labels as victory or defeat, the writer’s approach is common sense and objective. Jones lumps all insurgent strategies under three concepts: guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, and punishment. He defines punishment as the deliberate killing of noncombatants in order to raise societal costs of resistance and coerce governments to concede to insurgent demands (p. 47). Insurgents rarely rely on just one strategy, and often use a mix of at least guerrilla and conventional war strategies. The author makes a startling point that “no insurgent group that has utilized suicide terrorism has yet won an insurgency that has ended” (p. 59). With the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the recent suicide bombing in Manchester, England, this focus on suicide terrorism is timely and important.

The text also deals with numerous tactics and organizational structures used by insurgent groups. The role of social media is discussed as well, but only in one chapter. That is not a flaw with the study, but readers wanting more on that topic will have to look elsewhere. To the book’s credit, the study does discuss the role of Facebook and Twitter and how insurgents have quickly adapted their propaganda message to that medium. Jones does a great job arguing for and against some long-held notions about insurgencies, and he downplays the role of safe havens in insurgents’ success. Such sanctuaries are important, but according to the author, insurgents only won 38 percent of the time if they enjoyed a safe haven (p. 148). The author also makes the accurate claim that there is no road map to start an insurgency, and that each one is nuanced and different (p. 171). This is important to understand, not only for the academic, but also for the practitioner who lives in a world of doctrine. Lastly, Jones makes a bold statement that is well supported by his data: the biggest keys to winning an insurgency include access to great power combat support; working with other insurgent groups in some capacity; and waging of anticolonial wars. The last key means that insurgent groups that are fighting to overthrow a colonial government have a greater chance of success than a group trying to secede (p. 169). Algeria and Vietnam are mainly used to prove this last point.

Waging Insurgent Warfare is a great attempt at understanding insurgencies and how they start, win, or lose their wars. The book is complimented with charts that make the massive amounts of quantitative data easier to absorb. This volume is an improvement on Graveyard of Empires and is much more persuasive and encompassing. The work should appeal to both academics and practitioners and lead to a very healthy debate about how to counter insurgencies. For those interested in this field, this is a must-read.

Dr. Jon B. Mikolashek is the author of several articles on World War II and the Global War on Terrorism. He is also the author of General Mark Clark: Commander of U.S. Fifth Army and Liberator of Rome (Havertown, Pa., 2013). He is an associate professor of history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
Review by William A. Taylor

In The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order, author Sean McFate, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., discusses the recent growth of the private military industry and argues, “The United States has opened the proverbial Pandora’s box, releasing mercenaries into the international security environment, and it has done so, and what that development means for both national and international security. He utilizes a vast array of reports from nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and U.S. government agencies, and augments these sources with references from congressional hearings, magazines, and newspapers. The author also synthesizes prominent books and journal articles on the topic, many of them limited in either scope or detail. Finally, he provides useful annexes that contain sample contracts and timelines.

McFate has organized his book into twelve chapters. In Chapter 1, he looks at the relationship between profit and warfare that produces the phenomenon of contract warfare. Next, he analyzes the contemporary private military industry, much of it spurred by U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the third chapter, the writer explores the close relationship between the United States and the private military industry, something he characterizes as “A Codependency Problem” (p. 19). He considers what preceded this revolution, including such political agreements as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, technological advances like the advent of muskets, and social changes such as the emergence of conscription. As a whole, these shifts allowed states to gain a monopoly on power and the use of force. In Chapter 5, McFate explains how the push for free markets articulated by University of Chicago economists Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, and others, combined with President Bill Clinton’s post-Cold War drawdown of the U.S. military that cut both budgets and personnel by more than a third, spurred a modern resurgence of the private military industry. The author reminds readers that there are precedents to such dynamics. He examines the Middle Ages in Europe using examples of condottieri and landsknechts, illustrating the historical propensity of the private military industry to enlarge itself and to perpetuate war. He also warns of related moral hazards, including plausible deniability and opacity. In Chapter 7, the writer details how all these factors contributed to the modern international security system, beginning with the conclusion of the Thirty Years War and characterized by a state monopoly on power, equality among states, and recognition of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. It also led to the eventual outlawing of mercenaries. McFate outlines the relationship of the private military industry to neomedievalism, something he describes as “a non-state-centric, multipolar international system of overlapping authorities and allegiances within the same territory” (p. 73). Drawing from the work of international relations expert Hedley Bull and others, McFate relates globalization, regional integration, transnational organizations, weak and failing states, and the erosion of state sovereignty directly to a monopoly on force. In Chapter 9, the author highlights the likely contours of warfare under this new system, including an increase in civilian casualties and the resurgence of contract warfare. He presents two revealing case studies: DynCorp International raising and training a new Armed Forces of Liberia beginning in 2004 and the mercenary market in Somalia spurred by heightened piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. The chaos in Somalia resulted in the presence of nearly 200 private security companies, enough to form their own trade association known as the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI). McFate argues that the first case study in Liberia demonstrates the positive potential of the industry, while the second case study of Somalia portends a troubling warn-
The author concludes his work by articulating recent trends in the private military industry, including resilience, globalization, indigenization, and bifurcation.

*The Modern Mercenary* is a noteworthy contribution on an increasingly important topic. To his credit, McFate considers both the benefits of and problems with the private military industry, interjecting useful observations derived from his own experience in Africa with DynCorp International. He also offers nuanced distinctions between such relevant concepts as a free market and a mediated market for force (pp. 158–59) and among such “mercenary” companies as Executive Outcomes and “military enterpriser” ones like Blackwater USA (p. 30). The author also successfully relates such important terms as “neomedievalism” (p. 5) and “commodification of conflict” (p. 18) to international security in illuminating ways. Just as imperatively, the writer highlights the need for increased oversight, perhaps even a Geneva Protocol for the private military industry. Overall, McFate illuminates the shape of a re-emerging trend that has already impacted warfare and will continue to do so. He asks penetrating questions about the implications of this development and offers cogent suggestions on how policymakers can shape the industry moving forward. Most importantly, the author’s personal experience, especially his involvement with the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia, lends a gravitas to the work that explains the industry from within.
In my first Footnote, I observed that the Center of Military History (CMH) was embarking on a wide array of initiatives to improve how it accomplishes its missions. Since then we have successfully implemented the Graduate Research Assistant program, which has expanded to five schools with the addition of contracts with Texas Tech University and Texas A&M University. We are in the midst of achieving another significant change involving how CMH researches, writes, and produces its official history volumes. This grew out of the realization that many of our books took well in excess of a decade to complete. The sheer scale of some of the projects contributed directly to the long timelines, but it also increased the likelihood that an author would take another job, retire, or otherwise leave the project before it was finished, resulting in added time to identify a replacement and get them up to speed.

This new effort began with development of a Book Process Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which went through a number of drafts and internal reviews prior to the Center adopting it as policy in February. We are now turning that document into operational reality. The SOP summarizes the key conditions to meet the objective of ensuring that CMH is “the premier publisher of official history in the federal government.” Those requirements include “hiring and nurturing the best researchers/writers, ensuring that they can focus on their projects, providing timely and clear editorial guidance, and efficiently producing well-regarded books that prove valuable to the Army, academia, and the American public.”

The first and easiest fix contemplated in the SOP is scoping projects so they can be researched and written in a period of about five years. To that end, several volumes already in progress are being recast. Work on a book covering Vietnam logistics, for instance, got under way in the 1980s, but the initial author was sidetracked by his promotion into a supervisory position, and later retired. Another author has been at work on it (with a diversion for the Civil War commemoration series) since 2007. The current partial manuscript is already several hundred pages long, but only takes the story into 1968, so it would be years before this book saw the light of day. Given that other topics in the Vietnam series are dealt with in multiple volumes (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Military and the Media, and Advice and Support), it made sense to devote two volumes to the equally large and important topic of logistics. (In fact, as originally envisioned in the 1970s, it was supposed to be three volumes!) The author has developed a new prospectus for a book covering the period up to the end of 1967, and he will have a revised manuscript within a year. Likewise, the Center has a 900-page manuscript covering combat operations from 1969 through the end of the war, but it was left incomplete when the author took a new job outside CMH. This project will be divided into two, with each part assigned to new authors (probably by contract), so that it can be wrapped up in a more timely manner. A project that is just getting under way—the Army in Europe from 1945 through 1950—will be more narrowly focused on Germany, with a subsequent volume looking at Army activity in the Mediterranean area.

As is evident from these examples, we are not going to delete swaths of history to make the books shorter, but instead more tightly focus each book so that it is likely to be completed by a single author. The rest of the topic will be covered in a second volume. Authors are warming to this aspect of the SOP because they see “light at the end of the tunnel” (to borrow a phrase appropriate to the ongoing Vietnam fiftieth commemoration) on projects that previously seemed to stretch into the distant future.

The graduate research assistants are playing a significant role in speeding up the process, as they will provide considerable help during the research and production phases. They are able to comb secondary literature for relevant sources, wade through large numbers of archival boxes to identify those holding the most relevant records, search for photographs, check footnotes, and perform other tasks that can shave many months off the author’s schedule.

In the next issue, I’ll cover other aspects of the Book Process SOP.