CLICK HERE to go to pages 194-200 for research on Sir Gilbert Parker and Wellington House (British War Propaganda Bureau), WWI Propaganda targeting America (ca. 1914).

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF PUBLIC RELATIONS CONFERENCE 2012

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Conference Chair: Professor Tom Watson

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Abstract

In what is being called the “Mormon Moment” (The Guardian, The New York Times), there is a lot of recent media attention on The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. With two U.S. presidential candidates, a Broadway play, and cover articles in Time and Newsweek, the church’s exposure has reached a zenith. However, it’s not the first time the church has been in the national and international spotlight.

The beginning of the 20th century brought national press coverage and political pressure upon the Mormon Church. The election of Reed Smoot to the U.S. Senate prompted controversy because of his association with the church as an Apostle, one of the governing bodies of the church. The Smoot hearings lasted from January 1904 to February 1907, after which the Senate allowed him to take his seat. During 1910 and 1911, Muckraking magazines such as Pearson’s, Colliers, Cosmopolitan, and McClure's published vicious anti-Mormon articles. The movie industry added to the anti-Mormon stereotype with the release of A Mormon Maid in 1917.

This article examines Heber J. Grant’s ability as a public communicator and his role in trying to change national public perception about the church. Grant served as church president from 1918 to 1945. During the first decade of his administration he extended outreach efforts to change U.S. national public opinion after decades of scrutiny over the issue of polygamy.

The onset of the 1920s changed the geographical isolation of Utah and the Latter-day Saints. Technological and manufacturing advances during the 1920s would bring many people to Utah by new modes of transportation and communications. Mass production of automobiles and federal-aid highway construction in 11 western states made it viable to travel to Utah by car by the mid-to-late 1920s. The creation of Zion National Park and Grand Canyon National Park in neighboring Arizona in 1919 created a new tourism industry in Utah. The completion of Woodward Field in Salt Lake in December 1920 created a hub for air mail and commercial flight. Radio stations popped up all over
the country in the 1920s, including in Salt Lake. Phone lines ran through Salt Lake in 1916, but the invention of the rotary phone in late 1919 made telephony commercially viable. While the church was still largely located to the Intermountain West, it was growing outside of Utah.

On November 23, 1918, Heber J. Grant was sustained as president of the LDS Church. He proved to have an innate sense for communications and public relations. Some of his efforts included touring the country with speaking engagements. He spoke to industrialists in Detroit and met with Henry Ford. He also invited prominent guests to visit Utah. The Mormon Tabernacle hosted prominent national politicians such as Calvin Coolidge, Franklin D. Roosevelt, William H. Taft and James M. Cox. Grant promoted national tours by the Mormon Tabernacle Choir and worked toward national radio syndication. Today the Choir is noted as having the longest continual broadcast on American radio. The production of pro-LDS Hollywood films such as Union Pacific and Brigham Young was partly due to his quiet influence. He golfed with President Warren G. Harding, and then they both rode by horseback through Zion National Park during Harding’s 1923 Utah tour. Time Magazine even gave President Grant cover treatment. Grant would eventually go on to establish the Radio, Publicity and Missionary Literature Committee of the church and hire future church president Gordon B. Hinckley as the first executive secretary of the committee.

Lamme and Russell (2010) have made the case that public relations history in the United States has been framed as a linear progression shaped by key individuals. Certainly Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays contributed much to the practice and application of public relations, but they didn’t invent all of its practices. Lamme and Russell identify legitimate forerunners and peers who applied their own skills and abilities to accomplish the same outcomes. This paper looks at another figure who applied effective communications and public relations skills to help shape public opinion. It is unknown as to whether Grant read Lee’s “Declaration of Principles” (1906) or Bernays’ Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923), or whether he followed the growing development of the public relations field, but he did have an instinctive sense of public communications and an interpersonal nature mixed with homespun humor that endeared him to people and to the press. His influence shaped the way the LDS Church continues to practice public relations today.
Out of Obscurity: Heber J. Grant’s Public Relations Efforts to Bring the Mormon Church into a National Positive View

“An erroneous impression obtains quite generally that the Mormon evil will die out of itself. No evil dies out of itself. And the Mormon evil is such a peculiarly suspicious blend of between fanaticism and carnality as to create a very serious menace to American moralities and liberties for some time to come. This being the true state of things it becomes necessary to deliberately lay plans for a long and carefully ordered campaign against Mormonism.”

— New York Observer and Chronicle, March 6, 1902

A popular Mormon politician was being scrutinized by the press. A Broadway comedy on Mormons was a big hit. Mormons were frequently being portrayed in movies and other forms of popular media. Articles about Mormons and their practices began to appear regularly in the popular press. The period could be mistaken for the first 12 years of the 21st century, but in fact all these occurred in the early part of the 20th century. The Mormons (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) have had several moments in history when they have caught the imagination of the media and their audiences. This paper describes an earlier “Mormon Moment,” from 1900 to 1936—a time that coincides with the dynamic leadership of a church president, Heber J. Grant—and the public relations efforts of the church to battle the negative press and bring it out of obscurity.

During the first hundred years of the establishment of “Mormonism” as an emergent American religion, it remained a bit of an enigma to most of the public and a bit peculiar to those who looked at its practices in isolation. Since its earliest days the Mormons were the object of scorn and ridicule from both neighbors and the American partisan press. A 1999 book review in The Wall Street Journal acknowledged that “[The Mormon Church] for a time, was America’s most persecuted religious minority.”

By the mid-1800s the body of the church sought and found a place in the mountains of the American west, secluded from outside persecution to allow them to practice their religion. This seclusion also hid them from the eastern establishment press.

The public revelation of the Mormons practice of polygamy in the 1880s thrust them once again into the public eye. They found few friends among the muckraking press or the evangelical periodicals which dominated the American print landscape of the 19th century.
Considerable negative press coverage of the Mormons came in the form of editorial cartoons with the passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887. The Act was passed in response to the dispute between the United States Congress and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) regarding polygamy. This Act prohibited the practice of polygamy and punished it with a fine of from $500 to $800 and imprisonment of up to five years.3

The media attention of the Latter-day Saints ebbed and flowed over the next few years, but then reached a pinnacle with the election of Mormon Apostle Reed Smoot to the U.S. Senate in 1903. This election and the subsequent hearings about whether Smoot should be seated in the Senate brought a firestorm of press attention and muckraking. The Chicago Journal ran an editorial cartoon on December 17, 1904, captioned with, “About Time This Book Was Opened and Aired.” It reflected the general public feeling that scrutiny of Mormonism was long overdue and that a Senate investigation would shed light on the church’s practices which “would reveal the filthy and poisonous character of the LDS Church.”4

Just a year before Smoot’s election the LDS church had opened a Bureau of Information staffed by volunteers. The formation of this bureau represents the earliest, although informal, roots of a public relations effort.

The bureau was created in part to provide a response to the virulent and growing anti-Mormon sentiment that existed in the press during the first decades of the 1900s. This paper will review those issues and how the Mormon Church, in particular how one of its presidents, Heber J. Grant, used a progressive approach to increase access to the church, improve awareness among key stakeholders, and build relationships with influential individuals.

To accomplish this research, newspaper and magazine articles were culled as primary sources. Many of these sources consisted of mainstream U.S. Newspapers. Secondary sources were also reviewed.

In short, the paper will describe how this religious institution used public relations strategies and tactics in an era when these practices were becoming more formalized and recognized as a growing practice among all institutions. As Lamme and Russell (2010) noted, the history of public relations is “largely grounded in religion,” but there is a lack of scholarship on how these institutions used public relations tools in the time of Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays.5 While these two figures are recognized as pioneers of public relations, this may be more due to their own self-promotion than to reality. This paper will demonstrate that there were others using communication practices that now fall under the professional umbrella of public relations. As such, the paper supports Miller’s thesis that research into early public relations practices outside of corporations can provide a more accurate picture of its origins.6
Mormon Muckraking

U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt coined the term “Muckraking” to describe the type of investigative journalism that was developing in 1900. He borrowed the term from John Bunyan’s 1678 classic Pilgrim’s Progress when he was referring to journalists and quoted from the book, “the man who could look no way but downward with the muck-rake in his hands.” Journalists co-opted the term and proudly propagated in their writings.7

Joseph F. Smith was sustained by church members as Prophet and president in 1901. He was the nephew of church founder Joseph Smith, and one of the few remaining church members who had direct ties to the early days of the Church. His father, Hyrum, was murdered with his uncle when Joseph F., was five.

As Church President, Smith supported Mormon Apostle Reed Smoot’s candidacy for the U.S. Senate. But Smoot's election was contested on the grounds that as an apostle, he was an officer in the Church which supported polygamy. Smoot was elected Senator from Utah, but the U.S. Senate refused to seat him because he was part of the church’s 15-member governing body. The Senate hearings lasted more than four years between 1903 and 1907, with Smith appearing before a Senate panel in 1904. The Senate investigation again focused national attention on Mormon marriages and the Church’s political influence in Utah.8

By the time the Senate hearings on Smoot were over, the St. Paul Pioneer Press concluded in a headline, “Revelations Doom Mormonism to Extermination, no matter what the outcome of the trial may be, system will be suppressed.”9

The hearings didn’t just review the viability of seating Smoot in Congress, but it became a four year microscopic review of looking into the teachings and practices of the Mormon Church. Headlines poured forth from the nation’s largest newspapers during the hearings on “Mormon Propaganda,” “The Mormon Curse and Cure,” “Mormon Religion Called Immoral,” “Mormon Church a Trust,” “Mormon Smith Defies Country,” “Mormon Law Breakers,” “Mormon Veiled Threat,” and “Extirpate the Mormon Ulcer.”10

The U.S. national mainstream urban press was not alone in its indictments of Mormons. Newspapers in the South portrayed Mormon missionaries as “bad-low men,” “hyenas of society,” “emissaries of hell,” and “false teachers” who brought their “lustful doctrine of polygamy” in southern homes with designs to lure “silly women” into “social bondage.” Another account in the South described the Mormons as the “most degraded, ignorant, selfish, vice-stricken people on the face of the earth.”11

Just before the hearings began, a new book, The Founder of Mormonism (1911) was published. The timing of its publication was almost uncanny as it appeared the same year as Smoot’s
election. It was an historical psychological profile of church founder Joseph Smith. It cast Smith as an “epileptic paranoid,” who was a “dull-eyed, flaxen-haired, prevaricating boy, with an ancestry morbid, superstitious, diseased, [who] was bound to erratic tendencies varying with the abnormal conditions of physique, temperament and environment.” The book characterized him in his adult years as “an extreme occultist,” “a mystic clairvoyant,” and a “vulgar braggart.”

Magazines were a bit slower to cover the Mormons. Revelations from the Smoot hearings required investigation and research, and the long-form style of magazine writing lent itself to taking extra time. The Muckraking magazines began releasing articles in an almost simultaneous fashion between 1910 and 1911. A barrage of stories were published in Colliers, Cosmopolitan, Everybody’s, McClure’s and Pearson’s. Cosmopolitan provided the greatest imagery with its three part series, “The Viper on the Hearth.” The article began, “The name of the viper – I take it from the mouth of the viper – is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. It lies coiled on the country’s hearthstone, and only asks time to grow and collect a poison and a strength to strike.” McClure’s was no less subtle when it wrote, “All of Brigham’s successors have been mild-mannered souls, but President Smith is a man of violent passions; one could easily imagine him torturing heretics or burning witches to advance the kingdom of God.” Everybody’s ran the longest series, “Under the Prophet in Utah.” Its author, former Salt Lake Tribune Editor Frank Cannon, launched a book of the same title and spoke to over a million people on the Chautauqua and Lyceum lecture circuits on the subject. Both his book and lectures began with what he called, “The Great American despotism.”

Popular books and novels emerged with licentious portrayals of Mormons in the U.S. and in Great Britain. Zane Grey’s popular dime novels help to contribute to the national Anti-Mormon sentiment, even though that was not the focus, nor the intent of his western novels. Grey became a popular western writer and a rich man after publishing Riders of Purple Sage (1912) which portrayed the main character Jane as one who refused to marry one of the polygamous Mormon Elders and instead befriends a Gentile horseman. The Mormons then begin to openly persecute her. Grey published two other immensely popular novels, The Rainbow Trail (1915) the sequel to “Riders,” and Heritage of the Desert, where a woman is abducted by a group of Mormons (1910).

In Great Britain, Winifred Graham’s novels proved to be even more damaging to the Mormon Church in that country. Graham became an ardent Anti-Mormon crusader. She wrote 88 novels, and Mormons were a particular focus for several novels; Ezra and the Mormon (1907), The Love Story of a Mormon (1911), The Sin of Utah (1912) The Mormons: A Popular History (1913), Judas of Salt Lake (1916) and two more books during the 1920s. The preface to “Love Story” stated, “Mormonism is dull and unintelligible. Girls who emigrate from England to Utah find themselves members of an immorally constituted society.”
Graham would go on to become a popular Anti-Mormon speaker and she would publish a few more books on Mormons in the 1920s. *The Love Story of a Mormon* would be made into a film, *Trapped by Mormons* (1922).\(^\text{16}\)

Poking fun at Mormons also made its way to the stage. *The Mormon Wife* (1901) on Broadway portrayed the downfall of a Mormon convert and the religion as a vile comedic venture. Mormons were characterized as villains in plays and long the butt of derogatory stage jokes. The comic villain in *The Girl from Utah* (1914) was a Mormon who pursued the heroine, determined to add her to his flock of wives and expand his polygamous empire.\(^\text{17}\)

The film, *The Mormon Maid* (1917), was one more contribution from the arts which contributed to even more inflammatory anti-Mormon sentiment. It was marketed and portrayed in a fashion similar to the immensely successful *Birth of Nation* (1915) and was the largest advertised movie to date. The story’s main character is urged to enter a plural marriage and upon her refusal is taken prisoner by Mormons. She escapes and is pursued by group of Mormon “Danites” who are dressed strikingly similar to the Ku Klux Klan. Historians point to the Mormon Maid as arguably the most potent Anti-Mormon movie in film history.\(^\text{18}\)

All of this perceived negative media coverage converged upon the LDS Church during an eleven-year period between 1906 and 1917, and reached a zenith between 1910 and 1915. One periodical framed the entire affair with the Mormon Church and the media’s coverage this way:

> The magazine advertising [coverage] of the Mormons have had seems to have done some good. They say they have been slandered and are trying to prove it. . . . All this turning on of searchlights is useful, and the moderate cost of inaccuracy is not too high to pay for it. The cure for Mormonism is publicity. Its strength is in its secrecy.\(^\text{19}\)

In actuality, the church’s secrecy may have been the public perception. Each religion does carry sacred rites and rituals that seem secret to non-believers. Early persecution and the martyrdom of their founding Prophet, Joseph Smith, likely created a culture where the Latter-day Saints were less forthcoming to the public about the machinations within the church. Certainly, the church had separated itself from what it termed the “Gentile” world when it settled in the Great Basin of the West. But, it was more than that. The geographic isolation coupled with the perceived peculiar practices such as polygamy and baptizing for deceased persons, cast aspersions upon the church in the public eye. The intermingling between the religious and political life of Utah caused even greater concern, suggesting the Prophet was controlling state government. But, it didn’t stop there. The Mormon Church’s business interests in the sugar industry looked suspiciously close to a monopoly in an era of trust-
busting. And, all these practices were coming to the forefront in the early 1900s, during the heyday of magazine muckraking and the waning days of Yellow Journalism. The church needed to respond to the public. But, it had no process nor mechanism for doing so. One historian suggested the church had been in its “bunkers,” prior to 1900.20

**Early Public Relations Efforts**

The Church did establish the Bureau of Information in 1901, but the Bureau was located in a small booth (a larger permanent building was constructed in 1904) on Temple Square with its primary purpose to answer questions from visitors. The booth was operated by volunteers who primarily passed out pamphlets and gave directions. It did represent the beginnings of an outreach effort, but it was limited to those already visiting Temple Square.21

Pamphlets were still the choice of many organizations, and in the case of the Mormon Church, the small printed circular had been shown to be an effective proselytizing tool. But, this was the age of mass magazines and mass newspapers, and the church needed to expend efforts to reach the popular press. Up to this point there was no formal mechanism to do so.

There were some attempts on behalf of the Church’s hierarchy of Apostles to respond in the media, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Apostle Heber J. Grant related,

> During my entire three years in the British Isles [1904-06] I never succeeded in getting a single solitary article published in the newspaper. Some of the vilest, most wicked, obscene, terrible things were published regarding us, but those in charge of the press positively refused to listen to anything we had to say. . . . I sent an article to him [an editor of a London newspaper]. He kept it the usual two or three months, and then sent it back to me with the usual printed slip which I have read many times: ‘The editor regrets that he cannot find space for the enclosed manuscript.’”22

In America, Church leaders tried to respond to attacks coming from muckraking magazines. Joseph F. Smith tried to respond in 1910 to the articles written in *Pearsons*, but the editors refused to publish his reply. That same year, Apostle Charles Penrose tried responding to Frank Cannon’s series in *Everybody’s* magazine. Penrose certainly had a background for journalism having previously served as editor of *Ogden Junction* and *Deseret News* newspapers. He was the ideal respondent, having co-authored works with Frank Cannon decades earlier. However, he was unsuccessful in publishing any articles or responses in *Everybodys*.23
Apostle Rudger Clawson, president of the European Mission (1910-1914), with offices located in London, spent much of his time dealing with media attacks upon the church. Clawson lamented, “We have been doing and are doing all we can to get the truth before the people, but have measurably failed, because they do not want it, that is, the press does not want it.” The press had been vigilant in trying to rid the country of the “ridiculous travesty of a religion which goes by the name of Mormonism.” Clawson did find one friend in William Stead, editor of the Review of Reviews. Stead was one-time editor of Pall Mall Gazette and he gained a reputation crusading for the poor and revealing the extent of child prostitution in London. He had shown a proclivity for defending the oppressed. Stead wrote that Mormons were the victims of journalistic bias, “the whole so-called crusade is an outbreak of sectarian savagery worked up by journalists.” His support helped, but he was only one voice. Any support Stead provided disappeared when he died in the Titanic disaster in 1917.24

An effort was made to produce a film, One Hundred Years of Mormonism. The first effort in 1910 was unsuccessful, but by 1912, the first feature-length documentary was made (it preceded the acclaimed Nanook of the North by nine years). The movie was met favorably by members of the church, who were the primary viewers. There were some differing opinions from at least one church leader. Apostle James E. Talmadge thought it, “not a complete success,” and that it contained “many crudities and historical inaccuracies.”25

Talmadge wrote a series of articles to respond to anti-Mormon critics. Throughout 1917 he tried to get the articles placed in newspapers. Several agreed to publish and then withdrew their offer. Eventually, the Atlanta Constitution and the San Francisco Chronicle along with a dozen other papers agreed to publish the series.26

Historian Thomas Alexander suggests that “in general Talmadge’s efforts succeeded.” It is difficult to know the success of his newspaper writing campaign. If it was to raise awareness or to place some articles in newspapers, then there was some level of success. The Atlanta Constitution and the San Francisco Chronicle were certainly the major newspapers of those respective cities, and considering the previous decades of failed efforts with the press, this was certainly progress. Measuring the success of Talmadge’s efforts is difficult. Polling was still many years away, so the effectiveness in changing public opinion is unknown. In 1917, the American public was much more preoccupied with the War in Europe than it was with the subject of Mormonism.

There was one event that did turn the American press sympathies toward Mormons and it was unrelated to any public relations efforts by the Church. Several battles of the Mexican Revolution were centralized around Mormon settlements in Mexico. Newspaper articles mentioned that these were Mormons who were oppressed, but they were also U.S. citizens so the newspapers closely followed the movements of Pancho Villa. General John Pershing made the Mormon town of Colonia
Dublan his headquarters for 16 months. Even after Pershing’s departure from the area, headlines appeared in the New York, Chicago and Los Angeles papers.\(^{27}\)

An overall assessment of the Church’s public relations efforts during first twenty years appears as promising in establishing a Bureau and in trying to generate articles in the press. However, the success of those ventures can be described as poor at best. The LDS Church was the object of attacks from many different forms of media, and yet the response from a public viewpoint was meager at best.

**Heber J. Grant and the End of Isolation**

The Great War or the War in Europe (later called WWI) ended on November 11, 1918 when an armistice was signed in a rail car in France. A week later on November 19, Joseph F. Smith, president of LDS Church died. The month of November 1918 was also marked by a nationwide influenza epidemic. Utah felt the effects of this pandemic. Widespread panic and community quarantine orders meant there wasn’t a public funeral for Smith, who led the church for 17 years.\(^{28}\)

Heber J. Grant, as senior apostle, was now leader of the church. Grant’s background was as a businessman. He started insurance agency offices and retail businesses prior to his “calling” as an apostle. His life changed at age 26 when he took his place among the Quorum of the 12 Apostles. His business acumen would be needed. The church had many business enterprises including retail stores, sugar processing plants, and farms. Grant served as an apostle for 36 years before he became president.\(^{29}\)

Grant did his part to mobilize church resources to help during the pandemic. The Utah cities of Ogden and Park City were quarantined. People weren’t allowed to leave these cities and no one was admitted in. Temporary hospitals and care centers were set-up in LDS Chapels. It may have been fortuitous because many congregations cancelled their church meetings to prevent the spread of the flu. Where meetings weren’t cancelled church members stayed home anyway.\(^{30}\)

The war was over and Utah’s isolation was diminishing. Certainly historians and scholars have argued that the Church’s isolation ended with the coming of the railroad when the Union Pacific and Central Pacific met at Promontory Point, Utah. Further consideration could be given to the church since it had a vigorous missionary program that had been running for almost 90 years. But, the majority of church membership of almost half a million still resided primarily in the Intermountain West of the United States. Church members colonized towns in the southernmost part of Arizona, to the northern region of Idaho, even into the border towns of Alberta Canada.

A major consideration contributing to the elimination of isolation were soldiers coming home. More than 20,000 LDS members served in the military during the Great War. Of that number 381
died. There were many coming home from having served outside of Utah. New ideas, thoughts and technologies would follow some of them back to the mountains.31

The American military learned a great deal from the War in Europe. One concern was the ability to mobilize troops across the American Continent. In mid-1919 the military undertook a plan to cross the continental United States as quickly as possible. Officially the group became known as the First Transcontinental Motor Convoy. It included 24 officers, including Lt. Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower, and 258 enlisted men driving 79 specialized military vehicles. In 1919 there were no transcontinental highways. The route directed for the convoy was the proposed located for the Lincoln Highway across the country’s mid-section (currently I-80). The route lay directly across Utah, which also had the most difficult passage. The convoy left the White House on July 7th and arrived at the Presidio in San Francisco on September 6, sixty-two days later. The press followed movements of the convoy day by day. The plan not only tested the military, but it helped Lincoln Highway Association test the feasibility of the route. The biggest problem for the convoy was across the desert west of Salt Lake City. Eisenhower noted in his report that the roads of Western Utah were impassable and that “the road was one succession of dust, ruts, pits and holes.” Both the Lincoln Highway Association and the Federal Government would in subsequent years appropriate the funds to improve the highway. Utah would soon have a highway connecting it the rest of the United States.32

On September 8, 1920, Salt Lake became a major link in the last leg of an intercontinental air mail service. The completion and dedication of Woodward Field in December of that year would provide a major hub for the U.S. Postal Service as the airport was identified as one of the largest of the fifteen airfields used for the intercontinental service. Six years later Western Airlines would launch commercial passenger service out of Salt Lake.33

Notoriety came to Utah and the LDS Church from the sports world. Between 1914 and 1918 a boxer with Mormon roots going by the name of “Kid Blackie,” also known as Jack Dempsey, fought 100 fights in Utah and Nevada for nickels and dimes. Dempsey got his break in 1919 with some fights in San Francisco and in the East. On July 5, 1919, he became the world heavyweight champion. He defended his title multiple times over the next four years. Dempsey would fight in RCA’s first nationwide broadcast of a boxing match and he would fight for the first million dollar purse. Subsequent fights, movie appearances, and his ownership of the popular Jack Dempsey’s Broadway Restaurant in New York Times Square kept him in the media limelight for two decades.34

In 1915, Salt Lake secured a minor league baseball team called the Salt Lake Bees. The team was located on the far eastern end of the West Coast League, which was primarily located in California. The team had moderate success until the 1920s. The Bees home was Bonneville Park, located at over 4,300 feet in elevation, making it the highest altitude park in the U.S. Its altitude and park dimensions made it a hitters’ paradise. The astronomical numbers produced by the Bees caught
the attention of the Eastern press. In 1923 when the Tigers, a team from Los Angeles played the Bees in Bonneville Park, the greatest single game performance of the year occurred. Tiger Pete Schneider hit five home runs, and two of them were grand slams as Tigers beat the Bees 35-11. Later that year, the Bees scored sixteen runs in the sixth inning in a 25-12 win over the Tigers. It may have been the minors, but the team and its ballpark were making the national sport pages.35

The end of the war, highway completion, airport expansion and sports notoriety were bringing Utah out of isolation and by association, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was beginning to come out of obscurity. New attention was coming to Utah. The Church was changing. Soldiers were coming home and settling in areas outside of Utah. Utah farmers were moving to California for new opportunities and church membership in the intermountain west declined. The church began dedicating chapels and temples outside of Utah.

Coming out of obscurity

By 1919, the war was over and the influenza epidemic dissipated as quickly as it came. As Heber J. Grant began his administration, the church was entering a new era. Attacks by politicians and muckrakers were a thing of the past. One Protestant minister proposed to the media and public that there should be an effort to stop opposing Mormonism, and just let it die a natural death. “The way to oppose Mormonism is not to throw mud upon it. A campaign of detraction only helps it grow. The thing to do is to treat it with candor and fairness. . . . It must fall upon its own weight if it is to fall at all.”36

One historian characterized the change as “The Church entered the twentieth century beleaguered and isolated. The LDS experience hitherto had involved founding, exodus to the isolated American West, building there a spiritual and temporal kingdom of God, and grappling with an unsympathetic and often hostile larger American community.”37

Most of the church’s early public relations efforts were reactive. The Publicity Bureau and Talmage’s letter writing campaign were intended to respond to criticism and, hopefully, correct errors. This was a natural reaction from a church that had escaped persecution in the Midwest and had hoped to find peace and security in the isolated reaches of the Intermountain West. The Wasatch Mountains to the east of the Salt Lake Valley could almost be viewed as impenetrable castle walls in the early years of the church. However, the railroads, airplanes, and intercontinental roads allowed outsiders to penetrate into the region. Even more so, the growth of national media, whether in print or in the new medium of radio, shrunk the size of the nation and brought people closer together. The church had to come out of obscurity and had to be more proactive in shaping its image with an audience that was only familiar with its peculiarities.
The need for more proactive measures required a paradigm shift for the church and a different kind of leader. One who would practice some of the same public relations strategies and tactics that Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays were employing for their corporate clients.

It is unknown as to whether Heber J. Grant was familiar with, or even read, the principles outlined in the books on public opinion and public relations that were published during his tenure. Books such as Bernays’ *Crystalizing Public Opinion* (1923) and *Propaganda* (1928), or Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* (1922) were clearly outlining the principles of how public perception of government and other public institutions were influenced and how they could influence. Whether Grant studied these principles or understood them intuitively is unknown, but it is clear that he practiced them in such a way that gained influence and improved public opinion.

**Expanding use of media**

Some of the traditional publicity efforts continued under Grant, such as the publication of pamphlets explaining tenets of the church’s faith, press releases defending the church, and speaking engagements. But, Grant also embraced new forms of reaching audiences. Building upon the church’s previous efforts to use film, with its visual and emotional appeals, Grant sought to use this medium to record and promote its 100th anniversary pageant in Salt Lake City. The lavish production, entitled “The Message of the Ages,” was staged inside the Tabernacle. Grant advocated using cutting-edge technology to create public goodwill, so he planned to have the pageant filmed in color. Technicolor technicians convinced Grant there wasn’t enough light in the Tabernacle to make the film. Undaunted, Grant had the production moved to the steps of the Utah State Capital and filming continued. The film was eventually released as a Newsreel.38

After Zane Grey’s *Riders of the Purple Sage* was adapted into a major motion picture, the LDS Church, particularly Senator Reed Smoot, fought to have the negative images of the Mormons edited out of the movie. After some years of correspondence, the president of Fox Films wrote in 1921 to Apostle and Senator Reed Smoot “agreeing to stop exhibiting [the] movie ‘Riders of the Purple Sage’” after church condemnation of the film. Later “the studio re-edited ‘Riders,’ which Apostle Smoot reviewed and approved.”39

Grant’s efforts to improve the church’s image through film were bolstered by the passing of the Motion Picture Production Code in 1930. The MPPC, or Hays Code as it was popularly known (after Hollywood’s chief censor, Will Hays), prescribed more respect for religious organizations. Article 8 of the new code specifically prohibited films from throwing “ridicule on any religious faith,” portraying religious ministers “as comic characters or as villains,” and from showing religious ceremonies in a way that wasn’t “carefully and respectfully handled.”
When 20th Century Fox announced it was making a series of biographical movies of prominent Americans, and that Brigham Young was among them, Grant was concerned about how the church would be portrayed. He wrote to the movie's associate producer: “I hope we shall not appear to you to be over anxious, and we have no disposition to be oversensitive, but we are tremendously concerned that this picture shall be a true picture, and, while we are not, any of us, playwrights, or dramatists, or movie technicians, we can appreciate the war which must constantly go on in one preparing a picture, between the highly dramatic and the sober fact.”

Whether it was the influence of the new code or just the nature of its executives, Fox Studios were very accommodating to Grant and the Mormon Church. Grant was invited on the studio set in Hollywood during filming. A private viewing was arranged for President Grant, which he declared afterwards, “I endorse it with all my heart and have no suggestions. This is one of the greatest days of my life. I can't say any more than ‘God Bless You.’”

Grant and the Mormon Church were also early adopters of the radio technology. Not everyone was jumping on the radio bandwagon, but as a medium that had the potential to reach millions of people through airwaves and networks, it was the Internet of its day. In 1921, Latter-day Saints University in Salt Lake City was the first to receive a broadcast license issued to an educational institution. Then in 1922, the church entered into commercial broadcasting by launching KZN (later to become KSL). It went on the air on Saturday afternoon, 3:00 pm from a one-room tin shack atop the Deseret News building. The station began with Grant dedicating the station and reading a scriptural passage. The broadcast was reportedly heard 1,000 miles in every direction. Grant’s dedicatory address marked the beginning of radio broadcasting in the Mountain West, “the first full time commercial broadcasting operation between the Mississippi Valley and the Pacific Coast.”

Grant’s vision to reach audiences directly through a controlled medium demonstrated the same innovation that organizations use today with the Internet. He didn’t have to worry about having his message interpreted or edited by third parties that either misinterpreted him or, worse, twisted his words to fit their agendas.

The advent of radio also allowed the church to build goodwill with its most popular product, the Mormon Tabernacle Choir. The Choir was gaining in popularity outside of Utah, and in 1926 it went on its first national tour. Other than the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893, the Choir had mostly performed in Utah. The tour was very popular, and the Choir sold out many venues, including the Hollywood Bowl with an audience of 17,000.

The entry into radio and the success of the California tour led to church-generated radio programming. In 1928, a weekly half-hour radio program, Sunday Evening on Temple Square, began. In 1929, KSL affiliated with NBC began national syndication of the Tabernacle Choir as weekly...
Sunday broadcast. By 1936, the name changed to *Music and the Spoken Word*. This change began what has become known as “the longest-running radio program in the world.”

**Developing relationships with influentials**

While exposure to positive messages about Mormons was finding a hold in new and old media, Grant also built critical relationships with influential members of society. These relationships, often developed through authentic shared interests, provided the church with testimonials from third parties that could validate the claims it was making to the press.

Grant didn’t fit the prototypical Mormon leader. He was much younger than previous leaders. He didn’t practice plural marriage, and he had a close-cropped beard as opposed to the long flowing traditional beard. Growing up, he loved playing baseball. As an adult he was an avid golfer; a sport he continued as much as possible while leading the LDS church as president and prophet. His personality and interests matched the more modern pursuits of society, and he was comfortable in front of large crowds and mingling with the upper echelon.

Grant extended invitations to high-ranking government officials and he was asserting himself into the public sphere. Between 1920 and 1923 the church opened the Tabernacle to all kinds of public officials. Typically reserved for church conferences, regular speeches by church, occasional musical performances, and of course, The Mormon Tabernacle Choir, the Tabernacle was now open for political leaders. James M. Cox, governor of Ohio, and future presidential Democratic presidential candidate, spoke in 1920. So did Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mayor of New York City and the future running mate to James M. Cox. Ambassadors from all over the world came and spoke in the tabernacle. Former U.S, President William Howard Taft spoke there also. It was a time of national outreach. These invitations were assisted by Senator Reed Smoot, now in his third term.

The capstone event would be the visit of President Warren G. Harding in 1923. Harding not only spoke at the tabernacle, he found time to play a round of golf with Heber J. Grant. The end of Harding's trip took him to Zion National Park. There he rode horseback around the park with state dignitaries and was accompanied by Smoot and Grant.

As Grant and the church gained in prominence, new doors were opening up. In 1930, Heber J. Grant graced the cover of *Time* magazine. The cover was a tribute to both the 100th anniversary of the church and to the growing popularity of President Grant. Certainly, *Time* could have chosen a more recognizable image such as the Salt Lake Temple, The Mormon Tabernacle, or one of the early prophets such as Joseph Smith or Brigham Young, but it chose Grant.
Grant was also being invited to speak to prominent groups around the country. In December 1920, he was invited to speak before the Knife and Fork Club of Kansas City. The invitation came after Grant had golfed with the son of former Missouri Governor Thomas Crittenden. Grant was beginning to perceive a public attitudinal change as he said, “I think we as a people have very great cause to rejoice in the era of goodwill and fellowship that is existing today for us as people, among those not of our faith, in comparison with the conditions that existed some years ago.”

In 1935, Henry Ford sponsored “The Dearborn Conference of Agriculture, Industry and Science.” At the conference the following year in 1936, he invited Grant to speak before the gathering distinguished scientists, industrialists and agriculturalists on the subject of the “Domestic Sugar Supply,” a subject Grant knew well because of the church farms and sugar processing facilities. Grant sat at the table with Ford and was the concluding speaker on the first day. The Detroit Evening Times noted that Grant was the oldest delegate and the most entertaining speaker, “In a booming bass voice, standing straight as a ramrod, the bewhiskered old man then launched into a humorous semi-political speech which brought nearly one thousand people to their feet, cheering and whistling in the grand ballroom of the Cadillac Hotel last night.”

At a 1936 gathering in Estes Park, Colorado, NYU President Frank Kingdom introduced Heber J. Grant, the keynote speaker, in the following way: “I, representing the majority groups in America, feel bad that a minority group of this kind should have been ignored, and it is that spirit and with a deep appreciation of fine leadership of President Grant that I am now presenting him to you.”

Grant was noticing a shift in public opinion with regards to the church. At the Church’s semi-annual General Conference, while mentioning the film on Brigham Young, Grant noted, “It is a very marvelous and wonderful thing, considering how people generally have treated us and what they thought of us.”

**A Mormon presence outside of Utah**

In 1923, Grant assigned Church Apostles David O. McKay and Hugh M. Cannon on a 13-month worldwide tour. Their assignment was to visit church members, missions, and to meet leaders of the world where possible. They visited U.S. Ambassadors in China and New Zealand. Cannon returned home early, but McKay continued the trip that took him to the Pacific Islands, China, India, Egypt, and Palestine. In the end he travelled 56,000 miles and visited countries where no church authority had ever been.

An effort was expended to purchase church heritage sites in and outside of Utah. In 1922, a monument was placed where Brigham Young entered the Salt Lake Valley. In 1926, the Peter Whitmer farm in New York, where the church was organized, was purchased. It was later converted
into a historical site for visitors. In 1927, the church worked with the Utah legislature on a monument to the Mormon Battalion that was enlisted in the Mexican War, and placed the monument on the grounds of the State Capital. Another major purchase was the Hill Cumorah, outside Palmyra, New York, where church founder Joseph Smith lived. The church worked to preserve these sites and set up monuments, restored historical buildings and built visitor centers.52

A permanent function

Grant saw the need for the church to formalize its outreach activities. In 1935, a young missionary, Gordon B. Hinckley, returned from England and met with President Grant on the problems of missionary literature. Before long, Grant hired Hinckley as producer and secretary for the Radio, Publicity, and Mission Literature Committee. This was the beginning of the Church’s Public Affairs Department. For two more decades, Hinckley ran the day-to-day operations of this committee and pioneered the use of media in the Church.53 Hinckley later became the church’s 15th president and his years of service were noted for the artful way he presented the church to the media and other external audiences.

The formation of this new organization accelerated public relations activities in the latter part of the 1930s and into the 40s as the church launched a series of international radio programs, church pageants, exhibits at expositions and fairs, short films and filmstrips, brochures and other publications. Even World War II didn’t slow the efforts as the church, when it made the Mormon Tabernacle Choir available for free to the Armed Special Services Network.54

On May 7, 1945, Germany surrendered and the war in Europe was over. One week later, Heber J. Grant died. He became leader of the church at the end of World War I and died just months before the end of World War II.

Conclusions

In 1919, as Heber J. Grant began his administration, the LDS Church was entering a new era. Attacks by politicians and muckrakers were a thing of the past. One Protestant minister proposed to the media and public that there should be an effort to stop opposing Mormonism, and just let it die a natural death. “The way to oppose Mormonism is not to throw mud upon it. A campaign of detraction only helps it grow. The thing to do is to treat it with candor and fairness. . . . It must fall upon its own weight if it is to fall at all.”55

One historian characterized the change as “The Church entered the twentieth century beleaguered and isolated. The LDS experience hitherto had involved founding, exodus to the isolated American West, building there a spiritual and temporal kingdom of God, and grappling with an unsympathetic and often hostile larger American community.”56 Another author noted that,
“Beginning early in this century, a new era was initiated as that of the gathering passed from the scene. Under the direction of Joseph F. Smith and his successor Heber J. Grant, Mormonism emerged from its bunkers. . .” Heber J. Grant recognized the need to use the tools of an emerging profession, public relations, to help lift the Mormon Church out of obscurity.
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Entertainment Public Relations History:
Publicity Pioneers Who Created Today’s Global, Celebrity-Obsessed Culture

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Abstract
In Hollywood, stars are in the spotlight, while public relations practitioners traditionally have stayed in the background, which creates challenges for historical research. For this study, research included in-depth interviews and with some of the most important, living eminence grises of entertainment public relations; archived material; and numerous secondary histories of Hollywood. Results show that the goal of entertainment PR continues to be to “open” the show, so most strategies and tactics continue to be variations on P. T. Barnum’s templates. The primary motivation continues to be financial, because entertainment requires huge upfront investments for production costs. The early, immigrant movie producers brought sales skills from the garment industry, so the moguls themselves fulfilled many PR functions; however, they also teamed with press agents and former journalists, who worked behind the scenes, while moguls such as Louis B. Mayer and Darryl Zanuck were the front men. This study and a few predecessors identify a number of important practitioners, including B.P. Schulberg, Harry Reichenbach, Hal Wallis, Harry Brand, Howard Dietz, Howard Strickling, Walter Seltzer, Russell Birdwell, Bill Hendricks, Marty Weiser, Henry Rogers, Warren Cowan, Pat Kinglsey, Henri Bollenger, and Bob Werden. This study shows how the early focus on the appeal of stars to open the show developed into today’s celebrity-obsessed culture.
Introduction
Traditionally in Hollywood, stars were in the spotlight and in the headlines, while public relations practitioners kept themselves well in the background, perhaps even more so than in other businesses and areas of practice. According to long-time publicist and current president of the Entertainment Publicist Professional Society, Henri Bollinger, when he was younger, a publicist escorting a star could have been fired if he were accidentally caught in a photograph (Bollinger, telephone interview, Dec. 16, 2011). This traditional etiquette has left some of the most influential and colorful practitioners in obscurity.

Historians must dig to uncover the reticent, and anonymous publicist—the wizard (or strategist) behind the curtain—or to use a current key term—the strategic planner. Historical research would be easier if all our subjects came from the concurrent, but contrasting, tradition that harks back to P. T. Barnum—the showman. With an outsized personality, the showman’s stunts are so entertaining and compelling that eventually he becomes the star of his own show.

The current study is based on primary research, including interviews and archived papers, as well as secondary research on film history. It analyzes the motivations, tactics, and influence of early Hollywood PR pioneers within the context of current research and knowledge about public relations history.

Literature Review
The PR history research agendas proposed by Miller (2000) and by Lamme and [Miller] Russell (2010) call for studies to fill in the huge gaps in existing knowledge of how the profession was practiced in the past and who the innovators were. In 2000, Miller ignited efforts to reexamine public relations history and to question its orthodoxies and shared understandings. She questioned the emphasis in public relations history on 20th century big business or on company case studies that ignored or underplayed precursors in religious organizations, small businesses, and non-profits, as well as the work of entrepreneurs and social activists dating back a couple of millennia. Hoy, Raaz, and Wehmeier (2007) analyzed the way public relations history has been depicted in textbooks, and they found that the origins of the commonly accepted “progressive” narrative (bad PR to good PR; one-way communication to two-way communication) could not be ascertained with certainty. In their sweeping review of the scholarship on public relations history, Lamme and [Miller] Russell (2010) also conclude that public relations “was not progressive; in fact much about public relations functions was found to remain fairly consistent over time” (p. 355), and that “there was no discernable starting point, founding date, or incubation period” (p. 355).

Looking at the specialized realm of American film publicity, the present research confirms the findings of Lamme and [Miller] Russell (2010), as well as that of Hoy, Raaz, and Wehmeier (2007). This paper shows that the main function of entertainment publicity and promotion has always been to open the show—to deliver first-night audiences who will then generate word of mouth resulting in
sold-out attendance and great box office results. Until recently, however, not much has been written about who did that work or how it was done.

This neglect is partially caused by the industry’s mythology that the studio mogul alone is the star maker. In keeping with that mythos, each year right before the Oscars, the Publicists Guild, the Hollywood professional union that controls many jobs in the industry, honors producers and studio heads as “Showmen of the Year” for film and television. Eventually, Russell Birdwell, who had masterminded the publicity campaign for Gone with the Wind for Selznick and MGM, tired of publicity professionals being unacknowledged, even at their own awards ceremony, so the Guild began yearly awards for outstanding colleagues (Bollinger, telephone interview, Dec. 16, 2011).

Nevertheless, until recently, the numerous books written about Hollywood barely acknowledged the studio publicity heads and their extensive departments. The best book in the field is the by British public relations professional, television pundit, and blogger Mark Borkowski. His book, The Fame Formula: How Hollywood’s Fixers, Fakers and Star Makers Created the Celebrity Industry (2008), has chapters on such important figures as Harry Reichenbach, Harry Strickling, Henry Rogers, Warren Cowen, and Pat Kingsley, rather than on the stars and the moguls whose images they polished, unlike earlier books.

For example, previously, Twentieth Century-Fox: A Corporate and Financial History analyzed business deals and internal memos through more than 50 years and detailed film-by film box office results, but it mentioned Harry Brand, the first head of Fox publicity only once (Solomon, 1988, 24). Borkowski has a chapter on Brand. The encyclopedic Inside Oscar mentioned Russell Birdwell only three times (Wiley & Bona, 1987), and Anthony Holden’s Behind the Oscars: The Secret History of the Academy Awards makes only a couple of cursory mentions (1993). In contrast, Borkowski has two chapters on Birdwell (2008).

Prior academic work that provides a foundation for the field was conducted by Ronald L. Davis, whose interviews with a few publicity workers can be found among the several hundred in the Ronald L. Davis Oral History Collection at Southern Methodist University. In his book, The Glamour Factory: Inside Hollywood’s Big Studio System (1993), Davis has an excellent chapter on publicity that names early heads of publicity and gives specifics on the organization of the departments at the major studios (pp.137-157). One of the best and most complete accounts of the publicity machine during Hollywood’s Golden Era is Robert S. Sennett’s Hollywood Hoopla: Creating Stars and Selling Movies in the Golden Age of Hollywood (1998). Sennett looked at a number of primary sources, including press books, which were publicity or “exploitation” guides created by the studio publicity team for the use of local theaters showing each film.

Otherwise, the public relations practitioners who strategized to inform, motivate, and even inflame audiences are barely mentioned in books on Hollywood. That is the case in two recent books about Paramount Pictures: Dick’s businessman-focused Engulfed: The Death of Paramount Pictures and the Birth of Corporate Hollywood (2001); and Bart’s gossipy Infamous Players: A Tale of
Movies, the Mob (And Sex) from 2011. In contrast to most Hollywood histories, the present study focuses on the people and the strategies that created the stars and “opened” the shows.

Research Questions

Research questions examined in this study are:

Q1: Who were the pivotal pioneering entertainment practitioners?

Q2: Which of the pioneers’ tactics were innovative compared to the encyclopedic list identified by Lamme and Miller (2010, Table 5, pp. 342-249) as already in use from B.C.E. through 1900 in the arenas of religion; education, nonprofit and reform; politics and government; and business (including the entertainment endeavors of P.T. Barnum)?

Q3: On which among the five themes/motivations (profit, recruitment, legitimacy, agitation and advocacy) that Lamme & Russell (2010, p. 335) detected across more than 2000 years of public relations history did entertainment pioneers focus?

Q4: Following on Kulemeka (2010), how have entertainment tactics been tied to or influenced by various “new media,” i.e. technological developments that public relations texts from 1950 to 1999 ignore, isolate, idolize, or integrate (p. 208).

Methodology

In addition to secondary sources mentioned above, primary research included interviews with some of the most important, living eminence grises of entertainment public relations, who are in their late 70s to mid 90s, meaning that they began their careers from the 1920s onward. Current interviews augment earlier unpublished research by the author from the mid-1980s onward during more than twenty years working in entertainment public relations before rejoining the academy as a scholar-practitioner.

Other primary research looked for materials in private hands. Entertainment public relations organizations include the Entertainment Publicists Professional Society (EPPS) and the Publicists Guild of America, Local 818, which, under the auspices of the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees (IATSE), negotiates salaries and benefits for film and television publicity positions covered by union contracts. When the Guild became a subsidiary of the Cinematographers Guild, it gained a beautiful headquarters building but lost most historical files, according to Henri Bollinger (Bollinger telephone interview, Dec. 16, 2011). Appendix A, however, lists several archives, including the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, that house Hollywood public relations material for future research.

Results

As discussed below, this current research shows that many entertainment public relations strategies and tactics through the years simply update P.T. Barnum’s templates, using whatever media and
technology are currently available. The PR goal for entertainment clients then and now is the same: to deliver the audience on opening night. Along with a big opening, a positive entertainment experience for the audience then assures great word of mouth (good buzz to use entertainment biz terminology), again using whatever methods are currently available to transmit and amplify word of mouth.

Circuses and freak shows: The Barnum template

As analyzed by Lamme and Russell (2010), profit was the primary theme/motivation for P.T. Barnum for his PR work for various exhibitions of human oddities such as Tom Thumb, his family-friendly entertainments at his American Museum, and eventually various iterations of his circus.

Per Lamme and Russell’s informative compendium (2010, Table 4, pp, 336-338) of PR tactics, beginning in 1835 to publicize human curiosities, Barnum and his advance man, Levi Lyman, used such tactics as: “engineered controversy for coverage; editorial previews of exhibits; bribery of press; newspaper ads; inventive copy/design; lighted transparencies to draw attention to exhibit; woodcuts; planted anecdotes for word-of-mouth; targeted working class women; capitalized on public reaction and interest; biography as promotional tool; wrote for the press under pseudonym; and created pseudonym for juggler because foreign-sounding name more interesting” (Lamme & Miller, 2010, p. 336). Additional tactics in the 1840s included: “sermon for Fejee mermaid’s authenticity; Lyman [Barnum’s advance man posing] as a doctor; exterior [of his American Museum in New York city], streetside effects of light, sound color; “puffing”; stunts; advertising; developed and exploited his own reputation” (Lamme & Russell, 2010, 336).

In the 1850’s, to publicize his American tour of Jennie Lind, Barnum employed: “contests; street serenades; ticket auctions; daily press handouts; preview performances; repositioned performer to fit audience” (Lamme & Russell, 2010, 336). He also used endorsements from religious, secular, and educational authorities. Multiple editions of Barnum’s autobiography heightened his celebrity (Lamme & Russell, 2012, 332). Harris (1973) showed that Barnum “understood that American audiences did not mind cries of trickery; in fact, they delighted in debate. Amusement and deceit could coexist” (pp. 61-62), because controversies gave audience members a break from their daily routine. According to Adams (1997), by Barnum’s death in 1891, his “worldwide fame was no accident. His celebrity was his life’s work and his prize possession. He bragged about it, sued people over it, threatened to kill it, but most of all, he reinvented it” (p. 1).

Barnum cashed in on his fame—or notoriety—in ways that foreshadow the fortunes made by celebrities such as Kim Kardashian or Snooki of “Jersey Shore” infamy. Barnum’s multiple partners, who were doing the front-line work, split half the profits among themselves, while he took a full fifty percent ($87,850 from one enterprise for one year in the late 1870s), because, as he wrote his partners, “I propose to receive without grumbling something like the worth of my name and powers” (Kunhardt, Jr., Kunhardt, III, and Kunhardt, 1995, p. 250).
Barnum’s name and powers included his advertising and publicity genius, innovation and sheer dedication to marketing saturation. Among the 100 cars of his circus train, was an elaborate hand-painted advertising coach that arrived 14 days in advance of his circus as a moveable billboard with Barnum’s portrait surrounded by depictions of his circus acts on each side. Fulfilling the functions of today’s movie trailers, as well as bus wraps, the railway car was opened as its own preview attraction. Its most important function, however, was as a mobile advertising and publicity office, with areas for all the printed advertising and promotion materials, plus accommodations for his advance publicity staff, because Barnum used a rule of thumb that still holds true in the movie business today—one-third of the budget goes to marketing: “In a typical year, 1877, the cost of advertising and publicity for Barnum’s circus came to over $100,000, almost a third of the total expenses” (Kunhardt, Jr., Kunhardt III and Kunhardt, 1995, p. 252). He also articulated the ethos that still prevails in the entertainment industry, that “what gave pleasure to democratic audiences was good. . . . He legitimiz...
Warner history, the first screening of the first movie shown in the Warner brothers’ own storefront movie theater in New Castle, Pennsylvania, on May 28, 1905, turned out to be what is now called a “buzz screening.” Their father, a cobbler and grocer/butcher, invited friends and local gossips, and the next day the crowds came and kept on coming (Sperling & Millner, 1998, pp. 34-5). “Buzz screenings” or “sneak peaks” function like Barnum’s circus parade. Ahead of the official opening, they get the target demographic talking, an especially useful tactic now in the era of social media and viral word-of-mouth. As for promotion during the nickelodeon era, “campaigns were quickly adopted to fit prevailing media of the day—signboards, newspaper advertisements, and posters. Carnival attractions called for carnival hoopla” (Sennett, 1998, pp. 132). Now as then, public relations uses low-cost, creative tactics to generate free media coverage and word of mouth in order to extend the reach of paid advertising.

As the four Warner brothers moved into distributing films to theaters owned by others, they printed a bulletin for their customers (Sperling & Millner, 1998, pp. 42-44). *The Duquesne Film Noise* had the slogan, “We are the only film exchange issuing its own magazine—watch others follow” (Sperling & Millner, pp. 44 and 146ff). The customer newsletter—now distributed by email or RSS—is another familiar business-to-business public relations tactic. Of course, Barnum had created the “`Courier’ as advance tabloid for circus” in the 1880s (Lamme & Russell, 2010, p. 348).

### Studio publicity

Lack of enough new movies and Thomas Edison’s grip on industry patents eventually led the entrepreneur owners of nickelodeons and earlier movie theaters to produce their own films. They knew what appealed to audiences. By then, they were also accomplished businessmen and “showmen” in the Barnum mold. When they moved to owning chains of theaters and then to producing and distributing their own films, they moved from running small, local businesses to heading big businesses with geographically dispersed retail outlets (theaters) and diverse customers (the nationwide mass audience). Their national public relations campaigns reflected the changes that also occurred, as other kinds of businesses became “big business” in the late 19th and early 20th century (Lamme & Russell 2010; Miller, 2000). The new studios distributed their films through their own chains of theaters in certain regions and made distribution deals with other chains elsewhere. Since limited numbers of costly prints were created, distributors moved prints from theater to theater weekly. A film might stay in circulation for several years, until it had been seen in every theater or until the prints wore out.

Leading up to a film’s premiere, the studio publicity machine, gossip columns, newsreels, and national publicity tours by stars accompanied by a traveling publicist aroused awareness, curiosity, and the intention to buy tickets. When local theaters finally obtained their film print, however, they needed to refresh that interest. They put the titles and stars’ names in lights on their marquees, showed trailers, hung posters, and did local advertising, including hiring “newsie” aged kids to pass out handbills. They “themed” promotions and did local advertising and PR stunts suggested in the
studios’ 20-plus-page “press book” for each film. Press books included advertisement layouts; catalogues of available collateral materials such as life-sized lobby cutouts of the stars; “pre-written” reviews; news releases; and pages of ideas for PR stunts and local angles (Sennett, 1998, pp. 69-79).

Among the press books available to read in the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences in Los Angeles, for example, is the Warner Bros. 34-page “Showman’s Action Guide for ‘Superman’” (1978), which begins with an introduction headlined: For Showmen, “‘Superman’ begins a Whole New Era: For the Ultimate Entertainment, an ultimate Campaign” (no page numbers).

**Famous Players in Famous Plays (Paramount-Famous Players-Lasky)**

The Barnum template of adapting to the audience is evident in the title of Adolph Zukor’s autobiography, *The Public Is Never Wrong* (Zukor, 1953). Zukor had a penny arcade that used Edison phonographs, and when he heard about Edison’s projection machine, Zukor put in a theater upstairs from the arcade (A. Zukor, 1975, pp. 1-5). According to his son Eugene, Adolph Zukor’s two children became his test audience” (E. Zukor, 1975, p. 15). Besides such audience targeting and informal testing, A. Zukor was an early advocate of exit polling before he even opened his first movie house (Schulberg, 1981, p. 28).

Zukor brought business knowhow from the fur business as he later expanded into production, saying that he needed “‘a good inside man’ and ‘a good outside man’—someone to make the product and someone to front for it and sell it” (Schulberg, 1981, p. 29). The outside man who sold the movies to the audience was writer Bud Schulberg’s father, B.P. Schulberg, the person who named the company Famous Players in Famous Plays and was its first publicist (Schulberg, 1981, p. 30). To protect the significance of its “classy” name, the new company bought the American rights and imported a four-reel film from France, “Queen Elizabeth,” starring Sarah Bernhardt. By scheduling a prestige premiere with a celebrity audience in a major Broadway legitimate theater, the company forced the Patents Trust to relent and grant a license. The “red-carpet” star-studded premiere has been a staple of movie publicity ever since.

Soon the company produced movies starring Charlie Chaplin or Mary Pickford, dubbed “America’s Sweetheart” by B. P. Schulberg (Schulberg, 1981, p. 37). Zukor’s company prospered presenting four-reelers featuring stars, many from the world of the stage, publicized by B.P. Schulberg. Billboards of various sizes were an early mainstay of film advertising. Another technique, supposedly invented at Paramount under John C. Flinn to cause excitement about *The Miracle Man* in 1919, was the “wild posting” on telegraph poles of ambiguous posters without any company identification. They read: “The Miracle Man is Coming” (Davis, 1993, p. 151).

Harry Reichenbach came closest in this era to emulating Barnum. He got his start publicizing a magician in France and in the U.S., and some of his stunts and scams are chronicled by Borkowski (2008, pp. 78-87). Reichenbach worked early on with Jesse Lasky, and then with Zukor, Lasky and...
Goldwyn. A star maker, Reichenbach is the prototype of the puppet master, who orchestrates hoopla or controversy in order to “open” a picture.

Producer, former publicist, and walking Paramount history book, A. C. Lyles, recalled that by the 1940’s, Paramount had a publicity staff of 75. Publicists were each assigned to four or five of the 60 films made each year and were expected “to write a certain number of one-paragraph, one-page, two-page and three-page stories” on each film with first pick going to ‘Louella’s planter’ and with other planters assigned to Hedda Hopper, The Hollywood Reporter, Daily Variety, the dailies, Look and Life, and the fan magazines (Ames, 1987, 2). According to Eells (1972), such “powerhouses as Hedda and Louella [Parsons] each had a man assigned to plant items at the top of their columns and another to place squibs [short quotes, epigrams, items] at the bottom” (p. 339). Other publicists specialized in fashion and photography.

Star-development was a daily activity, and the unit publicists were in charge of bringing promising young contract players “looking like the stars of tomorrow they eventually became” in full make-up, hair, and wardrobe to lunch in “The Golden Circle” table in the Paramount commissary (Ames, 1987, p. 3). All of this activity serviced a print industry that included not just Louella Parson’s column carried by 600 plus newspapers and Hedda Hopper’s syndicated column starting in the late 1930s, but also “in excess of 400 accredited newspaper and fan magazine correspondents” (Eells, 1972, p. 12).

**Fox**

When William Fox couldn’t get movies from the Edison Patents Trust to show in his theaters, he began producing his own in 1909. He also sued the Trust and finally won in 1912, which opened a boom time for the film business (Solomon, 1988, p. 3). By 1916, Fox had moved production to Los Angeles and soon had exclusive contracts with stars, including Theda Bara and Tom Mix, who each made a dozen or more films per year. At the end of W.W.I., to satisfy changing audience tastes, Fox moved Winfield Sheehan from New York to head the Los Angeles studio. Sheehan put less emphasis on stars and more on improving the material and finding talented directors (Solomon, 1988, p. 8). This kept Fox successful until the 1926 format wars at the beginning of sound. The advent of sound, color, various wide screen formats, and 3-D all provided publicity people with news angles, such as “new” or “never-before-seen” or “bigger and better”—news angles that continue to fascinate audiences in the age of mobile apps.

**Warner Bros**

When the Warner brothers were put out of the east coast exhibition/distribution business by the Edison Patents Trust, they began to produce their own pictures, and they headed west—out of range of the Trust, they hoped.
During W.W.I., Warner’s first big hit was *My Four Years in Germany*, based on a bestselling true story by former Ambassador to Germany James W. Girard. “Based on a bestseller” and “based on a true story” are still effective PR pitches. A prior book means there is a build-in, “pre-sold,” core audience. “Based on a true story” allows for numerous media pitches exploring the real people, and in the 1990s during the heyday of TV movies, the general consensus was that the designation of “based on a true story” increased viewership by 10 percent.

At age 20, Hal Wallis supervised Warner’s publicity beginning in 1923. When Wallis became head of production, Bob Taplinger headed publicity at Warner, before moving to Columbia (Davis, 1993, 138). Bill Hendricks who later became publicity chief is quoted as saying, “‘publicity began when Warner Bros. bought a story; it never stopped until the picture was released’” (Davis, 1993, p. 142). That pattern continues today at all of the major studios. Acquisitions of pitches and screenplays are publicized to the trades, while purchases of bestsellers and well-known life stories are also publicized to the consumer press to begin to create awareness. Before a studio green lights a film, which means committing money for the budget and putting it into production, the publicity and promotion plans are already in place.

Warner’s first success creating a film star was with Rin Tin Tin in 1923, developing the canine into a “franchise star.” A “franchise” refers to a series of films with the same lead characters and similar plots that can be promoted as familiar but new products to pre-existing fans.

Next the studio secured Lionel Barrymore for *Beau Brummell*, thereby bringing the prestige of New York and London European theatrical fame to the studio in 1923 (Sperling & Millner, 80-84), as Sarah Bernhardt had done for Famous Players. Later a 1943 *Daily Variety* trade ad for Warner’s *To Have and Have Not* declared, “We believe that, with the release of this enormously dramatic film, Lauren Bacall becomes one of the most exciting discoveries in the history of motion pictures” (To Have, 1945, January 17). To create awareness for the new discovery, publicity ideas included naming a newly discovered volcanic island near Guam “Bacall Island”; and having troops on Kwajalein Island 4500 miles away record questions for Bacall and duping in her answers to generate stories on the “most unusual interview ever staged” (Weiser, 1945). Throughout the studio era, the Warner Bros. publicity heads created star-power and used it to drive box-office sales.

In 1925, Warner Bros. moved into another new technology—radio. They purchased the station they renamed KFWB as a way to circumvent the high cost of buying radio ads on the two established Los Angeles stations. And as low-cost programming they ran an open mike on sets during filming (Sperling & Millner, 88-90), an early version of “behind-the-scenes” coverage. Recently to feed the public’s appetite for “inside info” and “authentic” access, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences and ABC Television offered a smart-phone app to give a virtual full-access backstage pass for the 2012 Oscars, a strategy to appeal to younger viewers who use a “second screen” while viewing television (James, 2012, p. B1).
In 1937, Warner Bros. began a series of two-reelers on historical American subjects, which they offered cost free or at a minimal rental, in support of the Americanism movement leading up to WWII. The Warner brothers wrote personal letters to exhort exhibitors to show the films, and they spoke out in the press: “Defense of American democracy has been left almost entirely to the press,” J. L. Warner said this week. “through our medium we can reach 40,000 to 70,000 with a single picture. . . . We are descendants of immigrants and we know why our father came to America. . . . We believe that any one who is anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, anti-Protestant or anti-anything that has gone into the building of this country is anti-American” (Churchill, 1939, January 15). Because the Sons of Liberty tells the story of Haym Salomon, among others, the Boston campaign proposed direct mail to 250 Jewish Organizations in New England and sermons by 35 leading Boston Rabbis, plus outreach to “all the leading patriotic societies and organizations” (Sons of Liberty Campaign Outline, 1939). Despite Jack Warner’s public comments, the publicity campaign occasioned a firm reminder from Lee Blumberg of Warner Bros. home office to the publicist, Marty Weiser: “Remember, we don’t want “lovely” editorials or fine reviews of the picture. We want those newspapers to tell their readers to go to the theatre to see the picture” (Blumberg, 1939, May 17).

During the war, Warner Bros. supported Army Emergency Relief with the proceeds from This is the Army and from the sale of a souvenir booklet in the lobbies of 300 theaters by women in uniform (Twombly, c. 1943). This was one of a list of 22 publicity tactics that Marty Wesier outlined, including a number that assumed Army cooperation, such as: “Army tents set up in strategic spots [to sell tickets]; General Grant tank for street ballyhoo purposes; Army helicopter to deliver print on roof of one of the local theatres; Military parade; WACS as usherettes on opening night” (Weiser, 1943).

Marty Weiser is one of the unsung publicity pioneers, both from his time at Warner Bros. and later as an independent publicist. The hundreds of documents he donated to the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences are a treasure trove of specifics about entertainment public relations strategies and tactics through the years.

Twentieth Century Founded and Merged with Fox

Twentieth Century Pictures was formed in 1933 by Darryl F. Zanuck, a former VP of Production for Fox, and Joseph M. Schenck of United Artists, a releasing company, and his brother Nicholas, who had become president of Loew’s in 1927. By May 1935, Twentieth merged with Fox under Zanuck. Harry Brand was brought along as head of publicity (Solomon, 24). The merged studio’s biggest stars were Shirley Temple and Will Rogers. A 1935 company profile from Fortune, breaks down the company’s financials: “Distribution costs (and other expenses of the New York office) average around $10,000,000 a year” (Solomon, 21), equivalent to approximately an additional 50 percent above production costs. The distribution costs would have included advertising and publicity. As with Barnum, these costs today continue to add 30 to 50 percent beyond the film’s production budget.
Zanuck was a showman who knew how to hitch his films to surges of public interest. As we now say in the “O” of a SWOT analysis, Zanuck knew how to leverage an Opportunity. In 1936, he ordered a quickie, *The Country Doctor*, to ride on the public mania about the Dionne quintuplets. He also signed the Olympic figure-skating sensation, Sonja Henie, who became “the highest paid actress in Hollywood at her peak” (Solomon, p. 32), harnessing star power from the field of sports and pairing her with a series of leading men under contract.

Listening to the audience to give them more of what they liked was one of Zanuck’s many PR skills. The studios paid attention to the volume and the content of fan mail, which, for example, led Zanuck to cast a bit player named Tyrone Power as the lead in a big-budget “A” picture (Solomon, 1988, p. 32), establishing him as a new star.

Through the end of W.W.II, the most profitable part of the film business for the major vertically integrated companies was their theater chains (A. Zukor, 1953, pp. 261-262). Because of studios’ abuses in their dealings with independent theaters, however, in May 1948, the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v. Paramount Pictures that the studios had to divest their theaters. They were also banned from monopolistic practices such as price fixing, blind bidding (forcing theaters to sign contracts for films sight unseen), and block-booking, i.e. requiring independents to book numerous lesser movies to gain access to a hit (Solomon, 1988, p. 56).

By the time Twentieth had divested its theaters in 1952, the studios were also facing the challenge of competing with television (Solomon, 1988, p. 70). Zanuck moved toward “entertainment” films during the period of the Korean Conflict, but the greatest success came from star vehicles for Susan Hayward and Gregory Peck, and for the developing star, Marilyn Monroe (Solomon, 1988, pp. 72-3). In internal memos in 1953, Zanuck analyzed the financial successes and failures of recent films both domestically and in foreign markets (including those of competitors) and concluded that to be successful films needed action, size and…sex appeal (Solomon, 74-79). If one adds “big stars” (which to Zanuck must have been self-evident), this is a good description of the kind of films that today are known as “tentpoles.” Tentpole films, such as *Avatar* and any of the *Mission Impossible* franchise, are allotted high production and marketing budgets because of their potential for profits that literally ‘hold up the roof of the studio’ by paying for overhead costs.

Until his retirement in 1963, Twentieth’s Harry Brand was, according to an obituary, one of the “heralds of hyperbole known as the Hollywood Press Agent” (Folkart, 1989). The former sportswriter worked at studios, “when stars looked to the studio for all their needs. There were no personal press agents, business managers or answering services. . . .Yet he was Sphinx-like in his discretion and tireless in his loyalties” (Folkart, 1989). He also knew how to turn a PR threat into an opportunity, for example when Marilyn Monroe went missing from production and eloped with Joe DiMaggio. Brand proclaimed, “‘We’re not losing a star . . . We’re gaining an outfielder’” (Folkart, 1989). Talk about positive spin...before spin got a bad name by becoming a euphemism for lying.
MGM, Selznick and Gone with the Wind

Howard Dietz headed the east coast publicity office, while Howard Strickling was MGM’s west coast head of publicity, reporting directly to Louis B. Mayer (Davis, 1993, 138-141). Strickling kept a huge scrapbook labeled “History of MGM 1924-1940” that is full of year-by-year press clippings about his boss, Louis B. Mayer. The endeavor shows Strickling functioning as a kind of personal publicist and historian of the mogul’s connections with such luminaries as Herbert Hoover, Charles Lindberg, Winston Churchill, and so forth (History of MGM, 1924-1940). Most of all, the scrapbook shows Strickling developing the Mayer Myth of the Star-Maker, the angle of a big feature interview called, “Louis B. Mayer on Stars I have Made…and stars I am going to make!” (Harmon, 1937). Studio moguls such as Mayer bridled at anyone else claiming to have “discovered” a star. The moguls considered themselves, not the publicists, the star makers.

Walter Seltzer worked as a publicist at MGM under Howard Strickling from 1936 to 1939. Seltzer was born into the exhibition business, and his earliest memory was “sitting on a piano bench in one of his [father’s] theaters, along with the piano player, watching the serials and the Westerns and shorts” (Seltzer, 1986, p. 1). When he worked at the MGM Culver City offices as a planter for the dailies, he “made a swing of the town every day (a fifty-mile round trip in a 1928 rattletrap) to each of the eight dailies” (Davis, 1993, p. 139). His star assignment was Joan Crawford (Seltzer, 1986, p. 3). More so than some others, Seltzer moved from studio to studio as he climbed the publicity ladder.

Harkening back to circus parades, when stars from MGM and other studios were sent on national publicity tours, they were often featured in local parades, none more elaborate than that for Gone with the Wind in Atlanta, which was viewed, some say, by five times the city’s population of 300 thousand (Davis, 1993, 153). Barnum’s strategies for opening the show continued.

Depression promotion

Conventional wisdom holds that the Great Depression was a great time for movies; however, to get people to spend money on movie tickets, advertising and publicity became even more emotional and sensationalistic than previously. According to Sennett (1998) studio press books suggested more gimmicks and included more merchandise tie-ins to clothes, hats, watches, and books (pp. 132-135). The theater owners were receptive, because, “Selling was a religion, and in 1937, these men even had their bible, Charles “Chick” Lewis Presents the Encyclopedia of Exploitation, by Bill Hendricks and Howard Waugh” (Sennett, 1998, 140). The Academy library has a rare copy of this eye-opening compendium of stunts and attention grabbing publicity ploys, many of which out chutzpah those described in Peter Shankman’s recent, readable paperback, Can We do That?! Outrageous PR Stunts That Work—and Why Your Company Needs Them (2007).

Later, as editor/publisher of The Showman’s Trade Review, Chick Lewis published Showmanship in Advertising: The Fundamentals of Salesmanship in Print (Hendricks & Orr, 1949) to codify all that Hendricks had learned about publicity coming up through theater management from
small theaters in Ohio, Tennessee, and Los Angeles, to being in charge of a theater circuit’s “advertising, publicity and exploitation” (p. iv), to joining Warner’s publicity department; Orr provided instructive, hand-drawn illustrations. According to Hendricks, “Showmanship means alertness in sensing public response and adapting selling strategy to public mood or reaction. . . . The showman instinctively moves to the audience side; his personal persuasions are put aside while he sits with the paying customers and absorbs their point of view (Hendricks & Orr, 1949, p. xiv). Thus, for Hendricks, showmanship represents an implicit two-way model of communication, though the audience’s attitude is “sensed” rather than formally researched or actively sought. He also acknowledges those who preceded him: “In the olden days of show business, in the halcyon days of showboats, medicine shows, circuses and carnivals, theatrical entrepreneurs were faced with the problem of making intangible entertainment appear glamorous and desirable to backwoodsmen who, to say the least, were most loath to part with their hard-earned cash” (Hendricks & Orr, 1949, p. xv). Hendricks says that box-office sense, which “is closely related to common sense,” is invaluable, because, “A time-honored show-business axiom asks the question—does it sell tickets?” (Hendricks & Orr, 1949, p. 219).

Publicizing the movies in the non-studio era

After the studios no longer had stars under long-term contracts, most production moved to distant locations. There a “Unit Publicist,” such as Bob Werden oversaw the preparation for the print and electronic press kit materials (Werden, telephone interview, January 18, 2012). Publicist Marty Weiser continued to thrive as an independent after the end of the studio era. In 1955, the film Marty starred the little-known Ernest Borgnine in a low-budget, black-and-white feature remake of a live television drama. Hecht-Lancaster and United Artists backed the $350,000-budget movie version with an advertising and promotion campaign that reached more than $400,000, resulting in box office of $4-5 million after its big push for Oscar nominations and votes (Wilkerson, 1956, p. 1). A memo from Marty Weiser, punning on sharing the name with the title character, proposes “to re-create fresh word of mouth and interest within the industry to the end that MARTY is nominated and chosen for Academy Awards. . . . to assist Walter Seltzer and his staff in every possible manner with ideas and their fulfillment.” The memo listed 14 PR tactics for the film. Several of them focused on exploiting voice recordings of Marty on the telephone to augment the iconic sketch of a man in a phone booth that become the symbol of the film (MARTY memo, c. January 1956). Boxoffice columnist Ivan Spear praises the campaign, while questioning whether Academy members’ votes for this Paddy Cheyevsky born-on-television project constituted, “a nibble at the hand that feeds” (Spear, 1956, p. 29).

For another Weiser campaign, in August of 1973, for Enter the Dragon, starring Bruce Lee, one radio giveaway was a flip book with two of the co-stars, Bob Wall and Jim Kelly, demonstrating martial arts. Promotions were also staged at various martial arts events. For a Los Angeles radio
giveaway, Weiser had tickets to the premiere printed on t-shirts; other premiere tickets were baked into fortune cookies. And in front of the Chinese Theater in Hollywood, he staged a “dragon race.” Chinese-dragon teams of 20 men from San Francisco and Los Angeles raced slalom-style between human pylons of martial artists, who then demonstrated their fighting skills (Enter the Dragon, 1973). Weiser’s efforts achieved the most important goal for film publicity—a big opening, as delineated in an inter-office memo: “A little showmanship plus a tremendous amount of effort can be made to pay-off. As this is being written, DRAGON (in its opening day at the same theatre) is running double the box office take of LIVE AND LET DIE, a tremendous hit in Los Angeles” (Wilder, 1973). During the studio era, contact players understood that doing publicity was part of their contract, and most of them did what was asked, even if they “vanted to be alone.” After the collapse of the studio system, sometimes the publicist had to motivate attendance without much help from a star. Enter the Dragon was, however, an extreme case of publicizing without the star. Bruce Lee had died on July 20, 1973, and the picture opened on August 19.

“Opening the picture” with lots of media coverage and big box office continues to be the key goal for movie publicity campaigns. In an ethnographic study of the June 1989 opening of Batman, Bacon-Smith and Yarborough (1991) found that “preview moviegoers seemed conscious more of being present at a major event than a narrative film,” citing “the television entertainment pieces and preview specials” and “the publicity behind it, there’s been so much publicity, the hype, the hype and the promotional things” (p. 97). Making people want to be part of an “event” is one of the goals of pre-opening hoopla. Get the audience there. Then they’ll spread the word—good or bad.

Summary of Results

Q1: Who were the pivotal pioneers? The early movie producers embraced a flourishing already-existing entertainment tradition from circuses to burlesque to vaudeville to nickelodeons to two-reelers to four-reelers. They brought sales skills from the garment industry and the struggling immigrant experience. So the moguls themselves fulfilled many PR functions, but they soon teamed with press agents and former journalists, who became the puppet-masters behind the scenes, while the moguls were the front men. The tradition of the public relations person staying behind the scenes and out of the picture has resulted in many names falling into obscurity. Research up to now has identified the following especially influential pioneers from the beginnings of movies through the early seventies: B.P. Schulberg, Harry Reichenbach, Hal Wallis, Harry Brand, Howard Dietz, Howard Strickling, Walter Seltzer, Russell Birdwell, Bill Hendricks, Marty Weiser, Henry Rogers, and Warren Cowan.

Q2: Who was innovative compared to Barnum? The goal throughout film history has been to “open the show” and generate positive word of mouth—to get people talking. Therefore, even today, most of the tactics continue to be variations on Barnum’s templates.
Q3: Of the five motivations of Lamme and Miller (2010, p. 335), profit is the main concern of entertainment PR. Show biz is a business, and it needs to sell and make a profit on its experiential product—entertainment.

Q4: As new media themselves, movies and later radio, television, and the internet have always been in the forefront of using new media for public relations purposes.

Discussion

Results of the current study show how the early focus on stars and creating new stars out of a studio’s contract players followed the Barnum template. There is much more work to be done utilizing archival sources. The author is in the process interviewing prominent, living professionals who began working in entertainment PR as early as the 1930s.

The publicity processes described in this study have developed into today’s culture in which any regular person can become an instant celebrity via reality TV and personal publicity; any celebrity can become a multi-millionaire via appearances fees and endorsements accessed through PR leverage; and any kind of celebrity (idolization or infamy) may be as lucrative to the celeb and as tantalizing to the public as fame achieved through talent and hard work. Now current new media tools such as Twitter and Facebook allow a celebrity or his or her public relations practitioner to reach the public without going through the filters once provided by journalism’s editorial process or the editing and revision inherent in a hierarchical publicity department or public relations firm. Entertainment PR seems to be reprising P. T. Barnum’s playbook about creating and leveraging controversy and becoming one’s own entertainment product—becoming the show, while publicizing the show.
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Appendix A: Resources for Future Research

The Academy of Television Arts and Sciences has more than 700 video oral history interviews that cover the person’s career in detail in its Archive of American Television, many of which are accessible online at http://www.emmytvlegends.org/ and are cross-referenced by profession, topic and key words. Searching under “publicist” currently brings up three interviews, including one of Warren Cowan, and half a dozen mentions.

Illinois State University Circus & Allied Arts Collection in Special Collections of the Milner Library contains thousand of books and pieces of memorabilia, including posters and publicity material, related to the circuses, sideshows, carnivals and vaudeville. http://library.illinoisstate.edu/unique-collections/circus-allied-arts/

Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences includes an extensive, non-circulating collection of books related to the motion picture business, as well as hundreds of collections of papers, including those of William Hendricks, Howard Strickling, Robert M. W. Vogel, and Marty Weiser. The library also houses a number of oral histories running to 15 hours each with transcripts of 300 pages. Most of the interviews cover the person’s career, as well as volunteer work with the Academy.

Southern Methodist University’s De Golyer Library houses the Ronald L. Davis Oral History Collection on the Performing Arts, which includes interviews with heads of publicity departments, such as Walter Seltzer and others, along with hundreds of interviews with stars, directors and producers. A free guide to the collection is available. http://smu.edu/cul/degolyer/oh.htm

University of Southern California Archival Collections contains a finding aid by the person’s name, and includes materials related to people working in radio, television and film, including publicity materials searched under “publicity” at http://www.usc.edu/libraries/finding_aids/search_results.php?q=publicity+++site:www.usc.edu/libraries/finding_aids/records&hl=en&client=google-

Warner Collection at the University of Southern California holds motion picture documents including publicity files and publicity and historical stills from 1918 through 1968 when the studio was sold to Seven Arts, as well as Warner TV files from 1955-1968. http://www.usc.edu/libraries/collections/warner_bros/
1. Introduction

In this paper we draw on Bernard Ingham’s papers held at Churchill College, Cambridge to explore Ingham’s career in government communication and his impact as Margaret Thatcher’s chief press secretary in the early years of her premiership. (Later papers are still restricted under the ‘thirty years rule’.)

In reading these papers, we noted many parallels with contemporary British politics. A new, Conservative-led government had been elected following Labour-led administrations in which an electorally-successful leader had resigned between elections to be replaced by an unelected prime minister. Financial crises and economic worries were pressing concerns. Iran and Afghanistan were in the news.

Yet there are many differences between the two periods: Margaret Thatcher, unlike David Cameron, had a Conservative majority in the House of Commons. The press was still dominant in the media ecosystem, though television and radio, as we see, were becoming more important. The Soviet Union was still in existence and the 1980 Moscow Olympics became a political issue because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

2. The early years

Bernard Ingham was born in 1932 and brought up in Hebden Bridge, a West Riding of Yorkshire (now West Yorkshire) mill town. His father Garnet was a politically-active weaver in one of the mills (factories) who was elected as a Labour councillor in 1947.

Ingham failed his 11 Plus exams and left school at 16 to work on the local newspaper, becoming a member of the National Union of Journalists. His newspaper career saw him move from the Hebden Bridge Times to the Halifax office of the Yorkshire Post. He later became that paper’s northern industrial correspondent based in Leeds. He joined The Guardian as its Leeds-based correspondent before moving to this paper’s London office in 1965 reporting on industrial matters.

Bernard Ingham once had his own political ambitions, being adopted as an approved candidate and standing unsuccessfully in the Labour interest for the safe Conservative ward of Moortown in the Leeds city council elections of 1965. His career change in 1967 from newspaper journalism to government communication meant him resigning from the Labour Party in accordance with Civil Service rules.
3. Career in government communication: ‘application, integrity and toughness’

Ingham’s first job in government was a short-term contract from May 1967 as “press and public relations adviser” (INGH 1/1) to the Prices and Incomes Board (which had been set up two years earlier). A year later he was appointed Chief Information Officer at the new Department of Employment and Productivity led by Barbara Castle. He was supportive of and sympathetic towards Barbara Castle and was disappointed by the collapse of her ‘In Place of Strife’ proposals for curbing the power of the trade unions (Harris 1990).

He was retained in the Department of Employment in Edward Heath’s Conservative administration in 1970, moving to Director of Information (INGH 1/7) in the Department of Energy in January 1974 and subsequently working in that department under Tony Benn when Labour returned to power in 1974.

In a letter dated 13 May 1974 Ingham discusses the ‘independence from party politics’ required in the role of information officers (INGH 1/7). He was exercised by the distinction between public relations and information, between bias and neutrality, and was asked to prepare a paper on the qualities required of chief information officers, an update to the findings of the Crombie Report of 1947.

The postwar committee chaired by JIC Crombie and including JAR Pimlott (whose ‘Public Relations and American Democracy’ was published in 1951) had reported into ‘the recruitment, remuneration and conditions of service of departmental Information Officers’ and ‘the organization and staffing of Information Divisions in departments’ (Clark 1970: 36). In doing so, it defined the role of public relations and communication in government:

Departments require Information Divisions: -

a) To create and maintain an informed public opinion about the subjects with which the Department deals. This is the purpose which most properly is to be regarded as informative. It is much wider in scope than what is usually associated with the term “Public Relations.”

b) To use the methods of publicity, where suitable, to help the Department to achieve its purpose.

c) To assist and advise in all matters bearing on relations between the Department and the public with which it deals. This is the purpose more commonly described as “Public Relations”.

d) To advise the Department as to the reaction on the public of a policy present or contemplated. (INGH 1/8)

Ingham’s paper on ‘The nature, purpose, structure and organisation of the Government Information System’ was presented at a meeting of government information officers at Sunningdale in October 1974 (INGH 1/8). Its purpose was to establish the characteristics required of government information officers and was an updating of the Crombie Report.
In this paper he described “a more difficult communications and public relations role because of the need to reconcile the generally more cautious approach of civil servants to relations with the media and the public with the generally more extrovert approach of ministers and heads of quasi-governmental bodies”.

He outlined the purpose of government communication:

- to play its part in meeting and maintaining an informed public on the Government’s policies, legislation, services and activities both at home and overseas, with the objective of informing the public of its rights and responsibilities, and of seeking understanding and support for Government policies without entering into party political controversy or advocacy.

The voice of the Information Officer is... one of a number which should be heard in the formulation of policy. (INGH 1/8)

Anticipating his move five years later, Ingham went on to outline the role of the Chief Press Secretary at No. 10 Downing Street as having “responsibility at official level for co-ordinating the presentation of Government policy. Ideally he [sic] should have wide experience of the Government Information Service. He should consult Heads of Information Divisions regularly and be available for consultation with them.”

Ingham outlined the qualities of the generalists best suited to government communication roles:

i) Lively intelligence and intellectual curiosity;

ii) a positive approach to communications with the public;

iii) political “feel” – an ability to grasp the implications of policy and a basic awareness of what is – and what is not – possible;

iv) an ability to write simply, clearly and quickly and to communicate orally to audiences of all levels;

v) management ability, with particular reference to the allocation of resources;

vi) application, basic integrity and toughness of mind to uphold it.

Ingham received a letter of thanks from Henry James, Director General of the COI, thanking him for his Sunningdale work (letter dated 8 October 1974, INGH 1/8).

In a subsequent paper, Ingham returned to the Crombie Report when presenting his thoughts on open government (dated 13 April 1976). He defined open government as “the continuous and sustained disclosure of the maximum amount of information as a matter of conscious and deliberate policy with the general objective of creating an informed public and, more particularly, of enabling the public, through consultation, to make an effective contribution to the formulation of policy” (INGH 1/8).

In discussing the challenges of achieving this, Ingham concludes: “In short, as with most aspects of life, you have to take the rough with the smooth”.
He addresses the challenges this will bring to the sometimes covert practice of media relations: “But unattributable briefing has an honourable place in open government... It is not necessarily the antithesis of openness.” (INGH 1/8)

One more item from Ingham’s correspondence will be cited as it relates to his work updating Crombie and to his most celebrated role in government communication. In a letter dated 10 October 1973 addressed to R Haydon, then chief press secretary at No.10 Downing Street, Ingham criticises the selection of career diplomats to serve in this role (Ingh 1/8).

Had he begun preparing for this role in which he would be required to ‘take the rough with the smooth’? Was the school leaver without a degree but with half a lifetime’s experience of politics, press and public relations arguing for the promotion of the generalist over the specialist?

4. **Ingham in Downing Street**

Bernard Ingham, in his memoirs (1991) describes himself as an “innovative operator” in the way he practised public relations. He was also a thorough practitioner who had built up a clear vision of how to manage media relations from his experience in the Department of Energy.

The thoroughness of Ingham’s approach had been commended by Henry James, then head of the Central Office of Information (COI). In a letter dated 23 January 1975 he wrote to Ingham congratulating him on the success of a press conference. “Thank you for sending me the press kit. I think it rather impressive. As you probably noticed, I slunk in at the back of your press conference which seemed to go well.” (INGH 1/4).

Beyond media relations, Ingham had also practised integrated marketing communications in his campaigning work for the Department of Energy, working with the advertising agency Young and Rubicam on advertising on the ‘Saving in Industry’ and ‘Save It’ campaigns.

He had also gained experience of set piece broadcast interviews, appearing on BBC Radio 2’s Jimmy Young programme in June 1975.

Bernard Ingham’s appointment as Chief Press Secretary to the Prime Minister was announced on 9 September 1979 (Harris 1990). He took over from the previously-mentioned Henry James who had fulfilled the role on a 6-month contract following the election on 4 May 1979. James is not mentioned in Margaret Thatcher’s (1993) book on her time in Downing Street, while Ingham is cited eight times and her foreign affairs adviser, Charles Powell, gains nine mentions.

Thatcher records his arrival and praises his contribution early on in the book:

“Bernard Ingham, my press secretary, who arrived five months after I became Prime Minister, was another indispensible member of the team. I was told that Bernard’s politics had been Labour not Conservative; but the first time we met, I warmed to this tough, blunt, humorous Yorkshireman. Bernard’s outstanding virtue was his total integrity. An honest man himself, he expected the same high standards from others. He never let me down.” (Thatcher 1993: 20)
Ingham in his memoirs (1991) described how he saw his new role as having a broad communications remit:

I therefore went to Number 10 with a clear and comprehensive view of the work of a press officer – indeed of an information officer, to extend the role wider than the mere handling of press, radio and television journalists to the communications orchestra as a whole: advertising, films, visual aids, radio tapes, publications, conferences, seminars and so on. To summarize, my concept of the Chief Press Secretary’s job was to:

1. Maintain a dialogue – relations – with the media and more particularly with the lobby; to build a bridge between Number 10 and journalists and keep it in a good state of repair. In other words, I saw the job as being to manage the Government’s overall relations with the media.

2. Keep the communications bridge open on a basis of mutual respect; I recognised that they – the media – had a job to do, and they, I felt, must acknowledge that I had my responsibilities. I no more intended to stand any nonsense from them that I expected them to stand any from me.

3. Be as open as I could with the media, taking account of all the circumstances; to give them as good a steer as I could as to the true nature of events and to avoid misleading them.

4. Represent the views and interests of the media within the Government and, not least, to the Prime Minister. In other words, to act not as a one-way conduit of news and views but as a bridge for the two-way flow of information between Government and media. (The very idea that I might be able to identify the media’s interests let alone represent them within Government frequently brought hoots of incredulity when I spoke to courses, especially for BBC radio and TV trainees. But who else, did they assume, would do so? Probably no one, because by the mid-1980s young journalists were proud to consider themselves an estate apart, except, of course, when it came to their own personal protection, whereupon they resumed their fully paid up membership of the human race.

5. Brief the lobby and other journalistic groups as often as I could myself, recognizing that journalists always want the organ-grinder, never the monkey – and recognizing, too that my organ-grinder would be nothing as compared with the great Wurlitzer in the sky called Mrs Thatcher.

6. Treat everyone as equally as possible, regardless of which organization they represented. The provincial press, for example, had a legitimate claim on my time because of the extent to which they, above all newspapers in Britain, seek objectively to present the news and are read in their circulation areas. I had a
horror of such institutions as the ‘White Commonwealth’ – a selected group of journalists who were given privileged access in Harold Wilson’s days as Prime Minister – because of the disaffection it had caused.

7. Ensure that I was in a position to meet the legitimate demands of journalists – as distinct from their wilder aspirations – through my access to the Prime Minister and her documentation. (Ingham, 1991:164-165)

5. Broadcast media

On arrival in 10 Downing Street, Ingham’s experience of broadcast media and his enthusiasm for the popular end of the media spectrum was soon deployed to the benefit of the Prime Minister in a series of set-piece broadcast appearances.

An early success was the lengthy interview on London Weekend Television’s Weekend World interview in January 1980, in which the Prime Minister was interviewed by Brian Walden. The archives of Ingham’s correspondence reveal an eye for detail as well as focus on the big themes. The resulting interview drew praise from David Cox, the editor of Weekend World, who wrote in a letter to Ingham on 9 January 1980: “Thank you for arranging the interview. I certainly think you should be congratulated for ensuring that the Prime Minister was well briefed enough to display such incredible command of the subjects we covered.” (THCR 5/2/4)

The extent of the briefing which Ingham prepared for the Prime Minister included eight pages of guidance notes. These included four pages of general guidance on the programme, in which he confirms that:

I have had a further check with London Weekend about the format of the programme for Sunday and they have confirmed that they wish to concentrate on the economy to the exclusion of such subjects as Afghanistan, Iran etc…….The overall objective is to elicit your approach to “the rescue of the British economy. The programme will fall essentially into four parts:
- the trade union problem, occupying some 20 minutes;
- the steel strike in particular (5 minutes)
- the tax, public expenditure, PSBR equation (10 minutes)
- overall strategy, raising the question whether the Government will have time to show results. (THCR 5/2/4)

After these four pages of general briefing, Ingham goes on to provide a further four pages of specimen questions on the four subject areas of trade unions, the steel industry, economics and the government’s overall strategy.
One specimen question in particular (in the overall strategy section) gives a glimpse, perhaps, of Ingham’s views on the radical changes the country is going through at this time. The writing is certainly in Ingham’s distinctive voice:

How do you see the future unfolding? Are you not asking the British people to take a terrible beating? Or do you believe that they are ready for really drastic surgery – that, notwithstanding the reflex actions of trade unions, there is a basic and deep rooted yearning in Britain to snap out of it and that we are prepared to take our medicine? (THCR 5/2/4).

Similarly, his three page briefing document to prepare the Prime Minister for a BBC World This Weekend interview with Gordon Clough on Sunday 4 May 1980 to mark her first anniversary in Downing Street shows an understanding of the requirements of both parties. “I have told Mr. Clough you will not want a long conversation with him before recording.” (THCR 5/2/17)

Mr. Clough explains that his opening gambit will depend on whether the siege [sic] of the Iranian Embassy is still on. If so, he will open up with the Iranian issue, the abortive rescue attempt, into Afghanistan and the Olympics. Having completed this area, he will then wish to cover the EEC Budget issue before entering upon the economy where no doubt your views on inflation/unemployment/pay policy/freeze/monetarism/Employment Bill and Day of Action will be canvassed. (THCR 5/2/17)

He plays the role of adviser: knowing that the Prime Minister had a mastery of detail, he encourages a lighter touch: “Could I also ask that you eschew economic detail? Please deal in easily understood concepts – after all, people will be eating and drinking while they are listening to you.” (THCR 5/2/17)

Ingham seems keen to assert himself over the broadcast interviews. Prior to his arrival, Margaret Thatcher had made a distinction between the printed press (for which she relied on a press secretary) and the broadcast media, where she relied heavily upon advice from the television producer Gordon Reece and the Saatchi and Saatchi advertising executive, Tim Bell. Thatcher rated Reece as an adviser ‘with a unique insight into the medium ...and grasp of popular taste.’ (Thatcher, 1993:20)

By contrast, Ingham is less keen on the Prime Minister’s other advisers: “I think there is an inevitable tension between Messrs Bell and Reece and myself because they are deeper into showbiz than I will ever be, appearing in the gossip columns.” (Ingham, 1991:352)

6. Press digests

Perhaps with these competing voices in mind, Ingham worked hard to include the more popular media in the schedule of interview engagements and by-line articles he arranged for the Prime Minister.
In the Press Digest for 29 April 1980 (THCR 3/5/1), he proudly reports to the Prime Minister: “Your articles in Woman’s Own and Illustrated London News picked up, especially favourable in populars.”

Preparation and thoroughness remain a visible part of Ingham’s PR practice at 10 Downing Street. On 16 October 1979, for example, he prepares an extensive set of press briefing notes and a supporting questions and answers paper (THCR 3/5/1) on relations with the USSR for “defensive use” just in case the media raise questions.

Similarly, on 29 January 1980 (INGH 2/2/3), Ingham prepares a note to deal with any press queries relating to the fact that while unemployment is rising throughout the UK, 10 Downing Street is boosting its numbers of staff and advisers: “Line to take is that the dates chosen by the MP were two unrepresentative moments.”

Honesty and integrity are qualities stressed by Mrs Thatcher in her written assessment of Bernard Ingham. His notes to the Prime Minister also reveal a sense of humour and proportion as he deals with the issues of the day. In a briefing note relating to possible sanctions against USSR in January 1980 (INGH 2/2/3) he writes: “On dumping, the line to take is that HMG always vigorously assists UK industry when it is trying to mount an anti-dumping case through the EEC. Current examples involving a number of countries, including USSR, are: integral horsepower electric motors, fibre building board, mechanical alarm clocks, ball bearings and an unpronounceable and unspellable chemical.”

On 12 February 1980, in response to the poor health of the Yugoslavian President, Marshall Tito (who died on 4 May 1980), the Prime Minister received a note from Ingham suggesting that: “As Tito teeters again, I thought you might like to keep by you at home for night duty purposes the following material...” (INGH 2/2/3)

The Prime Minister did not read the newspapers and so Ingham’s daily press digests were effectively her eyes and ears. The format for the digests included a summary of issues of the day in the media, events in the world and the UK, the parliamentary diary, statistics (such as unemployment and economic measures), visits being hosted or undertaken by the Prime Minister, other ministers or the Royal Family and important speeches scheduled for the day by ministers.

From this first year of their working relationship, Ingham’s digests often combine humour with the honesty already noted by Thatcher. Ingham is certainly unafraid to give direct advice and observations, such as citing a press article on 24 March 1980 (THCR 3/5/1) which reports: “Cardboard cut-outs of the Prime Minister being sold for £6.95 as a party gimmick.”

There also seems to be a clear line for Ingham between public and private matters. For example, when the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visits London in 1980, he stays on for the weekend to make a private visit to his daughter who is working in the City. Ingham expresses concern for the privacy of the visit and the ongoing privacy and security for Schmidt’s daughter (THCR 3/5/1).
7. Wets, spin and briefings

These early press digests of the Thatcher premiership, while providing a fascinating glimpse into the operations of the 10 Downing Street press operation, contain little of genuine controversy. However, they do hint at a more turbulent future, both within the Thatcher cabinet and on Ingham’s role in working with other ministers.

The press digest of 25 February 1980 reports on press coverage of an interview broadcast on BBC Television’s Panorama programme the night before (THCR 3/5/2). “Extensively covered and well received. Most angle on Mr Prior’s “probation.” Some say you rebuked three ministers – Prior, Gilmour and Biffen.”

The progress of these three ministers (so-called “wets”) in the Thatcher government is intriguing: Sir Ian Gilmour, who served in the cabinet as Lord Privy Seal after the 1979 UK general election, survived the January 1981 reshuffle but was sacked by the Prime Minister on 14 September 1981 after making an unfavourable speech about the government. James Prior was moved from his post as Secretary of State for Employment in January 1981 to the post of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The move was seen as acknowledgement by Mrs Thatcher that he had moved too slowly on reform of the trades union movement. John Biffen served as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Secretary of State for Trade and Leader of the House of Commons. He was dropped from the Cabinet after the 1987 election by Mrs Thatcher, shortly after being described by Ingham in a lobby briefing as a “semi-detached” member of the Cabinet. Once outside the Cabinet, Biffen went on to describe Downing Street as a “Stalinist” regime (The Sunday Telegraph, 5 July 1987).

Stalinist or not, the media relations regime was certainly “Thatcherite” in the way Ingham represented the views of the Prime Minister. Referring to the sackings of Biffen, Gilmour and Prior, the BBC’s political correspondent John Sergeant (2001: 248) wrote in his own memoirs of the Ingham years at Downing Street that “On each of these occasions, of course, Mrs Thatcher’s press secretary was faithfully transmitting her view; that was very much his skill. There were often times when he gave her view, even though he had not had a specific discussion with her about the matter in hand. He had an uncanny way of sounding like her when she talked.”

This early involvement of the press secretary in communications surrounding the removal of ministers hints at the later difficulties which arose as ministers saw Ingham as acting against them on behalf of the Prime Minister. Certainly, the memoirs of many ministers suggest that they did not share the Prime Minister’s positive view of Ingham.

Michael Heseltine (2000: 307) refers specifically to Ingham when writing of the Westland affair that led to him leaving Government: “What seemed beyond any doubt is that those on the Prime Minister’s staff and directly answerable to her in No 10 were responsible for encouraging the leaking of a selective and misleading quotation from one of the two law officers of the Crown in order to
discredit a senior colleague.” He goes on to express distaste at the “insidious undermining technique of Bernard Ingham and the press office at Downing Street.” (2000: 339)

Other writers covering the period, including journalists who were on the receiving end of Ingham’s briefing, seem to have a more sanguine view. In their biography of Thatcher’s Home Secretary and later Deputy Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw, Garnett and Aitken (2002: 289) observe that: “Despite the media prominence of the PM’s devoted spokesman, Bernard Ingham, this government was not wholly given over to ‘spin’.”

Sergeant (2001: 248) shares this view and contrasts Ingham’s approach to public relations with that of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s press secretary: “But unlike Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair’s press secretary whom in many ways he resembles, Mr Ingham clung to his status as a civil servant and head of the government’s information service.”

8. Concluding comments

Ingham gained a reputation for being a tough, partisan spokesperson for a controversial prime minister. This might suggest his was a party political role and not that of an impartial civil servant. In this he has company in a previous and subsequent adviser to an electorally-successful prime minister who dominated the political landscape: Joe Haines (Harold Wilson) and Alastair Campbell (Tony Blair).

Yet in response to this party political challenge, Ingham had never been a Conservative supporter – and nor did the opposition to Margaret Thatcher come from the opposition benches. As with Harold Wilson before her and Tony Blair afterwards, the most worrying opposition to each prime minister came from colleagues in their own parties.
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The Past, Present and Future of Public Relations Activities in the Turkish Health Care Sector

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Introduction

Pharmaceuticals industry is one of the world's most investing industry to technology. ‘Corporate Reputation’ is so important for the pharmaceuticals industry. The main reason why the pharmaceuticals industry shows greater regard for corporate reputation has to do with the dichotomy between health and profit. On the one hand, pharmaceutical companies operate with the mission of fulfilling key duties in terms of the community and human health. On the other hand, they are also in the position of having to make money for shareholders. The industry experiences this dichotomy at every level of the business every day, and it is in the position of having to manage relations and communication between patients, physician and manufacturers on the basis of ‘trust’. Trust, however, is not a commodity you can go out and buy. Contrary to popular thought, it is not the number of beneficial drugs pioneered that instils trust in the community. Trust is something that everyone, above all investors, is keen to embrace within the framework of sustainability principles. Today, corporate social responsibility constitutes an indispensable part of the agenda for company management. Companies are responsible towards the community from the day they are established. And they can’t dress up this responsibility in the guise of ‘profits, commercial interest or similar expectations’ (Kadibesegil1). Until a few years ago, social responsibility activities were something that companies took on voluntarily and at their own discretion. Today, however, there is evidence to suggest that they have become ‘an imperative if companies responsible for consuming the world’s limited resources are to honour their duties with respect to the sustainability of these resources’. This is why, for example, the British government has appointed a Minister for Social Responsibility. Similarly, the European Commission has a separate department dealing exclusively with CSR issues (Kadibesegil2).

Turkish healthcare industry requires a special review. Turkey is the world’s 13th and Europe’s 6th biggest medicine market on turnover basis. It has been estimated that the size of Turkish medicine market will reach $ 15.2 billion in 2013. According to the PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ report titled “Medicine Industry: Vision: How You'll Follow A Path? Turkey will be the 10th largest market in the near future. Worldwide increase in the population at the global level, a rapid increase in the drug demand, increased levels of prosperity and the growing popularity of the aging, obesity will accelerate the growth of the sector (Bilgin, 2009). Furthermore, the research conducted by Prof. Kaya declares that the healthcare sector is the 11th future promising Turkish sector. According to Pharma 2020 Report, Turkish healthcare market is expected to be one of the largest 10 markets with the market
growth of 10-15% each year for the next decade. Turkey's large and rapidly growing population, as well as increasing average life expectancy and increasing elderly population and low drug consumption offer significant growth opportunities.

In this exploratory study, PR activities of Turkish health sector have been reviewed on historical basis. The success of the sector lies in its history. Anatolian medical folk culture regarding health and Islam give the traces of today’s pharmaceuticals. Herbalists are examined as the first pharmacists and the first PR practitioners. The importance of good product quality, ethical and socially responsible considerations, community wealth to form health sensitive and conscious stakeholders are observed. In the next part, early healthcare PR efforts between 1950-1990 are studied. Turkish healthcare deserves a special interest after the 1990s. These developments are examined in detail to forecast the future.

The historical development phase of Turkish Health PR
Turkish pharmaceutical production has reached a comparable level with EU countries, and the sector has become attractive for foreign investors. As a result, multinational companies began to cooperate with local companies. 15 of the 20 biggest pharmaceuticals company in Turkey merged with foreign capital (Kilic). Novartis was created in 1996 through the merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, established the first factory in Istanbul around the world. Fako was sold to Actavis in 2003. Eczacibasi as one of the leading company in the domestic pharmaceuticals industry sold 75% of shares to Czheck Zentiva in 2007. Mustafa Nevzat with 89 year history sold 95.6% shares to American Amgen in 2012(Kara). The success of the sector lies in its history.

Pharmaceuticals companies conduct public relations activities in different ways. These may be grouped into social, communal, medical and pharmaceutical studies such as founding educational scholarships, doing health screenings, establishing clinics, supporting nongovernmental organizations, conducting joint projects with medical colleges, managing seminars and sponsorship activities. Especially, in a sensitive industry such as healthcare industry, social responsibility deserves a special interest. The objective is to generate a positive corporate image, increase awareness and maintain an overall corporate reputation rather than to increase the sales (Nayir 2006). It is very important to examine the historical development of PR in order to understand the foundations of contemporary PR. Anatolia, is a real treasure for it.

Medicine folklore in Anatolia
Anatolia has been a unique transition place of many different and complex cultures with different ancestors, languages and beliefs. They were cuddled more or less with almost all the cultures since prehistoric times. The majority of those people were scattered in villages, devoid of education and health care, were living depending on their traditions, applying their own remedies against the
diseases. For example cheese, who knows since how long it was buried into the soil and the mould was formed on the surface of the cheese, was applied to the wounds. However, the miracle of mold was realized with the discovery of penicillin in 1941 (Eczacibasi, Sakir 421).

There is a myth about folk medicine and the treatment of diseases called *Lokman the Physician* in this land. According to the popular belief, Lokman lived too long (1000 years) and traveled around the whole world. It is believed that while he was visiting the countryside various plants, flowers and trees whispered him about the curative effects of themselves. Eventually, he found the remedy of death and wrote down all these remedies to the papers. But one day, an emergent wind blown up all these priceless information (aklindanevarsə). Now, folk or alternative medicines are called Lokman Hekim medicines among the public.

**Islam and health**
Throughout history Turkish communities have been role models to other tribes with their health and cooperation. After accepting Islam, they gave much importance to the health and cleanliness, and they are well known with the efforts to fulfill the orders of religion in this regard. Commands of the prophet Hz. Muhammed: “Cleaning is half of faith. There is a cure for every disease, death alone has no choice. You servants of Allah, use medication!” are about health and medication. The Ottoman Empire gave great importance to public health and welfare affairs, and became a model to world states. Many foundations, hospitals, caravanserais, votive fountains, soup kitchens were established to give social assistance to all people. Those developments led to the establishment of ‘International Health Assembly’ in 1839 during Ottoman Empire (Mavirize) ‘Ministry of Health and Welfare’ addressing the health services in its contemporary sense were established at 1920 in the period of the Government of Turkey Grand National Assembly. It has become ‘Ministry of Health’ in 1989 (Duru 2007).

**History of the Turkish pharmaceuticals industry**
Turkish pharmaceuticals manufacturing passes through three stages as in the western world. Majority of medications were manufactured in pharmacies and very few imported ones were sold without any control before the proclamation of Turkish Republic in 1923. Medication manufacturing laboratories were established after the First World War.

The state control was fulfilled for the imported and pharmacy manufactured medicines with the enactment of law in 1928 and licensing and pricing authority were given to the Ministry of Health (Eczacibasi, Sakir 286). The laboratories like Eczacibasi, Abdi İbrahim and Mustafa Nevzat have become the pioneers of modern Turkish pharmaceutical industry with the manufacturing of insufficient medicines when the importing has been stopped during the World War 2. Pharmaceutical
industry was entering an international competition for the first time in the mid-1950s. International companies like Sandoz, Roche, Ciba, Pfizer, Bayer, etc. have opened either alone or merged facilities in Istanbul. The have reached a large market share in a short time (Eczacibasi, Sakir 28).

Early pharmacists and PR health practitioners
Folk medicine traditions have a noteworthy role in Turkish daily lives. Lemon and mint is good for nausea, garlic is good for lowering blood pressure, olive oil is good for hair loss, yogurt is good for sunstroke, cataplasm herb is good for rheumatism, and so on. The Herbal (Egyptian) Bazaar is one of the oldest covered bazaars of Istanbul. It is said that Makron Envalos previously existed where the current Egyptian Bazaar stands during the Byzantine period. After the 18th century, its current name began to be commonly used. It has been a huge herbal market where meets assorted herbs and spices, dried medicinal herbs and hundreds of species have been a panacea throughout the history. Not only have spices been sold in the Egyptian Bazaar, but all sorts of medicines were sold during the old times in the bazaar as well. Most of the medicines were prepared according to the recipes from the historical book called “A Good Appetite” (misir carsisi). It is still famous with folk medicines, spices, flowers, rare plants, as well as traditional products, such as roots, bark and nuts. It would not be wrong to call Herbalists as the first pharmacists and the first PR practitioners with communication effort they have spent to inform the public about the healing power of the medicinal herbs.

First Turkish pharmacists and PR health practitioners
Until around 1890 in Istanbul, almost all pharmacy owners were non-Muslim. The number of Muslim Turk pharmacists was very small in the Ottoman Empire. There are two main reasons for this; Muslim Turks were accepting the pharmacy business as a trade not as a profession and it was very difficult to find a pharmacy to make practice. Istanbul's population was 873,565 people according to 1885 census; the number of people per pharmacy was approximately 3,300. There were approximately 265 pharmacies in Istanbul in 1890. Only 4 of them were of Turkish origin (angelfire). Turkey's population has become 13 million consisting mostly sick and disabled people during the establishment of the Republic days. National income was 1 billion TL and per capita income was 83 TL: $46 (Eczacibasi, Sakir 84).

GRIPIN: First legendary ‘Made in Turkey’ painkiller and Febrifuge Pharmaceutical
The origins of Gripin Pharmaceuticals began in the 1930s as a trailblazing enterprise established by the pharmacist Necip Acar. Both work and production license for Gripin established in 1935 and by its innovative flue cachets, Gripin’s history became legendary. In such a short amount of time, there was almost no one in the country who had not heard of Gripin. It became known as ‘the cure for all ills’. In 1935 winter, a flu epidemic plagues everyone in the entire country. Mr Akar invents Gripin with its practical, inexpensive and unbelievably quick treatment features. Its name contains the word
‘Grip’ which means flue in Turkish and ‘in’ taken from ‘Asprin’ which was the only competitor of him in those years. Especially in malaria epidemic years, it was used as the only medicine. It has become a ‘national medicine’ after its emergence in the market (Hacir, 2009). Today by maintaining its commercial and medical qualities, Gripin still keeps its niche in the market.

‘Take a Gripin, you will come around!’ This is Gripin’s catchphrase definition that emerged from the colloquial language of the people. The fact that the cachet due to its speedy effects and broad spectrum not only primarily addresses stopping the effects of flue, but the same time can be used as a medication for common colds and rheumatism, cements its common definition and popularity to this date. Being readily available at every pharmacy even in the most remote villages at a reasonable price and being marketed in a single-cachet box have paved the way for consumer interest to soar considerably and sales reached to record levels (Gripin). He achieved a great success throughout his lifetime within the borders of pharmaceutical profession. It is said that the inventions developed by Mr. Akar, delayed the pharmaceutical companies to come to Turkey.

Successful crisis management for GRIPIN
An unauthorized manufacturing has been made for a similar flue pharmaceutical in the same design and the same name in Izmir. A judicial proceedings initiated against ‘piracy’. At the court, Mr Akar did not complain about the defendants. Instead, he made a deal with them offering to buy four machines and the necessary materials to manufacture authorized Gripin boxes.

Early PR practices in the health sector for Gripin
Mr. Akar played a leading role in establishing modern and effective advertising having competence in research and strong work ethic. Moreover, he was socially responsible to his public; he made numerous donations to schools, mosques and other charitable organizations and undertook the education of poor students (Gripin).

Take a Gripin, you will come around! became a catchphrase all around the country. It was the success of both advertising and word of mouth PR. Just like Gripin, ‘Puro’ as the first domestic cleaning soap became a product which was in such high demand and sold such big volumes that the expression ‘Indeed, you are right, he washed with Puro soap!’ was used to state that someone was so clean. He invented an original innovative promotion campaign for Puro soap, too. He caught the attention of everyone by dropping small sample soap packages from the air onto the streets of Istanbul. This method was attempted for the first time and talked about for days. It may be assumed as an early viral marketing promotion. They became generic brand names (Hacir, 2009). He struggled heavily with piracy for his products. For Gripin, he gave announcements carrying ‘How one should be sure?’ headlines to newspapers for informing the public about the falsified products.
Another successful product of Mr Akar was Turkey's first domestic patented toothpaste in 1935. But, there was a resistance against the use of modern toothbrush and toothpaste. It wasn’t easy to shift from Miswak which is a tradition dating back to the Ottoman Empire to modern toothbrush and toothpaste. Miswak is the thin branch of a fruitless tree which is used as a toothbrush and is religiously very important. It has a pleasant smell and natural toothpaste inside (Islam forum). Besides, there was a rumor about synthetic toothbrushes were made of pig hair. Another problem was a tight competition with other toothpaste brand called Dandolin. He found a brilliant name for his new toothpaste; RASYOLIN. He inspired from ‘radio’ and combined the word ‘radyo-radio’ with the word ‘lin’ taken from Dandolin.

The formula and the name of new toothpaste called ‘Radyolin’ were perfect. By making the first poster advertisement Mr. Akar marked a new original era in this field and scientifically modernized the advertising business. In a year, almost half a million toothpaste was sold (Gripin). He gave announcements carrying ‘Useful words about dental health’ headlines to newspapers to raise public awareness for the importance of brushing teeth and to get public to adopt the attitude of brushing teeth saying; ‘Please do not forget that healthy teeth are an indicator of your health. Strong teeth, protects you from many diseases. Having good teeth means to have good health. Remember to brush your teeth 3 times a day. Brush your teeth after each meal’ (Cumhuriyet, 1937).

The first Turkish modern pharmaceutical plant: Eczacibasi
Dr Nejat Eczacibasi (1913-1993), the founder of the Eczacibasi Group, used to say that "the real measure of private entrepreneurship is the success with which it increases the wealth of the community as a whole". Dr Eczacibasi believed that the activities of a private enterprise ought to be integrated by social responsibility. His essential principle was to contribute to "a healthier life ". This belief was first put forwarded by Dr Eczacibasi's father, Ferit Eczacıbasi, whose maxim was "give back to your country what you take from it"(Eczacibasi, the founder). Ferit Eczacibasi was the first university-educated pharmacist in Izmir. He was inspired by his grandmother who was very talented in folk medicines. In 1909, he was given the title of "Eczacibasi-head pharmacist in honor of his long public service. Mr Ferit bought Sofa (Healing) Pharmacy in Izmir and began producing toothpaste, lotions and creams and the Ferit brand of colognes in 1912.

Ferit Eczacıbasi’s first revolutionary PR initiatives
After seeing Bayer factories in Germany, he believed that the mission to establish a modern pharmaceutical industry in Turkey should belong to Eczacibasi family. Friedrich Bayer had established Bayer when he was marketing chemical materials in 1860s. His company developed rapidly after he found Aspirin at the end of 1890 and it was one of the peak that can be reached in the modern pharmaceutical industry.
Mr Ferit, made revolutionary initiatives in his first pharmacy period. On the top floor of Sifa pharmacy, there were physicians, surgeons, dentists, midwives, health assistants and are all kinds of urine and blood tests were analyzed. He performed unprecedented public relations activities to ensure the confidence to the Turkish pharmacies. He launched 'non-prescription products' which can be taken without a doctor visit, especially for poor patients. He was meeting the patients coming from other cities at the train station, settling them to hotels or hospitals and at the end was sending them back to their home after making all kinds of treatments. Requested medication of patients from inside and outside of Izmir by phone or mail were sent to their addresses. All of these activities have not only achieved the recognition of Sifa Pharmacy, but also contributed in providing the confidence towards other Turkish pharmacies (Eczacibasi, Sakir 81).

Mr Ferit first inaugurated a Mother and Child Health Center in memory of his son who died shortly after his birth in 1940. He was not a rich man, but from 1952 till the end of his life he founded a tuberculosis dispensary, nursing home, blood center, child health center, state hospital, anesthesia and intensive care center and three elementary schools (Eczacibasi, Sakir 79).

Pioneering PR activities of Eczacibasi Health Group
Foundations of Health Care Group were laid with the production of the vitamin called ‘D-Vital’ in Dr. Nejat Eczacibasi’s own laboratory in 1942. He inaugurated the first Turkish modern pharmaceutical plant on 1952 in Istanbul. Over the next four decades, the plant expands its production capacity to include the full range pharmaceutical products (Eczacibasi, Health)

Corporate citizenship is a fundamental component of the Eczacibasi Group’s identity. Dr Nejat and his brother Sakir Eczacibasi firmly believed that "The real measure of private entrepreneurship is its success in increasing the wealth of the whole community." During their lifetimes, they sought to achieve this through the establishment and sponsorship of non-profit institutions involved in culture and the arts, education, scientific research, public policy and sports. (Eczacibasi, Social Responsibility) Sakir Eczacibasi, probably was the first personality who came from one of the most powerful family in the business world, and dedicated himself to art (Uludag).

Private entrepreneurship in Turkey had been developed after the 1950s; competition among the organizations had begun afterwards. For this reason, there was no need for promotional tools. In those days, the propagandists who were practicing the pharmaceutical promotion were old and retired doctors. However, the young people who were graduated from the faculties of biology, geology, botany, etc. other than medical school and who have difficulty for finding a job were trained and motivated to adopt the pharmaceutical promotion as a profession would have been much more
successful. In order to accomplish this idea, the young graduates were first trained about general medical knowledge and then about every single detail of pharmaceuticals to be promoted (Eczacibasi, Sakir pg299).

Another problem was the necessity to present the materials such as packages, prospectus, brochures, booklets, posters with a graphical identity which reflects a modern and reliable producer of the quality pharmaceuticals. They established a graphic design studio in the factory and created a visual communication identity. Japan IDEA graphic art magazine gave a special place to Eczacibasi in its supplement on May 1966 (Eczacibasi, Sakir pg301). These were the reputation management efforts.

The First School Education Program and Radio Quiz Show: Ipana Toothpaste

Ipana toothpaste was first produced by Bristol Myers in the world at 1915. It dominated the American market between 1936-1945. It was launched to Turkish market with the licence given to Eczacibasi by Bristol in 1956. Ipana was acquired by P&G in 1991 and made equivalent with the Crest formulation. Ipana is sold under the name of Crest all around the world except Turkey (Facebook, Ipana). It has been the pioneer of the "Firsts" and the market leader for 56 years in Turkish market such as sponsorship of the first radio quiz show and the first and longest school education program.

In 1950s, yearly toothpaste consumption was not exceeding 3 million tubes; 10 gram per person which was too low in comparison with an average developed country. They have to try the different ways other than the limited advertising possibilities to expand the market. The foundations of "Oral and Dental Health Education Project" were laid. Pickup trucks were converted into consulting rooms. They were visiting the schools, examining the students’ teeth and giving information on the benefits of brushing. Thus, the aim of the project was to acquire the habit of brushing and to raise oral and dental health sensitive and conscious individuals. Today, market share of Ipana is 43% and toothpaste consumption is 80-85 grams per person but it is still 1/5th of Europe (Tosuner, 2005). This sector needs more educative projects.

Ipana ‘21 Point Radio Quiz Show’ started on the radio in 1958 and continued for 17 years in different names with its legendary announcer. The show quickly became Turkey's most popular radio program. It was the first time that streets were empty during the show (Devrim, 2002). It inspired other brands to make quiz shows and started a flurry of quizzes.

The first scientific research and medical award fund

The Eczacibasi Group established this fund in 1959 to promote high caliber medical research. This was the first fund in Turkey to encourage health-based research. To date, the fund has supported 171 medical research projects and presented 65 awards to Turkish scientists for valuable research in health and medicine. Since 2002, the Scientific Research and Medical Award Fund is also supporting
promising research carried out by medical students (Eczacibasi, Bulent 2011, pg 2). The Group also, published ‘Innovations Journal of Medicine’ which drew the utmost attention in scientific, culture and art communities between 1956-1967.

The first sports club bearing its own private institution name

They could have been the first private enterprise establishing a sports club bearing their own name and approaching it as a social responsibility project as in health and art. The number of children and young people were 70% of the population in the 1960s. While the population ratio of those who were exercising sports was 30-35% in developed countries, even it was lower than 3% in our country. 308 Eczacibasi Sports Club was established in 1966. The main goals were to provide new opportunities for rapidly growing young population, establish fitness facilities, train its own athletes without disrupting other teams, to be a role model for the other clubs, contribute to the development of sports in Turkey and approach sports as a social responsibility project(309).

According to Sakir Eczacibasi; ‘Sport is the most effective public relations tool. It is apparent that an institution cannot be well recognized, generate positive feelings in the public and settled down on a solid foundation without continuous PR activities. Thus, the most effective way to reach the masses is the sport activities.’ Volleyball, basketball, table tennis are among these activities. Especially, the Women’s Volleyball Team has achieved many successes. The team joined the Istanbul League in 1968, becoming the Istanbul Champion in 1970, it won the Turkish National Championship 17 years in a row. Since 1968, the women’s volleyball teams has won 28 National Championships, eight National Cups and played in nine European Cup Finals.

Other firsts and social responsibility projects

*Istanbul Museum of Modern Art* is the first private museum to organize modern and contemporary art exhibitions in Turkey; Istanbul Modern was founded by the Eczacibasi Group in 2004.

*Istanbul International Music, Film, Jazz, Theatre and Visual Art Festivals*, The Eczacibaşı Group is a staunch supporter of the Istanbul International Festivals, both through its sponsorship of the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and the Arts, founded in 1973 on the initiative of Dr Eczacibasi, and its direct patronage of selected festivals.

Eczacibasi is an active supporter of the *Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation* (TESEV), an independent, non-profit think-tank dedicated to conducting and supporting research on public policy issues.

*The Eczacibasi Hygiene Project* for Primary Boarding Schools is designing new bathrooms and washing areas for primary boarding schools in eastern Turkey and equipping them with VitrA and Artema products.

*Eczacibasi Volunteers* is a volunteer organization created by Eczacibasi Group employees that
encourages colleagues to embrace the Group’s principle of “active contribution to society” by establishing a platform for them to share their knowledge, skills and experience with the community, established in 2007.

**Importance of crisis management in pharmaceutical industry**

Crisis management is extremely important in community sensitivities industries like pharmaceuticals industry. Crisis in would turn into an avalanche and would cast a shadow on the reputation of a giant conglomerate and even the whole pharmaceutical sector. Crisis would turn into scandals and harm the ‘reputation’ of the entire pharmaceutical sector and even related professional institutions. But it is not the case e.g. in the automotive industry. It seems acceptable for the leading world manufacturers to pull brand new vehicles off the market four or five months after launch and no one makes any noise about it whatsoever. The main reason is these pharmaceutical companies operate with the mission of fulfilling key duties in terms of the community and human health. Company directors would be hard pushed to create a more compelling scenario for a disaster (Kadibesegil1).

As quoted by the most important pioneer of Turkish PR, Mrs Betul Mardin; ‘crisis rehearsal had always been extremely important in health care’. The following crisis rehearsals were performed during Edgar Poffet’s management at Sandoz with the consultancy of Mrs Betul Mardin in the 1990s.

**Scenario 1.** A factory employee buys pasta, yogurt and garlic from a grocery store when he is on the way back to his home. They make dinner with this grocery. His two sons and wife get sick in the form of vomiting and diarrhea at midnight. One of the children dies, but they rescue the other. Grocery shop is examined on the other day and inspectors find the leakage of a pesticide produced at Sandoz. This leakage poisons the pasta. All the newspapers write this scandal.

**Scenario 2.** Laxative and tension pills are produced by juxtaposed machines at Sandoz factory. Something that happens very rarely. These two different pills’ boxes are mixed with each other. One day, a lawyer calls Sandoz and tells that his mother is in the hospital because of your laxative pills mixed with tension pills. He says that he will sue them.

Company officials do not know the contents of the scenarios. GM and other officials meet in the crisis room early in the morning. They read the newspapers printed with this news. Mr Poffet calls the PR manager, but finds out she is in vacation for 15 days. A famous editor calls and tension rises. The next day they make a press conference and prepare a press release.

**Developments of PR in Turkish health care industry from 1990s till today**

After TUHID (Public Relations Society of Turkey) was founded with the cooperation of IPRA (International PR Association) and other international organizations in 1972, there had been major developments in the 1990s. An organic connection was formed with the world’s most prestigious
organization, ICCO (International Communications Consultancy Organization). In 1998, 
PRCI/ICCO-Turkey (PR Public Relations Consultancy Anonymous Company) was founded. It is the 
voice of public relations consultancies around the world and tries to improve the quality of the PR 
services with international professional and ethical standards. In 1998, PRNet Research 
and Analysis Company was founded as the first PR media monitoring and PR media analysis service. Before 
PRNet, media coverage was not being measured according to international standards. Hereafter, 
development of Turkish PR industry had been accelerated and we started hearing about “corporate 
communication” in the 1990s.

Many pharmaceutical companies have emphasis on promoting wellness rather than managing 
illness. Healthcare payers will increasingly reward patients with healthy habits. The most of the 
world’s pharmaceutical spending goes on the treatment of disease rather than its prevention. This is 
partly because some diseases are so complex that scientific understanding of their pathology is still 
very limited, and developing cures or prophylactics for such illnesses is therefore extremely difficult. 
In addition, the risks associated with preventing disease in healthy people are quite different from 
those associated with treating people who are already sick (Pharma 2020, 10).

The aging of the population, together with dietary changes and more sedentary lifestyles, will 
also increase the burden of chronic disease. The World Health Organization estimates that 60% of all 
the deaths that took place in 2005 could be attributed to chronic conditions, and predicts that the 
number of deaths from chronic diseases will increase by 17% over the next 10 years (Pharma, 11). 
Chronic diseases need lifelong medical support. According to Semiha Baban, PR has started to 
understand the world with genomics. It has several medical implications. For example, the inventions 
about immune system made the effective organ transplantations possible without taking lifelong 
medicines. Health care industry has become scientific based and symptom elevated. The content and 
the images used in PR have been changed with life engineering; e.g. images used in breast cancer are 
now happy ordinary people living with their families rather than sexy and beautiful woman. Health 
care PR has started to support ‘the quality of life’ of its public e.g. by forming Alzheimer associations. 
Stakeholders have changed as well. Non-governmental organizations and internal communication has 
become important.

Organizational chart of PR has got its new separate form. It isn’t in the custody of HR and GM 
anymore. It is under the Corporate Relations umbrella including some major positions like corporate 
communication, media relations, congress and events management, on-line PR relations. Management 
of reputation, perception, crisis and internal communication deserve special interest. Sooner or later 
these issues would present a new identity (Kadibesegil).
Commercial communication in medicine sector is another noteworthy issue. It was not possible to make commercial communication to the public with the law that has been adopted in 1928 in Turkey. The only exception was for medical magazines. The code of commercial communication for medicines which are not subject to prescription (over the counter-OTC) put into force by RTUK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) in 2011. This code allows the advertisement of OTC medicine that constitutes 22% of the market (Baykal, 2008). But the definition of OTC medicine is still a question mark.

Patent expiration is another important issue. The great majority of “new” drugs are not new at all but merely variations of older drugs already on the market. These are called “me-too” drugs. The idea is to grab a share of an established, lucrative market by producing something very similar to a top-selling drug (Angell, 2004). Strengthening of new product development processes is a key factor for success. In this regard, consolidation in the global market is expected to continue.

H (Health) TV Turkey is started to broadcast in 2011. It is the first thematic channel about health with full of useful information for both public and health professionals.

**Ingredients of new reputation formula**

“Turkey’s Most Admired Companies” and “the Leaders of Sustainable Reputation” research of Capital magazine gives the clues of the success of PR activities in managing the reputation (Capital 2011). Immeasurable values of a company contribute in building the reputation. These include environment and public, respecting people, participative management, creativity, consumer orientation. Companies which give the top priority to sustainable growth above the corporate principles have a rising reputation. This brings financial success, consumer trust, high brand value, growth opportunity, consumer satisfaction and needs fast adaptation to changing trends. The Eczacibasi Group is at the top 5 list for many years. In health sector, Pfizer is number one for 10 years.

According to “The Most Important Communication Considerations to Achieve Business Goals” research, communication consultants were estimated the most important eight communication issues for the near future (IDA and TUHID 2009). The list includes the issues in order of importance; on-line communication, corporate reputation management, internal communication, crisis management, research and monitoring, corporate social responsible works, lobbying and media relations. In the same research, the expected features of an ideal PR company are listed as the ability of strategic thinking, accumulation of managerial experience and knowledge, being innovative, offering solutions, being ethical and transparent, having corporate values, reputable, ability to manage the time, systematic reporting.
In order to encourage and reward the successful PR works, "The Golden Compass Public Relations Awards" are given since 1999. This is the first and only rewarding program in Turkey. PR works are evaluated according to 5 criteria; situational analysis and research, planning, implementation, creativity, measurement and evaluation.

Conclusion

Pharmaceutical companies conduct public relations activities in different ways. These may be grouped into social, communal, medical and pharmaceutical studies. Especially, in a sensitive industry such as healthcare industry, social responsibility deserves a special interest. The objective is to generate a positive corporate image, increase awareness and maintain an overall corporate reputation rather than to increase the sales (Nayir 2006). For this reason, it is very important to examine the historical development of PR in order to understand the foundations of contemporary PR. Anatolia, is a real treasure for it. Development of Turkish PR industry had been accelerated and we started hearing about “corporate communication” in the 1990s. The cooperation with international organizations improved the quality of Turkish PR services with international professional and ethical standards. PR monitoring and measurements started on the same years. Crisis management is another noteworthy issue in health sector. It would turn into an avalanche and would cast a shadow on the reputation of a giant conglomerate and even the whole pharmaceutical sector.

According to Pharmaceutical Industry 2020 Report, Turkish healthcare market is expected to be one of the largest 10 markets with the market growth of 10-15% each year for the next decade. Turkey's large and rapidly growing population, as well as increasing average life expectancy and increasing elderly population and low drug consumption offers significant growth opportunities. The aging of the population, together with dietary changes and more sedentary lifestyles, will also increase the burden of chronic disease. Chronic diseases need lifelong medical support. Health care industry has become scientific based and symptom elevated. The content and the images used in PR have been changed with life engineering; e.g. images used in breast cancer are now happy ordinary people living with their families rather than sexy and beautiful woman. Health care PR has started to support ‘the quality of life’ of its public e.g. by forming Alzheimer associations. Stakeholders have changed as well. Non-governmental organizations and internal communication has become important.

Companies which give the top priority to sustainable growth above the corporate principles have a rising reputation. This brings financial success, consumer trust, high brand value, growth opportunity, consumer satisfaction and needs fast adaptation to changing trends. According to ‘Turkey’s Most Admired Companies” and ‘the Leaders of Sustainable Reputation’ research of Capital
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The Milestones Influencing Public Relations Profession in Turkey: Insights from the PR Pioneers

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Introduction

Public relations (PR), as a profession, is not understood and practiced in the same way in the world (Valentini 2009), the development of the profession is affected from several factors such as the culture, politics, economics, media systems and the level of activism (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002). When Turkish PR history is under examination, it is natural to consider all the contextual factors that have potential influence over the profession.

There are four different approaches related with the initiation of PR history in Turkey. Erdoğan (2006) mentions about PR in ancient Turkish civilizations and nations starting from the Orkhon Inscriptions (B.C. 8th century) and similar approaches indicate that there has been some intermediary stages in history before the modern PR periods (Kadıbeşegil, 2008; Kazan, 2007; Kazancı, 2005; Şanlı, 2007). Another approach states that the PR history in Turkey starts in the form of political PR, at the foundation of the Turkish Republic, with the launching and propagation of systematic and planned reforms led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (İşler, 2007). While a third approach claims that a provision about the PR of the police in Celal Bayar’s 1946 government programme is the beginning (Okay and Okay, 2002), the most common historical foundation in literature is the time of the studies in Turkey which aimed to inject the idea of planned development of the state as a whole to the public, starting with the
establishment of the State Planning Organization (DPT) in the 1960s (Asna, 1997; Asna, 2012; Balta Peltekoğlu, 2012; Görpe & Yüksel, 2011). Since PR is regarded as a phenomenon of a democratic society (Tampere, 2010), pre-republican involvements have not been discussed in this paper; milestones in every stage of development of the profession from the foundation of the Anatolia Agency in 1920 to the present have been considered.

When trying to form a narration out of this immense stack of information, we considered two main questions asked by Hazleton (2010): “What counts as data” and “What do data count as”. By analyzing the information at hand within this context, we tried to contribute to historiography.

Since oral history is reckoned as a precious source of information, the methodology of this study is based on in-depth interviews and McDowell’s (2002) historical research guide is taken as a framework for the analysis. Interviews were conducted with nine PR pioneers who has worked in the field between 20 - 45 years. The interviewees (in alphabetical order) , Prof. Dr. Aleaddin Asna, Prof. Dr. Ali Attif Bir, Betül Mardin (former IPRA president-1995), Ceyda Aydede (former IPRA president-2003), Prof. Dr. Filiz Balta Peltekoğlu, Fügen Toksü, Prof.Dr. Haluk Gürgen, Meral Saçkan and Salim Kadibeşegil were either academicians or senior PR professionals. The duration of the interviews was very flexible. The longest interview was 2 hours 35 minutes and the shortest was 30 minutes. All interviews have been audio taped and transcribed.

Descriptive and explanatory narrative of the milestones in developmental process of PR is taken as a part of a social process; thus, the analysis of interviews and documentary sources are grounded within the context of Turkey’s economic, sociologic and political history. Analyzing interviewees’ contributions looking back over 40 years, an interpretive point of view comes along, as a result, the realities of the past construct and reconstruct. As L’Etang (2008, p.322) has reminded PR historians ‘Historical explanations are not neutral and include ideological or moral components’, we acknowledged that there could not be an absolute historical fact, and tried to reflect the conflicting interpretations in the gathered information in order to reduce subjectivity.

The objective of this paper is not to narrate the entire story of PR in Turkey, but to mention the most important events, cases and names which have either positive or negative impact on the profession. Although the earliest periods of PR development are considered in the study, the main focus is to analyze the era starting with the 1970s systematically.
Antecedents of PR

Single party phase (1920-1946)

The 1920s and early 1930s were a time of radical change in Turkey. Since the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923, improvement process of political PR activities are extremely significant (Şanlı, 2008), in terms of integrating Turkish public, living mainly in rural areas, with the modern world and reflecting a modern and civilized Turkey image abroad. In the early years of the establishment of the Republic, Turkish politicians have always identified their primary goals as ‘westernization’ in order to be more integrated with the European political system by adopting certain values and practices (Şenyuva, 2006, p.21). It is observed that the Republican government has continued the one-way and government-dominated PR for a long time (Kazancı, 2005, p.31).

In the environment of a single party and statist structure, a professional approach to PR was impossible to grow. Instead of this, as to communicate with the public concerning the revolutions, Anatolia Agency (Anadolu Ajansı- http://www.aa.com.tr) and General Directorate of Press and Information (Matbuat ve İstihbarat Umum Müdürlüğü) were constituted (Brockett, 2011) in 1920 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic.

As Erdoğan stated (2006), Atatürk’s revolutions are acknowledged as the primary drive towards reforming a democratic relationship among the public themselves and between the public and the institutions of the Republic. Even if they were not titled as such, Atatürk’s actions, words and reforms, like the introduction of a new alphabet, the hat and the tractor, his statements such as “the peasant rules the people”, his famous “Nutuk” (declamation), specifying April 23rd as the children’s holiday, and May 19th as the youth national holiday (Keloğlu, 2003 in İşler 2006, p.5) were important PR activities. These activities led by Atatürk had a great effect on the public in terms of adapting to the social and political reforms. In conclusion, all these reforms were accepted by them easily and there were hardly any negative reactions (İşler, 2006, p.5).

While there is not too much academic interest on political PR, concerning the single party period that is between 1923 and 1946, existing studies (Ayhan, 2006; Şanlı, 2008) show that more systematic and programmed PR activities have started after the 1930s with the use of mass media channels – radio, newspapers and magazines- and special events such as exhibitions, conferences, meetings and the use of theatre-cinema. In those years first beauty contest was held in Turkey that presented the image of a modern and civilized country abroad. The idea of a “Miss Turkey” (Türkiye Güzeli) contest was first drifted by Cumhuriyet
(newspaper) in 1929, and the newspaper proceeded to sponsor the contest and to cover it in
details. The commencement of the Miss Turkey contest coincided with the beauty contest
fashion then widespread in the United States, Europe, and indeed in many “non-Western”
countries. (Shissler, 2004, p.107). In 1932, Miss Turkey Keriman Halis was selected as Miss
World, as a projection of a “modern” positive national image (Shissler, 2004).

It should be emphasized that even if these studies and activities were during a single-
party regime, the studies were not solely towards propaganda or public persuasion, the
government was also trying to understand the public, as well. Along with that, a major part
of the mentioned studies aimed to publicize national identity. The PR concept in Turkey did not
primarily aims to rebuild facts or systematically falsify people in the public and private sectors
(İşler, 2006), so we cannot label this start as press agentry, instead it may rather be claimed as
an “image-building era”.

Another interesting event in those years had the same objective regarding the image
creation: First sponsorship of political and professional manners took place in 1931. Two
Americans - John Polanda and Russel Bortman - were planning to cross the ocean on a
propeller plane, thus breaking the world records for longest flight time and the longest flight
range. The young Americans were not able to find support for their project, until Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk got wind of the situation. Despite the unstable and economically diminished
status of the Turkish nation after the war, Atatürk saw this as an opportunity to raise Turkey’s
voice in the world, and made the sponsorship deal via İş Bank. Polanda and Bortman were
successful and they broke the records. The people of Istanbul embraced these two Americans
giving out positive statements to the world about Turkey. The celebrations were held a day
after the event in Istanbul, with the attendance in large numbers. The two successful men
were then taken to Yalova by a ship. In Yalova, Atatürk stated: “Despite their great success,
the Americans were very modest. They hide their heroic deed with humbleness. Americans
should be proud of them”. The project also took the attention of international press
considerably, and the news of the event was the trending topic of international and Turkish
sponsorship and its context as breaking news can be an example to the use of Grunig and

Original organizations such as People’s Houses built in 1931, People’s Orator
Organizations built in the same year and People’s Rooms built in 1932 are remarkable efforts
in terms of communicating with the public in this period. Particularly People’s Houses
remained the most systematized way of managing relations with the public during Single-
party period (Şanlı, 2008, p.829).

In the 1930s, as in many parts of the world, peasant ideologies flourished. There was not a widespread organization that could convey the reforms and changes to the villages, for this, the Village Institutes were founded. The Village Institute experience is a part of the whole series of events like the People’s Houses, whose objective was to reach the hearts and minds of people, 80% of whom were living in countryside (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998, p.48). The Village Institutes embody an education attempt made in Turkey between 1937 and mid 1940s, to transform Turkish countryside. Along with other activities, the main idea stemmed from the necessity to find a mass base for a new regime and social revolution, in this modernization process.

**Multi-party phase (1946-1960)**

The reformations and changes of economic and political culture, which started with the transition period from a single-party phase to a multi-party phase during 1946-1960 and spread throughout the period, can be counted as important political initiations. In Atatürk’s single party phase, political PR was based on fulfilling the needs of the revolutions. With the foundation of the Democratic Party (DP) and the start of the multi-party phase, the private-sector based institutions or individuals backed by international political and economical market policies like landlords, bankers, merchants and industrial businessmen, started to develop the need for more intense methods of persuasion and instruction. The name of the profession was firstly mentioned in Celal Bayar’s DP government programme in 1946, with a provision on the PR of the police (Okay and Okay, 2002).

When Turkey lacked an example of modern political PR profession, the leading DP officers investigated examples from the west and tried to apply those examples domestically. The PR work of the party are planned, systematic and continuous managerial works in the modern sense. Like the system in the USA, they have used all the tools of political PR. Also, these are the first examples of public manipulation, governing the consciousness of the voters, publicizing and announcing in Turkey. Up to present, their strategies and tactics have been imitated by other political parties, their famous slogans like “enough, let the people speak now” albeit slightly modified, are still in use for other political parties’ election campaigns (İşler, 2007, p.374).

Turkey, who had about 100 million dollars of foreign trade surplus in 1946, started receiving help from USA within the context of the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan even though it was not really logical (Boratav, 2012:99). Turkey was also receiving help in
terms of economics too, and with this move, it’s evident that Turkey had started to play the
game by USA’s rules. The reformations in the multi-party phase have been categorized as PR
and communications activities, including the inception of consciousness, formation of a
community and therefore affecting the election process, use of mass media for election
campaigns, and many other activities which can be named as such (İşler, 2007).

As the PR understanding started to crawl within the governmental organizations in the
1950s, Turkey got accepted into the NATO as an extension of the anti-Soviet western alliance,
and numerous USA and NATO bases and facilities were positioned in Turkey (Findley, 2011,
p.309). Afterwards Turkish military forces adapted American PR perspective into the Turkish
army system.

After 1950s, the adaptation of industrialization-based growth models formed the basis
of the import substituting and conservative economy models and the planned development
programmes became the reason for political support to focus on these models (Tellan, 2008,
p.3). In other words, the USA-supported capitalistic economic model has consciously created
a new capital class in this period. According to Findley (2011, p.376) the emergence of this
new class of businessmen was one of the biggest changes that Turkey went through in the 20th
Century.

Starting from the 1950s the Turkish cinema, nicknamed as ‘Yeşilçam’, features a new
type of character: the industrialist. Some industrialists are depicted as bad people, some as
good people. One of the widely-renowned actors, Hulusi Kentmen, usually depicts a well-
developed character affiliated with paternalistic Turkish lifestyle, however like all bosses, only
aims to put more money to his pocket, and disregards love in the pursuit of his major life goals
of economic growth. The rich and the poor are segregated and their union is not permitted by
the family of the rich; in conclusion, richness is presented to people as an impure and guilty
concept. The new class of businessmen had to have a decent plan of action and
communication towards the capitalist economic model of Turkey, in order to change the
perception of Turkish people regarding themselves. As a result of this, important companies
like Sabancı and Koç started to form systematic and planned PR activities in order to change
the perception of Turkish people on the rich. These two example companies, being two of the
first institutions that needed PR activities to change the perception of the public, were also the
leading figures in terms of PR and communication studies. Through their foundations
supporting education, and through direct communication with people, they have, as public
heroes, emphasized how important their works were and how important it was for people to be
like them for the growth and development of Turkey (personal communication with Gürgen,
May 11, 2012). Here we can observe the philanthropic approach which forms the fundamentals of the transition to the understanding of social responsibility. The foundations initiated in those days are still active to our present day. As a result of the understanding formed back in those days, Koç Holding will, later on, establish the first PR department in Turkey.

**Emergence of PR (1961-1980)**

There are some important milestones in the emergence period of the PR profession in Turkey; these can be listed as the studies of the State Planning Organization (DPT), the MEHTAP report, start of the first University academic year, publications of the first PR books, establishment of the Public Relations Association, establishment of the first PR department in Koç Holding, and the foundation of the first PR agency. In this section, these milestones are investigated from the point of view of the economic and socio-political status of the period. There are two names that should be pointed out starting from this period, Alaeddin Asna and Betûl Mardin who are considered as the mother and the father of PR in Turkey. These two names have their separate sections below.

**Alaeddin Asna, Turkish PR Pioneer**

With the May 27, 1960 military coup d’état and the 1961 Constitution, the formation of the Development Plans for the financial, social and cultural growth have been bounded by laws. To fulfill these goals, The State Planning Organization (DPT) was founded in September 30, 1960, and it was subordinated to the Prime Ministry. The duty of the DPT was helping and advising the Government in the implementation of the social and cultural policies and goals and the coordination of the activities concerning the economical policy.[http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FCA5B0BB9C7A740968E31CF9AA8F449BFB16AFEA1F26CD6D79](http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FCA5B0BB9C7A740968E31CF9AA8F449BFB16AFEA1F26CD6D79). In this period, the private sector is dependent on DPT’s decisions in terms of credit loans, importation privileges, tax exemptions and currencies.

Instead of the 1930’s fashion, in which the state-owned enterprises (SOE) were the locomotives of industrialization, family holdings and companies competing in production, distribution, banking and service sectors in the 1960s were the leading units of many branches of the industry and the economy (Findley, 2011, p.326).
During the foundation process of the DPT, well-known people, who are graduates of the Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, and who communicate with each other in scientific and economic terms were put together. Nejat Erder was selected as the head of DPT in the Organization.

Asna, a graduate of the Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, class of 1961, started working in the DPT by exceeding expectations in the Organization’s application exam. By the time he graduated from the University, he was already a journalist in Ankara.

As Asna states (personal communication, May 11, 2012), during the foundation stage of the Organization, Prof. Jan Tinbergen, who was a development expert guiding Turkey in terms of planned development before the military coup, emphasized that the planned development idea had to be presented to the community, and that this had to be done via a long-term PR plan. He stated that PR studies should be taken as seriously as any other subject in planned development.

In order to successfully diffuse the innovations, DPT, Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture had various successful studies towards public persuasion, but through time, the foci of these studies have wandered away from PR, and therefore they have lost their effect.

The MEHTAP Report

The Central Government Organization Project, abbreviated as MEHTAP, which covers the foundation and the defined tasks of the “Central Government Organization”, has been initiated by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers dated 13.12.1962, numbered 6/209. The purpose of this study is to determine the distribution of the “Central Government Duties” and investigate if this distribution enables the optimal environment for the application of public services in the best way (Balta Peltekoğlu, 2012, p.135 cited Dinçer and Ersoy, 1974). The fourth of the four fundamental theses in the MEHTAP report which goes as: “it is mandatory to form a close relationship with the community in the studies and decision makings of every stage of the government”, is of great importance since it holds the implementation of PR activities and the formation of a relationship with the audience mandatory for the public institutions.

Even though this project is accepted to be one of the initiation stages of PR in Turkey, it has not been implemented thoroughly (Balta Peltekoğlu, 2012:136 cited Dinçer and Ersoy, 1974), and has been downgraded through time, becoming a consultation tenancy, or a clipping service (personal communication with Gürgen, May 11, 2012).
Political instability, the effect of PR in the capital-industrial union conflict

The biggest difference between the 1960s and the 1970s in terms of the socio-economic context of Turkish politics was the re-emanation of the tensions subdued by the 1960s economic growth in the 1970s, because of the global economic crisis (Findley, 2011). The need for a reformation process in terms of international and intra-national economic relations came about at the start of the 70s, due to the deceleration of the world economic growth, the disabling of classical production processes due to energy insufficiency and inadequacy of political developments in responding to the changing communal demands (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2001). The left-wing supporters dominating the population in the 1960s were balanced out mainly by the armed forces of the ultra-nationalists under the command of Türkeş (Findley, 2011, p.318).

Together with the beginning of 1970s, a period of ultimate violence originating from the serious political conflicts commenced, and especially the industrial unions formed a powerful resistance against the capital, with strikes, lockouts and similar activities. During these times Turkey was not confronting the workers but was generating employment possibilities for them, therefore making it possible for the nation to rise economically; companies took immense responsibilities with their tax-investments in subduing the socialist movement driven by the industrial unions among the people (personal communication with Gürgen, May 11, 2012). At this point the Turkish Industrial Businessmen Foundation (TÜSİAD) was established in 1971, with Vehbi Koç in the lead (Findley, 2011). In the context of claiming rights before the industrial unions with planned and systematic communication activities, and positioning itself in a dignified and effective position before the people, PR was of great help for the foundation. In this exact same period; Erol Toy penned the book “İmparator” (The Emperor) (1974) which indirectly tells the story of Vehbi Koç. With this book, Turkish people started to see the Koç family, their associate TÜSİAD and other capital groups from the same window with Erol Toy. This book is a breaking point with its widespread and extensive effect. A short time afterwards, Vehbi Koç penned his own book in response to Toy. In summary, PR served as a tool in the acceptance process of the capital class by the people in these politically tense times.

While Turkey was going through such complicated times, one woman in the 1960s was getting into this profession without knowing that she was going to be known as “The doyen of Public Relations in Turkey” in the future.
‘Mother’ of Turkish PR: Betûl Mardin

As Thomas Carlyle (1888) quoted “The history of the world is but the biography of great men”, Turkish PR history cannot be written without the most prominent ‘great woman’: Betûl Mardin. She is considered to be ‘the mother’ of Turkish PR, being the first woman PR consultant in Turkey. She became an expert without a formal PR education but by ‘going through life with very open eyes’ as she stresses (Tayanç 1984). She has worked as a translator and as an editor in some newspapers; adapter, designer, decorator and press relations consultant in her ex-husband’s theater and employed as a programme advisor in Turkish National TV Channel (TRT) in which she has formed the drama department afterwards, in 1967. She has worked for BBC as to learn the television and carried out her experiences in Turkey. As the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) has started broadcasting in the early 1970s, she has worked for TRT, as well. These experiences helped her to form the necessary background for her new profession called ‘Public Relations’. In the year 1968, she has started to work as a free-lance PR consultant, where there were only few multinational petroleum companies (BP and Shell) with PR directors and the Turkish business world did not even recognize a profession as PR. While telling her long and interesting story on the formation of PR expertise, Mardin explains how she kept in contact with the international PR development by exchanging letters and views with her colleagues abroad in those years and how she utilized Philip Lesley’s PR Handbook as an academic source. The work she has done in a few years for more than ten companies from different businesses, mostly from the entertainment field, were limited to publicity, special events organizations and audience research. Since the number of the customers was not numerous as today, the companies were eager to learn personal information of their customers, as a result, she used to work as a research company on her own, to gather the data by traditional ways. In 1971-74 she has been in London, working as a PR consultant at various corporations. This experience was the first steps of her going international. When she came back to Turkey, she became a major shareholder for the first Turkish PR agency, A&B PR.

In 1973 Mardin received an invitation from Nejat Eczacıbaşı, one of the most prominent businessmen, who was chair of the committee preparing the Istanbul Festival, to help him promote the festival. It was a milestone as Mardin enters the Turkish scene as a professional PR consultant. To promote the festival, she had prepared inserts and put them inside the passports of tourists entering Turkey from Istanbul airport, by herself, inviting them to participate in the festival. Since there was no evaluation of the objectives, the festival was said to be successful with its attendees and interest from the media. Mardin, working as a PR
consultant for the festival in year 1977, had imported the ‘sponsorship’ concept into Turkey from England. The first sponsors in the modern PR era were two prominent Jewish businessmen: Jak Kamhi and Ishak Alaton, spending their money for the expenses of classical music quartets, to support Istanbul festival and to build up a relationship with their publics.

Another innovation from that period that Mardin states is the employee relations they have conducted in Akbank (a bank from the Sabancı Group) during the 1970s towards their own employees. This early approach, which puts importance on the employees when considering the reputation and continuity of a company, is of considerable importance since this knowledge is actually fresh in present days. With the help of her international knowledge, manners, education and her contacts too, Mardin became a master of special events and was appointed as the world-wide president of the IPRA in 1995 – chronological details will be discussed in later sections; she is still the honorary president of the IMAGE PR agency.

The first PR classes in college
Okay (2003) asserts that PR education dates back to 1948, when Yahya Fehmi Tuna sets up the first ‘Journalism School’. This first school has evolved and re-named several times: It has formed into the ‘Journalism Institute’ then to the ‘Journalism and Public Relations Institute’, then ‘Press and Broadcasting College’ and finally to the ‘Communication Faculty’.

The first graduate public relations class in Turkey was given to 3rd and 4th grade students in the School of Press and Broadcasting within the Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, with the contributions of UNESCO and the Journalists’ Community. New faculties and departments in İstanbul and İzmir have followed this first institution in Turkey that provides a four year long education plan in the University level in the subject of press and broadcasting (Okay, 2003; http://ilef.ankara.edu.tr/fakulte/bolum.php?bodb=895&alt=1).

The first PR education which specialized in community management due to the teachings of political scientists like İnal Cemaşkun, Cemal Mihçoglu and Nermin Abadan, was later on continued with the new school created by Metin Kazancı and Alaeddin Asna. The first book on PR was named as “Halkla İlişkiler” (Turkish common name used for PR), written by Alaeddin Asna in 1969. It was published by the Turkish and Middle Eastern Community Administration Institute, Ankara. This was followed by the books written by Metin Kazancı and Nuri Tortop.
Establishment of the first department

In the early 1970s, private sector realized the importance of this young and energetic power as to survive in a competitive business environment; first PR departments emerged, following the multinational companies such as BP that already had PR departments. Kadıbeşegil (personal communication, May 16, 2012) states that the efforts of Tüpraş can be shown as examples to the PR activities conducted in Turkey in the 1950s. The activities conducted by institutions like Mobil, American Soyabean Association in the early 1960s to inform the society were again conducted by PR departments of companies with foreign origins. The Turyağ Company in İzmir was also conducting activities that reflected the true identity of the PR profession in those years.

On the advice of Rahmi Koç (Honorary President of the foundation at present), son of Vehbi Koç (founder of the Koç Holding), Alaeddin Asna established the PR department in the Holding in 1969 after conducting long-lasting discussions with Vehbi Koç and other directors for five years, thus making another “first” happen (personal communication, May 11, 2012).

For a long period, Asna worked as the only employee in the department, managing the PR of Koç Holding which includes 9000 people and 59 companies on his own; during this time he made various researches in the fields of communications media, organization and internal communications (Asna, 2004). Alongside launching the Tofaş automobile factory, launching the “Diners Card” which constitutes the start of the credit card usage in Turkey, launching other factories and facilities, and arranging personal jubilees, Alaeddin Asna worked on his own in the “Bizden Haberler” magazine which is proposed by Can Kıraç for the employees in the company, and transformed it into a professional magazine which enabled the most famous writers of the Turkish press to write articles (Asna, 2004, p.66). Asna, who conducted the PR activities of several institutions for six years, left Koç Holding in 1974 as a consequence of the process which started with the false broadcasting of a Koç Holding meeting closed to the press, and got worse with the events that followed this.

Establishment of the first PR Association: HİD

The Turkish Public Relations Association (HİD) was established in 1972 to gather the PR experts in Turkey under a single structure, and to encourage them to conduct studies on building vocational solidarity and presenting, maturing and developing the profession. The founders were Alâeddin Asna, Ahmet Ramazanoğlu, Affan Başak, Ayşegül Dora, Babür Ardahan, Canan Usman, Cüneyt Koryürek, Ender Gürol, Mehmet Akter, Mehmet Turaç, Necdet Günkut, Rûdvan Menteş and Sağlam Dalaman. The first president of the foundation
was Alaeddin Asna. Later on, this position was taken over by Betül Mardin, Engin Vardar, Ergüder Türova, Alaeddin Asna (again), and Meral Saçkan.

After getting over the crawling stages and establishing a decent public reputation for the profession, the foundation went international and formed relationships with other international foundations and institutions like International Public Relations Association (IPRA), Confédération Européenne des Relations Publiques (CERP) and Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management (Görpe, 2006-2007).

After deciding that the problems of this profession, which is a field of expertise, can only be solved by people who earn money from or who devote their lives to this profession, the founders of the HİD put some restrictive provisions in the Association code in terms of accepting new members. The purpose of this was to avoid the perception of becoming a social club and to encourage the full conversion of the foundation to an organization formed by experts who seek the development of the profession for their own good. Today, majority of the foundation members are people who have adopted this purpose and have accepted the public relations profession as a professional identity to themselves. (http://www.altinpusula.org/hakkimizda.php)

İzmir Public Relations Association (İHİD), founded in 1985, is the second oldest association. Ankara Public Relations Association (AHİD) was founded by an academician, Prof. Dr. Nuri Tortop in 1990 (Görpe, 2005). Today, AHİD has 163 registered members (http://www.ahid.org.tr/tr/uyelist.htm). The youngest of all is Bursa Public Relations Association (BHİD) was founded in 1992 (Görpe, 2005).

Establishment of the first agency
After leaving the Koç Holding in November 1974, Alaeddin Asna established A&B PR, the first Turkish PR agency in the contemporary center of Turkish press, Çağaloğlu, İstanbul. The agency was named as A&B symbolically to emphasize its importance as a milestone for the PR profession in Turkey (Asna, 2004, p.82). When the conditions of the 1970s and the scarcity of private institutions are considered, the establishment and activity of a private agency, which aimed to conduct communications consultation, was found dubious by many people at the time.

After Ayşegül Dora and (following her return from England) Betül Mardin joined the company, A&B PR conducted the PR activities of many private institutions like Boeing, English Tourism Organization, Benetton, British Airways, Four Seasons, Northern Telecom (Netaş), Sheraton, Kodak, BMW and Levi’s, and a few public institutions. As a result of
working with large-scale, international companies, the directors of the agency gained PR planning and project development knowledge and experience from PR experts in USA, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Japan (Asna, 2004, p.86). As Asna states (2004) Ayşegül Dora, Betül Mardin, Deniz Adanalı, Ertuğrul Zorlutuna, Yener Ölmez, Güngör Göktan, Koray Düzgören, Mine Kürkçüoğlu Vargı and Sancar Maruflu were people who were formerly journalists but later on established their own PR firms, and they were all crucial in the foundation and development of the agency.

At the 20th year of the agency, in 1995 Alaeddin Asna passed the agency over to cabinet led by Sibel Asna, who formerly was an intern in the agency after her graduation from her University in 1980, and later became the wife of Alaeddin Asna, and concluded his financial relationship with the agency. After this decision, which was aimed towards the institutionalization of the agency, A&B PR changed its name to A&B Communication in 2004 and continued to consult leading institutions in Turkey in terms of communication; and Asna continued his academic career in Marmara University, coaching and creating new PR experts. Since the day it was founded, the agency has continued recruiting students from Press-Broadcasting Graduate School in those days and from the Faculty of Communications at present day as interns during their education and as employees after their graduation, therefore forming a great portion of its staff from well-educated young students and graduates (personal communication with Asna, May 11, 2012).

**Developmental period**

**Liberal economy (1981-1992)**

After 1980, PR gained importance as a field of study and a profession due to the changes in the economic system and society (Özden and Saran, 2004, p.447). The Turkish economy experienced a great depression in the second half of the 1970s and after the economic depression deepened with impacts on social and political aspects, a series of economic policy decisions were issued in January 24, 1980 in order to overcome this depression (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2001). After this issue, the regime change caused by the September 12, 1980 military coup d’état allowed possibilities for the new neo-liberal economic policy that was going to be pursued (Boratav, 2012).

Under the effect of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the military government appointed Turgut Özal, former president and director of the economic reforms for the DPT, as the deputy vice-president responsible of the economy. Özal did not only solve the inflation
and foreign currency problems, but also ended the statist and conservative policies and directed the transition to a free market economy and an exportation based development plan (Findley, 2011, p.329).

After 1980, Turkish economy had a development in accordance with a very fast capital accumulation regime that overturned social dynamics. In this period, while leaving the traditional economic growth perspective which was framed from the beginning of foundation of the government and by the concepts such as modernization, statetism, cooperativism, industrialization, a new growing model, which is ‘believed’ to be evoked by the integration-concentration of national capital and international finance capital, has been put into practice. 1980s and 1990’s Turkey, lived privatization, liberalization, deregulation, localization experiences, had condemned an environment dominated by consumption, heavy individualization, poverty and depolitization. Neo-liberal ideology, putting forward triviality of national economic-political-cultural accumulations in the presence of multinational capital, stresses the necessity of the individuals’ focusing on consumption and uses ‘consumption centric life style’ as a basic instrument (Tellan, 2008, p.2).

Consequently the aim was to orientate individuals and communities to the reconstructed global capitalist system, built upon the benefits of the capital.

The reason why Turgut Özal took liberal policies even further when he was elected as the prime minister in 1983 was to establish a competitive atmosphere between the companies formed in the import substitution period. In this period, when privatizations gained weight, private institutions reacted differently to these policies (Findley, 2011, p.374). The exportation-based growth model that has been put to effect with the support of international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank has caused the production industry to work efficiently and adopt an internationalizing working method (Tellan, 2008). As a consequence, the competition with the foreign products and brands brought a need for differentiation; as the need for advertising continued, advertising proved to be insufficient through time and marketing oriented PR started to gain interest among companies. Kadıbeşegil states (personal communication, May 16, 2012) that the 1980s were the golden era for the advertising agencies similar to the situation in USA in the 1960s. Even if successful advertising agencies were the reason of differentiation for many companies, these companies got stuck during the 1990s and the need for a different dimension emerged; therefore an open path for PR was constructed.

PR continued to be effective in public administration in terms of media relations. As a leader who likes to build intimate and close relationships with the public, Turgut Özal shared governmental accomplishments with the public via programmes like “İçraatın İçinden”. At the
same time, in 1983-1984, public announcements and communication studies with different channels were prepared to inform the public on VAT (Value Added Tax), which came about with the new economic system (personal communication with Gürgen, May 11, 2012). The National Productivity Center, built in these same years as an extension of the Prime Ministry, is still a center in which public relations practitioners and academicians gather and discuss concepts and theses, and conduct benchmarking activities (personal communication with Kadıbeşegil, May 16, 2012).

The emergence period of PR brought some other “initials” with it. One of them was the successful crisis communication which took place in Istanbul Sheraton Hotel, when Betül Mardin was the PR director. In 1983, a piece of the hotel roof fell on the head of a journalist who was passing by and injured him; the potential crisis that could damage the company was averted thanks to Mardin and her team, who responded to the incident fast enough, conducted the right and transparent communication with the press and paid the necessary compensations.

An example of a crisis management performed by government can be the actions of the contemporary Minister of Industry, Cahit Aral, who drank tea in front of the cameras in order to tell the community to “rest assured”, opposing the claims that tea and hazelnuts in the Black Sea region were contaminated with radiation after the 1986 Explosion of the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor (personal communication with Balta Peltekoğlu, June 4, 2012; http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3801760&yazarid=44). This unethical application can be an example of the two-way asymmetric model.

According to Kadıbeşegil (personal communication, May 16, 2012), the first Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) project was conducted in 1982 in İzmir, Turyağ, under the supervision of Vasfi Akman, the PR director of the time. In that period in Turkey, people were forming cooperatives in lands by cutting down olive trees. This situation was detrimental to olive farming and caused a pointless increase in housing construction. Even if Turyağ did not have anything to do with olive oil, they conducted a social responsibility project with regional awareness, and arranged a two-day-long symposium in Ankara on the subject. With the attendance of many experts from the public and private sectors in Turkey, olive farming was discussed thoroughly; and as a result, a project that aims to save olive farming from this construction business was formed. Afterwards, with the help of the Chambers’ Union, the subject was conveyed to the agenda of Turkey. The project was successful and the formation of cooperatives was put under a certain discipline, therefore the destruction of olive trees was averted.
At this first stage of the development, Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) public information and two-way asymmetric models seem to be dominating. The exportation of commercial competition starting in the 90s was a factor that accelerated the development and professionalization of PR.

**International competition (1992-2001)**

The 1990s started around the axis of neo-liberal policies and privatizations. Privatization revenue with the total of 4529.4 million US dollars was harvested during the 1990-2000 period (Yeldan, 2001). In this period, integration with Europe and the United States, by economical means, increased the need for PR for Turkish companies operating globally (Özden and Saran, 2004, p. 447).

In the beginning of 1990s, it is observed that there were just a few PR agencies. Many advertising agencies, production, media, purchasing and media planning were present at that period. In time, in order to serve the customers in total fashion, a period in which PR was seen as a need was entered and PR companies started to take place “right beside” the advertising agencies. Advertising agencies triggered the foundation of these companies, and the differentiation of brands and products due to the increase of the number of multinational companies put importance on the idea that the PR profession could be used as a tool to influence the public (personal communication with Kadıbeşegil, May 16, 2012; personal communication with Saçkan, May 23, 2012).

In 1992, Global Tanıtım, which is owned by Ceyda Aydede 2003 IPRA president, became an affiliate of Fleishman-Hillard, the leading international PR Agency and made its first step towards internationalization (Özden and Saran, 2004).

Another important milestone in the PR development of Turkey is the transformation of all journalism schools into Faculty of Communication in 1992, and the formation of a PR department which gives a four year education plan (Okay and Okay, 2008). The graduates of these departments were intended to fill a gap, being qualified employees in the field. However most of the interview respondents agree that today PR education has not reached to the level that it is supposed to be. There is a lack of instructors with both academic and professional backgrounds, thus in Turkey, academia does not have the potential to serve as leverage for the profession.

Betül Mardin, who was elected to the International Public Relations Association (IPRA) Board of Directors in 1992, became the first Turkish President of IPRA in 1995. Thus, by gaining international power, PR profession in Turkey has expanded from being local to
being global. Mardin, who is a member of the European Public Relations Federation and the Public Relations Foundation, is the Founder-President of the Public Relations Association too, and she has received the Member Emeritus degree from IPRA in 1998.

During these years, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) also started to spread. Turkey has an entrenched donation culture. But the habit of concealing the donations and contributions by individuals and institutions due to religious and traditional reasons (personal communication with Bir, May 11, 2012) has retarded the acceptance of CSR in the global sense, as a two-way beneficial communication for the company and its publics. Even though the CSR understanding started to sprout in the 1990s, successful and long term campaigns did not emerge before the next millennium.

The concept of “reputation” is of great importance for the Turkish culture, and its roots are buried deep in the business culture. Even though it is possible to observe the conservation of reputation through sayings like “Our reputation is ruined, we can wipe the floors with our reputation”, scientifically maintaining this conservation as a PR task is a pretty new thing. After Charles Fombrun’s 1995 conference on corporate reputation in Turkey, some of the PR agencies added reputation management in their terms of reference (personal communication with Saçkan, May 23, 2012), but the demand of a reputation management by companies came a few years after that. An important “first” that has been excluded from the books even though it was known by many respondents is that the Koç Holding initiated the first reputation management programme in 1999. A consortium consisting of Salim Kadıbeşegil, Ali Saydam and Selim Oktar has coordinated a reputation management programme for the first time in Turkey. The programme that was founded in those years continued thereon and Koç Holding has always remained in the top three in the researches based on corporate reputation.

In order to congratulate and encourage successful PR activities, the “Golden Compass PR Awards” are being distributed by the Turkish PR Association since 1999. “Golden Compass” is the first award programme of the PR sector (http://www.altinpusula.org/hakkimizada.php). This awards programme, initiated by Meral Saçkan, is a valuable innovation in terms of accelerating the integration of Turkish PR with the world, and punctuating the importance of PR evaluation.

The PR sector had started to become a competitive sector even before expertise was a subject on the table and the sector volume in the 1990s hit 50 million dollars (personal communication with Saçkan, May 23, 2012). The PR sector decelerated together alongside the Turkish economy with the 2001 economic crisis in the new millennium.
Integration (2002-ongoing)

The 2001 economic crisis in Turkey caused a great devaluation. As a solution, one of the Deputy Presidents of the World Bank, Kemal Derviş entered the cabinet as the Minister of the State responsible from the economy, and launched constitutional reforms with the support of IMF (Findley, 2011, p. 375). In the following years, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) became ruling party in 2002, which, at the time, adopted policies that do not conflict with global powers, a relative consistency is provided, and neo-liberal policies were continued to be pursued. Throughout the AKP government that has come up till today, applications to the European Union have been densified, and the entrance negotiations have been initiated in 2005. On the other hand, the technological developments in informatics that came with the new millennium changed social and business life, and the newly developing internet and other communication technologies affected all the sectors that required communication, starting with public relations and the media.

In the new millennium, the CSR concept was adopted by all companies and successful projects were started to emerge. The telecommunication company Turkcell has been one of the leaders in this subject. The “Kardelenler” project which they started with the ÇYDD (Association of Supporting Modern Life) in 2000, aimed to present equal rights to girls who were not able to receive education because of their family’s financial insufficiency, and to build a female population who have careers and are illuminated individuals (http://www.turkcell.com.tr/site/tr/turkcellhakkinda/Sayfalar/sosyal-sorumluluk/egitim/kardelenler/kardelenler.aspx). Following the global tradition, the petroleum company OPET conducted one of the first successful CSR campaigns. OPET has been focusing on the subjects of “clean toilets and hygiene” with its ‘clean toilets’ campaign since 2000, and by carrying these subjects to the news, they aimed to create a nation-wide awareness on these subjects (http://www.opet.com.tr/tr/Icerik.aspx?cat=1&id=49). The tax discounts that are provided for firms who make CSR and sponsorship are also an encouraging factor that increased the number of projects in this area.

2000s are the years at which expertise started to become a concern for PR agencies. With institutionalization concerns, quality concerns and the efforts towards providing services at international standards, companies which mastered programmes and skills like CSR, sponsorship, marketing PR, digital communication and leadership started to serve their customers accordingly. These can be marked as the fourth generation agencies of Turkish PR history. The first generation includes the founders of the profession, and their period includes the times when PR was all about media relations and event planning; the second generation
consisted of the agencies that were formed at the end of 1980s and at the start of 1990s, managed usually by people with advertising, journalism, or management backgrounds; third generation was formed by the agencies founded by the people who broke down with the second generation to do customer-expectation based works rather than more creative works. Even if the agencies develop towards expertise, the evaluations of PR activities are still not at the desired level, and evaluation/measurement methods are not well-known by employees (personal communication with Bir, May 11, 2012).

One of the findings that can be extracted from the interviews is that in the last five years, with the effect of a trend that seems to be effective throughout the world, the name PR in Turkey has started to shift towards ‘Corporate Communication’. The name ‘Public Relations’ is found to be ethically nonconforming, narrow-scoped, and insufficient for strategy developments, and therefore this mandatory change is in effect, highlighting the stakeholder concept by making a paradigm shift with the name ‘corporate communication’. In corporate communication, communication towards each stakeholder should be strategically planned and from each stakeholders’ communication in total, there should be an orientation to the corporate reputation management. Although many of the companies in the private sector have changed their department names in accordance with this sense, the perception of the issue in Turkey hasn’t totally changed; the perception of PR solely in terms of media relations is still being adopted by some professionals.

Although Turkey has not matured in the area of PR, practitioners have continued to show individual successes in international portals, with Ceyda Aydede becoming the IPRA President in 2003. In the history of IPRA, this is the second time a Turk has taken the presidency position. In 2005, Betül Mardin, has been named the recipient of the Public Relations Society of America’s (PRSA) 2005 Atlas Award. This prestigious award, sponsored by the PRSA International Section since 1995, is given annually to an individual who has made extraordinary contributions to the practice and profession of public relations on a global scale over the length of his or her career. Betül Mardin, is considered eminent in the field of international public relations because she actively promoted professional ethics, tolerance, mutual help and respect throughout the world (http://media.prsa.org/article_display.cfm?article_id=530). In 2008, Ceyda Aydede won the Atlas Award of PRSA for lifetime achievement in International Public Relations as well.
Conclusion

Up to the present, Turkish PR history has not been represented internationally, with very few exceptions (Görpe, 2011; Özden& Saran, 2004), with deficient contextual background. This study tried to figure out the most influential milestones in the development of public relations profession in Turkey, from 1920 to 2012, within socio-economic and political framework. The most important events, cases and names which have either positive or negative impact on the profession are mentioned. As this paper tends to throw a new light on the history of PR in Turkey, interviews with both academic and professional PR pioneers were conducted and the history was reflected together with their point of views.

Periods in the development of PR are defined under three main stages:

1- Antecedents of PR
   a. Single party phase (1920-1946)
   b. Multi-party phase (1946-1960)

2- Emergence of PR (1961-1980)

3- Development of PR
   c. Integration phase (2002- ongoing)

L’Etang (2008) puts forward that existing (largely US) PR historical writing is analyzed in terms of its theoretical impact through the “four models” and it is argued that this typology is not appropriately applied to other cultures with different paths of historical evolution. It is not so easy to offer a completely new PR model for the existing structure; however, the sequence and the balance of the dominant models are incompatible; that is to say that, first period is the creation of a new Republic, so the PR was done by the government and the basic objective was ‘national image building’ and ‘public persuasion’. The most dominant model is public information, yet, it is not possible to say that the way of communication was totally one-way. In the second phase in which PR was utilized for political objectives, the aim was to make propaganda, as this was a transition from single party to multi party period.

In the emergence period starting with the formation of DPT in 1960, PR has been named as a profession. In this period, most of the initials such as the first university education, the first PR department within a Turkish corporation in Koç Holding, the first
PR agency: A&B PR company, the first PR Association: HID are the most important milestones in Turkish PR history. Within this period two names should be mentioned as the founders of the profession in Turkey: Alaeddin Asna and Betül Mardin. During this period PR was understood as media relations and special events management. In various private and governmental organizations press agency model is applied together with public information and two-way asymmetrical models. Evaluation and measurement are not considered as a part of PR process.

After 1980s PR gained importance both as a profession and as a field of study due to the socio-economic metamorphosis. This is the inception of development period, which is still ongoing. The period is split into three phases, mostly guided by the economical transformations that have crucial impacts over PR business. The most prominent milestones within this period may be stated as the new way of public information by the Prime Minister Turgut Özal; the first crisis communication done by Betül Mardin for Istanbul Sheraton Hotel; the development of CSR idea with several projects starting with İzmir Turyağ’s ‘Olive Tree Protection Campaign’ in 1982 and the expansion of the social responsibility paradigm in the following years. The second phase was guided by international competition among the companies that triggered the flourishing of the PR sector. Despite of several economic crises in those years, PR sector followed on its amelioration. Number of the agencies increased together with the need for qualified employees. This gap was intended to be filled with a structural change in the university education, thus all journalism schools were turned into Faculty of Communications in 1992. Another milestone of this phase was that the Turkish PR practitioner Betül Mardin’s election as the president of IPRA in 1995. She was followed by Ceyda Aydede, who became the second Turkish IPRA president of the year 2003. At the end of the 20th century, Koç Holding has started the first reputation management programme under the coordination of prominent PR consultants. The same year, first award programme of PR sector was being distributed under the name of ‘Golden Compass PR Awards’. In the third phase, with institutionalization and quality concerns and the efforts towards providing services at international standards, PR agencies have mastered programmes and skills such as CSR, sponsorship, marketing PR, digital communication and leadership, in the early years of 2000s. While PR evaluation is crucial for the professionals, it is still not applied in the proper way that it is supposed to be. This creates a barrier for the execution of two way symmetrical model.
Overall, this study tried to mention the most important events, cases and names that have influenced the PR profession in Turkey. For further studies concerning the history of PR in Turkey, we would like to suggest researchers to develop an alternative model that will combine public information built upon two-way communication in order to unravel the Turkish PR process.
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In the summer of 1928, Stewart Beach, the editor of the Boston newspaper *The Independent* (a weekly devoted to politics, social and economic tendencies, history, literature, and the arts) sent a letter to Edward Bernays (Bernays, 1928e), asking if he would comment on “the whole subject of public relations.” Bernays was already a well-known purveyor of the new “art” of public relations and a staunch defender of the uses of what was still called propaganda.

Beach’s motives, however, were more complex than simply a definition of public relations. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was just beginning what would become a six-year-long investigation of public utilities and, more specifically, electric utilities and their “public relations” arm, the National Electric Light Association (NELA). Since 1919, NELA had carried out a massive propaganda campaign intended to discourage public ownership of utilities, especially electric utilities—an effort that would continue until near the end of the FTC investigation in 1934. Prominent among those utilities was General Electric (GE), which had been founded by Thomas Edison and was the most powerful provider of electricity and the lamps (e.g., light bulbs) that would soon be lighting the entire nation.

Beach’s request was framed within the context of an ongoing debate about the uses of “propaganda” in the promotion of American industry. He seemed particularly interested in Bernays’ take on the specific question of whether it was proper to send out material prepared by a public relations person “in the interest of some organization, without making clear to the editor that the source of the material is the organization itself” (Bernays, 1928e). In order to even more explicitly set the context for this request, Beach enclosed two reprints of articles from *The Independent* on recent stories covering a specific exposé of a major player in the investigation, the “Hofer Syndicate.”

Even after Bernays had agreed to do the *Independent* piece, Beach sought to further clarify what he was looking for. Handwritten in the margin of his follow-up letter of July 14, 1928, to Bernays, Beach wrote, “What I should like particularly is the flat statement whether or not it is considered ethical to send out opinion — or ‘news’ — without its source’s being clearly stated. This seems to us the point toward which the Federal Trade Commission investigation is leading” (Bernays,
1928f). He once again invoked the “Hofer material,” and urged Bernays to respond with his article while that story was “still fresh in the minds of our readers.” Beach followed with editorial advice:

> It seems to me that the lead of the article might well state that since the Federal Trade Commission has been investigating the propaganda activities of the utilities for some months, and particularly of the National Electric Light Association, it seems useful at this time to straighten out the concept of publicity from the point of view of the public relations counsel.

And this final caveat:

> I do not know whether you advise the NELA or not. If so, and you felt you could say so or let us say so in the box, it would add just that more weight and interest.

Bernays replied, “No, I am not connected with the N.E.L.A., but I think the article will be even stronger coming from a disinterested person” (Bernays, 1928g).

The question of Bernays’ “disinterest” is the focus of this paper. Although he denied any association with NELA and its propaganda campaign, the following year Bernays spearheaded “Light’s Golden Jubilee”—a spectacular nationwide event celebrating the 50th anniversary of the electric light bulb, and, by inference, GE and the entire electric industry. This seeming contradiction raises critical ethical questions about Bernays’ work. After all, his stated position in The Independent article, published in September, was that there was a clear difference between the “bought and paid for” propagandist and the public relations counsel working “on an entirely ethical basis” (Bernays, 1928k).

Using primary source documents from Bernays’ papers in the Library of Congress, contemporary news accounts, and documents and publications of NELA and GE, as well as FTC reports and relevant materials of those involved in the propaganda debate, this paper will examine the possible ties between Bernays, NELA, and GE, focusing on the paradox of Bernays’ defense of the techniques of propaganda on the one hand and his belief in a new form of persuasion embodied in the ethical public relations counsel on the other. Because both ideas are contained in Bernays’ article, it could be read as an effort to combine these two seemingly disparate inclinations, revealing, at the same time, an early attempt at defining public relations as an ethical practice while subtly setting it apart from its propaganda predecessor.

However, this paper goes further, exploring the contradiction between what Bernays’ said concerning the ethical behavior of a public relations counsel and what he did himself. Specifically, his apparent opportunistic behavior during this period raises questions about a connection between his work on behalf of General Electric in Light’s Golden Jubilee and the possible concomitant promotion of NELA and the entire electrical industry—at the time under federal investigation.

The question of ethics loomed large for Bernays, but so did opportunities to grow both the new profession of public relations and his own client list. In order to better understand this seeming ethical contradiction, it will be analyzed using theories of utility, opportunism, and professional
obligation in order provide a deeper understanding of his thinking as he attempted to define the new practice, while shedding light on one of his most well-known campaigns. Was it a conscious ethical indiscretion or merely a “golden” opportunity?

**Background**

The massive NELA propaganda campaign that Beach wanted Bernays to address was, in many ways, representative, if not symptomatic, of the actions of electric utilities in the first three decades of the 20th century. In some ways, it reaches back even farther, to the end of the 19th century.

The age of electric lighting started with Thomas Edison’s invention of the carbon filament lamp in 1879. By 1892, the General Electric Company was formed with 10,000 employees and $20 million in sales (GE Lighting, n.d.). Although GE was certainly the largest player on the electrical power stage at the time, there were dozens of others, divided mostly by the technology they supported—arc lighting (already adopted for large, outdoor spaces, such as street lighting) and incandescent lighting (designed for more private spaces, such as homes). During this period, lighting and provision of electrical power for that lighting were the major concerns. Westinghouse and the smaller companies struggled to compete with GE; however, research and engineering facilities were costly to build, leaving the larger company in de facto control of the industry, both for equipment manufacturing and power generation (Covington, 1994). However, some within the nascent industry believed that what was needed most was a united front.

In the mid-1880s, a number of lamp manufacturers, suppliers, and power station owners met sporadically to consider forming a trade association similar to the existing Gas Association (their major competitor), the goal of which would be to represent the electric utilities at a national level—primarily those engaged in the manufacture and distribution of arc lighting. Ultimately, this led to the founding of the National Electric Light Association in 1885 (Covington, 1994; *Electrical World*, 1892).

Because of the arc-incandescent lighting debate, members of the Edison companies (specifically GE) were notably absent from NELA membership (Chung, 1997; Dyer & Martin, 1929). In response, GE formed its own association, Association of Edison Illuminating Companies (AEIC). A tense distance developed between the two entities that lasted until the victory of incandescent lighting for homes and the increasing development of other electrically powered devices for heat, cooking and other uses made the debate moot. During this period, however, other events occurred that would change the direction of the electric power industry.

By 1900, the incandescent lamp business was in turmoil. Patent infringement cases filled the courts while fierce competition had driven lamp prices below their actual manufacturing costs (Covington, 1994). The smaller manufacturers were in desperate straits. General Electric basically controlled the market, obviating competition. Early in 1901, key members of NELA met to discuss consolidation of the smaller, independent companies with an eye to sharing research and development
in order to complete more successfully with GE. The result was the founding in May, 1901, of the National Electric Lamp Company (NELC). Its goal was to share patents and an engineering department that would build better lamp-making equipment, but for this it needed to raise capital. The consolidation was to take the form of a holding company; however, the principals quickly realized that even as a consolidated group, they still couldn’t compete with the giant that was General Electric. The NELC leaders were worried that any consolidation without the support of GE simply wouldn’t work (Covington, 1994). General Electric’s massive research and development abilities could basically out-compete anyone. The result was an agreement struck with GE to join the venture as a “silent partner,” contributing their vast resources (including operating capital) to the endeavor. GE subsequently controlled a 75 percent interest in NELC—a fact not widely known, even among the rest of the membership (Covington, 1994; Nye, 1984, 1985). In 1906, NELC’s name was changed to the National Electric Lamp Association (NELA), and GE and the independents began sharing facilities, patents, and profits. It should be noted that at this point in time there were two NELAs—the National Electric Lamp Association and the National Electric Light Association. The former was a holding company and the latter a trade association.1

The First Government Intervention
Following the Civil War, companies that sold similar goods realized that competition could actually lead to lower prices, thus lower profits. Because of this realization, companies began to band together and agree to fix prices at a rate that would allow them all to make a profit. These monopolies, called “trusts,” over time became onerous to the public that was forced to pay the price of collusion (Smithsonian, n.d.; The New Deal Network, 1996; White, n.d.). Under extreme public pressure, Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced a bill in Congress that would make trusts illegal. It was passed in 1890 as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and in 1911, was used to sue General Electric, the National Electric Lamp Association (the holding company), and over 30 other companies for restraint of trade (Covington, 1994). The government prevailed (through a consent decree); however, the result was somewhat surprising. General Electric was forced to make public its control of the holding company, but was allowed to acquire all of NELA’s stock, to the surprise of many of the members who had no idea that they had ever had a “silent partner” (Nye, 1984; 1985). General Electric, which for years had surreptitiously controlled the electric manufacturing industry, now was openly the biggest player in the game.

At this point, the National Electric Lamp Association (the holding company) became the National Quality Lamp Division of General Electric Company; and, that left the National Electric Light Association (the trade association and now the only NELA) to apply itself to its new job of selling—not lamps, but a very singular point of view. By this time, the trade association, which had once discouraged GE employees from becoming members, was virtually controlled by General Electric. By 1910, as technical disputes had cooled among the companies and a common goal was
recognized, the leadership core of the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies (AEIC) had moved into NELA, occupying influential positions on the executive committee of that organization (Chung 1997; Dyer & Martin, 1929). For all intents and purposes, NELA was being run by General Electric.

**The Federal Trade Commission Investigation**

The number of holding companies in the U.S. increased dramatically between 1922 and 1927, while the number of their subsidiaries declined, so that by the early 1930s, nearly three-quarters of investor-owned utilities would be controlled by eight holding companies.

Prior to the Stock Market crash of 1929, the number of holding companies in the U.S. between 1922 and 1927 increased dramatically while the number of their subsidiary operating companies declined, and by the early 1930s, nearly three-quarters of investor-owned utilities were controlled by eight holding companies (Mosher & Crawford, 1933, p.327). In 1928, at Congress’s request, the Federal Trade Commission began a widespread investigation into the abuses of holding companies. They assembled thousands of pages of documents and testimony and began to expose something the public already knew—they were being bilked by the utility companies, especially their holding companies (Energy Information Administration, 1993).

Although the original aim of the FTC investigation was reform of the utility industry, and, ultimately, the implementation of an expanded regulatory environment, an unexpected side issue exposed an element of holding company operations that brings us back to the Hofer syndicate—mentioned by both Stewart Beach and Edward Bernays.

E. Hofer and Sons operated a rural press service out of Salem, Oregon, that in the early 1920s placed utility propaganda in the form of editorials (subsidized by some 90 utilities) in nearly 13,000 newspapers around the country—none of it attributed to the utilities (Lundberg, 1937, p.302; Gruening, 1931, pp.189-94). For this, Hofer was paid $84,000 annually. But, the Hofer “syndicate’s” work was only the tip of the iceberg. According to the FTC report, their efforts paled when compared to the electrical industry’s trade association’s endeavors.

It is unlikely that any pressure group ever engaged in a more comprehensive propaganda campaign than the National Electric Light Association campaign during the 1920’s [sic]. This campaign… was deliberately framed to ‘sell’ utility views to the Nation’s population…. [N]o campaign approaching it in magnitude has ever been conducted except possibly by governments in wartime (United States Congress, 1941, p.152).

NELA’s propaganda campaign was a major factor in the ongoing debate over public versus private control of utilities in the United States. The FTC estimated the total annual expenditure in 1923 for public utility advertising alone was between 25- and 30-million dollars (p.153).
The great propaganda machine

As utility industries multiplied following World War One, so did trade associations representing those industries. Through both the Coolidge and Hoover presidencies, the political and economic environment favored business, and Hoover, especially, favored trade associations (United States Congress, 1941, p.8). The major function of these associations quickly became one of representing the industry to both governments (local, state, and federal) and the public. The most common approach, already tested successfully in the Great War, was propaganda. By the mid-1920s, the National Electric Light Association, with a membership of nearly 16,000, was one of the largest trade associations in the country. The stated objective, set forth in its constitution, was “to advance the art and science of the production, distribution, and use of electric energy, largely through educational methods” (Federal Trade Commission, 1928, p.28). According to the FTC’s 1928 Annual Report (outlining the early stages of their investigation), NELA’s “educational methods” were, “intended to create public good will for the industry” (p.28).

The methods used in placing these views before the public included use of the newspaper press and of the schools…. They aimed to create newspaper good will through advertising; inspired news articles written signatures of prominent persons were inserted; personal contacts with editors were made; newspaper men were entertained in various ways; news bulletins and clip sheets were prepared and widely distributed; and many speeches were made, either by members of the utilities industry or someone paid by the utilities to represent their interests (United States Congress, 1941, p.153).

In the same year the FTC investigation began, Time magazine asked sarcastically, “If the private owners of some public utility, the suppliers of gas, bringers of electric light, should want their ownership to continue, might they not teach school children that such ownership was beneficent?” (Time, 1928).

Here and there they might juggle a paragraph in a textbook adopted throughout the land. They might now and again send inconspicuous checks to school teachers who preached that private ownership was public weal, State ownership ‘Bolshevism.’ When the school children reached maturity and taxpaying, they would accept private ownership of public utilities as matter of course.

According to the FTC investigation, this is exactly what was happening. Testimony before the Trade Commission indicated that not only were textbooks being paid for, but also college and university faculty were likewise being “bought” (Gruening, 1931; Sproule, 1997). In 1924, for example, the president of the National Education Association (who was also a General Electric industrial relations manager) advised the NELA convention “to give a thought to the teachers and when their vacation comes pay them a salary to come into your plants and into your factories and learn the public-utility business at first hand” (United States Congress, 1939, p.155). As the FTC noted:
In many colleges and universities courses of study were established which appeared to be sponsored by faculty members but which were, in fact, suggested by the utilities. Funds for the support of research scholarships were received by many institutions. Elementary and college text books were surveyed to determine their attitude on the electric and gas utilities. In some instances information given out by the State information committees [formed by NELA] was utilized in correcting the viewpoints of books considered bad or unfair. In other cases, new or substitute texts were prepared and introduced into the public schools. Educational authorities in certain States were approached directly in order to improve the text-book situation. In numerous cases, thousands of pamphlets presenting the utility point of view were introduced by the State committees into public schools (p.155).

In a particularly damning statement, the FTC stated that the endeavors of NELA “were thus not confined to affirmative propaganda but included efforts to block full and fair expression of opposition views, especially in books intended for school and research use” (United States Congress, 1939, p.2411).

It was within this revelatory context of skullduggery that Edward Bernays was asked by Stewart Beach to comment not only on what was happening, but also what it meant in the definitional debate between the nascent public relations profession and the old-order propaganda machine.

The Article

True to his word, Bernays submitted the requested article to The Independent, which was published on September 21, 1928, under the title, “This Business of Propaganda” (Bernays, 1928k). In recognition of Stewart Beach’s suggestion, he began by referring to both the FTC investigation and the “uncovering of the Hofer Syndicate in The Independent.” As requested, Bernays addressed Beach’s concerns in the opening paragraph.

The recent investigation by the Federal Trade Commission of public-utility propaganda and the uncovering of the Hofer syndicate in THE INDEPENDENT [sic] have again focused attention upon the propagandist and his relation to the scheme of things (p. 198).

This is the only mention of the FTC investigation in his 1500-word article. However, Bernays did tell Beach in the letter accompanying his article that the “Hofer matter” was “taken up” in the article itself by the viewpoint “…that when a public relations counsel enlists the interests of an individual or an organization in his client’s point of view, the relationship must always be predicated upon an entirely ethical basis and it is not an ethical relationship, for instance, when such an acquiescence in point of view is bought and paid for” (Bernays, 1928g)

What Bernays seems to have done most in this article was to refine the term “public relations” while, at the same time, attempting to rehabilitate the use of the term “propaganda.” Much of what he had to say was already familiar to readers of Crystallizing Public Opinion (published in 1923) and Propaganda (published in 1928). Both of these books were released contemporaneously with other books exposing the outrages of propaganda during World War I. Chief among these was a pointed
denunciation of propaganda that came from British MP Arthur Ponsonby in his 1928 book, *Falsehood in War-Time: Propaganda Lies of the first World War*, “a straightforward catalogue of all the major falsehoods propagated by the Allied governments” (Bernays, 1928/2004, p.29). Ponsonby’s point that “The ignorant and innocent masses… are unaware… that they are being misled” (Ponsonby, Introduction)—meant to be damning—was not lost on Edward Bernays, except that he viewed it in an entirely different light.

“The World War left business astounded at what the technique of propaganda had accomplished in the conflict,” wrote Bernays in his *Independent* article (Bernays, 1928k, p.198). “[T]his ‘new propaganda,’ this new technique that had made men willing to give up their lives and their money—this was something big business might find very useful!” (p.198) However, he quickly shifted to more pro-social applications of propaganda, citing its use by “colleges and other educational and social service bodies” (p.198), sounding a theme he returned to again and again during this period in his attempt to scrub clean the image of propaganda that emerged following World War I.

Harvard and a score of other college funds, the Near East Relief and a score of other social-service projects, were made possible through a response from the public which was based on the use of appeals and a technique comparable to the war propaganda (p.198).

Perhaps he was unaware that in April, only four months prior to the publication of his article, a headline in the *Harvard Crimson* (Harvard’s campus newspaper) announced: “Business School Receives $90,000 From Utilities” (Harvard, 1928). The *Crimson* article was a thinly veiled accusation of a questionable relationship between that school and the National Electric Light Association, based on disclosures already coming from the FTC investigation. Surely Bernays, working as he did in the arena of American industry, was at least cognizant of the investigation and the threat it posed to his championing of propaganda as a legitimate business tool.

Bernays then switched to public relations—a “special profession” based on the recognition of the importance of the self-same propaganda made infamous in World War I—and now, fortuitously for his purposes, readily being applied in business. In a speech to the 25th convention of the Advertising Affiliation in June of 1928, Bernays had noted that, “There is hardly a big business today that does not use propaganda and use it effectively to accomplish its purposes” (Bernays, 1928c, p.1). For Bernays, at the time, the newer job of public relations counsel was still bound up with the job of propaganda.

…propaganda became a well-organized part of business. It created and developed the technician to handle this, who came to be known as the counsel on public relations (p.1).

This conflation also carried the somewhat ominous recognition that, as he had noted in an earlier piece, “good propaganda is an invisible government which sways the habits and actions of most of the people of the United States” (Bernays, 1928d).
In his September *Independent* article, however, Bernays suggested that public relations, as a profession like medicine and law, was, also like them, honorable and vital to the public welfare—although he admitted that all professions had their share of “quacks,” “malpractitioners,” and “shysters” (Bernays, 1928k, p.198). It is at this point that Bernays turned most fully to public relations as a profession and to answering Stewart Beach’s central question posed in his first letter of inquiry: “[D]o you feel it quite proper to send out material prepared by you in the interest of some organization without making clear to the editor that the source of the material is the organization itself?” (Bernays, 1928e).

It has long been known by public relations practitioners that a message passed through the news media, whose gatekeeping skills are assumed to provide transparency, will garner for that message a credibility that it may not have obtained on its own—or if disseminated under the name of its original author. Under this construction, the newspaper appears to address its readers in its own voice, but is actually acting as a conduit for a third party, sometimes referred to as “information laundering” (Nye, 1984, p.27; Bivins, 2011, p.5). In his 1924 book on public relations and publicity, John C. Long noted that one of the chief “faults with which Publicity has been charged” was that the source of information was concealed (p.137). Despite the recognition that this practice was clearly suspect, it was obvious that simultaneous with the publication of this book, NELA and other trade associations representing the utility companies were doing exactly what Long highlighted as problematic. According to the FTC report

In the press, the material ran the gamut from harmless and often needless advertising to ‘canned editorials’ furnished to thousands of newspapers throughout the United States, especially the smaller local weeklies (United States Congress, 1939. p.2411).

Similarly, journalist Ernest Gruening’s mid-FTC- investigation exposé of the NELA campaign flatly stated that much of the newspaper industry had been complicit in the covert dissemination of utility propaganda. He suggested that the most “insidious” aspect of the campaign centered on the

… concealment of origin, in the inability of the consuming public—in this case, the newspaper reader—to tell where the goods came from, to know, in other words, who is talking. Editorials inspired or actually written by power company representatives and then appearing as the newspaper’s own… are legion (Gruening, 1931, p.182).

Bernays also addressed the issue of disclosure in his *Independent* article, but from a very different point of view, stating that “the public relations counsel… may enlist the interest of an individual or an organization in his client’s point of view.”

That individual organization may then propagandize it through its own channels because it is interested in it. In such a case, the point of origin then becomes that individual or organization. The public relations counsel, having made the link between the interest of his client and the interest of the third party, no longer need figure in the resulting expression to the public [italics added] (Bernays, 1928k, p.199).
Although he followed with the disclaimer that “This is always predicated on the relationship being on an entirely ethical basis” (p.199), this tactic, nonetheless, buries the origin of the message at least one level deeper than full transparency might dictate. He also notes that a “bought and paid for” acquiescence is not an ethical relationship; however (and this is a big “however”), he clarified his statement by saying that if a third party is identified by the public relations counsel as a potential “propagandist” for the point of view, then the identification of that third party as the originator of the message is entirely sufficient (p.199). He then addressed directly the issue of such information flowing to newspapers through these third parties—by putting the onus squarely on the newspaper itself.

As to the flow of propaganda into the newspaper offices of the country, every editor can very simply reject any material that does not stand out in the news of that day. All he needs is a wastebasket (p.199).

Again, he was careful to modify this statement with the caveat that editors should reject information with no mark of origin or one that was “ethically doubtful” (p.199)—still placing the responsibility on the editor and ignoring the possibility of second- or third-party “laundering” that potentially adds respectability to the message.

As to the public relations counsel himself, Bernays had frequently noted throughout his early career that a propagandist working on behalf of a client “must adopt the same point of view as the man who accepts his services” (Bernays, 1929). He was careful to point out, though, that unlike a lawyer, a public relations counsel needn’t take on a client or cause that is morally suspect—or in his words, “has committed an unsocial action” (Bernays, 1928k, p.198). The reason? The reputation of the client or cause might transfer to, and thus taint, the “special pleader.” Ultimately, Bernays did come down on the side of what he defined as ethical practice, theoretically, at least.

The public relations counsel must maintain an intense scrutiny of his actions, avoiding the propagation of unsocial or harmful movements or ideas. Every public relations counsel has been confronted with the necessity of refusing to accept clients whose cases in a law court would be valid, but whose cases in the higher court of public opinion are questionable (p.199).

What Bernays did not do was to consider the possibility that there might be mitigating conditions that could obscure, or even cause to be disregarded, the “unsocial or harmful” actions of a client. What then would be the proper response of a public relations counsel?

Light’s Golden Jubilee

In May of 1929, Bernays was approached by a representative of General Electric. That year was the 50th anniversary of the invention of the incandescent light, and GE wanted to honor both that event and the aging inventor, Thomas Edison. General Electric, although barely mentioned in the newly established FTC investigation (Nye, 1984, p.30), had long been the target of congressional
concern over its monopolistic practices. This proposed celebration would be an excellent opportunity to rehabilitate the image not only of GE, but also the entire electrical industry (Ewen, 1996, pp.216-17). Bernays too was itching to further enhance the image of his new profession, and, by extension, his own reputation. Although he was certainly doing well—at 38, his company was clearing nearly $12,000 a month in profit (Bernays, 1965, p.445) —he was chafing under constant belittling from the press, which had referred to him as “the young Machiavelli of our times” (Pew, 1928, p.32), and to his occupation as “publicity agents for special and selfish causes inimical to the general interest…” (Irwin, 1936, p.120) “[T]he profession of counsel on public relations lacked the respect that I felt it deserved,” Bernays later wrote. “I hoped for a dramatic event that would make others see us as we saw ourselves.” This celebration of one of Bernays’ personal heroes was just the thing. “I recognized the potential professional significance of the assignment and plunged into the given task eagerly….” [italics added] (Bernays, 1965, p.445)

The full force of Bernays public relations expertise was brought to bear on the proposed six-month celebration. A series of luncheons were set up to woo the press. Stories about Edison and the invention of the incandescent light were sent out to newspapers all over the country. The press responded with staggering alacrity. By August, according to Bernays, the press, especially newspapers, had become self-motivated in trying to outdo each other in their eagerness to explore every angle of the story. Every imaginable avenue for publicity was explored. Universities were enticed to offer lectures on Edison and his invention. Exhibits were displayed in libraries, museums, and women’s clubs (Bernays, 1965, pp. 448-9).

General Electric and the electrical industry were not forgotten. A speakers’ bureau was set up to offer pre-packaged talks to social and professional organizations—with speakers supplied by the National Electric Light Association. And, in order to ensure that the entire electrical industry might benefit from piggybacking on the celebration, a plan book, put together by Bernays’ office, was issued to public utilities throughout the country (p.449). Even a commemorative stamp was issued by the Postmaster General at Bernays’ request. Originally set to be released on October 21st to coincide with the closing ceremonies of the Jubilee, the stamp was instead issued on June 5th to promote the National Electric Light Association convention in Atlantic City (Postage Stamps, n.d.; Bernays, 1965, p.450). Time magazine, in tracing the history of Edison and the electric industry, revealed the plans for the months-long Golden Jubilee in a lengthy May 27 article. Using obvious religious metaphor, Time announced, “The father, brethren and children of Electric Light will shortly begin celebrating handsomely its 50th anniversary.” The father, they said, was Edison. The brethren? “[M]embers of the National Electric Light Association,” assembling in Atlantic City for their annual convention (Time, 1929).

How could Bernays not have known that he was working, even tangentially, for the electric utility industry? Despite his disclaimer to Stewart Beach that NELA wasn’t a client, Bernays’ actions during Light’s Golden Jubilee clearly advanced the cause of that industry, often with the help of the
very association that the FTC was vigorously, and simultaneously, investigating for propaganda activities that literally mirrored those Bernays was undertaking for his celebration of the electric light bulb.

**Ethics versus opportunity**

Despite Bernays’ often-stated emphasis on ethical behavior for the public relations counsel, his actions as one himself reveal a loosely constructed personal and professional ethic that seemed to combine both forms of consequentialism—egoism (acting out of self interest) and utilitarianism (acting for the greater good). So constructed, it was one in which opportunity may have, under certain conditions, trumped ethical obligations to third parties (those other than the public relations counsel and the client). According to his most recent biographers (cf. Ewen, 1996; Tye. 2002), Bernays’ focus was perpetually on growing his client list and, in no small measure, his own reputation. Notwithstanding his insistence that propaganda was primarily a tool for social improvement, his attention continued to gravitate to the business sector where money and recognition were more easily made. Mark Crispin Miller in his 2004 introduction to Bernays’ *Propaganda*, notes that the book was aimed primarily at Bernays’ corporate clientele (Bernays, 1928/2005). According to Miller, despite Bernays’ usual embrace of propaganda as the savior of social programs and education, its “disingenuous” inclusion in this book was “intended, seemingly, to make the book seem something other than an essay on how business stands to benefit immensely from the author’s sort of expertise” (pp. 18-19).

In order to place that expertise within a weightier context, Bernays, in his *Independent* article, had likened the new profession of public relations counsel to the more staid and accepted professions of law and medicine. Although he recognized the differences, he also applauded the seeming scientific detachment with which these professionals plied their trades. He may have thought that if he simply adopted the proper impartiality, his actions would be above suspicion—or, at least, excusable in the sense of professional modus operandi. Like the lawyers and doctors with whom he identified professionally, expert detachment was a virtue. This would allow him, and assure his clients, that he could, and would, work zealously on their behalf—as long as he believed in their cause. As Miller points out,

> For self-conscious professionals such as Bernays, expert detachment was, of course, a point of pride—and a strong selling-point, as that hard attitude provided tacit reassurance to potential clients that the propagandist worked not just by instinct or mood, but as impartially, and, if need be, ruthlessly, as any doctor or attorney (p.21).

However, Bernays’ likening of public relations to professions such as law and medicine assumes a similarity that may not exist. Although he admits to the differences between, for example, law and public relations, he appears to ignore the most obvious contradictions. In a court of law, a case may be heard simply in order to determine whether it is valid or not. As part of this process, an
impartial party (judge or jury) is required to assess the validity of the claim. The court of public opinion may, as Bernays stated, serve a similar function; however, it is ultimately the public relations counsel’s sole prerogative to determine the validity of his client’s cause—whether it deserves a hearing in the court of public opinion or not. And, as McBride (1989, p.15) points out, “Accepting personal responsibility for professional conduct is a standard eluding easy codification because it lacks the conformity of objectivity.” The result is, that under Bernays’ personal ethical code, the validity of a client’s cause is left to the “special pleader” whose own interests are then inextricably bound to those of the client. And, being bound to those interests, the tendency has always been to let those interests dictate the truth. This in itself is a form of self interest, because it allows the agent to assume a lawyerly impartiality while believing (or believing he believes) in his client’s cause. And, as Bernays frequently stated in various forms, “In the struggle among ideas, the only trust is the one which Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court pointed out—the power of thought to get itself accepted in the open competition of the market” (New York Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1928, p.15-16)

Was this the situation for Bernays and Light’s Golden Jubilee? Individual integrity is often hard to maintain in a setting in which there is serious conflict between ethics and personal welfare. The idea that opportunity can be made to excuse what others might see as an ethical lapse clearly existed prior to the theories of opportunism which began to appear in the late 1930s (cf. Barnard, 1938). In Bernays’ case, his need to grow his client list and gain public recognition for and appreciation of his new profession may have outweighed any doubts he had about his clients and their goals. In the case of Light’s Golden Jubilee, his goal was to do the best professional job possible. He may have believed that job to be the glorification of a personal idol, Thomas Edison—not the cleansing of a monopolistic industry’s image. He may even have been aware of the conflicting goals, and, if he was, simply remanded his conscience to the verdict of the court of public opinion.

As he stated in The Independent, a public relations counsel must believe that his potential client’s cause is legitimate and not antisocial—and that’s all. Bernays clearly believed in what he was doing for the Jubilee. But, to believe fervently in something sometimes obscures a recognition of other obligations that may fall outside of that belief. In his Independent article, Bernays noted that unethical conduct by professionals of all ilk simply showed that “in an economic world there will always be some whom money will tempt from the path of ethical conduct…” (Bernays, 1928k, p.198). What is notably lacking from this statement, however, is the possibility that something other than money might also cause a professional to diverge from the ethical path—a myopia concerning differing levels of obligation and the true objectives of his client. The danger of this myopia may even extend to the professional, blinding him to a realization of his own self interest.

One theory suggests that, especially in public relations, obvious functional obligations (usually egoistic) to serve the client’s interests sometimes substitute for less obvious moral obligations (usually utilitarian) to third parties, typically out of a sense of short-term positive outcomes for both
the client and the client’s agent (Bivins, 2009, pp.22-24). However, a failure to recognize that a purely functional obligation to a client should not override a moral obligation to third parties doesn’t absolve the agent of the moral obligation. In Bernays’ case, he may have thought that both the functional goals of his client, General Electric, and the moral obligation to a society that he believed needed to honor the debt it owed to Thomas Edison actually meshed. This would have combined egoistic and utilitarian concerns while fulfilling both functional and moral obligations—what Baker (1999) has called, “enlightened self interest.” Or, it may have been, as New York Herald Tribune editor Stanley Walker noted in his 1934 book, “…simply a publicity stunt pulled off by Bernays, representing powerful and rich interests, to exploit the uses of the electric light” (p.144).

The operative question is: Did Bernays understand that by celebrating the anniversary of the electric light and its inventor, he might also be serving a less honorable cause—that of perpetuating private ownership of public utilities at the expense of society as a whole? Did he even suspect that he was part of a larger, ongoing propaganda campaign whose goals he had recently derided in his Independent article? If he did, an egoistic, client-centered, functional approach would have been ethically questionable at best. At worst, it would have completely misrepresented, thus ignored, the utilitarian, other-centered, moral obligation to potentially affected third parties.

In the end, however, this may be something of a false dichotomy. There is an ethical scale on one end of which an individual acts exclusively out of egoistic interest disregarding consequences for others’ welfare. On the other, an individual chooses actions to promote societal gain (Hinman, 2008, p.107). Edward Bernays most likely fell somewhere in the middle of this scale—ultimately prey to the uncertainty of his own, developing, moral code and the natural vicissitudes of the profession he founded.

Notes

1 There seems to be a lot of confusion in citations referring to NELA (the holding company whose name was changed to the National Electric Lamp Association in 1906) and NELA (the trade association, whose name was the National Electric Light Association, which was founded in 1885), mostly perpetuated by information in Nye’s 1985 book. Although otherwise authoritative, Nye conflates the two associations on page 18 when referring to the holding company and GE’s stranglehold on the electric power industry. His information is subsequently cited by Ewen (1996, pp.216-17) and others as proof of GE’s involvement in the National Electric Light Association’s propaganda campaign. This is not to say that GE was not deeply involved in the scandal, but by the time of the FTC investigation in 1928, the holding company had already been broken up by Congress in 1911 using the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. It was subsequently absorbed by GE as the National Quality Lamp Division. In 1933, when it became clear that the National Electric Light Association’s propaganda campaign was tainting GE’s image, NELA was abolished and its successor became the Edison Electric Institute, which still exists today.
References


The 1908 Great Race from New York to Paris captured the imagination of the world as intrepid competitors endured the hardships of the around the world race. The New York Times, its co-sponsor, was in a unique position to practice media relations. There was no gatekeeper for this media relations effort because the new outlet was the source of the publicity. Too often media relations is viewed as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. The integration of framing into media relations (Zoch & Molleda, 2006) provides insights into how the news media can use strategic communication to accomplish organizational goals. By building interest in the race, the New York Times could sell more newspapers and the automobile manufactures could broaden their markets outside of cities. The research analyzes the frames used to generate interest in order to gain insight into their strategies for trying to influence behavior through a controlled form of media relations.

Key words: Great Race, media relations, framing, strategic communication
Introduction

In a world dominated by the Internet and globalization, it is difficult to image a time when society was beginning to industrialize and consumerism was in its infancy. That time was around the early 1900s. Technology was rapidly transforming how people viewed the world and a sense that, with technology, anything was possible. This blind faith in science was fueling what would become known as technological hubris—an arrogant belief in technology and its abilities. At the center of all this enthusiasm was a relatively new technology known as the automobile.

Around 1908, the automobile was primarily an urban vehicle. Horses still dominated outside of the major cities in part due to a lack of roads and the perceived fragility and unreliability of automobiles (Long, 2012). The first motorized vehicle race was held in Paris circa 1893. These early races were destination based and involved traveling to places such as Paris and Chicago. In 1900, auto making was centered in France, where the concept of city-to-city speed races originated (Fenster, 2005). When fatalities mounted from these wild races within France, France outlawed the frenzied point-to-point races and circular racetracks were born. However, the monotonous racetrack format proved less than satisfying and French automobile enthusiasts soon circumvented the ban by looking beyond their borders for more interesting, distance-based races. The longest such race was the 9317-mile (14,994 km) race from Peking (Beijing) to Paris that was held in 1907 and sponsored by Le Matin, a prominent Paris newspaper. It was considered an amazing feat to drive an automobile across the U.S. given the state of many roads and the complete lack of roads in some areas.

It was a very bold move for Le Matin to announce plans for the 20,000-mile (32186.88 km) New York to Paris race set to begin in February of 1908. The Peking to Paris race had captured the imagination of much of the world through first-hand accounts provided by journalists traveling with the teams. Surely the more ambitious New York to Paris race would prove even more newsworthy. The New York Times and Le Matin would promote what would essentially be an around the world race from Times Square to the Eiffel tower. The proposed race was so audacious it became known as the “Great Race of 1908” or simply “The Great Race” (Evans, 2011).

The Great Race was much more than a challenge for automobile manufacturers and their racing teams. The Great Race was a major public relations effort that offered a number of significant ramifications for society. At its heart, the Great Race was a pseudo-event created by two newspapers, the New York Times and Le Matin. Media relations is a means to an ends, not an end in and of itself. There needs to be some objective for generating news stories. For the Great Race, the initial objective was to sell newspapers. Interest in the race would drive sales as the two newspapers would have on-the-scene reporters in the automobiles writing stories for those transfixed by the event (The Great, n.d.). The automobile industry could see the value in publicizing their product. If more people realized the potential utility of a brand of automobile, people would be more likely to buy that brand.
However, for car companies, participation could be risky if the cars did not perform well in this highly publicized race (Fenster, 2005). At its core, the Great Race was a public relations action.

As described by Fenster (2005):

In an era that glided along without any overarching news story, such as a war or some pestilence to dwell on, the New York Times realized that the world’s longest race would not only be news, but a turning point in the young twentieth century. Besides, it would fill up a column on page one every day, and a lot of page two for at least six months running. The … Times was not often in the habit of generating news, like some common tabloid churning up controversy where none existed before, but this ‘big undertaking, it enthused, ‘a year or two ago would have been termed the wildest dream of automobile imagination’. (p. 20)

The New York to Paris race also holds fascination for public relations because it did not utilize traditional media relations wherein a practitioner “pitches” a story to the media and the media gatekeepers decide if they will cover the story and how they will cover the story. Because the media control the content, traditional media relations is considered uncontrolled media (Treadwell & Treadwell, 2005). However, in the case of the Great Race, because the New York Times was co-sponsoring the race, it could place any number of stories about the race anywhere in its paper at any time. There was no gatekeeper for this pseudo event. However, if other publications chose to cover the Great Race, that would be considered to be traditional media relations. But the New York Times coverage was controlled media and is similar to online public relations where “citizen journalists” publish stories directly to their audiences. The New York Times coverage of the Great Race has more in common with online public relations than with traditional media relations. There is power in controlled media because the creator controls how the information is framed (Zoch & Molleda, 2006). This research project examines how the New York Times’ pre-race coverage framed various aspect of the anticipated event in order to generate audience interest.

**Literature Review: Media Relations**

Media relations is a foundational element in public relations and is about trying to influence the content of media coverage (Diggs-Brown, 2012). But it also a source of criticism because public relations is considered a corrupting force for news media (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). As Zoch and Molleda (2006) observed, it is odd that very little is written about media relation given its ubiquity in public relations. Many of the core ideas of media relations date back twenty or thirty years (e.g., Bennett, 1988; Gans, 1979). An accepted tenet of media relations is that it involves two different audiences: the news media and the intended public (Hendrix & Hayes, 2010; Zoch & Molleda, 2006). These two audiences provide the structure for this literature review that focuses on media relations in traditional media outlets that would be common in the 1900s.
The news media gatekeepers

The initial objective of media relations is to generate a news story. Public relations practitioners create possible news stories, often in the form of news releases, which are sent to the news media in hopes of stimulating a story. However, the news media are free to ignore the information or to develop a story much different from the one intended by the practitioner. Practitioners obviously want positive stories that benefit the organization but the news media could craft a negative story. News releases and other media relations tactics are considered uncontrolled media because the practitioner has no control over the message once it is sent to the news media (Diggs-Brown, 2012). Many discussions of media relations, including Ryan’s (2005) entry in the Encyclopedia of Public Relations, emphasize capturing the news media’s attention.

Practitioners use newsworthiness, the news value a potential story holds for the news media, to attract the media’s attention. Six commonly identified news increase the newsworthiness of a story: (1) timeliness, the story is happening now; (2) impact, the story can affect a large number of people; (3) audience interest, the story will appeal to the audience of the news outlet; (4) conflict or oddity, the story involves conflict or an unusual situation; (5) drama, story fits the narrative formed by news media; and (6) human interest, ordinary people or animals in unusual situations (Gans, 1979; Paletz & Entman, 1981).

Two other factors that enhance newsworthiness are news pegs and celebrities. The news peg allows a story to be linked to something already being covered in the news media. Stories that feature well-known celebrities also increase the attractiveness of the story (Gans, 1979). Practitioners increase the likelihood of the news media using their story idea by maximizing its newsworthiness. Other factors that affect whether or not a practitioner’s story idea becomes a news story include relationships with the news media and understanding the news media’s routine (Ryan, 2005). Zoch and Molleda (2006) argue for the importance of the practitioner becoming an information subsidy for the news media by providing reliable, low cost information to the news media. The pre-packaged information provided by practitioners is appealing to news media outlets with limited budgets and financial pressures (Gandy, 1982).

Pseudo-events are a specific type of media relations tactic that has relevance for this case. The term pseudo-event was coined by Daniel Boorstin (1961) and denotes an event created specifically to attract media attention. If there is no news media, there is no need for a pseudo-event. Public relations practitioners create pseudo-events when they develop events primarily designed to attract media attention. For instance, do CEOs really need to use shovels and break ground for a new building? The answer is no because the construction crew does the real work. The shiny silver shovels are used to garner media attention—the groundbreaking is a pseudo-event.
Attracting media attention is merely the first act in the two-act play that is media relations. When the news media create a story, other audiences are now exposed to the message. And hopefully the story provided the frame desired by the practitioner. Ultimately, the practitioner hopes the story influences this other, target public.

The target public

Media coverage is a means to an end. Media coverage is strategic because it seeks to reach an outcome objective beyond simply the creation of the news story. That news story should help to move a target public to develop more positive impressions of the organization, want to purchase stock, or buy products or services. Zoch and Molleda (2006) argue that framing is a useful concept for explaining how public relations practitioners utilize the news media to achieve objectives with their true target publics. The literature on framing is rich and vast and interdisciplinary. This brief overview of framing illustrates how framing works in public relations through media relations.

Framing

Framing is a significant concept in public relations (Hallahan, 1999). Goffman (1974) explained that frames provide a lens through which people can organize and interpret information. People encounter a wide array of information each day and frames tell people what information they should attend to and what that information should mean to them (Entman, 1993). Thus, a frame serves as a filter by allowing some information through while blocking other information from view. Moreover, that filter tells people how the visible pieces of information fit together with one another and signals their relevance. Practitioners want to influence how the news frame their information because of the potential effects of the frames on their target publics.

The news media do influence people’s perceptions, especially when people lack personal experience and are dependent on the media for information. Most publics experience an organization and develop opinions about an organization largely through mediated messages, including those from the news media. What the news media decides to cover and how they cover it (i.e., how they frame the story) holds consequences for an organization and their publics (Carroll, 2004; Carroll & McCombs, 2003; Meijer, 2004). As Zoch and Molleda (2006) noted, there is power in media frames. The media frames tell publics what should be seen as important to them, agenda building (Zoch & Molleda, 2006). The framing process also signals possible interpretations, including favorable and unfavorable views of an organization and its actions. The frame of the news story can help the organization to achieve an objective with its target public. For instance, media frames can be critical for cultivating favorable organizational reputations (Carroll, 2004; Meijer, 2004). Favorable news stories about an organization’s CSR efforts should help to develop a positive reputation among customers and potential customers. Hence, media coverage is a means to an end.
In sum, the practice of media relations and the value of influencing media frames have a long history in public relations because of the benefits they can provide to organizations. Interestingly, media organizations also practice their own form of media relations as self-promotion. They act strategically to attract readers or viewers through the way they present their stories. This present investigation focuses on an early use of media relations by the *New York Times* in its promotion of the New York to Paris auto race. The purpose of this paper is to explore the public relations function of the Great Race through an analysis of the *New York Times*’ pre-race coverage. The pre-race phase was chosen because it set the stage for the race and was designed to increase circulation prior to the race. The newspaper stories are analyzed for the frames used to build interest in the race that was anticipated to increase sales for the *New York Times*. The general research question guiding this investigation was, “What frames were evident in the *New York Times*’ pre-race coverage of the New York to Paris race?”

**Method**

**Sample and media frames**

The *New York Times* archive served as the database and the name of the race was used to identify all articles from January 1, 1908 (the day the race was announced) through February 11, 1908 (the day before the race began). The search process produced 63 relevant articles. Each article was treated as the unit of analysis.

The authors read the corpus of articles in order to familiarize themselves with the content and began conceptualizing and operationalizing the media frames that appeared in the pre-race coverage. In this way the coding scheme was inductively derived from the story content. The frames were seen as emergent themes that were evident in stories that seemed to provide a “hook” (news value) for generating reader interest. The following describes the emergent categories and operationalizations used to code the content.

First, the “interest in the Race” frame reflected whether or not the story mentioned that others, including other countries, car enthusiasts, etc. had expressed interest in the race (coded as “yes” or “no”). This frame seemed intended to have a bandwagon effect and signaled that because the world was interested in the race, the reader should be too.

The “can the New York to Paris race be completed?” frame reflected the idea that the race was “do-able” (at least one car will triumph by completing the route) vs. “impossible” (no one would complete the race due to any number of factors such as the treacherous geography of the route or poor weather conditions).
The New York to Paris Race often was framed as an “adventure” rather than a speed-based race. The “adventure” frame encompassed three categories: the driving route as a challenge, the weather conditions as a challenge (snow, rain, cold temperatures, etc.), and the geographical conditions as a challenge (e.g., road conditions and natural obstacles like mountains and rivers).

The “equipment” frame included two categories: special equipment needed for the automobile (equipment to be carried in the car or car modifications made prior to the race) and equipment needed for the driving team (personal equipment and/or personal supplies needed for the journey, including items like clothing, cooking, and camping supplies). This frame supported the adventure frame but extended it to focus on the participants and the gear that would contribute to ability to compete.

The “logistical challenges” frame included two categories: the challenge of securing fuel and oil along the way and the challenge of transporting or shipping autos during the race in the case the Bearing Sea was not frozen and drive-able and cars needed to be shipped rather than driven across the sea. This frame focused on the outside support that might be needed throughout the competition.

The “profiles” frame encompassed three categories: the entrants (who is participating in the race, including drivers and mechanics, along with their personal characteristics and experiences); the experts (people who had completed other races or people who possessed other expertise such as familiarity with the geography or driving route); and the officials (public officials or important figures who endorsed the race, who would signal the start of the race, or who would participate in planned festivities, etc.). This frame directed attention to other “celebrities” and important individuals associated in the New York to Paris race.

Finally, the theme of “promotion of the automobile industry” indicated whether or not the story mentioned that the automobile industry had a vested interest in the process and outcome of the race (coded as “yes” or “no”). This was not restricted to a particular car company but rather reflected the idea that the race would be beneficial for the auto industry as a whole. The frame directed attention to the symbolic meaning of the race for the auto industry.

Each article was examined to determine if the themes identified above were present. More than one category within a frame could be observed (e.g., a story might contain both the “entrant” and “expert” categories). One of the authors coded all articles. The other coded a sub-sample to verify the reliability of the coding scheme. Discrepancies between coders were resolved through discussion.

Results

Readers could hardly overlook the coverage of the Great Race because stories about the race appeared nearly every day on the front page, and on some days more than one story appeared. The following
presents excerpts and descriptions of story content that correspond to the frames. Table 1 reports the observed frames and frequencies of categories within the frames.

**Frames**

The “interest in the race” frame was evident in one-third of the stories that described the importance of the race and the events associated with the race. The *New York Times*’s headline “Interest growing in race to Paris” (January 9, 1908, p. 10) encouraged readers to view the race as significant and worthy of their attention, regardless of their personal experience with automobiles. The race was described as “the greatest international automobile contest that has ever been projected in the history of the sport” (January 21, 1908, p. 2), suggesting that the whole world was reading about it and *New York Times* readers should be as well. “There is lively interest in the character of the cars that will be prepared to start in the big automobile race to Paris” (January 20, 1908, p. 2). Large crowds were anticipated as the steamers carrying the teams and cars arrived in New York, “The greatest curiosity is expressed on every hand to see these cars which will brave conditions on the road such as no car has ever faced” (February 6, 1908, p. 1).

Stories described numerous events planned by American Automobile Associations in the East and Midwest that would allow the curious to participate in some fashion. Cars would be met by AAA members and accompanied along various parts of the route. Confetti trails would greet drivers and mark the route. Entertainment committees were formed to provide entertainment for drivers at some points.

Events held in other countries that signaled interest in the race also were reported. For example, in Paris, the Italian car “attracted much attention as it passed down the boulevard to the Matin building. Its Italian drivers were cheered by the crowd that immediately surrounded the foreign car as it drew up in front of the newspaper’s offices” (January 28, 1908, p. 1).

Another story described how the Protos car, the German entry, left Berlin at 8:00 am, to begin its voyage to the U.S. Amid a crowd estimated at 10,000, the car paraded down the street and was decorated with German, French, and U.S. flags.

The streets …were thronged with spectators anxious to be eye-witnesses of the start of the representative of the Fatherland in the epoch-making contest… A long cavalcade of automobiles, bicycles, and other vehicles followed in its wake until the Postsdam was passed. (January 27, 1908, p. 1)

In Paris, four competitors, three French and one Italian, were each draped in French, Italian, American, and Russian flags as they left the city on their way to the steamer bound for New York. The article reported that “The houses were decorated and the streets crowded as on a holiday, and
here was everywhere the liveliest interest in the contest. A public reception was attended by them in the evening” (January 29, 1908, p. 1).

In summary, by reporting widespread interest in the race, the New York Times reinforced the significance of the undertaking. From the initial announcement to the arrival of the foreign drivers and car, the interest frame was self-reinforcing and self-promoting; reporting interest in the race generated additional interest.

The question of whether the New York to Paris race could be completed by any team was posed to generate drama. Comparisons to the Peking to Paris race were offered to illustrate the difficulty of the more arduous New York to Paris race. For example, “Severe as the Peking to Paris race was as a trial of the automobile, it was insignificant compared with this greater project” (January 26, 1908, p. SM8). The New York Times also noted “The Peking to Paris race, when projected, was declared impossible by all automobilists, and the participants themselves, according to their own declaration, had small hope of accomplishing the trip” (January 13, 1908, p. 2). As shown in Table 1, the coverage skewed toward optimism as 60% of the articles framed the race as incredibly difficult but ultimately do-able. At least one intrepid team was expected to prevail.

The “adventure” frame was evident in about half of the stories (58%) and described the New York to Paris race as a dramatic test of technology and men’s ingenuity against nature.

It means a long, careful preparation; a knowledge of the character of the country, the carrying of extra parts, and of instruments to aid in repairs. It means the ingenious use of a variety of simple contrivances to extricate the cars from unexpected difficulties involved by certain accidents. It means the hardest kind of physical labor for all the contestants who drive or accompany the racers. (January 26, 1908, p. SM8)

Another story described: “In all, it is about as dangerous an adventure as any ever undertaken – one in which man and his machine are to be matched against the forces of nature, and matched against them in one of the longest of all long-drawn-out struggles of this kind” (February 9, 1908, p. SM6).

Of the three categories within the adventure frame, the route for the race received the most attention (44%). Due to factors like topography, quality of roads, and weather, selecting the best course was a complex task; pros and cons of various routes were debated. Once the route was determined, stories frequently announced the route and the approximate distances and time estimates for completion between major cities along the route. Sometimes selected portions of the route were highlighted. For example, a story reported that weeks before the race began, an Oldsmobile car would follow the race route as far as Cleveland and send detailed reports of the road conditions, including the condition of bridges and the possible need for detours if bridges had burned since the time the
route was determined (January 27, 1908, p. 2). The hazards posed by various portions of the route were debated. For example, in the U.S., the routes through Wyoming and California were considered very challenging (January 28, 1908, p. 1). The controversy surrounding the route signaled that the Great Race was risky business.

The adventure frame also was evident through the frequent reports of current and projected weather conditions along the route that might create hazards for the competitors (30%). There were constant reminders of the harsh, challenging weather conditions under which the cars would compete. For example, one automobilist scouting the early part of the route reported that the weather was favorable for traveling along a particular point because there was little snow in the hills and minimal snow beyond that (January 28, 1908, p. 2). Numerous race supporters provided information about how weather affected travel: “In answer to telegraphic inquiries, automobilists throughout the Middle West make encouraging reports of the road conditions at this time” (February 4, 1908, p. 2).

The geographical conditions that must be overcome by teams focused attention on the physical obstacles (35%). In the early 1900s few Americans were personally familiar with the geography of the U.S., let alone the Alaskan, Siberian and the European route. The novelty of the ambitious route was a natural focus for stories. Stories also highlighted the European’s lack of familiarity with the diverse and challenging terrain of the U.S. For example, Alberto Pirelli of Milan (February 4, 1908), a representative of the Brixia-Zust car company, explained:

Few Europeans realize the immensity of the United States or the nature of its mountains. Of course, these cars, manned by plucky drivers who have the grit to push on the in face of every discouragement, ought to get through, but it is not the easy task that the foreign drivers imagine. The lack of defined roads and the heavy snows likely to be encountered make it very different traveling from that in the mountain roads of Europe. Then, too, the Alaska country is altogether different from any that an automobile has ever traversed … (February 4, 1908, p. 2).

The frame concerning the equipment needed for the race included reports of car modifications prior to the race as well as descriptions of the equipment that would be required to maintain the car throughout the race. About 43% of the articles referred to the automobile technology that would make the competition possible. Stories spotlighting the unusual personal equipment required for the team were less frequent (14%) but reinforced the idea that the men would undergo considerable hardships.

Stories about the cars often highlighted the technology that could be used to equip the vehicles. Some stories focused on special modifications that were made to the autos to prepare them for the grueling race prior to their being shipped to the U.S. For example, the German Protos car was built in 16 days by some 600 different men (February 8, 1908, p. 1). The French De Dion car was
specially built and tested in the Swiss Alps (January 26, 1908, SM8). It also was equipped with a sail (January 7, 1908, p. 4). Stories contrasted the special modifications of the foreign cars with the stock cars that would be used by American entrants:

“The foreign cars have been especially built for the contest from designs suggested by the experiences of the French and Italian contestants in the Peking to Paris race. The single American contestant will be handicapped by the necessity of adapting a stock car to the race, but this difficulty has not deterred E. R. Thomas from meeting his foreign rivals. (February 6, 1908, p.1)

The equipment required for the cars and team members included a curious array of items and were likened to what would be needed on an artic exploration (February 2, 1908, p. S1). These included thermometers, barometers and hydrometers (for mountain climbing) as well as navigation tools such as sextants and compasses. In addition, tools such as axes, hatchets, picks, shovels, and wire cutters could be required to clear a path for the vehicles when good roads were not available. The dangerous nature of the race was signaled by the need for fire extinguishers and first aid kits as well as shotguns and revolvers for self-protection against people and/or wild animals.

Articles about the equipment required to maintain the cars outlined an impressive collection of gear that must be carried within the cars and used for repairs. Equipment included items like a complete tool set, blow torch, soldering outfit, large wrenches, block and tackle, electric hand lamp, tire tools, foot pump, jacks, extra tires and wheels, wheels with ice spikes, and shocks (February 2, 1908, p. S1).

Driving teams also required personal items such as fur coats, sweaters, snow goggles, dust goggles, rubber boots, and woolen underwear and socks. In addition, camping equipment such as frying pans, coffee pots, drinking cups, water bottles, tin grub boxes, and utensils were needed (February 2, 1908, p. S1).

Overall, the equipment frame portrayed the race as more of an expedition than a race and anticipated the struggles to be faced by the men. The focus on the specially equipped autos signaled that technology, not mere driving prowess, would win the race. Readers also could anticipate accounts of the intrepid teams using various technologies throughout the race.

The logistical challenges of a 20,000-mile race across vast stretches of unpopulated and relatively unexplored areas posed obstacles for the teams. In particular, 22% of the articles mentioned the difficulty of securing supplies of gasoline and oil was described as “the most serious problem connected with the entire organization of the Paris race” (February 2, 1908, p. S1). Although some portions of the route would pose no problems, the absence of established roads and outposts would make securing gas and oil in Alaska and Siberia very challenging for the teams. One story described
how a plan for furnishing the teams with gasoline and oil along the Siberian route was submitted by the Nobel oil company, the same company that handled this task in the Peking to Paris race (January 27, 1908, p. 1). Moreover, teams would need to pay for their fuel (at a cost of about 25 cents per gallon in the U.S.). Other articles identified exotic-sounding cities along the route across the Russian-German frontier, the distance between points, and the amount of gas and oil supplies required to reach those points (February 2, 1908, S1). At various points these supplies would be carried by horse and sled as well as by reindeer (February 2, 1908, S1).

A second category of logistical challenges involved the need for the transportation of the cars and teams from Seattle to Valdez, the point of entry to Alaska. The time they require to cross the U.S. would affect their ability to catch a ship for the trip to Alaska (January 28, 1908, p. 1). Although the race was planned to take place during the Winter when the Bearing Sea should be frozen solid and thus drive-able, the status of the sea could depend on the team’s driving progress and would not be fully known until cars neared that portion of the trip. It was possible that later-arriving cars might confront a thaw. Hence, the precise nature of this logistical challenge was unknowable.

About 63% of the articles contained profiles of various individuals who could provide insights into the route, had competed in previous transcontinental races, or were well known officials who were enthusiastic about the race. The lack of documentation about roads about topography increased the value of first-hand knowledge from those who had “been there and done that.”

Readers were briefed on the accomplishments of the drivers and their teams. These profiles framed the drivers (and sometimes their teams) as intriguing heroes, or at least soon-to-be celebrities. Entrant profiles appeared in over one-third of the articles. For example, Montague Roberts, the American driver, was featured:

The Thomas car and Roberts are almost synonymous terms, for Roberts has driven Thomas cars in so many big events within this past two or three years and his successes have been of such a marked character that the very fact of Roberts being at the wheel inspires not only confidence, but a very fair assurance that this combination of car and skillful driver will produce satisfactory results. From a National viewpoint, Roberts will have six foreign machines as competitors, and his progress from the day of the start will be watched with the keenest interest by every American with a drop of sporting blood in his veins, whether he ever enjoyed the exhilarating experience of motoring in the open air or not. (February 9, 1908, p. S2)

The race would require drivers and other team members to demonstrate more than driving skill. Military credentials provided useful preparation for the ordeal facing the drivers. For example, Montague Roberts’ experience in the Ordinance Department of the U.S. Army at Washington was considered an asset: “He was one of the mechanics in the experimental department and had charge of
building and operating the first gasoline artillery truck used by the Government in army maneuvers” (February 9, 1908, p. S2).

Similarly, stories reported: “The (German) men who will take the (Protos) car through are splendid specimens of manhood… And their military experience and standing are such to command confidence” (February 8, 1908, p. 1). Lieut. Koeppen joined the German army at age 17 and currently served in the General Staff. He was described as “not an automobilist, but a sportsman, and is entering the race in that spirit, though he has a serious purpose as well” (February 8, 1908, p. 1).

Another category of profiles focused on people who possessed expertise on some aspect of the race (19%). Their first-hand experience was portrayed as indispensable to the teams. For example, the route through Alaska often was depicted as particularly precarious. An interview with Colonel Swanitz of the Valdez & Yukon Railroad described challenges facing the drivers. The colonel, who was laying out the railroad route to connect the Yukon to the port of Valdez, was thoroughly familiar with the country and believed it was possible to go from Valdez to Nome. He explained the route followed the Government road, which is about 5 feet wide at some points and about 1,110 miles long. However, at the beginning of the Alaska route was a steep mountain range that he doubted could be crossed without aid (January 23, 1908). Another person familiar with Alaska, Casey Moran, a miner, was visiting the U.S. and offered insights. The miner had spent 12 years in Alaska, knew the trail from Valdez to Nome, and believed the snow should pack hard in Winter (February 5, 1908).

Other stories described trips across the U.S. that were made by other automobilists. For example, L. L. Whitman, the holder of the record for ocean to ocean trips (in 15 days) volunteered to serve as a guide/pilot for the American portion of the route. The New York Times reported, “His experience on his three trips across the continent, together with his exhaustive knowledge of the mountainous passes of the West, fit him singularly for the position of pilot on such a tour” (January 6, 1908, p. 4). Similarly, Percy Megargel had crossed the Rockies and the entire continent from San Francisco to New York in the Winter and forecast what team would encounter (January 19, 1908, p. SM6).

Presidents of automobile clubs as well as political figures were featured in some stories (10%). This frame signaled that important individuals as well as auto enthusiasts were interested in the race and references to the Great Race implied everyone was familiar with the event. For example, the French Ambassador to the United States, a guest at a banquet of the New York automobile club, called the race not a contest but

a voyage of exploration in which the daring international derivers would brace dangers and hardships incident to the crossing of a vast and practically unknown country, and in the name of sport would confer great benefit upon the interests of the world” (January 26, 1908, p. C3).
Similarly, New York Senator Depew lauded the auto as an “agent of civilization” (February 7, 1908, p. 1). The president of the American Automobile Association as well as auto club welcoming committees that would greet the teams as they passed through various cities or spent the night also were reported in detail.

Overall, the profile frames piqued interest by acquainting readers with the entrants as well as the experts who provided pre-race intelligence and could continue to provide insight throughout race. The officials reinforced the significance of the race.

The promotion of the auto industry frame was observed in only about 16% of the articles. Races such as the New York to Paris race were seen as opportunities to promote the developing automobile industry. Although the races represented exotic, bigger-than-life adventures, the races also afforded the auto industry the opportunity to promote automobiles for more mundane uses as well. If a car could endure the hardships of an around the world race, surely it must be reliable enough for the average person. A senator from New York was quoted as describing how the race will demonstrate the economic value of the automobile in motoring and facilitating trade through Alaska and Canada (January 26, 1908, p. C3).

The *New York Times* reported:

As far as practical values go, automobile enthusiasts say that much will be accomplished for the trade by a demonstration of the ability of the cars to cross the United States successfully in the worst period of the Winter season, but none doubt that they will accomplish this task. A 3,000-mile endurance contest is no mean achievement. (January 9, 1908, p. 10)

The *New York Times* contributed to the interests of the automobile industry by framing the race as an opportunity to showcase the high quality of American-made cars. An American auto would compete on a world stage dominated by the success of Italian, German, and French autos. An article observed:

Their (the U.S. Thomas car Company) attitude from the time the race was seriously broached was that it afforded a rare opportunity to demonstrate the sterling qualities of the well-made American car, and being in close competition with some of the best foreign made machines an exceptional occasion was thereby offered to prove the touring ability and real worth of the home-made product to withstand all conditions of weather and road. (February 9, 1908, p. S2)

The popularity of the automobile, and thus the viability of the U.S. auto industry itself, was reinforced through stories of the numerous automobile enthusiasts who would, in at least some small way, participate in the adventure as they gathered for the start of the race or greeted teams traveling through the U.S. Listing the names of the automobile clubs and their members in the paper added
prestige to these organized events that were promoted as important social functions. However, articles that reflected the special car equipment and modifications frame (43%) appeared twice as often as the promotion of the auto industry frame (16%). This demonstrates that interest was directed more often to the specific cars in the race than the auto industry as a whole. Moreover, the descriptions of these specially crafted automobiles set them apart as qualitatively different from the automobiles available to most consumers. So although the race might cultivate reader interest in automobiling, readers may not see themselves as having access to the high quality technology available to the racing teams.

In summary, a variety of frames were used strategically to build an audience for the pre-race coverage of the New York to Paris race. The New York Times provided sustained coverage to build excitement and its audience from the time the race was announced through its start on February 12, 1908.

Discussion

The New York to Paris race provides an example of how news media can use strategic communication to accomplish organizational goals. By building interest in the race, the New York Times could sell more newspapers and the automobile manufacturers could broaden their markets outside of cities. The turn of the century was an age of adventure and exploration as well as technological development. People were enacting daring stunts and attempting to conquer mountains and other natural obstacles. These adventurers were the “reality celebrities” of their day. The dramatic dispatches from the 1907 Peking to Paris race whetted the public’s appetite for this type of on-the-scene reporting of heroic endeavors in exotic locations. This historical background helps us to understand why the various frames were crafted to generate interest.

The most basic frame was designed to promote the belief that people around the world were interested in the race. It was depicted as much more than a race - it was an ambitious adventure - but something that most likely could be accomplished through the resourcefulness of the teams. There would be less interest if the race were either too easy or impossible. Moreover, why should the paper invest in following the event if the race could not be completed? The pre-race frames dramatized the challenges of the route but reinforced the idea that the race could be completed. In reality, three automobiles, the Thomas, the Protos, and the Zust did finish but took far longer to do so than anticipated (169 days, 195 days, and 217 days, respectively).

As noted in the introduction, this time period was marked by an extreme belief that technology could be used to overcome nature. The equipment and logistics frames reflect this belief in technology. Special tires and fueling depots do qualify as technology. Special clothing and tools also are forms of technology. The New York Times’ discussions of equipment and logistics feed the
belief that people can use technology to overcome a challenge. It is a combination of people (drivers and mechanics) and technology (automobiles and fuel) that will allow the race to be completed.

In comparison to other frames, less attention was devoted to the direct promotion of the automobile industry. The discussion of the entries focused on the countries and the special modifications to the cars that entered the race. At that period in history, American cars were considered inferior to their foreign counterparts. No American cars had competed in the Peking to Paris race that featured three French, one Italian, and one Dutch auto (the Itala car won by a large margin). Profiles of the American driver, Montague Roberts, included patriotic elements that conveyed confidence and pride in his prior accomplishments and a hope that he would make a strong showing. In several instances, the auto industry frame directly promoted the automobile by indicating the race will demonstrate that vehicles can be made to be reliable and durable even in the harshest of conditions. However, simply focusing on the race itself likely benefited the industry.

Overall, this examination of the frames used to promote an important pseudo-event in 1908 helps us understand how a form of controlled media relations could be practiced strategically by a media organization to benefit the organization. The case provides a glimpse into a rare form of media relations that can be practiced through a controlled channel. Frame analysis is useful in determining how public relations practitioners position messages when they have the ability to directly communicate with audiences. In this case, the analysis of pre-race coverage illustrated how frames directed audiences to focus on specific aspects of the New York to Paris race. The *New York Times* sustained its promotion of a newsworthy event and its coverage of that event further enhanced its newsworthiness. The value of this research endeavor lies in its ability to provide insight into their strategies for trying to influence behavior through a controlled form of media relations.
References


Wadsworth.


## Table 1

*Frequencies of observed frames in media coverage*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in the race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mention</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>65.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can the race be completed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mention</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather conditions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical conditions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mention</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special car equipment/modifications</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal equipment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mention</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60.32%</td>
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*Note.* N = 63. Percentages do not sum to 100% because categories within the frames could be used more than once within an article.
The Ramparts We Watch and the beginnings of PR war films in America

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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze Louis de Rochemont’s *The Ramparts We Watch* as a public relations war effort from the past century. Arising from the informative and propagandistic strategy of late 1930s newsreels, the aforementioned documentary was made using very appropriate narrative techniques to award it the dimension of objectivity and truthfulness characteristic of public relations messages, without losing sight of its educational and persuasive function. From this standpoint, *The Ramparts We Watch* founded a genre and constituted one of the clearest precedents of public relations war films in America.

Introduction
Recent research has shown that during World War II the American film industry established the foundations for disseminating and informing American soldiers and public opinion on the aggressive expansionist policy of the countries comprising the Axis (Girona & Xifra, 2009, 2010). These foundations had their seed in Archibald McLeish’s *strategy of truth*. As Girona and Xifra (2009) have argued, the strategy of truth and other subsequent efforts, such as the *Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry* (1942), the efforts of General George C. Marshall and the production of the documentary series *Why we fight* by Frank Capra (1942–1945), demonstrate propaganda’s ethical contribution to facilitating the dialogue and debate necessary in democratic societies.

However, other efforts sharing the same aim were made in the American film industry before 1942. Indeed, prior to U.S. involvement in World War II, newsreels and screen magazines progressively invested more minutes on news footage related to the country’s war and defense policies. On the whole, these newsreels and screen magazines were aligned with interventionist and pro-Allied theories advocated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his government. *The March of Time* was one of the most noteworthy newsreels of the era. Produced by the influential American publisher Henry Luce and directed by Louis de Rochemont, it excelled due to its didactic will and desire to encourage debate within American public opinion. *The March of Time* was defined
as being ideologically against totalitarianism –fascism and communism– while appealing to “American liberalism”.

The object of this paper is one of the most outstanding films produced in those pre-war years, within the formal and ideological coordinates established by those responsible for *The March of Time*. The film we are referring to is *The Ramparts We Watch*. Production began in 1938 and did not end until the world was already at war. To develop its content and achieve its planned didactic and propagandistic objectives, the film (1) advanced the principles of Archibald MacLeish’s *strategy of truth*, being a precursor (and a model today) of those principles, and, in consequence, (2) employed similar discourse resources to those used by Frank Capra in his directing and editing of *Why We Fight*. From this standpoint, our paper analyzes the consistency of the film’s *mise en scène* with its informative and educational aims and Louis de Rochemont’ contribution to creating a film documentary discourse in the field of public relations.

**Documentary films, newsreels and screen magazines as tools of information**

The documentary had traditionally only been considered of secondary importance in the commercial strategy employed by large Hollywood producers, a fact that can be confirmed by looking at the billboards of the 1930s and 40s. At that time, the presence of documentary images in US cinemas was restricted to the weekly screening of news bulletins before fiction movies. An *ad hoc* cinema bill of the age would include these newsreels, a short cartoon, commercials and charity appeals, the full length A movie and the complementary B movie. However, as Doherty (1997) points out, screening times were advertised on the basis of the start of the A movie and not the newsreel beginning the session.

All of the large film production companies of the age ended up allocating a –small– part of their budget to producing news bulletins and created units that had the basic function of gathering news items which were then produced for screening in cinemas. Among these documentary units were *Paramount News, 20th Century Fox’s Movietone News, RKO–Pathé News, MGM’s News of the Day, and Universal Newsreel*. The two basic formats under which documentary images were distributed were *newsreel* and *screen magazine*.

The newsreel tended to be shown in cinemas twice a week and lasted from eight to ten minutes. It offered a panoramic view of current events in a compact format: home and foreign news, parades and foreign shows, images of celebrities, pin-ups, children and animals in unusual situations, sports, etc.; in short: a potpourri of images and news which by no means offered a critical view of reality.

As Doherty (1997) pointed out: “The newsreels were required to abide by the Production [Hays] Code, whose regulations on permissible images, proper language, and correct opinions mandated discretion in the exposure of blunt reality” (p. 401). This preventive option also obeyed a less *moral* motive: there was no need to indispose the audience, who had left their home to spend a
nice evening watching a movie, with unpleasant news and images. Most newsreel producers believed their products had to be closer to entertainment than journalism (Fielding, 1972).

During the thirties, however, and with the gathering pace of world events, newsreels covered happenings like the bombing of Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese war, the bombing of the American ship Panay during the same war, and the assassination of the king of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the forties, with the world at war and issues related to external affairs and defense of the nation taking priority in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s policies, newsreels allocated more minutes to these issues accordingly. In 1939, foreign news and images of the war in Europe occupied almost 30% of their content. Although by 1940–41 the projection of images related to the world war had been reduced, news related to national defence policies had increased considerably (Steele, 1985; Fielding, 1972).

According to Schatz (1997), over 20 newsreels covered the war from September 1939 to December 1941, informing Americans of the events taking place in Europe and the Far East.

As Steele (1985) points out, newsreels tended to align themselves, via images, with the interventionist and pro-Allied theories of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration. However, a reluctance to show overly explicit images and the superficiality with which the news was treated—mostly due its inherent brevity—were principal characteristics of the format (Girona, 2009).

Screen magazines, on the other hand, were considered to take a more in-depth approach to issues. If newsreels basically functioned as a headline service, screen magazines could be compared to an in-depth article in a weekly magazine. Although initially including three news items in their monthly screenings, from 1938 onwards they were dedicated to one single issue and ran for fifteen or twenty minutes.

There were two screen magazines of note at the time: The March of Time (1935–1951) and This is America (1942–1951), the former being the more popular. This screen magazine was created by Henry Luce at the end of 1934. It was directed by Louis de Rochemont and by 1936 had achieved an audience of 12 million viewers. The March of Time also had a radio version on which Orson Welles collaborated (Manvell, 1974; Fielding, 1978).

**The Ramparts We Watch and public relations documentary discourse**

The producers of The March of Time treated the selected news items extensively, contextualizing them with archive images, scenes dramatized expressly for the occasion, explanatory captions, maps and a strong narrative voice that would soon become characteristic of the genre.

Fielding (1978) pointed out that the film had a clear didactic purpose. And in the name of this didacticism, the editors did not hesitate to commit themselves to the reality they were attempting to describe: “The intention of The March of Time was to create and exploit controversy and to provoke discussion of politically, economically, racially, socially, and militarily touchy subjects” (Fielding, 1978, p. 76).
Adopting a vague political position, *The March of Time*’s editors proclaimed themselves defenders of what they called *American liberalism* (Fielding, 1978) and defined themselves above all by their opposition to the large-scale totalitarian political systems—fascism and communism—present in various European countries at the time. They generally opposed all forms of political movement founded, in their words, on demagogy, considering it alien to what they defined as *American ethics* (Fielding, 1978).

In the face of the slow but inexorable increase in international tension throughout the thirties, the editors of *The March of Time* had sufficient opportunity to publicize their ideological viewpoint. From this perspective, in 1938 and 1940 Rochemont produced two fairly explicit screen magazines as part of the series *The March of Time: Inside Nazi Germany* (1938) and *The Ramparts We Watch* (1940). He and his collaborators used these films to propose two critical views of the Third Reich and to insist on the need for vigilance with regard to Hitler’s expansionist ambitions.

This awareness of the importance of the mass media—and particularly cinema—in the expansionist strategy adopted by European dictatorships, highlighted by Rochemont and his collaborators with the first cinema screening of *Inside Nazi Germany* in 1938, went one step further two years later with the conclusion of *The Ramparts We Watch*. And the rhetoric of the documentary genre was an essential element in this.

The role played by documentary cinema in the construction of audiovisual messages for public relations purposes has been emphasized by different authors. L’Etang (2000) stated that “public relations and documentary shared similar aspirations to objectivity and truthfulness while at the same time trying to encompass an educational and sometimes overtly persuasive role” (p. 90). On the other hand, Kilborn (2006) pointed out that documentaries are one of the few audiovisual genres to reach better understanding of how institutions operate, stressing the full public relations potential of the genre. The definition of a documentary by American filmmaker W. Van Dike is useful in this respect: “a film in which elements of dramatic conflict represent social or political forces rather than individual ones” (cited by Fielding, 1978, p. 70). This provides a good verbal definition of the kind of films made for public relations purposes, and especially those made by Grierson and Rochemont (Fielding, 1978).

*The Ramparts We Watch* is a good example of the above quotations, especially with regard to its “aspirations to objectivity”; that is, revealing the truth of what had happened during the First World War to persuade Americans of the dangers of the present (the Second World War). And to achieve this, Rochemont used a very accurate staging technique.

The main body of *The Ramparts We Watch* was a dramatized evocation—with non-professional actors and natural settings (Fielding, 1978)—of the years prior to the United States’ involvement in the First World War. In fact, one might say that the film takes as a starting point the idea that Germany would probably be the cause of the war repeating itself and then develops this in some depth.
In this respect, the authors of *The Ramparts We Watch* aimed to establish, by means of a full-length feature film, a parallelism between the events that led to the First World War and those taking place in Europe at the time (1938/1939). As Fielding (1978) argued: “The film’s story had been designed in such a manner that only the most obtuse members of the audience could fail to grasp the moral and see the similarities between the totalitarian ambitions of the Kaiser’s Germany in 1914 and Hitler’s in 1939” (p. 246).

The extensive production of the film meant that international events would alter its original content and the script would be revised and modified on various occasions. Rochemont did not, in essence, change his initial discourse, but he did have to make room for several war episodes that had marked European reality in that short and intense period of time. When he had practically finished the film, the German army had already invaded Poland and the neutral countries of Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. He therefore concluded *The Ramparts We Watch* with images from these events.

This latter fact is fundamental in understanding the documentary vocation of *The Ramparts We Watch*, which led to it being updated with current news stories during its production. From this standpoint, Rochemont’s film anticipated the principles of Archibald MacLeish’s *strategy of truth*, such an influence on American cinema during the Second World War.

The film begins with captions that give a clear explanation of the relationship between events prior to the United States entering the First World War and what the country was experiencing at the time –1938/1939. Set in 1914, the narrator’s voice and images describe a country, the United States, in an all but idyllic situation. The ideal *American community* takes the form of a medium-sized town, with its church, its houses with gardens, its streetcars, its milk deliveries, stores and train station (Fig. 1 to 7). A community made up of Americans of European descent (Fig. 8) and newcomers (immigrants: Fig. 9) in search of work; a prosperous community in which industry worked at full throttle (Fig. 10), in which work became the mechanism for integration (Fig. 11), and where children played carefree at the school gates (Fig. 12 & 13); a community, in short, that certified the success of the *American experience* and the progress of the United States.
One of the central ideas of this first part of the film – interventionist by vocation, and close in this respect to the theories of president Roosevelt – was that precisely said success of the model of American life had distanced the country’s inhabitants from the events taking place beyond its borders. Using this idea as a starting point, providing as it did a partial version of American isolationism, *The Ramparts We Watch* turned into an exhaustive chronicle of the years prior to the country’s entry into war in 1917; years of public debates on whether to become involved in the conflict; years under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, whose idealism and international vocation allowed the film to establish, without expressly saying it, diverse points of contact with Roosevelt.

Here we also see the influence on MacLeish’s future strategy of truth, as the first part of Rochemont’s film becomes a chronicle of past events which are narratively articulated via flashback (analepsis) – one of the narrative resources of film documentary discourse in public relations (Xifra & Girona, 2012).

The ultimate intention of *The Ramparts We Watch* was to make explicit the idea that the events taking place in 1930s Europe or the Far East were not alien to the United States’ reality or interests, just as the events that led to the First World War and American involvement in that conflict were not. In the background in both cases, for Rochemont and his collaborators what was at stake was precisely the American experience – the *American Way of Life*.

The lengthy first part of *The Ramparts We Watch* therefore concluded with a recourse to analepsis – setting the action after the end of the First World War, at the turn of the year between 1918 and 1919, and with the documentary’s central figure recalling the words of the president, Woodrow Wilson. The character is shown in medium shot (Fig. 14), seated at the table where that New Year was celebrated, recalling a fragment of the speech the president gave to Congress on 2 April 1917 attempting to gain its approval to declare war on Germany.
The role of analepsis as a narrative element to strengthen the idea of truth is reaffirmed when the film’s central character says that he will never forget the words the president used to address the nation, via Congress, to give the reasons behind the United States having to fight a war taking place far beyond its borders. The character quotes a brief fragment of the speech given by Wilson (1917):

[...]we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts – for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free (p. 7).

This flashback introduced via the script (as opposed to images) is another appeal to memory. Above the image of this character, with the words of president Wilson still resonating, Rochemont has numbers appear to form the year 1940 (Fig. 15, 16 & 17). The wishes of the president for a world free from rivalries, a world where democratic principles are respected, which it seemed would be accomplished at the end of the First World War, now clashed with the reality of this new war.

The equivalences between these two historic moments were thus made evident; even though in 1940 the United States had not yet effectively become involved in the war. The sequence ended with the following two separate captions further reinforcing the idea of equivalence between these two historic moments:

The people of the United States went to war in 1917 because they feared the consequences of a German victory, feared and hated what might have happened to their world and to their hopes. /.../ Today a new and greater German war machine is on the march. And, again, the people of the United States know that a victorious Germany would mean disaster.

Therefore, as we have already said, Rochemont’s initial approach, which was basically supposed to focus on chronicling the events surrounding the First World War and subsequent American involvement in the conflict, was altered by the events that led to the beginning of the Second World War.
Within said context, Rochemont incorporated a form of epilogue into *The Ramparts We Watch* which summarized the events of the first year of war. The interest of this final fragment lies to a great extent in how Rochemont and his collaborators approached it; an approach that once more reaffirmed the importance those in charge of *The Ramparts We Watch* awarded cinema as a means of disseminating information and propaganda; and also their awareness of the importance it had in German expansionist strategy.

In this final segment, then, the editors of *The Ramparts We Watch* offer a description of the German method of warfare, the *Blitzkrieg*. And they do so by using, or reusing, images from a German documentary entitled *Feuertaufe* (directed by Hans Bertram in 1940), of which an English version was made under the title *Baptism of Fire*. This German documentary, like similar others (e.g. *Feldzug in Polen*, 1940; *Sieg im Westen*, 1941), became the cinematographic narration of the first German successes in their quest for European expansion. These films were used as propaganda material, intimidatory examples of German power aimed at nations that had not yet fallen under Nazi control.

*[Feuertaufe/Baptism of Fire]* had been intended by Hitler to be seen widely throughout Europe and the western hemisphere, and to intimidate not only French and British leaders, then at war with Germany, but also opinion leaders in neutral nations /.../ In the United States, it was shown to members of Congress in Washington, and was licensed by the German film company, UFA, for release in American theaters (Fielding, 1978, p. 246–247).

This is another clear example of analepsis used as a rhetorical resource to jog the audience’s memory in audiovisual public relations discourse. As we have seen, the film’s main character says that he will never forget the words of president Wilson. This, added to the description of the *Blitzkrieg*, helps the audience towards comprehension, awarding the discourse an informative dimension more characteristic of public relations than of propaganda; or, if not, one closer to ethical propaganda (Girona & Xifra, 2009). As Burch (1970) explained, the audience understands flashbacks more easily because experience, memory and culture have accustomed them to relive the past.

In *The Ramparts We Watch*, Rochemont used the narrator’s voice to state that the first step in German war strategy was that of propaganda, aimed at demoralizing the enemy and inspiring fear and terror (Manvell, 1974). British counterpropaganda, the narrator continued, had intercepted tons of German propaganda destined for America; and among this intercepted material one item stood out: the aforementioned English version of the documentary *Feuertaufe*, entitled *Baptism of Fire* (Fig. 18).
The Ramparts We Watch therefore proposed a meta-cinematographic mechanism for presenting images from the German documentary. Rochemont and his collaborators reconstructed a hypothetical cinema session screening the German documentary, or parts of it. The title of the English film *Baptism of Fire* was projected (in Gothic characters) on a screen. And this hypothetical screening ended with the title of the film and the word “end”, but this time in German: *Feuertaufe. Ende* (Fig. 19 & 20). Given the persuasive nature of the discourse in Rochemont’s film, this meta-cinematographic procedure also became meta-persuasive, turning the communicative act into both a means and an end, and reinforcing the effects of communication and persuasion.

The images following the initial title provide a summary of the stages of the *Blitzkrieg* designed by the Germans: the initial air force attack aimed at neutralizing the enemies’ principal communication channels, means of transport and centers of industrial production; then parachutists sent behind enemy lines to sabotage the broadcasting stations, mainly radio; following that, the deployment of panzers and the motorized army, which entered enemy territory at great speed; and finally, the advance of the infantry, which was to finish the work initiated by the other army units.

A certain fascination could be detected here: the narrator’s voice asserted that this type of warfare, which he identified as *total war*, was a science of which the Germans were masters; a fascination for the efficiency of its execution, the modernity of the approach and the elements deployed, particularly the use of the air force and mobile units, but also the use of propaganda as a spearhead of a strategy apparently impossible to stop.
In parallel with this –undesired– fascination of German warfare, there was also the will to denounce it, and the forcefulness used to depicted German actions sought to impact upon American society, to reaffirm, for the nonbelievers, sceptics and isolationists, that this was a real threat and serious preparation was required to address it. To this end, the narrator’s voice recalled a remark made by Hitler: “Today we dominate Europe, tomorrow the entire world”.

Following this documentary summary, after the projection of the word Ende, The Ramparts We Watch finished by again referring to American values, American heritage. It was these values that were at stake and precisely these and the values they had defended throughout their history that needed to be taken as an example in the face of such a problematic future. A series of images appear in this final summary –converted into icons, symbols of that American heritage– which are worthy consideration because they became visual icons. In some cases they already were, even before Rochemont used them, and they would later be used in other important cinematographic public relations efforts in times of war, such as Frank Capra’s Why We Fight (Xifra & Girona, 2012).

The end of The Ramparts We Watch suggests the importance of editing in constructing a discourse that aimed to represent the world according to precise purposes –influencing the audience’s view with regard to the ideas or issues presented, and how to approach them; precisely and consciously organizing the figurative, and not so figurative, elements of diegesis. As Amiel (2001) pointed out, persuasive films build demonstrations.

With the eleven final images of The Ramparts We Watch, those in charge of making the film present a flashback, although this time progressively. Each image, or group of images, appear to direct the audience to one of the initial moments of the country’s history. The first of these images depicts the statue of a soldier wearing the American First World War army uniform (Fig. 21). The three following images could be interpreted as clear references to keeping watch –the Americans kept watch (from the allegorical and hypothetical ramparts of the title) over the seas and American coastline for possible attacks from outside (Fig. 22, 23 & 24).
The final seven images evoke the American past, American heritage. The first image is an evocative statue of the pioneers (Fig. 25). The character holds a rifle – an essential element for life on the wild frontier and an acknowledged right of Americans in the second amendment of the Constitution. This statue establishes a clear visual link with the statue of the soldier from the First World War (Fig. 21). Both carrying a weapon, both symbolizing Americans who defended their country at different times of history and in doing so ensured the continuity of its values. The six images following the image of the pioneer guide the audience through the three stages of European immigrants arriving in and colonizing the country. In the opposite order to that of the cinematographic projection, the last of these images depicts a detailed shot of a stone with an inscription (Fig. 26). The stone is the Plymouth Rock, named after the place where in 1620 –the date of the inscription– the Pilgrim Fathers arrived on the American coast in the Mayflower. The following image –waves battering against the rocks (Fig. 27)– is intended to portray the origins of these first settlers –and by extension of all those who came after them– and their founding voyage across the sea, their exodus in search of new lands in which to live and freely express their religious beliefs. Following this image comes one (Fig. 28) which evokes the promised land, that land which divine providence has put within their reach. On this occasion, and not by chance, the film’s editors use one of the most characteristic images of Yosemite Valley, in the Sierra Nevada in California. Yosemite, founded in 1864, was the United States’ first National Park.

The foundations of the country are a land that not yet civilized, virginal, primitive –with no human presence. And the two following images (Fig. 29 & 30) reaffirm this first impression: that of an immense territory, full of natural assets to exploit, the land of the wild frontier which would become home to these little agrarian communities, depositories of the American values at the heart of a society which over time would necessarily become more socially and politically complex, but which must not lose those original values. The process of civilization is made visual through the same image of the American community used at the beginning of the film (Fig. 31). Ordered nature –an artificial channeled river or lake and gardens– and the church –symbol of human beings’ capacity to civilize, to construct– standing out in that environment. An image that certified the indissoluble union between the land, its pioneers, its political and social system and the religion that inspired them. This use of editing is a clear demonstration of a documentary mise en scène, where the power is found in
depicting natural elements—and their being linked in the editing—and in recording—free from fictitious filters—the artificial work of man (in this case, buildings).

The final cut of *The Ramparts We Watch* transports the audience from the First World War to the country’s founding moment (in canonic terms). And then comes the reverse journey, via Plymouth Rock to the First World War, continuing on and demanding of the present generation, in the prewar context of the country at the time, a similar response to that of their ancestors.

*The Ramparts We Watch* inserted itself into that ideological *continuum* which, from the years of the Depression and the New Deal up until the moments prior to American involvement in the war, had found diverse means of manifesting itself, thus making the film an element of information and propaganda.

**Conclusions**

Critical reception of *The Ramparts We Watch* was unenthusiastic, although *Time* magazine promoted the film in every issue of the month of July, 1940, calling it “a new kind of motion picture… for a new kind of world” (Dunlop, 2006, p. 160). In August it also published a number of testimonials from well-known people who had seen the film. *Life* did the same, and on August 26, both *Life* and *Time* published a highly favorable two-page feedback on the film by Archibald MacLeish. According to Dunlop (2006), the father of the strategy of truth saw *The Ramparts We Watch* as a “great achievement” (p. 160), stating: “The fact was in 1917—and the fact is today—that the defense of this democracy against an attack which might destroy its democratic institutions is alone, and of itself, a cause worth fighting for” (cited by Dunlop, 2006, p. 160).

These declarations suggest that Rochemont’s film was, as well as a clear forerunner of the strategy of truth, also an excellent example of it and therefore an effective public relations initiative in times of war. Indeed, as Girona and Xifra (2009) have argued, MacLeish’s *strategy of truth* and other subsequent efforts, such as those of General George C. Marshall or the production of documentary films like *Why We Fight*, show “the ethical contribution of propaganda to facilitate the dialogue and debate… necessary in democratic societies” (p. 290).
Furthermore, *The Ramparts We Watch* is a clear exponent of how audiovisual persuasive discourse uses its own grammar to achieve its rhetorical objectives. A grammar which it articulates through editing, on the basis of which the audiovisual discourse is constructed. Editing consists in ordering the shots of a film to form a series of sequences, some of which may be, as is the case with Rochemont’s film, anachronistic (Chatman, 1978).

One of the technical procedures in the anachronistic sequence is analepsis. As Xifra and Girona (2012) have suggested, analepsis plays a central role in public relations documentary discourse. The result of analepsis is the sensation of reliving moments without losing the feeling of now in the story being told (Halloway, 1979). Analpepsis means subjecting one’s heart once again to past experiences. The time-image (Deleuze, 1989) betrays the storyline and History itself, representing the future as a flux of the present into the past. All in all, analepsis reveals and emphasizes the results of awareness being associated with memory.

In times of war, such as the 1940s, this association is one of the most effective discursive mechanisms in managing the tension between explanation, interpretation, information and persuasion, and addressing the challenges of transparency and authenticity – the two activities shared by documentarists and public relations practitioners alike (L’Etang, 2000). This was very evident to British directors like Michael Powell, who used flashback in his propaganda films, thereby transferring “the aesthetic purity of the documentary to fiction” (Esteve, 2002, p. 133). Consequently, for filmmakers like Rochemont, Powell or others who have offered their talent in the service of public information and ethical propaganda, analpesis was not simply a formal issue, but much rather a moral one.

In sum, Louis de Rochemont should rightly be awarded a place as one of a group of filmmakers who, like John Grierson, Alberto Cavalcanti, Humphrey Jennings or Paul Rotha, have played an important role in creating a rhetorical and audiovisual dimension to public relations, and particularly in the production of educational films and documentaries like *The Ramparts We Watch*. Certainly, as L’Etang (2006) pointed out, Grierson saw educational films as an instrument of social action and a key source of social change: “if you can’t teach the citizenry to know everything all the time, you can give them comprehension of the dramatic patterns within a living society” (Grierson, cited by L’Etang, 2006, p. 32). This statement would seem to have served as an inspiration to Rochemont and MacLeish.
References


Public relations and public diplomacy:
An opportunity to broaden the body of knowledge
Roger Hayes, PhD
Henley Business School

Introduction
The founding fathers of the international public relations industry had the highest ideals. They wanted nothing less than to help the world reunite following World War II. The principles enshrined in the 1965 International Code of Athens were truth, dialogue and the public interest. The objectives, agreed between 1950 and 1955 were professional recognition, professional skills and ethics, in particular distinguishing the field from propaganda and whether mutual or self interest. This remains a key debate to this day (Tench and Yeomans, 2009). James Grunig, one of the early theorists said that collaboration must become the major public relations idea and skill offered to organisations if it is to rise above its negative reputation (J. Grunig, 2000). While there has been tremendous growth of the practice in recent years internationally, public relations theory and research have been slow to keep abreast of international developments. The challenge and opportunity for corporations, governments and other organisations thrust into the global spotlight, spurred on by electronic communications media are catalysts for the field to rethink its role and purpose.

The growth of internet access and social media, the speed and democratisation of information as well as the ‘sans frontières’ thinking of modern activism, are creating a new global culture of awareness and communication. While it is difficult to measure the speed and impact of change brought about by these new technologies, they have altered the power relationships, virtually eliminating traditional gatekeepers, even in countries that try to limit freedom of access.

Rationale/Purpose
The domain of public diplomacy, an extension of traditional diplomacy involving the shaping of foreign public opinion (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992) is quite similar to the growing role of public relations, particularly given the involvement of corporations in international politics and collaboration with governments, particularly in the developing world. However the public relations literature has only recently begun to discuss the practice of, if not theoretical convergence with public diplomacy (Van Dyke and Vercic, 2009). Given the practical overlap and concepts such as culture, propaganda and the shared global networked environment, this researcher decided to undertake a research study among public relations practitioners (both corporate and consultant) and diplomats in mainly four countries-Singapore and UK (developed) and Malaysia and South Africa (developing), as well as a few others in Indonesia, Ghana (developing) and EU/US (developed).
He was encouraged in this pursuit because an international Delphi study on the priorities for public relations suggested the relationship between the two disciplines to be among the top ten issues, especially given the importance of culture. (Watson, 2007). Another factor is that the growth of the practice internationally has not been accompanied by much research into multicultural communication that could help predict outcomes based on empirical data (Sriramesh, 2010). This is supported by discussion among public relations academics that the growth of a coherent body of knowledge has been stunted by its limited theory, its managerial/corporate bias and the prevalence of North American/Anglo-Saxon perspectives, mainly based on small samples of public relations people.

This research was designed to shed light on whether by learning from diplomacy, in particular public diplomacy, public relations could become more credible and strategically relevant, thus enhancing its global professionalism. This is much needed, especially in the emerging world where its growth is greatest.

Over the past 30 years public relations has developed a relatively strong body of knowledge, thanks to the first generation of theorists. Today it is at a crossroads (Gower, 2006). It is therefore important to encourage the development of new theories as well as engaging in debate around the merits of all theories and models (Botan and Hazleton, 2006). It can learn more about its own area by integrating other understandings into the body of knowledge (Tench and Yeomans, 2009). Hence why this study has picked a focal concept-public diplomacy-that overlaps practically with public relations in this interdependent and interconnected world-to develop at least theoretical conjecture and model building, based on the best of both.

With many different definitions, a poor reputation and being a fragmented discipline, largely private sector driven, public relations seeks a broader theoretical framework to guide its practical application. The field has made initial steps towards professionalization on a global scale. But at this rate it will take many years to achieve globally recognised status. Recognition and appreciation of cultural diversity is the next step for the field, a step that was advocated almost two decades ago by Sriramesh and White (1992), but one that is yet to take deep roots.

A review of the public relations literature, including its links with public affairs, corporate responsibility and business-society writings was supported by a review of the public diplomacy literature. Like public relations it tends to be Western centric, relatively under researched and quite new. But it does spell out the similarities with public relations, even while historically disdaining use of the term ‘public relations’, preferring the term ‘public affairs’. However, this may now be moot, given eroding boundaries both between countries and organisations, not to mention economics, politics and public opinion. The term, ‘corporate diplomacy’ has entered the lexicon and is deemed to occupy the space beyond public relations into public affairs (Kraus, 2006). This involves thinking ahead, skilful analysis of the context, combined with astute networking and relationship building.
Melissen (2005) and Cull (2008) referred to the ‘new’ public diplomacy, referring to the broader array of international actors, the advent of real time technologies and the rise of techniques drawn from public relations, marketing and advertising. There is a lack of analysis of deeper trends and perspectives on how official communication with foreign publics should be seen in the context of wider diplomatic practice. But exchange, whether partnerships, cultural activities, relationship building to attract tourists or investment and educational links, is the bedrock. Copeland (2009) argued that traditional diplomacy is neither equipped to address the complex challenges of the 21st century, nor to deliver the kind of remedial policies the era of globalisation requires. So both public relations and diplomacy operating in the global public space must update and upgrade.

Apart from the confusion about terms, the point is also made in the public diplomacy literature that public relations is merely related to message delivery rather than being critical to policy. (Cull, 2008) However there is no doubt that the ‘tender minded’ or ‘soft power’ school of public diplomacy owe a lot to the long established discipline of public relations. (Snow, 2009). This latter is achieved by using techniques of attraction and persuasion, thus defining it in such a way as to make it directly akin to business communication, aligning international relations with organisational behaviour. (Van Dyke and Vercic, 2009). The conceptualisation of soft power fits neatly into the Sriramesh/Vercic conceptual framework for analysing public relations in different countries based on variables such as culture, level of economic development, political system etc. There is also an increasing convergence between the fields apparent in the focus on relationships (L’Etang, 2009). Signitzer and Wamser (2006) also called for public diplomacy to embrace ‘international, governmental public relations’. This may be broader than the public policy element, yet it is another term likely to cause practical, let alone conceptual confusion. However the positive concept of this convergence is being constructed on a shaky theoretical foundation, far from the attention of most public relations scholars (Van Dyke and Vercic, 2009).

The model of public relations/public diplomacy convergence suggested by Van Dyke and Vercic (2009) while looking at NATO is more inside than out. More research needs to be done among stakeholders in a multi-cultural context and the feedback loop, part of the diplomat’s armoury. At least this model has helped to evolve thinking and is a basis for further development.

The conceptual differentiation between the two disciplines, which employ similar tools and methods is losing validity in a world of global media, a new array of sometimes uncomfortable stakeholders and porous borders. This is another rationale for this study, the results of which are outlined below.
Question and Methodology

In short the question was whether, with globalisation as a catalyst, public relations could benefit from the skills and expertise drawn from public diplomacy so as to transform its credibility and strategic relevance? The qualitative study, which befits this researcher’s capability and world view and which is most relevant to extract holistic and rich data from a relatively young field about which little is known (Wakefield, 2007) was conducted largely in the first half of 2009 in the countries listed above, based on semi-structured, elite interviews. These were analysed using grounded methods and counting, appropriate to the interpretivist research paradigm. Questions were asked about the impact of globalisation and the new technologies, (conditions), changing institutional relationships and the links between public relations, public diplomacy, corporate responsibility and public affairs (context) and the public relations ‘best of both’ skills set (consequences), with its implications for education and training.

Findings

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS (OF 56) WHO MENTIONED PARTICULAR THEMES

Prioritised by Respondents
GLOBAL THEMATIC NETWORK ONE (CONDITIONS)

Communities
Complexity
Common Goals/ Collaboration

Speed and complexity of the information environment empowers wider communities to collaborate and communicate new expectations globally.

Despite varying levels of political and economic development and cultural adaption, scale and intensity of issues, empowered stakeholders create integration, shifting and shared power.

Collaboration is about assertion and cooperation between diverse groups.

GLOBAL THEMATIC NETWORK TWO (CONTEXT)

Communities
Complexity
Common Goals/ Collaboration

Practice Overlap
Shared Public Space
Opportunities For Public Relations

Government using traditional public relations skills to promote country and corporations hiring diplomats for their skill transfer.

Same Public Diplomacy context, overlapping roles and skills requirement from gatekeeper to facilitator.

In a more specialised, issue intense multi-stakeholder world with wired public conversations, PR's role could be increased.

Given broader role for business, if policy and principles are interlinked, public relations can play greater strategic role, balancing self with societal interest.
Philosophical, strategic and tactical skills/attributes required

GLOBAL THEMATIC NETWORK THREE (CONSEQUENCES)

Diplomacy is strategic, serious, subtle, in-depth, facing facts, developing healthy relationships and building goodwill, where as public relation is superficial communication, spin, pushing a line, tactical with debased brand

Public relations by diplomats, knowledge of public opinion, business and communication skills, media relations and presentation skills

Diplomacy by public relations, cultural sensitivity and cultivation of broader stakeholder groups via sustained dialogue

Public relations education and training, requires broader, more rigorous and strategic, ethically-based global rethink

FRAMEWORK FROM CODES TO THEMES TO ORGANISING THEMES

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Findings, which reinforce the literature yet extend it, indicate there is a convergence of both disciplines with cross-transfer of resources and people. That diplomats engage in more commercial activity, media relations and broader stakeholder relations, while public relations is becoming involved with government relations, operating alongside public affairs, yet needs to learn more about international public policy dynamics and political networks. Above all it needs to grow its cultural, contextual antennae to add to its business and communications expertise. One Interviewee
summarised this by suggesting it is vital for public relations to add intelligence and insight to its armoury in face of the more complex, interconnected world.

They highlight that the field needs to emphasise more issue management capability, environmental sense-making and cultural sensitivity. That metrics should be developed to measure these more strategic elements of public relations. That there should be more emphasis placed on the stakeholder in the political, economic and cultural context. Playing a broader role means shaping the issues beyond just the narrow interest of the organisation. By looking at the total system organisations are more likely to have their interests served, while also adding value to society. It is important to transform narratives beyond transactional selling to building relationships across a broader stakeholder group. One interviewee considered this a more ‘statesmanlike’ approach. It is recognised that there is a symbiosis in terms of the need for both ‘stagecraft’ and ‘statecraft’ as well as an overlap in the emphasis on relationships. This is considered a potential area for extending research between the two disciplines.

In the new networked environment people are interacting differently, which affects how diplomats and public relations practitioners and those they advise/support, approach their role. Both believe that learning from the skills and expertise of diplomacy could provide the credibility and strategic relevance public relations has been searching for, particularly in the international sphere. There is a skills gap in the developing countries, where the discipline remains mired in a tactical, media relations compartment without the strategic ‘top hat’. Integrating corporate responsibility, sometimes viewed as corporate diplomacy is emerging countries and further integrating public affairs, viewed as a bridge between public relations and public diplomacy could be useful. An emphasis on the stakeholder would indicate a need for public relations to build into its thinking elements of stakeholder theory.

Public relations has enormous opportunities due to the internationalisation of the practice-more government relations, a bigger role for business in society, new media, more complex issues requiring collaborative solutions and above all more empowered, sometimes uncomfortable stakeholders. However, despite these opportunities, a relatively poor reputation and skills gap in the developing countries will only widen the credibility gap, unless public relations undertakes further research, broadens its theory and injects that into its education and training modules. Embracing lessons from public diplomacy is a first step.

Conditions have existed for some time, namely the networked environment. This is characterised by individualism and informality, decentralisation and diversity. However the extent of impact on institutions and decision-making is taking time to sink in. However it is the context—the interdependence between the media, business and politics in a multi-cultural environment and the nature of those relationships that requires a greater conceptual framework. This is where the
navigation, networking and negotiation skills learned from diplomacy could help boost public relations, so long as the practice and academia work together in a more coherent manner to develop education and training modules that fully reflect global complexity and interconnectedness. The consequences will be a better balance between self and community interest, moving from persuasion to collaborative engagement, from communication with elites to a global community of interest, from hierarchy to lateral networks.

The Conceptual Model, based on answers to the research questions can be used to discuss the new approach required. The model is a transition from the traditional framework-namely information controller and gatekeeper, operating superficially in a self-serving manner, targeting audiences using Western messages. This has transitioned to the newly merged global public diplomacy and public relations architecture, in which practitioners become facilitators. They are facilitators of conversations and collaboration on complex issues using a range of old and new skills. These skills combine both a global mind-set and local cultural sensitivities—‘sharp eyes and sensitive hearing’.

**PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SYMBIOSIS AND REFORMATION: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL**

While some progress has been made towards this new combined architecture, both in the practice and literature much remains to be integrated. The old gatekeeper approach is working side by side with the facilitator one, especially so in developing countries, where demand for public relations
services is greatest. Public diplomacy as a discipline also needs updating, which should be a stimulus for both academies to cooperate.

**Conclusion**

The 56 interviews among diplomats and public relations professionals in four primary countries and several others, both developed and developing, resulted in a mass of data analysed using a grounded theory approach. Results showed there is a new model of globalisation-a networked environment speeded up and intensified by new media and that there is a wider array of demanding stakeholders with government, corporations and NGOS working together to solve complex issues.

This researcher remains worried about the skills set of public relations, its values and its recognition, particularly as diplomacy is viewed as a more serious discipline. It is particularly important in the international environment to develop more theory and share interdisciplinary thinking, such as from international relations.

This study did not set out to develop a new theory as such. It tried to offer some building blocks based on interpreting the ‘lived experiences’ of practitioners in public relations and diplomacy. This was so as to answer the call from theorists to bring into the field ideas and models from other disciplines. The challenge is to build theory that advances practice. Few new theories have emerged from the public relations academy of late to add to the Excellence body of work.

The predominant paradigm does not entirely account for today’s multiple voices of multiple stakeholders engaging on the issues. So a multi-stakeholder, network model needs to be acknowledged. There is a need to connect public relations to the larger canvas of how organisations and their stakeholders relate in a complex, converging and sometimes conflicting global community. Perhaps a new, dynamic model of organisation, stakeholders and different kinds of relationships within a multicultural environment, could emerge. The collaborative approach could help reshape capitalism and conflict politics. This study is hopefully a small step along the way.

As one interviewee said-“The future is ours to lose”, but another warned- “We have a huge opportunity, but a certain inability to get there”.
References


Meiji Restoration and the "Public"?

Public relations originated from the persuasive skills employed in the power struggle vying for public support among merchants, farmers, and the leaders of pioneers in the 18th century U.S. (Cutlip et al., 2006). It is the offspring of modernity, replacing armed rule.

Modernization occurs when the progress of scientific technology leads to the industrialization. In some European countries and in North America, the democritization accompanied the industrialization. But in Japan, democratization did not accompany modernization. Since early 17th century, the Tokugawa Shogunate had implemented an irregular isolation policy that allowed foreign ships only at Nagasaki seaport. Because of this policy, Japan was not so much influenced by the modernization of advanced countries, nor did it fully take in new technologies. However, the trade with western countries, though slim in volume, and the skillfulness of Japanese, brought industries such as textile to a level that mass production was possible (Moritani, 1998). Since mid 18th century, battleships from Holland, Russia, England, and the U.S. repeatedly visited Japan trying to force the country to open its door. Shaken by the conflicts with foreign countries, the Tokugawa Shogunate returned power to the Emperor in 1867, making ways for the new politics under the Emperor Meiji. The return of power, called the Meiji Restoration, marked the beginning of modernization in Japan, some 100 years after the advanced countries in Europe and the U.S.

Modernization can be characterized first as "a move to improve economic efficiency to overcome poverty" (Masamura, 2010 p. 9) and in many countries it was embodied in the form of capitalism. Second, modernization can be characterized as the "growing move toward abolishment of class systems and social discrimination," (p. 10) and it was achieved through the enhancement of democracy and individualism. The oppressed sought participation in politics and the acknowledgement of human rights. Newspapers and magazines supported these movements. In Europe and the U.S., the development of media encouraged the formation of public (Igarashi 1998).

The strategy Japan's Meiji government (1868 - 1912) took was to modernize its economy, starting with the adoption of political, legal, economic, management, and military systems, and the importation of various industrial technologies. First, the government invited teachers from other countries such as Holland, England, the U.S.A., France, and Germany to teach Japanese people arts and science, technology, and social systems. The leaders of Japan at the time thought human resource, not financial capital, was the
most important asset. Of course there was a shortage of capital, but the country took in foreign capital only through bond certificates. Had the country sought direct investment from abroad, Japan might have been colonized (Ishii, 1997).

In 1871, three years after the Meiji Restoration, the government sent a 46 members delegation to 12 western countries for 21 months. The members included some of the key figures of the government and they were accompanied by 60 students who were to study abroad. Many of those students later played central roles in the modernization of Japan's political and economic systems (Izumi, 1993). Japan copied from advanced western countries the political, legal, military, education, industrial and corporate systems, and modified these systems to fit Japanese culture, and gradually absorbed them. A common thread among Japanese leaders then was the phrase "wakon yosai [Japanese spirit and western skill]." It was to learn systems and technologies from western countries but maintain the traditional Japanese spirits. When the country copied the parliament system from Europe, the spirit of democracy did not accompany.

Another aspect of modernization, to break down class systems and family systems, and to aspire to democracy, did not materialize in Japan. The Meiji Restoration was achieved by persuading leaders to change the system, not by uniting the intellectuals and the suppressed to break the system. Consequently, individuals could not escape from the restraints of the collectivity of families and villages. In organizations, the premise was that individual members belonged to the organizations they worked for. This mentality continued to support Japan's economic growth and it still remains intact in many organizations today (Maruyama, 1961).

In the 19th century, the major powers of the world competed to grab regions in Asia and Africa. Japan needed to catch up. Trying to be one of the major powers, Japan fought a war with China in 1894 and with Russia in 1904, both of which she won. The country urged its citizens to catch up, then surpass western countries.

In 1889 the Constitution of Imperial Japan was promulgated. In the constitution the final decision was to be made by the Emperor. The right to vote and to run for the parliament was given only to the males who had made sufficient tax payments. Despite such restrictions, democratic movement budded in the parliament. However, the government, trying to maximize efficiency to catch up to the world, began eliminating free discussions and oppressed those who opposed to the government's course of action. Newspapers and magazines that expressed opposition to the government gradually disappeared from around 1910 (Yamamoto, 1981). The suppression of the freedom of expression grew stronger until Japan lost the World War II and was occupied by the Allied Forces.

During Meiji era in Japan, public did not exist, only the subjects of Emperor did.
The birth of public relations in Japan

Today in Japan, public relations is called kouhou. The original meaning of the word is to 'widely notify,' which represents only a part of public relations functions. The term does not have a long history. It first appeared in May 1872 in the Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun, the oldest daily newspaper in Japan, to denote advertisement, or announcement (Kitano, 2009).

The first organization to set up kouhou department was Mantetsu (South Manchurian Railroad). The company was established in 1906, as Japan obtained the right to manage railroads in Manchuria (north eastern part of today's China) after winning the Russo-Japanese War. Mantetsu set up the kouhou department in 1923. Since early 1920s, Mantetsu had an office in New York, not only for the introduction of capital and technology, but also for provision and collection of information (Ogawa, 2011). In the U.S., the railroad industry was among the first to use the term "public relations" (Cutlip, 1995). Mantetsu had close contacts with them as evidenced by the fact that Henry Harriman, the railroad magnate who managed companies such as Illinois Central and Union Pacific, had offered Mantetsu to jointly manage the railroad network in Manchuria (Ishii, 1997). Hence we infer that Mantetsu had opportunities to study public relations from the U.S., and possibly had a chance to learn about the Committee on Public Information. It would be interesting to know why Mantetsu chose the term kouhou for the public relations department, but we are not yet able to determine the reason behind this choice as Mantetsu disappeared when Japan lost the World War II and only a fraction of the documents remain today.

The purposes of Mantetsu's public relations activities were to inform Japanese in the home country that Manchuria was a frontier land with enormous opportunities and to encourage them to emigrate. To Japanese in Manchuria on the other hand, the purpose was to guide them to live in harmony with local people. Mantetsu also conducted various publicity activities including: inviting group of journalists from the U.S. to see Manchuria; inviting story tellers, painters, and other opinion leaders from Japan to introduce Manchuria through their work; holding Manchuria Exhibition in various locations in Japan; producing movies on Manchuria, and; publishing magazines (Ogawa, 2011).

In 1932, Japan established a puppet regime, Manchukuo, in Manchuria. The last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Puyi, was named the head of the country, and Japanese undertook the administration. Manchukuo government set up a kouhou-sho, a public relations department, to jointly engage in public relations activities with Mantetsu. The kouhou-sho published a research journal on propaganda and public relations. What were introduced in the journal included Harold Lasswell's Propaganda Technique in the World War, and Nazi Propaganda Minister Paul Joseph Goebbels (Matsumoto, 1938/1981). It is clear that the public relations research in Manchuria was far more advanced than in mainland Japan.

How were the public relations activities in Japan then? In 1932, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Army jointly but informally set up an information committee. In 1937, the committee
officially became the information division of the Cabinet Office and controlled the collection and dissemination of information both internally and externally. By the time Japan entered the World War II, the propaganda machine was in place (Tobe, 2010).

As Japan's economy boomed during the World War I, big corporations needed to keep experienced workers and employed various employee relations tactics. For instance, the seniority wage system and life-time employment were adopted to encourage workers to stay longer. Many companies kept these systems and they became the icons of Japanese style employment practice. Kanebo, the largest textile company in Japan at the time, was hiring female workers at the age 13 or 14. As one of the welfare benefit, the company built schools in its factories for the workers and provided classes including reading and writing, mathematics, and sewing. In 1903, the company published the first in-house magazine in Japan called 'Kanebo no Kiteki (The whistle of Kanebou).' The magazine stated in the first issue that its goal was to share information with everyone from the president to female factory workers (Nihon PR Kondankai, 1980).

The foundation of such employee relations was the corporate paternalism. A corporation was regarded as a community and employees were expected to devote themselves for the prosperity of the community. Corporations in turn treated employees as family members and cared about their livelihood. This kind of corporation-employee relationship was ubiquitous in Japan until 1970s, but as the financial capitalism took over the industrial capitalism since 1980s, corporate paternalism gradually faded away.

**Revolutionary change in the post World War II era**

In August 1945, Japan unconditionally surrendered to the Allied Forces. The Allied Forces shook up Japanese systems to make sure Japan will never initiate a war. The leaders who had driven the country, whether in politics, business, or social affairs, were either arrested as war criminals or purged from their positions. The military forces were demobilized. Those who used to be in the middle positions and did not have voices, occupied the top positions in political, business, and bureaucratic arena. As they had resentment to the strong suppression by the government, they were eager to accept democracy introduced by the U.S. led Allied Forces.

What was the most difficult to rebuild was the industry. The U.S. had bombed big cities and destroyed factories. Trying to democratize Japan, the Allied Forces encouraged formation of labor unions and factory workers eagerly engaged in the union movement. Labor disputes boiled up one after another and the labor-management relationship was the worst in the history of Japan. Under such severe environment, management made efforts to revive the economy. Two management organizations were established in the late 1940s. One was Keizai Doyu Kai [Japan Association of Corporate Executive] and the other was Nikkeiren [Japan Federation of Employees' Association] (Ikari, 2011).
Keizai Doyu Kai was an association of executives in their 40s with progressive mind-set. They advocated the introduction of management council that included labor union as its members. They also supported the idea of corporate social responsibility, however, they were too philosophical and did not fully take these philosophies to practice.

Nihon Keieisha Renmei (Nikkeiren), another influential management organization, was established with a mission to plan and practice ways to bring about the healthy labor-management relationship. In 1951, Nikkeiren sent its first management delegation to the U.S. to learn ways to improve the labor-management relationship. From this delegation, the members brought home the concept of public relations. However, as their concern was the improvement of the management-labor relationship, their proposal upon return was primarily the adoption of human relationship oriented labor management such as the employee suggestion system, publication of in-house magazine, and management training focusing on the human relationship with their subordinates - a mere portion of public relations concept (Nihon PR Kondankai, 1980).

Dentsu, the largest advertising agency group in Japan and the 5th largest in the world today, also played an important role in introducing the public relations concept to Japan. The company had branches in Manchuria since before the World War II and was engaged in radio advertising, a commercial media which did not exist in mainland Japan then. It also had a business relationship with Manchukuo's propaganda arm, the kouhou department. Some of the senior staff of the Manchukuo kouhou department joined Dentsu after the war and became the senior executives of the company. Hideo Yoshida, the president of Dentsu since 1947, learned about public relations and began studying it. Kanjiro Tanaka, one of Yoshida's staff explained: "A corporation is allowed to exist when the society thinks its existence is desirable. For this, corporations need to widely inform the work they are doing. A corporation can exist when it informs and is accepted. This process is what public relations is" (Ogura, 1976, pp. 21-22). Since around 1955, Japan entered the era of rapid economic growth and marketing was introduced from the U.S. as mass sales technique. Dentsu spearheaded the efforts to popularize marketing in Japan. According to Vance Packard (1957, 1960), around that time in the U.S., public relations was conceived as one of the marketing technique. His books, The Hidden Persuaders and The Waste Makers were translated into Japanese and became best-sellers in Japan. Although Packard criticized marketing as playing with deep psyche and depletion of natural resources, it was taken in Japan as an ideal model.

Another path for public relations' entry into Japan was the General Headquarters of the Allied Occupation Army (GHQ). Japan was governed by the U.S. led Allied Forces after the World War II. Starting from 1947, the GHQ and its branches began providing suggestions to the national and local governments to install public relations offices. Each ministry and local government tried to understand the GHQ's intention and what public relations was, and installed the public relations offices (Nihon PR
Kondankai, 1980). Under the public administration regulations at the time, the names of departments and offices had to be in Japanese language and they could not be called public relations office. Various names were assigned and eventually converged into a Japanese word kouhou, which means to "widely notify." In addition, as Japanese government did not have any mindset and system to seek input from citizens, what kouhou offices did were information dissemination from administration, or at best, public opinion surveys.

This assignment of the word kouhou as translation of public relations caused many Japanese to misconceive public relations even to this date. The word public relations was also used, in particular, among marketing people. As foreign words are difficult for Japanese to pronounce they are often abbreviated. PR became a common term in the context of marketing. Hence, the term PR came to be in common use but often meaning self promotion. Whether it was called kouhou or PR, the aspects of public relations such as two-way communication, mutual understanding, and trust, were lost in translation.

The first public relations agency on record was established by the wife of a Red Cross public relations director Richard Day. It has been reported in November 1949 that GHQ authorized Mrs. Day to be engaged in public relations activities (Nihon Keizai Shimbun as cited in Dentsu, 1949).

1960s: Public relations as marketing function
In the midst of the cold war of the 1950s, the conservative party and the reformist party clashed over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty scheduled to be signed in 1960. Despite active protest campaigns by labor unions and students, the treaty was signed. Since then, the government focused on improving the economy and people started to increase their spending.

The rapid growth of the economy that began budding since around 1955 came into full bloom in the 1960s. With the internationalization of the economy, the flow of goods and capital were liberalized. In 1968, Japan's GNP became the second largest in the free world, making Japan one of the leading economic powers of the world.

In 1959, "consumption is a virtue" and "consumers are the kings" became buzzwords. In early 1960s, television sets, refrigerators, and washing machines drove Japan's economy. In late 1960s, color television sets, automobiles, and air conditioners were the drivers of economy. Almost every household had a television set and they were placed in the middle of the living room. Family drama TV series that projected the richness of American way of life more than stimulated the Japanese's quest for wealth. The consumers who obtained durable consumer goods began to feel they were in the middle class. The 1960s was the most vibrant days after the World War II. People came out of poor life and their efforts to improve their standard of living coincided with the economic growth of the country.

The mass media grew alongside the economy. Newspapers increased the number of pages and many weekly magazines were launched. Publicity caught attention as marketing tool because it was able
to supplement advertising with somewhat different flavor. Publicity was applied to newspapers, radio, and weekly magazines. It was in this decade that full-scale public relations agencies were born. There were also cases that Japanese who had studied in the U.S. or had worked for the Allied Occupation Forces established public relations firms (Morito, 2011). Such a new trend supported the emergence of Japan as the second largest consumer country after the U.S.

Public relations became a Japanese word PR. PR meant information dissemination about beneficial features of goods and services and public relations came to be recognized as part of the marketing techniques. In the term public relations, public became almost synonym to consumers.

In the 1960s, while the focus shifted from politics to economy, there remained anti-conservatism sentiment. As seen in the birth of the Peace to Vietnam Citizen's Coalition in 1965, the word citizen gained acceptance and were widely used.

Many companies set up a public relations subdivision or assigned persons in charge of public relations within the advertising department. However, certain advanced companies set up a public relations departments as independent function. One newspaper reporter recalled 1960s and said that "mass media welcomed corporate publicity activities as it helped them increase the volume of articles" (Morito, 2010).

1970s: The establishment of kouhou department in response to criticism

As a natural consequence of the rapid economic growth, Japan in the 1970s was polluted with by-products of mass production and it was called the pollution islands. Rivers and sea were muddy, air became filthy, and ground sank because of over-pumping of underground water for industrial use. Newspapers accused big corporations for the lack of social responsibility with sensational headlines like 'drop dead GNP'. Corporations, the source of industrial pollution, faced severe social criticism as the root cause of the destruction of human lives and peaceful living. Victims of pollution related diseases sued companies responsible and they won the suit or settled off-court with favorable terms.

Corporations were criticized not only for industrial pollutions but also for oil-shock related price hike, dual pricing, speculation on land, drug-induced diseases, fire in the plants, and harmful food products. They were blamed for not fulfilling social responsibility, and exaggerated advertisement and false labeling were also brought into question. People realized that economic growth alone could not bring rich and fruitful life. They came to think that there was a need to monitor corporate activities and protest against companies that did not fulfill social responsibilities. Hence consumerism in Japan gained momentum to an unprecedented level. Consumerism movement in Japan was also under the international influence. Consumer movements and anti-war movements in the U.S., and students' demonstrations in France were reported in newspapers and on TV. With only a slight time lag, Japanese followed the suit.
For example, in response to a New York Times report about unsafe Japanese automobiles, Asahi Shimbun (a quality daily newspaper) ran a campaign on defective Japanese automobiles, resulting in consumer organizations' actions (Nihon no jidousha, 1969). Even when Japanese consumers in general were not affected, if a top executive committed a crime, labor unions and consumer activists rushed to the company to protest. The rise of consumerism in Japan can be interpreted as a sign that citizens in Japan were being formed as a layer of the society.

People with elevated awareness of social issues suddenly became an important public for corporations. In the 1970s, there was a rapid growth in the number of companies setting up sections responsible for dealing with consumers. Many of these sections were placed under the umbrella of public relations and handled complaints and inquiries from consumers. Mass media rushed to companies that caused environmental pollution and these companies were suddenly busy handling media inquiries. In the 1970s, the installment of *kouhou* department was the most popular among manufacturing industries (Ikari, 2011). Some executives thought that corporations would need to bear increased social responsibilities, but for most of the corporate executives, what was the most important was to help the economy continue to grow so that the country could be one of the leading nations of the world. For individual executives, dealing with the liberalization of capital and the internationalization of businesses were more important than attending to the social responsibility issue (Nihon no top, 1979).

Since early 1970s, business organizations such as Japan Federation of Employers' Associations, Japan Committee for Economic Development, and Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (JFEO), had been since early 1970s making recommendations that corporations should fulfill social responsibilities. Concerned about the rising criticism of corporations, JFEO established the Japan Institute for Economic and Social Affairs (JISEA) as public relations functions to facilitate communication between the business community and the society.

**1980s: The enhancement of public relations departments**

In the 1980s, Japan's economy began shifting from natural-resource-dependent heavy and chemical industries to knowledge based energy-efficient industries. Consequently, Japan's reputation in the international arena rose but at the same time the economic conflicts with other countries arose. Economic conflicts with the U.S. developed in the areas such as automobile, semi-conductor, communications, agriculture, and finance. With Europe, automobiles and household electric appliances. In the U.S., a group of people tried to characterize Japan with revisionism and Japan Inc. became the focus of criticism. The economic conflict expanded to the cultural conflict, resulting in Japan bashing. In the U.S., even an event just to destroy a Japanese automobile was organized by a congressman and the event was widely publicized.
Japanese companies that expanded overseas brought with them the Japanese style management and engaged in fierce competition among Japanese companies, often ignoring profit. Consequently, local companies suffered from such competition. There were criticisms even among Japanese executives. For instance, Akio Morita (1992), the founder of SONY, warned the danger of ignoring co-existence in the global arena.

Changes among consumers guided the country toward knowledge based economy. Consumers began choosing products based on their personal preference rather than simply following the mass trend. They demanded cultural flavor in products and advertisements (Fukuhara, 1999). In response, corporations tried to incorporate artistic designs and to promote artistic character of their products. Corporations supported artists, in particular in the field of music, theater, and painting to improve their reputation.

During the 1980s, many companies built factories in advanced countries such as the U.S. and England. Japanese companies learned the concept of corporate citizenship through this experience and brought this concept home. The entrepreneurs in Meiji era (1868-1912) made contributions to the society by building universities, museums, and hospitals, but corporations in later days did not follow the suit. The concept of corporate citizen was imported and once again gained ground in Japan. Companies building plants began paying attention to the local community.

Both industry structures and consumer behavior had changed significantly. Many companies were operating in multiple domains and the name did not properly represent their businesses anymore. Many chose to change names to clarify their identity. Changes within the company, both in terms of business and culture, were required. Corporate identity became important and corporate philanthropy added flavor to it.

The top-down changes of corporate culture and employee mindset gave rise to the importance of internal communication. Companies also recognized the importance of external communication activities to improve the awareness of its identity. Corporate identity business - for the most part company name change and development of new logo - boomed. Kouhou led the corporate identity activities. Against this backdrop, the kouhou sections gained ground in many corporations. In 1980, 34% of the companies had independent kouhou sections. In 1992, the figure had grown to 72% (JISEA 1981, 1993).

In the 1980s, Japanese companies that expanded abroad had to develop businesses while coping with heightened Japan bashing. Companies expanding into Europe and the U.S., in particular, engaged in corporate philanthropic activities and proactively made donations to universities, and research. In the U.S. and England, donations worth more than US$ 1 million were often made by Japanese companies (JISEA, 1982 April; 1984 December; 1987 January; 1989 May).
In the late 1980s, Japan's economy began booming and prices of stock and land soared. It was the coming of the bubble economy. Companies made direct investment overseas and acquired buildings, golf courses, hotels, and even film companies. One of the buildings acquired by Japanese companies was the Rockefeller Center, an American icon, and the acquisition led to a huge backlash. Such moves contradicted to and offset the effects of the social contribution activities of Japanese companies abroad.

1990s and after: From crisis management PR to CSR PR

The 1990s began with the collapse of the bubble economy and it led to the frequent occurrence of various corporate scandals. Kouhou sections managed crisis situations and were exposed to media inquiries. Scandals such as improper lending, and stock brokers' compensations for preferred clients' losses revealed the interdependence among politicians, bureaucrats, and the business circle over political and business interests. Corporate scandals became the focus of social concern and trust in corporations reached the rock bottom.

In 1990 when the wave of revelations of corporate scandals began, the Association for Corporate Support of the Arts (ACSA) was established. In the same year, the 1% Club, a social contribution arm of JFEO was born. The ACSA aimed to support corporate philanthropic activities and the 1 % Club advocated spending 1 % of annual profit to social contribution activities. Kouhou was busy dealing with both corporate misdeeds and good deeds.

With the conservative party's gradual loss of power and the growing distrust in corporations, the business circle was concerned about the sustainability of the social systems. They feared that social distrust might spread to those companies that had nothing to do with corporate greed and misdeed. In an attempt to facilitate conversation between corporations and society, JFEO and JISEA jointly held a forum in 1991. Wide range of people including journalists, labor union, educators, researchers, and housewives participated in the forum and expressed harsh view on corporate ethics and behavior (JISEA 1991). Later in the year, JFEO drew up the Charter of Corporate Behavior which reflected the discussion in the forum. The Charter has been constantly reviewed and has become a social responsibility standard for Japanese corporations.

Corporate public relations practitioners were under constant pressure as there's no telling when their company might be subject to accusation of misdeed. What used to be a commonly accepted behavior could suddenly be harshly criticized. For instance, shuffling stock and bond asset to hide unrealized loss had been a common practice that corporate finance managers needed to master, but it was no longer an accepted practice. In an effort to promote abidance to laws and regulations, the English word compliance was used without translation. Compliance became the key concept to help prevent crises and JFEO's Charter of Corporate Behavior incorporated the concept (Nippon Keidanren, 2009).
Starting from the late 1990s, Japanese corporations began creating corporate behavior charters of their own. Many of those charters incorporated measures to ensure observance of the charter such as the creation of watchdog committee and incorporation into the employee training program. Furthermore, some companies began setting up systems to protect whistleblowers. Whether directly or indirectly, kouhou departments were engaged in the internal communication concerning compliance issues.

In addition to the crises management and the corporate social responsibility, the field of kouhou further expanded due to the emergence of the Internet, the rise of investor relations, and the need for environmental communication.

As the information technology developed, the Intranet became the main tool for internal relations. However, in-house publications still remain as the key internal communication tool. Changes in the fund raising schemes and the introduction of the concept of shareholder value gave rise to the importance of the investor relations. As many of the important issues in the investor relations such as management change and merger and acquisition overlapped with issues handled by kouhou, some companies moved the investor relations functions from accounting or finance department to kouhou department.

Since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, sustainable development became the buzzword. Unlike the 1970s when corporations handled the environmental issues reactively, Japanese corporations tackled the environmental issues as part of its management strategy and began developing products and services that were environment friendly. The international standard on environmental management systems provided by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO 14000 series, became popular in Japan. Today, more than 20,000 companies have been certified as ISO 14001 compliant (Japan Accreditation Board, 2012). Many corporations publish environmental reports or sustainability reports and in many cases corporate kouhou department support production of these reports. The environmental reports are often incorporated into CSR reports as one pillar of the corporate social responsibility activities today. Since the beginning of this millennium, CSR has become a common business term and the promotion of CSR management is one of the key functions of kouhou today.

**Duality of public relations**

We have reviewed, though briefly, the path public relations (kouhou) in Japan has gone through the 20th century. Before the World War II, the public relations function, though not widely practiced, assumed the propaganda role to show the world that a small country in Asia had joined the major forces of the world. After the war, public relations was introduced from the U.S. through various organizations. In corporations in particular, the public relation's role went through dynamic change and gradually came to assume a core management role. In the 1950s it was a buffer between labor and management as they opposed to each other. It was an important part of marketing strategy in the 1960s. In the 1970s it
functioned as a check system on pollution and defective products and ushered in the concept of corporate social responsibility. In the 1980s it supported the transformation in corporate identity to cope with changes in the society. In the 1990s, while keeping its eyes on globalization and rising interest in the environmental issues, it adjusted itself to the drastic changes in communication strategy resulting from the emergence of the Internet and advancement in the IT technology. Since late 1990s through 2000s, corporations were rocked by the wave of financial globalization and corporate scandals, thus being forced to squarely face the issues of social responsibility.

Looking back the history of corporate public relations in Japan, it was always the kouhou department that first tackled new social issues surrounding corporations. Through the cyclical changes in the key theme in corporate public relations in Japan, there are two aspects of public relations. One moves human emotions by manipulating information through mass media, and the other appeals to human rational through continuous dialogue (Ikari, 2003). In the days of economic up-swing, the advertising spending increases to stimulate consumers, the focus of public relations shifts to marketing communication, and there is an inclination toward spin through manipulation of information to further expand business activities. As a result, there will be more companies deviating from ethical standards. After a while, the criticism against corporations emerge and people come to think that corporations should prioritize public interests and observe ethical standards. The business environment suddenly changes and public relations department will have to change the focus of their activities, seeking internal departments to comply with rules and regulations, and communicate externally that the company is compliant and ethical. When the days of introspection prolong, the economic activities lose vibrancy and people start to long for the re-energization of businesses. Corporations respond to it and mass media, sensing the public sentiment, proactively reports "bright news" that lead to economic revitalization. This cyclical phenomenon seems to appear in the history of public relations activities in Japan. To determine if this is a phenomenon particular to Japan, further theoretical and historical studies are required.

The lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake

The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 revealed both positive and negative aspects of Japanese people. Likewise, it revealed the problems commonly held among large organizations in Japan. One was the manipulation of information by withholding, releasing bit by bit, and distorting. The other was the manipulation of public opinion by lining up mouthpiece, overtly and covertly, to speak on behalf of the powerful organizations. The aftermath of the earthquake revealed the presence of so-called "atomic energy village," or joint efforts by the government, politicians, and industry, to promote atomic energy policy. It was an effort among the power structure to mobilize people with shared interest and shared idea, and to eliminate heterogeneity when making decisions. This is the potential illness common
among Japanese organizations. Shuichi Kato (2000), a literature scholar and great thinker, pointed out the conformity as one of the key attributes of Japanese. It has become a national character to follow the majority without expressing disagreement.

In their seminal work on the analysis of the Imperial Army of Japan's failure in the World War II, "Shippai no honshitsu - Nihon Gun no soshiki ron teki kenkyu (The essence of failure - the study of the Imperial Army of Japan from organizational theory perspective)," Tobe et al. (1984) pointed out that one of the causes of the failure was that, "Inside the Imperial Army, free discussion was not tolerated. Information stayed within individuals or small human networks, and knowledge and experiences were never transmitted throughout the organization to be shared among all members," (p. 327) and "While innovation begins with incorporating heterogeneous people and information, and coincidence, the Imperial Army detested heterogeneity " (p. 386). This was quite similar to what happened to Japan at the time of the Earthquake. The Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), and TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant could not share important information, resulting in the failure to issue appropriate orders in a timely manner. There was a stunning similarity between the Imperial Army and those in the nerve center of TEPCO, METI, and the Cabinet Office handling the Fukushima Nuclear Power Accident.

How do we, as public relations scholars and practitioners, help eliminate these ills? We will conclude our discussion with our proposals to corporations in Japan.

1. Public relations practitioners must always seek and implement the optimum communication within and out of the organization to create a *habit to discuss* and a *corporate culture to freely exchange ideas*.

2. As part of the management function, public relations practitioners must obtain all the relevant information from within and out of the organization, understand the implications, and deliver them to the top executives and relevant departments.

3. Public relations practitioners must keep in mind that the nature of communication in Japanese organizations has not changed much in the past 100 years. They must take on the challenge of changing the communication practice in the organization. Otherwise, innovations will cease to come out of Japan and we will only look back and cherish the memories of good old days.
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Developing a history of public relations scholarship in Australia

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Abstract

This paper reviews the development of public relations literature in Australia from the 1970s. In particular, it focuses on the development and publishing of text books, popular handbooks and academic journals which emerged out a perceived gap in the market and the need for students and practitioners in Australia to have access to a literature beyond the texts of the United States, which had hitherto dominated the Australian marketplace. The paper presents a discussion of Australian academic and professional books, beginning with Potts’ 1976 edited Public Relations in Australia, moving to Johnston and Zawawi’s 2000 text Public Relations: Theory and Techniques, the first in the contemporary range of Australian texts, to the latest text by Macnamara (2012), Public Relations Theories, Practices, Critiques. It also investigates the rise of Australian public relations journals—notably Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, which began in 1999; PRism, first published in 2003, which subsequently moved to New Zealand several years later with editor Elspeth Tilley; and Public Communications Review, launched in 2010. In providing the first comprehensive overview of Australian PR literature, the paper includes first-hand accounts by Macnamara and Johnston on their rationales for publishing collectively more than a dozen texts and reference books for the Australian academe and the professional PR market. The approach is informed by Yin’s (2006) case study methodology of bringing together contemporary issues or phenomenon within real-life contexts, illuminated by additional sources. Finally, after reflecting on the historical development of public relations literature in Australia, the paper will consider some of the challenges in developing local narratives of public relations in the contemporary global environment.

Keywords: public relations, literature, PR scholarship, scholarly publishing, history, text, manual, journal, Australia.

Introduction

This article presents a potted history of public relations scholarship in Australia. It traces the pathway through the early years of publishing public relations books, identifying key points at which the country’s literature and scholarship moved forward, bringing the analysis through to the present day. While 1961 represents a starting point, with the first Australian public relations handbook, it was not until public relations was firmly established as a discipline within the academe that the first dedicated
text was written in 1976. The 1980s saw the emergence of a raft of public relations manuals developed for industry and these were utilised, along with North American texts, in the absence of other Australian titles for many years. During the 1990s, Australian scholars increasingly began to join international discussions about public relations pedagogy, research, epistemology and theory, marking a significant shift in thinking from the previously accepted North American-centric approaches to university teaching and scholarship. By problematizing issues such as how technological change would affect the industry and examining differing theoretical and epistemological positions and shifting and emerging public relations paradigms, Australian scholars began to look at PR in a broader and more critical way (see, for example, the themed edition of the Journal of Communication, ‘Public Relations on the Edge’ in, 1997; Leitch and Motion 1998; Motion and Leitch 1999; Singh and Smyth 2000).

It was not until 1999, however, that Australia was to launch its first scholarly journal in the field, and 2000 before a contemporary text book was published to cater to the now-burgeoning public relations courses around the country. It was then to take several years before academic publishing was to gain real momentum in Australia.

This paper does not aim to provide a critique of the various public relations books, journals or advances in scholarship in Australian universities. It does this only insofar as it is relevant to the development of new literature. Rather, its purpose is to expand the small but developing literature on the history of public relations in Australia, while also enhancing understanding of how public relations scholarship, through its literature, has developed within the Australian academe since its inception in the 1960s.

**Developing a history**

This brief history weaves together several threads of data. While it draws from published accounts of scholarship development (mostly academic articles), it also sources historical documents and personal communication to provide material from academics and the Public Relations Institute of Australia (PRIA). It includes first-hand input from the two authors, based on their collective contribution of some 12 public relations texts, monographs or edited works (including various editions). In addition, it goes to the primary sources – the texts and journals which have been published in the past 51 years in Australia – from which localised knowledge has been derived.

The research utilises a case study methodology as described by Yin (2009) which brings together contemporary issues or phenomenon within real-life contexts. Wimmer and Dominick (2011) note that case studies afford researchers the ability to utilise a wide spectrum of evidence including documents, historical facts, interviews and surveys, noting the more data that can be brought to bear in a case the more likely it is to be valid (2011, p. 141). As Seale et al. (2004, p. 2) suggest, qualitative research practice is not a linear process. It involves “an engagement with a variety of things and people,” including the research team’s own past experience and aspirations. They note that “if
practicing researchers are encouraged to write about their inquiries in a methodologically reflective way … we may learn a great deal” (ibid). Through our investigation we have endeavoured to provide a summary and context for the development of Australian public relations scholarship during the last 50-plus years.  

**Early texts and journals**

The first book on public relations published in Australia was *The Australian Public Relations Handbook*, edited by Thomas Dwyer (1961) but, as the title suggests, this was a practical guide. For instance, contributors included Eric White, a former military PR officer and founder of the first PR consultancy to become national and then international with offices in New Zealand and South-East Asia (later sold to Hill & Knowlton).

The first locally-authored and published PR textbook was *Public Relations Practice in Australia* by pioneering Australian PR scholar, J.D.S. (David) Potts (1976), who later became the first professor of public relations in Australia. Potts undertook post graduate studies in the United States and also introduced the first public relations curriculum to an Australian university (Morath 2008). Potts’s text, produced with the support of the Public Relations Institute of Australia, sought to discuss PR within a theoretical framework and informed by research. For instance, in the foreword, then PRIA president, Ronald Plater (1976, n.p.) stated:

> The Institute has not sought to produce solely a how-to-do-it book, but rather one that combines much practical information with reasoning that goes with the research of communication problems and the implementation of thorough, well-directed communication programmes.

Potts’ text represented a departure from early ‘press agentry’ models of PR advanced by Hollywood press agents and General Douglas MacArthur’s publicity team (Zawawi, 2009). It noted that PR should involve “two-way communication” (p. 3) and broadened discussion of PR beyond media publicity to include financial PR, political PR, community relations, PR for government, marketing PR, internal communication and other roles. Nevertheless, despite its textbook status, the book was predominantly practice-focussed. What is widely overlooked in most reviews of Australian PR scholarship is that all chapters in Potts’ (1976) textbook were written by leading practitioners, including Asher Joel, Hal Myers, Laurie Kerr, Peter Golding and Eric White who were the founders and heads of the nation’s leading PR consultancies at the time. Potts played an editing role only. The text was grounded in (mainly US) functionalist conceptualisations of PR, affirming that “PR is a management function” (p. 6) and focussed on roles and management objectives. Potts drew heavily on

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1 Though we have attempted to include a comprehensive range of literature as developed in Australia since the early days of publishing about public relations, it is inevitable that omissions may occur. The inclusion or omission of publications in this article in no way reflects their endorsement by the authors.
US PR texts including the 1971 edition of Cutlip and Center’s *Effective Public Relations*, as well as *The Role of Public Relations in Management* by UK academic, Sam Black (1972), which were widely cited in the text.

Given that Potts’ post graduate studies were undertaken at California State University in San Jose and Stanford University in San Francisco, it should come as no surprise that his text included a US-centric approach. In an interview with Karen Morath (2008, p. 64) he noted:

> We have not been influenced very much by the UK. Most of the research, most of the knowledge, most of the text books, has come from the US and the leading academics are in the US.

Nevertheless, he also commented:

> What we need to do in Australia now is to take some of that theory and that research and reinvent it in Australia, in our environment, in our Australian workplace, in an Australian context. Because we’re not the same as the United States (Morath 2008, p. 57).

Along with Potts’ textbook, the mid 1970s saw the launch of two important Australian academic journals focussed on communication and media. The first was the *Australian Journal of Communication* which has been published continuously since 1975 by the University of Queensland. However, as the title suggests, this journal is focussed on human communication broadly and offers only limited opportunities for analysis of public relations. A year later in 1976, *Media Information Australia* (now *Media International Australia* and incorporating *Culture and Policy Journal*) was launched. This journal, which also has a broad media and communication focus, was instigated and edited for a number of years by noted Australian media scholar, Henry Mayer and published initially by the Media Information Research Exchange (MIRE), before finding an institutional home at the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy at Griffith University which was jointly managed by the University of Queensland and Queensland University of Technology, and then moving to its current location at the University of Queensland.

### The 1980–1990s

A number of practice-orientated books were published by prominent practitioner, Jim Macnamara, starting in 1983. Macnamara says he published his early books because of a “yawning gap” in local documented knowledge at the time and largely “by accident”.

*Public Relations Handbook for Clubs and Associations* (Macnamara, 1983) grew organically out of a series of internal manuals produced by Macnamara who was working as Director of Public Relations for the National Farmers Federation in Canberra at the time, the peak national industry group representing agricultural producers in Australia comprised of 22 affiliated farmer associations with 175,000 members in total. These manuals and this 137-page handbook were produced by Macnamara
because the only Australian book on public relations in print at the time was Potts’ (1976) work which was written as a textbook for students. There were a number of books on media relations including a PR-orientated text by freelance journalist, Iola Mathews (1981), *How to Use the Media in Australia.* However, this focussed only on mass media publicity and Macnamara identified that PR included other activities and media such as information publications (e.g. brochures, annual reports and newsletters), videos, events, government relations (or lobbying) and community relations.

Macnamara’s interest in publishing was given its final impetus when he discovered that the hand-bound manuals that he first produced for use by office-bearers of farmers’ associations around Australia were being photocopied and used by a number of environmental and community groups, clubs and associations.

Somewhat ironically, Macnamara could not convince a publisher of the viability of a handbook on public relations, so he published the first edition through his own business, originally set up in Canberra. After selling out the first print run of 2,000 copies in nine months, a publisher came knocking on the door and a second edition was published by Information Australia in Melbourne, a specialty publisher which also produced the leading media directory in Australia at the time, *The Margaret Gee’s Media Guide.*

Soon after, *Public Relations Handbook for Managers and Executives* followed (Macnamara, 1984), an expanded edition tailored to executives and management. After an Asia Pacific edition was published in Singapore (Macnamara, 1992) and a substantially expanded edition of the managers and executives handbook was published by Information Australia in 1996, the audience-specific naming was dropped and the text became *Jim Macnamara’s Public Relations Handbook* (Macnamara, 2000). In total, Macnamara’s series of PR handbooks sold out five editions between 1983 and the mid-2000s, culminating in Macnamara (2005).

The book remained a self-professed practice-orientated handbook. However, Macnamara continued to expand its theoretical as well as practical content, particularly in relation to evaluation, after he gained a Master of Arts degree by research which focussed on measurement of PR. Due to the dearth of PR books at the time, and Macnamara’s pioneering work in PR measurement and evaluation, a number of undergraduate courses adopted the book as recommended reading. The fifth edition (Macnamara, 2005), totalling 356 pages, was used in a number of universities as a PR text, although Macnamara recoiled from the view that it was a textbook.

In the late 1980s, two other leading Australian practitioners, Candy Tymson and Bill Sherman, sought to fill the gap for local PR texts with *The Australian Public Relations Manual* (Tymson & Sherman, 1987). While this book was used in some Australian university courses in public relations, its focus also was primarily practical. Subsequent editions contained increased theoretical and scholarly content and gained new editors, as discussed in the next section, but its focus remained primarily functionalist and managerial.
Other Australian media-oriented handbooks continued to fill the teaching void, particularly in the field of media relations. Following Mathews’ (1981) came Hudson’s *The Media Game* (1994) which was a practical how-to guide on publicity and working with media. Such books were useful handbooks but were never intended for, nor appropriate for, scholarly learning and required significant supplementary material for university use.

As Alexander (2004) observed in his study of PR scholarship in Australia, “text books in the 1970s and early 1980s were mostly sourced from the United States” (2004, p. 1). This gap in local PR scholarship was made more pronounced by a lack of any Australian PR journals.

The eve of the new millennium saw publication of Australia’s first specialised public relations journal, *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal (APPRJ)*, which was launched in 1999, sponsored by Canberra University during its early years and later Deakin University. The first edition heralded how:

> On the edge of the Millennium it is time to open a new front for discussing the role of public relations in society that gives prominence to what is happening in the countries of Asia, Australia and New Zealand (Singh & Smyth 1999, n.p.).

The first edition included a stellar line-up of academics, practitioners and PRIA executives including Debashish Munshi, Judy Motion and Shirley Leith, Lelde McCoy and Marjorie Anderson. The journal remains an important outlet for academic publishing in Australia, particularly for research into local developments, applications and alternative theorising.

**PR scholarship in the new millennium: 2000 and beyond**

It is significant and telling of a gap in localised PR development that almost 25 years elapsed between Potts’ first PR textbook and the emergence of another Australian-authored text on public relations. Johnston and Zawawi’s publication of the text *Public Relations: Theory and Practice* was the first purpose-written text for university education since Potts’ 1976 pioneering effort which was, by now, long out of print. The rationale for the book was outlined in an article in *APPRJ* (2000) which acknowledged the journal for beginning “the process of allowing and focussing academic effort in the field [with] an introductory text a logical next step” (Johnston and Zawawi 2000 p. 115). Not surprisingly, Johnston and Zawawi (2000 p. 107) cited the reliance on North American texts as a primary reason for publishing the Australian text, in particular Cutlip, Center and Broom (1997), Wilcox, Ault and Agee (1998), Van Slyke Turk and Kruckeberg (1996) and Baskin and Aaronoff (1998), noting:

> The continued use of North American texts, excellent though they are, poses ever-increasing problems for public relations education in Australia … the cultural and social differences that exist between Australia and North America require Australian educators to prepare extensive support materials to contextualise material contained in these texts. At best, this dilutes the value of the messages contained in those texts, at worst, it undermines it.
The authors cited Motion and Leitch’s *APPRJ* article which argued for localised public relations to be developed as a discipline at a local level, stating “…without such freedom to develop, local knowledges may be suppressed by established ways of thinking and speaking about the world” (1999, p.27). They added how others had developed a “robust dialogue” which called for consideration of critical theory in the formulation of public relations theory (Johnston & Zawawi 2000 p. 109). Moreover, it was noted that without such acknowledgement the world view of the North American paradigm was reinforced—seen as being “better” than “alternative versions” (2000 p. 109). In addition, they argued that PRIA held expectations (in its accreditation process) that local knowledge should be utilised in the rapidly expanding array of public relations courses within geographically diverse tertiary institutions. Johnston and Zawawi (2000 p. 110) stated:

The overwhelming indication of this body of research data was that an introductory text book, written by Australian educators for use in a non-North American environment, was needed. Introductory because, in order to break free from a dominant North American paradigm, it is necessary for students to be exposed to a localised narrative from the very beginning. Collaborative because a great deal of work and a great deal of expertise is already available located in universities around the country.

It was this collaboration that clinched the progression of the book – the idea that the text should draw upon the expertise of a range of academics as well as leading professionals, citing Australian case studies, examples and laws. Its key imperatives were threefold: to target the first-year public relations student; to present public relations inclusive of, and beyond, a management role; and, to draw together contributions from a range of Australian and (by the second edition) New Zealand academics and practitioners, including the various perspectives they would bring. Notably, in this first edition only three of the academic authors (as opposed to practitioner authors) held PhDs. By the 2009 edition this number had grown to eight. Johnston noted in the third edition: “… the sophistication and scholarship of this third edition reflects advances and developments in the public relations industry and the academy during this decade” (2009 p. ix).

Shortly after the first edition of Johnston & Zawawi, *PRism*, an online, peer-refereed public relations and communication research journal was established in 2002, publishing its first issue in 2003. Originally published in Australia at Bond University, *PRism* moved to Massey University in New Zealand with its founding editor Elspeth Tilley in 2004/5, nevertheless retaining an evenly split editorial committee of Australians and New Zealanders. Now in its ninth year, Tilley (2012) notes how the journal has been described by L’Etang as filling a particular niche in scholarly journal offerings by being interdisciplinary and non-paradigmatic in scope. By contrast with other journals in the field that are “closely associated with the dominant [normative theoretical] paradigm,” *PRism* “makes a point to encourage diverse perspectives” (Tilley 2012).
Following Bill Sherman’s retirement, Candy Tymson partnered with pioneering Australian PR practitioner and founder of Professional Public Relations (PPR), Peter Lazar, and his son, Richard Lazar, to produce two more editions of their manual during the 2000s. Tymson, P. Lazar & R. Lazar (2002 and 2008) was broadened to become *The Australian and New Zealand Public Relations Manual* and increased its theoretical and research content which resulted in it becoming a textbook in some PR courses. However, with none of its authors being an academic or having a scholarly research profile, Johnston & Zawawi (2000) and two further editions of this book (Johnston & Zawawi, 2004, 2009) remained the only entry-level Australian PR textbook until the late 2000s.

As the first decade of the 2000s progressed, it was as if the Australian PR academic community came to realise the stark lack of localised books in both specialist and generalist fields. A relative rush of new books appeared including, in chronological order:


As the titles suggest, some of these were specialised texts dealing with writing, media relations and case studies of PR campaigns. Johnston’s media relations text, published in the same year as Stanton’s, highlighted the need for this popular subject area to be catered to by localised texts. Other books, which had application for PR, but which were cross-disciplinary in approach, such as Steven Stockwell’s *Political campaign strategy: Doing democracy in the 21st century* (2005), showed how members of the academe were publishing to their strengths, often borne out of their PhD research.

Meanwhile, others had moved to publishing in specialty fields of public relations, reflective of the growing scholarship in the academy and the rise in PhD completions. It also heralded international collaborations with a distinct move toward Europe and New Zealand. Daymon and Holloway’s *Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications* (Routledge 2002), was to see its second edition (2011) published after one author, Christine Daymon, had become Australian based. Daymon was later to team up with Kristin Demetrious to gather an international line-up for their *Gender and Public Relations* (Routledge, forthcoming in 2013).

Another Australian-British collaboration was the edited *Sport Public Relations and Communication*...
Australia-New Zealand links continued to remain strong, with PRism still sporting dual branding by an Australian (Bond) and New Zealand (Massey) university and the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association (ANZCA) reinforcing links across the Tasman. In publishing, Johnston and Zawawi’s 2004 and 2009 editions included chapters by New Zealand academics and, in 2005, the specialist text Public Relations Issues and Crisis Management, edited by Monash academics Chris Galloway and Kwanema Kwansah Aidoo, also included chapters from Australia and New Zealand.

By the late 2000s, Australian academics and students had access to at least three general textbooks on public relations – Chia and Synnott (2009), Johnston and Zawawi (2009) and Harrison (2008). At the same time, as Macnamara (2010) observed, PR scholarship in Australia even in the late 2000s, also continued to utilise a number of international texts. Prominent among these were Cutlip and Center’s Effective Public Relations (Broom, 2009); Wilcox and Cameron’s (2006, 2010), Public Relations Strategies and Tactics; the final Excellence Study book by L. Grunig, J. Grunig and Dozier (2002); and Toth’s (2007) edited volume, The Future of Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management from the United States; Tench and Yeomans’ (2009) Exploring Public Relations from the UK.

The second decade of the 21st century saw a new journal launched, Public Communication Review, published by the University of Technology Sydney where Macnamara is now Professor of Public Communication and co-editor. PCR, launched in 2010, is published in electronic form only and focuses on ‘public communication’ incorporating organisational communication, political communication, corporate communication and public relations. The editors, Macnamara and media historian, Robert Crawford, advocate trans-disciplinary and integrated thinking in conceptualising and undertaking public communication.

Around this time, Macnamara also published his monograph, The 21st Century Media (R)evolution: Emergent Communication Practices through Peter Lang, New York. While being a transdisciplinary study reporting research into social media in the context of journalism and media studies, the public sphere and political communication, social capital and notions of community, Macnamara (2010a) includes chapters examining public relations and advertising in the era of Web 2.0 and the emerging Web 3.0.

During the late 2000s Australian scholars increasingly turned to non-US and alternative theories of public relations, including critical theories emerging in the UK, Europe, New Zealand and in some Asian and Africa studies. This was in contrast with the US-dominated approaches that had underpinned the introduction of public relations into the Australian academe. However, in a paper presented to the 2010 ANZCA conference, Macnamara (2010b) reported a content analysis of 14 PR
text and reference books widely used in Australia in which he identified continuing “gaps” in terms of their axiological, epistemological and methodological focus. Macnamara reported how most books on public relations used in Australia – both local and international texts – were still largely grounded in Western ideologies, and particularly in US modernist, behaviourist and functionalist thinking and focussed predominantly on US-centric theories and models of PR practice; that Australian texts did not focus heavily on critical analysis; that all lacked up-to-date analysis of social media; and, that discussion of formative and evaluative research was mostly segregated as an ‘add on’ to PR practice, rather than integrated into PR practices and activities (Macnamara, 2010b).

Macnamara’s critique pointed to a need for an advanced text to further reflect the contemporary environment and critical approaches to public relations theory. He subsequently went on to publish what, at the time of writing, was the latest ‘Australasian’ textbook on public relations (Macnamara, 2012). As suggested by the title, *Public Relations Theories, Practices, Critiques*, this text is presented in three parts discussing theories, practices (methods and activities) and critical analysis of public relations. While recognising and summarising the ‘body of knowledge’ accumulated within the dominant paradigm of Excellence theory, Macnamara’s latest book identifies more than 20 major theories and models of PR, including emerging models, and supports calls for a multi-paradigmatic approach. In reviewing the text, Anne Gregory (2012) commented: “This is the most comprehensive review of the theories pertinent to public relations that I have ever seen brought together”.

Meanwhile, the previously published texts continued to be updated. Harrison published a substantially expanded and updated fifth edition of his *Strategic Public Relations: A Practical Guide to Success* in 2011 with a major focus on online communication using Web sites, e-mail, blogs and social networks including examination of Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and LinkedIn. Johnston’s *Media Relations: Issues and Strategies* moved to its second edition (2013), completely overhauled, with a focus on the inter-connections between public relations, the news media and social media. New chapters on law, campaigns and social media addressed both the feedback from the first edition and the increasingly complex communication’s environment.

Chia and Synnott’s *Introduction to Public Relations: From Theory to Practice* is being revised at the time of writing for a second edition (2013), as is Sheehan and Xavier’s *Public Relations Campaigns* (2013). Johnston and Zawawi will move to a fourth edition in 2013/14 with a significant change. With co-editor Clara Zawawi now living in the middle-east and working outside public relations, Deakin University’s Mark Sheehan will take on the role of co-editor with Johnston and Zawawi will remain in an ‘honorary’ capacity.

Meantime more specialised texts continue to be published. Sheehan, along with Peter Sekuless, published the edited text *The Influence Seekers: Lobbying in Australia* (2012) and on the horizon is Kristin Demetriou’s *Speaking Up: Public Relations, Activism and Social Change*, forthcoming in 2013.
Moving forward
In his latest book, Macnamara noted that PR literature in Australia still has a way to go to fully reflect emergent thinking in Europe, New Zealand and among critical scholars around the globe (2012). Nevertheless, in just over a decade, Australia has moved from a paucity of public relations literature published by Australian academics to a rapidly growing collection of publications, including five dedicated text books and a range of specialist texts, edited collections or monographs ranging in subject from research and lobbying to gender and activism. Given the relative youth of public relations scholarship in Australia, the discipline can be seen to be moving at a significant rate in publishing and updating literature, inclusive of new approaches and ideas, both within international and national frameworks.

While public relations scholars are increasingly publishing with international publishers and in international journals, part of the way forward will be in finding a balance of developing localised narratives for localised consumption as individuals seek to gain and expand their credibility and profiles within the global publishing landscape. As Petelin (2005 p. 461) noted of Australian public relations scholarship, PR scholars must “de-territorialize” existing knowledge blocs and “re-territorialize” these into the Australian space. By so doing, local knowledge can impact on the field as a whole. This is the challenge that arguably began in the 1970s, gaining momentum in the past decade and is now potentially on a steep trajectory forward.

References
ABSTRACT

In a recent address on the occasion of IBM's 100th birthday. Stanley Litow, its Vice President, Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Affairs, and President, IBM Foundation, discussed the role of citizenship in 21st Century Business. Litow repeatedly emphasized that corporations cannot divide their corporate responsibility from their business programs, and that CSR is not separate from the way you conduct your business. The thrust of his talk though, was how IBM was not only a global technology leader but had become a global model for corporate citizenship. It had succeeded, he said, in developing innovative technology and talent to build its business but also to address social issues in communities where IBM operates.

This was not a new strategy but rather one consistent with IBM founder Tom Watson's view that the organization needed to change in terms of its innovation but not in terms of its core values. IBM, which created the technology to support Social Security, one of the most important social welfare programs of all time, has created voice recognition programs that has multiple pro-social uses. Is this good public relations or self-promoting hype? To what extent had IBM crafted the concept of corporate responsibility and integrated it with its business plan to fuse corporate relations with community relations?

Litow maintained that IBM's corporate citizenship is also not a new concept and that to Tom Watson, social and community concern needed to be expressed as private philanthropy. One went about one's good deeds privately for their own sake and did not publicize them. Clearly, Watson was convinced of the virtue of publicizing his personal philanthropic efforts.
Today, one merely has to google IBM CSR to see the depth and breadth of its corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments. In addition, CSR is now a discrete management function with a range of programs suited to their various global environments and areas of need.

This paper will explore the history of IBM's CSR and the history of its public relations for CSR. This is significant given the shift in company emphasis from philanthropy as a private matter to corporate citizenship as a company imperative and as a mandated but largely self-directed area of employee engagement. Despite the fact that there appears to be at least one point in time during which the company's business choices may have been, in retrospect, questionable, Mr. Watson's overarching legacy of concern for others has been operationalized into a highly-targeted set of community-and-educationally centered programs. The technology and talent employed in them may serve as models for non-profits and other corporations, in terms of both running effective CSR initiatives and planning and implementing effective public relations.
Forgotten roots of International Public Relations. Attempts of Czechoslovakia, Germany, Great Britain, and Poland to influence the United States during World War I

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1. The Situation in the United States

World War I was the starting point of modern Public Relations.¹ The New York Times (p. 8) wrote September 9, 1914: “The present European war […] deserves to be distinguished as first press agents war.”² Americans did not regard the conflict, when Europe “slithered over the brink” (David Lloyd George), as a decisive historical event (Miller 1992, p. 540): “[…] most Americans have never ever heard of Sarajevo, or Bosnia, or Serbia, and the newspapers dismissed the murder as ‘another mess in the Balkans’. ” The opinion dominated, “that the war would not last long” (Daniels 1944, p. 565).

Concerning the effects of PR on America’s decision to enter the war four positions can be distinguished. Firstly it is argued that British propaganda was far more effective than German and a decisive factor in changing the U.S. attitude from isolationist to belligerent (Grattan 1929; Millis 1935; Peterson 1939).³ The second viewpoint emphasizes the effectiveness of German propaganda in contrast to Britain allegedly unprepared for psychological warfare (Ford 1919; Hobson 1928). According to the third thesis German and British propaganda cancelled each other out (Link 1960; Schwabe 1971). The fourth position either ignores propaganda (Clements 1992) or regards the effects as insignificant (Wilson 1985). Here the viewpoint is that propaganda has had different effects on different target groups.

¹ PR for the nation-state is the planned and continuous distribution of interest-bound information aimed (mostly) at improving the country’s image; the following discussion focuses on persuasive communicative acts directed at foreign audiences. Trying to distinguish among PR and propaganda in this context is regarded as a semantic game. This means, following the tradition of Bernays (1923, p. 212).
² Doenecke (2011, p. 90) points out that on April 5, 1915 financed by a German a full-paged Appeal to the American People was published in about 100 newspapers. Americans were urged „not to manufacture, sell or ship powder, shrapnel or shot of any kind of description to any of the warring nations of Europe, or Japan.”
³ Hubert Herring (1938, p. 111) stated: “England propagandized us into the war.”
The reasons for Wilson’s declaration of war remain unclear. Fuller’s (1970, 392) thesis is that Wilson would have remained neutral, “had it not been for the octopus of propaganda, whose tentacles gripped him like a vice.” Fleming (2003, 75) emphasizes Wilson’s anglophilia: “It does not take a degree in psychology to see how such a man could be heavily influenced by Wellington House’s (cf. 3.1.) propaganda.” But this position is not grounded on facts. Doenecke’s (2011, p. 287) resumé is: “Public opinion was not determinant.”5 Freud and Bullitt (1967, p. 36) underline that Wilson continuously changed his opinion. They interpreted the decision to enter the war as result of self-deception. According to Doenecke (2011, p. 304) the President even did not to identify the causes of war – “nothing in particular“ but „everything in general“ stimulated taking up the arms.

2. Isolation of Germany from the International News Flow

Britain, because of her imperial telegraph cable communications strategy, dominated international communication. A report to the Cabinet in 1911 concluded that "it would be possible to isolate Germany from practically the whole world outside Europe" (Kennedy, 1971, p. 744). Indeed, the first British act of war was to cut Germany's overseas cables on August 5; cutting Germany off from the world’s most important neutral country at the very moment when American public opinion on the *Kriegsschuldfrage* (question of responsibility for the outbreak of war) was being formed. McAdoo (1931), Secretary of the Treasury, reported that, because of cable control: "Nearly everything in the newspapers which came from Europe during the war was censored and colored in the Allied interest" (p. 322). According to Grattan (1929/1969) "honest, unbiased news simply disappeared out of the American papers about the middle of August, 1914" (p. 44). In fact, the *Defence of Realm Act* (DORA, 1914)6 made it an offense to publish information “of such a nature as is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy" (Sanders & Taylor, 1982, p. 9). Peterson (1939) observed: "Newspapers in America during the years of neutrality represented

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4 Fleming (2003, p. 75) writes: “In an unguarded moment, Wilson confessed to a friend he hoped for an Allied victory in the war but was not permitted by his public neutrality to say so.”
5 This thesis is supported by Wilson’s attempts - at least at the beginning of the conflict in Europe - to isolate himself from journalism as Doenecke (2011, 5) reports: “As early as December 1914, he stopped reading press accounts of the war, seeking 'to hold excitement at arm's length.”
6 DORA gave the government powers: “1 to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or obtaining information for that purpose calculated to jeopardize the success of the operation of any of His Majesty’s Forces to assist the enemy; and 2 to secure the safety of any means of communications, or of railways, docks or harbours” (Andrew 2010, p. 54); cf. Sanders & Taylor 1982, p. 9.
the endpoint of the British propaganda campaign” (p. 159). News about such important events as the German invasion of Belgium or the sinking of the *Lusitania* came without exception from Germany’s enemies.

3. **British Propaganda Activities**

3.1. **Wellington House**

At the beginning of the war the British government was concerned about German propaganda activities in the U.S. (Sanders, 1975; Squires, 1935). In September 1914 Masterman, a journalist and member of the Cabinet, became head of the British propaganda organization *(War Propaganda Bureau)*, known as *Wellington House* (Masterman 1939, p. 273). Masterman was chosen because he had already proven a “natural talent for spin” (Milton 2007, p. 26; Krause 1940) in introducing the *National Insurance Act*. The activities of *Wellington House* were kept secret, even from Parliament (Sanders, 1975; Squires, 1935). Secrecy was the main characteristic of British propaganda. No connections to official sources could be located.

*Wellington House* was concerned with the production, translation, and distribution of books, pamphlets, government publications, speeches, and so forth. They also assisted with the placing of articles and interviews designed to influence the opinion in the world’s newspapers and magazines, especially in America. Information and facilities were provided to correspondents of neutral papers (Nicholson 1931). Never official channels of communication were used, preferring instead personal contacts (Peterson 1939; Squires 1935) or organizations that were credible per se like Oxford University, which published 87 *Oxford Pamphlets*, whose authors were able “to give a patriotic bias to the apparent objective presentation of material” (Squires 1935, p. 17; cf. Roetter 1974, p. 32). Masterman’s propaganda did not simply present a one-sided point of view, but let recipients draw their own conclusions from ‘facts’ presented (Sanders 1975).

3.2. **Intellectuals as Patriots**

Wars have to be legitimized as just in order to motivate one’s own side. The Allied cause should become identified with the cause of civilization itself. To a degree that had no

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7 For a content analysis of news cf. Foster 1935; 1937.
8 David Hume (1974/1948, p. 348) in his *Treatise of Human Nature* emphasized that any state waging war has to come up with stories justifying and enobling one’s cause: “When our [...] nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent. But always esteem ourselves and allies
historical precedent, British intellectuals took part in a propaganda effort to stigmatize Germany as the only one responsible for the outbreak of the war (Ratcliffe 1917). They created the propaganda myth that “The Allies, particularly Britain, had no responsibility of starting the war, which was a product of German militarism and lust for conquest” (Buitenhuis, 1987, p. XVI). Masterman was primarily responsible for the Gleichschaltung (bringing into line) of intellectuals. He invited many of Britain’s major writers to take part in a secret meeting on September 2, 1914 - among them G. K. Chesterton, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Sir Gilbert Parker (!), and Herbert George Wells. The authors announced their support of the war in a so-called Author's Manifesto, which appeared in The New York Times on September 18, 1914 with the authors’ signatures. Wells (Knightley 1975, p. 104) warned the world of "Frankenstein Germany", inhabited by people of intellectual inferiority. He also coined the famous phrase “The War that will end War" (Smith 1986, p. 219).

In Germany, too, intellectuals were willingly cooperating with the government, treating the horrors of war in rather euphemistic terms and pointing out the superiority of German culture; cf. Kunczik 1997, p. 139ff; Stibbe 2001, p. 49ff. The Declaration of the 93 was a document signed by 93 personalities of academic and cultural life: "We as representatives of German science and art protest herewith before the entire world of culture against the lies and defamations with which the enemies of Germany strive to dirty the pure intentions of Germany in the difficult battle for existence which has been forced upon it." The declaration was distributed throughout the U.S.: "Have faith in us! Believe that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilized nation, to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant, is just as sacred as its own hearths and homes. For this we pledge you our names and our honour" (Link 1960, p. 34). Meineke (1995, p. 231ff) discusses the mobilization of German scientists which was based on the assumption, even shared by pacifists, that the war was a defensive one, forced upon Germany.

9 In Germany, too, intellectuals were willingly cooperating with the government, treating the horrors of war in rather euphemistic terms and pointing out the superiority of German culture; cf. Kunczik 1997, p. 139ff; Stibbe 2001, p. 49ff. The Declaration of the 93 was a document signed by 93 personalities of academic and cultural life: "We as representatives of German science and art protest herewith before the entire world of culture against the lies and defamations with which the enemies of Germany strive to dirty the pure intentions of Germany in the difficult battle for existence which has been forced upon it." The declaration was distributed throughout the U.S.: "Have faith in us! Believe that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilized nation, to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant, is just as sacred as its own hearths and homes. For this we pledge you our names and our honour" (Link 1960, p. 34). Meineke (1995, p. 231ff) discusses the mobilization of German scientists which was based on the assumption, even shared by pacifists, that the war was a defensive one, forced upon Germany.

10 Colonel T. N. Dupuy (1977, p. 7) emphasizes that Prussian-German military excellence was one factor that consistently influenced European affairs during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Dupuy writes: “This was true despite the fact that in the 130 years following the Napoleonic wars, all the other European powers were engaged in many more wars than was Prussia-Germany.” Germans were believed to be inherently military and naturally good soldiers.

11 Rudyard Kipling distinguishing between “human beings and Germans” argued: “This is not war. It is against wild beasts that we fight. There is no arrangement possible with wild beasts.” He warned: “The Hun is at the gate.” According to Roetter (1974), “the only protest against calling the Germans ‘Huns’ came from a group of English scholars who argued that identifying the Germans with the Huns was an insult to the Mongols living in Central Asia” (p. 46). The Germans for their part built up “Perfidious Albion” as enemy image (Stibbe 2001): “Unser gehaßtester Feind”; “Gott strafe England!”
3.3.  Bonding Journalists

In contrast to the Germans, who did not allow neutral correspondents to visit the front\textsuperscript{12}, the Britons handled journalists perfectly. American correspondents, accompanied by diplomatic officers, were driven to the front: "They were then wined and dined at the headquarters chateau and quietly briefed about the British case" (Knightley 1975, p. 121). The British were extraordinarily successful in this foreign press-influencing effort. Palmer, who represented all three major American news agencies, (1934, p. 300) wrote: "Deep down I did think of the World War as a war to end war [...]. But our side must win [...] and not the Germans, in order to start (a) new era for mankind."

The Neutral Press Committee was established on September 11, 1914\textsuperscript{13} (Sanders \& Taylor, 1982) in order to influence journalists from Allied and neutral countries.\textsuperscript{14} Lord Beaverbrook (1925) underlined: "Better than any pumped-in propaganda abroad was this method of making the leaders of the Imperial, neutral or allied press themselves the propagandists when they returned home" (p. 12). Friendly relations with the press were cultivated intensively in London. There was a meeting every week with American correspondents including regular access to high-ranking people in politics whose names alone guaranteed the event worth reporting. Peterson (1939) comments: "The censorship bureau in Great Britain must be considered a determining factor in controlling American opinion, because the news it passed was the version the American press released" (p. 14).

3.4.  Sir Gilbert Parker

Wellington House had a special America section headed by novelist Parker,\textsuperscript{15} "who gave his entire time voluntarily" (Masterman, 1939/1968, p. 274). Parker may not have been an

\textsuperscript{12} German military was strictly opposed to conducted tours of journalists to the front. The famous Swedish explorer Sven Hedin was the exception; he published his experiences in Nach Osten! (1916). According to Erzberger (1920), who was in charge of the German foreign propaganda, the motto of the military was: "Uns kann keiner!"

\textsuperscript{13} Already in 1912 the D-Notice-System (D = Defence) had been established in order to steer the relationship between government and media concerning the distribution of information and national security. According to Wilkinson (2009, p. XI) it was a 'back-door' form of censorship. Its aim was to control journalism esp. to patronize self-control of journalists. The first study about this still existing system has been published in 2009 by Nicholas Wilkinson – a former head of the Defence Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (DPBAC).

\textsuperscript{14} According to Milton (2007, p. 29) the task was "exchange of news services between British and foreign newspapers; the promotion of the sale of British newspapers abroad [...] the dissemination of news articles among friendly foreign newspapers and journals; and the transmission of news abroad by cables and wireless."

\textsuperscript{15} Parker (1918), Canadian-born and a former MP, wrote: "I was fortunate in having a wide acquaintance in the United States and in knowing that a great many people had read my books and were not prejudiced against me. [...] Practically since the day war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity" (p. 522).
outstanding novelist but he was a superb organiser. He “assembled an excellent staff of assistants, which included historian A.J. Toynbee of Oxford” (Fleming 2003, p. 469). Parker – whose activities are still not adequately researched16 - analyzed American newspapers and worked out a plan to influence them. With the help of Who's Who he compiled a mailing list of Americans likely to be able to sway public opinion; he also used personal contacts to influence public opinion (Sanders & Taylor, 1982, p. 168).

Even years after the war, prominent Britons were still being quoted as saying that before America came into the war there had been no British propaganda in the United States (Squires, 1935, p. 48ff). The activities were so secret that even in the letters of the British ambassador, written between August 1914 and April 1917, Parker is not mentioned once. 17 The German-American journalist Viereck18 (1930) reported that Parker had said to him about 10 years after the end of the war, when questioned whether he would describe his activities: “I shall say nothing except what I have already written in my article on propaganda. I have no right to reveal the innermost secrets of the British Government” (p. 129). Viereck continued: “Allied propagandists covered their tracks very well. They destroyed every compromising document wherever possible” (p. 139). German propaganda in the U.S. on the other hand was exposed in various ways. Lansing (1935) reported that the improper activities of German and Austrian officials and agents were then a matter “of constant investigations by the United States Secret Service, the special agents of the Department of Justice, and the inspectors of the Post Office Department, who were also aided by the police in many of our cities” (p. 67).

There are several accounts of Parker`s operations (Millis, 1935; Peterson, 1939; Silber, 1932; Squires, 1935) revealing that American correspondents willingly received

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16 E.g., Tansill (1938) doesn’t refer to Parker. Doenecke (2011, p. 18) mentions Parker only shortly. In her history of Public Relations in Britain, L´Etang (2004) doesn’t name Parker.

17 Lansing (1935), Secretary of State, discusses in his War Memorials extensively “Teutonic propaganda” but does not refer to Parker. The German ambassador Count von Bernstorff names in My Three Years in America (1920) Parker only once; in his Erinnerungen und Briefe (1936) Parker is not mentioned at all. But it is doubtful whether British propaganda activities took place in absolute secrecy. Daniels (1944), Secretary of the Navy, recalled: “Hardly had the reverberations of the first guns in Belgium died away the propaganda for Uncle Sam to fight with the Allies began” (p. 565). McAdoo (1931) remarked on Germany's propaganda: “I’m morally convinced that the Allies were doing the same thing, but we had no documentary proof” (p. 330). McAdoo commented in his memoirs that British propaganda, "disguised as news and opinions, was undoubtedly a violation of American neutrality, but what could be done about it?” (p. 322).

18 George Sylvester Viereck was editor of The Fatherland, whose first edition came out August 10, 1914. The Fatherland became the ‘most outspoken German propaganda sheet’. According to Bonadio (1959, p. 51) the paper condemned British materialism and tried to identify Wall Street and England with a world-wide conspiracy to subvert American ideals: “The war, said Viereck, benefited no one except England and Wall Street.”
articles written by patriotic “intellectuals”. Publications of Wellington House were sent off by Parker himself, a personal letter enclosed (Peterson, 1939, p. 52), in order to create the image of an English patriot performing his duty spontaneously. Parker (1918) wrote: "Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to a great number of public libraries, Y.M.C.A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs, and newspapers" (p. 522). Furthermore, he was in "constant touch with the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in England. I also frequently arranged for important public men in England to act for us by interviews in American newspapers" (p. 521). Parker held the view that the U. S. entered the war "because they believed that the German policy is a betrayal of civilization" (p. 521). He continued his argument: "Everyone knows that the Prussian military organization had thrown overboard all rules of war which centuries of civilization had produced and imposed . . ." (p. 522).

One clever move by Parker was to arrange for the translation, printing, and distribution of the works of extreme German nationalists, militarists, and exponents of Machtpolitik like von Treitschke, Nietzsche, and von Bernhardi19 (Link, 1960; Peterson, 1939). The aim was to create a frightening image of Germany - militarism, ruthlessness that knew no restraints, exaltation of the state, and worship of power and might - and the consequences should such a nation triumph.20

3.5. Atrocity propaganda and building up the image of barbaric Germany

The British were not only in the business of intellectual and sophisticated propaganda but of atrocity propaganda, too. The Kaiser was labeled `mad dog of Europe´ and `Super–Hun`. He was called a 'lunatic', 'barbarian', 'madman', 'monster', 'modern Judas' and 'criminal monarch' (Knightley 1975, p. 82). Stories of Germans cutting off the hands of children, boiling corpses to make soap, crucifying prisoners of war, and using priests as clappers in cathedral bells were widely believed among both Allies and neutrals (e.g. Ponsonby 1928). Atrocity propaganda was part of the strategy to make the war appear to be a fight between the forces of good and evil; trying to convince America that the British cause was America's cause

19 Stibbe (2001, p. 10) diagnoses 'the popularity' of Bernhardi's book but doesn't support his thesis by data.
20 The New York Times on August 9, 1914 gave the whole front page of its Sunday Magazine to an article on the "remarkable prophetic book" of General Friedrich von Bernhardi Germany and the Next War, which had "foretold Germany's war plans". This chauvinistic book "was reprinted by the million to flood the United States as well as the Allied and other neutral countries." Millis (1935) wrote: "[...] the stupefied Germans discovered themselves convicted before world opinion on the evidence of a few writers whom the vast majority of Germans had never read or never even heard of (p. 77).
The new British War Propaganda Bureau under Cecil Rhodes' relation Charles Masterman, and specifically the American Propaganda Chief Sir Gilbert Parker approached these authors earlier that month (ca. Oct. 1914) in a bid to secure the power of their pens. See also https://spartacus-educational.com/FWWwpb.htm

FAMOUS BRITISH AUTHORS DEFEND ENGLAND'S WAR

Fifty-three of the Best-Known Writers of the Empire Sign a Vigorous Document Saying That Great Britain Could Not Have Refused to Join the War Without Dishonor.

One of the most interesting documents found at the War Office is a supplement to The New York Times of October 18, 1914, which reproduces the signatures of 53 of the best-known British writers in a statement of support for the war. The signatures are of such prominence that the supplement is an important source of information about the war's impact on the arts.

New York Times, October 18, 1914, p SM5. Reproduced for educational purposes only. Fair Use relied upon.

TRANSCRIPTION:

Who's Who Among the Signers
William Archer
K. Granville Barker
Sir James Matthew Barrie

Hilaire Belloc
Arnold Bennett
Arthur Christopher Benson
Edward Frederic Benson
Very Rev. Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson
Lawrence Binyon
Andrew Cecil Bradley
Robert Bridges
Hall Caine
R. C. Carton
Charles Haddon Chambers
Gilbert K. Chesterton
Hubert Henry Davies

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, creator of "Sherlock Holmes".

Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher
John Galsworthy
Anstey Guthrie (F. Anstey)
Sir Henry Rider Haggard
Thomas Hardy
Jane Ellen Harrison
Anthony Hope Hawkins (Anthony Hope)
Maurice Hewlett
Robert Hickens
Jerome K. Jerome
Henry Arthur Jones
Rudyard Kipling
William J. Locke
Edward Verral Lucas
John William Mackail
John Masefield
Alfred Edward Woodley
Gilbert Murray
Henry Newbolt
Barry Pain

Sir Gilbert Parker [Director of American Propaganda, British War Propaganda Bureau, Wellington House; editor and publisher of this propaganda piece]

Eden Phillpotts
Sir Arthur Wing Pinero
Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch
Sir Owen Seaman
George R. Sims
May Sinclair
Flora Annie Steel
Alfred Sutro
George Macaulay Trevelyan
Rt. Hon. George Otto Trevelyan
Humphry Ward
Mary A. Ward (Mrs. Humphry Ward)
H. G. Wells
Margaret L. Woods
Israel Zangwill

The new British War Propaganda Bureau had approached these authors earlier that month in a bid to secure the power of their pens—and the weight of their reputations—for the promotion of the empire’s cause throughout the world. The declaration provides a fascinating view of the period’s literary landscape; many of the authors listed are virtually unknown today, and some who remain popular are touted in the declaration for reasons that may now seem surprising. H.G. Wells, for example, is hailed not as the author of The Time Machine (1895) or The War of the Worlds (1898), but rather of Tono Bungay (1909) and Ann Veronica (1909).

Not to be outdone, German authorities responded to the declaration by bringing together an even larger assortment of artists, authors, and scientists to sign the Manifesto of the Ninety-Three, an astounding document which denied any German wrongdoing in Belgium and bewilderingly accused the Allies of “inciting Mongolians and negroes against the white race.”
too. Tumulty, Wilson’s private secretary, quotes the President (1922, p. 231): “England is fighting our fight [...] and that I shall not [...] place obstacles in her way.” Wilson in his famous Address to Congress, 2 April 1917 called the German submarine campaign “warfare against mankind” and argued: “The world must be made safe for democracy.”

According to Silber (1932, p.139) the British wanted to convince the U.S. public “that England’s cause was solely the cause of the weak – of poor little Belgium.” But Belgium in those days was no more democratic than Germany and had committed (was committing) monstrous barbarisms in the Congo - not really a country to fight for in the name of democracy. The Bryce Report on Alleged German Outrages (1915) in Belgium was published in May 1915 shortly after the sinking of the Lusitania. According to Fleming (2003, p. 53): “Wellington House made it sure that it went to virtually every newspaper in the United States.” The New York Times of May 13 had the headline: “GERMAN ATROCITIES ARE PROVED; FINDS BRYCE COMMITTEE“. The reputation of Lord Bryce, former British ambassador to Washington and “an old friend whom the President greatly admired” (Heckscher 1991, p. 374), for many Americans was proof of the authenticity of the report (Doenecke 2011, p. 76). In order not to produce a boomerang effect in the U.S., where a strong German minority lived, Allied propaganda tried to create a split image of Germany, consisting on the one hand of Prussian militarism and on the other hand respecting Germany's culture (e.g., Goethe, Kant, Beethoven, etc.). Wilson (1918) reinforced this split image. In his address to Congress on April 2, 1917, he said: "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship" (p. 42). But according to Nagler (1993) British propagandists even were able to define German Kultur as antithesis of American values. After America’s entry into the war (1993, 169): “[...] everything German, and Kultur in particular, had become synonymous with barbarism, militarism, authoritarianism, and the urge for world hegemony.”

4. German Propaganda in the United States

4.1. Aims and Activities

Before the war the Kaiser had no bad image in the U.S. The New York Times on June 8, 1913 argued on its front page (O’Keefe 1972, p. 251): “Kaiser 25 Years a Ruler; Hailed as Chief

21 According to Lasswell (1927) the widespread reports about horrors allegedly perpetrated by the Germans, in particular about massacres of Belgian children, produced a marked change in the image of Germans. However, in the long term the spreading of the horror stories had negative effects in Britain. After the war the population learned that their own propaganda had been lying to them (Ponsonby 1928) and from then on was regarded as incredible.
Peacemaker.” After the outbreak of the war German Propaganda – stigmatized by Peterson (1939, p. 137) as “blind deaf, and dumb”22 - wanted to convince the American Public that Germany had been drawn into war against his will and without any responsibility for the outbreak of war (Reiling 1997, p. 174). The German Embassy in Washington was quite aware of the importance of propaganda in the U.S., but presenting the German position was a difficult task, communication with Germany was not easy, and no coordination like Wellington House did on the British side was done in Berlin (cf. Erzberger 1920). The main problem was that German propaganda did not seem to understand the complexities of American society and lacked an overarching plan (Nagler 1993, p. 167; Doerries 1993, p. 157). The main actors (the German Propaganda Cabinet) were ambassador Count von Bernstorff, Viereck, Dr Dernburg, officially representing the German Red Cross, and Dr Albert of the Department of the Interior.

The first step taken to advance the German cause was the establishment of the German Information Bureau in fall 1914 (Doerries 1993, p. 138). The Germans too preferred to use interpersonal channels of communication to distribute their point of view (Wilke 1993). They had lists of members of Congress, leading members of the administration, public libraries, colleges, clubs, and so forth. Especially the Library of the Congress was regarded as an excellent place for circulating German propaganda material. Germany bought the New York Evening Mail (for $1.5 million) with the purpose of reaching a large metropolitan audience (Doerries, 1989; 1993, p. 150f; Falcke 1928). German propaganda made use of the third-party approach and tried to influence public opinion through books written by Americans. Millis (1935) reported that the authors Frank Harris (England or Germany? New York 1915: The Wilmarth Press) and Edwin J. Clapp (Economic Aspects of War: Neutral Rights, Belligerent Claims and American Commerce on the Years 1914-1915, New Haven 1915: Yale University Press) were on Dr Albert's payroll.

According to Lansing (1935) "publicity agents were sent out by the German Government to aid the propagandists in their endeavour to influence American public opinion" (p. 75), but Lansing does not specify who the publicity agents were. In December 1914 the services of William Bayard Hale, a leading American journalist and former advisor of Wilson, were secured to wage a publicity campaign (Viereck 1930). Grattan (1929/1969) elaborated: "He was put in immediate charge of the news sheet, and was detailed to prepare pamphlets and other matter for the general public" (p. 87). Among other things, Hale

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22 Nagler (1993, p. 168) who is of the same opinion, characterizes the German attempts to inform America about the ‘truth’ as Oberlehrer approach.

Count von Bernstorff had excellent relations with the press; he leaked information to the journalists. According to Link (1960), he "by assiduous effort won the confidence of the newspapermen and constantly fed them information, most of it actually quite accurate, that portrayed German actions and policies in a favorable light" (p. 352). Heckscher (1991, p. 374) portrayed Bernstorff as "a genial character, liked by the Washington press corps". Bernstorff, the "master in the art of public relations", according to O'Keefe (1972, p. 193), had a working agreement with journalists to quote him as a source only when he had given permission. Regardless of these apparently good relations with the press, Germany’s main problem was that she had to work within a culture shaped mostly by British heritage. Roetter (1974) emphasizes that the Germans "imagined that their purpose perhaps might best be served by setting on the discontented section of society - Protestant against Catholic, worker against employer, Jew against gentile, Negro against White" (p. 55f). In their efforts to keep the U.S. out of the war, the Germans tried to instrumentalize the peace movements (Grattan, 1929/1969; Millis, 1935). Bernstorff telegraphed Berlin on November 1, 1916: "Since the *Lusitania* case we have strictly confined ourselves to such propaganda as cannot hurt us if it becomes known. The sole exception is perhaps the Peace propaganda which has cost the largest amount, but which also has been the most successful." Important target groups of German PR were besides the German-Americans and the churches the Irish (esp. Sir Roger Casement; Andrew 2010, p. 86; Kluge 1985, p. 172ff) and the Jews, which were supposed to be against Russia due to Russian anti-semitism. American businessmen, whose

23 The telegram quoted by Grattan (1929, p. 93) cannot be found in Bernstorff 1960.
24 This thesis cannot be verified; cf. Heydenreich 1995.
25 Bonadio (1959, p. 47) underlines that German propaganda, primarily directed toward the American of German descent, failed because “the influence of the American ‘melting pot’ and its ability to assimilate the ‘one into many’ was not recognized.” The result of this assimilation process was, according to Bonadio, that second generation German immigrants had become Americans.
26 Doerries (1989, p. 72ff; 155ff; 1993, p. 151ff) discusses this lesser known aspect of German propaganda.
28 According to Doerries (1993, p. 148) Jews were chosen as target group “hoping that Jewish animosity towards Russia could be turned into pro-German sentiment.” Cf. also Doerries 1989, p. 72ff; 155ff.
activities were affected by the British Navy, were an important target group too (Lansing 1935).

4.2. Misfortunes of German Propaganda

Some misfortune hampered German propaganda. On July 24, 1915, Dr Albert ‘lost’ his briefcase, which was stuffed with documents relating to the German propaganda activities; he had fallen asleep in an elevated train. The daily *New York World* obtained these papers with Wilson’s approval and started a series of articles on German intrigues and conspiracies (Tansill 1939). Lansing (1935) speculated on the motivation to publish the papers: "The purpose of publishing this interesting correspondence of Doctor Albert was to counteract, in a measure, the political effect of the slanderous articles on the government and its officials, which were constantly appearing in the newspapers and periodicals receiving subsidies from Germany" (p. 77).

A second mishap occurred on August 30, 1915, when James Archibald, an American citizen and journalist, was searched by the British at Falmouth (Martin 1959). Archibald was a dispatch bearer for Dr Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. This time he was also carrying papers written by German diplomat von Papen (German Chancellor June 1932 until November 1932), whose responsibility was to purchase munitions and raw materials. The British, who had been tipped off by the Czech Intelligence Service, informed the Americans. The Dumba-Archibald affair was according to Martin (1959, p. 136ff) the finishing stroke for German (and Austrian) propaganda in the U.S. Since autumn 1915 American newspapers were full of reports about German sabotage (Andrew 2010, p. 75ff) and hatching plots (Link 1964, p. 56; Doenecke 2011, p. 130ff).

The British on November 3, 1914 had declared the blockade of the North Sea. On December 23, 1914 German Secretary of the Navy, Alfred von Tirpitz, complained in an interview in *The Sun* that the U.S had not protested against the blockade (von Tirpitz 1920, p. 620ff; 1919, p. 340ff; O’Keefe 1972, p. 73): „We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and torpedo every English or Allied ship which nears any harbour in Great Britain,”

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29 According to Peterson (1939) these disclosures resulted from the theft of the Albert portfolio by an American Secret Service operator; the most reliable source seems to be McAdoo (1931).

thereby cutting off large food supplies.” On February 4th, 1915 Germany announced the submarine blockade of Britain.

On May 1, the day the Cunard liner *Lusitania* sailed with 1,257 passengers from New York to Liverpool, an advertisement composed by the German embassy’s ‘PR department’ was published in seven New York dailies in close proximity to the notice of the *Lusitania*’s sailing. The advertisement reminded travellers that British ships sailing in the war zone do so at their own risk (Bernstorff, 1920; Link, 1954; Doenecke 2011, 70; Preston 2002, 91ff). On May 7, the liner - according to Germany an armed merchant cruiser (von Tirpitz 1919, p. 352) - was sunk by a submarine. The press reaction was moderate; only a minority demanded the U.S. enter the war. Secretary of State Bryan was of the opinion that "England has been using our citizens to protect her munitions" (Borchard & Lage, 1949, p. 144). But after the *Lusitania* incident German propaganda broke down. Bernstorff (1920) cabled Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg on May 17, 1915: "Our best plan is frankly to acknowledge that our propaganda in this country has, as the result of the *Lusitania* incident, completely collapsed" (p. 25). The *Lusitania* affair transformed former President Roosevelt into an all-out interventionist. Roosevelt prepared an editorial for the *Metropolitan* magazine called *Murder on the High Sea* and later explained: "I never wished to take part in the European war until the sinking of the *Lusitania*" (Miller, 1992, p. 546).

The execution of Edith Cavell on October 12, 1915 influenced public opinion too. Cavell was a nurse who had helped Allied soldiers escape from prison camps (Baker 1968, p. 126; Doenecke 2011, p. 126). According to Walworth (1965; Vol. 2) "her martyrdom impressed American hearts once more with the frightfulness of Prussian militarism" (p. 28). Baker (1968, p. 126) postulated that the execution sent wave of shocks through the U.S. German novelist Stefan Zweig (1944, p. 277) argued that the shooting of Cavell and the sinking of the *Lusitania* were for Germany more disastrous than the loosing of a battle.

Wilson's decision to declare war surely was not determined solely by British propaganda. Two additional German actions have been important: the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare against all ships, neutral or belligerent, in the war zone; and

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31 Neitzel (2012) in a symposium on 'Foreign Policy and Public Opinion' regards this interview as starting point of a process resulting in the U.S. entering the war; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 February 2012, p. N4.
32 Bryan (1925) wrote to Wilson: "Germany has a right to prevent contraband from going to the Allies, and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from attack - it would be like putting women and children in front of an army" (p. 399).
the Zimmermann Telegram, deciphered by the British\textsuperscript{33}, in which the German Foreign Secretary, Dr Zimmermann, on January 1917 informed the German Ambassador in Mexico City that in the event of war with the U.S. he was to negotiate for a German-Mexican alliance, holding out the bait of regaining Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Link (1965, p. 354) comments: “It was as if a gigantic bolt had struck from the blue across the American continent. No other event of the war to this point, not even the German invasion of Belgium or the sinking of the Lusitania, so stunned the American people.”\textsuperscript{34} The Literary Digest resumed (Tuchman 1994, p. 200): “How Zimmermann United the United States.” Doenicke (2011, p. 267) underlines: “For the first time, major segments of the American Press called for war, the entire nation now perceiving Germany as a hostile and untrustworthy power.”\textsuperscript{35}

Furthermore the sinking of the Laconia (Cunard Line) by a German submarine on February 25th 1917 resulted in strong anti-German reactions and was according to Spencer (1935) a central factor for the decision to enter the war. Passenger and journalist Gibbons of the Chicago Tribune produced an eye-witness account (The Sinking of RMS Laconia) which became a journalistic sensation (Knightley 1975, p. 124f; Gibbons 1953).

5. PR for independence: Czechoslovakia and Poland - Tomás Garrigue Masaryk and Ignacy Jan Paderewski

Czech propaganda in the U.S. had started before the outbreak of the war\textsuperscript{36} and had been organized from 1914 onwards by Emmanuel Viktor Voska\textsuperscript{37} (Masaryk 1927, p. 241ff). According to Masaryk (1927, p. 241) Voska “unified the action of the Czech press in America and helped to combine into one unit – the ‘Czech National Alliance´ - the organizations which had been created in the various cities of the U.S. At the same time he established relations with the American press and [...] with the American Government.”

\textsuperscript{33} Arthur Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, described the moment of handing over the decrypted telegram to the US ambassador as ‘the most dramatic in all my life´ (Andrew 2010, p. 75).

\textsuperscript{34} Doenecke (2011, p. 267) writes: “No event of the war thus far, not even the invasion of Belgium or the sinking of the Lusitania, so jolted Americans. Shock, incredulity, outrage – these were the dominant public reactions. The press ridiculed the Zimmermann note, considering any actual threat ludicrous.” Cf. also Garcés 1993, p. 287ff.

\textsuperscript{35} One headline was (Millis 1935, p. 407): GERMANY SEEKS ALLIANCE AGAINST US; ASKS JAPAN AND MEXICO TO JOIN HER; FULL TEXT OF PROPOSALS MADE PUBLIC.

\textsuperscript{36} Masaryk reports (1927, p. 222): “As early as 1907 the New York Jews had given me a gigantic reception.”

\textsuperscript{37} Voska organized a system of counter-espionage (Masaryk 1927, p. 93; cf. also Tuchman 1994, p. 74f), which brought about the arrest of Archibald (Masaryk 1927, p. 242). Benés (1928, p. 117) wrote: “It was through Voska’s activity that the intrigues of Ambassador Dumba and of [...] von Papen [...] were exposed.” Voska’s daughter worked as secretary in the office of Dr Albert (Doerries 1989; Grattan 1929; Lansing 1935).
Masaryk (1927, p. 89) labelled his propaganda as democratic\(^\text{38}\) because influencing public opinion was the main goal. Masaryk reported about his propaganda in the U.S., where he arrived end of April 1918 (1927, p. 221): “Before long I was able to place interviews and articles in the largest and most influential daily papers, weeklies and reviews, and to establish personal relations with prominent writers of all opinions.” Masaryk (1927, p. 90), who preferred personality PR, gave the following account of his principles:

“In the psychology of propaganda one point is important – not to imagine that people can be converted to a political idea merely by stating it vigorously and enthusiastically or by harping on its details; the chief thing is to rouse interest in your cause as best you can, indirectly no less than directly. Political agitation often frightens or alienates thoughtful people whom art or literature may attract. Sometimes a single phrase, well used at the right moment, is enough. Longwindedness is always to be avoided, especially in private talk. [...] Paderewski and Sienkiewicz – a musician and a writer – had been the most successful propagandists for Poland from the very outbreak of war.\(^\text{39}\) Those who had read Sinkiewicz’s ‘Quo Vadis’ were already as good as won for the Polish cause. [...] Our store of helpers was small.”

Masaryk (1927, p. 234) regarded the arousing of public interest as the most effective propaganda: “This, at any rate, was my main method, especially in society and in private talk.” Concerning personality PR Masaryk (1927, p. 221) wrote: “My work obliged me to visit the principal cities, to get into personal touch with people and to look up old acquaintances; and, in Washington, to cultivate the society of the Senators and Congressmen of the two chief parties and of all shades of public opinion [...]”

In his Memoirs (1965) Bernays\(^\text{40}\) described how he advised Masaryk to issue his country's declaration of independence on a Sunday for PR reasons: because Sunday was a slow news day, so it would get more space in the world's newspapers: “At lunch in 1914 I urged him to declare his country's independence on a Sunday. The slack news events of Sunday would give his declaration more space in the newspapers of the world. Masaryk was astounded. 'That,' he said, 'would be making history for the cables.' I answered that cables

\(^{38}\) Masaryk (1927, p. 401) argued: “The right and the duty of democratic public opinion leave, or should leave, no room for concealment or secretiveness.” But Masaryk (1927, p. 223) also wrote: “The democratic character of our propaganda did not by any means exclude active relations with Ambassadors and Ministers.”

\(^{39}\) Masaryk (1927, p. 233f) wrote: “Paderewski was well known in the United States, and, doubtless, many who had heard him as a pianist came also to hear him make a political speech.”

\(^{40}\) Bernays did not show critical distance in reporting his activities as his Memoirs (1965) document. Cutlip (1994, p. 160) comments: “[...] he was a braggart”. Cf. also Tye 1998; Kunczik 2010, p. 224ff.
“make history” (p. 159). Pringle (1930) wrote: "And so not October 27 but October 28 became the Czecho-Slovakian Fourth of July."

Besides the fact that 1914 is not correct (it must have been 1918), Cutlip (1994, p. 539) gives a different account of the Czech declaration of independence and emphasizes the role of Byoir 41 (“one of the towering giants who built today’s highly successful public relations business”; Cutlip 1994, p. 531): “Byoir was one of the innovators of the staged event [...] on July 4, 1918 [...] Byoir arranged for the proclamation of Czech Declaration of Independence by Thomas Masaryk at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. Byoir also got Masaryk to serve as a chairman of the League of Oppressed Nations.” 42 Masaryk himself (1927, p. 283) just mentioned “our Declaration of Independence on October 18, 1918” without referring in his Memories either to Bernays or Byoir.

Bernays (1965) emphasized the high symbolic value Masaryk possessed to the still-to-be-created Czechoslovakia. And Paderewski was regarded as equally valuable to Poland. Bernays reported that at his suggestion, these two symbolic figures of the two oppressed nations joined together in 1918 to convene a mass meeting in Carnegie Hall "to protest Austrian domination" (p. 159). Bernays claimed: "Newspapers in this country [U.S.] gave the event some coverage - we were still isolationist in our country - but it made big news in Europe" (p. 159). Proofs for the success are not presented, it is a mere conjecture. Masaryk (1927, p. 233) describes the Carnegie Hall - event without mentioning Bernays: “On September 15, 1918, we organized a gathering of the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary [...] Paderewski represented the Poles [...] The Carnegie Hall was crowded [...] also with Americans.”

Masaryk underlined that Austrians and Magyars made intensive efforts in propaganda. One of their tactics was to create the impression that Austria-Hungary was the victim of Germany, having been compelled into war by her (1927, p. 244ff). Masaryk (1927, p. 244) emphasized: “[...] it was hard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austria-Hungary.” The Empire often was regarded as a safeguard against ‘Balkanization’. According to Masaryk’s evaluation, which in view of the Dumba-affair seems not to be quite correct (1927, p. 245): “Austrian and Hungarian propaganda [...] could be organized without hindrance in America, since she long remained neutral.” Masaryk (1927, p. 274) argued:

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41 Byoir (1888-1957), son of Polish immigrants, was one of the most influential American PR-counsels. According to Cutlip (1994, p. 539) Byoir developed the third party technique.

42 Cutlip (1994, p. 539) writes: “In later years, Byoir made a great point of this propaganda work and was particularly proud of creating the League of Oppressed Nations to sap morale behind the Central Powers’ lines.”
“The work and propaganda of our people won us public goodwill – and Austria-Hungary lost it.”

Important for Polish propaganda in the U.S. which aimed at the re-establishment of Poland\textsuperscript{43} was Paderewski (1860-1941)\textsuperscript{44}, a then world famous pianist who in January 1919 became first Prime Minister of Poland. Already in 1891 he gave more than 100 concerts in the U.S. He was a kind of pop-star (the genius artist from a remote Eastern country) of his days whose musical performances sometimes could be finished only by carrying away his instruments; one of his fan clubs were the so called ‘Paderewski Girls’ (Szczepaniak 2003, p. 14ff). Paderewski’s personal charm was important for the success of his propaganda (Szczepaniak 2003, p. 109f)\textsuperscript{45}: He used his ‘magic’ appeal, to sell the trade-mark\textsuperscript{46} Poland to the Americans. Herbert C. Hoover (1951, p. 319) characterized him in his \textit{Memoirs} as honest democrat. Paderewski also performed in one of the musical evenings established by Edith Roosevelt in the White House (Miller 1992, p. 428).

His propaganda in the U.S. started when he arrived in America in April 1915; a short time later a propaganda office was founded. Paderewski’s goals were to “raise money for relief work, make Americans aware of Poland’s needs, and organize the different Polish-American organizations into a unified front” (Lisandrelli 1999, p. 49).\textsuperscript{47} Since October 1915 (till May 1917) he “gave over three hundred concert-speeches” (Lisandrelli 1999, p. 50) which were connected with appeals for Poland. In November 1915 he met Wilson’s advisor ‘Colonel’ House for the first time (Biskupski 1986, p. 38; Zamoyski 1982, p. 153f)\textsuperscript{48}. Without doubt Paderewski ‘charmed and flattered’ House (Lundgreen-Nielsen 1982, p. 108): “Yet it is quite another question as to how far this acquaintance influenced political

\textsuperscript{43} In 1795 Poland had ceased to exist as political entity and had been divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia (later part of Germany). During the war Paderewski focused on America because Poland could not find allies in Europe. Zamoyski (1982, p. 150) writes: “Of the five principal belligerent nations, three were her enemies, and the other two, Great Britain and France, were bound by alliance to one of these enemies.”

\textsuperscript{44} Gerson (1956) discusses Paderewski’s importance for the rebirth of Poland whilst other historians ignore his influence; e.g. Conze 1959; Hoensch 1990; Levin 2001. Wilson’s policy for the reestablishment of Poland is discussed by Lundgreen-Nielson (1982).

\textsuperscript{45} Biskupski (1986, p. 44) writes: “He was a charismatic leader not a political strategist.” According to Biskupski (1986, p. 55) Paderewski did not possess the qualities that constitute a successful politician. Edith Bolling- Wilson describes in her \textit{Memoirs} (1939, p. 135) a visit of Paderewski on November 6, 1916 as a member of a Polish delegation: “I shall never forget Mr. Paderewski’s face as he stood pleading the cause of his country. It was so fine, so tragic, so earnest. […] His hair was like a nimbus around his head.”

\textsuperscript{46} Paderewski also advertised shampoo, soap, and sweeties (Szczepaniak 2003, p. 16).

\textsuperscript{47} Lisandrelli (1999, p. 49) writes: “He persuaded (former President) Taft to become chairman of his Polish Relief Committee.”

\textsuperscript{48} House (1925, p. 30) characterized Paderewski: “His genius as a musician has obscured his achievements as a statesman, as an orator, a linguist, and patriot.” Gerson (1956, p. 130f) describes the affectionate relations between House and Paderewski.
decisions.” Wilson, who initially had no explicit sympathy for Polish immigrants (1902, p. 212f), was met in February 1916 at a concert given in the White House. The instrumentalization of piano concerts for propaganda is unique in the history of modern political PR and a good example for the so-called side-approach. Furthermore Paderewski made - esp. in cooperation with Nobel Prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz - use of political myths in order to create/strengthen Polish national identity. Paderewski was the “inspirer of American Polish unity” (Biskupski 1986, p. 38). Concerning the PR for Poland Paderewski was quite critical and pointed out that a story was missing (Szczepanski 2003, p. 77). But, in the words of Paderewski (quoted in: Szczepaniak 2003, p. 105): “[...] the miracle happened.” Wilson’s point 13 in his Fourteen Points-Speech on 8 January 1918 demanded the restoration of and freedom for Poland.

According to Szczepaniak (2003) Paderewski’s PR based on the premise that an idea like Polish independence must be symbolized by a single person. Furthermore he demonstrated that excellent PR is an art requiring special talent and not mechanical, scientific work. Worth mentioning is that Ivy Lee in 1927 handled Polish loans and created a climate of opinion favouring investments (Hiebert 1966, p. 268f). Bernays and Byoir on the other side tried to build up a negative image of Poland immediately after World War I whilst working as PR-counsels for an independent Lithuania (Bernays 1965, p. 188ff).

Résumé: The birth of professional image cultivation

49 Lundgreen-Nielsen (1982, p. 108) underlines: “When the Allied debate on the Polish problem was most acute – that is, during the Paris Peace-Conference – the influence of Colonel House was declining.”

50 Wilson (1902, p. 212f) spoke in his A History of the American People of “men of the meaner sort out of [...] Poland, men out of the ranks where there was neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence [...]”.

51 Sienkiewicz in 1905 had won the Nobel Prize for Quo Vadis. The novel Krzyzacy (The crusaders) had been published in 1900 and had the Deutsche Orden as enemy image. The battle of Grunwald/Tannenberg 1410 - the central event for German-Polish relations (cf. Molik 1998) – was glorified. In 1910 the 500 years celebration of the battle had taken place.

52 “An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.” Some historians argue that Paderewski had no influence on point 13; cf. Szczepaniak 2003, p. 107f. Kusielewicz (1955, p. 2f) emphasizes that Wilson’s activities on behalf of Polish independence also included the Peace Conference of Paris. The Peace without Victory Speech (January 22, 1917) was the first occasion that Wilson brought Polish rebirth before the attention of the world. Kusielewicz (1955, p. 3) writes: “Unfortunately, no historical account of the part played by Paderewski in Poland’s rebirth exists.”
Adaptation of foreign policy to the mass media started during World War I. Politicians were accepting advices from PR or developed a policy which could have been created by PR practitioners. A dominating motive of political action in the U.S. was not the substantial quality of policy, but the creation of newsworthy events in order to influence public opinion. Lee after World War I emphasized the importance of media oriented foreign policy (Hiebert 1966, p. 255ff). To paraphrase Patricia Karl (1982), statecraft started to change into stagecraft. The PR practitioners and politicians knew how news is selected by journalists. Bernays (1923) argued: "The counsel on public relations not only knows what news value is, but knowing it, he is in a position to make news happen. He is a creator of events" (p. 197).

At the outbreak of the war in 1914, America was clearly unwilling to participate. But the British "paper bullets" (a term coined by Creel53) changed public opinion. It cannot be quantitatively ascertained what influence propaganda had on the decision to declare war on Germany, but it certainly influenced public opinion and perhaps even the Congress. But an interpretation stressing propaganda as a major cause of the entrance into the war must illustrate first how that propaganda reached Wilson and/or his advisors and how Congress was influenced.

The political PR discussed here was completely different from the then dominating approaches to the theoretical comprehension of the effects of mass communication which were closely intertwined with doctrines of mass psychology and proceeded from the assumption that an omnipotent medium can influence the defenceless, isolated recipients at will. The PR-actors preferred interpersonal communication. Only atrocity campaigns and hate campaigns against Germany were based on this stimulus-response model of mass communication. Even symmetrical PR in the sense of Grunig, Grunig & Dozier (2002) was practiced (cf. the exchange of letters between Roosevelt and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Grey; Kunczik 1997a, p. 171). Furthermore, different PR tactics were employed according to the respective target group. Without doubt the focus on Masaryk and Paderewski implies the neglect of other actors of political PR; just to mention Benéš and Voska or Dmowski and Pilsudski. Research on the beginnings of political PR seems to be promising; esp. the integration of knowledge and research from Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia into the wider scientific discussion seems to be fruitful.

53 George Creel headed the Committee on Public Information established on April 14, 1917 to conduct propaganda abroad and in the U.S. Bernays and Byoir had worked in the Committee.
References

Principles of the profession: The enduring relevance of Arthur W. Page

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Abstract
Few public relations professionals have recognized the historical significance Arthur W. Page holds for academic scholarship. Mention of Page tends to focus instead on practical applications, such as guidelines for ethical public relations practice at the managerial and corporate level. The purpose of this narrative study was to uncover academic insights of Arthur W. Page from a narrative analysis of 38 previously unpublished speeches. Imploring Bell employees; promoting lofty ideals; differentiating Bell business; emphasizing public opinion and praising public relations emerged as key concepts from the speeches. The researchers anticipate future opportunities to extent study of Page beyond the application into academia.

Introduction
When Arthur W. Page agreed to serve as the vice president of public relations for American Telegraph & Telephone Company (AT&T) in 1927, he changed the face of public relations. Though his responsibilities at the company were much the same of his predecessor—supervising the newspapers and magazine ad development, ghostwriting management speeches, hiring writers to publish flattering company features, paying company managers to network with community leaders (Olasky 1987)—he joined when the roller-coaster of American business was trending downward. Companies were facing entirely new market conditions and a simultaneous loss of product sales and public trust (Bernays 1937).

As with other corporations, Bell needed help rebuilding its reputations and restoring its position in the marketplace. Page wanted a say in company policy. The business context was well-suited for Page’s request, and he was able to establish his place in history as the first ever corporate public relations counselor (Griese1977; Cutlip 1994). The position afforded Page the freedom to implement some of the lofty business ideals he’d harbored for years as editor of the World’s Work (Griese 1977) and the responsibility to live up to those ideals.

Page began to move away from the company’s more questionable public relations tactics such as hiring writers for positive stories (Griese 1976), and moved closer to what would become the company foundation: increasing telephone quality, improving customer service, and keeping costs low. An extensive image restoration campaign accompanied the changes, buoyed by Bell employees giving 7,000 lectures and demonstrations to schools and groups upon request in 1940 alone (Speech

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In this section, the researchers present a detailed analysis of Arthur W. Page's speeches, revealing key concepts that shaped public relations practice. The study highlights Page's efforts to promote lofty ideals, differentiate Bell's business, emphasize public opinion, and celebrate the role of public relations in corporate success. The researchers anticipate opportunities to extend this study, exploring the broader implications of Page's insights on academic scholarship in public relations.
It was just the start of Page’s place in corporate public relations. In his 20 years at AT&T, he counseled managers, conducted public opinion research, and effectively articulated the company vision both inside and outside the company (Griese 1976). Page deserves to be known as a pioneer among public relations (Burger 2001).

Although public relations professionals recognize the historic significance Page holds for the corporate and managerial public relations functions, few have considered the equally important position Page holds for academic scholarship. Mention of Page tends to focus instead on practical applications, such as guidelines for ethical public relations practice, the Arthur Page Society’s corporate-level manager membership and its annual case study competition which awards exceptional corporate public relations practice. Publications about Page have been biographical or introductory public relations texts focused on the practical rather than academic context (e.g., Griese, 1976, Cutlip, Center, and Broom 2000).

The purpose of this narrative study was to uncover academic insights of Arthur W. Page from an analysis of previously unpublished speeches. This study is needed because the current literature and discussions about Page are deficient in understanding Page from an academic perspective.

“To find the value in what the Page Society has identified as ‘principles’ you have to understand what corporate public relations is in the Page context. It is not about ‘communications,’ except at the margins. Mr. Page was an advisor, a counselor” (Block YEAR).

Public relations scholars and students will benefit from this study because it provides a new way of looking at corporate public relations in the Page context.

**Literature Review**

Scholarly literature situating Page in the academic context is scare; therefore, the following review discusses extant work closest to the topic.

Some authors stated that Page equated public relations with good customer service (Griswold 1967; Griese 1977). Every employee was a public relations representative, according to Page. Other authors noted the esteem in which Page held employees. He considered employees vital to a company’s success, and he utilized many channels for communicating with them. Page encouraged use of company magazines and newspapers, manager-led employee discussions of the annual report, and company films (Griese 1977).

The essentials of corporate character were evident from ideas Page embodied at AT&T and expressed in speeches, letters and other documents. The Arthur Page Society, an organization of senior-level corporate public relations professionals, condensed Page’s ideas into a set of statements known as the Page Principles (See appendix). The Principles outline what companies should strive for in serving their publics. According to Remund (2010), Page believed companies had an obligation to
society in particular. Environmental protection, labor rights, consumer protection and education, and child welfare emerged from an analysis of editorials Page wrote.

Research reviewed for the present study indicates that Page equated public relations to good customer service and he valued the essential role employees played. Corporate character and social responsibility also emerged from research about Page.

Based on the literature reviewed for this paper, the research question for data collection and analysis of this study was as follows:

**RQ:** What academic concepts emerge from Arthur W. Page’s speeches from the early twentieth century?

**Methods**

The researchers used criterion sampling to select the population of study (Cresswell 2013), transcripts of 38 speeches delivered by Arthur W. Page from 1927-1955. These previously unpublished speech transcripts were made available publicly in 2010 by the Arthur W. Page Center for Integrity in Public Communication. The researchers excluded two documents that did not fit the criteria: an article (What we think about held orders, 1946) and a pamphlet (Bell system prospects, 1943), resulting in a remaining dataset of 36 speech transcripts.

The researcher is the instrument in qualitative research (McCracken 1988), so the researchers analyzed the study data, the speech transcripts. They used narrative analysis, a process which involves gathering documents of individual’s self-reported experiences and organizing them based on the meaning that emerges (Creswell 2013). The analysis included grouping the data thematically and identifying some of the persuasive approaches used (Riessman 2005). The researchers printed out and read each transcript, reading for overall understanding. Then, they read the transcripts line by line, writing notes in transcript margins about patterns or repeated concepts. Next, the researchers reread the notes and identified and labeled repeated ideas, words, and phrases. After that, the researchers conducted more detailed analysis of the categories. Working inductively, the researchers alternated between the concepts that emerged and the transcripts to ascertain the final themes allowing any themes to emerge prior to the final transcript reading. The researchers used “in vivo” codes for labeling each theme (Creswell 2013).

**Findings**

**Theme 1—Imploring Bell employees: The original walkie-talkies**

According to Page, every employee held equal responsibility for the fate of the entire company. Why? Because anyone who came in contact with employees—the “the original walkie-talkies” (Speech 30, p. 4)—effectively came in contact with the company. “Usually people think about the whole business in the terms of their immediate contact with it and if they have a bad contact, they think the whole thing is bad” (Speech 7, p. 3). Employees had to be top-tier, and
employees companywide shared the responsibility to be engaged and involved in the well-being of Bell. Page built his argument through a series of rhetorical questions:

“How can an organization possibly be successful when the plant executives feel that whatever happens after the product leaves the factory is the problem of the sales department? Similarly, what becomes of the concern whose auditing department deals only in figures, and has nothing further in view than the end of the fiscal year? What becomes of the concern whose purchasing agent is interested only in the lowest bid, and who is not interested at all in the preservation of good-will?” (Speech 5, p. 4).

He responded to his questions by imploring Bell employees to exceed customer expectations. Page used compelling illustrations and imagery when he delivered speeches. His perspectives about the future of the business could be suffused in religious imagery one moment and sports terminology the next. “Now we have come out of the valley of the shadow and are on the sunny slopes of the upward climb again” (Speech 21, p. 5) he told the listeners, later equating the business environment to a game with no rules, brains as equipment, no intermissions and heavy penalties for too much time out. When he admonished, cajoled and encouraged Bell employees, he did so with the awareness of the central role employees played in the game. “The direct route to the public is through our own people” (p. 5).

Employee training was a frequent focus of Page speeches. He anticipated such training would foster confidence in employees, improve customer service, and eventually boost sales. Reading his speeches, the logical inferences were impossible to minimize.

“The more a man knows about the whole business and the purposes of the business he is in, and why it is a good business to be in, the more he will take a pride in it and see something in it besides three meals a day, and the better man he is going to be. The same thing gives him the information by which he can better explain it to the public” (Speech 17, p. 5).

Well-informed employees were also less likely to respond to customer requests with “rumor, gossip or indifference” (Speech 14, p. 5).

A fail-proof approach to ensure employee engagement involved an especially engaging illustration:

“If every telephone company employee acted toward the public in every public contact as if he were the owner of a small business and the person he was dealing with were his best customer, nearly all the problems would be done” (Speech 6, p. 5).

Theme 2—Promoting lofty ideals: Fulfilling a social purpose

The identity of AT&T went beyond its walls and even its customer’s homes, according to Page. He had loftier ideals for the company and its meaning to customers and society. Rather than look at the phone as an item, Page wanted others to think in terms of social service, needs, and changes. (Speech 27). The primary social service he saw the phone fulfilling was democracy. He intertwined the comfort of a phone “safety, comfort, convenience, and a wider range of friendly human contacts to people’s lives” (Speech 16, p. 9) with humanity’s need to communicate. Lofty
ideals for society were often paired with a practical application, however. Describing the company’s social purpose, Page said Bell made it possible for people to congregate in cities if they want to, or live in the suburbs if they want to or live in the country, on a farm or anywhere else, and go where and when they please and still be able if they want to, to talk or write or sing or send a picture with anyone else with as little inconvenience as possible” (Speech 21, p. 4).

In an idea predating McCluhan, he envisioned the telephone to be used as naturally as the voice to reach anyplace a customer desired. (Speech 16). With more than a little aspiration, he called the telephone “one of the great agencies of democracy” (Speech 16, p. 4). In what sounded more like a sermon than a speech, Page implored listeners to embrace his vision of the profound place of telephones in business. “Neither the law, medicine, teaching, nor any other profession has any higher standards, or is any more to the public advantage,” (Speech 10, p. 7). He may not have convinced everyone to share his lofty ideals, but he was quite effective at differentiating Bell from other corporations.

Theme 3—Differentiating Bell business: Esprit de corps

Many of the speeches Page delivered included lengthy distinctions between Bell and other companies. Sometimes he stated the difference as an advantage; other times as a disadvantage. Among the advantages was how well known the company was (Speech 15) the quality of its recent hires (Speech 13, p. 2) and the company’s deft ability to meet public needs. An especially creative turn of phrase came when Page referenced how the Western Electric Company could take raw material and

“automatically turn it into any desired shape, perfectly, rapidly, certainly and at a reasonable cost. Our operation is an effort to make a small dent in the raw material of the public consciousness, and we have no machine for doing that automatically, perfectly, certainly or rapidly. The only thing we can guarantee is a reasonable cost” (Speech 1, p. 1).

Bell had cost and customer service to its advantage, according to Page.

“There is a spirit of service which will make people instinctively, without reasoning, tend toward meeting the public point of view and make them automatically keep out of the troubles that some of the other industries have gotten into” (Speech 4, p. 3).

A disadvantage of Bell which Page made frequent reference to was the perception of the company as a monopoly. He alternately admitted it (“although a monopoly, [Bell] isn’t the ordinary kind of monopoly” (Speech 15, p. 2), distanced the company (if it were a monopoly, it would be “greedy, “inefficient,” and “slothful” (Speech 7, p. 4), or differentiated Bell from a monopoly; according to Page, Bell didn’t have excessive profits, didn’t play politics, and didn’t use propaganda (Speech 14, p. 8).

Ever mindful of an apprehensive public that disliked bloated companies, Page reminded the company to remain above reproach due to the scrutiny it would inevitably receive.
“When the public gets an idea that certain business practices should be changed, it picks out a
victim, tries him and convicts him under the law it intends to pass” (Speech 20, p. 3).

What Bell needed to do was to remain vigilant in ascertaining public perspectives. Historical examples of companies who failed at serving the public filled many of Page’s speeches. They included oil companies, the meat-packing industry and rail lines had unresolved public issues. Page did not intend for Bell to make the same mistake. His focus was evident in public opinion-related speeches and research.

Theme 4—Emphasizing public opinion: Business exists by public approval

Page seemed to recognize the inherent challenges of public perception. He admitted that the company faced an uphill battle considering the nature of American business and the mistrust of the public. But he resolved the face the challenges. If Bell couldn’t get a fair hearing, “it would merely mean we would have to find a way to please the public without a fair hearing” (Speech 21, p. 3). It would take research to please the public, and Page enlisted help from the entire company as he’d done previously with employees. The legal department, the statistical department, the engineering department and the public relations department should participate in public opinion research. One speech included a detailed statement about what public opinion research required:

“A top management that has analyzed its overall relation to the public it serves and is constantly on watch for changes in the public desires; a system for informing all employees concerning the general policies and practices of the company; a system of giving contact employees the knowledge they need to be reasonable and polite and the incentive of knowing that those equalities count in pay and promotion; a system of getting employees and public questions and criticisms back up through the organization so that management may know what the public thinks of the business” (Speech 20, p. 4).

If all businesses began with public permission and existed by public approval (Speech 25, p. 1) Bell must determine a way stay informed of how the public viewed the company. Approval was evident through company charters, business licenses, company profits and customer compliments. Disapproval was evident through limiting regulations, commission rulings, public hostility and fewer customers (Speech 25, p. 1). Page often praised his public relations team for working to enhance public perception.

Theme 5—Praising public relations: Making a dent in public consciousness

Few speeches in the dataset focused primarily on public relations. Those that did revealed Page’s wit. The president of the company was primarily responsible for public relations, said Page, but “If you had a perfect president and perfect line organization, you wouldn’t need any public relations man” (Speech 36, p. 5). And if you did have a public relations man, he should have intimate knowledge of the company, knowledge of public and politics, and “he must be the public’s representative in the company councils and the company’s advocate to the public” (Speech 36, p. 5).
His self-effacing humor was especially prominent when he described his as not contributing a great deal in (Speech 5, p. 5), merely a “staff job” (Speech 14, p. 2)—just before rattling off the extensive details of a public relations campaign and its efforts at planning, analyzing and exploring business public perception.

The primary role of the public relations team was to conduct research regularly. But that didn’t mean research was the sole purview of public relations. As emerged from previous themes, Page preferred team responses to issues.

“You cannot study public relations in a research laboratory and devise a chart form for them, which you can send out to the people. The laboratory for research of public relations is in the hands of everybody in the System and the work is done at the point of contact between the telephone employees and the public” (Speech 18, p. 2).

Internal research was equally important to Page. He believed “turning the searchlight on itself” could reveal whether Bell was fully serving the public interest (Speech 18). He also believed delivering and repeating simple messages could sink into the public consciousness (Speech 2, p. 3).

References to public relations were not always consistent. It was not uncommon for Page to emphasize how connected public relations was to other businesses one day and to highlight its autonomy another day. His description of the function of public relations was equally unclear. In one speech he defined the function of public relations “to make the public like us more and more in general, over-all and in detail” (Speech 3, p. 2). He seemed to contradict himself in another speech when he discouraged the company from solving public relations issues by

“running around trying to put salve on each manifestation of public displeasure…meeting one kind of attack here, another kind over there and continually and all the time on the defensive” (Speech 5, p. 2).

His perspective about the dual role of public relations was crystal clear when Page noted that although public relations was not a panacea, it could reduce the likelihood of political or press attack (Speech 17).

Discussion

It is interesting to put a scholarly lens on the findings of the present study rather than viewing Page in the oft-explored practitioner context. The value in Page as a practitioner is unquestionable. Yet scholars have missed an entire aspect of research in virtually ignoring the academic scenarios to which he speaks. In imploring employees, the approach is in line with research regarding fostering employee morale. Promoting lofty ideals promulgates long-held beliefs about utilizing emotional appeals in speech. By differentiating the Bell business, corporate identity and distinction could be applied for a broader perspective of his speeches. Public opinion and public relations are well studied in the academic literature, but they have not included Page in the analysis. His is an important voice that should be considered when covering these important public relations concepts.

The finding that Page implored Bell employees as the original walkie-talkies is supported by Griswold (1977). Like the scholar, Page used the terms “public relations” and customer service
interchangeably. Thus, all front-line employees were in the public relations business. This theme also appears to support Block’s assessment of Page. Rather than focusing on communications, Page was an advisor and a counselor. While Page would disagree with this—he disliked the term—his speeches were filled with advice tailored to Bell employees.

Promoting lofty ideals is clearly supported in previous research about Page regarding a company’s role in social responsibility (Remund 2010). He envisioned the company’s role as serving the community. The speeches analyzed for this study and the articles analyzed by Remund (2010) reflect Page’s long-time beliefs in social responsibilities for corporations. The present study does not reveal how that responsibility should be demonstrated, however. Page seemed instead to focus in the current speeches on establishing a higher plane for the company.

Page’s efforts to differentiate Bell from other businesses were reflected by research by Griese (1976) and Olasky (1987). In it, the authors suggest that Page had motives for previous efforts at distinction that were not positive. Bell was trying to appeal to congress to maintain its status as a monopoly and suggest to customers that being a monopoly was necessary. The timeline for the speeches analyzed for the present study suggest the approach may have continued to be in place. Especially Page’s mention of monopolies reveals his mixed messages about Bell, as supported by previous work (see, e.g., Griswold 1967; Griese 1976).

The thematic findings of emphasizing public opinion and praising public relations both support previous research regarding raising the status of the public relations profession. In this instance, Page expresses the equally essential roles of the public and the public relations in studying them. Clearly he provided more than was needed to establish the quality of public relations, he also articulated the strategy of the department and how its efforts supported those of the business as a whole. His identification of specific tactics helped—particularly those in research—clearly raised the status of the profession inside and outside of corporations. In fact, positioning Bell alongside other businesses helps understand the degree to which public opinion was sought.

Including the mention of other management-level and staff-level employees while identifying the role of public relations is also supported by previous work discussing Page.

In response to the research question regarding the academic concepts emerging from Arthur W. Page’s speeches, Page appears to have spoken from a social constructionist framework, particularly in the lofty ideals theme. He implored the listener repeatedly to view situations from his perspective, to ascribe his meaning. Page did this with employees, Bell as a company, and even in his compelling constructs of public relations (See appendix). This lends much opportunity for future studies that approach his work from related ontological, axiological, and methodological stances.

One of the limitations of this study was the dataset. Though extensive, it would have been enhanced with analysis of additional Page documents. Future studies could use content analysis to ascertain if focus on particular imagery supports the conclusions of the present study.
Viewing Page from a scholarly framework extends his value beyond the standard practitioner perspective. The researchers anticipate value in a new stream of research for students and scholars alike.

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Appendix A: The Page Principles

1. **Tell the truth.** Let the public know what’s happening and provide an accurate picture of the company’s character, ideals and practices.

2. **Prove it with action.** Public perception of an organization is determined 90 percent by what it does and 10 percent by what it says.

3. **Listen to the customer.** To serve the company well, understand what the public wants and needs. Keep top decision makers and other employees informed about public reaction to company products, policies and practices.

4. **Manage for tomorrow.** Anticipate public reaction and eliminate practices that create difficulties. Generate goodwill.

5. **Conduct public relations as if the whole company depends on it.** Corporate relations is a management function. No corporate strategy should be implemented without considering its impact on the public. The public relations professional is a policymaker capable of handling a wide range of corporate communications activities.

6. **Realize a company’s true character is expressed by its people.** The strongest opinions—good or bad—about a company are shaped by the words and deeds of its employees. As a result, every employee—active or retired—is involved with public relations. It is the responsibility of corporate communications to support each employee’s capability and desire to be an honest, knowledgeable ambassador to customers, friends, shareowners and public officials.

7. **Remain calm, patient and good-humored.** Lay the groundwork for public relations miracles with consistent and reasoned attention to information and contacts. This may be difficult with today’s contentious 24-hour news cycles and endless number of watchdog organizations. But when a crisis arises, remember, cool heads communicate best.

Appendix B: Compelling public relations constructs

- Establishing a business in the public mind as an institution of character and an institution which functions in the public interest (Speech 20, p. 2).
- The art of adapting big business to a democracy so that the people have confidence that they are being well served and at the same time the business has freedom to serve them well (Speech 20, p. 6/Speech 24, p. 7/Speech 29, p. 10).
- A mysterious cure for what ails us (Speech 22, p. 1).
- The task of business fitting itself to the pattern of public desires (Speech 23, p. 2).
- What everybody in the business from top to bottom says and does when in contact with the public (Speech 25, p. 3/Speech 29, p. 10).
Appendix C: Chronological listing of speeches

In the years following World War I, Edward L. Bernays, his wife and partner Doris E. Fleischman, and Ivy Ledbetter Lee were arguably the leading pioneers of public relations in America, and their works are often relied upon to understand the field during this time. However, there were many other voices—advocates and critics alike—whose insights also are important to understanding the development of the profession during these post-war years. Together, they paint a richer and more complex portrait of the field as it attempted to distinguish itself from associations with wartime propaganda, press agentry, and, sometimes, publicity.

As time passed after World War I, allowing for more perspective and insight into wartime propaganda and its implications, the world watched the rise of the Nazi party and the Third Reich and its propaganda machine. Doob (1935) points out, for example, that as early as 1920, Hitler and his followers had laid out a program for Germany (Das Program der N.S.D.A.P.—the National Socialist German Workers Party—as cited in Doob), that in 1924, Hitler was released from prison and began an organized spread of Nazi propaganda, and that in 1933, he rose to power and established a “Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda” to be headed by Joseph Goebbels. The next year, Lee, whose career was largely devoted to corporate public relations, testified at U.S. congressional hearings concerning his and his firm’s involvement with I.G. Farben and the German government (“Father & son,” 1934; Hainsworth, 1987; Hiebert, 1966). He would die in November of that year.

In the meantime, however, a post-war wave of publicists, press agents, and in 1922, public relations counsels, spread throughout the country. Many followed the trajectory launched by the war’s U.S. Committee on Public Information and were to various degrees equipped with strategies and tactics that would be attacked or embraced for their practices and for their effects on public sentiment. Corresponding works by practitioners, the press, and what Squire and Wilson (1924, p. 26) called “leaders of thought,” began to appear, too, addressing the functions, obligations, and effects of public relations, publicity, advertising, and propaganda, as well as how to “do” publicity and, sometimes, why it worked as it did. [1] Among these latter works, often designed to be resources for the uninitiated, there were clear predictions concerning the rise and promise of the public relations
function as a distinct contribution to business, religion, nonprofits, governments, and related institutions and organizations.

This study, then, employs historical method to understand the ways in which public relations was considered in the midst of postwar concerns about propaganda, power, and control. Evidence gathered for this study included books and pamphlets written by people in business, education, religion, media, nonprofits, small business, and public relations, as well as news articles and some contemporary scholarship. Six overriding themes emerged: lessons learned from the war; the role of intention; disclosure and outreach (including the press); the public; power, control, and propaganda; and the rise of the profession.

Lessons learned from the war

Three overall themes arise from discussions about the impact of wartime propaganda: technique, opportunity, and caution. The New York Times declares in 1920 that the business of a press agent in post-war America is largely adopted from an approach that “states and nations” employed even before the war. “Business propaganda,” which the Times defines as the repetition of policies in cultivating goodwill, is reflected in the press agent’s efforts to “favorably interpret the actions of his employer” in alignment with public sentiment (“Press agents and public opinion,” 1920, p. XX3). [2] During the war, diplomats competed with press agents and news correspondents to dominate the news, so although “open propaganda” was considered to be an inappropriate tool of state, the most effective diplomats were those “whose personal popularity put his country in a favorable light abroad” (“Press agents and public opinion,” 1920, p. XX3).

Lippmann observes (1922, p. 14), that such appeals amount to a “counterfeit reality,” which, with “the casual fact, the creative imagination, the will to believe,” conspire to generate a “violent instinctive response” that then plays out in the real world. Additionally, such efforts include speaking “in the language of the people,” of winning them over, and, by doing so, winning over those whose actions are sought after, such as legislators (Lee, 1925, p. 58), abandoning logic in favor of emotion, and juxtaposing a “we” position against a stated or implied “they” or “enemy,” that polarizes viewpoints in peacetime, as well (Biddle, 1931, pp. 287-290).

The promise to be found in wartime propaganda, however, is evident as well. Bernays (1923, p. 217) fairly exults in the global recognition of “what a momentous factor in the world’s life public opinion is becoming,” although, referencing the work of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, he also warns that as this occurs, it is important to ensure that public opinion reflects the public conscience: “It is in the creation of a public conscience that counsel on public relations is destined, I believe, to fulfill his highest usefulness to the society in which he lives” (Bernays, 1923, p. 218).

Niese (1925, p. 38) celebrates the war’s ability to change nations by influencing public sentiment and its “great publicity campaigns using slogans to spur the young and old on into battle.” The war revealed ways in which organizational appeals previously thought “drab and uninteresting” can be
positioned “with life” by well-funded men retained for that purpose, concluding that “the future
development of publicity along these lines may be of constantly increasing helpfulness in educating
the public” (Quiett and Casey, 1934, p. 19).

Although post-war America was now aware of such powers of publicity, and their failures,
Wilder and Buell (1923, p. 11) caution that Americans are still unaware of the true extent to which
this “very keen weapon” is employed by a range of diverse interests stateside, including business and
politics. Indeed, Lasswell (1927), a political scientist, finds that manipulations in wartime propaganda
shook to the core contemporary democratic notions of effective majority rule. It did not emerge from
“the mighty rushing wind of public sentiment,” he concludes, but from “the tedious achievement of
the few” who sought to “inform, cajole, bamboozle and seduce in the name of the public good”
(Lasswell, 1927, pp. 4-5).

Defining intentions

Stoker and Rawlins (2005) concluded that as long as publicity had been understood to be a
tool for reform “it maintained a positive connotation and image” but that during the 1920s, once it
began to be employed by business, government, and “professional propagandists,” publicity was
perceived as “another weapon for manipulating public opinion” (Stoker & Rawlins, 2005, p. 186).
Those conclusions are supported here, as well, but there are also concerns among the practitioners
about the negative connotations of “publicity” and “press agentry.” Among those less inclined to
differentiate among the functions are the press and the thought leaders, whose ideas about propaganda
and publicity are gaining ground (Squire & Wilson, 1924). The war had exposed Americans to
propaganda, but rather than sharpen their abilities to critically evaluate and respond to efforts intended
to shape their opinions, they are found to be alarmingly and disappointingly pliant. Neither the
practitioners nor the thought leaders consider this to be a welcome effect and so focus on the role of
intention in helping to discern “good” from “bad” publicity.

An exception is Doob (1935), a psychologist, who suggests there are two kinds of
propaganda: intentional, which is a deliberate effort to control attitudes and, thus, actions, by
suggestion, and unintentional, which does the same but without considering effects and long-term
consequences. By example, he characterizes a newspaper as encompassing both, with news as
unintentional propaganda and the opinion page as intentional (Doob, 1935). He also devotes
significant discussion to the work of Lee and Bernays and, acknowledging Bernays’ heritage (as the
nephew of Sigmund Freud) and interest in psychology, credits Bernays with being an exception
among the practitioners of the day in understanding unintentional propaganda (Doob, 1935).

Other examinations of intention in relation to public relations, publicity, and propaganda
include a 1920 Literary Digest piece on a New York Times article concerning press agentry. The
Digest explains that despite evidence of lies, hoaxes, and fakers, the perceived value of a press agent’s
work lies not in the means so much as in the ends. When their efforts are undertaken to promote a
“good cause,” press agents are less likely to be criticized (“Publicity, public opinion, and the wily press-agent, 1920). Press agentry, according to the *Times*, is a “natural by-product” of democracy in which public opinion holds reign: the “press agent, the director of public information, the public relations adviser” all seek in their own ways to influence public opinion in favor of their clients (“Press agents and public opinion,” 1920, p. XX3). Additionally, the focus on public opinion can be adapted across sectors, from political and religious enterprises to business and individual initiatives (Wilder & Buell, 1923). With the “constantly growing number of points of contact between the public and any given business,” a skilled publicity adviser can provide a competitive edge (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 13). But, because the public does not consider publicity to be credible, it is important to stay focused on the intention of promotional efforts and that, in turn, will help work toward long-term gains (Squire & Wilson, 1924).

Similarly and somewhat cryptically, in a book review comparing four works concerning propaganda and public opinion, including those of Bernays and Lasswell, Hunt (1929, p. 111) explains that “advertisers, salesmen, and propagandists” are so named when seeking to “manipulate public opinion” to profit a specific interest; however, if those efforts align with the public interest, then they are called “promoters publicists, [sic] or even statesmen.”

The loudest voice

Opportunities to garner public attention include what Lippmann (1922, p. 378) calls “the wedge,” the insertion of “some form of expertise between the private citizen and the vast environment in which he is entangled,” which is constructed by any person or organization in government, nonprofit, or private enterprise, seeking to yield influence. In the process, the intention is to appeal to the majority without revealing to it the kinds of criticism that those in the know harbor (Lippmann, 1922). Such an approach to courting public opinion is dependent upon “who has the loudest or the most entrancing voice, the most skilful [sic] or the most brazen publicity man, the best access to the most space in the newspapers” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 401). And, try as they might to be fair, he adds, editors cannot always ensure that other, marginalized viewpoints are given voice (Lippmann, 1922). Referring to the work of private, government, and trade organizations to disclose information and to “stand accountable for them,” Lippmann (1925, p. 43) later contends that there is in fact a need “not only for publicity but for uninterrupted publicity”; the concern, he writes, surrounds intention.

Desensitization to the noise of publicity also drives extreme lengths pursued in the market (Reppelier, 1928). Although anyone can “do” publicity, from charities to big business and international interests, it is “a serious labor with serious ends in view” although it also “has its pleasures as well as its uses” (Reppelier, 1928, p. 650). People like seeing their names and images in the press, as do those who follow them; however, it is also true that there is a strata of society who, for reasons of position or occupation, for example, “are understood by the seasoned reporter and the
Intelligent interpretation

Beyond attention-getting, however, is the idea of interpreting an organization or institution to the public, with the intention of enlisting its support for that organization’s actions or policies. Terms for the name of this function vary and include “‘good will manager’” and “‘counsellor [sic] in public relations,’” but it is an increasingly challenging job as communities themselves change and grow (Wilder & Buell, 1923, pp. 3-5). Thus, those in publicity must “bridge the gulf between the mind of the thinker or organizer and the psychology of great numbers or people” with skill; if done well, the result is “neither impossible nor undignified” (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 8). Such careful and considered approaches also eliminate “the danger of fanaticism,” because they demand rational, not emotional, consideration of opposing viewpoints (Wilder & Buell, 1923, pp. 10-11). This is such an important outcome of the “intelligent use of publicity” that it is “not only the privilege but the duty of the more constructive forces at work” in the U.S. and abroad to learn how to spread ideas through publicity methods (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 11).

In contrast, propaganda, with its “rather unfortunate connotation of an appeal to the prejudices and emotions rather than to reason,” is also distinct from publicity (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 4), which, in turn, should not be confused with the negativity connected to press agentry (Miller & Charles, 1924). Hyde (1931, p. 1), also aware of the negative connotations, defines publicity not as advertising or propaganda or “a deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive the public,” but as a response to the increasing challenges of providing interpretation to the public, for “creating an intelligent public opinion,” in the face of changes such as the growth of literacy, democracy, education, and suffrage. On the other hand, Fleischman (1931) characterizes propaganda as being old as Adam and Eve but, as a newly developing field, prejudice has not yet taken hold so women can work their way to the top, if they wish (Fleischman, 1931). It is not just a “thrilling profession” but the work will also improve the “general well being” of the groups for which she works or targets (Fleischman, 1931, p. 86).

The idea that publicity has a constructive and meaningful purpose in cultivating an informed public entails deliberate and appropriate public outreach, responsible content that is accurate and newsworthy, and adherence to “conditions and standards making for a sound public policy” (Long, 1924, p. 2). An information service also is based on the idea that to inform is to “communicate knowledge,” and knowledge “is perception of truth” (Squire and Wilson, 1924, p. 3). Truthfulness comes from disclosing “the real purpose and performance of the undertaking which he represents” (Squire & Wilson, 1924, p. 6). Publicity, then, should be understood as meaning “the actual relationship of a company to the people, and that relationship involves far more than saying—it involves doing” (Lee, 1925, p. 48; italics are from original).
Although Mayer (1933, p. x) carefully declares that in his work “no effort has been made to sanctify publicity, presenting it as it has been found through the years,” he finds that publicity has become increasingly important with the rise of democracies, the shifts in power from top-down to bottom-up, the surge of “new energies” prompted by new “educational and economic opportunity,” “the increase of literacy and knowledge among the ranks of the common man,” new modes of faster and more efficient communications, “and the growing complexity of our institutions” (Mayer, 1933, p. 2). It “is the act of presenting information in inviting and widely interesting form through enlisting the help of the most effective mediums of communication to gain an audience at the proper time and in the proper place” (Mayer, 1933, p. 3). The publicist must “get to the facts” in evaluating an initiative, to conduct a rigorous investigation “to find out what is fundamentally right with it and what is fundamentally wrong; what will appeal to the public and what will estrange the public” (Quiett & Casey, 1934, pp. 9-10). No publicity, they declare, is better than any attempts to conceal or misrepresent, which tend to cause more trouble anyway once revealed.

A good publicity man, then, Lee (1925) suggests, should not be dictated to concerning policy and persuasion, rather he should initiate those discussions. Once the policy is set, Lee writes, he then clearly presents the facts to the media and the public so they understand the importance of the policy from the perspective of the organization. “The fundamental purpose, therefore, which must underlie any policy of publicity must be to induce the people to believe in the sincerity and honesty of purpose of the management of the company which is asking for their confidence. If the men who are in charge of a particular company enjoy the complete confidence of the people of that community, fifty per cent [sic] of that company’s troubles are over” (Lee, 1925, p. 47-48; underline is from original). An experienced publicity man approaches solutions in terms of relationships (Quiett & Casey, 1934).

Public relations, on the other hand, has gained traction because it reflects these broader ideas and because it deflects the “scrutiny and criticism” that can be leveled at the term “publicity” for distorting facts and concealing the source of those facts (Long, 1924, p. 2). The focus of public relations is on reputation and goodwill and, as Long emphasizes (1924), listening, to “know the public attitude” (p. 11). Eschewing emotion or appeals to present news and instead presenting the truth also can “bring about understanding, create good-will, and result in active and continuous cooperation” (Squire & Wilson, 1924, p. 8). Women in public relations, for example, organize meetings and events, write clearly and accurately, conduct research, and advise “in new situations with balanced judgment” (Fleischman, 1931, p. 86). A woman “who can do contact work efficiently, intelligently and tactfully” has promise (Fleischman, 1931, p. 86). The public relations counsel, she and Bernays advise in their newsletter “Contact” (no. 8), seeks to engage “sectors of the public” with an organization, so the latter’s goals can be made more “familiar and friendly.” It is important, though, to stick with the facts and ensure that a client’s case is “ethically, economically and legally sound” (“Contact,” no. 10). In fact, a “U.S. Department of Public Relations” that would fall under the auspices of a cabinet member or the Department of State could interpret governments to one another in this way (“Contact,” no. 13).
Because the public relations counsel’s function is “to interpret his client to the public, and the public to his client,” Bernays (1935, p. 82) later reiterates that the “logical extension” is to do the same for states, “to bring about a harmony of understanding between . . . any group and the public which that group serves and upon whose good will it is dependent.” As Mayer (1933) did, however, Bernays also adds that “no attempt has been made to discuss the social significance of this new development in our complex civilization” (Bernays, 1935, p. 87). Thus, despite his optimistic vision for public relations as an international tool for diplomacy, he nevertheless indicates a deeper understanding of the complications involved, especially at that point in time.

Mayer (1933, p. 10) goes so far as to characterize public relations as the “academician of the publicity family and is concerned mostly with policies, the fertilization of ideas; with social, economic, and other trends” and “deals directly or indirectly with all the other members.” Largely invested with corporate clients and “national organizations,” public relations men are “idea-hatchers” who often collaborate with advertising “to put these ideas across” (Mayer, 1933, p. 11). Public relations is, according to Quiett & Casey (1934, p. 7) “one of the institution’s greatest assets.”

The special pleader

A number of sources compare the role of the publicity man or public relations counsel to that of legal counsel. The New York Times explains in 1920 that such work is best compared to that of a lawyer, except the press agent “may be talking to the nation rather than to a jury” (“Press agents and public opinion,” 1920, p. XX3). Additionally, according to the Times, their jobs involve not only advising clients against actions but also of explaining what clients are doing. It is still the reporter’s job, however, to sift through all the facts and determine the “truth,” just as a judge sifts through lawyers’ arguments (“Press agents and public opinion,” 1920, p. XX3). As long as public opinion is “the power behind the democratic throne,” the press agent is a “special pleader” whose “place is as sure as the lawyer’s,” and propaganda is here to stay (“Press agents and public opinion,” 1920, p. XX3).

In a democracy in which so much depends on public opinion, according to Wilder and Buell (1923), no one person, business, reform movement, or government can press ahead without public approval. Thus, just as a lawyer presents his client’s case to the court, so does a publicity manager present his client’s case to the public (Mayer, 1933; Wilder & Buell, 1923). Both are hired to review those cases and to advise their clients as to the best possible strategies for winning a favorable decision. Whereas a person or organization would not consider facing a court of law without legal counsel, they still might opt to face the court of public opinion without publicity counsel. Additionally, law is a profession, while publicity is still too new to warrant such a status, leaving “no limits short of treason” on the press agent’s approaches (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 16). In the absence of a problem, then, a publicist works to maintain relationships between the client and the public, to ensure they are “soundly based and are rightly furthered” (Quiett & Casey, 1934, p. 8). Nevertheless,
while not a “miracle nor a cure-all” and while vulnerable to “amateurs” and “charlatans” (Mayer, 1933, p. 1), the “publicity manager” remains and is a “special pleader” and “an advocate” for his clients (Wilder & Burrell, 1923, p. 16). “He is becoming a more and more familiar figure and his art is becoming an ever greater power in modern life” (Wilder & Burrell, 1923, p. 16).

This “new technique,” then, is the response to concerns aired since the war about “this problem of the appeal to public opinion,” and “a new group of specialists has sprung into existence” to apply it (Wilder & Burrell, 1923, p. 16). Long (1924, p. 13) also considers failsafe measures in responding to those concerns and proposes four standards of sound public relations work in lieu of a code of ethics, which, he points out, lawyers already operate under: it must be true, it must disclose its sources, and it must be “interesting” and “intelligent.” Lee (1925, pp. 35-36), too, recognizes the ethical similarities with law, noting that “a publicity man’s character comes very quickly to be his stock in trade very much as with a lawyer. Every man has got to work according to his own conscience, with a knowledge that one whose ethical standards are low is going to be quickly discredited, and that the man whose ethical standards are high is going to gain the public confidence.”

**Advertising**

A few works make a point of distinguishing advertising from public relations, often along the lines of paid versus unpaid promotion. Advertising is a subset of publicity designed to promote a brand name or product to the buying public (Wilder & Burrell, 1923), but public relations is not “‘free advertising’” (Long, 1924, p. 6). Nor does it compete with advertising. For one thing, advertising concerns paid placement but news does not, so coverage earned by competent and intelligent public relations efforts should not be measured by advertising conventions (Bernays, 1927). For another, public relations can either complement or precede advertising (Bernays, 1927) or even employ the press to convey key messages to a key target public (Bernays, 1928). This approach to news content capitalizes on the public’s suspicions about advertising’s intentions and its accuracy combined with its lack of awareness about the work and impact of publicity agents (Doob, 1935). As part of their efforts to enrich their clients’ coffers, “commercial propagandists” surreptitiously influence the public by employing a “publicity agent,” whom newspapers call “space-grabbers” (Doob, 1935, p. 180). Because the public has “a kind of naïve faith in their own paper,” stories that appear in the newspaper are held to be true (Doob, 1935).

**Disclosure and outreach**

Another focus concerns disclosure and outreach, with particular emphasis on the press, its post-war challenges, and the benefits and drawbacks of its relationship with public relations. The campaign against space-grabbing that was spearheaded by news and advertising interests in 1917 and continued into 1921 (Lucarelli, 1993), does not eliminate concerns that public relations seeks coverage in lieu of placing paid advertising. However, such objections are not only countered by
attempts to explain the obligations of public relations and the press concerning news value and transparency but also are soon overshadowed by broader discussions concerning implications. In their study of school publicity campaigns, Alexander and Theisen (1921) urge a localized, centralized, and professionally managed program for which the goal of informing, not misleading, the public is the focus. Hines and Jones (1923, p. 2) characterize such transparency as “professional insurance” against instability. “Pernicious propaganda,” “half truths,” and overpromising undermine the benefits of effective publicity, which, they explain, should consist of two approaches: direct, which is largely concerned with press relations, has more short-term effects, and risks overlooking critical facts to promote others, and indirect, which takes more time but has more impact and less risk in the long run (Hines & Jones, 1923). Miller, who will later serve as the secretary to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc., in New York, and Charles (1924, pp. 9, 164) also advocate a focus on reputation, honest and effective communication, and “actual performance” as well as administrators who approach the work with “honesty and intelligence” and with “a complete willingness to state adverse facts and to admit shortcomings.”

Lee (1925, pp. 37, 45) agrees that proper publicity is “honest,” “acknowledged and responsible”; however, it is “distinctly a weapon that cuts both ways.” Unless the intention is to provide full disclosure, “a man . . . better not ‘monkey’ with publicity” (Lee, 1925, p. 45). Stevenson (1926) also supports disclosure. Voters, he warns, demand more information more of the time, not just when funding is needed, so it is important to commit to providing “accurate information” over time and avoid short bursts of efforts for elections (Stevenson, 1926, p. 58).

Targeted outreach

Publicity advocates also describe the importance of targeting publics. Bernays (1965) credits Doob with the concept of segmentation, but he also claims to have employed the method himself while a theater press agent in the 1910s. Examples of targeted outreach in the 1920s, however, include a study by the Russell Sage Foundation’s Department of Surveys and Exhibits. In it Routzhan (1920) presents ways in which transportation (trucks, trains, trolleys) can be used as effective and economical channels to promote education about farming, health, and welfare to rural communities. To be successful, such efforts require advance work, such as publicity and advertising, targeted appeals to special interest groups, plans for ensuring attendance, partnering with locals, reaching out to newspapers, churches, schools, and “foreign language groups” with effective messaging, “a single topic that is definite and concrete,” as well as plans and resources for determining the campaign’s effectiveness (Routzhan, 1920, pp. 63, 66).

Similarly, in planning a school publicity campaign, the management structure should absorb the campaign as a priority function; in turn, a committee comprised of members of the business, church, and school communities as well as those who bring expertise in particular areas, such as publicity, reporting/editing, public speaking, or advertising, should advise, execute portions of the
plan, and interface with the community (Alexander & Theisen, 1921). The authors also emphasize particular publics who should be courted: the illiterate; non-native English speakers; “heavy taxpayers” (as influencers); retired farmers; families with school-age children; workers who can only be reached during their commutes; youth 18 to 20 years old; and school children (Alexander & Theisen, 1921, pp. 19-20).

The press: challenges

Discussions about disclosure and outreach often focus on the press, and some concern the challenges facing the post-war press that make it more or less vulnerable to the rising tide of publicity. For example, the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation of Armaments, 1921-22, demonstrated greater access and transparency via publicity than the Paris Peace Conference two years earlier (“Publicity Without Candor,” 1921; Villard, 1922). The conference had no language barriers as Versailles did, the delegation chairs were more accessible, and efforts were made to ensure correspondents were informed (Villard, 1922). Nevertheless, deception took place, and although “no essential facts are concealed from the public,” the New Republic lays the blame on “overzealous correspondents,” government advocates providing stories that help their own countries, and the “inability of the correspondent to place a correct interpretation” on complex materials (“Publicity Without Candor,” p. 29), a problem that Villard (1922) attributes to, in part, America’s isolationism, which bred a corps of journalists much better suited to covering domestic rather than international stories.

Journalists are also overwhelmed. “The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 358). But the press cannot itself “furnish from one edition to the next the amount of knowledge which the democratic theory of public opinion demands” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 361). It is an impossible expectation to be “the machinery of information” for “every organ of government, for every social problem” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 363). Instead, because the press reflects “social organization,” the more transparent and representative the institutions are, the better they are at presenting and explaining issues, and the better able the press is to report that information (Lippmann, 1922). Similarly, in countering Bertrand Russell’s admonishment of the press, which Reppelier (1928, p. 653) characterizes as holding it accountable for “the circumstances it reports, the qualities it mirrors, the publicity which it is required to give,” she explains that the mission of American journalism is “not to teach reticence and dignity to the public. The most it can do is to defer to these highly civilized qualities whenever they come its way” (Reppelier, 1928, p. 653).

The press: role of public relations

Just as Lippmann (1922, p. 358) sees the news as a way to “make a picture of reality,”
Bernays (1923, p. 171) sees public relations as a source for that news, based on the “instincts and fundamental emotions of the public.” The public relations counsel must make these appeals ethically, he writes. Material must be truthful and accurate, have “the elements of timeliness and interest,” and be up to the best standards of professional journalism—as if the editor himself had assigned it. Stories must suit the particular needs of each newspaper and the particular needs of each those paper’s editors in the departments from which coverage is sought (Bernays, 1923, p. 198). In the process, according to Squire and Wilson (1924), relationships also should be cultivated with editors, publishers, and reporters.

For example, it is important to be fully available and transparent to reporters and be armed with “all of the facts—bad as well as good, unfavorable as well as favorable” in helping them see how the schools work (Miller & Charles, 1924, p. 71). And while people seeking press coverage should be able to “write acceptable news stories” (Niese, 1925, p. 17), editors should use their own judgment about the news value of a story when unsolicited information comes across their desks, and the public should “demand knowledge as to the source of the information which is given concerning any fact” (Lee, 1925, p. 24; underline is from original). Reporters, adds Reppelier (1928, pp. 651-652), rely on publicity to provide access to the “privacy of the office or the sanctity of the home.” The publicity seekers willing to provide that access will find that they are “not victimized by curiosity” from a reporter; however, they also, then, have no room to complain about the “unwarranted personalities of the press” (Reppelier, 1928, p. 652).

Such relationships are a result of, in part, publicity’s newfound respectability as a “natural” outgrowth from journalism (Alexander, 1929, p. 129). Yesterday’s seamy press agent has since evolved into “a publicity man, and then a publicity director, and finally a director of public relations or a public-relations counsel” whose work has achieved a permanent and professional status and who is recognized for its value, albeit sometimes reluctantly, by reporters and editors (Alexander, 1929, pp. 128-129). The key is “mutual service”—coverage for a client, a story for the press—and it has been mastered by many who are not in either field, such as “lawyers, public officials, clergymen, scientists, and others,” whose work entails a “semi-public nature” and whose ability to learn “journalese” and what qualifies as news to different outlets has also extended to promoting themselves and providing advance copy and details to help ensure press coverage (Alexander, 1929, pp. 128-129).

Although the press considers publicity as amounting to, simply, unpaid advertising, Quiett & Casey (1934, p. 4) contend that, instead, publicists should adhere to the standards of news value in preparing their materials, and they should write it so well that the quality can compete with newsroom copy [3]. Although publicity represents a specific viewpoint, it nevertheless “must be honest. . . . responsible and above board” (Quiett & Casey, 1934, p. 2). Additionally, the content must benefit the publicist, the client, and the readers (Quiett & Casey, 1934). Ultimately, though, it is the newspaper’s
responsibility to decide “whether it will permit its news initiative to be ‘broken down’” (Quiett & Casey, 1934, p. 6).

The press: negative implications of public relations

While to varying degrees practitioners, the press, and thought leaders alike identify some benefits to the press/public relations dynamic, the press and thought leaders tend to air more concerns about the negative impact of that connection. At the post-war Armaments Conference, for example, amid all the “publicity to burn,” the lack of candor was the missing ingredient from the coverage (“Publicity Without Candor,” 1921, p. 29), a problem stemming from the statesmen’s desire for “facesaving.” Villard (1922), however, observes some issues in the process and in the selection of spokesmen. For example, while stenographers were allowed in the meetings, the members of the press were not and had to rely on the formers’ notes instead. Additionally, Britain’s Sunday *News of the World* publisher Lord George Allardice Riddell, having established his reputation at Versailles as a representative of government, represented the British Newspaper Proprietors’ Association at the Conference and served as press liaison even though his tabloid newspaper, while popular, was held in low regard by members of the press (Villard, 1922).

The publicity man can help the press by clarifying and explaining complexities, but the resulting picture is one that is painted in the client’s interests, making the publicist at once a “censor and propagandist,” accountable only to those who retain his services (Lippmann, 1922, 345). Indeed, *Time* finds that many editors “are very weary of being wary,” on guard to ensure accuracy in the face of the public, press agents, and even reporters seeking to mislead or deceive them either out of enthusiasm for their own cause, out of obligation to a paying client, or, in the case of reporters, “carelessness, laziness and pure imagination” (“Tax publicity,” 1925). For example, frustrated by the proliferation of information (1.6 million words) emanating from President Calvin Coolidge’s prolific press secretary during the president’s summer retreat, *The New Republic* comments that not only is there no documentation to back up the releases, which provides the Administration complete deniability, but they set a dangerous precedent for “government by publicity” (“Government by publicity,” 1926, p. 111). Such a system misleads a public, who believes everything it reads, and a press corps, who are “meekly subservient to it,” creating the possibility that “the great task of the next decade will be bringing that power under democratic control” (“Government by publicity,” 1926, p. 111). By the time of the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation into public utilities two years later, which includes testimony from “a long parade of publicity agents and ‘public relations’ executives” (“Probe,” 1928), *Time* reports that with the exception of the “yellow (viz Hearst) press,” there was little reaction among “unsensational editors” because propaganda itself is “an old story in the U.S.”; instead, the real story is whether private ownership provides true financial benefits, and that is to be argued at a later stage of the investigation (“Probe,” 1928).

“When camouflaged as news,” publicity, unlike costly advertising, “is effective and all pure
profit.” It is “what the ‘public relations counsel,’ alias ‘publicity man,’ alias ‘press-agent,’ sets out to accomplish” (Reppelier, 1928, pp. 649-650). Enhancing this approach are, spokespeople (“the ‘stuffed shirt’”), the business of the press, the development of newspaper chains, purchase of newspapers by business, and the growth of radio and film. “We have no tradition of ‘freedom of the radio’ or ‘freedom of the movie,’” Biddle notes (1931, p. 291-292). By the same token, while purchased advertising space is at least somewhat transparent, despite threats of advertisers to pull placements in the event of a contradictory news story, the “real propaganda” takes place in the stories and columns that look and sound like news but that have been driven, behind the scenes, by propagandists (Biddle, 1931, pp. 293).

Carroll (1935) goes a step further. Recalling Bernays’ appeal for a national, presidential-level “Department of Public Relations,” he describes the world of Washington as a “factory of fame” fueled by people who can attract attention for those seeking publicity (p. 30). Terms might vary, Carroll (1935, p. 30), explains, and include “public-relations counsel, personal representative, special assistant, director or press relations, co-ordinator of the press, chief of current information, public-relations adviser, director of publicity, director of information, chief of press relations and chief of press service” but their purpose is “professional builder-uppering.” To this end, their work entails “the cultivation” of reporters and columnists, planned and canned interviews, ghost-written books, “hitch-hiking back into fame” via association with a certain cause, and going on the radio with a “stooge,” a host prepared with questions to position the guest in a positive light and in the minds of listeners, a tactic that “moves with the precision of a vaudeville act” (Carroll, 1935, p. 117).

Doob (1935) concurs with the role of media in propaganda and explains that newspapers in particular are not immune. He attributes this to factors such as media ownership, the position of reporters and editors in their organization and in the social milieu they represent, the extent or lack of awareness concerning the true sources of their news stories, and their own frames of reference in covering a story.

The public

The discussion around the press and public relations largely concerns the duties, obligations, and considerations to which the press and public relations are advised to adhere. There are others, though, including practitioners, who consider the public’s role in the success or failure of publicity efforts via the press and otherwise. In this light, the public is at times a participant in as well as a recipient of the public relations process, with particular emphasis on its ability or lack thereof to cognitively process and critically evaluate messages and viewpoints. As Niese (1925, p. 38) observes, this process of publicity is effective because human nature drives people to read the news and because psychology then drives them to “believe a great, great deal of what they read and to a large extent be influenced by the writers.” Lippmann (1922) offers disillusioned commentary and analysis concerning wartime propaganda and is also a kind of foil and inspiration for Bernays (1923) (St. John & Lamme, 2011). However, in Lippmann’s lesser known *Phantom Public* he revisits his ideas concerning the
press and public opinion and finds that much of what the public actually does is “not to express opinions but to align itself for or against a proposal,” and often without knowing the whole truth of it (Lippmann, 1925, p. 61). [4] Crisis, he argues, is the only scenario in which outreach to public opinion is effective, and it is used for selecting those whose actions could best stem the crisis (Lippmann, 1925). Such seeming demonstrations of unity, however, more accurately reflect a “modus vivendi,” a compromise or agreed-upon co-existence that does not promise long-term alignment or understanding but, rather, serves a short-term purpose after which the parties resume their separate interests (Lippmann, 1925, p. 99). Biddle (1932) argues, however, that attempts at unity are really drives for conformity, a more prized outcome. In both cases, what is lost is the coming together of independent thought to comprise genuine public opinion.

Public opinion, Lippmann (1925, p. 197) concludes, is “not the voice of God, nor the voice of society, but the voice of interested spectators of action.” The public, then, has duties different from “those of the executive men” whose interests are not to be confused with “some common purpose” (p. 197). The power of self-interest also resonates with Lee (1925, pp. 37-38), who advises that the public should be aware of an information source and then determine whether the information “serves his interests or not” because that is ultimately how each person evaluates a situation. In a later work, Lippmann concludes that “each man has countless interests through which he is attached to a very complex social situation. The complexity of his allegiance cannot fail to be reflected in his political conduct” (1929, p. 269).

**Power, control, propaganda**

Doob (1935, p. 83) characterizes many of the works written in the earlier part of the 1920s as being reactionary to the “war-bath of propaganda” and “unworthy of the succeeding decade.” He particularly criticizes Lumley (1933) for publishing a work that was reminiscent of those inflammatory post-war pieces in pitting democracy against all propaganda rather than distinguishing between intentional and unintentional efforts (Doob, 1935). However, over time, other works appear that do seek to better understand the long-term implications of wartime propaganda, the rising tide of publicity, their effects on the public and the press, and, sometimes, ways to defuse those effects.

There is great faith in the idea that propaganda would not be able to flourish when pitted against truth and long-term commitments to disclosure and goodwill. *The New Republic,* for example, posits that propaganda will fail, despite the corruption in its wake, because that is “the tribute which the lie pays for the truth” (“Publicity Without Candor,” 1921, p. 30). It is publicity that will thrive, according to Squire and Wilson (1924, p. 17), and propaganda that “has only passing vitality.” In fact, “the revulsion of press and public against selfish or biased publicity effort is a healthy sign” (Squire & Wilson, 1924, p. 26). Propaganda’s “essential evil,” Lee argues, is not in the word but in the concealment of an information source; and the best guard against that evil is the public who by virtue
of numbers alone can detect and flush out falsehoods to the detriment of that source (Lee, 1925, p. 23; underline is from original).

On the other hand, an examination of problems within social movements, according to Lippmann (1925, p. 187), demonstrates the root problem of control: “it is necessary to extend the area of control over all the factors in a problem or the problem will be insoluble anywhere.” Working beyond the arena of facts, data, and information, and into individual perceptions, “propaganda is the war of ideas on ideas” (Lasswell, 1927, p. 9), a molding force on public opinion that appears to overshadow democratic ideals concerning the power and “sanctity of individual opinion” (Lasswell, 1927, p. 222).

Control, however, does not occur solely on the side of the propagandist. When the public weighs in on a situation, for example, it is seeking to “control the actions of others from the outside” (Lippmann, 1925, p. 52), but its real effect is to influence opinion, not behavior. Additionally, communication is “a prime instrument of social control,” not only in terms of the actual outlets and their content, but also in “mobilizing accessory forms of propaganda, with the purposes of forging an obedient and patriotic mentality in the population, and of spreading advantageous propaganda outside of the state as an instrument of national policy” (Riegel, 1934, pp. 210-211). American intellectual life is “relatively free from the nationalistic control” of its government, he continues, although the control of the press is more likely to develop “through a slow and not clearly perceptible evolution in the factors of financial control” (Riegel, 1934, pp. 211-213). Ideally, then, minority voices should be given full sway in the press while the power of the newspaper industry power structures, which seek to eliminate competition even as they are themselves vulnerable to “non-journalistic control,” should be kept in check (Riegel, 1934, p. 213).

Indeed, Lasswell (1927, p. 37) warns that it is getting increasingly difficult to distinguish between propaganda employed for “private advantage which is incidental to a legitimate public advantage, and a private advantage which brings no overwhelming public advantage, is difficult to draw.” For example, Biddle (1931, pp. 293-294) cites the October 1929 event, Electric Light’s Golden Jubilee, which was designed by a then-unnamed propagandist, Bernays, to challenge the unnamed “enemy,” the Federal Trade Commission and others opposed to the privatization of public utilities. The success of the campaign was grounded in emotional conditioning: using well-known men such as Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh who would generate great amounts of news coverage which would then be read by the multitudes who were unaware of the process being imposed upon them (Biddle, 1931).

Propaganda “has proved a remarkably powerful method” of “social control” that eschews force in favor of persuasion and that chips away at “critical thinking” in favor of “gullibility” (Biddle, 1932, p. 1). By the same token, in the absence of social scientific measurement, propagandists’ claims as to the effectiveness of their methods, Biddle suggests, even propagandists are vulnerable to gullibility (1932). To effectively advocate for one side of a cause or issue, he observes, requires the
propagandist to avoid the critical evaluation of a program’s elements and instead “perforce accept or reject the whole program” (Biddle, 1932, p. 6). Laws can regulate advertising and newspapers, but propaganda’s “control innuendo” and “campaigns of whispering and rumor” is less likely to be regulated at the risk of suppressing “persuasion and the expression of opinion” (Biddle, 1932, p. 8).

**Education**

Indeed, because in America, propaganda “connotes deceit or disguise in motives or source” it “generally passes under the name of education” (Riegel, 1934, p. 199). Similarly, contending that the label is not as important as the function and context, Lasswell (1935, p. 4) groups “propaganda, pedagogy, education, contagion, news, publicity, and advertising” together as “closely connected terms” that can be distinctly differentiated by the times in which they are used and “the technical jargon of different specialists.” Bonnett (1935, p. 5) finds that with propaganda a now “regular function of variously named departments of public relations under such cognomens as ‘educational work,’ ‘promoting better standards,’ and similar phrases,” such entities “have been able to influence public opinion through many of our social institutions, including the schools from kindergarten to university, as well as the church, the press, and other public forums.”

The increasing complexity of the world and the rate at which it continues to change precludes the ability to stay informed and develop informed opinions (Lippmann, 1925). This is why the appeal to education “as the remedy for the incompetence of democracy is so barren”; the best that can be attained is the teaching “of a pattern of thought and feeling which will enable the citizen to approach a new problem in some useful fashion,” a model that needs to emerge from political science, not pedagogy (Lippmann, 1925, p. 27).

Biddle agrees that education should provide the critical thinking skills and “coöperative intelligence of well-adjusted citizens” that a democracy demands, and because, historically, education seeks to cultivate “intelligent, discriminative thinking,” it must be designed to “control propaganda” by guarding against gullibility (1932, pp. 3, 5, 8). This approach extends beyond mere skepticism and generates “positive, creative thought as well,” providing “additional information, with experience in a great variety of points of view in all controversial questions” (Biddle, 1932, p. 70).

**Rise of the profession**

Despite their concerns about the implications of propaganda and publicity, thought leaders, practitioners, and the press all acknowledge, albeit with varying degrees of reservation, the rise of the professional applications of those functions. “Propaganda is itself a skill,” Lasswell (1935, p. 27) concludes, causing propagandists to compete among those with other skills in the marketplace and thereby creating interest in understanding more about “the wealth and position of advertisers, missionaries, and publicity men of all degrees in various times and places.” In the United States, for example, one propagandist can work with multiple clients on “their relations with the public,” and
they are called “‘publicity men’ or ‘public relations counsels’”; on the other hand there are also those who advise from within but whose function is public relations (Lasswell, 1935, p. 4).

Even by 1920, the profession is thriving, “enlisting thousands of capable men and women in all the large cities and most modern countries. . . . from the perfectly legitimate to the criminal,” a problem experienced in other professions as well (“Publicity, public opinion, and the wily press-agent, 1920, p. 58). Wilder and Buell (1923, p. 14) contend that such interest in publicity will begin to draw “some of the best minds in the field of publishing and the arts,” leaving no room for those pretenders. The technique of publicity, they conclude, is fairly straightforward, but the science of it, the ways in which arguments will be presented to the public, “involves common sense and experience of the world, as well as the study of psychology as a science” (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 266). They predict that publicity managers will be as commonly found and relied upon in business as lawyers are in guiding the organization; the key is to continue to develop publicity so that it remains a “force of enlightenment . . . available to all” (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 266).

Doob (1935, p. 191) recognizes the “public relations counsel” as at once typical of the employment of such tactics and yet “unique” for his deeper understanding of “the problem of propaganda” and his subtler, more indirect approaches in influence. Rather than starting with a goal, “arousing certain related attitudes, and hoping that the result will be the desired integration,” the public relations man begins with the “desired integration” and then “considers which related attitudes he should try to tap in order to secure that integration” (Doob, 1935, pp. 191-192). Lee was able to change public attitude toward the Rockefellers not by telling Standard Oil’s story through advertising, but “by making the country’s press acquainted with the favorable aspects of that company and of Rockefeller himself” (Doob, 1935, p. 194). Bernays, on the other hand, drove “one of the most astonishing pieces of propaganda ever engineered” with Electric Light’s Golden Jubilee (Doob, 1935, p. 195). Like Biddle (1931), Doob finds that while the celebration was positioned to honor Edison’s invention, Bernays was not working for Edison or for Henry Ford, a driver of the anniversary celebration, but instead for people interested in capitalizing on the event (Doob, 1935). He characterizes Bernays’ approach as applying similar principles of laissez-faire economics to public opinion, “constructing a new attitude upon the foundation of certain pre-existing attitudes. In a word, he is using human nature as a means to mould a different kind of human nature” (Doob, 1935, p. 199). Doob credits Bernays for being one of the few who recognize “ the existence of unintentional propaganda in society,” he also points out that by assuming “the propagandist, especially the commercial propagandist like himself, should play upon the fickleness of people to achieve interested ends,” Bernays “is making himself and his whole profession the arbiters of social change” (Doob, 1935, p. 200). Other institutions, he writes, have achieved more than Bernays in influencing public sentiment to do more, such as churches or wartime governments; however, Bernays, who “conceals himself too skillfully,” also has the advantage of modern communications: “In short, the society which Bernays helps to direct has made him possible” (Doob, 1935, p. 205).
Conclusion

In this study, the post-war surge of publicity was attributed to literacy, democracy, education and the opportunities it provided, suffrage, mass communications, particularly radio and film, and the increasingly powerful business structures within the newspaper industry. There was also considerable deliberation concerning the implications of wartime propaganda and the obligations of the press, public relations, and the public in navigating and critically evaluating persuasive efforts. Public relations did not crystallize during this time, although there were some indications that early on, labels aside, it had already started to work out as Ivy Lee (1925) wrote, “some of the things it is and is not” and what it should be.

Thought leaders, the press, and practitioners alike wrote of their concerns about power and control in relation to those efforts, and practitioners advised that such effects could be offset or even avoided with positive intentions, disclosure, and program longevity. Indeed, practitioners were quite vocal about their obligations to the public and the press in executing effective and ethical work. Likewise, the press and the public were both named as participants in, not simply recipients of, that process. Concepts prized today as indicative of effective public relations, such as disclosure, transparency, goodwill, public interest, even listening, were evident in the field’s development during this time, as were attempts at developing ethical principles of practice. Similarly, references made to the ease of “doing” public relations, once learned, also emphasized the field’s adaptability across sectors, beyond business and large organizations. In fact, there were fewer references to business, per se, than to how public relations and its effects played out as increasingly significant components of the democratic process, regardless of the interests represented.

More prevalent than comments about what to call the “new technique” Wilder and Buell (1923, p. 16), intention was seen as a measure for evaluating the quality, the perceived value, of a purpose, tactic, or outcome (e.g., “good” versus “bad” publicity). Good publicity, for example, served the public good and entailed a commitment to accurate, factual information (and when possible, bolstered by credible research), ethical practice, and public goodwill. It was a failsafe against “forces of darkness” (Wilder & Buell, 1923, p. 266). Doob’s work on intentional propaganda was different, however. In his study, intention meant, essentially, a deliberate, systematic attempt to influence others with an understanding as to some intended effect. Disturbingly, perhaps, Doob’s construct, conceived within the context of post-war thought concerning propaganda, the rising threat of propaganda abroad, and the increasing number of “commercial propagandists” stateside, resonates with modern attempts to characterize effective public relations. However, then, as now, consideration of social effects among practitioners weighed in favor of serving the public interest, as did calls for the measurement of those effects. Thus, by 1935, despite the growth of the field, public relations was not found to have been clearly and unequivocally distinguished from propaganda and the power and control with which it was associated. Nevertheless, among the practitioners there was an overriding faith in the public’s
ability to work out and process and develop opinions competently if presented with ethical and effective practices.

References


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Notes
[1] Informing Your Public (Squire & Wilson, 1924), was copyrighted by the YMCA, included a foreword by an editor of Editor & Publisher, and was recommended in a letter to Lee from Bernays following a lunch they had together (Bernays, 1924).
[2] The use of male nouns and pronouns is a deliberate one, intended to correspond to the historical evidence presented here and to remain true to the context of the time presented in this study.
[3] In addition to the challenges and contradictions laid out by DeLorme and Fedler (2003), the idea that well-written, clearly sourced, and otherwise credible publicity copy (unfettered by threats or promises related to corresponding paid placement) could hold its own and at times outshine and
displace or replace reporters’ own works suggests an additional underlying factor contributing to
tensions between the two fields.

[4] Characterized as “perhaps the clearest, pithiest, and must full-throated expression of Lippmann’s
crystallizing skepticism” (McClay, 1993, p. xv), The Phantom Public faded quickly from public view
in its own time (Steel, 1980) perhaps because of “the challenges it poses, and the implications of those
challenges for the conduct of practical politics” (McClay, 1993, p. xix). Lippmann championed the
“disinterested” public, one that held no stake in events and so could judge them more objectively and
truthfully, over the groups of interested people who from outside the actions of executive insiders are
limited to approving or disapproving of those actions, with no real sway over the actions themselves
(Lippmann, 1925).
The International Public Relations Association (IPRA): diplomacy, ideologies and politics

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Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of discourses emerging around the formation and early years of IPRA. The paper recounts a basic narrative from early meetings between members of the Institute of Public Relations and overseas practitioners in 1950 to the development of the initial concept for an international body that reached fruition in 1955. It examines key documentation such as The Hermans Memorandum and explores the steps taken by IPRA to enhance the standing of the public relations occupation.

The paper explores the language, values and ideologies of the emerging body and those who shaped it in the early years, and relates the early history of the professional association to the post-Second War, Cold War political context. While the paper is written from a British perspective, it lays out a number of international themes and discourses such as nationalism, de-colonisation, and globalisation. It also highlights European inspiration and influences behind the international project as a counterpoint to Anglophonic assumptions.

The paper is based on archival research at Bournemouth University (IPRA archive) and the History of Advertising Trust (CIPR archives.)
Abstract
This paper traces the evolution of the Canadian federal government’s communication community over a 25-year period, from 1985 to 2010. At the heart of this evolution were efforts made by the community itself to be - and to be valued as - strategic and professional. We argue that the two Government of Canada communication policies supported by the community and the professional development driven by the community were the primary factors in any strategic and professional evolution.

Introduction
The public sector is fundamentally different from the private sector. Many popular models of public relations/communication do not account for the complexities of government communication (Liu & Horsley, 2007). In fact, at the federal, national level of government, public relations/communication remains largely un-researched (Liu & Levenhus, 2010; Lee, 2008; Gelders, Bouckaert & van Ruler, 2007; Vos & Westerhoudt, 2008). This is especially true for research on a community of practitioners employed in federal government communication. While survey research that targets federal government communication professionals as a population has been conducted (for example: Gelders et al, 2006; Fairbanks et al, 2007; Liu & Levenhus, 2010), to our knowledge, no research has been conducted that focuses exclusively on these professionals as a collectivity, as a specific functional community. Our research describes the changes affecting the Government of Canada’s (GoC) communication community, focusing on the community’s strategic and professional evolution from 1985 to 2010.

In tracing this evolution, we explore three research streams. For the first, we examine the introduction of two Government of Canada (GoC) Communication Policies, in 1988 and in 2002, and the roles played by the community in the development of the content of these policies and in their subsequent approval and introduction. For the second, this paper looks at two central government agencies,
Privy Council Office and the Treasury Board Secretariat, as the loci of community leadership and the roles they played in fostering a sense of community. For the third research stream, we consider infrastructures built by community members themselves to improve management practices across the community and to provide programs for community development.

1. Definitions of Strategic and Professionalism

We define strategic as two-fold: (1) the communication function being part of the strategic management of the GoC department; and (2) managing the communication function strategically (J. Grunig in Lee, 2008; Likely, 2010). Managing strategically and strategic management means involvement in the decision-making around strategy development and execution. Strategy is the setting of long-term goals and objectives, the determination of courses of action and the allocation of resources to further those goals and objectives (Chandler, 1962). We employed the nine generic principles of organizational communication as our guide to strategic, with the first four referencing strategic management and the last five managing strategically (Vercic, Grunig & Grunig, 1996).

Citing directly, they are:

- Involvement of public relations in organizational strategic management;
- Organization employs two-way symmetrical model of public relations;
- Organization has a symmetrical system of internal communication;
- Organization executives have a knowledge potential for managerial role and symmetrical public relations;
- Empowerment of public relations in the dominant coalition or a direct reporting relationship to senior management;
- Integrated into one public relations function;
- Public relations as a management function separate from other functions;
- Function headed by a manager rather than a technician;
- Diversity embodied in all roles in the PR function.

We define professionalism as the communication community or occupational group achieving legitimization as a specialized functional community through external recognition of unique knowledge, set of skills and common standards – to the extent that it “gains the power to determine who is qualified to perform a defined set of tasks, to prevent all others from performing that work, and to control the criteria by which to evaluate performance (Freidson, 2001, p12).”

2. Context for the GoC’s Communication Community

Canada is a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. The Prime Minister is Canada’s head of government and she or he appoints a Cabinet, with each Minister responsible for a department. A deputy minister, a public servant, supports each Minister and is the functional head of a department while the Minister is the department’s political master. Each department has a
communication branch. The most senior position in a communication branch is the department’s head of communication. In most cases, heads of communication report directly to the deputy minister but work on a daily basis with the Minister’s politically appointed director of communication. The Prime Minister and each Minister of the Crown directly employ a number of political or “exempt” staff. These are partisan, political appointments and are not members of the public service. Public servants are non-partisan and neutral; their employment depends on merit, not the whims of any government. Therefore, public servants can provide non-partisan advice and speak truth to power. As a result, they, particularly communication branch staff, tread that fine line between non-partisan and political communication. Exempt appointments don’t have the authority to direct public servants but can convey the Minister’s instructions, though the line between directing and conveying could blur and shift (Aucoin & Savoie, 2009; Kozolanka 2009, 2006).

Canada had 36,800 employed public relations and communication practitioners in 2004, an increase of 56% since the mid 1990s (Canadian Government Job Futures, 2007). The federal government’s communication community is the largest concentration of these practitioners in Canada, employing approximately 15-20% of the total. It is larger than that in any other organization and larger than the two biggest public relations/communication associations: the Canadian Public Relations Society (CPRS); and the Canadian chapters of the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC).

One should note the cycles of investment and disinvestment in the public service by different governments in this 25-year period. Budgets and the absolute numbers of employees grew in the 1980s. This was followed by extensive downsizing in the 1990s, to be followed again by significant growth in the size of government in the 2000s. By the end of 2010, the federal government was entering another period of sizable cuts to budgets and employees. As we write this paper in 2012, the communication community has been affected by significant resource cuts, with more planned. The importance of periods of investment and disinvestment on the ability to enact positive reforms is captured in the following comment about change management efforts during the disinvestment period of the 1990s:

“There has not been one reform effort introduced in recent years that has lived up to expectations. Indeed, if one is to believe consulted officials or former public servants like Paul Tellier or John L. Manion, who have written about their experiences in government, none has ever succeeded in meeting even modest objectives” (Savoie, 1999, p.232).

Methodology

This paper has been developed to provide a practice-based overview of the Canadian Federal Government’s Communication Community evolution of the last 25 years. The authors agreed on a research approach that reflects a human interpretation of reality which is constructivist and
postpositivistic (Leedy & Ormond, 2004). “Quality research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including filed notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the Self” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Following this approach, our methodology is qualitative, and we follow the principles of narrative inquiry that values personal and social experiences as valid and important sources for knowledge (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).

The authors of this paper have had, and still have, extensive experience either as active communication executives and professionals in government, or as consultants, in the time frame of this research from the late eighties to now. As researchers, we were the bridge connecting the research with the research participants. Our sources included many official government documents, policies, memoranda and speeches, as well as unofficial drafts that did not become formalized. We asked a series of questions, noted in Appendix A, which we sent electronically to our participants, all of whom were involved in the communication community over the 25 year period and are now either retired, the vast majority, or still working. Of the 35 questionnaires sent, we received 16 responses. These written questions were punctuated by conversations and interviews with senior Canadian federal communicators that comprised our data resource pool. Our method, therefore, was narration both written and verbal, with documentation shared voluntarily by participants.

As researchers taking a narrative inquiry research approach, we were mindful of our own consciousness during the research process and aware of the influence our interpretation may have had on the lived experience of others. “One of the ways we learn to think about risks, dangers and abuses throughout the inquiry is through our multiple ‘I’s’ as narrative inquirers” (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).

The quality of our research follows a process of craftsmanship (Kvale, 2002) in the care and attention brought to the research process; the observation and the value of conversations about the observations; and the degree to which the knowledge can be applied to reality. And we were mindful of the value our research brings to the community that was researched. We, the researchers, had numerous exchanges about our work, and revised our work plan to accommodate the complexity of gathering data over time and space.

However, the processes of taking raw data, collating and organizing it, interpreting it to find patterns, creating information and providing meaning, are probably the most challenging aspects of the qualitative research process. Difficult decisions have to be made about what is to be included and what data is not helpful in constructing meaning (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). This study, therefore, has its limitations. The epistemology of our qualitative research is based on the subjective interpretation of human behaviour in order to create meaning. This meaning, or sense- making of reality, is then
expressed through the filter of human interpretation as a methodology. We, the researchers, served as that filter.

**Research Questions**


2. How did Canadian Government central agencies - the Privy Council Office, Communications and Consultation Secretariat or the Treasury Board Secretariat, Communications - affect the strategic and professional evolution of the Canadian Federal Government’s communication community?

3. How did the professional bodies - Canadian Federal Information Directors (CFID), the Information Services Institute (ISI), Federal Communications Council (FCC) and/or the Communications Community Office (CCO) - affect the strategic and professional evolution of the Canadian Federal Government’s communication community?

**Discussion: Linkages to Research Questions**


The Government of Canada released the Communication Guide in 1981. Its purpose was to “better manage communication programs in support of government and departmental objectives …” (Harley & Kelly, 1984, p.2). This was the first comprehensive policy document ever issued by the federal government on communication effectiveness and the first attempt through policy enactment to have the community become more strategic. The Guide, though, did not lessen “internal demands for better advice, planning and management of the communication function (Government of Canada, 1987, p. 1).” Ultimately, these challenges led to a major review of government communication. One result of the review was the adoption by the GoC of a government-wide communications policy, approved on June 22, 1988. The Policy incorporated the recommendations of the review. Since the policy redefined the communication function – including envisioning “communications officers helping to set goals and make decisions, in addition to their traditional function of producing communications products” (Government of Canada, 1988d, p.6) - and necessitated a cultural change, it was accepted that full implementation would be a long, methodical process and that there would be roadblocks to be surmounted (Government of Canada, 1990a). Over the next few years, the policy had not yet received full implementation and knowledge levels of its requirements varied; these were stronger with senior executives and weaker with junior executives, program and policy managers (ibid; FCC 1992a). The years following the introduction of the policy were also years of disinvestment, with cuts to
communication branch operational budgets in 1993 and 1994 and along with other functions major cuts to salary budgets in 1995 to 1998.

The government’s first communication policy never did receive complete and broad implementation (Government of Canada, 1991a; Ferguson, 1993). The 1988 Government Communication Policy was both neglected and out-of-date, for among other things not recognizing new e-communication technologies, by the turn of the decade. A new GoC Communication Policy was issued in 2002. It followed much of the orientation expressed in the 1988 policy, but it also went much further by assigning detailed accountabilities. The 2002 policy did not just describe, it prescribed, assigning roles and responsibilities for every facet of communication activity. Heads of Communication were under tremendous pressure in the early and mid 2000s to meet the demands for increased communication service as the government greatly increased its investments in programs and in public servants to manage those programs.

The 2002 policy took a business orientation and spoke of modern management functions beyond those related to the traditional role of informing and exchanging information with Canadians (Canada, 1988). Some of these new functions to be handled by communication officers had not even been on the radar in 1988. They included citizen engagement, risk communication, crisis communication, regional operations, internal communication, web and e-communication, partnering and sponsorships, marketing and public education/outreach (Canada, 2002a).

Many respondents suggested that the 1988 Policy provided the needed clarity to legitimize the role of the communication function within federal departments. One respondent even suggested that the Policy might have evolved as a result of the controversial role that centralizing and controlling organizations such as the Canadian Unity Information Office and Information Canada had played in shaping federal politics, in the years preceding the first GoC Policy. Their demise had suggested that a structure was needed to identify the role of communication and to clarify who is responsible for the function within federal departments. Some respondents said that the Policy helped elevate the communication function to a strategic level by providing communicators a seat at the departmental management table. With the articulation of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, the 1988 Communication Policy provided the framework for the development of a classification system that gave the communication function an operational identity.

The Government’s 2002 Communication Policy achieved far greater uptake and more extensive implementation than did the first policy. “That policy document resulted in a greatly expanded definition of the government communications function” (Devereaux, Ferguson & Johansen, 2005, p.112). Being more prescriptive than the 1988 Policy, the 2002 version was used aggressively by many Heads of Communication, according to a number of respondents. One respondent suggested that the Policy “provided a lever for driving compliance, and provided the source for authority”. The
Policy allowed for consolidating authority in the office of the communication branch Head. It gave the Head accountability for all communication functions and thus for all communication activity in the department. It provided the legality in the business case to obtain more resources and to elevate branch management positions. In a 2007 benchmarking exercise, Heads offered several opinions about the 2002 Policy. It

- Clarified what the communication branch actually does;
- Set expected norms against which gap analyses could be conducted and business cases built and made;
- Provided justification to decline client demands and to manage service expectations;
- Provided a foundation for developing strategic communication plans tied to government and departmental plans;

The 1988 GoC Communication Policy and a number of its spin-off guidelines provided a foundation by which the communication function could be made more strategic. It described what a more strategic reality would look like. But it wasn’t prescriptive. The 2002 GoC Policy was describing roles, responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities in detail.

Some respondents, however, offered a contrary view regarding the value of the two communication policies by suggesting neither was taken seriously. In fact, to cite one answer to our survey, “If I had invoked the 1988 Policy in internal PCO meetings or with Deputy Ministers they would have wondered what I was smoking. To them it was some weird creation of communicators that served no purpose as we dealt with each other and/or the political side”. One respondent, who had recently trained federal professionals with a communication role, was actually taken aback by the lack of awareness and understanding of training participants regarding the existence and import of the 1988 and the 2002 communication policies.

In 2004 and 2006, the Treasury Board Secretariat issued amendments to the 2002 Policy that addressed advertising and public opinion research processes. In 2005, it started consultations on the development of a renewed policy. While a revised policy exists in draft form, it has yet to be approved and issued. The 2002 Policy is still in force.

2. Central Agencies: Privy Council Office and Treasury Board Secretariat

The Clerk of the Privy Council is Head of the public service and of the Privy Council Office (PCO), which is the Prime Minister’s department. The Privy Council Office (PCO), created at the time of Canadian Confederation in 1867, provides non-partisan support to the Prime Minister, cabinet, and government departments. The PCO has had a longstanding leadership role in government wide communication. As noted above, it released the first communication policy document in 1981. Prior to 1986 though, when a new secretariat was formed in Privy Council Office to house its communication resources, there wasn’t a specialized division for communication leadership. In 1987,
the Head of the public service and Clerk of the Privy Council, Paul Tellier, initiated the Communication Management Review and expressed the view that “communicating is not just a fancy wrapping on new products, but in some sense the very business of government, and a continuing duty with everyone with responsibility to serve the public (Government of Canada, 1988d).” He delegated leadership of the review to the head of this new secretariat. Those involved examined modern communication requirements, conducted an occupational analysis, set up a system to track all expenditures on communication across government, developed a government-wide communication policy (as described above), created a working group on public environmental analysis to address “…new demands for tactical and strategic communication (that) have emerged” (Government of Canada, 1988a, p.1). The PCO-led group developed a communication planning framework and developed an orientation training program. Recommendations included the following:

- Designate communication as a central management function;
- Include research and public environmental analysis, advice, planning and department-wide functional management
- Integrate communication in policy and program decisions and share responsibility for communication with policy and program officers;
- Make departmental deputy ministers responsible and accountable for the communication function; and
- Position the head of communications in the department’s management group (Government of Canada, 1987).

While developed and driven in large part by the Privy Council Office, the 1988 Policy itself was housed in the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada. As such, there has been a historic tango between these two organizations that has been, in large part, mutually congruent. The Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) has two mandates. First, it provides support to the Treasury Board as a committee of ministers with their responsibilities for accountability and ethics, financial, personnel and administrative management, comptrollership, approving regulations and most Orders-in-Council. Second, it fulfils the statutory responsibilities of a central government agency, in that the Secretariat makes recommendations and provides advice to the Treasury Board on policies, directives, regulations, and program expenditure proposals with respect to the management of the government's resources. With regard to the communication community, TBS has the responsibility for the GoC Communication Policy, for personnel training and for communication performance measurement.

Post 1988, the Privy Council Office worked closely with the Treasury Board Secretariat to identify the competencies required for a new breed of communicator, from the level of officer all the way to executive. Respondents noted that the communication community was unique by being one of the earliest to identify its own competencies and develop its own classification standard, with the full support of the Privy Council Office and Treasury Board Secretariat. In essence, the Secretariat provided the resources both to the Privy Council Office and the federal communication community by giving legs to the Communication Policy.
Many respondents noted that the 1988 Policy was taken seriously mainly because of the individual efforts and leadership of the Clerk of the Privy Council and Assistant Secretary of Communications and Consultation of the time. Respondents, though, suggested that at the departmental level, the degree to which the 1988 Policy was adhered to was largely a function of the leadership of the deputy minister and Head of communication of that department. That is, while the Policy had top-down PCO and TBS backing, its adoption in individual departments was at the whim of the departmental leadership and thus could not be enforced universally. Writing in 1991, a PCO official stated that: “it (1988 Communications Policy) is far from being fully embraced or implemented in every government department or agency” (Government of Canada, 1991a, p. 2).

From its inception in 1986, the PCO Communication and Consultations Secretariat was the functional leader of the communication community (Government of Canada, 2002a). But, from approximately 1992 to 1998, its influence waned. Remnants of the Communication Management group in PCO moved to TBS and TBS assumed full responsibility for the implementation of the 1988 Policy as well as for training (Government of Canada, 1991d). In the early 1990s, PCO had introduced the idea that Heads of communication report to Heads of policy branches and not to the departmental deputy minister, contrary to the 1988 Policy requirement – an idea that was loudly opposed by the communication community (Federal Communication Council, 1994a). PCO focused its leadership role only on its operational work with the communication community: the management of issues and horizontal, cross government communication (Federal Communication Council, 1993c).

A vigorous training program for all levels of federal communicator accompanied the launching of the 1988 Policy, to ensure the Policy was fully understood. This training was supplemented by other communication courses to elevate the professionalism of the community. By 1991, PCO was able to state that “the Communication Management Review is working with the Federal Communication Council and the Information Services Institute in the pursuit of permanent “community-based, community-directed” thrusts to improve training and development generally…” (Government of Canada, 1991b, p. 11). By 1993, PCO was no longer a major player in community training initiatives, with the community leadership stating that “professional development is a shared concern of FCC, ISI and TBS. TBS is also involved in the best practices study and the media relations study” (Federal Communication Council, 1993b, p. 3).

Treasury Board initiated a number of efforts in the mid 1990s to ascertain the status of the 1988 Policy. One involved the creation of an advisory committee of experts from the public and private sectors: “At issue is not whether changes to the current policy will be made: the real question is whether the current review will result in a minor tune-up, or a major makeover (Nelson, 1995, p.7).” In a period of massive downsizing from disinvestment, the advisory committee approach floundered. Nothing happened until 1988, when Treasury Board established a Corporate Identity and Government Communication Division. The division had a twofold mandate: to brand the Government of Canada
and to renew the 1988 Government Communication Policy (Johansen and Devereaux Ferguson, 2005).

In 1997, PCO was seeking input into its role as community leader (Government of Canada. 1997b & c). The result was that “the (PCO) Assistant Secretary of Communications to Cabinet steered a government-wide committee that created a vision statement for the communications community” (Devereaux Ferguson & Johansen 2005, p.114). From 1998 to 2002, both PCO and TBS were recommitted to improving the lot of the community. For TBS, the result was a new communications policy. For PCO, the result was the creation of the Communications Community Office (described below). In latter years, the CCO has assumed much of the community role these two central agencies previously played.

Several respondents noted the important role that central agencies played over the years in developing training programs through the federal Canada School as well as with local universities. Most respondents noted the importance of central agencies in elevating the professionalism of the communication community by such efforts. Various respondents weighted their contributions differently, giving one or the other more credit. However, other respondents suggested that central agencies were not as instrumental in developing the community, as was the community itself.

3. Professional Bodies: ISI, CFID, FCC and CCO

Over the years, information and communication practitioners in the federal government sought to organize themselves into a collective association. In 1968, the Information Services Management Group was created for communication managers in the IS-04 to 06 categories. A year later, its name was changed to the Information Services Management Institute. It became the Information Services Institute (ISI) in 1973. In the mid-1970s, the ISI began to represent all information service officers and managers when the Council of Federal Information Directors (CFID) was established (Miller 1976, p.27) to represent communication executives. CFID became the Federal Communication Council in 1989.

Both the ISI and CFID/FCC were associations where membership was voluntary. ISI members paid dues personally and the membership of the ISI “never exceeded 100 members” (Federal Communication Council, 1993a). On the other hand, the FCC never had more than 90 or so members (out of a potential 425), but the FCC members paid a levy from their communication branch budgets and not from their own pockets (ibid). Their interests included a career planning module for IS-01 to IS-06; a career counselling service; the development of an inventory of IS personnel; and an interdepartmental secondment program (Federal Communication Council, 1993b).
From 1989 to the mid 1990s, the FCC employed an Executive Director. By the mid 1990s, as downsizing of the community was in full bore, the activities of the two groups lessened greatly. Both the ISI and the FCC ceased to exist towards the end of the 1990s and neither has been revived since. The same heads of communication that belonged to the FCC created the Communication Community Office (CCO) in 2002, at the urging of the PCO. “Directors General (Heads) of Communication have also agreed to fund a Community Development Office to collectively address, find and implement solutions to the challenges faced by the community” (Government of Canada, 2002a, p.3). The CCO is governed by a board of directors, and its work is performed by a paid staff. It does not rely on volunteer efforts to the extent that the ISI and FCC had. The Office is funded by 40 or so federal departments, from a levy based on the number of departmental employees. It has a deputy minister champion and an assistant deputy minister of communication who chairs its board of directors. Overall, its purpose is to advocate for the community among deputy ministers and to take control of the community’s destiny in a number of areas. Its mandate is to provide tools and mechanisms for the following purposes:

- support the recruitment and retention efforts of managers;
- enhance learning and career development opportunities for communicators;
- support the use of new technology and media;
- strengthen the community through sharing information and networking; and
- play an advocacy role in positioning the communications function as a value-added service in advancing Government of Canada priorities” (Government of Canada. 2006b).

The CCO engages in many activities to foster the training and development of the federal communication community, which range from developing professional training programs with Ottawa-based colleges and universities, as well as the Canada School of the Public Service. A number of training events are hosted each year, a conference is held, and mentoring programs have been established. In addition, the CCO takes an active role in developing competencies, and staffing positions. These services are also extended to regional staff with the help and support of the Federal Regional Councils of Communicators. The Communication Community Office showed leadership, according to one respondent, by providing a number of training events and conferences each year. The CFID/FCC and the ISI were involved with the professional development of the communication community over the years, from the 1987 Review onwards. “The CFID was going to be involved in the orientation/training sessions going forward (Government of Canada, 1987c). “The FCC is, as this report suggests elsewhere, trying to assume a leadership role in the training and development of professional communications staff. The ISI is currently examining what it can do for its members” (Government of Canada, 1991b). “Professional Development is a shared concern of FCC, ISI and TBS” (Federal Communication Council, 1993c). The community was heavily involved with PCO’s revitalization initiative in the late 1990s: “The committee also contributed to a competency profile for communicators, part of the Universal Classification System initiative undertaken by the Public Service Commission. The competency profile included categories related to knowledge, cognitive
thinking abilities, interpersonal and partnering skills, and specialized and technical skills” (Devereaux Ferguson & Johansen 2005, p. 14). The CFID/FCC and the ISI also supplied participants for PCO and TBS initiatives – for various reviews, task forces and policy development groups. After the FCC and ISI disbanded, the CCO became the mechanism for engaging the community, as for example: “…a working group of over 100 individuals under the leadership of a director general of communications has made significant progress in documenting the current use of social media as well as developing the business case and policy considerations for further adoption of leading edge approaches” (Seymour, 2010).

Most respondents acknowledged the importance these professional communication bodies brought to the federal communication community for networking, the sharing of issues and challenges, and formal as well as informal training. With a number of working groups established by these bodies, the professionalization of the federal communication community increased through needs assessment and partnership with central agencies in the development of such things as a competencies framework, institutionalized training programs and a number of horizontal committees that were struck to address economic and social issues in communication coordination. While some respondents noted that these bodies were limited in influence, other respondents suggested that on the contrary, these bodies filled a void that may have been left in the absence of central agency leadership. Some stated strongly that it was the leadership the community provided through these groups that was the most important driver in the strategic and professional evolution of the community itself. However, some respondents noted there was a growing awareness of the increasing politicization of this community over the 25 period in question, and a devaluing of this community in the eyes of government program and policy sectors. As one respondent noted, “policy/program types see the political side as the real communicators. Public service communicators are seen as pale imitations. Or worse, doing work that is inappropriate for public servants.”

Conclusions: Strategic and Professional Evolution

We defined strategic as two-fold: (1) managing the communication function strategically; and (2) the communication function being part of the strategic management of the GoC department. Then we defined professionalism as the communication community achieving legitimization as a specialized functional community through external recognition of unique knowledge, set of skills and common standards. Here we examine each by drawing conclusions from our discussion of each research question.

Research Questions:

Strategic Evolution

Likely (2010) argued that the communication branches in the Canadian government had evolved to the point that they were being managed strategically. The majority of the branches: (1) had a Head who reported to the department head; (2) were separate functions and not subsumed under other functions or lumped in with other functions in a mixed branch; (3) were integrated into a single function and not decentralized into a number of stand alone communication units; (4) had a Head who spent the majority of time managing the function and not acting as a technician (such as a writer or media spokesperson); and (5) enacted diversity (such as visible minority representation) throughout the branch. The first four are clearly articulated in the 2002 Policy, with the requirement for the fifth stated in other government legislation. But, even with the prescriptiveness of the Policy, there has not been complete uptake across government for the first four, fulfilment being in the range of 75% to 90% (Government of Canada, 2001; 2003b; 2008a). This, though, is far greater than that following the introduction of the 1988 Policy. The 1988 Policy stated that communications was a management function but gave no recourse as to how it would now be managed. More Heads attributed their ability to manage strategically to the 2002 Policy than those that did not (Government of Canada, 2003b; 2008a). “All but a few Heads stated that they used the 2002 Communications Policy extensively. This is many more than in 2003. They commented positively on their use of the Policy” (Government of Canada, 2008a, p. 142). The 2002 Policy, in particular, did help them get to the table: “They see more Heads at the table … They appreciate this even more so since they feel ‘it is a difficult, risk averse environment’ for the communications function currently, where managerial implementation skills seem to be valued more than leadership, strategic or advisory skills” (Government of Canada, 2008a, p. 145).

That meant that Heads were no more involved in the on-going strategic management of the organization by 2010 than they were before the 2002 or 1988 Policies. Heads, though, did become involved in strategic management when involved in major issues and crises, typically on a case-by-case basis. A number of respondents also suggested that some strategic management practices are not conducive to two-way, symmetrical communication for internal or external communication and that organizational executives are not seeking knowledge to undertake symmetrical communication. Other commentators see communication involvement in strategic management as primarily the role of exempt staff with public servants as implementers (Aucoin & Savoie, 2009; Kozolanka, 2009). A number of respondents suggested that the enactment of symmetrical communication concepts as stated in the two Policies (such as free flow of information, open access to information, open communication with the public, listening to the public, complete and timely information dissemination and two-way dialogue) was within the realm of government level strategic management.
and not that of the public service and therefore not the communication community. Where respondents agreed that the 2002 Policy gave Heads “leadership tools,” they also agreed that that Policy did not add to their management value.

As noted above, the initial review that led to the 1988 Policy made a number of far reaching recommendations. Some of these fall under the general principles for strategic management and some for managing strategically. For strategic management, they include: research and public environmental analysis, advice, planning and department-wide functional management; and integrating communication in policy and program decisions and sharing responsibility for communication with policy and program officers. Under managing strategically, recommendations include: designate communication as a central management function; make departmental deputy ministers responsible and accountable for the communication function; and position the head of communications in the department’s management group (Government of Canada, 1987; Government of Canada, 1988a, p.1). While these recommendations were articulated in the two Policies, a lack of continuous enforcement inhibited their institutionalization across the GoC.

Our conclusion is that the Policies contributed to the strategic evolution of the community, especially true for managing the communication branch strategically.

**Professional Evolution**

Only the 2002 Policy addressed issues around the professionalism of the community. The Policy stated that the Head must “foster professional development among communications staff” and “facilitate communications training for all staff … particularly those who work directly with the public.”

Heads did put in place learning plans and training programs for their staff (Government of Canada, 2001; 2003b; 2008a). Respondents had mixed views about how serious were the efforts to professionalize the community, either post 1988 or post 2002.

We conclude that the Policy only required fostering and facilitating and that, in itself, did not contribute greatly to the professionalization of the community.

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2: How did Canadian Government central agencies - the Privy Council Office, Communications and Consultation Secretariat or the Treasury Board Secretariat, Communications - affect the strategic and professional evolution of the Canadian Federal Government’s communication community?
Strategic Evolution
The 1988 Policy called for each communication Head to develop annual strategic and operational communication plans, with these plans integrated into departmental plans. These were to be reviewed by PCO against government priorities. Treasury Board Secretariat was to use these plans to monitor compliance with the Policy. These actions by PCO and TBS only lasted into the early 1990s. By 1998, the Assistant Secretary for PCO, Communications and Consultations was suggesting the re-instatement of these plans (Devereaux, Ferguson & Johansen, 2005). The plans, and their review, by PCO and TBS, were never reintroduced. The 2002 Policy required that plans be provided to TBS for monitoring and review, although that policy statement has not been enforced.

The responsibility for monitoring the community’s overall compliance with the 1988 Policy rested with both PCO and TBS, but for the 2002 Policy, only TBS was responsible directly. Although information was available from various reviews (FCC 1992a; Government of Canada, 1990a, 1991c, 1994a, 2001, 2003b; 2008a) about the number of Heads who reported to the deputy minister, about whether communication branches were organized as separate and integrated functions or not, about the roles enacted by Heads, about their degree of influence at the management table and about the asymmetrical or symmetrical systems employed by the department, there is no evidence that these central agencies intervened directly in either managing a branch strategically or involvement in the strategic management of a department. However, in times of horizontal issues and crises, PCO did intervene when necessary to ensure the communication Head was empowered to manage strategically as part of the department’s on-going crisis management approach.

The Privy Council Office, Communication and Consultations Secretariat changed direction from being the functional leader of the community to becoming a daily operational manager in the early 1990s. Except for a brief period in the late 1990s, it has sustained this operational role to this day. While the Treasury Board Secretariat maintains its role as policy manager, that role has not included enforcement of the strategic requirements in the policies. We conclude by stating that with the exception of brief periods where PCO advocated periodically for more strategic insights, neither of these agencies contributed greatly to the strategic evolution of the community.

Professional Evolution
Both central agencies have long supported the professional development of the communication community. PCO drove the training activity during the period of introduction and implementation of the 1988 Policy (Government of Canada, 1987c, 1991b). From then on, TBS was the main driving force (FCC 1992b, 1993c, 1994b; Government of Canada 2008a), gradually giving way to the CCO. It should be noted that the work of these agencies was performed in cooperation with the CFID, FCC, ISI or CCO. Though a number of respondents praised these agencies for their foresight in supporting training and development, others suggested that their efforts were not that continuous or sustained. Along these same cynical lines, one respondent suggested that there was little training support or
initiatives coming from central agencies, and that these were not serious enough to be able to professionalize the federal communication community.

Our conclusion is that PCO and TBS had their hearts in the right places but, ultimately, did not have the resources (especially in the disinvestment period of the 1990s) or influence to achieve the critical mass of training and professional development activities needed to professionalize the community in any great way. By the 2000s, a report summarizing the views of Heads about competencies in the community stated that: “as the community strives to be seen as professional, to be moved to a professional category, resources will be invested heavily in continuous learning” (Government of Canada, 2001, p. 42). The professionalization of the community was left to the CCO throughout the remainder of the 2000s.

3: How did the professional bodies - Canadian Federal Information Directors (CFID), the Information Services Institute (ISI), Federal Communications Council (FCC) and/or Communications Community Office (CCO) - affect the strategic and professional evolution of the Canadian Federal Government’s communication community?

Strategic Evolution

While the central agencies managed the lengthy policy approval processes, there were many individuals with leadership positions in the communication community that had an influence in moving the development, adoption and implementation of the two policies forward. Neither the CFID/FCC or the ISI ever had full membership. They did, though, have strong leadership at many points in their history. These leaders were strong advocates and strong partners with the agencies and assisted in pushing a strategic direction. Communication was declared a management function, and the Head and executive of the CFID were strong advocates (Government of Canada, 1987c). The FCC pushed for evaluation mechanisms to be established jointly by the FCC and Treasury Board Secretariat that would see “…diagnostic teams … determine how well the Government Communications Policy has been implemented … in each department” (FCC, 1992a, p. 20). The FCC established a Working Group on Management of Government Communications, set up in response to management messaging that the “… communications support we are providing was seen to be not good enough” (FCC, 1993b, p. 2). The ISI, resurging under a new leader and a “militant executive” led the community’s charge on proposals to change the classification systems and thus undervalue the communication management role (FCC, 1993a, p. 1). The community’s membership associations were proponents of the community being more strategic, until their demise in the mid 1990s. While the communication community now looks to the CCO for community leadership and development, this management or strategic advocacy role is not a role that the CCO was mandated to fulfil.

We conclude by stating that while leaders of these associations played important roles in the strategic evolution of the community, the associations themselves did not have the resources to sustain such a role. And, while certain leaders were strong advocates, they did not have the influence with their peers
– or their peers’ departments – to ensure that 100% of federal government communication branches were managed strategically. The current incarnation, the CCO, does not perform such a role.

**Professionalism Evolution**

There have been mixed reviews about the value of community communication bodies; but in all, there is consensus that these provided helpful networking and support systems for federal communicators, notably in the areas of advocacy for training. “Both the Federal Communications Council and the Information Services Institute are attempting to promote professionalism and collegiality community-wide” (Government of Canada, 1991, p. 5). As noted above, for years the CFID/FCC and the ISI advocated for and worked with central agencies on training courses. The Communication Community Office continues to work in areas of recruitment and retention, learning and training, and other areas of professional development such as mentoring programs, competency profiles and succession planning frameworks (Government of Canada, 2006; Seymour, 2010). The strength of the work of the CCO to professionalize the community was recognized more broadly: “the communications community can become among the most effective leaders in renewal for the public service as a whole” (Lahey, 2008). The need for training was recognized by Heads of communication in the 2000s - especially for “strategic thinkers” - to the extent that they set up their own courses and professional development opportunities, over and above the work of the CCO (Government of Canada, 2001; 2003b; 2008a).

In conclusion, we believe that these professional bodies – particularly the CCO – contributed to the professional evolution of the communication community. This was of special importance in times following periods of disinvestment, when the average age and years of experience of staff members dipped. The community faced a challenge in the early 2000’s when a shortage of qualified IS staff meant that officers with limited experience and knowledge rose quickly through the ranks, without proper training in government communication. It should be noted, of course, that it was the community that funded its professional development – from monies allocated for communication activities.

**Summary**

It is our contention that it was the two Government of Canada communication policies, but primarily the second, supported by the community and the professional development driven by the community, primarily from the CCO, which were the primary factors driving strategic and professional evolution. Central agencies acted as initial interlocutors and mechanisms for integrating community initiatives but their importance waned. They were, though, vitally important for the strategic and professional evolution of the federal communication community in the early years. Likewise, the community
bodies in place before the establishment of the CCO had a similar positive influence on community development.

**Future Research**

Certainly, periods of investment and of disinvestment affected the evolution of the federal communication community, both strategic and professional. The community is currently in a period of disinvestment. Furthermore, in these times of restraint, funding for the Communication Community Office, which comes from individual departmental budgets, is becoming more difficult. Future research should focus more closely on these time frames, particularly when examining fairly lengthy historical periods. The effect of financial upturns and downturns is noted in research as a factor with manager and technician role enactment (Likely, 2004).

The current status of the communication community is a source of concern for some respondents, who suggest that this community is becoming increasingly challenged to find a value-added role in the world of centralized controls, electronic media and social networking that allow for uncoordinated communication. In addition, the value of the function is being put in question as the Internet and social media, being accessible to all professionals in a department, could make anyone a ‘communicator’ and ‘publisher’. The late 2000s also saw a thinning of the line between non-partisan and political operations and movement towards more politicalized communication (Kozolanka, 2006; 2009). Future research should examine the effect of the political level on the communication community and its strategic and professional evolution. It would be interesting to ask similar research questions to gain the perspective of deputy ministers and associate deputy ministers who benefitted from the services of communication branches, and from the political sphere, primarily the directors of communication in Minister’s offices. This would be particularly important in understanding the community’s involvement in the strategic management of a department.

Most of the respondents polled in this study are now retired from the Government of Canada. It would be interesting to do a comparative analysis of different demographics, and the relationship between years when working and communicators’ perception of the strategic and professional evolution of their community.
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The Israeli Mossad and the media: Historical and Theoretical perspectives

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Introduction

This study aims to shed light on a rather neglected dimension of Western intelligence services - the public dimension. It suggests broadening the perspective on intelligence-media relations. In several well-known cases, such as the War in Iraq, Western services have played a central role not only in the shadows but in the public sphere as well (Harlow, 2007; Hastedt, 2005; Kessler, 2003; Tenet & Hewitt & Lucas, 2009). They contributed to the influence on public opinion and became a major factor in the justification of the decision to use force against Saddam Hussein’s regime (Diamond, 2008; Lowenthal, 2009). It is significant, therefore, to explore these relations and understand the methods of the services when addressing the public via the media.

Despite the growing importance of understanding the relations between intelligence services and the media, very little research has been done on it (Bennett, 2002; Hulnick, 1999; Thurlow, 2000). Previous research of these unique relations is extremely scarce from a public relations perspective (Gibson, 1997). A reasonable explanation for the lack of studies of the relationship between the intelligence communities and the media through the field of public relations may be the apparently wide gap between the two worlds. While public relations are by nature extroverted, intelligence services operate in the shadow, away from publicity. Relating the fields of intelligence and public
relations may seem contradictory. However, the lack of studies from a PR perspective leads to a paradox: Issues that are mainly about strategic communication and PR are analyzed without the relevant theoretical field.

Numerous publications describe the major map references of the Mossad, focusing on historical and structural aspects (Bar-Zohar, 1972; Black & Morris, 1991; Deacon, 1977; Doron, 1988; Kahana, 2002; Raviv & Melman, 1990; Steven, 1980; Thomas, 1999). Only a few, though, deal with the organization’s relations with the outside world - the public (Katz, 2006; Shpiro, 2001). This paper suggests for the first time an integrated and comprehensive framework for analysis of the media-intelligence relationship and tests it on the Israeli Mossad. It combines different methods such as qualitative research and comparative analysis of case studies from the history of the Mossad. Sources such as newspapers, books and face-to-face interviews with key figures of the Israeli intelligence, media and politics created a broad database on which this study leans on.

The theoretical framework of this research suggests analyzing the relations through the lens of a challenge-response matrix. Since different changes have taken place in society, culture and media, it is crucial to define what the organizations covered during each era in order to accurately evaluate their public relations methods and strategies. CIA Director William Colby (1973-1976) confronted different challenges than Director David Petraeus (2011- ). Director of the Mossad, Isser Harel (1953-1963) did not deal with the same society and media that Tamir Pardo, the new Mossad Director (2011- ) is dealing with nowadays. This study reveals how Israel's external secretive agency confronted and is still confronting the challenge of “selling” itself to the public by utilizing public relations and crisis communication strategies and tactics.

Since its birth in March 1951 the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence service, has drawn great attention around the world and captured the imagination of film producers and authors alike (Richelson, 2007). This is especially due to operations such as the capture of Adolph Eichman, a former Nazi officer in the sixties, or the fact that the Mossad was the first to put its hands on Nikita Khrushchev’s historical secret speech against Joseph Stalin’s regime in the Twentieth Party Congress
in 1956. Current mysterious events such as the assassination of Hizbullah’s chief of staff Imad Mornia in Damascus attributed to the Mossad maintain the organization’s historical halo as a legendary service. Other publications, such as the ones around the assassination of an innocent waiter in the Lillehammer affair in Norway (1973) or the publications after the assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh in Dubai (2004) put the Mossad in a delicate position and in a negative light.

**Literature review**

Existing research on the complex relationship between Western intelligence services and the media is scarce and fragmented. Nevertheless, several studies contribute to the understanding of the unique relations. Dover and Goodman’s book, *spinning intelligence*, focuses on how intelligence services and the media use each other for their interests and objectives (2009). Hulnick (1999) deals with the media strategies of the American intelligence community and concludes his study with concrete suggestions for improvement. Johnson (1986) analyzes the complex relation between the CIA and the media. Gibson (1997) suggests a quantitative description of the FBI’s public relations, while others examine the disclosure process of the British intelligence services in releasing classified documents to the public (Bennett, 2002; Thurlow, 2000).

In contrast to studies about Western intelligence services and the media, previous research about their Israeli counterparts is much harder to locate. Many studies are dedicated to the relationship between the Israeli military forces (IDF) and the media or provide a more general view on the relationship between the different security forces operating in Israel and the local press (Lebel, 2010; Limor & Nossek, 2008; Shai, 1998). Other studies put an emphasis on specific events such as the 1973 war (Ben-Tsedef, 1996), the well-known “Bus line 300” affair in 1984 (Gutman, 1995) or the more recent Second Lebanon War (Liebes & Kempf, 2007).

Only a few studies deal specifically with the Mossad’s relations with the media and they too put an emphasis on how the media cover the organization, rather than on media strategies and tactics used by the Mossad (Alloush-Levron, 2000; Sultz-Landau, 1999). Exceptional is the study of Shpiro (2001) who distinguished between German and Israeli intelligence services models of media
strategies. The German services developed a relatively open approach to the media, primarily to regain legitimacy lost during the days of the Nazi regime. The German model (“Defensive Openness”) includes media monitoring, proportional response to criticism, cautiously doling out data and rewarding journalists rather than threatening them. Throughout their history, the Israeli intelligence services have consistently enjoyed a very high level of public legitimacy and support among the Israeli citizens enabling them to adopt a tough approach to the media. The Israeli model (“Controlled Exclusion”), according to Shpiro, includes suppressing operational revelations, threatening or punishing uncooperative media outlets and using the media for building up deterrence.

**Methodology**

In order to achieve the objectives of the study a qualitative content analysis of approximately 2000 press items, memoirs, books and articles was performed through a method of structured focused comparative analysis of case studies (George & Bennett, 2005; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Four crisis situations of the Mossad from different periods of time were selected. For the purpose of triangulation, data dealing with the case studies was collected from interviews with journalists, senior figures from the Israeli intelligence services and politicians. Every case study was examined on the basis of coverage in the mainstream Israeli press (*Maariv, Yedioth Ahronot* and *Haaretz*). The time defined for the duration of the examination was one month prior to the emergence of the affair in question (defined as “non-crisis time”), and three months subsequent to the emergence of the affair in the media (defined as “crisis time”). All these steps together created an extremely large database and enabled a broad overview of the relations to be analyzed.

The proposed framework is based on a simple challenge-response matrix with two applications to crisis and non-crisis situations. This structure was selected in order to develop a more holistic approach for analysis of the unique relations. The initial task of the framework requires accurate identification of the specific challenges the services face in different periods, societies and circumstances. The next stage requires evaluation of the organizations' media responses to these specific challenges. Detailed clusters of variables have been developed for both challenges and
responses. The framework suggests that based on careful and balanced analysis of the clusters’ major components, it is possible to construct three levels of challenges and three levels of response: maximal, moderate or minimal. Identifying the correct level of challenge is crucial because it assists in determining whether a proportional response was applied. The final stage of the framework is confronting the Challenge Cluster evaluation with the Response Cluster evaluation and examining the implications of the relations between the two clusters.

**Figure 1: Challenge – Response Framework**
The Challenge Cluster

The Challenge Cluster presents specific social and professional conditions under which the services operate when the crisis occurs. It includes four variables: 1) Media environment 2) Media functions and 3) Organizational communication culture 4) crisis type.

1) Media Environment

This variable identifies the state of information technologies including access to and utilization of global and regional all-news networks, internet and social media. The challenges of a relatively primitive media environment differ significantly from those of an advanced one (Gilboa, 2003, p. 98; Thurlow, 2000; Tumber, 2001; Winseck, 2008). In primitive technological environments, governments can control information much more effectively than in advanced environments (Berkowitz & Goodman, 2000; Gross & Costanza-Chock, 2005). One of the most challenging goals of intelligence services nowadays is to keep sensitive information away from the public (Chan & Spinner, 2004, p. A24; Herman, 2001). Alternative voices of "citizen-journalists" to the official voice are more common than in the past (Reich, 2008). Dealing with a crisis nowadays is significantly different from dealing with one three decades ago.

2) Media Functions

The media functions variable describes various normative and empirical roles the media perform in society. For the purposes of this study, it is useful to distinguish among three major functions: mobilized media and disciplined journalism (patriotic press); critical and investigative media (watchdog) and attack journalism (Carruthers, 2000; De-Burgh, 2000; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003; Jensen, 2005; Patterson, 1996; Thrall, 2000). The suggested typology helps to identify specific challenges intelligence services face in particular situations. Supportive media reduce the difficulties while the other types increase them.

3) Organizational Communication Culture
Marra (1998) emphasized the importance of internal communication culture in any evaluation of the PR system organizations employ. Communication culture within intelligence services is usually rigid and suspicious of any relationship with the media and journalists. In the past, leaks from inside intelligence services were a rare phenomenon. However, today due to social, cultural and technological changes they are more common (Dover & Goodman, 2010; O'Rourke, 2010). Leaks add a relatively new challenge to the services as unofficial sources from within the organization talk to reporters and supply credible information that sometimes contradict the policy and actions of the directors and their senior staff.

4) Crisis type

Scholars argue that it is crucial to accurately identify the specific kind of crisis organizations face in order to address them properly (Burnett, 1998; Coombs, 2002; Holladay, 2010). However, there isn't yet a typology of intelligence crises. The framework suggests a relative measure based on salient elements from various past intelligence crises: level of operational failure, targets - legitimate (i.e. terrorist groups) vs. illegitimate (innocent bystanders, ordinary citizens); outcome - minor or devastating such as death and destruction; country - friendly or hostile; the extent to which the modus operandi is exposed; the scope of diplomatic and political entanglement; legal issues such as charges and trials and the number and status of agents involved. Application of these criteria may yield various types of crises spread out over a spectrum from low to high severity.

A few additional factors may affect the severity level. Loss of public trust may push a crisis to a more severe level on the spectrum (Earle, 2009; Wyatt, 1993, p.18). Other relevant factors are longitude and proximity. There is a difference between a crisis that ends after a few days and a lingering one that lasts weeks or even months (DeVries & Fitzpatrick, 2006). Proximity refers to a series of intelligence crises occurring one after the other in a relatively short period of time.
The Response Cluster presents variables designed to analyze responses to various levels of challenges and crises. The variables in this cluster were divided into three categories: 1) General variables 2) Crisis variables and 3) Non-crisis variables. For obvious reasons, it is much more common to hear about intelligence failures than successes. Thus, much of the coverage of intelligence services and much of their communication with the media focus on crises. The framework, then, must distinguish between crisis and non-crisis situations. The analysis of non-crisis periods is significant because previous research suggests that there is a correlation between on-going media relations in routine times and the ability to successfully cope with and manage crises (Coombs & Holladay, 2006).

**General Variables**

1) **Director’s approach to the media**

The attitude of the directors toward the media is a major factor in determining strategic and tactical responses to challenges and crises. Gibson (1997) argued that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover (1924-1972) cultivated and maintained a positive public image for the FBI via aggressive PR strategy. The Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Stansfield Turner (1977-1981), established a public affairs office while his successor, William Casey (1981-1987), reduced interactions with the press to a minimum (Kessler, 1992). Their approach is usually influenced by their appointer's approach - the President or the Prime Minister - but is also a matter of personality and their own character.

Grunig & Hunt differed between a one-way communication relationship that focuses on the organization’s interests and a two-way communication that encourages dialogue and mutual understanding between organizations and their publics (Grunig, 2001; Grunig & Hunt, 1984). In later research, the personal influence model was added. This version suggests that practitioners promote objectives of their organizations via personal relationships with key individuals in the media, government, politics and activist groups (Grunig, Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang & Lyra, 1995, p. 180).
Through this variable we examine whether a two-way communication was applied or even considered by the Mossad's directors. Did the organization apply and prefer the Personal Influence model through its history?

2) Public relations capabilities

Today's complex media environment requires the building of highly professional internal PR capabilities and/or utilization of external PR agencies by every major organization (Fearn-Banks, 2001). In the intelligence arena, these issues are complex and sensitive. An official PR person cannot always fall back on “no comment.” In some cases saying “no comment” is considered a form of admission in essence revealing information the intelligence services wish to conceal. Different Western intelligence services face this dilemma and solve it in various ways. The CIA, for instance, appointed a spokesperson from the very beginning, while its British counterpart avoids it for years (Kessler, 1992, p. 269). On its website the British secret intelligence service (SIS) declares: “Because of the secret nature of our work, it's been the policy of SIS and successive Governments not to comment on operations, staff, agents, or relations with foreign intelligence services. SIS does not have a Press Office.” (www.SIS.gov). Did the Mossad have some kind of point of contact to the press through its history? Did it consult with PR experts?

3) New media

The information age challenges organizations but also provides them with opportunities to achieve their public objectives (DiStaso, Messner & Stacks, 2007; Taylor & Perry, 2005; Worley, 2007). New media outlets offer direct communication as messages don't have to travel through media filters or gatekeepers, and it allows immediate feedback from the public (Bonewits-Feldner & Meisenbach, 2007; Stephens & Malone, 2010; Xifra, 2007; Williams & Delli-Carpini, 2004). Every year, the CIA posts on its website millions of documents from past events and operations. On June 25, 2007, for instance, it posted reports from the seventies on the “Family Jewels.” (www.cia.gov). The internal intelligence service in Israel, the ISA, issues updated reviews and reports about terror data and trends and occasionally reveals details about operations from the past (www.shabak.gov.il).
Crisis Variables

1) Strategies

There are two general contradictory approaches to crisis communications. The “classical approach” suggests an open, fast and sincere response to crises (“tell it all and tell it fast”), while the "topical approach" suggests the opposite policy of no response, denial, and shifting blame to other actors or factors (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Benoit, 1997; Fearn-Banks, 2009). Between the two approaches there is a large spectrum of various organizational behaviors in times of crisis.

In the past, intelligence services enjoyed special privileges from the public when refusing to reveal information (Kennedy, 1993; Morrison & Tumber, 1988; McLaughlin, 2002). This is to a limited extent still applicable. Nevertheless, in a 24/7 media environment, the topical approach is becoming less effective because it stimulates rumors and speculations that fill the vacuum created by the organization’s silence. Moreover, the public and the media are nowadays critical towards the services and demands more transparency and openness. Intelligence services, like other governmental agencies need to reconsider the efficiency of applying the topical approach and to balance what they gain and lose from such a policy.

Benoit (1997) suggests five optional strategies for image restoration: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action and mortification. These strategies are useful in coping with a crisis after it erupts. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between restoring image in the short-term and the long-term. The need to distinguish between the two ranges is relevant for any organization, but even more so for intelligence services. During crises and immediately afterwards the services often lower their profile and keep silent, but a few months later, sometimes years later, they employ image restoration strategies.

2) Tactics

Intelligence services employ several well-known basic tactics, among others, somewhat modified by their unique areas of operation. The first is the "carrot and stick" approach. This technique is
employed by all kinds of organizations, firms and government agencies alike, but intelligence services have an extra leverage: they can restrict the work of recalcitrant reporters by enforcing censorship, utilizing classification, and other practices that put constraints on access to information (Carruthers, 2000; Gibson, 1987; McLaughlin, 2002). Spin doctoring is another popular tactic among intelligence services. It is especially relevant for secretive organizations that can decide what information to release and what information to keep close at hand (Dover & Goodman, 2009). Abuse of these tactics may cause intelligence services great damage when revealed to the public. An additional tactic is using former intelligence figures and politicians as spokespeople, when the organization, for certain reasons, is forced to lower its profile and keep silent.

3) Communication contingency planning

Crisis management studies emphasize the need to build a crisis communications plan (Fearn-Banks, 2001; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Nikolaev, 2010; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2001). Despite the need for communication contingency planning, many organizations including intelligence services, neglect this vital function of preparing the organization for a crisis (Coombs, 2007; Fearn-Banks, 2009).

Non-crisis variables

The holistic approach to crisis management proposes that coping with challenges should be viewed as an on-going integral part of running an organization. Therefore, periods of calm can help to prepare for crises along with the promotion of organizational interests (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2001).

1) Personal media relations

The simple fact is that a PR practitioner and a journalist are two social human beings connecting each other (Delorme & Fedler, 2003; Kim & Bae, 2006; Neijens & Smit, 2006). Avraham & Ketter (2008) argue that reporters who are assisted by PR practitioners feel an obligation to return a favor. In the study we examine if the officials in the Mossad developed personal relations with reporters in times of calm.
2) Reputation management

Maintaining a stable positive reputation is considered an efficient tool assisting organizations in tackling crises (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Fearn-Banks, 2001). Here the services face a paradox: they suffer from a built-in disability because they can't glorify brilliant and successful achievements, but are commonly exposed in their failures. Nevertheless, the long history of Western intelligence services demonstrates that these unique organizations generated creative routes to promoting their good reputation (Weiner, 2007; Woodward, 2005). The question is did the Mossad take such actions?

Case studies

The criterion for selection of the case studies was an attempt to create a historical axis from the early days of the state of Israel to date. The rational was that through an analysis of a long period of time one may gain a broader view of these unique relations. Moreover, from an historical perspective we may indicate whether there was some kind of progress in the Mossad’s strategic communications. Therefore, cases were selected from the early sixties (1963), the seventies (1973), the nineties (1997) and from 2004. One limitation, however, majorly influenced the choices of case studies. Very recent intelligence publicized crises, by nature, have less unclassified material accessible to the public than the ones that occurred in the far and near past. Declassification of sensitive material is many times a long process. Moreover, it is an extremely difficult task to interview current Israeli intelligence figures that are not authorized to discuss their experience with scholars or reporters.

The German scientists’ affair (1963)

In the early sixties, information about German scientists, former Nazis, working for the Egyptian government was brought to the Mossad. According to the different sources, the scientists were working simultaneously on several military projects for Egypt (Bar-Zohar, 1967; Deacon, 1977).
Mossad director, Isser Harel approved the “Damocles Operation”. German scientists involved in disturbing Egyptian projects were persecuted by the Mossad (Black & Morris, 1991; Raviv & Melman, 1990). After a few successful operations against the scientists, two Mossad agents were caught threatening Heidi Goerke, the daughter of one of the German scientists in Switzerland (Bar-Zohar, 1972; Harel, 1982).

The research indicates that when the crisis occurred the Challenge Cluster was minimal. The media environment in Israel was primitive (Caspi & Limor, 1999) and the majority of the local media were mobilized and patriotic (Ben-Porat, 1963, p. 7; Giladi, 1963, p. 1; Unger, 1963, p.1). Challenging the remote and secretive communication culture was extremely rare and leaks were a scarce phenomenon (Giladi, personal communication, November 12, 2007; Lavi, personal communication, November 11, 2007). The crisis was of low severity. Merely two agents were caught in a friendly country and there was no devastating outcome. At the time, the media challenge confronting the Mossad was relatively a simple one.

A general evaluation of the Response Cluster indicates that the response given to the challenge was moderate. The director at the time, Isser Harel, had an ambivalent approach to the media. On the one hand, Harel was extremely suspicious of the media and he denied access of reporters to the organization. On the other hand, he understood that he can utilize the media for promoting the Mossad’s and his personal agenda (Haber, personal communication, February 17, 2008). The director’s personal approach to the media was dominant in the way the Mossad tackled the publicized crisis of the agents caught threatening Heide Goerke. Harel “juggled” between his extremely secret public image and the need to make full use of the media potency for his organization’s interests (Ben-Porat, 1963, p. 2; Dan, 1963, p. 4).

The dominant organizational approach to the media was the Personal Influence model. Pragmatically, the Mossad had no interest in establishing a two-way communication with the public. The research finds that Harel’s PR capabilities were premature in his era and that he used several public relations tools to cope efficiently with the media. He managed to pull the strings of the media
and remain in the shadows simultaneously. There was no spokesperson to the Mossad at the time. It was, to a large extent, a “one man’s show”.

When analyzing the crisis variables of the Response Cluster there is evidence of the Mossad’s communication strategies and tactics. Harel and his senior staff put significant efforts into setting the public agenda of the German scientists’ crisis (Black & Morris, 1991, p. 199; Steven, 1980, p. 142). The traditional strategy of intelligence services of the “topical approach” of denial and silence was not applied. Instead, there was an attempt to carefully reach out to the public via the media.

Harel managed the crisis by operating according to fundamental codes of crisis communications (being prepared, available and credible). While senior figures such as Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion or Minister of foreign affairs, Golda Meir, were hesitant about how to deal with the crisis, Harel did not waste precious time and made some important moves immediately (Harel, 1982, p. 61). He contacted three leading journalists from the three major newspapers in Israel and briefed them personally about the missile industry in Egypt and its relations to German and Swiss companies. Using the advantage of intelligence information he gave them important “tips” for their reporting (Bar-Zohar, 2003; Harel, 1982, p. 65; Raviv & Melman, 1990). He contacted several foreign journalists as well, choosing them carefully according to their background in supporting Israeli issues (Eytan, 1963, p.2; Tevet, 1963, p. 2). Understanding the power of media credibility, as opposed to official statements, Harel briefed the reporters on the condition that they file their stories from Europe. That way the link between him and the stories was latent and the reports were more authentic (Black & Morris, 1991; Harel, 1982). He was intelligently balancing “carrots and sticks” in his relations with the media, preferring dialogue with the media rather than censorship, but using them both.

One of the most fascinating tactics applied by Isser Harel in the German scientists’ affair is the spin doctoring. The core of the media coverage totally diverted from the operation failure to the wrongdoing of the German scientist in Cairo. Harel succeeded in framing the publication of the crisis in the media according to his personal point of view, even when it contrasted the Prime Minister’s political agenda of establishing diplomatic relations with “new Germany” after World War II (Ben-
Porat, 1963, p. 1; Vardi, 1963, p. 2). The variable of communication contingency planning is estimated as minimal. According to former senior employees of the Mossad there was no communication contingency planning at the time (Eytan, personal communication, January 23, 2008).

When analyzing the Mossad’s relations with the media in non-crisis periods there is evidence that Harel and his senior staff put efforts into personal relations with several reporters and in reputation management in routine eras. Harel managed to build a firm heroic image of the Mossad, by systematically briefing leading figures in the local and foreign press about the achievements of the organization (Eytan, personal communication, January 23, 2008; Giladi, personal communication, November 12, 2007; Lavi, personal communication, November, 13, 2007; Raviv & Melman, 1990). He did so before the Heidi Goerke affair and it influenced the way the Mossad was depicted after the failure in Switzerland.

While holding the Nikita Khrushchev’s historical secret speech against Joseph Stalin’s regime, for instance, Harel seriously considered the option of publicizing the fact that the Mossad was the one Western intelligence service that managed to put its hands on the sensational document. Due to the delicate status of the Jews in the Soviet Union at the time he decided to transfer the speech to the CIA without publicizing the fact that the Mossad succeeded where all other Western services failed (Steven, 1980, p. 97). He understood the potential of reputation management and personal connections with reporters. Summing up the evaluation of all the variables leads to the conclusion that the media response of the Mossad to the minimal challenge was moderate (challenge < response). The fact that the response was higher than the challenge assisted the Mossad in tackling the crisis and restoring its image.

The Lillehammer affair (1973)

Following the Munich Massacre in 1972 Golda Meir’s government approved a series of operations of the Mossad that aimed to put its hands on all terrorists involved directly or indirectly to the massacre. The Mossad was especially anxious about a certain figure - Ali Hassan Salameh- that had a central
part in the planning of the Munich Massacre as well as in many other terror attacks on Israeli targets. A mistake in the identification of Salameh led to the tragic killing of a Moroccan waiter named Ahmed Bouchiki. Six Mossad agents were caught after the assassination in Lillehammer, Norway.

At that period the Israeli media was still rather patriotic and mobilized, though some evidence was found of critical press (Lavi, 1973, p. 2; Zehavi, 1973, p. 11). The media technological environment was developed compared to the era of the German scientists affair, but still relatively primitive (Caspi & Limor, 1999). In addition, there was no internal challenge to the Mossad’s communication culture and informal leaks from inside the Mossad remained a rare phenomenon (Deacon, 1977, pp. 245-246; Zamir, personal communication, October 10, 2007).

The Lillehammer case study illustrates the dominance of the crisis type variable in the framework. Lillehammer is considered to be one of the most serious crises the Mossad ever confronted (Raviv & Melman, 1990; Steven, 1980). Applying the intelligence crisis index demonstrates a case of a major operational failure, which includes the revealing of *modus operandi*, many agents involved and most of all a devastating outcome of the death of an innocent person, an illegitimate target. The high severity of the crisis turned a potentially minimal cluster of challenges into a moderate one.

The findings indicate that Director Zvi Zamir consistently led an extremely remote approach to the media (Lavi, personal communication, November 11, 2007; Haber, personal communication, February 17, 2008). His first interview to a reporter was in 2006, thirty two years after he left the Mossad (Melman, 2006, p. 22-26). The organizational approach to the media was directly influenced by the director’s approach. No dialogue or two-way communication with the media was encouraged; on the contrary, it was harshly forbidden. There was no formal or informal spokesperson to the organization or a professional consultant. Developing any PR capabilities was considered redundant & harmful (Zamir, personal communication, October 10, 2007). In Zamir’s era ambiguity became the dominant PR strategy of the Mossad.
By analyzing the case study according to the crisis variables there is evidence that Zamir’s consistent approach to the media dominantly determined how the Mossad confronted the Lillehammer crisis. Zamir forbade any connection with the press during the crisis and embraced the “topical approach” (Haber, personal communication, December 17, 2007; Segev, personal communication, December 2, 2007). Basic tactics in crisis communication were not implemented. The Mossad gave no formal response to the incident (Kiviti, 1973, p. 1). At the time, the Mossad could not act otherwise. Any official reaction would have damaged the agents caught by the Norwegian police. The Mossad’s silence was crucial for the freedom of its agents. There was neither communication contingency planning nor any efforts to restore the Mossad’s image after the Lillehammer affair.

Zamir’s approach to the media was consistent in non-crisis times as well. He forbade any relations with the media and believed silence and ambiguity were the most efficient PR tools for reputation management of the Mossad. “Nothing glorifies the Mossad more than the silence. Its secrecy raises its value in the public’s eyes”, says Zamir thirty-four years after the Lillehammer incident (personal communication, October 10, 2007). He did not invent the concept of ambiguity but he did take it to the extreme. For many years, this was the Mossad’s unofficial leading media strategy. Nevertheless, even in Zamir’s era there is some evidence that there were connections with few reporters, on rare occasions, mainly for operational interests rather than for reputation and PR objectives.

This case also demonstrates how intelligence services avoid restoring their image in the short term after the crisis, but prefer to do so in the long term. The Israeli government compensated Ahmed Bouchiki’s family, which was killed in the Lillehammer affair, only twenty-five years after the crisis occurred in the seventies (Melman, 1996, p. A1). Benoit’s corrective action strategy was applied only years after the crisis. Instead there was silence from all governmental sources, the Mossad included (Kiviti, 1973, pp. 1, 5; Lavi, 1973, p. 2). Director Yitzhak Hofi (1974-1982), Zamir’s successor, continued his predecessor’s approach in sticking mainly to the ambiguity strategy. He refused to deal with the Lillehammer affair even after the agents were released from prison. Like Zamir he truly
believed that consistently saying nothing about the Mossad is the most effective PR strategy for the secretive organization (Hofi, personal communication, November 19, 2007).

After evaluating the Challenge Cluster and confronting it with the Response Cluster we can conclude that the response the Mossad gave to the moderate Challenge Cluster in Zamir’s period was a minimal one (challenge > response). This case well demonstrates that in the case of intelligence services sometimes the image restoration in the short term is different from the one in the long term. For many years the Mossad neglected the image restoration process that was needed after the Lillehammer affair and continued to pay a high price of bad reputation for not doing so.

The Khaled Mashal assassination attempt (1997)

On the eve of the new Jewish year, September 1997, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was informed that Mossad agents were caught in Aman, Jordan. A Mossad squad aimed to assassinate the Hamas’ Jordanian branch chief, Khaled Mashal, by transmitting a lethal nerve toxin to his left ear. The operation failed, two agents were caught, four escaped to the Israeli embassy and Israel was compelled to send an antidote for the nerve toxin to save Mashal’s life (Halevy, 2006).

The challenge has changed dramatically. It was maximal. The media environment was highly developed (“CNN broadcasted the news about killed soldiers from 10 pm”, 1997, p. 3; Kaveh, 1997, p.16). The Israeli media were critical and investigative - no longer a lap dog, but rather a watchdog or even an attack dog (Melman, 1997, p. B3; Fishman, 5.10.97, p. 5; Thrall, 2000). The censorship system had weakened significantly through the years (Caspit, Levi & Meiri, 1996, p. 16; Segal, 1997, p. 6; Zimuki, 1996, p. 2). The Mossad’s traditional communication culture was challenged by internal figures from the organization. Leaks from inside the Mossad became more common (Caspit, 1997, p. 5; Granot, 1998, p. 10; Miberg, 1997, p. 7).

In addition, the severity level of the crisis was high. The public was widely exposed to the Mossad’s modus operandi, several agents were caught and the diplomatic entanglement with Hussein King of Jordan was extremely acute; it was only a few years after the peace agreement and it put the
king in a delicate situation with his subjects (Halevy, 2006). The Mashal incident well demonstrates the proximity syndrome when estimating the crisis type variable. Within six months, between September 1997 and February 1998, the Mossad was involved in three major failures: the attempt to kill Mashal in Jordan, the arrest in December 1997 of a Mossad agent accused of feeding the organization with false reports about Syria, and the arrest in February 1998 of a Mossad agent in Switzerland (Melman, Horovitz & Alon, 1998, A1).

When analyzing the Mashal case study according to the Response Cluster it is clear that Director Danny Yatom’s personal approach to the media was crucial. Yatom was considered an outsider at the Mossad (Rapaport, February 24, 1998). This led him to avoid formally violating the traditional communication culture of ambiguity. On the other hand, his previous duties were public and that encouraged him to adopt an open but cautious approach to the media behind the scenes (Ben-David, personal communication, May 6, 2008; Caspit, Levi & Meiri, 1996, p.16).

The organizational approach to the media remained focused mainly on the Personal Influence model. PR capabilities were not developed and there was no formal or informal spokesperson. On one occasion during the Mashal affair, Yatom wanted to respond to a news item broadcasted in the Israeli T.V. as director of the Mossad. Having no one as a mediator between the Mossad and the media he found it difficult to reach out to the public (Capra, 1997, pp. 16-18). Although the internet was already a central medium at the time, the Mossad did not have a website and did not make use of the internet for PR.

At the time of the crisis the general approach remained remote and closed and the “topical approach” strategy was dominant. As the director, Yatom mainly denied and shifted the blame to other actors or factors (Ben-David, personal communication, May 6, 2008; Rapaport, 1997, pp. 1, 7). There was poor use of public relations tools and tactics. The basic public relations principles for crisis times were not fulfilled. There was no communication contingency planning. Danny Yatom did consult with well-known public relations professionals in Israel, but it was a minor, limited consultation (Oren, 1998, p. B5; Yatom, personal communication, December 16, 2008). There were
several attempts of Yatom to spin the media reports about the failure in Jordan. These attempts only
damaged Yatom and the Mossad in a boomerang effect. The Mossad was accused of trying to
manipulate the public.

Evaluation of the non-crisis variables indicates that Yatom developed personal relations with
several reporters prior to the crisis and that he allowed them to a certain extent to publicize
information from the past about the Mossad’s heroic moments as part of reputation management
(Eichner, 1997, p. 17; Meiri, 1997, p. 19). There is evidence of an attempt to restore the Mossad’s
image after the crisis (Shifer, S. 1997, p. 7). However, the proximity of several crises turned it into a
difficult task and following the third crisis in Switzerland Yatom resigned.

Yatom’s hybrid approach to the media caused him and the Mossad trouble in the Khaled
Mashal affair. On the one hand, he led a very harsh campaign in the Mossad against leaks to the
media during the crisis, but on the other hand, it was publicized that he consulted with communication
strategists and that he spoke with many reporters to restore his own image after the incident in Aman

There is one important point that needs to be raised about the claims mentioned above. Danny
Yatom was the first Mossad director that had to deal with a new situation - he was not anonymous.
His name and face was known to the wide public for the first time in the history of the organization.
This led to a peculiar situation in which he was, on the one hand, personally attacked and criticized on
a daily basis by Israeli journalism and on the other hand, had no tools to protect his good name from
these attacks. He was trapped between the traditional communication culture of the Mossad and the
fact that he was a public figure in contrast with his predecessors. His solution to this unique situation
was to arrange personal meetings with several reporters - meetings that have raised severe criticism
against him inside the Mossad.

For Yatom it was a “lose-lose” situation. The organization did not anticipate this hybrid
situation which led to problems inside the organization and reflected its image “outside” as well. The
sacred ambiguity strategy was converted by news reports about internal intrigues between the director and his employees. This caused further damage to the organization in a fragile time. From a general evaluation of the Response Cluster we can conclude that the Mossad coped with a **maximal** challenge by a **moderate** response (challenge > response). The damage to the Mossad’s reputation was significant and restoring its image was a complicated task.

### The New Zealand affair (2004)

On April 2004, two Mossad agents were caught by the police in New Zealand. They were accused of an attempt to obtain a passport on false grounds. The incident caused severe diplomatic entanglement between New Zealand and Israel. Prime Minister Helen Clark decided on several diplomatic sanctions against Israel, and reconciliation between the countries was obtained only after Israel sent its formal apology about the incident to the New Zealand government approximately a year after the agents’ arrest (Apology opens doors for Israeli minister to visit New Zealand, 2005). Eight years have passed since the incident; however, there is a significant lack of unclassified information regarding the Mossad’s strategic communication at the time. The analysis of this case study is therefore based on limited information.

In 2004 the media environment in Israel was extremely developed and the dominant media functions were investigative and attack journalism. Director Meir Dagan led a harsh campaign against violations of the traditional communication culture of the Mossad. His deputy was forced to resign after talking to a reporter (Bergman, 2008, pp. 8-9; Oren, 2007, p. 1). Leaks became rare again (Ben-David, personal communication, May 6, 2008). According to the crisis type index the crisis was considered of low severity, although its diplomatic aspects were seriously challenging.

A general evaluation of the different variables is of a **moderate** challenge. The response, too, was **moderate**. Dagan as a director was one of the most remote directors the Mossad ever had. This influenced the organizational approach and the fact that PR capabilities were not developed. The Mossad’s website was mainly a tool for human resource recruitment and not for dialogue with the
public or for reputation management. After the agents’ arrest was publicized the Mossad refused to respond (Eichner, 2004, p. 18; Melman, 2004, A7). As in incidents in the past, any reaction would have complicated the situation even more, especially when the agents were still under arrest. Keeping silent and ambiguous was a pragmatic choice. The strategy was the “topical approach”.

There is no evidence of the use of tactics or any indications of communication contingency planning. Dagan occasionally did meet senior reporters, but it was not an on-going personal relations but rather very specific briefings on certain circumstances (Ben-David, personal communication, May 6, 2008). Dagan’s reputation management was similar to some of his predecessors: keeping the Mossad’s activities- successes and failures - in ambiguity. This was the case in the mysterious assassinations of Imad Mornia in Damascus, Iranian scientists, Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh in Dubai and the bombing of a nuclear reactor in Syria. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that even in Dagan's era there were briefings to certain reporters to promote the Mossad's objectives in the public sphere. Bringing together the challenge and the response in the New Zealand affair in a matrix leads to a case where a moderate challenge was treated with a moderate response (challenge = response). It was a proportional response to the circumstances and challenges.

**Discussion**

The following tables illustrate the proportions between the Challenge Clusters and the Response Clusters in the different Mossad case studies. Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrate the Challenge Cluster and the Response Cluster in each case study. Table 3 indicates the proportion between the two clusters in each case study.

In the sixties it wasn’t essential for the Mossad to have a sophisticated developed strategic communication. The German Scientists affair well demonstrates this point. Although the Mossad did not consult at the time with any professional public relations figures, or use communication contingency planning, the director’s personal approach to the media behind the scenes combined with a closed communication culture was a proportional response to the specific crisis at the time.
Furthermore, the severity of the crisis was low and it was a one-time crisis. There is evidence that Harel put some effort into image restoration after the arrest of the two people in Switzerland. In this case study there was a minimal Challenge Cluster and a moderate Response Cluster (challenge < response). The organization achieved public opinion support not only in Israel but also abroad and managed the crisis well. Since Harel faced an extremely supportive and patriotic press and a disciplined organization a simple media response was sufficient.

**Table 1: Challenge Cluster**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case studies</th>
<th>German Scientists 1963</th>
<th>Lillehammer 1973</th>
<th>Khaled Mashal 1997</th>
<th>New Zealand 2004</th>
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<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Maximal</td>
<td>Maximal</td>
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Nevertheless, he combined methods of censorship and control over information with additional media strategies and tactics to gain a maximal impact on public opinion via media coverage. These active moves undoubtedly assisted Harel and the Mossad to cope with the publicized crisis. Insisting on the secrecy code of his organization but at the same time cultivating friendly personal relations with selected reporters he trusted helped him to mount a public campaign against the German scientists.
Table 2: Response Cluster

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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
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<td>German Scientists 1963</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lillehammer 1973</td>
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<td>Khaled Mashal 1997</td>
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<td>New Zealand 2004</td>
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<td>Director’s approach</td>
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<td>to media</td>
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<td>Communication</td>
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<td>Personal media relations</td>
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<td>General Evaluation</td>
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Table 3: Challenge - Response Proportions

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Challenge Cluster</th>
<th>Response Cluster</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German Scientists, 1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lillehammer, 1973</td>
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<td>Khaled Mashal, 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand, 2004</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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Though coming later chronologically, in the seventies, the approach of Zvi Zamir to the relations between the media and the Mossad was somewhat contrary to the approach of Isser Harel. After the Lillehammer incident, the Mossad’s reputation was badly harmed. This is, of course, also due to the severity of the crisis and its tragic outcome. The objective options for response were minimal at the time and the Mossad’s hands were tied to a large extent due to the apprehension for the wellbeing of the arrested agents.

Applying the traditional ambiguity strategy served the Mossad’s interests well at the time. While in regular organizations one of the basic public relations “commandments” is avoiding denial, in the arena of the intelligence communities, as mentioned earlier, denial is occasionally a necessary tool. This is right even more when the challenge is not maximal. However, the Mossad’s long delay in restoring its image after the Lillehammer affair continued to damage the Mossad over the years. Efforts to compensate and sincerely apologize to Ahmed Bouchiki’s family earlier could have assisted the organization in repairing its reputation and rebuilding the trust in the organization. It seems the Mossad could have done more behind the scenes in terms of strategic communication, especially having the late perspective of the German Scientists’ crisis communications.
Essential differences in the Challenge Cluster occurred in the third case study: The Khaled Mashal assassination attempt in Jordan in the nineties. The Israeli media, at that point, were totally different from the media which confronted the Mossad in previous incidents. The negative gap between the two clusters, the difficulty of the Mossad to adapt to the new media approach, to the information age and to the public awareness, minimized its options for coping efficiently with the crisis. This created great difficulties in managing the crisis and further damaged the already damaged reputation of the Mossad following the assassination attempt.

The New Zealand affair in 2004 demonstrates that ambiguity as a classical communication strategy of intelligence services did not disappear with the evolution of the information age and the development of a more critical media and society. It can be argued that from a moral aspect this may be troublesome in liberal democracies. Nevertheless, when analyzing the strategic communication of intelligence services one cannot ignore these organizations unique characters that determine the scope of transparency they can allow themselves. Intelligence services should avoid abusing the credit and trust they receive from the public due to their unique nature. If they do not do so from a moral perspective, they should do so from a pragmatic one. The challenges are only becoming harder to tackle. The Response Cluster should be developed accordingly and ambiguity should not be used as a curtain to conceal wrongdoings.

Another interesting aspect that derives from the New Zealand case is the importance of reacting proportionally according to the severity of the crisis. From the historic axis in this study and the experience of the Mossad in dealing with crises in the past it isn’t groundless to assume that Meir Dagan’s remote approach was sufficient in the New Zealand case because it was considered a low-severity crisis and there was no gap between the clusters (moderate challenge = moderate response). A maximal challenge combined with Dagan’s approach (maximal challenge > minimal response) could have caused the Mossad in 2004 great damage.
Conclusion

The Response Cluster through the history of the relations between the Mossad and the media was not developed simultaneously with the development and crucial changes of the Challenge Cluster. Sometimes this delay derived from objective circumstances as the Lillehammer affair demonstrates and sometimes it was a result of the Mossad’s difficulties in adapting to the dramatic changes that occurred in the media, the technology and the Israeli society, as illustrated in the Mashal affair. There were diverse approaches of the different directors of the Mossad to the media. For instance, Isser Harel (1953-1963) was a pragmatic director when it came to the relations with the media, while Zvi Zamir (1968-1974) was extremely closed and suspicious of the media’s intentions. These different approaches had direct influence on the crisis communications of the Mossad during challenging times in the organization.

Mossad Director Isser Harel insisted on the secrecy code of his organization but at the same time cultivated friendly personal relations with a selected group of reporters he trusted. In the sixties, these relations helped him address the crisis in Switzerland. Zamir thought his organization may gain less and lose more from cooperating with the media and therefore decided to lead an extremely remote approach to the media; an approach that was applied in the Lillehammer incident and that to a great extent dictated what crisis communications strategies were and were not applied. Both Harel and Zamir utilized the traditional ambiguity media strategy. The main difference is that Harel simultaneously added to this strategy several PR tools behind the scenes that assisted him in achieving his goals as director of the Mossad.

From the analysis we can conclude that maintaining a proportion between the challenge and the response may be crucial for the organizations to gain their objectives, directly or indirectly. A wide gap between the clusters may make it difficult for the organizations to deal with reputation issues, in crisis times in particular. The different case studies provide evidence that in an era of a patriotic press - a primitive technological arena and an extremely secret communication culture - a minimal Response Cluster is sufficient. In eras of a critical and investigative media and a developed
technological arena, a minimal Response Cluster isn’t proportional to the challenges and may damage the organization’s reputation substantially.

Even the most efficient crisis communications do not make damages caused by a crisis to vanish. Nevertheless, they do have the power to minimize the magnitude of the damages or moderate the potential of ripple effects that may cause further damage to various aspects in an organization. The suggested model, therefore, can assist in evaluating whether intelligence services are providing an appropriate response to specific challenges confronting them and to identify what their weak points are when dealing with the media. This may lead to a more balanced system where transparency, to a certain extent, is possible.

The following quotation, by Director Efrayim Halevi (1998-2002) relates to the Mossad’s media policy. In an internal document distributed to the Mossad employees he wrote:”I am afraid the continuing of our policy might put the Mossad, its foundations and its people into great risk [...] There is a danger that individuals in an unsupervised way might cause irreversible damage to the most large intelligence assets of the state of Israel. The total silencing will not last for long” (translated from Oren, 1999, p. A1, by the author).

In Israel, two major intelligence services adopted different approaches: the ISA (Israeli Security Agency) promoted a communication culture less hostile to the media; while the Mossad kept the more rigid ambiguity culture and was intolerant towards insiders advocating more open relationships with the media and journalists. The Mossad does not have a formal spokesperson even today. There is continuous debate in the Israeli intelligence services over this dilemma. This research suggests a wider perspective. Harel’s crisis communications in the sixties exemplify that a formal spokesperson is not necessarily what a unique organization, like the Mossad, needs to manage the organizations reputation.

Other relevant variables in the Response Cluster, such as strategies, tactics and contingency planning may play a crucial role in the organization’s attempt to cope with crises. Moreover, analyzing the relations through the lens of the challenge-response matrix contributes to a wider scope
in evaluating the intelligence services’ confrontation with publicized crises. Unsurprisingly security
issues remain the Mossad’s main interest. Nevertheless, side by side with its intelligence, operational
challenges, the Mossad must recognize and deal solemnly with a relatively new challenge - the public
aspect - and respond to it accordingly.

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Abstract
Of all the women’s missionary organizations, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Woman’s Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church had the most dues paying members, largest budget, and most missionaries in the field. This account of their public relations strategies and tactics relies primarily on stories and facts from their monthly periodical—Heathen Woman’s Friend, which was later named Woman’s Missionary Friend to widen its appeal and conform to political correctness. The publication was a tool for self-promotion of the organization and education of their internal publics. We argue the WFMS developed and maintained effective public relations tactics using cultural values and media resonating with members from local congregations to bishops at the highest level. Messages to raise funds and recruit missionaries were targeted at audiences of all ages, from the cradle to the grave.

Introduction
Patterson (2009) argues the contributions of women must be written into the history of public relations since up to 90 percent of the students engaged in the study of the field are female. This study examines a group of women in the United States who are often overlooked when the history of public
relations is written—Protestant women missionaries who served overseas and women on the home front who supported them from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries.

Robert (1993) noted the lack of recognition women missionaries have received within academic scholarship while Hunter (1984) identified the significant role these women played within the missionary enterprise. Originally only married women went overseas to serve as companions and helpmates for their husbands. After the American Civil War however, women’s missionary societies began sending single women overseas in their own right. By 1919 the American missionary force in China was populated by nearly equal numbers of married men, married women, and single women.

The single women missionaries were almost exclusively supported by the thousands of missionary societies formed after the American Civil War. Flynt and Berkley (1997) observed “the women’s missionary movement was the largest female reform movement in the United States” (p. 192). Hill (1995) noted, with more than three million dues-paying members by 1915, their combined membership outstripped their closest competitor—the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union.

This historical study focuses on the Woman’s Foreign Missionary Society [WFMS] of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States. Like the nation, Methodists divided prior to the American Civil War and the Methodist Episcopal Church was the northern splinter from the schism. Montgomery (1910) argued the WFMS was “the greatest Woman’s Missionary Society of the country” (p. 32). With semi-autonomous branches, this organization selected, appointed, and paid for their own missionaries. By 1910, they had “the largest budget, the most teachers, the most Bible women [indigenous female workers], the largest number of schools and colleges, and the most contributing members of any woman’s missionary organization in the United States” (Montgomery, p. 32).

**Formation of the Woman’s Foreign Missionary Society**

**Founding mothers, their husbands and the “parent” board**

The WFMS was founded in March 1869 when six women met at Tremont Street Church in Boston. Within three months the organizers began publishing their magazine, *Heathen Woman’s Friend*. Two single female missionary were sent to India in the first year with additional missionaries going to China the following year. Keller (1981) argued the WFMS “was created not only to liberate women in non-Christian lands . . . but to provide outlets for the energy, ability, and leadership of American women” (p. 251). The women created their own organization since participation and leadership in the male-dominated General Missionary Society, also called the parent board, was closed to them.

Mrs. Rev. E. W. Parker was a key organizer of the WFMS. She and her husband were home on furlough after serving as missionaries in India for 10 years. She believed, unlike married women, single women in the field could focus exclusively on missionary work since they had no domestic
responsibilities (Wheeler, 1884). Like many early leaders, Parker was married to an influential man within the Methodist Episcopal Church or the larger political sphere. These men were church leaders including bishops, ministers, missionaries, and college presidents with a governor and a general from the world of politics thrown in for good measure. For instance, Mrs. Bishop Osman C. Baker was the first president and eight of the original 44 vice presidents were married to bishops (Baker, 1898). Due to their husbands’ positions, Keller (1981) argued these women were “concerned with maintaining the society as a middle-of-the-road organization” (p. 258).

Even though the founding mothers were well connected, two men from the parent board met with several founders to come to “a more definite understanding” regarding the “object and aim” of the new organization (Wheeler, 1884, p. 41). The women “were authorized to proceed” with the understanding their society “though independent of the parent Board, was to act harmoniously with it” (Wheeler, p. 42).

From the onset, there was tension between the General Missionary Board and the WFMS. The parent board was primarily concerned about money—namely, not having their funds siphoned off by the women. The WFMS was prohibited from collecting money during church services, Sunday school, and other general meetings (Wheeler, 1884). This stipulation created fundraising challenges for the new organization.

The women minimized the men’s concerns by framing their identity as the educational arm of the Methodist Episcopal missionary enterprise (Keller, 1981, p.255). In the September 1869 edition of *Heathen Woman’s Friend*, the organizers identified their “missionary intelligence” as potentially increasing the “enthusiasm of the people” thereby expanding overall donations to missionaries and their projects (*HWF*, 1869, p. 52-53).

‘Women’s Work for Women’

The rallying cry of the movement was *Women’s Work for Women*. Female missionary organizations believed the male-dominated denominational boards had failed to address the unique needs of women and children, particularly in sex-segregated societies. The concept of women supporting their global sisters provided those on the home front with “a strong sense of their own destiny in contributing to the salvation of women everywhere” (Robert, 1993, p. 110).

Robert (2002) argued Women’s Work for Women was the “first significant gender-linked mission theory” (p. 7). Based on white middle-class values, this approach postulated women in countries served by missionaries could be liberated through education, medical care, and other support from their western sisters. Conversion to Christianity provided eternal salvation upon death and improved social conditions during life.

The relationship of imperialism to the missionary enterprise is outside the scope of this study. Scholars’ perceptions on this relationship, however, have changed over time. Flemming (1989) argued
“women’s work for women” endorsed the superiority of American civilization (p. 1). Robert (1993) extended this argument by stating the late nineteenth century mission movement was “marred by the idea that western women knew what was best for the rest of the world’s women” (p. 115). Recent scholarship argues for a more nuanced interpretation of the Protestant women’s missionary movement. Shemo (2012) argues for “embracing the complexity” of a movement that opposed imperialism, particularly gender and race bias, while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of imperialistic structures (p. 270).

**Tactics for recruitment**

**Magazines and publications**

The founders envisioned publishing a missionary paper to serve as a link between the missionaries in the field and their supporters on the home front (Rice McCoy, 2004). The project also needed to be a self-supporting entrepreneurial endeavor (Wheeler, 1884). Subscription and advertising fees were used to cover production and distribution costs of their publication, *Heathen Woman’s Friend*.

The annual subscription fee was to be reasonable so every member could afford the publication. The original fee was 30 cents in 1869 and was raised to 35 cents in 1870 and 50 cents in 1875. The original publication had eight pages and the size was increased to 12 pages in 1870, 16 pages in 1872, 24 pages in 1875, and 28 pages in 1886. Likewise, subscribers also increased. There were 4,000 subscribers at the end of the first year and the number had increased to 25,000 by 1872.

A significant change was made from a newspaper to a magazine format the year before the publication’s 25th anniversary. Then the magazine increased to 30 pages over the course of several years (Baker, 1898). The types of articles expanded over the years, but the primary focus remained reports from missionaries in the field and tips on organizing a successful local auxiliary. The WFMS supplemented their monthly periodical with leaflets, maps, books and other printed material to be used as study material (Baker).

Children were an ongoing focus of the publication work. A children’s section was integrated into *Heathen Woman’s Friend* but there was interest in producing a specific monthly publication for children. The publication was finally approved by national leaders and the general membership in 1889—after three earlier failures (Baker, 1898).

*Heathen Children’s Friend* was originally an eight page publication with illustrations. There were over 5,000 subscribers the first year and the publication expanded to 12 pages the second year. The price remained constant—15 cents for an individual subscription, but a discounted rate of 10 cents per subscription for 10 copies to the same address. This publication included stories from missionaries, a monthly study lesson, and an exclusive page for those five years of age or under (Baker, 1898).
Grassroots organizing

There were three organizational levels in the WFMS—the General Executive Committee at the national level, Branch Societies encompassing multiple states at the regional level, and Auxiliary Societies in local churches. By 1895 there were 6,223 local organizations with 153,584 individual members (Baker, 1898). By 1870 this system had evolved so the regional organizations ran their own programs while leaders at the national level coordinated the larger operation (Robert, 1993). Essentially, in this semi-autonomous structure, the General Executive Committee set the priorities for funding while the Branch Societies raised money for their missionaries through the local Auxiliary Societies (Baker).

The founders of the WFMS recognized the importance of organizing their members at the grassroots level. Their objective was “to have an Auxiliary in every Church, and every woman a member” (Baker, 1898, p. 28). Keller (1981) noted detailed instructions on how to organize a local auxiliary were published in an early addition of Heathen Woman’s Friend and “resulted in the early success of 130 branches after one year of the society’s existence” (p. 257).

In addition, adult members were encouraged to form grassroots organizations called Mission Bands for young women, teenage girls, and both male and female children (Baker, 1898). Beaver (1962) documented the vital role these local bands played in promoting the missionary cause. They fostered support at the local level while producing a reliable flow of new members for local missionary societies with some of those members eventually becoming workers in the foreign field.

The first band, “The Juvenile Missionary Society,” was formed in Berea, Ohio in 1873 and there were 741 Children’s Bands twenty-two years later (Baker, 1898, p. 61). The children in these bands elected their own officers, held their own meetings, listened to guest speakers, performed in pageants, saved their pennies, and raised money while learning about and supporting missions (Beaver, 1962). Children involved in local missions progressed from Little Light Bearer, to King’s Herald, to Standard Bearer (WMF, 1903, back cover advertisement). Then as young women, they could become members of the junior auxiliary affiliated with the local missionary society where their mothers were members.

Little Light Bearers were critical to the organization’s success. These groups were open to babies and toddlers to age five—both male and female. Mothers paid 25 cents per child for a five-year membership (Baker, 1898). The rationale for membership was two-fold. One objective was interesting mothers in foreign missions through activities offered to their children. The ultimate objective, however, was to get them young so the toddlers became members of Mission Bands when they reached school age and hopefully, remained active in the mission movement from cradle to grave (Beaver, 1968).

The Little Light Bearers became a formal institutional structure in 1891 with membership cards and enrollment certificates being printed and distributed to the Branches for resale and recruitment. The
certificates also became a revenue stream for the WFMS. They created a non-denominational version that was used extensively by other Protestant mission organizations (Baker, p. 62).

**Fundraising and sponsorships**

The women had been required to make concessions to the parent board, particularly regarding money, to maintain their autonomy. Consequently, the women’s ability to raise funds was negatively impacted by the agreement between the two parties. The women were specifically prohibited from collecting funds during church services and other public meetings where men, other than pastors, were present (Wheeler, 1884). These restrictions ensured the women would not siphon funds away from the men’s parent board. To compensate, the women developed a “constant and systematic gleaning of small sums” from their members (Baker, 1898, p. 28).

The founders wanted membership fees to be reasonable so every woman in the church could afford to participate. Membership dues were one dollar per year and were collected at the local level and forwarded to the regional Branch Society for distribution in the mission field. For women with more resources, they could purchase a one-time life membership for $20 (Wheeler, 1884). Those with substantial assets were encouraged to become an Honorary Manager for life by making a one-time donation of $100, while a lifetime Honorary Patron contributed $300 once (Wheeler).

There were also opportunities for sponsorships for those who could afford to contribute more. An orphan in India could be supported for $30 per year or in Mexico for $40 per year. Sponsoring a scholarship in India required $30 per year while in Japan it was $40 per year. Women on the home front could underwrite the annual salary for an indigenous female worker—$24 supported a deaconess in China and $60 supported a Bible-reader in India (Wheeler, 1884).

The WFMS also developed mechanisms to solicit and accept larger gifts. *Special gifts*, frequently given in memory of a loved one, often were used for larger projects such as building a church, school, orphanage, or hospital. Baker (1898) noted the significance of these “sanctified offerings . . . hallowed by the touch of those of those whom God has taken from hearts left desolate” (p. 109). There were also standard contracts for individuals to bequeath both personal property and real estate to the organization (Wheeler, 1884). To encourage gifts of $1,000 or more, these donors were recognized in public venues such as histories of the organization (Baker).

The concept of self-sacrifice was ingrained into the organization’s identity. Self-sacrifice was primarily rooted in the theology of the holiness movement, but was reinforced by the restrictions the parent board placed on the women’s fundraising. The women were not to siphon funds away from *regular giving* such as what would typically be put in the Sunday school offering or worship service collection plate.
To emphasize the concept of self-sacrifice, there is an often repeated story regarding how the fledgling organization would pay to send their first missionary overseas to India. “Shall we lose Miss Thoburn because we have not the needed money in our hands? No, rather let us walk the streets of Boston in our calico robes, and save the expense of more costly apparel” (Baker, 1898, p. 24).

Children were also encouraged to practice self-sacrifice by supporting the missionary enterprise with their pennies. In the late nineteenth century, coins from children were collected via “Penny Helper” and “Jewel Gatherer” cards (Baker, 1898, p. 63). Mite boxes however, were the most prominent tool used to encourage children and youth to donate. In addition, they raised awareness of foreign missions and encouraged future support, perhaps even service in a foreign field.

Cards and mite boxes served as visual reminders to pray, give, and go while reinforcing the widespread cultural value that foreign missions was important as mentioned in the admonishment “Every time they drop in a coin they may be reminded to whose support it goes” (WMF, 1900-1902, p. 322).

Norms that reinforced this cultural value included words of praise when auxiliaries or individuals ordered mite boxes and when groups submitted their thank offerings. One organization held a mite box reception to celebrate the collection of funds (WMF, 1898-1899, p. 29). Another organization held a mite box party (WMF, p. 141). One individual ordered a dozen mite boxes to share with friends. There were even “Little Light Bearer baby boxes” that were “so pretty and attractive any child would love to have one” (WMF, p. 377). Giving to the cause was a cultural norm recognized and celebrated within the organization.

**Presentations and events**

Women departing or returning from the mission field promoted the movement and recruited volunteers by speaking at camp meetings, Sunday school classes, and missionary society gatherings. Their purpose was two-fold—raising money for the missionary enterprise and recruiting missionaries for overseas service (Rice McCoy, 2004).

Their messages disclosed events surrounding their call and included requests for prayer support, which implied emotional support. In 1884, two women, on the eve of their departure, shared their excitement and fears about their future work.

The last evening, after Miss Jewell and Miss Reed had spoken, telling of their call, joy at being chosen for this work, and asking the prayers of those who "hold the ropes " for those who go down into the "pit" (HWF, 1884, p. 63).

The same year two women leaving for the field shared their stories at a camp meeting in Coolville. Audience response was an indicator of how these messages influenced listeners.
Misses Lloyd and Fisher spoke of their joy in being chosen to go as messengers of the King, and the vast audience was moved in a wonderful manner. The presence of the Spirit was very manifest (HWF, 1884, p. 90)

Missionaries serving overseas and their families returned home on furloughs to visit their families and travel throughout the United States promoting missions. Typically furloughs were scheduled every seven years but intervening situations could delay or accelerate the trip. These extenuating services included needing medical care, getting a child settled into college, or attending General Conference—Methodism’s quadrennial business meeting.

Missionaries who were home on furlough often spoke at camp meetings and assemblies. Camp meetings were a hallmark of Protestantism in the United States during this time period. Methodists were no exception and the women of the WFMS used these occasions to promote their work, inspire women to organize auxiliaries in their local churches, raise money to support their missionaries and projects, and recruit new missionaries for the field.

Baker’s early history of the WFMS devoted an entire chapter to the women’s involvement at camp meetings. These women were often asked to speak on special days devoted to missions and at anniversary celebrations. Sometimes their presentations were integrated into the regular programming. At the Kansas Chautauqua a “Woman’s Hour” was scheduled for four o’clock each afternoon (Baker, 1898, p. 71). Often, however, the women were given the unpopular time slots such as eight in the morning when participants were rising and the day’s events were scarcely beginning.

Despite the challenges, camp meetings and assemblies were an important communication venue where missionaries from the field could connect with their supporters. In 1881, Isabella Thoburn told her listeners at the Lakeside, Ohio assembly that Miss Ellen Warren was prepared to serve in India as a teacher but there was no money to send her to the field. Over $400 was raised for her support in a matter of minutes (Baker, 1889).

**Nurturing “The Call” in young women**

**Overview on “The Call”**

Missionaries are unique individuals with differing life experiences and worldviews, but during this period they typically shared the experience of being “called of God to be missionaries” (Tucker, 1988, p. 13). The call provided staying power when rational thought and logical decision-making mocked the foolishness of the enterprise. In essence, it was impossible to argue with God’s voice—it had to be heeded (Tucker). In fact, sending agencies from that period either refused or were reluctant to send missionaries who were unable to profess a sense of divine calling (Neely, 1995).
Methodist Episcopal perspective on “The Call”

Within the American Methodist tradition, “the call” played a pivotal role in recruiting personnel for missions (Rice McCoy, 2004). Thoburn (1898), a name synonymous with missions in the Methodist Episcopal Church, recognized “the call” as the most important criteria but he also cautioned this calling must stand the test of time because “… many young men and young women go to the foreign field with a great deal of enthusiasm, thinking they are called, and when they get there the call seems gone, and in a few months they cool off” (Thoburn, p. 89).

For Thoburn, a call to missionary service must pass three tests. First, it had to be confirmed through others (Thoburn, 1898). Second, there had to be harmony between God’s providence and the impression of the one being called. Third, the call had to be tested to ensure harmony between the Word of God and the proposed endeavor. Thoburn advised the call should be thoughtfully reviewed if opposition occurred on any of these three fronts (Thoburn).

Rider Meyer (1887), considered an authority on Christian vocation as it related to women, addressed the issue of being called to missionary service in an article for *Heathen Woman’s Friend* entitled “About Christian Young Women.” Rider Meyer recognized not everyone was called to a foreign field however, she encouraged readers to consider the call. This persuasive strategy was an interesting twist on “the call.” Since the need was so great, it was assumed everyone was called to a foreign field unless there was a specific reason to stay home.

The WFMS also relied on missionaries in the field to recruit colleagues. This was done by having the missionaries make direct appeals to readers in letters and reports written in the field and published back home. According to Rice McCoy (2004), single missionary Lizzie Fisher made an appeal for missionaries in *Heathen Woman’s Friend*.

We are praying for two ladies to be sent to us within a year. . . . O that our Father may put it into the hearts of two ladies to say. . . We see such rare opportunities for a great harvest, if we spare not in the sowing. Send is help; O send us help! (Fisher, 1887, p. 175).

Fisher’s request was precise and stated opportunities were in medical, educational, and evangelistic work.

After Fisher married Rev. William N. Brewster on the mission field, she reported to readers the English church was expecting 10 new workers in Fuzhou bringing their count to 36 female missionaries. She continued to write the English “have not as much work as we have” (Fisher, 1903, pp. 218-219). Brewster was explicit regarding requirements for the American Methodist work—five or six young ladies were needed.

Rice McCoy (2004) argued both the young Lizzie Fisher and mature Elizabeth Brewster were intentional in these appeals for additional personnel mission field—the requisite skills were identified in both. The first was based upon the rhetoric of the holiness movement and was framed within the context
of a prayer. The second was based on *logos* and used Toulmin’s (1958) model to persuade readers. Data: The English are getting more missionaries. Warrant: We have more work than the English. Claim: Therefore, we need more workers too. In both cases, Brewster attempted to persuade readers to answer the call for missionary service on foreign soil.

**Nurturing “The Call”**

As readers matured, the WFMS attempted to cultivate *the Divine Impulse* in the young ladies who read their missionary magazines by encouraging them to “cultivate the habit of obeying” these impulses since “obeying them is the most precious secret of life” (p. 198). The writers believed these directives came directly from Heaven through the Holy Spirit and included imperatives to “‘Do this,’ ‘Go there,’ ‘Say that.’” The underlying assumption was readers would be directed to join missionary organizations, donate money to mission projects, and perhaps, be called to missionary service (The Divine Impulse, 1904, p. 198).

An example of persuading young women to consider missionary service is a series of seven articles published in *Woman’s Missionary Friend* from June 1901 to October 1902 profiling college women who responded favorably to the divine impulse and served in a mission field. This series highlighted dedicated Christian young women answering God’s call (Rice McCoy, 2004).

After a young woman was called to service, missionary magazines addressed the practical issue of preparing for the foreign field. In 1893, Dr. Martha A., a medical missionary to India, outlined a strategy in *Heathen Woman’s Friend* to help potential candidates prepare for overseas service. These recommendations included:

1. Learn to keep accounts.
2. Get as much practical knowledge of saving souls and building them up in the faith as possible.
3. Learn to value and take care of your health.

The ordering of these tips is interesting. The worldly issue of money was placed before the spiritual matter of saving souls with guarding one’s health a close third (Rice McCoy, 2004).

**Responding to “The Call”**

After hearing and responding to God’s call, missionary candidates needed to negotiate the institutional bureaucracy of the Methodist Episcopal Church, particularly the WFMS. Ferguson (1971) identified methodological order as an intrinsic trait of the Methodist movement since the days of its founder John Wesley. In fact, “disobedience to discipline . . . is the cardinal sin in Methodism” (p. 277).

Robert (2000) described the selection process missionary candidates encountered in the late nineteenth century in the Methodist Episcopal Church while attempting to secure an overseas appointment.
The first question asked of a prospective missionary was “Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon you the work of a foreign missionary?” The second question involved willingness to make a lifetime commitment. The third and fourth questions asked whether the prospective missionary had “an experimental knowledge of salvation through Jesus Christ our Lord” and whether that had been manifested in bringing souls to Christ. The final questions related to Methodist doctrine, education, health, teaching experience, and marital status of the candidate (Robert, p. 22).

Robert identifies the three-fold purpose of the interview as engaging the candidate in discussing her conversion, call to the mission field, and experience with the Holy Ghost.

Once the call was confirmed, missionaries like Lizzie Fisher wrote articles for Heathen Woman’s Friend to report their activities and to garner support for the foreign mission field (HWF, 1885).

Discussion

Public relations had not developed into a formal profession in the United States when the WFMS was being founded in the mid-nineteenth century. Yet the leaders of the WFMS used methods familiar to today’s public relations practitioners including identification of publics and objectives plus use of controlled media, grassroots organizing, fundraising, sponsorships and events. The WFMS was not the first mission-focused organization for women. These tools however, helped the organization become “the greatest Woman’s Missionary Society of the country” (Montgomery, 1910, p. 32). By their 25th anniversary in 1894, 231 missionaries had been sent to the field with 161 active at the time. The women owned mission-related property valued at $408,666 and almost $3.5 million had been spent supporting missions (Isham, 1936).

Identification of publics and objectives

The WFMS clearly identified their publics as being internal rather than external. In order to recruit and support missionaries, they specifically wanted an Auxiliary Society in every local congregation of the Methodist Episcopal Church. They also wanted every adult female church member to be a member of the local auxiliary, every young woman to participate in the local junior auxiliary, and every child to be active in the local mission bands.

These internal publics could also be identified as latent, aware, or active. Female members of the congregation who were not members of the WFMS were a latent public. Their values overlapped with the WFMS however, these congregants were unaware of their potential relationship to the organization. The mission bands, particularly the Little Light Bearers, were a tactic utilized to involve this latent public. It was believed the mothers would become involved if there was programming to engage their children.
Inactive or marginally active members of the local auxiliary constituted an aware public. They recognized a formal relationship based on shared values, but they were not ready to fully participate in the organization. It was important to move these women from an aware to an active public. Members of an active public recognized a formal relationship based on shared values and the responded by serving as officers, organizing fundraisers, donating to the missionary cause, organizing and involving children in mission-related activities, and even serving in the foreign field.

The founders of the WFMS also needed to focus on another internal public—the men of the parent board. The male leaders of the General Missionary Board could have thwarted recognition of the WFMS when the issue was voted on at a quadrennial meeting. Robert (1993) argues the WFMS was able to survive and thrive within the male–dominated hierarchy of the Methodist Episcopal Church because “the founding women had friends in high places who shared their goals—namely, their husbands” (Robert, 1997, p. 141).

The husbands of the founders were opinion leaders who acted as an intervening public. They served as spokespersons at meetings where the women would not have been welcome to speak, or in some cases, even attend. As an intervening public, these men had credibility with their fellow pastors at all levels of the institutional church—from the bishop with the most seniority to a local pastor serving his first congregation.

Controlled media

The WFMS used controlled media as a primary tactic beginning with the publication of *Heathen Woman’s Friend* in the third month of the organization’s founding. This allowed them to manage messages to their internal publics as well as, bolstering their claim as being the educational arm of the Methodist Episcopal missionary enterprise. A monthly periodical specifically for children was added a few years later. Additional study materials were printed including leaflets, maps, books and other printed material. The women’s publishing efforts were a self-supporting entrepreneurial endeavor that provided a revenue stream while allowing them to positively impact their image within the denomination and broader mission movement.

Grassroots organizing, fundraising, sponsorships and events

Like today’s neighborhood organizers, the WFMS understood the strength of grassroots organizations. Their goal was to have an Auxiliary Society in every local church, and if that failed, to provide an opportunity for local women to participate at the popular camp meetings and assemblies of the era. (1898, p. 63). In addition, children and youth became a feeder system proving a steady stream of recruits to the adult auxiliaries through their age-based organizations spanning newborns to college co-eds.
Methodists are known for their hierarchy and the WFMS was no exception with three structural levels—local, regional, and national. Leaders at the national level managed the big picture but regional leaders managed the purse strings. Consequently, since money was sent to regional rather than national officers, members of local auxiliaries could feel closer to their missionaries, their orphans, their students, their schools, and their hospitals.

Providing opportunities for giving at all levels also fostered this sense of shared community. Only two cents a week was required for annual membership in the WFMS. There were additional giving levels however, up to underwriting the cost of building a school or hospital. Sponsorships, known as special gifts, encouraged special ties between the donor and recipient of the funding. Contributions of $1,000 or more were recognized publically, and naming rights for buildings accompanied large gifts.

Children and youth were also targeted for giving through mite boxes and other tactics. While raising funds, these tactics also raised awareness of foreign missions and encouraged membership in local auxiliaries and potential service as a missionary. Even newborns were included as potential supporters and received doll souvenirs with a poem attached reminding all to give (WMF, 1898).

‘Cradle to Grave’ recruitment

The potential for youth, who had already become regular givers, to continue support through leadership, responding to “the call,” or maintaining financial support, demonstrates the success of their strategic cradle to grave recruitment plan. Messages targeted each age group and age-appropriate media were used to sustain interest. Furthermore, the WFMS relied on age-old rhetorical devices like pathos when using fear appeals, logos when detailing the practical training needed, and ethos when relying on status or first-hand accounts of work in the field to gain interest.

Cultivating a culture of mission-minded women and children within the United States during the late 1800s and early 1900s, the WFMS relied on basic public relations principles by addressing each public using multiple media and rhetorical strategies to promote their cause and recruit members. Their promotion and recruitment plan resulted in one of the largest movements during that time period and created vocational opportunities for women on foreign soil unavailable to them at home.
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Public diplomacy on the agenda of early PR professionals in Finland
- The birth and evolution of a profession

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Introduction
The terms public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy continue to be used incoherently in historical analyses, without clear agreement of the definition of the terms. Joseph S. Nye is arguably the most prominent theorist in cultural and public diplomacy today. His widely known concepts of hard, soft and smart power all seem to be applicable to Finland’s early public diplomacy and PR history, because, as the firsthand source material illustrates, cultural diplomacy opportunities were taken into account in the propaganda put forth by the early PR professionals hired by the military before the Second World War.

Cultural and public diplomacy during the Cold War era have been subject of extensive study in the US. They have also received increasing attention in Nordic countries. The study continues to focus on defining more sharply the basic concepts. In my study I have considered public diplomacy to fall within the broader context of cultural diplomacy. Historian Nicholas Cull has defined five core dimensions of public diplomacy in 1960’s United States as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting (see, e.g. Glover, 201, pp. 8–9). During the war, the content was naturally subject to censorship and intended to support the war effort. As an example, movies presenting Finland and the Finnish Broadcasting Company’s foreign news and cultural broadcasts were included in the selection of State foreign PR tools during the war.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate how propaganda, public and cultural diplomacy were conducted before and during the WWII in Finland. We tend to think that there is a strong difference between these terms and that propaganda relates only to the era of WWII. However propaganda today is still involved in nation’s strategic communications. During the WWII nation communication was summarized as the ‘Strategy of Truth’. If anything, the propaganda in different forms and with creative euphemisms is well alive today, as evidenced by the "information" related to "war" on terrorism. (See e.g. Taylor 2002, s. 437-452) Secondly, this paper covers the birth of the PR profession in Finland. Key questions are what was the mission of the PR pioneers and how did they organized themselves? Eventually did they succeed in achieving common goals they believed in?
Information as a branch of Armed Forces

Finland, like many other nations, began making preparations for global political crisis in the late 1930s. Propaganda and the dissemination of information gained in importance as a “weapon” for many countries, including Finland, during World War II. The word “propaganda” began to take on negative connotations as a result of its use by Nazi Germany during the war and was increasingly replaced by “public diplomacy” after WWII, particularly in the United States. Although the term was essentially an euphemism for propaganda during the Cold War era, state and private-sector PR activities during wartime Finland and thereafter can also be examined from the perspective of the concept of modern-day public diplomacy.

In 1937 the Finnish army recruited reporters, so-called “advertising men”, as well as artists, such as authors and painters, for its military refresher training. Colonel L. Leander, a propaganda trainer, believed that an armed forces propaganda branch should be created for Finland, and that men who were better than average at writing, speaking, drawing and photography would make the best military reserve personnel (Lehtinen, 2009). Leander himself can be considered one of Finland’s wartime PR professionals, although this word was not yet used at the time. Information, enlightenment and propaganda were the terms of those days. Leander’s 1935 book “On National defense and the press (Maanpuolustus ja lehdistö) is considered the groundbreaking publication on the role of PR service of the nation (Uola, 2001).

Alongside the preparations for potential war, Finland was also eagerly preparing for the 1940 Olympic Games, which eventually took place only in 1952, due to start of the Winter War in autumn of 1939. From the war propaganda perspective, Olympic preparations were fortunate, as they created positive press through the numerous international medias covering the preparations. The favorable image held major significance for Finland’s public diplomacy during the war years 1939-44, which were covered by relative few foreign correspondents, who paid less than a hundred visits per year to the country during the war years. Even a single industrious correspondent could have a profound impact on spreading a positive public image of Finland. Edzard Schaper, a German writer who covered Finland’s politics, economy and culture, produced extensive articles about Finland during the 1941–1944 Continuation War with the Soviet Union for the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, a politically important newspaper for the Third Reich. After the war, Schaper became a prolific and well-known independent author and translator in Switzerland (Peltovuori, pp. 38-39).

When the Winter War (1939–40) broke out, Finland was a little-known, small nation between Sweden and the Soviet Union – between the west and the east. A great amount of prejudicial and erroneous information had been written about Finland immediately before the Winter War. For that reason, authentic articles about Finland’s circumstances and politics written by newsmen were a valuable means of spreading accurate information. The Olympics were seen as a good opportunity to promote the desired image of Finland. The Foreign Ministry considered this sports event to be
significant also in terms of foreign politics, and as a result, the State budgeted special funds for the games (Hallituksen kertomukset [Finnish Government’s Reports]), 1938, 77, 99–100 and 1941 p. 78).

Of course, public relations had been practiced in various forms in Finland even before the world wars. The first press releases for the forest industry were written up back in the 1910s, and the first in-house corporate magazine in Finland appeared in the same decade (Von Hertzen, Melgin, Åberg, 2012, p. 10). There is, however, relatively little information and research available on early PR activities and public diplomacy, beside the research on World Expos.

Finland has engaged in public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy at least as long as there have been diplomats and embassies. In the 19th century, scientists and artists, alongside politicians, acted as unofficial representatives of Finland in establishing foreign relations. One such notable was the painter Akseli Gallen-Kallela (1865–1931), who designed, among other things, Finland’s official army uniforms and whose advisory protocols were relied on by the war-time Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces Marshal Mannerheim (1867–1951). The main tasks of foreign embassy officials naturally included fostering peaceful diplomatic relations and promoting positive perceptions of Finland in the country where they were positioned. (Nevakivi, 1988 pp. 152–153).

**Winter War and public diplomacy**

When the Winter War broke out between Finland and the Soviet Union, other European nations, such as France and Italy, took notice of Finland, primarily for its thorny foreign politics situation, but also in more general terms. Finland’s war against the mighty Soviet Empire was understood and communicated in the media of various countries close to the way what Finland had hoped: as a defensive war for independence and neutrality (Holmila 2009, p. 7–18). Newspapers both in European countries and in the United States conveyed sympathy for Finland, naturally partly to promote their own ideologies and from a perspective that supported their own foreign policy. Finland was a country to pay back its sovereign debt in full to the United States, in accordance with the signed contract, which helped to create a positive impression of Finland in US. (FFM, a, 1938) Due to its foreign policy, Germany kept distance to Finland during the Winter War, but later on, during the Continuation War (1941–1944), publicly applauded the country for being brothers in arms and for fighting against the Bolshevik regime.

In addition to wartime political news, the global press also published general news affecting Finland’s national image. The articles documented the kinds of things that foreign correspondents experienced firsthand. Finland’s harsh albeit beautiful natural landscape and the nation’s hard-working albeit impoverished citizens secured space in news columns. The articles also served the propagandist goals of both Finland and the correspondents’ homelands. In Finland, the goal was, in addition to conveying an image of a neutral Nordic nation, also to spread stories of the courage of Finnish soldiers and their wives, as well as of Finland’s unique culture. Highlighting “Finnishness” detached the nation from the Soviets and Slavs. PR activities were also used as a means of supporting foreign trade
relations. Germany was interested in Finland’s nickel industry, and many other European countries in its wood products manufacturing. The impact of trade policy interests on public diplomacy has not yet been comprehensively covered in Finland.

**Culture and politics**

Using Finland’s unique culture as a tool for public diplomacy has its own important chapter in the nation’s public diplomacy history. High culture was Finland’s way of detaching itself from Imperial Russia during the oppressive years (1889–1905 and 1906–1917). It’s no wonder, that the music of such composers as Jean Sibelius, which was associated with nationalism during the oppression years also lent itself well to Finland’s public diplomacy during the Winter War and Continuation War. Members of the armed forces “information units” that were responsible for Finland’s war propaganda were themselves, authors, reporters, artists, scientists and researchers. It was natural for them to incorporate art and culture in their war propaganda. Many, among them Mika Waltari (1908–1979), one of Finland’s most renowned authors, worked as information officers in the Government Information Center. In his free time, Waltari churned out novels and short stories. Some of Waltari’s books dealt with the war. They were then translated, as were a number of other works by wartime writers, and exploited by the State’s public diplomacy machine. Artists, who were not officially in the service of the State’s information organization, were also coached in wartime propaganda at the hands of the PR pioneers. Sibelius, for example, was coached into giving impassioned accounts of his feelings about Finland and its suffering citizens in radio broadcasts in the US (Lähteenkorva, 2004, pp. 438–9).

A central artist in Finland’s public diplomacy history is architect and designer Alvar Aalto. He used the connections he established in the US in the 1930s to benefit the Finnish State during the war while serving as a military official on behalf of the Finnish State’s information organization (Schildt, 499–500). Aalto’s broad network of PR contacts in the Finnish–Swedish corporate sphere helped him tremendously in building international success for himself; Finland as a whole also benefited from his success later, during the Cold War. Alongside Sibelius, Aalto can be considered a key figure in Finland’s cultural diplomacy history.

Aalto, Sibelius, Waltari and other culture persons naturally also contributed to art in and of itself. But they and their contemporaries were also skilled in instrumentalizing culture for the strategic goals of the State. In this small country, everyone knew one another; cooperation may therefore have come about naturally between various professional groups, including the information activities.

Particularly skilled at veiling politics with culture were the Germans. The Germans, including Goebbels and Hitler, were genuinely interested in Finnish culture. Art and classical music in particular, was incorporated in the PR of the brothers-in-arms countries as part of their aspirations in foreign politics (See e.g. Peltovuori p. 242). A major exhibition of Finnish female artists in Berlin, inter-country sports competitions, a German graphic arts exhibition in Helsinki, a music festival in
Wiesbaden to celebrate Sibelius, the Weimar International Writers’ Meeting, the anniversary of the national epic Kalevala in Germany, a celebration of Finland’s Independence Day at the embassy in Berlin – these are some examples of the cultural ties between Finland and Germany. During the war, for Finland also after the war, culture was a topic for the media particularly when foreign politics could not be discussed publicly because of the delicate relations with the Soviet Union.

**Strategy or coincidence?**

Finland’s public diplomacy was not very organized or controlled before or even during the Winter War, despite media success abroad. The State’s communications organization during the Winter War was deemed fragmented, and improvements were made by a decree in 1941 (Hallituksen kertomus, 1941, pp. 76–77, 88). Finland’s media success during the war did not come about by chance, even though a memorandum drawn up by the Government Information Center during the Continuation War smugly declares that *our propaganda during the Winter War was not actually handled by Finns themselves* (Lähteenkorva, p. 441). The statement does not give credit to the eager information and PR work that was spread out extensively among various professional groups and which was, in part, responsible for creating the positive national image of Finland. This was no more about an inexplicable wave of sympathy than it was the outcome of the State’s strategic public diplomacy. It was about a correctly timed and critical mission. The war in Finland was considered a defensive war against the Soviet Union. The nation’s citizens formed a united front, despite their diverging political standpoints. A certain “spirit” arose during the Winter War, but could not be revived during the Continuation War.

The Finnish State’s information organization generated thousands of texts during the war both for its homeland and for foreign communications. Based on the material submitted by the military correspondents, the Government Information Center (VTL) passed on the most information to Germans and Swedes, neighboring Sweden being a key diplomatic channel for Finland throughout its independence. Finnish embassies around the world disseminated such information. The list of articles distributed abroad between 1941 and 1944 contains headlines from 1,901 articles. Among the writers were a number of influential people at the forefront of cultural spheres. History researcher and later Professor Eino Jutikkala was in charge of VTL’s production office, where articles were edited (Peltovuori pp. 46–47).

Films and photographs were also shipped abroad for propaganda purposes. For example, 17,000 photographs were taken in 1941–42. Only some of these were given to newspapers free of charge in the name of wartime propaganda. Others were sold and the profits, e.g. FIM 3.6 million in 1942, were placed in safe keeping, because no decision had been made on how they were to be used (Valtiontilintarkastajan kertomus hallituksen kertomuksessa [State Auditor’s Report in the Finnish Government’s Report] 1942, pp. 6–7). The selling of the photos is intriguing due to the general assumption made by foreign magazines at the time that the media was paid for column space. In
Finland, such communications policy has presumably never been in use. In the 1960s and ‘70s, when the global ethical rules for public relations (The Code of Athens and Lisbon) were adopted, Finland, with only a few PR professionals at the time, did not even have any real ethical issues to resolve. The basic principles of ethical behavior have essentially been an intrinsic part of the early PR profession in Finland (von Hertzen, Melgin. Åberg, 24-26,60).

**Sweden’s special role in PR during the war**

The purpose of Finland’s World War II foreign public relations was primarily to serve as a means of “justifying the policy adopted by Finland” (Hallituksen kertomus 1941, p. 77). It meant being part of Scandinavia and independence from the political interests of the superpowers. Sweden, as Finland’s neighbor to the west, was very important not just in terms of diplomacy, but also in terms of communications and PR. The State drew up separate guidelines during the Continuation War concerning information activities directed at Sweden. “Information activities directed at Sweden must be increased. That is required by the following: a. Sweden holds considerable political significance for Finland, because its positions and official and unofficial statements can positively influence Finland’s status in countries where Finnish propaganda has no access. b. Sweden’s financial assistance is important for Finland.” (FFM, b, 1942).

These guidelines concerning propaganda to and through Sweden also take into consideration the significance of cultural diplomacy. Lectures, presentations and visits were considered important. In guidelines drawn up by the State organization, it was recommended that “cultural individuals,” including the King of Sweden, be utilized in foreign communications (FFM, c, 1943). The importance of building “relations” was discussed, at a time when public relations was not a well-known concept in Finland. The concept of PR gained ground in Finland only in the latter half of the 1950s.

Guidelines on PR concerning Sweden were handled by key information professionals, such as Lauri Puntila, deputy chief of the Government Information – and censorship – Center, working directly under the Prime Minister’s office. After the war, Puntila became an executive in the Finnish Cultural Foundation and subsequently a long-standing professor of political history at Helsinki University. Drawing up PR guidelines alongside Puntila was Heikki Reenpää, who in civilian life served as CEO of a major Finnish publishing house Otava.

**Nation communication and self-image**

Studies on Finland’s national image, or on the concept of national image in general, is often focused on material intended for foreign use. Advertising and propaganda films have been studied, as well as country brochures. The propaganda for domestic audiences has been somewhat neglected in research, which elements were used to create the self-image of the Finns. - In the end, it cannot be very different from the image that Finland wished to project outwards. The specific image of “sisu”, strongly persevering, as a result of wartime public diplomacy efforts would be worth of a deeper study.
The primary goal of Finland’s domestic PR was naturally to maintain the population’s will to defend. The military PR correspondents were expected to boost the nation’s morale and strengthen people’s faith in the future. The letters from men on the front line and the sermons of front-line military chaplains contributed to the Finns’ renowned will to defend. This set an example for the rest of the world. “If the rest of the civilized world were as determined as the Finnish nation, Soviet attempts to infiltrate every corner of the globe would have been much less significant.” This is a passage from a 1951 American newspaper as quoted by the Finnish Embassy in Washington in its foreign press report for the Foreign Ministry (von Hertzen, Melgin, Åberg, p. 252).

One essential episode in Finland’s early PR history is Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim’s Orders of the Day, an unrivalled example of psychological warfare. Finland was expected to be politically divided in the pre-WWII 1930s due to its language conflict (Finnish–Swedish) and civil war (1918). But the domestic propaganda efforts during the Winter War, and the heroic content of the Orders of the Day in particular, helped to unite the nation.

The radio transmissions of the Commander-in-Chief were clear and concise. His message was based on repetition. A highly qualified group of the Commander’s most trusted subordinates and civil servants of the Government Information Center were responsible for formulating the “Orders.” Mannerheim himself took part in the PR work as a key communications strategist. He read his Orders of the Day in previously advertised radio broadcasts to an audience of soldiers on the front line and in hospitals, as well as to people on the home front. It was precisely these messages that helped Finnish soldiers and their families conceptualize their identity. The Finnish soldier was fearless and brave, fighting on behalf of his country. This bravery and “sisu” branded the entire Finnish nation in the foreign press throughout the 1950s.

The first of Mannerheim’s Orders of the Day in 1939 was: “We are fighting for our homes, our faith and our country.” The Finnish soldier was celebrated in winter/spring of 1940: “I have fought on many battlefields, but never have I seen your like as warriors.” The situation later, during the Continuation War, was more difficult. The war had exhausted the nation and sparked a critical attitude towards warfare, something which was reflected in the Finnish novels penned at the time. At first accepting in tone, they became increasingly critical during the Continuation War (Lassila, 1999, pp. 8–10, 21–23). Mannerheim wisely shifted the message of his Orders of the Day to cultural issues. Since Finland could never be victorious in war with the Soviet Union, who was much greater in size, Mannerheim told the nation, “This country is now a cultural nation that has proved to the world that it has earned the right to live.” (Mannerheim, 1918–44).
After WWII, Finland’s close ties with Germany were cut. Along with Germany, Finland was on the losing side. Building good relations with the Soviet Union was at the top of its foreign policy agenda. Finland’s foreign politics were characterized by extreme cautiousness.

The first PR professionals during peacetime in Finland headed for the United States for lessons in the business. As Finland was not able to participate in Marshall Plan due to the delicate political situation in the country, US looked for alternative ways to cooperate with Finland. Finland had repaid according to schedule its wartime debts to US, which provided funds for purposes like study grants. For the US it was important to launch an ideological attack on the Soviets and to get Finns on board. A typical program was the Asla–Fulbright Grants, which helped many Finns to learn about PR in the US, grants that continued until 1960s. Among those travelling to the US was Olavi Laine, Managing Director of the promotional Association of Finnish Work. Laine became a mainstay in the 1947 grounded organization of PR professionals in Finland (Von Hertzen, Melgin, Åberg, p. 49).

The word “information men” was used for PR professionals those days. This profession began to spread after the war, but the professional title remained relatively unknown for decades among the general public (Söderman, 2011). “Information men,” in professional circles, meant largely the same thing as “communications officer/manager.” Peacetime “information men” were united by a common past, and the PR profession in 1950s Finland was characterized as “patriotic.” It was generally assumed that “information men” were, as they were during the war, still in the service of the State. Corporate information professionals were even shunned in the early years of the sector’s first peacetime association. It was called in Finnish “Information Men” (Tiedotusmiehet), although the official translation in English was Association of Public Relations. PR as a term and concept was adopted in Finland by only a handful of people. (Pietilä, 1980 p. 102).

Finland’s first PR association, called “Propagandaliitto” (1937–1942), was, in a way, the first association of the sector. The association cooperated with other associations, such as a veterans’ organization, on foreign PR in connection with the 1940 Olympics. During the Continuation War, a number of unofficial organs alluding to propaganda also operated in Finland (Archive directory, 1968, pp. 6–11). After the war, propaganda and censorship were abolished, but the need to congregate amongst those who churned out information remained.

The first PR organization established during peacetime in Finland, the Finnish Association of Public Relations (“Information Men”), is surprisingly the oldest in its field in Europe. It was founded in 1947 as a natural continuation of the work carried out by civil servants who handled propagandist tasks during the war. The original purpose of the association was to ensure open communications media for the citizens. Contemporary documents indicate, however, that the association’s most important task was to organize communications beyond the borders of Finland.
The small group of men who founded the association did their part to disseminate information about Finland to foreign countries during the war. It was natural that concern about Finland’s interests was strongly in the forefront even after the war ended. Finland’s foreign policy position during what was dubbed “The Years of Danger” (1944–48), when Finland’s social order was threatened by the communists. They gained power in many other countries under Soviet influence. Geopolitics had special status in Finnish foreign politics. Close relations with Germany during the Continuation War strained Finland’s public diplomacy, and relations with the Soviet Union were detrimental. Finland was now forced to balance its foreign policy between eastern and western ideologies.

The information men believed that there was not enough accurate and timely information about Finland being disseminated abroad. Accurate information meant facts instead of rumors. Rumors and fears of Finland slipping into Soviet spheres of influence swelled within its borders. For a short time, the country’s internal political power relationships were characterized by great instability after the re-established communist party won a surprising number of seats in parliament and gained several key positions in the government and civil service. The seeds of “Finlandization” were sown in foreign politics, although the term Finlandization only came into use in the 1960s (Seppinen, pp. 55–57). Early PR men began to organize during highly unstable times, with major concern over Finland’s global image.

**Finland’s image a concern for the sector**

The domestic power dynamics shifted again as soon as 1949, as support for the communists declined and people’s worst fears began to subside. For decades, however, Finnish–Soviet relations restricted Finnish freedom of speech on every topic, mostly on Finns’ own initiative. Politically sensitive information made its way into the news via peculiar channels, often being routed first through Stockholm. Once sensitive issues were dealt with in the Swedish press, Finland was then also free to discuss those topics (Söderman, 2011).

State officials who had joined the Association of PR Professionals tried to get involved in the State’s information organization immediately after the war. The Finnish State initially strongly limited the Government Information Center and discontinued it altogether in 1944, burdened by its friendliness towards Germany and overblown nationalism (Seppinen p. 51). A number of other semi-official organizations were discontinued after the war, forcing a ministerial committee in 1945 to deliberate how the State’s communications should be organized. During these deliberations, it became apparent that national propaganda during the Continuation War had been highly criticized. The goal was now to make information dissemination activities more of a “technical disseminating machine” and a “tool for the Government” than a centralized PR machine focused on generating articles. The deliberations highlighted the high cost of generating collections of press clippings, which were considered important, and the need for sufficient staff with the relevant language skills to carry on the work. Otherwise, the tasks of the State’s information organization, which was in the planning, were
the same as the PR tasks of today, i.e. managing press relations or writing press releases. In terms of public diplomacy, it was essential that foreign information tasks be returned to the Foreign Ministry, as censorship was no longer required (Mietintö [Deliberation] 1945: 32 p. 5–21). As the outcome of considering various models during the deliberations, the committee stated that there were no grounds for maintaining a centralized information organization. The tasks would have to be distributed amongst the various ministries. The Foreign Ministry saw a need to more effectively build Finland’s image, for example, through better films (ibid. pp. 22–27).

The restructuring of the State’s information organization and the public debate it generated lasted several years in Finland. Finland’s first organized PR professionals were able to voice their opinions on the outcome of the deliberations. In 1948, the first president of the association, Yrjö Kankaanpää (later Kouti) addressed members of the administration he personally knew in a memorandum, together with the sector’s PR association statement. The statement highlights the numerous shortcomings of the State’s information organization. The information personnel were considered either non-existent or unable to engage in dialogue with those carrying out information work within the various ministries. For that reason, among others, a group of these “information men” voluntarily began congregating Monday mornings on the premises of the Ministry of Supply (Kansanhuoltoministeriö). In their statement, the information men suggested that in order to improve the quality of work between the PR personnel of the various ministries, a State information advisory committee should be established (ibid. Attachment, no page numbers).

“The Information Men”, i.e. Finland’s first public relations professionals, were the drivers behind not only the State’s information-organization-related agenda, but also behind building Finland’s national image. In 1947 the association submitted a proposal to the government concerning the establishment of their own Ministry of Information. In 1949 the association submitted also a motion for the establishment of the “Suomi Institute” or Finland Institute. With the purpose of building an image of Finland, this center was, according to the annual reports and archived press news, the main item the association worked on for as many as ten years (FPRA, 1947–58). The tasks were more state-oriented then than they were during the association’s entire history.

**Finland Institute to handle public diplomacy?**

The Finland Institute was intended to carry out the same public diplomacy mandate as the Swedish Institute was set up to do in 1945. The organized PR professionals were considerably well-networked for their time. They were familiar with the Swedish Institute and wanted the same thing for Finland. They also travelled to other European countries as soon as they were able to. They were supported by Aero, the national airline at the time, whose Chief Information Officer was Veli Virkkunen, a presiding officer of the association in the 1950s. Excursions were organized, for example to England in 1952. Virkkunen and Olavi Laine were foreign founding members of the Institute of Public
Relations Association (IPRA). The association’s representatives, who travelled to Western Europe, spread the concept of PR in Finland in the 1950s, including inevitably also their own values.

The Finland Institute and Finland’s national image were the topics of the first PR Days in 1949. The project was dismissed, however, as poorly organized and expensive (FPRA, press clippings, 1949). Discussions on the organization of the PR activities of the Finland Institute and the State continued in the media for years. The association did cooperate with the Foreign Ministry, but organizing the State’s PR activities was probably not considered its responsibility. The Finland Institute never made it to Finland. The idea was consistently discarded, particularly in connection with discussions related to funding. Towards the end of the 1980s, the Finnish Government commissioned research on the idea of the Finland Institute and its establishment. It was once again declared that a centralized PR organization for Finland’s national image was not necessary (Elovainio 1990).

In the late 1940s the Government and the Foreign Ministry wanted to resolve the issues related to foreign communications on their own. Although the sector’s association was courteously being heard, the Foreign Ministry officials themselves were evidently generally opposed to the Finland Institute. In the early 1950s, the State started hiring press officials for its foreign embassies. The press officials were also expected to handle tasks relating to cultural diplomacy, such as organizing art exhibitions in the country where they were stationed. Few of these state press officials, however, were able to carry out this cultural role, due to the embassies’ insufficient resources.

The inspired dialogue on Finland’s national image by the PR association was at the core of the association’s activities also because Helsinki was preparing for the 1952 Olympics. The event was hugely significant for Finland’s image in Cold-War Europe. It follows that early PR professionals were interested in this international event. More foreign correspondents than normal landed in Finland for the Olympics, and Finland was once again featured in a positive light in the newspapers of the world. 1952 remains an important year in Finland’s history of internationalization.

PR combined different professional groups

The Finnish PR association was made up of a wide range of professionals. In the early decades, it counted among its numbers department heads, teachers, judges, CEO’s and reporters. The actual title of communications or PR professional was still seldom used in the 1950s. Only a handful had studied the field in Germany or the US. Female members were even rarer. The association had 168 members in 1958, 6 of whom were women. A unique characteristic of the Finnish PR association was its inclusion of journalists. This cooperation with the media continued for a long time and still has not completely disappeared. Many people with a background in reporting still end up today working in PR and vice versa. “As a matter of curiosity, I point out that our association is, even today, probably the only PR association in the world that also has journalists as members,” stated the Chairman in 1973, K. Heiskanen (PR annual book 1973, p. 11).
Creating Finland’s national image, a central aspect of which involved highlighting neutrality in foreign policy, had united information officials during the war and continued to do so for years after the war had ended. The association’s members had links to a number of professional groups, including politicians. If not recorded in the minutes, politics were most likely discussed in relation to the image of Finland. The PR pioneers had connections with both communist ministers and capitalist politicians, the latter of which were drivers of Finland’s official line - the Nordic identity, independent of the superpowers. The high point of these political congregations was in 1964, when the association was visited by Finland’s President, Urho Kekkonen, who had been in power since 1956.

The State’s public diplomacy agenda was wiped from the PR association’s agenda in the latter half of the 1950s. There was room for other major topics than Finland’s national image. Major disturbances in the society, especially the general strike of 1956, led to an entirely new understanding of organizational PR in companies. The association’s agenda was filled with topics of great social importance other than promoting Finland’s national image. One key social issue was supporting corporate democracy. PR people from the corporate world, who were initially shunned, were increasingly accepted as members of the PR association in the 1960s. The men-only, cigar-club mentality held strong for quite some time, but finally came to a halt. The PR sector grew at a fast pace beginning in the late 1950s, and the number of women in the sector increased. The club-like and closed-membership “Information Men”, with its Finland agenda was labeled completely old-fashioned in the 1970s. In 1978, the new Finnish Association of Public Relations (Suomen Tiedottajien Liitto) was established. It united the “Information Men” established in 1947 and the female reporters who worked on in-house magazines and who had created own association 1955 (Suomen Henkilöstölehtien Yhdistys).

**Conclusion**

The Finnish State’s wartime PR activities focused on disseminating information to foreign countries. The battle of one small country against the Soviet Union, which was several times greater, required the diplomatic support of other nations. Finland sought that support by means of propaganda and public diplomacy. Wartime PR was carried out by individuals best suited for it, i.e. by those skilled in writing and photography.

For a small number of those working in wartime information organizations, PR became a peacetime profession. The war had united them. The war also taught them skills in propaganda and public diplomacy. The wartime “information officers” established Finland’s first PR association during peacetime. During its first ten years, the association felt that its mission was to build Finland’s national image.

The cultural impression of Finland that was spread throughout the world during the war remained unchanged for decades. Finland’s domestic PR and enlightenment activities supported the country’s public diplomacy. Finns collectively experienced new self-awareness during the war, which
bolstered the concept of Finland as a western vanguard against the east. The war also solidified the Finns’ understanding of themselves as a civilized nation.

Finland’s international wartime PR was not purely propaganda; it can also be considered cultural diplomacy as we understand it today. Culture, art, science and sports were an important part of the lives of people who were engaged in other roles during the war. The people who worked in PR during wartime had amassed wisdom – those famous soft and smart powers – from their civilian professions and made use of it in their PR activities. Visiting lecturer or art exhibitions abroad were already understood to be part of public diplomacy and Finland’s national image.
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1. Public relations in Italy and the inception of FERPI in 1970

Documented antecedents of the public relations profession in Italy may be traced back to 1936 when Mussolini, preoccupied that the USA would eventually join the UK in actively trying to stop the dictator’s planned invasion of Ethiopia, sent Emilio Bergamaschi from his propaganda office\(^1\) to stir up the always powerful and rich Italian migrant communities in the States and to lobby Washington in a successful attempt to avert such turn of events. Also, in that same year, Linoleum, a Pirelli Group company, opened the first ever public relations office in Italy. The profession then consolidated during the post war reconstruction (1945-1955), the economic miracle (1955-1965), the slow down (1965/1975) and the stagnation (1975-1990)\(^2\).

Following a decade of ‘wound-licking’ induced by the Clean Hands (Mani Pulite) corruption scandal of the early 90’s, the profession then soared in the first decade (the decline) of this new century.

The Italian Federation of Public Relations, FERPI (Federazione Relazioni Pubbliche Italiana), was created in 1970 by the merger of two existing associations, both incepted in 1956. The two -FIRP and FIERP- reflected (the first) the Roman community of professionals tied to the public sector, large state-owned corporations and public affairs consultants; and (the second) the Milanese community of professionals more tied to the private and financial sectors and to the few existing agencies, as well as to media relations consultants.

In these 42 years -with ups and downs- FERPI has represented the more professionally aware segment of a much larger public relations community; a small segment that has never counted more than 1200 members, with something like a 25% annual churn rate. To become a member one needs to be endorsed by existing accredited members, go through an interview with an elected commission of peers and, once accepted, sign the code of ethics and ensure an active presence in ad hoc professional training programs supplied by the association.

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\(^1\) Gloria Gabrielli ‘Gli amici americani’ Franco Angeli, Milano 2004

\(^2\) The history of public relations in Italy from 1945 to 1960 was presented in Bournemouth in its 2010 edition with a paper by Elisabetta Bini, Ferdinando Fasce and Toni Muzi Falconi and a 30 page chapter on the history of PR in Italy appears in Toni Muzi Falconi’s Gorel- Governare le relazioni Il Sole 24 Ore (2002-2004)
Recent research\(^3\) indicates that today there are some 110 thousand individuals in Italy who invest more than 50% of their professional time in programmed and aware relationship building activities with stakeholders and publics for, or on behalf of, social, private, and public sector organizations.

Some 60% of these operate in the public sector, some 35% in the private sector, in agencies as well as solo consultants; and another 5% in the social and non-profit sector.

If one adds to FERPI members also those of the existing association of public sector communicators, investor relators, public affairs, employee relations, public relations agencies, the total number of members does not amount to more than 7% of the public relations community in the country\(^4\).

In its first twenty years, the seventies and eighties, FERPI successfully performed an intense and active advocacy of the profession through many papers, debates, and events\(^5\).

It also incorporated the activities of the IPR (Institute of Public Relations, a private organization founded by the social democratic leader and finance minister Roberto Tremelloni, ) that, since the early fifties, had created and consolidated the highly relevant Oscar del Bilancio, an award for the most comprehensive annual report. It is sufficient to note that the first ever Oscar (1952) was given to the Motta company with the motivation of having been the first company to include annual income and profit and loss figures in its annual report (!), while in its most recent 2011 edition awards were given to listed; non listed; public administration; nonprofit; banking and insurance reports… as well as corporate governance, sustainability and on-line reporting. Some ten national associations (auditors, accountants, finance managers, independent directors, financial analysts, public relators; stock exchange, banking, insurance and industry associations) all actively participate in a year long process of defining indicators, benchmarks and identification of finalists for each category, in order to offer to the Jury -chaired by the Rector of the Bocconi University and formed by the acting Chairs of the participating associations- a selection of candidates for the annual awards.

In those twenty first years FERPI activities were inspired by liberal and progressive leaderships who accompanied the country’s quest for modernization and development by launching many cultural stimuli to members and their stakeholders: from the rise of the consumer protection wave, the quest for citizen participation, the formation of public policy, the role of culture in communication, the role

\(^3\) Stefano Rolando, IULM, 2010 (this latest estimate is connected to an earlier estimate done in 2001 following the Italian government’s official census mentioned later on in this paper)

\(^4\) If one follows the methodology indicated in the 2005 paper by this author published by the institute for public relations under the title ‘how big is pr and why does it matter’ the only country that has a number of members of the professional association higher than 10% of the estimated pubic relators is Sweden.

\(^5\) Francesco Scarpulla, 2010 storia della FERPI www.FERPI.it
of cultural sponsorships; to the refusal to accept a corporative guild structure but to align with EU liberals’ demand for free access and exchange of professional practices.

2. The end of the first Republic and the inception of the second

In 1992/94 the First Republic of Italy -since its inception by referendum in 1946 and substantially based on mass and elite political parties intermediating relationships between Society and the State-closed shop. Of the three major parties, two dissolved (the socialists and the Christian-democrats) and the third changed name (the communists) and - while the political system’s gradual dissolution had been going on since a decade- this unexpected collapse was dramatically accelerated by the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) corruption scandal that also involved relevant components of the Italian public relations profession⁶.

(Disclosure by the author of this paper. Personally he was never investigated, but three other executives of the PR agency (SCR Associati) he had a year earlier sold to the then-British Shandwick group, and on whose board of directors he was committed to serve until his earn-out period expired, were indicted for a bribe. The judiciary claimed a company that Shandwick had just merged into SCR had paid aides of the then Health Minister in exchange for a major contract related to a massive anti-Aids campaign).

Public relations activities had mostly focused on public affairs, facilitating dialogue and relationships between the media, the business and the political communities. The two latter functions were severely compromised by the Clean Hands scandal and nearly 50 public relators were investigated in tandem with their clients and employers. Some were indicted, others self confessed, a few went under trial and were either sentenced or jailed.

In a 1994 issue of Economy and Management edited by Milano’s Bocconi University, this author published an essay by the title ‘Corporate communication in the transition and after Mani Pulite’ arguing that while the media and the judiciary had formed a winning alliance to replace the existing political system, the public relations profession had failed to distance itself from those political and business interests directly involved in the scandal. In many instances it was actually proven that the public relators stimulated, induced and facilitated criminal actions by their intense interaction (financial intermediation) between politicians and private/business interests.

⁶ Economia e Management (Bocconi University) 1-2004. Le comunicazione d’impresa nella transizione e dopo Tangentopoli by Toni Muzi Falconi
3- Silvio Berlusconi’s direct entrance into active politics and his cucu model of public relations

Silvio Berlusconi, the real-estate/show-business impresario, turned media-magnate and financial-mogul, holding strong relationships with the two major ruling parties that had suddenly disappeared (Christian Democrats and Socialists) was frightened that a then most likely electoral victory of the former Communist Party (PDS) would have endangered his financial empire and also led to criminal procedures against himself and his companies. In 1993 he said, ‘if I don’t go into politics, they will send me to jail and drive me bankrupt’. He therefore allocated his best employees, substantial financial resources and striking communication abilities to form and launch a new party (Forza Italia) that won the 1994 elections through a highly effective campaign, thus inaugurating the Second Republic, an experience that concluded in November 2011, with the resignation of his fourth government out of the eight that had led the country in the period 1994-2011.

Throughout his political career Berlusconi implemented with amazing effectiveness what he himself had recently (2009) referred to as a ‘cucu model’ of public relations. It is a model based on a highly sophisticated and planned network of relationship systems (joyous and candid, yet often sordid) stemming from a structurally populist culture of direct democracy that, in many instances, anticipated dynamics and trends that today are common to political leaderships in many western and East European countries. The expression of ‘cucu’ in fact originates only in November 2008 when, at an Italo-German summit in Trieste, Berlusconi surprises German chancellor Merkel by peekabooing her and jumping from behind a monument under the eyes of major international TV networks.

Yet, all the concepts behind the model were already part of his narrative since 1980 when he had launched Publitalia 80, the advertising services company.

Coming from a career in real estate in Milano that also led him to set up a cable TV station (Telemilano) that was quickly transformed into a local broadcasting channel called Canale 5. Berlusconi then absorbed the ailing local Rete 4 owned by Mondadori and Italia1, another local channel owned by publisher Rusconi - and formed Publitalia 80, a television services advertising company.

In that year advertising in Italy accounted for only 0.6 of GNP against 1.0 in France and 1.5 in the UK and Germany.

Publitalia’s CEO was Marcello Dell’Utri, an erudite and innovative Sicilian manager. In the nineties he would become a member of Parliament, and in the first decade of this century would be indicted and condemned in a first and second judgment for being the vehicle between Berlusconi and

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7 As directly stated in 1993 to journalist icons Indro Montanelli and Enzo Biagi
8 Porta a Porta Rai June 3 2009 and http://www.ticinonews.ch/articolo.aspx?id=161697&rubrica=15
9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPdr4LctMW0
the Mafia. More recently, February 2012, he was acquitted in a third degree decision by the Court of Cassation, that however ascertained his active (‘defensive’, said the jury motivation for the acquittal) role in personally intermediating financial and political relationships between his boss and the mafia.

In 1980, Dell’Utri recruited two consultants (the author of this paper and Antonio Pilati, a radical liberal intellectual who later became a major Berlusconi asset as prominent member of the national communication and then the antitrust authorities). The consultants’ mandate, in Berlusconi’s own words expressed at their first business meeting, was “to create Italy’s most advanced and innovative service company, firmly based on a culture of relationships.”

The two assisted the company and its hundreds of young salespersons (many of whom subsequently became prominent local and national politicians) in rationalising, absorbing and practicing what was then defined a ‘service culture’, and which today one could (with some callous tweaks here and there) call a ‘relationship culture’.

Every time the consultants met with Berlusconi they were amazed by his dynamic and relentless devotion to homework and, most importantly, to the strengthening of the relationship with his interlocutor. Berlusconi (*hon y soit qui mal y pense*) would give every individual he related with, male or female, the impression that his only interest in life was to gain his interlocutor’s approval and empathy.

The Publitalia ‘service culture’, developed by the two consultants in cooperation with Berlusconi and Dell’Utri, quickly developed and became the ‘talk of the business community’.

Every Publitalia employee – mostly, but not only, salespersons - adopted and constantly fed an ad hoc dynamic and electronic data-based system (it was 1980!) recording every single personal, mail or phone contact with prospects - mostly small and medium sized entrepreneurs in northern Italy who did not have sufficient budgets to advertise on national state television, but were highly attracted by the myriad of smaller and local private stations that had been sprouting all over the country since liberalization by the Maccanico bill introduced in 1975, that allowed only local TV stations. Italian consumers began to emancipate from the traditional and consolidated pauperistic and anti-consumerist values propagated by the two major Italian political cultures (catholic and communist) and that were very well reflected by the national state television’s programming.

By 1981, for every Publitalia prospect one could instantly trace birth date, patron saint, composition of family, principal advisors, financial resources ... and this database was instantly updated with information stemming from the ongoing lunches, dinners, breakfasts, conversations… that formed a great part of each Publitalia employee’s day-to-day activity. Being professionally trained to attract conversations also on the private side of things (a precise mandate from Berlusconi),
the data bank became a repository of highly valuable information on the protagonists of Italy’s economic backbone.

Publitalia also adopted an early tactic of making deals by accepting as payments future sales induced by TV advertising; of buying and then reselling shares of their clients’ companies; of stimulating investments through initially free editorial services. Basically the win-win argument was: you try for free, if you make money you give us a part. The company took off very quickly and definitely became Italy’s major and most admired services company.

And boom it was!

There was, however, one element missing: the very legitimacy of private local TV stations that were not allowed by law to connect to one other in real time. This was a major handicap and Berlusconi realized very well that his small (at the time) empire would inevitably collapse if the existing law -that ruled out any other national TV network save for the State’s- was ever to be really enforced. Therefore, it became clear to him that political interests needed to be awakened in order to obtain a new regulation that would allow the growing private TV network to flourish.

In the second part of the 80s, the two most powerful political parties in the government were the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. The Communist Party was at the opposition and, mostly out of disinterest, played a largely insignificant role in this issue. Berlusconi had always nurtured excellent relationships with Milan’s political bosses with whom he had ‘networked’ during his real estate activities to obtain and sell buildings and concessions. During the seventies the Socialist boss in Milan was Bettino Craxi, who became National Party Secretary in 1976. There was no particular ideological leaning towards him, as Berlusconi was (and is) a tough Catholic dealmaker and very well entrenched in the culture of compromise typical of the Christian Democrats. He dealt with Craxi because the latter held the position of public works minister in Milan’s local government and the two had therefore established a very fruitful, reciprocal and solid relationship.

For many years on, countless attempts by Craxi to introduce the new regulation he had promised Berlusconi were frustrated and delayed by the very powerful interests of the State-owned RAI television company, by the left faction of the Christian Democrats and by the Communists.

In the meantime however, the whole situation of the television market had become socially untenable as the growth and the success of Fininvest / Publitalia quickly became the most highly valued part of Italian popular culture in promoting values such as individualism, personal consumption and competition integrated with bare female bodies, bold, populist and vulgar sexual references.
Also, Berlusconi had, at least in part, exchanged for political backing to his quest for a new regulation by giving free editorial and advertising space to candidates of all parties for the frequent elections (local, regional, European and national). Eventually, come 1990, the Italian Parliament finally voted the Mammi law that gave legitimacy to this unique situation and sanctioned a duopoly of the national television market making it practically impossible for other players to enter.

Today, in 2012, total TV represents some 55% of overall advertising investments, and the two major networks collect 75% of that. There are two other national channels (Sky, owned by Murdoch and La7, owned by Telecom Italia) and together they collect only 12%!

Apart from Berlusconi and Dell’Utri’s thorough knowledge of the communication industry and how mass media impact opinions and behaviors of publics, over the years the two had also mastered the art of continued and daily (!) public opinion polling, comparing results from different vendors through the formulation of slightly different questions to better capture the electorate’s gut-feelings in that very moment. This allowed Berlusconi, more than anyone else in Italian society, to direct a populist, vocally antiparty and anticommunist political agenda aligned with that gut–feeling, and to interpret and give it voice, before it became formed opinion. He also succeeded in consolidating the latter with his own personal narrative and an unprecedented direct access to mass media that lasted for a full seventeen years.

In rationalizing years later (1999) in various public speeches his cucu model, Berlusconi would describe it (excerpts from different public speeches) as:

“being open, understanding others and friendship are the pillars of the cucu policy, a term that I had first learned of from my friend Vladimir Putin and of which I am a very proud implementer. This is an effective policy that evokes a friendly relationship based on empathy, and -where there is friendship- it is easier to prepare grand decisions and resolutions. My cucu model implies -he continued- an attempt to understand others, one by one. My governments have done much to solve major international and national issues by a simple phone call and by reducing difficult and complicated political and bureaucratic barriers. The model implies a policy that stimulates in others friendship, esteem and empathy, a policy by which I have obtained many effective results…… a policy based on personal relationships, often on friendship and sometimes on affection with others political leaders.”

Only to cite two of the tens of memorable episodes related to his international activities:

- a day before an official encounter with the Obama’s in the USA Berlusconi was seen by a journalist as he was privately rehearsing in front of a mirror an expression of sexual admiration for Michelle by extending wide his arms with a great smile on his face as if to say,
as a full blown Italian macho compliment ‘what a great piece of ass we have here…’ and this is exactly what he did the following day at the encounter to Michelle’s visibly disdained and puritanical reaction….. and made world headlines10.

- as he was preparing to receive Gheddafi during one of the dictator’s official visits to Rome, Berlusconi sought the advice of an expert to show him the exact motions necessary to kiss in deference the Libyan’s hand. to the shock of the international community11.

Very little improvisation, as one may gather.

In parallel with this growing and compulsive nurturing exercise to stupefy international leaders and public opinions, his uncontrollable personal sexual activities led his second wife Veronica Lario in 2007 to officially demand from the front page of daily La Repubblica that her husband excuse himself publicly with her and move to a less athletic interpretation of his night life, but the situation deteriorated to the point that in 2008 she filed for divorce. Medical experts, astonished by his well publicized and intensive nights, suggested a priapist dementia syndrome….i.e. while he remained (and remains) highly lucid, it is the senile dementia that triggers the compulsive priapist syndrome.

Of course, the very serious financial crisis was the major cause for his decision to resign and leave to others the chore of implementing strict cost cutting measures that a populist would never consider, but his international reputation was at that point definitively shot. Thus the fall of his CUCU model. A fall that however heavily permeated Italian political, economic and cultural communities with long term effects and consequences.

6 - The public relations profession from the first Mani Pulite to the second one.

In this scenario, and back to the fall of the end of the first Republic (1992-94):

- a soaring national public debt, at least in part determined by premium costs imposed on private companies by exceedingly high bribes they had to pay to receive contracts through the intermediation of political parties that caused an unprecedented spent by the public sector;
- a local electoral success of various anti-party lists in the north of Italy united into the Lega Nord movement;
- a parallel rising popular success of a left of center popular movement (led by the catholic Mario Segni and supported also by the ex communist party) strongly entrenched with anti-party signals, requesting a referendum to modify the electoral law.

11 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eyzoZ2BDK8
These induced the judiciary to investigate the nature of the quasi-universal practice of bribing mainstream politicians and parties to receive public sector contracts. The business community, that had over the years become intolerant of the ever increasing toll to pay to the parties, began to confess its misdeeds (it had become more a practice of extortion rather than corruption).

In a couple of years, 2565 individuals were officially investigated. Of these, 1408 either confessed or were found guilty and sentenced, while 790 were either dismissed or released (246) for expiration of time to judge. Their reputation was shot by a highly attentive and inquisitive media system allied with the judiciary.

Not only did the political parties collapse but many public relations professionals working either in or on behalf of corporations were charged with criminal acts (some 50 of them). Practically the whole system of large state controlled corporations and the public sector were involved, as well as many private and listed companies.

It is however somewhat ironic that Berlusconi’s companies were never accused of political corruption in that period but only of tax evasion, and this simply because he was not forced to accept extortions from political leaders and parties, given the amount of free time and space he gave them on his television networks, which was -in itself- not an illegal practice.

The Mani Pulite scandal dug deep into the political and business communities and Berlusconi-as he himself stated - to protect his business and his own personal freedom from criminal investigation, he decided to ‘enter into the game’ i.e. to create a new party and run for Premier based on a conservative, Catholic and strongly anticommunist platform. This decision had been very much advocated by Marcello Dell’Utri, the CEO of Publitalia. The two had successfully created a group of tens of propagandists that simply moved on from Publitalia to Forza Italia, the new party created by Berlusconi. It was a whirlwind of a campaign to which Italians voters were not used to.

When, in the early nineties, the profession was strongly hit by the Mani Pulite scandal, FERPI, the professional association failed to react, as if paralyzed by shock. The leadership had changed and for some years, until the end of the nineties, FERPI went practically silent as if in a catatonic mode.

More in general and until the mid nineties, as most of the public relations activities were involved in facilitating relationships between the business, the media and the political communities, much of that activity practically disappeared under the constant attention of the Judiciary and the media.

In the second part of the nineties the judiciary eased its surveillance on the malpractices of the business and political communities and focused more attention on the then prime minister Berlusconi who was forced to resign due to an indictment related to fiscal issues in early 1995.
Corruption once more began to rise as if nothing had happened only a few years back, when-in the first years of the new century - the second Berlusconi government modified the electoral law by ensuring a strict political control on candidates to be elected.

The power therefore returned into the hands of the parties and this sparked a much more perverse corruption cycle that also gave birth to a new full time occupation: a few well related public relators- become shady entrepreneurs, joined an increasing number of private investigators, ex politicians and magistrates, telephone eavesdroppers and secret service professionals who successfully created a thriving trade based on private information, blackmail and corruption of the public as well as the private sector.

Basically, whereas in the late eighties and early nineties many public relations practitioners had vastly benefitted by intermediating the needs of specific economic interests (their clients or employers) they represented by negotiating financial benefits to political parties in exchange for favorable public policy decisions, this time some public relators evolved to devising schemes by themselves and no longer on behalf of their clients. They first negotiated on a ‘what if’ basis with decision makers and then convinced economic interests to participate and reap the benefits. Very entrepreneurial. These practitioners developed profound expertise in recruiting informants to identify the right moment in which to contact the right decision makers with the right idea.

7- FERPI is vigilant and proactive

In this second case, however, the professional association reacted quite differently and was not caught with its fingers in the jam.

All through the first decade of the new century FERPI, under new leaderships, was very vocal in publicly stigmatizing this newborn industry, cooperating with the Judiciary, advocating the value of responsible practice with its stakeholders and, specifically, with students, academics and its own members, in order to maintain a strong and visible distance from the many scandals and investigations that populated the media agenda during the whole decade.

The one major tool for FERPI was (and is) its public website ( www.FERPI.it ) that to this day receives every day three times the number of unique visits equal to its annual members. Visitors include journalists, politicians, other non member professionals, students, academics, intellectuals. Ad hoc surveys\(^2\) indicate that this website is the most reputed and respected amongst all other professional association websites from no matter what profession. The website keeps constant

\(^{12}\) LUISS 2010
attention on the developments of major scandals and argues the difference between so-called black and white PR.

In the late nineties a major integrated communication effort led by the then Treasury Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (who was to become President of the Republic), and directed by Paolo Peluffo, a professional public relator (today Communication Undersecretary of the Monti Cabinet) familiarized the Italians with the Euro, that became a reality in 2001.

Many professionals all over the country were involved in this program in the absence of a sleepy FERPI. But in 2000 and 2001, when the transition to the new monetary system actually took place as the country dropped into an economic downturn that risked provoking a potential popular rejection of the new currency, the professional association repaired that early absence by undertaking a substantial nationwide effort to facilitate its members in coping with the transition. Communicators of many corporations activated consumer and marketing public relation initiatives to explain the expected benefits of the transition.

In 1998/99 a very weak and short-lived center-left government led by Massimo Dalema - the first ever ex-communist party dignitary to become prime minister - became intensely involved in securing the safety of the country’s communication infrastructure from the presumed global consequences of the ‘millennium bug’, or Y2K as many referred to the phenomenon. The prime minister’s chief aide, Undersecretary Franco Bassanini obtained that a special task force, guided by Ernesto Bettinelli, a jurist from the University of Pavia with strong interests in public relations as a discipline, develop a major effort to facilitate a nationwide overhaul of all existing computer networks in the public, private and social communities.

This program, contrary to many other reform attempts in the same period, needed to be implemented because a specific date and hour had been set for the potential global computer breakdown: midnight of the 31st of December.

Of its many complexities the more dire proved to be ensuring and facilitating that all the myriads of committees - technical, political and communicational - formed all over the country between the end of 1998 and throughout the whole of 1999, would operate in a coherent and effective modality.

Just about every single public relations professional in the country found she/he somehow, directly or indirectly, involved. For many of those who more actively participated, this marked the
first time they experienced a vivid notion that they were doing something crucial for their country (regardless of whether the Y2k scare was a commercial hoax, as some said, or not).

Informing the public, raising the awareness of every single organization, making sure that all preemptive measures had been considered, brought together professionals from many disciplines (computer experts, software engineers, organizational experts, accountants, public relators).
And this effort, in itself, was a public relations adventure.

Maybe this was the first time that, at such a wide level of awareness, the public relations profession, although not explicitly protagonist of the program, was able to apply and demonstrate its competencies in ensuring smooth and effective relationships within and amongst the Italian economic, political and social communities.

In parallel, the Vatican was preparing for the Jubilee of 2000 (once every fifty years) and the city of Rome was involved in preparations for this major series of ongoing mass events and celebrations.

A special joint agency (Agenzia del Giubileo) to deal with public relations and organizational issues had been formed by the Vatican and the Government, led by Luigi Zanda, a lawyer who had been member of the board of the L’Espresso and Repubblica publishing group and today is a Senator for the Democratic Party. Clearly, there were many conjunction points between this agency and the Italian Y2Keffort: the most relevant of course was the date and the hour, but also the overlapping of the Capital’s preparedness Y2K program, as well the inclusion of the possible consequences of computer failures in preparation of the tens of international events that were to be held in the early new year in Rome due to attract millions of pilgrims.

Once again another major area of focus and work for many thousands of public relations professionals. In June 2000 the Italian Parliament approved a law (150/2000) mandating all public sector, national and local government entities to formalize three functions related to public relations: the office of relationships with publics (URP), the press office and the spokesperson. Specifically, the first reported to the organization’s management as the second (but only journalists belonging to Italy’s journalist guild were allowed to work in the press office), while the third was a political position nominated by the elected political leader of the organization.

The census came up with a number of 40,000 public sector employees that were mandated to join a massive and unprecedented professional training effort. This in no way implied that public relations was not present in Italy’s public sector before then (the first public relations office of the Province of Bologna dates back to 1954), but that it was a follow-up to the 1994 law that established the right to information by citizens vis-à-vis the public sector.
FERPI added a survey to identify the number of public relations professionals operating in the private sector, the social sector, the agency and solo-consulting sectors and came up with a number of 70 thousand including the public sector ones.

It was not only the first ever government census, but also an important effort to pinpoint and analyze the economic value of a predominantly labor intensive professional activity. While having strongly objected to the ‘journalists only’ clause for the press offices included in the 150 bill, FERPI decided to make the best of it and, in competition with many other public, private and social sector subjects, for the next two years organized reputable and profitable professional training courses for some of those 40,000.

FERPI also devised and promoted, in agreement with the Minister of the Public Function, a joint program to raise awareness inside the whole public sector for the concept that any reform necessarily needed to have the quality of relationships with the citizen, his/her rights and obligations, as the central focus of its activity. ‘Si può fare’ (literally ‘it can be done’, inadvertently anticipating the internationally recognized ‘yes we can’ pay off of the Obama campaign a few years later in the USA) was the selected heading of the campaign that was to last until 2004.

In the meantime the strong growth of the immigration movement in Italy created much social and political tension and FERPI initiated a program of advocacy with its members but also with interested external publics in many Italian cities to explain the cultural richness of immigration and argued that corporations needed to consider immigrant communities (legal and illegal) as stakeholders (whether in consumer goods, banking, real estate services and basic citizenship issues).

Corporate social responsibility, mostly thanks to FERPI, was beginning to become a household term amongst Italian public relators. A research effort was conducted amongst a panel of 13 best practice corporate cases in Italy and the publisher of the major economic newspaper, Il Sole 24 Ore in partnership with the association, edited a book in 2004 authored by Nicoletta Cerana with the results of the research under the title ‘Communicating social responsibility’ that was presented and discussed in many Italian cities with many stakeholder groups. The concrete objective of this initiative was to help guide the many public relations professionals - somewhat confused and in search of accountable and effective references - who had recently been entrusted by their organisations/clients to plan, develop and implement CSR communication plans.

The political objective was, instead, to develop a specifically communicative (rather than holistic) model in order to avoid the already perceivable risk that CSR be assumed as mere communication, and to reaffirm the general principle that public relations are effective when they
communicate behaviours rather than intentions or, even worse, when they manipulate stakeholder expectations.

This position of FERPI had its roots in a defined social responsibility policy carried out since the year 2000: a policy implemented through various and parallel programs that thematized the CSR issue as an extremely relevant opportunity for public relations as long as their support function, as much as strategic, is explicit and interiorised by the professional community.

In other terms, without excluding that in specific and contingent cases public relations actually may happen to guide a CSR project, the most important legitimacy for the same concept of social responsibility, together with the certainty that it is not only a ‘façade operation’, is obtained when, guided by the CEO, the entire dominant coalition of an organisation implements directly the CSR program versus and in cooperation with specific stakeholder group.

The social responsibility policy of a professional association implicitly extends the same concept of CSR to OSR (organisational social responsibility). As a matter of fact, there appears to be little reason why only corporations are called upon to be socially responsible and not also public or social sector organisations: and this, even more so in a situation in which the Government, as is the Italian case, overtly pressured companies to commit to subsidiarity financial support versus the non profit sector, interpreting this support as a strategic part of CSR policies, when it is only marginal. Even more so, there is no guarantee that an organisation is socially responsible simply because it financially supports the non profit sector of the economy and, from this point of view one could even say that CSR policies of the Italian Government, by incentivising financial support to non profit organisations, stimulated the diversion of corporate attention from priority stakeholder groups (defined as subjects aware and interested in a relationship with an organisation whose activities are perceived to produce consequences on them).

The first principle of FERPI’s ASR (association social responsibility) policy adopted in 2001 was that the association would not protect ‘a priori’ and ‘in any case’ the interests of its members when these are, also potentially, in contrast with those of their respective stakeholder groups and/or the public interest. This is a relevant option as it assumes that members are satisfied in their expectancies from their professional association only if their respective stakeholder groups are also satisfied. And, in turn, the latter are satisfied of their relationship with the professional association only when they are relatively comfortable that any individual FERPI member represents the better quality segment of an enlarged professional community.

A second principle, confirmed at the 2003 Rome First World Public Relations Festival, was the need for the association to orient its members through an ad hoc policy, accompanied by specific actions, proving capable of reconciling the contradiction emerging from the effectively demonstrable
positive relationship between economic performance and strong CSR policy of an organisation; while this same statement is, in itself, ethically debatable. This is a highly delicate issue, and not only from a communication viewpoint.

On the other hand if this positive relationship is proven, the contrary is not. Even when one looks at the devastating cases of Enron or Worldcom, no one is entitled to confirm that only cases which become public are referred to misbehaving corporations. All the evidence seems to point to the exact opposite: in most cases one can safely say that socially irresponsible behaviour does not necessarily become public nor does it produce negative effects on organisations.

FERPI has so far implemented these principles by thematizing an extensive internal debate through its highly visited Internet site and by organising intense training courses for members on the communication of social responsibility. As a result, FERPI also developed, with the cooperation of Sodalitas and Anima (two well known associations of business interests in the non profit sector), an ad hoc offer to Italy’s medium sized businesses to ‘replay’ a similar course in-house, with the sole exchange of a pro bono contribution to the National League against Cystic Fibrosis.

Also, considering the ‘migrants’ issue and the progressive (albeit difficult) transition of Italian society to multicultural and multiethnic subjects as one of the most relevant national emergencies, FERPI also initiated with Unicom (association of small advertising companies) and etnica.biz (a specialised non profit organisation), a multi phase project to train members to the direct professional implications of the issues leading from a bilateral and symmetrical approach to communication management.

An extraordinary opportunity for the public relator to participate to the decision making process of the organisation’s ‘dominant coalition’ and voicing his/her contribution by an attentive listening and interpreting of the expectancies of other influential publics, like for example the media (who are horizontal), activist groups and other opinion leaders who usually do not consider themselves holding any stake but certainly exert strong influence on the organisation’s actions.

In the meantime the University of Bologna located in Forlì was the first to offer a special master in CSR in agreement with FERPI, quickly followed by Bocconi University in Milano.

One of FERPI’s greater and traditional assets has always been the Oscar del Bilancio, an annual award program for the best corporate reporting process actively participated by a coalition of the country’s better business community associations and institutions. In the first decade of the 21st century, the Oscar led the road towards integrated reporting as an ongoing multichannel stakeholder differentiated reporting process by devising special awards for the best environmental report, then the best social report, then the best online reporting practice, the best governance reporting, the best social
responsibility and sustainability reporting. The global quest for better reporting procedures may be traced by the Oscar’s path towards integrated reporting for which it now has a special working group.

In the international arena, FERPI was one of the founding members of the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management and in 2003, under the presidency of the Italian founding chair of the new global organizations, held in Rome the first World PR Festival that attracted more than 400 members from 27 nations and led to the signing of the global ethics protocol. This event galvanized Italian public relations. A year earlier Il Sole 24 Ore published with FERPI the first edition of Gorel (relationship governance) authored by FERPI’s president with proceedings going to the association. The first edition went quickly out of distribution and in 2003 and 2004 a process was initiated on the FERPI website to attract as many comments and suggestions as possible for the second edition adding on to this a dictionary of typical English/Italian PR terms. It was the first ever crowd sourcing exercise for a book on PR and the second edition (early 2005) also very quickly sold out.

Again in 2003 FERPI, in cooperation with the Communication Sciences department of the University of Rome La Sapienza, organized a two day workshop to discuss the relationships between professional practice and academic studies and education. As a result, the Consulta Education was formed, a special project to which some fifty university scholars and teachers and as many professionals signed up, that for many years promoted public relations courses, including a Masters program in partnership with IULM University, coached new professors, and found financial resources for doctorates.

A major research effort to analyze how Italian journalists perceive the role of public relations and vice versa was conducted by scholar Chiara Valentini and published in 2008 by Luca Sossella Editore ('The shattered mirror') in a package also containing three DVDs with a total of 12 hours of highly professional video recording of six consecutive sessions of discussion by some 60 of Italy’s most reputed public relations scholars and practitioners under the title: In what sense? What is public relations today?

In support of the EU’s discussion on the white paper for a communication policy, FERPI actively participated to the public consultation and, in alliance with EU institutions. organized a road show in many Italian cities to present and discuss the final White Paper.

Also, FERPI organized special 20-plus member group professional visits in 2003 for its members to New York, Washington DC, Quebec (for the annual Global Alliance general meeting in conjunction with the CPRS annual conference), and in 2004 another group visit for members to
Auckland, New Zealand for the annual Global Alliance General Meeting in the context of the Annual Conference of PRINZ, the New Zealand professional association.

In 2005 the association organized in Trieste the second World PR Festival with a participation of more than 600 participants around the theme of ‘communicating diversity, with diversity, in diversity’: the first ever gathering of public relations professionals and scholars from 40 countries dedicated to the growing global issue of diversity considered as a fundamental social economical and cultural value for society.

In 2006 FERPI organized another twenty-plus group visit to Cape Town for the GA’s third world PR festival organized by PRISA (the southern Africa professional association); sent a group of its members to Brasilia for the fifth WPRF in Brazil; then to London in 2008 for the same event in London, followed by a major effort related to the 2010 WPRF held in Stockholm, that led to the Stockholm Accords.

FERPI’s effort to devise, coordinate and implement the Stockholm Accords was central. On one side the whole formation process of the Accords was coordinated by FERPI members, on the other side the Italian implementation of the Accords accounted for an amazing rise of awareness of the value of public relations for organizations and society on the part of the country’s business, tourism, education and professional communities.

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also entrusted FERPI with the responsibility of organizing repeated workshops and seminars featuring also international speakers for young, mid career and senior diplomats to acquaint themselves with the concept, the theory and the practice of Public Diplomacy.

In this international awakening FERPI members not only networked with their colleagues from all over the world, but voiced their studies and their practices in all of these forums, becoming active international players by representing, besides the founding chairmanship of the GA, its general secretariat (Amanda Succi) and facilitating that an Italian scholar (Emanuele Invernizzi) become President of EUPRERA marked by the very successful 2008 EUPRERA conference in Milano on the theme of the institutionalization of the PR function in organizations.

Also another FERPI member, senior professional Roberto Zangrandi, was elected President of CERP. Other members presented papers in Bled symposia, in the International History of Public Relations Conference in Bournemouth and chaired the Committee for research on global public relations of the Institute for Public Relations many others. An annual Med-Com conference was
repeatedly held in Catania, Sicily in order to attract and relate with public relations professionals and scholars from northern Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Europe.

The Italian public relations community, despite the language difficulties, became one of the most active amongst international public relations associations. In 1994 only 22% of the 300 largest Italian companies had a dedicated division or department for public relations and communication. In 2011 the percentage has risen to 86%. Also, in 2011 75% of the directors of communication report directly to the CEO, or the managing director or to the chairperson. In 51% of the cases they belong to the executive board13.

FERPI had lobbied for a regulation of all representation of legitimate interests towards the public policy process way back since 1976 with no result. The successive scandals that in the 2008/2011 period led to the collapse of the Berlusconi cabinet have also revitalized the debate on the regulation of lobbying activities and the professional association maintains a highly visible public positioning in favor.

It was a “changing era” for FERPI activities (both internal and external), yet also a “golden dawn” for the acknowledgement of public relations’ in Italy amongst other stakeholders. An early phase of what today – 12 years later - we would consider an aware and planned effort to move the profession (and FERPI) to the core of the public sphere through dialogue, discussion and advocacy with stakeholders on socio-cultural, political and economic issues facing organizations and society at large. In short, a change management process guided by the association amongst its members and their stakeholders.

The profession in Italy (as elsewhere) is currently redefining its operational perimeter and is integrating new or redesigned competencies that make it imperative for associations to urgently review their traditional model and current policies to be able to “map, include and represent” them effectively.

13 Stefania Romenti, Emanuele Invernizzi IULM 2012
Public relations activities in Brazil emerged in the early Twentieth Century in the wake of the humanization of capitalism, the growing need to build a relationship with employees and customers by corporations. The beginning of the profession in Brazil took place on January 30, 1914, with the creation of the Department of Public Relations at The São Paulo Tramway Light and Power Company Limited, now Electricity de São Paulo SA - Eletropaulo.

The development of the activity occurred only in the 1950s by a combination of factors: a Governmental Industria’s Development Policy took place, with the opening and growth of the domestic market while multinationals corporations applied their practices of Public Relations, enhancing and strengthening its activities in Brazil. At the same time there was the rise of media conglomerates of newspapers, magazines and radio stations and the first television programs were broadcasted.

The profession was regulated in 1967 by the issuance of Law No. 5377/67, approved during a military dictatorship government. The first PR Consultancy started its operation in 1962 and the first undergraduate course was created in 1967 at Escola de Comunicações Culturais (School of Cultural Communications) at the Universidade de São Paulo (University of Sao Paulo), which is now known as Escola de Comunicações e Artes (School of Communications and Arts).

Through a historical analysis, this paper aims to analyze the influences of the licensing of the profession, educational institutions, corporations and industry associations on Brazilian public relations practice.

The origins of public relations in Brazil

The origins of Public Relations in Brazil dates back to the beginning of the 20th Century. (Kunsch, M. 1997, Kunsch, W. 2009) On January 30, 1914, with the creation of a Public Relations Department in
the Canadian electricity company *The São Paulo Tramway Light and Power Company Limited* (today called Eletricidade de São Paulo S.A. – AES Eletropaulo). The first company of Brazilian origin to create a public relations department was Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, CSN, in 1951. (Kunsch, M. 1997)

The real development of the activity flourished in the 1950s, due to a combination of factors: democracy brought an industrial development policy, with the opening and growth of the domestic market. “Large foreign multinationals came to Brazil, set up public relations departments, and ran them with the structure and expertise that characterized headquarters organizations” (Kunsch and Nassar 2009 p. 655). This environment helped strengthen and enhance the value of the activity in Brazil. At the same time newspaper, magazine and radio conglomerates were formed, and the first television transmissions appeared.

In this scenario, Public Relations established a position as a business activity, and the first Public Relations course in Brazil arose in 1953, organized by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Instituto de Administração da Universidade de São Paulo and Instituto de Organização Racional do Trabalho (Idort). The memorandum of incorporation of the Associação Brasileira de Relações Públicas – ABRP (Brazilian Public Relations Association) was drafted in 1954. (Kunsch, W. 2009 p. 26)

Major entrepreneurial initiatives arose at this time, driving the positive advancement of the profession. Among these was the creation of the Public Relations Consultancy (AAB), in 1962. Up until that time, advertising agencies had an internal department geared towards public relations.

The first book published in Brazil and in Latin America was *Para entender as relações públicas*, (Understanding Public Relations) written by Cândido Teobaldo de Souza Andrade, in 1962 (Kunsch, W. 2009). Andrade was an important educator who wrote seven books focused on Public Relations theory and practice.

**Licensing public relations**

A political event marked Brazil in 1964, which was the start of the military dictatorship. The profession was regulated in 1968, by the issuance of Law no. 5,377, approved by Decree-Law no. 63,283, in late 1967, which restricted the activity to bachelors of social communication with qualifications in public relations. Although Public Relations is a licensed profession since 1968, the license does not guarantee that only licensed professionals practice Public Relations. Companies hire professionals from multiple academic backgrounds such as journalism, advertising, marketing, business, law, social sciences, as well as public relations to manage Corporate Communications. The area or department is rarely called public relations. It is usually called Corporate Communications, Institutional Communications, Public Affairs, Business Communication or only Communication. To issue the license for the professionals and police the activities of Public Relations in Brazil, it was created in 1971 the Conferp – Federal Council of Public Relations Professionals and Conrerps – Regional Councils of Public Relations Professionals.
Kunsch and Nassar argued “the year 1967 was a landmark for public relations in Brazil and for the relationship between the academy and business organizations.” (2009 p. 655) The first undergraduate course in Public Relations was created at the Escola de Comunicações e Artes of the Universidade de São Paulo at the same year the Aberje – Associação Brasileira de Editores de Revistas e Jornais de Empresas was created by Nilo Luchetti, a journalist and public relations manager at Pirelli. Large multinational and national corporations with established public relations/communication departments joined Aberje and could benefit from learning programs, researches, conferences, guides, meetings, publications and the Aberje Award.

In the theoretical field, the first doctoral thesis on business journalism was written by Gaudêncio Torquato at the Escola de Comunicações e Artes of USP. In 1983 he also defended, at the same institution, his habilitation thesis in which he argued in favor of the need to use communication in a synergic manner, for effective results at organizations.

The military, who have exercised political power in Brazil for 21 years, used many public relations techniques to communicate with society. In 1968 was created AERP – Special Public Relations Advisory Office. “In the government of General Medici (1969-1974), AERP was used as the political propaganda office, to “promote” massively the dictatorship regime, masquerading the most violent censorship that the country has ever had.” (Kunsch, M. 1997 p. 26)

Torquato (2002) argued that “the well-equipped public relations system of military governments, hub of issuance of a vainglorious communication system that marked the grandiloquent language of business communication at the very beginning of the 1970s, had the respect of the media – most of them submitted to previous censorship.” (2002, p. 3)

In the government of General Ernesto Geisel (1974 – 1979), AERP – Special Public Relations Advisory Office that operated in the first half of the decade, promoting government actions – was deactivated and later terminated (in 1975), when it was replaced by AIRP – Press Advisory and Public Relations Office, also later split up, to allow for the creation of ARP – Public Relations Advisory Office.

In the scenario of national politics, the 1980s were marked by the country’s political opening and the establishment of democracy, which brought about the advent of the new institutional behavior – both by the government, and by organizations – which transformed the way communication was conducted in Brazil. With the curtailment of the authoritarianism arising from years of military dictatorship, society began to demand more transparency from the government and from companies. That old management model no longer served its purpose and the situation called for a radical change in communication as well.

Modern public relations

It was at this time, in the business scope, that the first attempts were made to achieve integrated, strategic communication. The first company to operate in this new institutional reality was Rhodia
S.A., which in January 1985, created its Social Communication Policy. The communication policy entitled Open Doors was a milestone that became a reference for the other companies that wished to establish an open channel of communication with their multiple audiences.

In 1985, Margarida Kunsch published her master’s dissertation – which later gave rise to the book *Planejamento das Relações Públicas na Comunicação Integrada* – in which she addressed the role reserved for public relations in the set of components of integrated communication.

In the 1980s there was considerable evolution in scientific production and research focused in public relations. There were an increasing number of masters and doctors that graduated during this period. Specifically for public relations, there were initiatives in the search for excellence made by entities and schools of communication.

In 1989, Aberje changed its name to Associação Brasileira de Comunicação Empresarial, keeping its well-known acronym, as a trademark. “The new name was an attempt to express the transformation underway in communication and in the relationship of companies, which were taking their first steps in search of a profound restructuring in the context of a country that was once again breathing the air of democracy.”(Nassar 2009 p. 30)

Since its foundation, Aberje contributes to the strength and improvement of the practice and education of Public Relations and Business Communication in Brazil through knowledge sharing, learning programs, courses, conferences, seminars, publications, meetings, researches. “In effect, Aberje wants to be a reference center for the production and dissemination of knowledge about communication practices that guide management strategies of organizations.(…) to strengthen communication’s strategic role in business” (Kunsch and Nassar 2009 p. 658). Aberje played a significant role to improve and strengthen the public relations activity in both professional and educational field helping to build the modern public relations in Brazil.

Aberje operates following six fields of work: education, knowledge management, relationships, recognition, creative economy and communicational intelligence. It is very active in networking with associations, universities and NGO’s within Brazil and worldwide (Aberje 2012a). Aberje is a member and is represented at the board of the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management. It is an organizational stakeholder and certified training partner of Global Reporting Initiative – GRI. Aberje also offers in Brazil a joint Executive Program in Public Relations with S. I. Newhouse School of Public Communications – Syracuse University.

With the objective to make the practice of public relations in Brazil better known worldwide and to promote the networking between practitioners, entities, media and educators, Aberje launched the Brazilian Corporate Communications Day in 2010. It is a series of meetings that are hosted in different countries around the year. It already happened in the United States of America, United Kingdom and Argentina, and is schedule to happen in Chile, Germany, Italy, and Portugal by the end of 2012, and more countries the following years.
Professional environment

More than a dozen researches and surveys have been done in a regular basis by DataAberje - Research Institute of Aberje, in the last decade to understand and map public relations professional practices in Brazil.

According to Aberje /DMR Consulting´s salary survey (2010), the main duties of Communication’s professionals are: internal communication, institutional relations, government relations/public affairs, press relations, corporate social responsibility, crisis management, sustainability, investor relations, corporate history and branding. It may vary from company to company. Press Relations was the activity that was in all companies, and Investor Relations was under the communication department in only 12% of the companies surveyed.

Another survey (2012b), also conducted by Aberje /DMR Consulting focused on corporate communication suppliers, such as communication’s agencies and consultancies. The data collection took place between January 18th and February 23rd, 2012, relying on the response of 107 corporations listed in the 2011 edition of the ranks of Valor Econômico newspaper and Exame magazine. These 107 corporations represented 20.5% of Brazil’s GDP - Gross Domestic Product. The results show what kind of external communication suppliers are hired by corporations. 75% of corporations hire an external firm for press relations, 70% for events, 62% for internal communication, 53% for research and measurement, 40% for branding, 20 % for corporate history, 19 % for corporate social responsibility/sustainability, 13% for sponsorship, 10% for investor relations, 9% for government relations.

Aiming to draw a profile of the Organizational Communication area, DataAberje– in partnership with Valor Econômico newspaper, conducted a study entitled —Corporate Communication in organizations (2008).

The data collection took place between August 19 and 28, 2008, relying on the response of 282 professionals in charge of the Communication area at companies mentioned in the 2007 edition of the list —1000 Maiores de Valor (Top 1000 of Valor newspaper), and was published in the Valor Setorial supplement of October 8. Several sectors are represented in the sample, such as sugar and alcohol, metallurgy and steel industry, agriculture, mining, water and sanitation, paper and pulp, food, oil and gas, foreign trade, retail, construction and engineering, information technology, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, transport and logistics and vehicles and parts.

The communicator has become a mediator, a team manager, an overseer of the great modern ritual that consists of relationships. Today, the company is a node in a huge network and must build its image through dialogue. In this context, the communicator has to embrace the cultural flag: they need to be intellectuals, able to deal with the process that leads from identity to alterity - to otherness, to difference. Women predominate in Communication, representing 59.2% of the respondents. As regards the age bracket, almost 70% of the interviewees are aged between 25 and 44. Among
managers, men and women hold the position. About 65% of the respondents occupy a management, coordination or supervisory position at the company where they work.

Journalism is the area of specialization of 1/3 of these professionals, followed by business administration and public relations, among several other areas of origin. A high percentage of interviewees realize that the Communication area is seen as strategic in the company, particularly in the line of services where 67.4% share this opinion. It is worth emphasizing that the higher the employee headcount, the greater the perception: in 70.2% of the companies with more than 5 thousand employees, Communication is seen as a strategic area.

The data reveals the growth of the Organizational Communication area. Investments are increasing, and, consequently, the area has more prestige and power inside the corporation. Moreover, there is already concern over measuring its performance. However, at half of the companies, the area does not yet have any representatives on the Executive Committee and there is a variety of different names: Corporate, Business and Institutional. Only 5.4% of the companies do not have a Communication area.

At most companies Communication is a senior management or management area, especially if the company is foreign: at 73.1% there is one of these configurations. Almost 80% of the companies have teams in the area with less than 10 employees, and almost all of those with less than one thousand employees have up to 10 professionals in the area of Communication. What draws the attention of analysts is that in spite of their lean size, these sectors are responsible for important topics in daily business activities, such as relationship with employees, with the community, with the government, press and organized civil society. There is a certain balance in the replies about the tendencies of the Communication area in the relationship with stakeholders: 53.2% declared that the tendency is to work with all the audiences in an integrated manner and 43.3% believe that it is to work with some of them in a segmented manner. Perhaps for this reason 74.5% of the interviewees believe that Communication has a considerable impact on a company’s reputation. The creativity of local professionals, associated with the receptive profile of the Brazilian citizen, produces a favorable situation for the implementation of collaborative models of communication and increases receptivity in relation to initiatives in the area.

Conclusion

Brazil is one of the few countries in the world to have the profession of public relations licensed by the government. But it did not guarantee more job opportunities for professionals neither improved the image of Public Relations in the country. It is hard to find a professional hired to a job position named public relations in corporations. Professionals are usually hired for communications management positions. According to Aberje’s Corporate Communication in organizations survey (2008), the leaders of communication departments in organizations came from multiple academic
backgrounds: journalism 29%, business 20%, marketing 17%, advertisement 13% and public relations 12%.

Public Relations principals are valued in Brazil. Although most of the time it is not called public relations, but corporate communications. According to the report from the expert commission of the Proposta de diretrizes curriculares nacionais para os cursos de Relações Públicas, (2010) the technical progress of communication has been changing the professional identity of communicators leading to a process of reflection and renewal of their practices. To better understand the role of public relations activity nowadays, it is required to comprehend the new social, political, economical, cultural, technological configurations.

Due to the growth of the Brazilian economy which is ranked fifth in the world, a series of Brazilian companies that in the past operated only in the national territory, have become multinational or global companies. Business communication and public relations professionals now face the challenge of defining global communication policies from Brazil to their operations worldwide.

Corporate Communications departments in Brazil are broadening their scope regarding corporate social responsibility and sustainability, public affairs in an environment that is not regulated, digital media and stakeholder engagement. Educational institutions and industry associations in Brazil are aware of these challenges and are willing to help professionals to improve their expertise and build a strong relationship with their stakeholders.
References


A Global Analysis of the Public Relations Body of Knowledge:  
A Comparison and Contrast of International Associations

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Introduction

Research presented within public relations divisions and/or tracks of academic and practitioner associations should address aspects of public relations vital to developing a body of knowledge representing an international focus. In The Professional Bond: Public Relations Education and the Practice, ” the report focused on “Public Relations Education for the 21st Century.” This report summarized the global implications of public relations, especially where “mutual understanding and harmony are more important than ever” (November 2006, p. 4). Most importantly, this report featured seven areas of “analysis to profile public relations education and practice in various parts of the world” and includes:

1. cultural values and beliefs  
2. laws and public policies  
3. external groups, organizations and associations  
4. institutional factors in the academic setting  
5. international exchange programs  
6. inter-personal factors within an institution  
7. intra-personal factors among students and educators

The above list outlines the key components with the aspect of ”associations” as having a very close impact on the body of knowledge affecting the discipline, particularly in terms of the contribution of research toward a more global understanding of public relations as a profession. However, very little research has been conducted on the contributions of academic contributions from associations in terms of the BOK development in public relations, specifically those contributions being very relevant to global transnational concerns and key concepts such as culture.
The forces influencing the development of the body of knowledge in public relations are complex. A graphic presentation best captures the most essential features of the critical aspects of the impacts upon public relations functions. Most importantly, a visual overview of the variety of factors affecting public relations provides a more refined sense of the inputs into the discipline. Such a visual depiction allows for multiple approaches to the study of public relations with, in this instance, a need to be more connected to the international and/or global implications. It was noted that “with more multicultural and global public relations research, the discipline of public relations will further mature toward a high level of professionalism” (Neff, 2010, p. 375), Neff noted that public relations identity is complex and the factors are primarily defined by the elements in the Figure below (Neff, 2010, 377):

Forces Affecting the Changing Functions of Public Relations

Sustainability

Technology

Global Communication

Society

Societal/Political

Trends

Cooperation/Competition

Global Stability

Infrastructure

Social Responsibility

Leadership

Publics

Communication

Development

Multicultural (web of relationships)

Philosophy

Preparation/Ongoing

Theory

Public Relations Functions

Leadership for Social Responsibility

Research Leadership for Social Responsibility

Professional Development

Tactics/Strategy; Ethical/Legal

Academic/Practitioner

Standards/Codes/Accreditation/Certification

Metrics; Impact/Results

Academic/Practitioner

Perhaps a similar thrust into this discussion is explicated by the title of the following book. These authors as quoted in a chapter on public relations identity describe in the title the fuller implications of these variables. In search of an “international identity” globally, Curtin and Gaither (2007) offer the most dedicated conceptual discussion of global public relations. The title speaks well to the central
Thus communication is the central focus of the process developing the identity of public relations. However, other scholars have indicated that while the “public relations practice has become increasingly globalized, scholars are still behind in theorizing about the intersections of culture, communication and power” (Bardan and Weaver, 2011, p. 2). It is this nexus that is examined in the body of knowledge literature produced by the public relations associations, those with a research component in their yearly annual conferences. It is the search for public relations “identity” from a global perspective that gives the unique understanding of the fuller extent of the public relations functions critical to operating within a global context. Finally, the authors conclude the following:

The relationship between culture, communication, context, and power (Martin and Nakayama, 2010) in practice (as well as in scholarship) needs to be a key focus if we are to stay intellectually current (McKie, 2001), keep providing suggestions for how to improve practice, and genuinely engage with questions of ethics and social responsibility in public relations in a rapidly globalizing and interconnected world (ibid).

Culture

Jacquie L’Etang pointed out in her research on public relations, culture and anthropology the limitations of current research in public relations. Her proposal for exploring deeper into the dimensions of public relations relationship with culture emphasized more of an ethnographic approach, a method of measurement not common to the public relations profession. Thus this discussion on the connection between public relations and culture is quite limited in a perspective not having such a dimension and may inhibit further an understanding of the roles and functions public relations develops through the process of communication (L’Etang, 2012, p. 165.). However, as a former member of a research team on energy conservation for the Institute for Family Studies, there was clarity of analysis most helpful when both the traditional and the ethnographic methodologies were utilized to confirm the accuracy of the original findings.

For example, in the first wave of research on energy, a questionnaire was sent to families on their energy usage. Questions such as “how often do you open the refrigerator door per day?” focused on behavior. Such questions were most often responded to on the low side of the behavior in the survey thus emphasizing more of a concern for energy conservation. To verify the habits more fully, observers were sent to a sample of the same respondents as an
ethnographic team. The ethnographic approach required a coding of all visits to the refrigerator within the same time period as well as other behavior. The results were very surprising. The subjects were visiting the refrigerator far more often than reported in the earlier questionnaire. Utilizing a mix of methods to ascertain the reliability of the response was critical in confirming the accuracy of the results. The ethnographic approach, however, is much more labor intensive and certainly involves learning many more techniques. However, as a member of ethnographic discussion research groups over the years, the development of the techniques for coding and the coding process itself has evolved with the introduction of technology and new types of software.

The intersection of public relations and culture needs an extensive application of the ethnographic approach. Imagine an intensive ethnographic analysis of key cultures with developed public relations professional activity. Imagine teams of researchers establishing benchmarks of public relations usage within various cultures. Utilizing this approach should answer many questions about behavior, attitudes, traits, and interpretations of what public relations is in a particular context. Perhaps studying different industries within a particular category ethnographically would establish a benchmark for particular industries.

Asking someone a question about how public relations operates may bring one type of description when a survey is conducted and bring an entirely different understanding when teams of researchers observe and code the operations of public relations on a daily basis within a particular culture and context. The possibilities are very exciting for understanding better the practice of public relations analyzed under ethnographic conditions. Most importantly, the bottom line of these research approaches should examine the intersection of three very key aspects of global public relations: communication (the fabric of interaction), culture (the experience and learning within a context), and power (the impact of resources and influence).

**Communication**

Kent and Taylor integrated the intercultural communication literature, particularly theory, to address the global considerations (Kent and Taylor, 2011). By focusing on the communication aspect, these authors highlight note what is “a central part of many public relations professionals’ jobs--to communicate with multiple stakeholders and stakeholders” (ibid, p. 50). Most importantly, Kent and Taylor note “relationships are a central goal of public relations communication.” (ibid, p. 51). These authors add that “culture, as a fluid phenomenon, influences how organizations and relationships are developed within domestic and international publics” (ibid, p. 51).
Here is where we begin the major intersection between culture and communication: communication is the means by which public relation functions foster and facilitate this web of relationships embedded in cultures. In this aspect, it is viewed as a web without a ‘centric’ anything. Meaning there are not ‘corporate centric’ or ‘media centric’ models. All organizations and publics live in a web of relationships with the public relations professional facilitating and integrating the connections. Thus by viewing the intersection of culture and communication from a public relations perspective, an operating relationship or the interplay will be captured if an ethnographic research approach is utilized in gathering such intelligence within contexts. However, there is another key factor impacting these interplay aspects, the concept of power, which becomes most salient at this point in the discussion.

**Power**

Why the intersection of culture and communication is so central to public relations is further reinforced when one examines the critical concept of power. Another reason for examining the role of public relations is evident when the body of knowledge in public relations is examined for the role of public relations in terms of boundary spanning, message development and execution, as well as the established roles within both nonprofit and corporate organizations. This includes the incredible growth of public relations agencies and/or firms with financial worth, at least for Edelman Worldwide, as the first organization to be close to a billion dollars in revenue (*PR Week*, 2012).

Public relations must be also viewed then as integrated into a wide range of contexts from government to tourism, sports, religion, natural resources, diplomacy, as well as the multitudes of nonprofits where several are global. Public relations professionals touch so many aspects of culture and are so often intertwined with power, it is the facility and ethical grounding in communication, especially the ethics of care bringing public relations to the forefront in leadership on the global level.

**Research Questions**

What has been described as the ideal focus on public relations as the best perspective for analyzing the intersection of communication, culture, and power remains more of a proposal as the reality of this potential is yet to be realized. Little research, for example, focuses on the public relations role within these intersecting concepts. However, one of the key sites for generating the body of knowledge explicating these relationships is found in the academic and practitioners associations, especially those organizations with a division or track and/or focus on
public relations. The potential is great, the experience is extensive, but the research proof or support seems slim. However, the contributions of research by associations to the body of knowledge will be given a closer examination to see if the potential of this strong source of academic thought is possibility evolving toward a better understanding of the intersection of communication, culture, and power as affected by public relations professionals.

**Methodology**

Seven national and/or international associations’ body of knowledge established through public relations division or academy units for year 2011 were content analyzed for support of the seven global areas along with an assessment of the global perspectives presented (culture, power emphasis, or dialogic process). The refereed presentations were examined for the following associations: the Association of Educators in Journalism and Mass Communication - AEJMC (est. 1965), the Central States Communication Association (CSSA) - a regional organization established in 1988 as an interest group, International Academic Association of Business Disciplines - IABD (est. 1987), International Communication Association - ICA (est. 1984), National Communication Association -NCA (also known as SCA) (est. 1987), International Public Relations Research Conference – IPRRC - in Miami (est. 1997), and the Public Relations Society of America’s Educators Academy - PRSA (est. 1983). Central States Communication Association was eliminated because the association was basically a regional association. The Association of Women in Communication (AWC) and the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC) do not have refereed research paper opportunities and focus more on practitioners.

**Coding**

Keywords were coded with a global/international references required to be counted in this category. Otherwise, the research was categorized as national. Major general categories for mention tended to be primarily technology and/or crisis. Depending on the association, a teaching emphasis was more frequently mentioned. The table below identifies the primary associations with a public relations division, interest group, or track. Only one association is regional (has an interest group), most are national, with one association truly international (holds conferences consistently around the world). All of these academic and/or practitioner association headquarters are housed in the United States. However, the founding dates of the public relations subdivisions provides a perspective on the development of public relations efforts yielding research potentially focused on international topics
**Associations with a Public Relations Unit or Membership**


**Associations:**  AWC  AEJMC  IABC  PRSA  ICA  NCA  IPRRC  CSCA  IABD

**PR Unit:**
- Mem
- PRD
- Mem
- EdAcad
- PRD
- PRD
- Conf
- PRIG
- Track

**Founders:**
- Young
- Sharpe/
- Hamilton
- Neff
- Sharpe
- Neff
- Nelson
- Newsom

**Conferences:**
- ---
- 45
- ---
- 24
- 23
- 22
- 22
- 21
- 20

*Primary Founder(s)

** (PR Unit: members, Public Relations Division (PRD), Educators Academy, Conference, PR Interest Group (PRIG), Track)

**Results**

Global presentations are evident within public relations units for national and/or international academic and/or practitioner associations if research presentations were presented. However, the emphasis varied in terms of quantity and focus. ICA and IPRRC tied for the most international themes and revealed a more rigorous analysis questioning the global impact. NCA had a broader representation of presentations with a more centered focus on the dialogic approach. The other associations, having research papers, had fewer global centered presentations and were less likely to be incorporating the cultural or power themes. The global theme was primarily focused on cultural values and public policies for the associations having a larger number of papers focusing on global. Organizations (includes associations), academic setting, international exchange programs, inter-personal (institutions) and intra-personal factors (academic) are topics largely ignored. A summary of the results are listed below:

**International Paper/Total Papers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associations</th>
<th>AWC</th>
<th>AEJMC</th>
<th>IABC</th>
<th>PRSA</th>
<th>ICA</th>
<th>NCA</th>
<th>IPRRC</th>
<th>CSCA</th>
<th>IABD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PR Unit:</td>
<td>mem</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>mem</td>
<td>EdAcad</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>confer</td>
<td>PRIG</td>
<td>Track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Papers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>5/54</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0/21</td>
<td>25/75</td>
<td>12/47</td>
<td>25/88</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5/8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Associations for Women in Communications (AWC)
Association of Education for Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC)
International Association of Business Communication (IABC)
Public Relations Society of America (PRSA)
International Communication Association (ICA)
National Communication Association (NCA)
International Public Relations Research Conference (IPRRC-Miami)
Central State Communication Association (CSCA)
International Academy of Business Disciplines (IABD)
**Discussion**

The results may follow the larger contexts of the association emphasis. The communication associations like ICA, NCA, and IPRRC are primarily focused on communication. Such a context emphasizes the importance of communication. A journalism association such as AEJMC is more likely to be examining public relations impact globally from a media or social media approach; hence, the impact is viewed as “power” with some regard for interactivity with the newer media. The International Academy of Business Disciplines (IABD) has a definite economic emphasis as a business academic association with refereed research and several academic publications. PRSA similarly with the practitioner dominate environ encourages more of an economic viewpoint with the association’s Educators Academy contributing the refereed research aspect. Whereas, the International Association of Business Communicators does reflect the perspective of the business practitioner, the lack of refereed research sessions removes the association’s contribution to the research domain under study in this analysis.

**Conclusions**

Research in the public relations global arena needs to be aware of the larger contextual and conceptual focus of association research. More effort should be given to represent the association body of knowledge in public relation from more than one association. There needs to be greater cooperation to make find ways to create avenues for the association research to be available to a larger audience. *The limitation of research focused on culture and/or policies brings more levels of concern to the results of association research*. Furthermore, these findings suggest more international interdisciplinary teams are needed in the research in the global arena.
References


The Image of the Public Relations Practitioner in Movies and Television 1901-2011

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Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism
University of Southern California

Introduction
In this article, we examine images of public relations practitioner in film and television appearing in more than 327 English-speaking films and television programs from 1901 to 2011. This is the largest study of its kind ever attempted and one of the first to include the image of the public relations practitioner in television programs. Many public relations practitioners believe that the image of the publicist and the public relations professional is one of the most negative in history. But this analysis indicates that the images of the PR practitioner are far more varied and even more positive than previously thought.

Literature Review
There have been previous studies on the image of the PR practitioner in film. They include Karen Miller’s landmark study in 1999 (which included film and print images), L. Tavcar’s 1993 look at 17 films depicting public relations in the movies, Donn. J. Tilson’s brief look at public relations and Hollywood in 2003, and Carol Ames, comprehensive follow-up to Russell’s study in 2010. In addition, Mordecai Lee studied images of the public relations practitioner in government and public administration sampling 20 films from 1944 to 2000 in a 2001 study, and in a 2009 update added seven more films from 1996 to 2008.

There have been a few scattered studies of the image of the PR practitioner in television. Emily Kinsky analyzed the PR professional working at the White House in 22 episodes in the debut season of the TV program The West Wing. In “Learning About Public Relations From Television: How Is the Profession Portrayed,” Youngmin Yoon and Heather Black looked at how public relations is portrayed in primetime television programs in the United States, analyzing 10 TV dramas and sit-coms. Their unpublished study “confirm many of the conclusions from other studies of entertainment media: (1) public relations as a field is still portrayed negatively; (2) the field is not well defined, mostly as publicity and party planning; and (3) the field looks ‘easy’ and ‘glamorous.’ New insights were gained into the portrayal of public relations on television including: (1) the association of the term ‘public relations’
with negative and ‘silly’ actions; (2) society’s expectation of immoral behaviors from PR practitioners; (3) the portrayal of gender barriers, and (4) a tendency to focus only on practice areas dealing with the rich and powerful elements of society.”

Miller depicted PR practitioners as ditzy, obsequious, cynical, manipulative, money-minded, isolated, accomplished or unfulfilled. She points out that public relations scholars and practitioners “have long indicated concern about the ways that people, especially journalists, perceive practitioners and PR.”12 Ames’ follow-up study also concludes that the images of public relations practitioner underscore and popularize stereotypes giving the public its principal understanding of what a PR practitioner does and how he/she does it. Ames points out that her results “show that for major films from Mars Attack! (1996) to Hancock (2008), public relations practitioners are more credible, respected and influential, and PR work is more varied and complex than found in studies of films through 1995.”13 She adds that “the accomplished PR practitioners in these films are not bitter ex-journalists or isolated anti-social novelists who have gone into PR for the money. Public relations is now presented as a profession in its own right, not a desperate, fall-back position.”14

Methodology
This study looks at the images of public relations practitioners in a variety of movies and television programs. For the current study, a key source was the online IJPC Database of the Image of the Journalist in Popular Culture Project.15 Unlike Ames’ study, films and TV programs with unnamed PR characters or characters who appeared briefly and then disappeared are included. The television category included TV series featuring a public relations character, specific episodes of a TV series featuring a public relations character and movies-made-for television. Also, films from England and other English-speaking productions were also included.16 More than 500 movies and TV programs were initially identified, viewed and analyzed.

The following four tables summarize the results by decade, gender, job title, and perception of personality traits and professional characteristics.

Decades
A breakdown by decades (20th Century) and years (21st Century) appears in the following Table 1, and a complete list of films and television programs with each character identified can be found in the appendix. A total of 327 films and TV programs were documented with 222 movies and 105 TV programs.

A character is defined as being involved in public relations if the character was identified as a publicist, public relations practitioner, PR man or woman, press agent, media consultant, public information officer or the like or if the character performed what is acknowledged to be a public relations activity – dealing with the public in some form, handling publicity or public relations duties, advising the person in charge about dealing with the public.
### TABLE 1: Decades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Movies</th>
<th>TV Programs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920s and before</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Gender

As can be seen in Table 2, males overwhelmingly dominated the image of the public relations practitioner in the movies from the 1920s through the 1990s (189 male characters to 44 female characters). But by the 21st century, PR women in the movies were almost on an equal footing (26 male characters to 16 female characters). Women PR practitioners fared far better on television. From the 1950s to 2011, there were 60 female characters as opposed to 68 male characters and since many of these TV programs were weekly series, the impact was even greater than the numbers suggest.

### TABLE 2: Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Movies MALE</th>
<th>Movies FEMALE</th>
<th>Television MALE</th>
<th>Television FEMALE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Agent</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>215</td>
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<td>Business/Priv</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publicity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>403</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Job Titles**

As Karen Miller points out, practitioners work “under almost every title and in a variety of organizations.” They are referred to as a “publicist,” “PR man,” “press agent,” “Head of,” “Manager of,” “Director of,” Public Relations or Publicity, spokesman, spokeswoman, spokesperson, press secretary, press officer or press aide. Here are the definitions for each occupational niche:

**Press Agent**: An individual publicist who relies primarily on stunts to get publicity. He is often a con artist.

**Business/Private/Publicist**: An individual working in a corporate or individual PR firm, or an individual working in business and industry including entertainment, sports, fashion and other specialties.

**Politics/Government**: An individual working in politics especially representing a candidate for public office or working for a government agency ranging from the White House to local government.

**Military/Policeman**: A public information officer working for a military or police agency.

As can be seen in Table 3, the overwhelming image of the public relations practitioner is that of a professional executive working for a private business or corporation or individual client (189 characters out of a total of 325 studied in the survey). Press agents dominate the early decades of the 20th century, but by the 1950s they have been absorbed by professional public relations practitioners who are working in a variety of organizational settings. There are 46 characters working for political and governmental organizations and 19 working for military and police agencies; these characters run the gamut from very positive and helpful to very negative and manipulative.

The two most prominent areas – press agents (71) and public relations professionals working in the private sector (189) – usually end up at the opposite ends of the spectrum with the image of press agents as grasping, I’ll-do-anything-for-publicity, stunt managers labeled as one of the worst, and the image of the professional public relations practitioner working for his client gradually becoming one of the more positive images (although with a few glaring exceptions).
### TABLE 3: Job Titles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Press Agent</th>
<th>Business/Private</th>
<th>Politics/Government</th>
<th>Military/Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS** | **71** | **189** | **46** | **19** | **325** |

*One film (*Roman Holiday*, 1953) and one TV program *Royal Pains: But There’s a Catch* (2011) only mentioned public relations.

### Description

Using descriptions developed by Miller and Ames, all of the film and television PR characters were evaluated as to their positive and negative personality traits and whether they followed popular culture perceptions or stereotypes of their professional roles. Five descriptive labels – very positive, positive, negative, very negative, and neutral – were determined as follows:

**Very Positive (VP):** The public relations practitioner as a heroic character. This is the PR man or woman who is “confident, poised, capable, responsible, bright, reliable, efficient, imaginative, well-read, personable and trusted.” These PR men and woman are accomplished practitioners “good at their jobs and love what they do.”

**Positive (P):** The PR practitioner who tries to do his or her job without hurting anyone, basically a person trying to do the right thing, but often frustrated by the system. He or she is skilled, but often “unhappy with their jobs,” unfulfilled, upset, discontented, tired, irritated, disturbed by either the
profession or their particular situation or life in general. In some instances, the PR practitioner is played for comic relief or is just a lovable character, “effervescent, jovial, lively, mild and chipper.”22 Sometimes this PR man or woman is an outsider, isolated, “unable to fit in with coworkers … ill at ease, naïve, pathetic, a nun in a whorehouse, a lamb among wolves, a eunuch in a harem.”23

**Negative (N):**24 A PR practitioner who will do anything to help his client and doesn’t care much about the public, basically a person who doesn’t care about doing the right thing, but will do whatever is necessary to keep his job, even if his/her actions are unethical. These are what Karen Miller calls, money-minded practitioners “who think about their jobs from only a financial standpoint; they are shrewd, cheap and have commercial minds.”25 They are usually manipulative and will lie, cheat and do whatever it takes to advance their careers. This PR practitioner is “a wheeler-dealer with a supple conscience – a shark or a snake who is ruthless, deceptive and predatory.”26 In milder cases, they are simply obsequious “guided by whatever they think will satisfy their employers.”27

**Very Negative (VN):**28 A PR practitioner who is engaged in unethical and often unlawful activities serving the client at all costs, even committing murder or serious crimes. They are manipulative and cynical, “sarcastic, edgy, angry, contemptuous and driven.”29 The men are usually alcoholic womanizers who treat everyone with scorn. The women will do whatever it takes to get what they want, from sleeping their way to the top to killing off the competition. Sometimes, the individual is just a morally corrupt person who does very little public relations but is labeled as a public relations practitioner.

**Neutral:**30 A nondescript character who is simply there as a PR practitioner doing his or her job without offending anyone. He or she is often in the background and figures slightly in the plot or action of the film or television program.

Other analysts using the same films and television programs in this study might come up with slightly different conclusions based on their interpretation of very positive, positive, negative and very negative. Sometimes the difference between positive and negative labels can be so small that it is possible, depending on the sensitivity and experience of the analyst, for an individual characterization to be labeled either way. Tables 4, 4a, 4b should be considered in that light, and future analysts are urged to review the data in the accompanying Appendix and come up with their own evaluation of the 327 films and TV programs included.

Using a subjective scale from very positive to very negative, there are more negative images of the public relations practitioner in films and television programs than positive images. There are
111 very positive and positive images and 179 very negative and negative images in the 327 films and television programs sampled.

**TABLE 4: Description by Decade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>VP</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>329*</td>
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</table>

*There were two films with two descriptions. *The Big One* (1997) included four female media escorts who were described as P and a press secretary who was described as N. *The Great Man* (1952) included one public relations man rated as P and a press agent described as VN.

When we separate images of the public relations practitioner in films and television (Tables 4a and 4b), we discover that there are far more negatives images in film than there are on television. In 224 movie examples, there are only 68 positive images as opposed to 127 negative images. In 105 television examples, there are 43 positive images as opposed to 52 negative images.

TV series, which come into the home on a weekly basis and because of this frequency have more chances to influence the viewer, fare even better. Nineteen TV series were rated positive to very positive31 whereas 12 TV series were rated negative to very negative.32 One reason for this may be the necessity to have likable people as leading characters. Positive images were prevalent in long-running series such as “The West Wing,” “The Love Boat,” “Benson,” “Hotel,” “Spin City,” “What I Like About You,” and “Las Vegas.” Two of the most popular series involving public relations practitioners were rated very positive (“The West Wing”) and very negative (“Dallas”).
### TABLE 4A – Descriptions in Movies Only

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>VP</th>
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<th>N</th>
<th>VN</th>
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<td>4</td>
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### TABLE 4B – Descriptions in TV Only

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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
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</table>
Discussion

In studying the image of the PR practitioner in films and TV programs from 1901 to 2011, seven images stand out, offering a range of positive and negative descriptions of the professional and the field.

(1) The early press agents whose stock in trade was outrageous publicity stunts and ballyhoo is one of the oldest and enduring images.
In the movies, their hair-brained schemes always resulted in big headlines and pictures splashed all over the nation’s newspapers.33 As Karen Miller points out, these early movies show that all a public relations practitioner has to do to get front-page headlines and stories is to ask and it is done.34 Most of these press agents are former newspapermen.

There was enough truth in real life to give these films an aura of reality. *The Half-Naked Truth* (1932), for example, is a film based on the real-life, outrageous publicity stunts of Harry Reichenbach, who was considered the king of the publicity stunt. Jimmy Bates (played by Lee Tracy) is a Barker at a down-at-the-heels carnival who becomes a powerhouse New York publicity man through one extreme stunt after another.35 In one memorable scene, patterned after Reichenbach’s real stunt to promote a Tarzan film, Bates hides a lion in a hotel room, has a fake princess order 20 pounds of raw meat, summons the press to the hotel room and then watches in amusement while the newspaper reporters and photographers run for cover. The story makes front page headlines. So did sensational stunts created by other press agents in the movies, including a woman publicized as the ideal of American womanhood when in fact she loves gambling, booze and men (*Professional Sweetheart*, 1933) and a woman who tries to commit suicide, is rescued by the PR man who then gives her a new name, a full beauty treatment and turns her into a celebrity (*Made on Broadway*, 1933).

A typical press agent in the movies aped real life by creating phony romance stories between a celebrity and an unknown actress whose career he is trying to promote.36 Movie press agents and publicists would do anything to get publicity for a studio’s movies.37 Stunts range from the ridiculous to the criminal.38

And Mel Brooks had the final word on press agents by showing that Marty the press agent, created Robin Hood’s image that he stole from the rich and gave to the poor as opposed to what really happened -- stealing from the rich and keeping everything for himself (*The 2000 Year Old Man: The Animated TV Special*, 1975).

(2) Publicity men and women who would do anything to get their clients publicity and to protect their clients in crisis situations.39
The only thing that matters to these publicists is what is good for the client. In *Mr Broadway*,40 Manhattan public relations man Michael Bell (Craig Stevens) puts it this way, “Unimportant people
pay me to get their names in the paper, and important people pay me to keep their names out.” In The Kid (2000), public relations practitioner Russ Duritz (Bruce Willis) is a successful image consultant, vicious in his criticism of his clients as he manages their crises and offers sage advice. He comes dangerously close to crossing ethical lines, when he meets his childhood self who tells him, “You help people lie about who they really are.” By the end of the film, Duritz is a changed man ready to do some good in the world. In People I Know (2002), publicist Eli Wurman (Al Pacino) is what Duritz would have turned out to be if fantasy hadn’t altered his life. Wurman is a hard-drinking, pill-popping, old-school publicist, a guy who was called press agent when he started in the biz. He's washed-up, living on the money and sympathy of his last paying client. But he has one last hurrah in him before his career is over and pushes with all of his might to make it happen.

Much of these public relations practitioners’ job is handling the news media – either using the press to get their clients good publicity, or keeping the press away from their clients. Public relations man Cornelius Cobb (Lionel Stander) is a former newspaper reporter whose job is to keep the press away from his millionaire client. He is genuinely anguished when a female reporter blindsides the millionaire to get exclusive stories, and he ends up becoming a good friend and colleague (Mr. Deeds Goes to Town, 1937). Other PR practitioners try to keep stories out of the press that would hurt their client. But most PR men and women are just looking for clever angles in which to sell their clients to the media and they will use any means to do it, including publicity stunts and age-old ballyhoo to promote a product or personality.

(3) The public relations professional as hero is one who rebels against unethical practices and will quit his or his job before doing something immoral. These professional public relations men and women often are portrayed as conflicted, anguished people who try to elevate what they do into a profession with high standards. More often than not, they fail, but they are heroes in that they try to do the right thing. This image is more prevalent than one might think because the negative images are so strong and powerful that they often are more memorable than the positive images.

Public relations is defined in a variety of ways in the films and television programs. In the television series, Baby Bob (2002), public relations executive Walter (Adam Arkin) is a talking baby’s father who asks his mother what his father does: “He’s a publicist, honey. Famous people hire him to make sure that everybody hears all the good things about them, and none of the bad.” The talking baby answers, “So he’s kind of like their mommy.” “Yeah, in a way, only when one of his clients throws a tantrum, it’s the lead story on Access Hollywood.”

In The Days of Wine and Roses, Public relations man Joe Clay (Jack Lemmon) explains what the ideal public relations practitioner should be doing: “My job is supposed to be to advise people how to relate to the public, how to make the good that my client does known and how to help him find ways to do good and benefit others as well as himself.” Clay is tired of acting like a pimp
getting women to attend parties for clients. He wants to do the right thing. So does Public relations practitioner Tommy Layton (Patrick O’Neal) in The Secret Life of an American Wife (1968), who is tired of waiting hand and foot on a celebrity who hires him to do everything for him. He finally tells his client off and leaves him alone in his hotel room.

Two films show the seriousness in which the public relations profession is shown in 21st century films. In Jersey Girl (2004), publicist Oliver “Ollie” Trinke (Ben Affleck), a Manhattan public relations man loses everything after his wife dies in childbirth, He goes berserk at a press conference condemning the news media and becomes blacklisted as a publicist. As Carol Ames puts it, Trinke has “broken two of the commandments of PR: thou shalt not ‘dis’ thy client and thou shalt not publicly bag on journalists nor disparage the media.”46 For Trinke, however, leaving the public relations profession is a revelation – he discovers what life is all about.

In Hancock (2008), public relations practitioner Ray Embrey (Jason Bateman), a PR man with a heart who is a non-profit advocate, tries to rehabilitate the public image of Hancock, an alcoholic, broken-down man with amazing super powers. This film shows, in Ames’ words, “PR as challenging, positive and worthwhile. Its practitioner balances a happy, satisfying personal life with the demands of his profession, and PR helps both the client and the public, using the two-way symmetrical model of PR.”47

Several films are based on real-life public relations practitioners. Public relations man Robert Kensington "Bob" Lansford (Errol Flynn) is a former editor and PR legend based on real-life PR pioneer, Ivy Ledbetter Lee, who created positive images for very rich people by having them donate to charities anonymously, and then having stories written about them revealing their generosity (Four’s a Crowd, 1938). Public relations man Tom Rath (Gregory Peck) writes speeches and acts like a mature PR man doing a professional job in The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1956), a film that has the memorable scene where Rath asks how to be a PR man and is told, “You got a clean shirt. You bathe every day. That’s all there is to it.”

Positive images of PR practitioners go back to the beginning of film. Some of them do the job of representing their clients with passion and dignity. Some don’t. Some get fired or quit or threaten to quit because they won’t violate their ethical guidelines – public relations director for Premium Pictures Kent Carter (Ross Alexander), gets fired when he refuses to stop a story about an actor whose former wife is suing him for non-support: "I'm a press agent, not a suppress agent," he claims (Here Comes Carter, 1936).48

Some work at major hotels handling not only the hotel’s PR problems, but often the guests as well.49 Some public relations practitioners work at major corporations and businesses handling news media crises and pushing stories that offer positive images of their companies.50 Some work for celebrities whose images need constant attention.51 Some public relations practitioners handle authors. When it comes to handling the publicity needs of writers, PR people often have their hands full.52 Some PR executives discover that hard work alone does bring rewards – Whitney
(Bridget Moynahan) wins a promotion to partner, the youngest in the PR firm’s history, by working long hours and doing whatever is necessary to help a client (Six Degrees, 2006-2007). And some show the diversity of the public relations field by doing what they can to be successful.

There are heroic depictions of public relations practitioners in both films and television programs, including Wickland Snell (Walter Houston), a star reporter, who takes a job as a public relations man to make more money to help his family and give his son-in-law a job. Finally, he can’t take the hypocrisy and lying, quits and goes back to newspapers (Gentlemen of the Press, 1929).

(4) Press secretaries, political aides, and military and police information officers are among the most diversified public relations professionals in the movies and television.

They range from vile people doing terrible things to some of the most appealing and professional public relations professionals depicted.

Press secretaries not only advise the elected official about public relations, but they also take care of the news media principally through news conferences, one-on-one meetings with reporters and dealing with all crises. Their job can range from open discussion of issues with the press to trying to conceal damaging information by omission rather than outright lying. Perhaps the most positive image of the press secretary is Claudia Jean (C.J.) Cregg (Allison Janney), one of the first female White House press secretaries in history, in the weekly series, The West Wing: 1999-2005. Week in and week out, the public sees a public relations practitioner trying to do the best job she can within the limitations of her office. Even when she was kept out of the loop so she didn’t know harmful information that could damage the presidency, she performed with professionalism, good ethics and humor. White House press secretary Kelly Ludlow (Ever Carradine) seems to be a younger, more anxious version of Cregg in another TV series, Commander in Chief: 2005-2006. When an assistant interrupts her press conference, she politely tells him not to do that again. He counters by saying he deserved the job, not her. She fires him, then handles one crisis after another in a professional, controlled way, even tricking a reporter into writing a favorable story on the female president’s first 50 days.

Press Secretaries featured in docudramas are usually presented in a positive light. White House press secretary Pierre Salinger (Michael Lerner) performs admirably in President Kennedy’s administration, getting angry when he is kept out of the loop even when it is for his own good. President Kennedy tells him, “I don’t want to put my press secretary in a position of deliberately deceiving the press. And you’re not the world’s greatest liar, Pierre. You don’t know how lucky you are not to know what you don’t know” (The Missiles of October, 1974). Salinger is also given an affectionate portrayal by Peter Boyden in Kennedy (1983) as he tries to help Jacqueline Kennedy create the public image she wants while dealing with the press on the Cuban Missile Crisis. PR men and women who work for government agencies try to do their best to represent their bosses’ agendas.
Political aides form a mixed bag. Some do the best they can to get their candidate elected within the bounds of the law and good taste. A host of opposing political aides, press secretaries and speechwriters work to get their own senatorial candidate elected by trying to spin stories to get maximum exposure and to lead off the nightly TV newscasts (Speechless, 1994). Other political aides end up doing unethical and questionable things to get their candidates elected or to keep them in office, doing whatever it takes, even breaking the law.

Military information officers are usually treated with humor and portrayed as good citizens. Other military PR men find themselves in the middle of the action. A public relations division lieutenant (Lew Gallo) somehow makes it to a besieged military area with a camera crew to film a story about heroes and is sent back to headquarters to ask for reinforcements (Pork Chop Hill, 1959). Public relations military officer Bruce Daninger (John Lithgow) has to convince the public that daylight bombing raids are a good thing, so he zeroes in on the mostly uncooperative men of the Memphis Belle bomber to sell the story (Memphis Belle, 1990).

Most police information officers also are portrayed as hard-working, dedicated public officials trying to keep a good relationship with the news media while having their hands full with uncooperative police officials.

(5) The public relations professional as a true villain who will step on anyone, do anything, lie, cheat or steal to protect a client’s image. These PR men and women will stop at nothing, even murder, to get what they want. Publicity man Jimmy Dolan comes up with a publicity stunt, blackmauls a writer and then murders his mother when she threatens to destroy everything he has created (Alfred Hitchcock Presents: Madame Mystery, 1960). Public relations practitioner Miriam Deering (Olivia de Havilland) tries to drive her sister crazy and kills anyone who gets in her way until her sister murders her (Hush...Hush, Sweet Charlotte, 1964). PR man Stan Armbrewster sets up his predecessor to be killed by a genetically engineered cyborg, then takes over his job. He is an inept whiner eventually turned into blood vapor by an experimental weapon (Syngenor, 1960). A public relations firm is a front for a devil-worshiping cult that kills young women. Publicist Brittany Drake (Amber Newman) controls the minds of people around her and makes them do what she tells them to do. It turns out the Devil is really the ultimate public relations man (Evil Ambitions (aka Satanic Yuppies), 1996). Jake Dunmore (Dermot Mulroney) murders his PR partner and brother, Ben Dunmore (Don Johnson) for the love of a woman who then turns around and kills him (Goodbye Lover, 1998). And in Blue Bloods: Silver Star (2011), public relations practitioner Ian Seroy (Michael Izquierdo) is involved in the killing of a homeless man who turns out to be a former U.S. Marine war hero.

One of the most memorable villains who does everything evil sort of murder is public relations practitioner Leslie Stewart (Susan Flannery). Stewart even out-evils the program’s key villain, oil tycoon J.R. Ewing. She lies to everyone, uses her sex appeal to get what she wants and
ends up selling everyone out. In one pivotal scene, J.R. shows up at her apartment to finally consummate their relationship. She teases him out of it and when he leaves, goes into her bedroom, where her former husband is waiting for her in bed laughing at how duplicitous she has become (Dallas: 1981).

Equally ruthless is PR agency owner Amanda Woodward (Heather Locklear) who arrives from New York to fire half the Los Angeles staff. She keeps on publicist Ella Simms (Katie Cassidy), who is an equally ruthless public relations practitioner, cool and blonde, and eager to be another Woodward. To test Simms’ loyalty, Woodward arranges for a lesbian PR woman to use sex to convince Simms to sell Woodward out and take a job at a competing firm. Blackmail, lies and deceit are all part of Woodward’s stock in trade (Melrose Place: Cahuenga, 2009).

They call themselves the Mod Squad, aka the Merchants of Death, and often debate which of their clients has killed more people. They are chief spokesperson and lobbyist Nick Naylor (Aaron Eckhart) the vice-president of the Academy of Tobacco Studies; PR woman Polly Bailey (Maria Bello) who works for the Moderation Council dealing with alcohol, and Bobby Jay Bliss (David Koechner) who promotes the gun business with his own advisory group SAFETY. They frequently meet with one another in a bar to discuss strategies on how to dupe the American people and make what their clients do acceptable to the public (Thank You for Smoking, 2005).

Two public relations firms featured in TV series decide that the best way to handle a PR problem is to create a fake disease for their client. In Absolute Power (2003), Charles Prentiss (Stephen Fry) and Martin McCabe (John Bird), who run Prentiss McCabe, a London public relations company (or "government media relations consultancy"), create a fake disease to solve a public relations problem: “Cherry pick. Take the best bits from, say, cancer, add highlights from other ailments and come up with a name…Most obscure diseases are named after two people….we’ve got a career to save and a pestilence to unleash,” Prentiss tells his staff. Prentiss is a man without morals whose only objectives are money and power. The disease the PR firm creates is used to distract the news media from the fact that an actor viciously beat up his girlfriend. As Prentiss tells the actor, “There is nothing more nauseating to the common working shmuck than the sight of some pampered millionaire celebrity banging on about how hard life is at the top.” Actor: “But it’s the truth.” Prentiss: “How many times do I have to tell you, nobody gives a shit about the truth. That is why you employ me.” In P.R.: Operation Overload (2000), Alex Reed (Diane Flacks) is a fast-talking liar, boozer and inspired owner and founder of Alexandra Reed & Associates, a flourishing metropolitan PR firm in Toronto. She and her partner Jill Hayes (Ellie Harvie) create news, hype and fabricate only the best events to serve a guarded list of actors and celebrity clients. In one episode, they also decide to fabricate a disease and give it to their client so the public will feel sorry for him and forgive him his trespasses.

Presidential crisis consultant Conrad Brean (Robert De Niro) is one of the most evil images of the PR practitioner ever put on film. His actions, in the words of Carol Ames, are “manipulative,
dishonest, sleazy, amoral and outright criminal.”66 Called in to do damage control (the president had a messy affair that has become public), Brean creates a massive distraction to “change the story, change the lead.” He not only manipulates the news media through a made-up world crisis complete with fake video and one lie and deception after another, but he also sanctions murder (Wag the Dog, 1997). Equally sinister Malcolm Tucker (Peter Capaldi), the aggressive, profane and feared director of communications for the government. He will do anything to protect the government, including intimidation, blackmail, seduction and destroying anyone who gets in his way (The Thick of It: 2005-2009). An equal member of this villainous trio is Reed Rockwell (Michael Gladis), a public relations counsel, who is a professional career assassin using any means at his disposal to destroy reputations (Leverage: The 15 Minutes Job, 2011). Other PR practitioners do terrible things to get ahead or stay in power.67

(6) The female public relations practitioner who uses her sex appeal to win clients and get promotions.68

Publicist Rebecca Flannery (Alison Doody) seduces a major league ball player to get his business (Major League II, 1994). Alicia 'Allie' Brayman (Elizabeth Berkeley) is a young and rising public relations executive dead set on advancing her career in any way possible. She meets a strange man after a cocktail party and is framed for the murder of her biggest client. The person framing her turns out to be her boss and mentor, head of the PR firm Blake Preston (Barry Flatman) (Random Encounter, 1998). Publicist Samantha Jones (Kim Cattrall) owns her own PR firm and is as sexually active as any womanizing man in securing clients and success (Sex and the City: 1998-2004; Sex and the City: The Movie (2008), Sex and the City 2 (2010). Publicist Bridget Jones (Renee Zellweger) is a single, thirty-something working for a publishing firm and sleeps with the boss to get ahead before coming to her senses and quitting her job (Bridget Jones’s Diary, 2001). Publicist Jessie (Jill Richie), who is hired to improve a family’s image, tries to have sex with the family spokesman and ends up with mud on her face (Arrested Development: Public Relations, 2004).

(7) The alcoholic public relations man is a staple throughout the history of movies and television.69

These PR practitioners drink for a variety of reasons – to keep their clients happy, to escape the pressures of their job, to forget the horrendous things they often have to do to keep an account. Many films featuring public relations men and women have scenes of serious social drinking, but few seem to consider alcoholism a problem.70 Films and TV programs that emphasize drinking by PR practitioners are either played for comedy or end up being deeply tragic dramas.

The seriousness of alcoholism as an occupational hazard in public relations was made crystal clear in Days of Wine and Roses (1962) in which public relations practitioner Joe Clay (Jack Lemmon) is an alcoholic who turns his wife into an alcoholic before struggling to regain his sobriety
and keep a job. He eventually realizes his work as well as his personal life will be destroyed forever unless he gets sober and he does. But the woman he introduced to alcohol won’t give it up and that final shot of Clay looking out the window as she walks away with the reflection of a neon bar sign next to his face is one hard to forget.

An even more horrific picture of the public relations practitioner as an alcoholic is a movie-made-for-television, *The Morning After* (1974). PR man Charlie Lester (Dick Van Dyke) is an alcoholic who can’t control his drinking. At first, he simply makes mistakes that his secretary catches. But at a presentation meeting, his boss realizes he is drunk and confronts him in the restroom telling him to clean up his act or he will be fired. A drunken Lester tries but can’t do it, beating his wife when she refuses to give him liquor and finally ending up in a hospital with delirium tremens. He’s given one chance after another, but finally ends up alone and sick on a beach crawling on the sand, trying to get away from the demons he sees around him. It is a desperate, haunting final image.

**Conclusion**

This analysis of 222 films and 105 television programs reveals that the images of the public relations practitioner are far more varied and more positive than previously thought. When they are good, they are very, very good, and when they are bad, they are horrid.

It is obvious that males overwhelmingly dominate the image of the PR practitioner in the movies, but by the 21st century, women are represented in almost equal fashion, especially on television. We also discovered that there are far more negative images in film than on television. TV series may have more impact on the public because of the frequency and necessity to have likable people as leading characters, resulting in more positive than negative images of the PR man and woman.

Negative images range from press agents and their outrageous ballyhoo to publicity men and women who will do anything for their clients, from alcoholics and PR women who use their natural charms to win clients and get ahead in the profession to true villains who are willing to lie, cheat, steal and even commit murder to save their reputations.

Positive images range from those who will do anything within the law to get their clients publicity and to protect them in crisis situations to the efficient and often likable press secretaries and military-police public information officers. The PR professional as a hero who rebels against unethical practices and quits his or her job before doing something immoral is a frequent image, especially on television.

Nevertheless, there is much work to be done. Karen Miller in her ground-breaking study on “Public Relations in Film and Fiction, 1930 to 1995,” wrote that scholars should not dismiss “the stereotypes as foolish or uninformed.” Rather, she said, scholars “should do well to try to understand if and in what ways these representations have influenced public knowledge and attitudes about PR.” That is as true today as it was then. Although there have been a few papers on the image of the
public relations practitioner in film, there has been virtually nothing on the image of the public relations practitioner in television, in novels and other aspects of popular culture. This is a rich field for future academic research and we encourage colleagues to mine this field as a means of understanding how the image of PR men and women influences the public’s understanding of a profession that seems to be coming into its own in the 21st century.

1 Those who helped with the finalization of this article include Research Associate Liz Mitchell; Xing Ju, a graduate student in public relations at USC Annenberg, and Jennifer Saltzman.
2 The original sampling included more than 500 films and television programs, but the list was reduced to 327 films and television programs because the portrayal of PR practitioners in the items left out were either insignificant or unavailable. The final study includes 222 movies and 105 television series and movies-made-for-television.
9 Kinsky, Emily, “The Portrayal of Public Relations Practitioners in The West Wing, a paper presented at the 2006 AEJMC Convention in San Francisco. “The practitioners were coded based on demonstrated traits and work performed or discussed. Significant differences were found between male and female practitioners being included or disciplined, appearing as major characters, dealing with government officials and the media, discussing speech writing, and appearing silly.”
10 Youngmin Yoon, Associate Professor, School of Media and Communication, Korea University and Heather Black, Research Associate, Berrier Associates, Narberth, United States.
12 Miller, p. 4, pp. 8-10.
13 Ames, Abstract, p. 1
14 Ames, p. 6.
15 The Online IJPC Database includes more than 80,000 entries. Using key words such as “public relations” (1,371 entries) and publicist (560 entries), it was possible to isolate more than 500 movies and TV programs of interest. In addition, various online databases, including the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), were searched for verification and new possibilities.
16 There seems to be little current distinction in production values between films made for theatrical release, for non-network outlets or broadcast TV programs. Since one of the primary resources for the public is the home screen, the point of origin of productions is less important than it was in the mid-20th century. Also, the image of the public relations practitioner in England is similar to the image of the public relations practitioner in the United States, so those films and TV programs are included as well.
17 Miller, 1999, pp. 7-8. “Because most sources do not provide explicit definitions of PR, audience members might deduce its meaning by watching what its practitioners do. The characters have an incredibly wide range of duties. They organize open houses, guide tours and handle corporate contributions to political campaigns; plan parades, movie premieres, and beauty competitions; and conduct research and refer to opinion polls and market surveys. They prepare clients and employers for interviews, debates, and Congressional testimony; plan national speaking tours; form clubs; make awards; plan parties; write purpose statements and newsletter articles; sign autographs for their famous clients; work in graphics and production; and attend meetings. However, the details of work are regularly omitted: Many practitioners are never seen doing any work,” Miller, pp. 12-13.
19 Miller, p. 10.


21 Miller, p. 10.

22 Miller, p. 8.

23 Miller, p. 10.


25 Miller, p. 9
26 Ibid
27 Miller, p. 8.


29 Miller, p. 9


33 Films showing press agents doing outrageous publicity stunts include Terrible Teddy, the Grizzly King (1901), Hook, Line and Sinker (1930), The Miracle Woman (1931), Professional Sweetheart (1933), Bureau of Missing Persons (1933), Made on Broadway (1933), Britannia of Billingsgate (1933), Hard to Handle (1933), Another Face (1935), Lady by Choice, 1934, A Night at the Ritz (1935), Cheers of the Crowd (1935), Cain and Mabel (1936), The Golden Arrow (1936), Something to Sing About (1937), Shall We Dance (1937), When Love Is Young (1937), Cowboy From Brooklyn (1938), Annabel Takes a Tour (1938), Dancing Co-Ed (1939), Second

Miller, p. 13.

35 In the 1930s, Lee Tracy played various reporters, gossip columnists and publicity men. In Blonde Bombshell (1933) Tracy does memorable turn as Press Agent E.J. "Space" Hanlon, a two-faced publicity man for Monarch Studios who will do anything for a story and usually does.

36 In Cain and Mabel (1936), publicist Reilly (Roscoe Karns) tries to stir up interest in his client’s latest musical show by creating bogus headline stories about an actress and a boxer in love even though they really hate each other. In Expensive Husbands (1937), public relations man Joe Craig (Allyn Joslyn) has to convince “the newshawks” that a fake marriage between an actress and a prince is on the level. Press agent Jimmy Sutton (Tyrone Power) creates one fake romance after another to promote the studio’s stars, getting sympathy from the newspapers and cooperation from the stars by pretending his job is in jeopardy if he doesn’t get their names in the newspapers (Second Fiddle, 1939).

37 In Another Face (1935), Publicist Joe Haynes (Wallace Ford) does one outrageous stunt after another including having the police dragging a river for a fake missing suicide to publicize one of the studio’s pictures. In Blonde Bombshell (1933), press agent E.J. "Space" Hanlon (Lee Tracy) is a two-faced publicity man for Monarch Studios who will do anything to get publicity for the studio’s leading actress, even lie to the woman he loves. Press agent Joe Drews (Roscoe Karns) for Monarch Pictures stages a fake national dance contest and makes sure the studio’s new dancing star wins the contest (Dancing Coed, 1939).

38 Stunts included publicizing a run-down hotel as a resort favored by the rich (Hook, Line and Singer, 1930); a kidnapping to get a Broadway actress (Bureau of Missing Persons, 1933) or a Hollywood actress (Studio Stoops, 1950) some publicity; turning a so-so face cream into a dynamic reducing cream through one publicity stunt after another (Hard to Handle, 1933); getting a fan dancer to adopt a mother on Mother’s Day so she can make headlines and save her career (Lady by Choice, 1934); finding an “honest man” by having him discover $10,000 in a restroom — planted by the press agent — and then returning the money to the police (Cheers of the Crowd, 1935); turning a bank clerk into an heiress (The Golden Arrow, 1936); making a marriage between two dancers by creating a photograph of the two of them in bed (Shall We Dance, 1937); promoting a Broadway play by having a woman herd a flock of geese down Broadway (When Love Is Young, 1937); creating a phony singing cowboy from the Wild West (Cowboy From Brooklyn, 1938); turning a waitress into an instant celebrity by clever promotion stunts (I Wake Up Screaming, 1941 and Vicki, 1953); turning a college professor into a beauty products’ expert (For Beauty’s Sake, 1941); having a singer show up in a nightclub leading a leopard on a chain to promote her act (The Leopard Man, 1943); publicizing a restaurant by claiming that authentic zombies would attend the opening (Zombies on Broadway, 1944); paying seniors to protest a sexy male singer so headlines will make him a bigger star (Loving You, 1957); setting up a sky diving stunt to get headlines for an actress who stays on the ground and takes the bows (Landing Blanket Bingo, 1965); having a phony fisherman pretend he’s the world’s greatest expert on fly fishing (Man’s Favorite Sport, 1964); having rock climbers scale a large building to get publicity (Emergency!: Rules of Order, 1976).


Mr. Broadway (1964). In this TV series, public relations man Michael Bell (Craig Stevens) is a sophisticated Broadway press agent and owner of public relations firm in Manhattan.

41 Publicity agent Matt Libby (Lionel Stander, Jack Carson) spends most of his time massaging the press so they won’t reveal that the studio’s top actor is a drunk (A Star Is Born, 1937, 1954). Publicist Nellie Weaver (Ruth Warren), tries to plant positive stories about her mob boss client (The Guilty Generation, 1931). Publicist Scoop Spooner (Jack Paar) tries to get a quarterback favorable publicity before the big game (Easy Living, 1949).

42 Publicity consultant Toni Wentworth (Sheila Ryan) tries to convince her boyfriend reporter not to print a story exposing her client’s secret: he’s a singer who can’t sing (Heartaches, 1947). PR Man Boyd (Douglas Kennedy) handles the press during an airplane crisis (The High and the Mighty, 1954). Entertainment publicist-press agent Elizabeth “Liz” O’Neal (Mary Wickes) tries her best to make sure a story on her client is a good one (Make Room for Daddy: Too Good for Words, 1958). Ted Wilson (Dort Clark), Consolidated director of public relations, tries to follow the company line putting the blame for a plane accident on the pilot (Fate is the Hunter, 1964). Corporation PR man Fitzgerald (“Fitz”) (Nicolas Coster) tries to minimize the damage to his client’s proposed merger by controlling the information released to the news media (The Electric Horseman, 1979).

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relations-image consultant Brody Johns (Christopher Titus) and PR adviser Miriam (Christopher Ryan) do damage control as they try to keep embarrassing stories out of the newspapers, stories that could ruin their clients’ careers (Big Shots: 2007-2008, The Life and Times of Vivienne Vyle, 2007). Public relations corporate executive David Wyatt (Adam O’Byrne) works for LM Plastics and is a nervous whistle-blower who asks his boss to fix a factory problem causing cancer or he will reveal all to the (Cold Case: Breaking News, 2009).

Public relations man Daniel “Dan” Armstrong uses blimps and other audience-pleasing stunts to promote a corporate product (Thunder in the City, 1937). Press agent Lester Green (Fred Gordon), one of the few African-American publicity men in film, brags about his ability to get his client stories in the newspaper (Sepia Cinderella, 1947). Public relations man Windy (Frank McHugh) promotes a beautiful woman and a giant ape to incredulous newspapermen (Mighty Joe Young, 1949). Publicity man Eddie Mooney (Eddie Byrne) convinces a young teenager to enter a soap beauty contest for fame and fortune (Lady Godiva Rides Again, 1951). Press agent Tom Miller (Tom Ewell) turns a mobster’s girl into a celebrity and then falls for her (The Girl Can’t Help It, 1956). Publicist Harry Silver (Keenan Wynn) starts a rumor that soon becomes fact (The Patsy, 1964). Public relations practitioner Richard Bramwell (Gig Young) must turn a husband who hates his wife into a loving spouse so he can get a raise and a promotion (Strange Bedfellows, 1965). Publicist Hymie Kelly (Tony Bennett) spends most of his career cleaning up one mess after another caused by an actor (The Oscar, 1966). Public relations-image maker Jeremy Tove (Jeremy Lloyd) creates a singing sensation through image making and news media manipulation (Smashing Time, 1967). A publicist (Lewis Arquette) has a young actress show up at press club parties to get her picture in the newspapers (The Jayne Mansfield Story, 1980).

Public relations practitioner Frankie Stone (Ann Magnuson) humanizes an android for the purpose of space exploration by making him a household word (Making Mr Right, 1987). Public relations woman Edna Monsoon (Jennifer Saunders) and Claudia Bing (Celia Imrie) run their own agencies and will take on any client who wants media attention (Absolutely Fabulous, 1992). Publicist Sy Spector (Gary Kemp) cares more about publicity for his pop star than her personal safety (The Bodyguard, 1992). Publicist Sydney Mercer (Catherine Oxenberg) wants to give the mayor sex appeal so he will be attractive to more voters (The Nanny: Oy Vey, You’re Gay, 1995). Publicist Stuart “Stu” Shepard (Colin Farrell) works the phone 24 hours a day to make sure his clients are featured in all the right newspaper and magazine columns (Phone Booth, 2002). Publicists Wally Fenton (Larry Miller) and Amber Cole (Jennifer Coolidge) publicize their musical client using any idea they can come up with, true or not (A Mighty Wind, 2003). New York City public relations whiz Jake Phillips (John Stamos) tries to fix disasters before they happen (In the Thick of It, 2005-2006). Publicist Candy Springtime (Robin Riker) is called in by a law firm to influence jury selection by creating specific and memorable images of its client (Boston Legal: Shock and Owww!, 2006). African-American public relations practitioner Ellen Laskow (Valarie Pettiford) works to get her author clients the best publicity they can so their books become best-sellers (Bones: The Bodies in the Book, 2007). And the animated Stewie (voice by Seth MacFarlane – Voice) assumes the role of public relations practitioner for Brian, his friend and now top-selling author, epitomizing every cliché of the PR man who will do anything to please his client (Family Guy: Brian Writes a Bestseller, 2010).


Men of Christmas (2009). This image includes the hard-bitten PR professional woman who resents the female stereotypes and is as good or better than any male in the office. She sometimes rebels against the glass ceiling for female executives and works hard to change the status of women in public relations, although she can be threatened by any new female who joins the firm. These women can be tough and often have a take no-prisoners attitude, but they can also be kind and cooperative.

Days of Wine and Roses (1964). Public relations man Joe Clay (Jack Lemmon) is an alcoholic who turns his wife into an alcoholic before struggling to regain his sobriety and keep a job.

Ibid

Public relations director Alex Coffman (Tony Randall) is hired to make sure a financier’s image is not tarnished, but can’t put up with deception and lies and threatens to quit unless changes are made – which they are (Let’s Make Love, 1960). E.J. Baxter (Kristin Chenoweth) is a New York City PR practitioner who uses her media savvy to bring tourism to a small Montana town after she quits her job when she discovers her boss Lillah Sherwood (Heather Hanson) in the restroom with her fiancé (12 Men of Christmas, 2009).

Publicity director Hugh Halsworth (Macdonald Carey) and his assistant and son-in-law Jerry Denham (Robert Wagner) handle all the publicity needs for the hotel they work for (Let’s Make It Legal, 1951). In The Towering Inferno, 1974, Bigelow (Robert Wagner), public relations executive for the skyscraper hotel, is coordinating public relations for the grand opening while having an affair with his assistant Lorrie (Susan Flannery). The night of the big event, Bigelow shut's off the phones so he and Lorrie can be together without interruption. As they are getting dressed, Lorrie asks, "Did you leave a cigarette burning?" Bigelow pauses, then says, "That's no cigarette." Both burn to death in the towering inferno. Mark Danning (Shea Farrell) is the handsome and likable PR director of San Francisco's St. Gregory hotel who tries to solve the myriad publicity problems of the hotel’s guests (Hotel, 1983-1986). Director of special events Mary Connell (Nikki Cox) handles public relations for a Las Vegas hotel, handling all kinds of guests, from high-rollers to people in trouble (Las Vegas: 2003-2007).

Doris Walker (Maureen O’Hara, Teresa Wright and Jane Alexander as Karen Walker) is a hard-bitten department store PR woman who helps her client while learning about the true meaning of Christmas and Santa Claus (Miracle on 34th St., 1947; Hour of Stars: The Miracle on 34th Street. 1957; Miracle on 34th Street, 1973). Public relations woman Jane Mitchell (Wendy Barrie) works for an automobile manufacturer and tries to explain to the public the brawn and vision that makes for great automobiles (Speed, 1936). Publicity-sales manager Richard L. "Dusty" Weston (Bill Williams) is in charge of promotion and public relations for a motorcycle company and drives racing cars to promote the company (The Pace That Thrills, 1952). Publicist Eric Yeager (Ray Milland) must convince a baseball team and the news media that their new owner, a cat, will bring the team luck (Rhubarb, 1951). Public relations director Janet Blake (Pamela Hensley) handles any problems her hospital has with the public and its patients (Marcus Welby, M.D.: 1974-1975). Krystle Carrington (Linda Evans) of Denver-Carrington gets the top PR job when public relations man Gil Roland leaves because she is married to the company’s owner Blake Carrington. Roland’s assistant, Tracy, who does most of the work and was promised the job by Roland, takes the defeat in stride by offering to help Krystle in any way she can (Dynasty: 1983). Corporate public relations vice president Christy Cooper (Marcy Walker) is angry when her boss hires a thief to help solve some robberies (Palace Guard: Pilot, 1991). “Employee liaison” Hunt Stevenson (Michael Keaton) handles public relations problems between American autoworkers and their Japanese managers in an attempt to keep an American car production plant in business (Gung Ho, 1986). Susan Costello (Madchen Amick) is a single parent who is head of public relations at Garvers department store in New York City, solving one problem after another until there is one vermin problem she can’t solve by herself (The Rats, 2002).

Public relations man Norm (Norman Rossington) tries to keep the Beatles on track as their fans smother them in attention in A Hard Day’s Night (1964). Bill Dunnigan (Fred MacMurray), a studio public relations expert, rehabilitates his I’ll-do-anything-for-the-studio image by discovering a new actress. When she dies, he tries to salvage her first and last film (The Miracle of the Bells, 1948). Candy (Frances Fisher) publicizes a little-known hairstylist after she gives her the haircut of her life (The Big Tease, 1999). Publicist Billy Stanton (Dan Bucatinsky) is hired by an actress to get her picture on a magazine cover after another publicist Carolina (Stephanie Courtney) turns her down (The Comeback, 2005). Public relations specialist Dahlia (Rosie Perez) works to make a fashion designer famous, and gets furious when the client dumps her (Lipstick Jungle, 2008-2009). Public relations woman (Randa Walker) handles a photo shoot and press conference while trying to comfort a difficult actor client (Somewhere, 2010).

New York publisher Lewis Jackman (Jeff Chandler) creates a publicity campaign and a new image for a newly discovered writer (Return to Peyton Place, 1961). Publicist Kitty (Kit) Donovan (Jessica Browne) squires an author around New York for her first book promotion tour (Murder, She Wrote: The Murder of Sherlock Holmes: Pilot, 1984) as does Press agent (Mary Wickliffe) when the author goes to Milan (Murder, She Wrote: Murder in Milan, 1992). Publicist Irving Mansfield (Nathan Lane) uses every contact he has to create a new
Public relations assistant Ashley Albright (Lindsay Lohan) works at a ritzy PR firm headed by Peggy Braden (Missi Pyle) where luck determines how much of a future she will have (Just My Luck, 2006). Public relations executive Priscilla Chase (Parker Posey) wins a promotion to vice president when she brings new businesses to Cleveland (The Oh in Ohio, 2006). Publicist Melissa "Mel" Rochester (Carly Pope) gets a well-deserved promotion through hard work and a good heart (This Time Around, 2003). Valerie (Val) Tyler (Jennifer Garth) relies on good ideas and a moral work ethic to become director of a public relations firm, beating out less scrupulous publicists (What I Like About You: 2002-2006). PR practitioner Jamie Stemple Buchman (Helen Hunt) lands a big account with a don’t-give-up attitude (Mad About You: I’m Just So Happy for You, 1992).

Public relations man Johnny Morgan (Reginald Denny) works for a movie studio and solves a crime using PR tools (The Preview Murder Mystery, 1936). Public relations woman Jennifer Nelson (Doris Day) gives guided tours at a space research institute and ends up writing the boss’ official biography (The Glass Bottom Boat, 1966). Frederick "Fred" Bolton (Dean Jones) comes up with a PR campaign for a product to combat stomach acidity – by promoting a horse with the product’s name at horse shows to attract high society (The Horse in the Gray Flannel Suit, 1968). Public relations executive Ted Pierce (Gene Wilder) puts his job on the back burner when he falls in love with a mysterious woman in red (The Woman in Red, 1984). A series of public relations women serve as media guides for author Michael Moore, who continually tries to subvert their work (Roger and Me, 1989). PR man Rick (Brian McNamara) promotes TV programs and is not ashamed of being gay (Murphy Brown: Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are, 1992). New York press agent Bob Tredici (Marc Grapey) applies his show-business acumen to revitalize his ailing father's Indiana fruit farm even though he has to lie to his family to prove his worth (A Piece of Eden, 2000). Publicist Joel Meyers (Diedrich Bader) does all he can to turn an FBI agent into a public spokeswoman (Miss Congeniality 2: Armed and Fabulous, 2005).

Publicity director Burt Winslow (House Peters, Jr.) who works for a research science center, fights the bad guys and saves the world (King of the Rocket Men (1949). American press agent, Dave Bishop (Robert Mitchum) probes the death of a millionaire client and his mysterious past in Europe, ending up using his fists and a gun to win the day (Foreign Intrigue, 1956.). Sports columnist-turned-press agent Eddie Willis (Humphrey Bogart) loses his column when his paper folds, goes to work as press agent for a crooked fight promoter, then quits to write a book exposing the underside of boxing (The Harder They Fall, 1956). Military public relations officer Bennett Marco (Frank Sinatra), who was brainwashed while captured in Korea, comes home to stop an assassin of a public official (The Manchurian Candidate, 1962). Charlie Madison (James Garner), who works in the Navy’s public information office, ends up an unlikely hero of D-Day in 1944 (The Americanization of Emily (1964). Michael Bell (Craig Stevens), a sophisticated, powerhouse Broadway press agent, fights the good fight using PR methods and occasionally his fists (Mr Broadway, 1964). Peter Reaney (Rod Taylor), a swinging PR man working out of London at a corrupt PR firm, finally rebels against the system to do the right thing (The Man Who Had Power Over Women, 1970). Scottie Templeton (Jack Lemmon), a Broadway press agent who learns he is dying of cancer and tries one more time to reconnect with his son and the people who love him (Tribute, 1980). Bob Jones (Michael Keaton) runs a Los Angeles public relations firm when he learns he has cancer and a few months to live. He creates a video tape so his unborn son can get to know his father and in the process learns who his real friends are (My Life, 1993).


Other press secretaries offering a good image of the office include Joe Tumulty (Thomas Mitchell) who helps President Wilson get and stay in office (Wilson, 1944). Former reporter Kenneth Gibson (Donald O’Connor) who convinces a newly appointed female ambassador to hire him as press attaché by handling the press with aplomb (Call Me Madam, 1953). Public relations man Charley Hand (Darren McGavin) works for the governor of New York, refusing to be a “yes” man and showing an integrity rare in any public official (Beau James, 1957). Governor’s press secretary Pete Downey (Ethan Phillips) of Benson (1980-1984) and the mayor’s press secretary Paul Lassiter (Richard Kind) of Spin City (1996-2002) offer affectionate if bumbling portraits in these long-running comedies. Sam Toi (Ronald Yamamoto) performs admirably as press secretary to a mayoral candidate, dealing honestly and compassionately with the news media (The Palermo Connection, 1990). Deputy press secretary Melanie Mitchell (Donna Bullock) is taken hostage by hijackers after they seize the plane carrying the President of the United States and his family and is assassinated. Assistant press secretary (Michael Monks) meets the press trying to keep the information secret (Air Force One, 1997).
Press secretary Ronald Ziegler (James Slovan) tries his best, but is either kept in the dark as to what is happening in President Nixon’s administration or prompted by political aides to give sanctioned “correct” answers as he prepares for a news conference (Blind Ambition, 1979). Director of communications Alastair Campbell (Mark Bazevich) for Prime Minister Tony Blair prepares a speech in which Princess Diana is described as “the people’s princess,” as he tries to help Blair capitalize on her death and in the process creates a household phrase (The Queen, 2006).

Director of public relations Jonathan Lyles (Mario Joyner) of the Board of Health is interviewed by TV Reporter Wanda Hawkins, falls for her and then drops her when she exposes the Board of Health cafeteria as being infested with vermin (Wanda At Large: King Rat, 2003). Bud Gerber (John Slattery) of the Treasury Department is the civilian handler of the three survivors who raised the American flag on Mount Suribachi at the Battle of Iwo Jima. He creates a publicity campaign to sell war bonds that is filled with lies and deception (Flags of Our Fathers, 2006). National Institutes of Health (NIH) publicity liaison Eva Rossi (Anna Belknap) uses unconventional methods to keep the media at bay in the TV series Medical Investigation, 2004-2005.

Political public relations man Charlie Dale (William Demarest) makes “The Great Man” a household name (The Great Man Votes, 1939). Political Press relations-speech writer Steve Jackson (Martin Balsam) tries to do the right thing, even when falling short (Ada (1961). Marvin Lucas (Peter Boyle) convinces a man, who he says can't possibly win, to run for the Senate and then manipulates the candidate’s ideals into acceptable political platitudes (The Candidate, 1972). Press aide Chet MacGregor (Ray Wise) tries to protect his candidate from the news media with mixed results (Bob Roberts, 1992). Image specialist Mel Felcher (Ben Masters) is worried about a presidential candidate’s girlfriend whom he believes is influencing the candidate in the wrong way. He works to neutralize her influence and maximize his influence (Running Mates, 1992).

Press Aide Dennis Murphy (Oliver Platt) worries about damage control when a politician begins to say exactly what he thinks. Then, when the press likes what it hears, he climbs aboard the bandwagon (Bulworth, 1998). Media consultant Libby Holden (Kathy Bates) is drafted to nullify the potent threat of negative media reporting and isn’t above pulling out a gun to prove a point (Primary Colors, 1998).

Films and TV programs that show press secretaries and political aides doing unethical things include All the King’s Men (1949), The Werewolf of Washington (1973), Washington Behind Closed Doors (1977), Final Assignment (1980), Bob Roberts (1992), The President’s Child (1992), Dave (1993), Mars Attacks! (1996), Wag the Dog (1997), Bulworth (1998), Primary Colors (1998), The Growing Pains Movie (2000), Spooks: Thou Shalt Not Kill: Pilot (2002), Wanda At Large: King Rat (2003), All the King’s Men (2006), Flags of Our Fathers (2006), NCIS: Corporal Punishment (2007). Specific examples include: Reporter Jack Burden (John Ireland, Jude Law) becomes a corrupt governor’s press secretary resorting to blackmail at the official’s command (All The King’s Men, 1949, 2006). Press secretary Hank Ferris (Nicholas Pryor), urged on by top political presidential aides, handles a lot of dirty tricks for the White House to give the president a better image and to manipulate the news coverage in the president’s favor, even breaking the law when necessary (Washington Behind Closed Doors, 1977). Campaign adviser (William Devane) will use anything it takes to get his candidate elected, including telling him that he has “good news” – a rival candidate is withdrawing from the race because of his wife’s mastectomy (The President’s Child, 1992). Public relations-press aide Alan Reed (Kevin Dunn) is part of a plot of deception and lies to use a look-alike actor to play the president, who was struck down by a stroke (Dave, 1993). And then, hardly to be taken seriously, there is press secretary Jerry Ross (Martin Short) who advises the president when aliens attack Earth. He ends up helping destroy the world when he invites a prostitute into the White House who turns out to be an alien terrorist (Mars Attacks!, 1996). Press aide Jack Whittier (Dean Stockwell) to the president has a problem: he’s a werewolf and is more concerned with his condition than with the president’s public image, especially after he tries to kill him aboard Air Force One (The Werewolf of Washington, 1973).

Films and TV programs that feature military information officers include See Here, Private Hargrove (1944), Don’t Go Near the Water (1957), Top Secret Affair (1957), Kiss Them for Me (1957), Pork Chop Hill (1959), The Manchurian Candidate (1962), The Americanization of Emily (1964), That Girl: Fly Me To the Moon (1969), Full Metal Jacket (1987), Memphis Belle (1990), NCIS: Corporal Punishment (2007). The officers are usually treated with humor or portrayed as good people. Specific examples include: Journalist Pvt. Marion Hargrove (Robert Walker) and Pvt. Mulvehill (Keenan Wynn) join the public relations staff run by public relations officer (Ray Teal) to stay out of harm’s way (See Hear, Private Hargrove, 1944). Lt. J.G. Max Siegel (Glenn Ford) is part of the PR staff for the Navy commandeered by Lt. Cmdr. Clinton T. Nash (Fred Clark). Another member of the staff, Ens. Tyson (Russ Tamblyn) is ordered to ensure all war correspondents are given everything they need to write positive articles about the war effort (Don’t Go Near the Water, 1957). Army public information officer Col. Gooch (Jim Backus) has his hands full when a magazine editor sets her sights on a war hero who doesn’t want anything to do with publicity (Top Secret Affair, 1957). Public relations officer commander Wallace (Werner Klemperer) is assigned to promote several war heroes who don’t want to be publicized (Kiss Them for Me, 1957). Lt. Cmdr. Paul “Bus” Cummings (James Coburn) and Cmdr Charlie...
Madison (James Garner) are in the Navy’s public information office when they are ordered to make sure the first casualty of D-Day in 1944 is a Navy man. All goes well until the dead Navy man turns out to be very much alive (The Americanization of Emily, 1964). Air Force public relations man Major Brian James (Robert Colbert) creates a campaign to get women into the space program by using “that girl” as a recruiting image (That Girl: Fly Me to the Moon, 1969).

Films and TV programs that feature police public relations officers include City in Fear (1980), The Dead Pool (1988), The District (2000-2001), Monk: Mr Monk and the Blackout (2004), Criminal Minds: 2005-2011, NYPD Blue: Stratis Fear (2005), Blue Bloods: 2011. Specific examples include: Police publicity man Henry Zeller (Mark Lonow) gets in trouble for giving exclusives to a newspaper columnist (City in Fear, 1980). A police public relations man wants a detective to play nice with the news media and not offend reporters, but Dirty Harry Callahan doesn’t care. (The Dead Pool, 1988). Press secretary Nick Pierce (Justin Theroux) works for the Washington, D.C. police department and supports the unorthodox police chief in every way he can (The District, 2001). Police department public relations woman Michelle Rivas (Alicia Coppola) falls for an eccentric detective while working on a case together (Monk: Mr Monk and the Blackout, 2004). Press relations woman Jennifer “J.J.” Jareau (A.J. Cook) acts as the team's liaison with the media and local police agencies for the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) making sure the news media doesn’t get in the way of solving a case (Criminal Minds, 2005-2011). Deputy press secretary Sue Connors (Noelle Beck) works for the Mayor and is in conflict with the police chief. The chief’s own PR man and speech writer Garrett Moore (Gregory Jbara) helps him deal with the inside politics as well as the news media (Blue Bloods, 2011). The worst example of a low-life police information officer is one who is killed almost immediately. Paul Westervile, who is doing PR for the Policeman’s Benevolence Association, is murdered in a parking garage after he has an affair with a paraplegic’s wife (NYPD Blue: Stratis Fear, 2005).


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PR man Richard Stuart (Robert Culp) blackmails his clients for millions of dollars before being shot down in his hotel room (Perry Mason: The Case of the Defiant Daughter, 1990). Bill Gibson (James Hampton), who handles public relations for a nuclear power plant, does what his boss tells him to do even if it means condoning murder. Gibson labels a man who is killed while trying to warn the public of a safety hazard as “an emotionally disturbed employee who was humored just long enough to get the situation under control…yes, he had been drinking.” (The China Syndrome, 1979). Press agent Sid Moore (Keenan Wynn), a womanizing, amoral man, viciously tries to control everyone in his life, using blackmail to secure clients and power (The Great Man 1956). Tom Ferrell (Domenic Cuzzocrea), a womanizing PR practitioner, violates every ethical professional standard before finding the tables are turned on him when he falls for an enigmatic woman (No Angel, 1992). Public relations creative director Julian Wright (Jason Clarke) works to get a rich new client who covets family values. His temper and violence get in his way, destroying everything he has built up as he beats up a rival, almost killing him, and then sends a girlfriend to the hospital (The Human Contract, 2008). Publicist Tracey Green (Sarah Carter) is accused of having a lesbian relationship with her boss Stephanie Rogers (Dana Wheeler-Nicholson) for financial purposes. It turns out they made up the whole thing to get their firm needed publicity. (Boston Legal: It Girls and Beyond, 2005). PR practitioner Dauri Rathbun (Sharon Stone) is a corrupt, sexy, drug addict who sleeps with her lawyer before police come to arrest her for fraud (Huff, 2006). Public relations executive Sheila (Stockard Channing) meets a waiter named Sam (Shaun Evans), uses him as her boy toy and then hires him as her personal assistant. When he get involved with her daughter by accident, she fires him and throws him to the wolves (Sparkle, 2007).

When it comes to being a villain, nothing is worse than picking on children and animals, unless it’s dealing with zombies and aliens. Newspaper publisher Jim Taylor (Edward Arnold) owns the news media in his state and decides what the public should and should not know. He handles his own public relations by sending out goons to beat up the opposition including harassing and physically hurting children (Mr Smith Goes to Washington, 1939). PR man Gilbert Sipes (James Donadio) tries to kill a sweet-faced celebrity pig so he can control the company fortunes (Gordy, 1995). Randi James (Lindsay Frost) who is a public relations executive
for Dante Pharmaceuticals seems to be doing a good job until she turns out to be a disintegrating zombie (Dead Heat, 1988). Crazy public information officer Lt. Col. Dan Lerner (Dirk Benedict) helps cover up the arrival of aliens on Earth by attacking anyone who disagrees with him before he is finally brought to justice (Official Denial, 1994).


Films in which the alcoholic PR man is featured include Murders in the Zoo (1933), Hemingway’s Adventures of a Young Man (1962), Days of Wine and Roses (1962), The Morning After (1974).

In Murders in the Zoo (1933), press agent Peter Yates (Charles Ruggles) gets a job doing public relations for the zoo and is drunk in practically every scene. His alcoholism is played for laughs as he escapes one tricky and occasionally dangerous situation after another. Yates is typical of the popular drunk character of the 1930s before the seriousness of alcoholism was recognized in the movies. In Hemingway’s Adventures of a Young Man (1962), press agent Billy Campbell (Dan Dailey) is always drunk as he goes from town to town to publicize a show before the actors arrive. The young Hemingway tries to take care of him, but the situation is hopeless. Miller, pp. 24-25.
Promoting the Pleasure Dome:  
*Press Agentry and the Promotion of Adolph Sutro’s Tropic Baths*

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*In Xanadu did Kubla Khan  
A stately pleasure dome decree:  
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran  
Through caverns measureless to man  
Down to a sunless sea.*

— Samuel Taylor Coleridge

When the doors of Adolph Sutro's Tropic Baths officially opened in San Francisco in March of 1896, members of the community and of the press held their collective breath to see whether the city's newest recreational attraction would live up to its promise. Encased in glass and perched on the edge of the Pacific Ocean, the Sutro Baths were a veritable wonderland of activity. Seven swimming pools; a gallery filled with exotic curios; fragrant plants and flowering trees; and an amphitheater that could hold thousands of spectators — all were housed under one roof and could be experienced by the average visitor for only ten cents.

Conceived and built by Adolph Sutro, a prominent San Francisco citizen and a one-time mayor of the city, the Sutro Baths marked the pinnacle of Sutro's long and illustrious career, a career that ran the gamut from digging with miners to dining with presidents. Eight years in the making, the Baths fulfilled Sutro's vision of providing the residents of San Francisco with a place of "healthy recreation" (Stewart, 1980, p. 11), one that surpassed in its design all other bathing establishments in the city and perhaps even the world. Yet, despite the indisputable magnificence of the glass-encased natatorium, the initial public reaction to the Baths was a mixture of wonder, curiosity, and skepticism. Some called the Baths a virtual Xanadu by the sea; others referred to them as "Sutro's Folly" (Rubissow, 1993, p.33).

Never before had anyone undertaken such a grandiose project in the City by the Bay. For Sutro, an engineer by trade, the construction of the Baths presented the ultimate challenge of trying to harness Mother Nature — in the form of the Pacific Ocean — while attempting to create an environment that would allow visitors to benefit from her largesse — in the form of salt-water bathing pools. Sutro was banking on his past entrepreneurial successes and his own unwavering confidence in the project to transform the Baths from the vision in his head into the reality of a one-of-a-kind swimming establishment where thousands could relax and rejuvenate.

But Sutro was more than just a visionary. He realized that in order to attract the residents of San Francisco to his Tropic Baths, he needed more than simply the dazzling design of the Baths themselves. As a result, Sutro devised an intricate network of promotional activities to generate
interest in and bring customers to the Baths, promotional activities worthy of the likes of P.T. Barnum and other noted 19th century press agents (Cutlip, 1995). Swimming contests, special events, promotional fliers, free band concerts, and weekly activity programs were among the assortment of promotional gimmicks Sutro used to attract the interest of both the press and the public. Consequently, the Baths received repeated mention in the local San Francisco newspapers and attracted crowds of thousands to partake of the wonders of Sutro's Xanadu by the sea.

This paper suggests that Adolph Sutro's active promotion of the Sutro Baths equaled some of the promotional tactics implemented by well-known press agents of the 19th century and contributed to the successful reception of the Baths by the public and the press. The paper examines the various publicity activities Sutro used to promote the Baths and analyzes how well these techniques worked based on the media coverage they generated.

The literature pertaining to Adolph Sutro and the Sutro Baths is limited to a few biographical volumes and an assortment of newspaper and magazine articles written long after Sutro's death. Information about the Sutro Baths is occasionally included in historical accounts and travel books about San Francisco. A vast amount of material about Adolph Sutro is available in Sutro's personal papers, many of which are now owned by the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley.

In addition, both the San Francisco Public Library and the California Historical Society have numerous original examples of the various promotional pieces used to publicize the Sutro Baths in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The San Francisco Public Library and the Golden Gate National Park Service have an extensive collection of photographs of the Sutro Baths dating from the early 1890s. The California Historical Society also houses a collection of scrapbooks of newspaper articles from the late 1800s about the Sutro Baths. These articles reflect the extensive media coverage that resulted from Sutro's active promotion of the Baths.

This paper will examine Sutro's career prior to the opening of the Sutro Baths, provide an overview of the Baths themselves, and review some of the promotional materials used to publicize the Baths as well as the newspaper articles that resulted from this promotion. It is intended to illustrate how Adolph Sutro's multi-dimensional approach to promoting the Sutro Baths was comparable to some of the promotional activities used by 19th century press agents and contributed to the successful reception of the Sutro Baths by residents of the city of San Francisco.

**Press Agentry of the 19th Century**

To fully appreciate the promotional talents of Adolph Sutro, it is first necessary to place him in context of public relations history by examining the time period in which he lived and the nature of the promotional activities being implemented during this period. Sutro's career spanned the 19th century and coincided with an era when the practice of press agentry flourished in the United States.
Press agentry stemmed largely from the development of the Penny Press in the 1830s. When newspapers became available for a penny apiece, more readers could afford to buy them, and circulations soared. But with a decrease in the cost of the newspapers came an increase in the cost of newspaper advertising. Consequently, many in the promotion business tried to secure free coverage for their clients and business enterprises, often relying on outlandishly exaggerated events and activities to do so. "The object was simply to break into print, often at the expense of truth or dignity" (Newsom, Turk, & Kruckeberg, 1996, p. 40).

Some of these attempts to make news involved elaborate publicity blitzes. When a circus came into a town, for example, its press agents would arrive a week or two ahead of time and plaster the town with signs and handbills promoting the upcoming attraction. The day before the event, the "twenty-four-hour men" would show up to talk to reporters from the local newspapers. Then, according to Fuhrman (1989), "The circus parade, which could be a lavish spectacle involving a cast of thousands, was the final ballyhoo that lured the crowd to the big top" (p.21).

Several 19th century press agents have made their way into the annals of public relations history for the lasting marks they left by way of their promotional astuteness. Ned Buntline, for example, is credited with helping to transform cowboy-performer William Frederick Cody — known as Buffalo Bill — into a Wild West legend in the 1870s by penning dime store novels that portrayed Cody as an all-American hero (Fishwick, 1969). "Arizona John" Burke, who succeeded Buntline as Cody's press agent, continued to perpetuate this illusion by churning out newspaper stories about Cody and cultivating an interest on the part of both the public and the press in Cody's activities. Author Fishwick noted, "All doors were open to him as he described the immortal buffalo hunter. He was welcome in newspaper, railway, and theatrical offices. Even when editors doubted his tales, they printed them.... Burke so infused myth into history that no completely reliable biography of Cody has ever been written or ever will be written" (p. 125).

The most famous of all the 19th century press agents was P.T. Barnum, also known as the Prince of Humbug. Barnum built his career by promoting entertainment and sideshow acts, often using ingeniously creative promotional techniques to garner media attention for these acts and rouse the interest of the public. In 1842, for example, Barnum opened The American Museum in New York City. The museum was a veritable wonderland of eclectic curios and exhibitions, which he described in his autobiography:

Industrious fleas, educated dogs, jugglers, automatons, ventriloquists, living statuary, tableaux, gipsies, albinos, fat boys, giants, dwarfs, rope-dancers, caricatures of phrenology and "live-Yankees," pantomime, instrumental music, singing and dancing in great variety.... Dioramas, panoramas, models of Dublin, Paris, Niagara, Jerusalem, etc., mechanical figures, fancy glassblowing, knitting machines and other triumphs in the mechanical arts. (Barnum, 1855, p. 225)

It was Barnum's aim to make his American Museum a showplace, and he used every publicity trick he could muster to do so. This included hiring a man to lay a trail of bricks leading into the
museum — a gesture that piqued the curiosity of many an onlooker who followed the bricklayer to the museum's door and then purchased a ticket to go in.

Later, in 1850, Barnum introduced soprano Jenny Lind, known as the Swedish Nightingale, to the American public. Lind was an established sensation in Europe but was virtually unknown in the United States. Barnum set out to make Lind's name a household word by launching an advance publicity campaign more than six months before the opera singer's arrival in the U.S. He painted such a romantic portrait of the young woman that when the steamship carrying Lind pulled into New York harbor in September of 1850, she was greeted by thousands of people (Wallace, 1959, p. 131).

Although Adolph Sutro is not recognized as a 19th century press agent, some of the techniques he used to publicize his Tropic Baths draw on the activities of his contemporaries and were as successful in attracting the attention of both the public and press as those used by Buntline, Burke, and Barnum. The next sections of this paper will take a closer look at the promotional talents of Adolph Sutro.

The life of Adolph Sutro

The son of a wealthy clothing merchant, Adolph Joseph Sutro was born in Aachen, Prussia, in 1830, the third of 11 children. His father owned a woolen cloth factory, and from an early age Sutro was fascinated by the machines used to produce the woolen goods and was constantly tinkering with them in an attempt to develop his mechanical and engineering skills. When Sutro was only 16, his father, Emanuel, was seriously injured in a carriage accident, which resulted in his death a year later. With 11 children to care for, Sutro's mother Rosa elected to move the family to America in hopes of better job opportunities, and in 1850, the family set sail for New York.

Sutro, now 20, had his sights set beyond the Eastern seaboard. The lure of the prospect of gold in California called out to him, and soon after arriving in America, he left his family and booked passage to San Francisco. Realizing he could capitalize on the gold rush by catering to the needs of those who had already struck it rich, Sutro set himself up in business as a commission merchant, buying and selling dry goods. He eventually opened a store of his own, and by 1854, he owned three tobacco shops in San Francisco's growing financial district (Stewart & Stewart, 1962).

By 1860, the quest for gold and silver had expanded into Nevada, and Sutro, intrigued by the possibilities for business opportunities there, left San Francisco and moved to Virginia City, Nevada. Working conditions for the miners at the time were perilous and precarious, as mine accidents were a routine part of the quest for riches. Realizing this, Sutro conceived the idea of building a mine tunnel that would allow for improved drainage and ventilation, enable ore to be mined at deeper levels, and provide an escape route, if needed, for miners in distress. While his idea was initially well-received by the owners of the local mining companies and the bankers financing their ventures, the enthusiasm for Sutro's project was short-lived. As these individuals realized that Sutro's idea would bring him far
greater profits than it would them, they withdrew their pledges of financial support, engaging in a political struggle with Sutro over the tunnel that lasted five years (Lyman, 1937).

It may well have been this experience that taught Sutro the power of publicity. From 1864 to 1869, Sutro tried every method he could think of to raise money for the tunnel, from lobbying Congress in Washington, D.C., for government funding, to approaching European investors for financial assistance. In 1866, Sutro wrote a pamphlet about the tunnel, which he distributed to potential financiers in New York, and which appeared to create quite a stir in the business community (Sutro, 1866).

But the turning point came in 1869, when a fire swept through the Yellow Jacket Mine in Virginia City, Nevada, killing 45 miners. Enlisting the support of the Virginia and Gold Hill Miners' union, Sutro gave a public speech to union members, advocating the need for his tunnel to ensure the prevention of similar tragedies in the future. The speech was reprinted on the front page of the Virginia City Territorial Enterprise two days later, resulting in an outpouring of financial support for the project; by the end of the year, construction on the tunnel was underway. Riding this publicity wave, on the day the ground was to be broken for the tunnel, according to biographers Robert and Mary Stewart, "Adolph Sutro...used newspaper advertisements and other means to invite the entire population of Nevada and California to witness the historic act. There would then be a giant barbecue followed by a ball" (Stewart & Stewart, 1962, p. 81).

The Sutro Tunnel was completed in 1878, and soon after, having achieved his goal, Sutro sold his tunnel stock for $700,000 and returned to San Francisco. Armed with both substantial wealth and a national reputation, Sutro embarked on the next phase of his career — that of real estate mogul.

By the late 1870s, much of San Francisco's land was still largely undeveloped, particularly the area near the Pacific Ocean, which consisted primarily of sand dunes. In 1881, while out on a carriage ride through this part of town with his daughter, Emma, Sutro came upon the home of Samuel Tetlow — a small cottage at the western edge of the city, perched on a hill overlooking Point Lobos at the Pacific Ocean. He was so enchanted with the cottage and its surroundings that he purchased it on the spot for $15,000. He named the house "Sutro Heights" and installed elaborate, park-like gardens on the land surrounding the house. Sutro opened these gardens to the general public, encouraging visitors to stroll around the grounds and take in the ocean view. Sutro also did a great deal of entertaining at the Heights, playing host to such notables as William Jennings Bryan, Andrew Carnegie, Oscar Wilde, and President Benjamin Harrison (Stewart & Stewart, 1962, p. 198).

Eventually, Sutro began buying up large parcels of the surrounding real estate near the Pacific Ocean. His acquisitions included the Cliff House, a dining establishment with a seedy reputation just down the road from Sutro Heights, which he rebuilt and transformed into a family-oriented resort constructed in an ornate, Victorian gingerbread style. It is estimated that with all his real estate purchases, Sutro ultimately owned approximately 1/12 of San Francisco's land (Pierce, 1995, p. 203).
It was at this point that Sutro's idea for the Tropic Baths began to take root. Sutro spent much of his leisure time at Point Lobos, observing the seals out on the rocks just off the shoreline and watching the waves create tidal pools on the water's edge. He decided that this would be the perfect spot for an aquarium, which he could open to the public in order to offer San Francisco residents a close-up view of the native sea life. Sutro commenced work on this project in 1887, but he soon hatched an even grander scheme. Instead of building a pool where people could watch fish swim, he surmised, why not build one where they could swim themselves?

As a local railroad company ran a railway line from downtown to the Point Lobos area, he concluded that visitors could easily reach such a place by public transportation. And so the notion of a bathhouse right on the ocean began to take hold in Sutro's mind. As one of his biographers noted, "The Sutro Baths were Sutro's last building project, his last effort to name something for his family and perpetuate the name 'Sutro.' In many ways, the baths were a summation of all of Sutro's objectives" (Stewart, 1980, p. 189).

**Adolph Sutro's Tropic Baths**

From the beginning, Sutro recognized the importance of involving the public in his vision for the Baths in order to make them a success. Upon announcing his decision to construct the Baths in 1888, Sutro offered a $500 prize for the best design for the structure. The winning result came from architects, C.J. Colley and Emil S. Lemme, who had also designed Sutro’s Cliff House in 1895 (Blaisdell, 1987, p. 2). The design featured a glass-encased pavilion that was to house six salt-water bathing pools and one fresh-water tank.

Sutro supervised every detail of the construction of the Baths, from the pouring of the concrete to the hiring of the company chosen to manufacture the more than 15,000 bathing suits that were to be rented out to patrons. (For sanitary purposes, customers were not allowed to bring their own swimsuits or towels to the Baths. The cost of admission included the rental of a swimsuit, towel, and locker.) (Sutro, date unknown).

When they were completed in 1894, the Baths themselves were a wonder to behold. The largest of the seven pools was an L-shaped tank, stretching 300 feet in length and 175 feet in width. This pool contained sea water maintained at ocean temperature. Five smaller pools, approximately 75 feet in length, were heated to varying degrees, with the warmest kept at 80 degrees and known as "the soup bowl" (Flamm, 1977, p. 98). The seventh pool was a fresh-water tank called the "freezing pool" and was designed for only the most stalwart of swimmers (Jackson, 1993, p. 120).

A variety of water accessories were available for use by the bathers. One author, writing at the time the Baths were built, described them: "Spring-boards, toboggan slides, trapezes, bars, swings, and all purchasable paraphernalia, are provided for the promotion of aquatic sports, and afford agreeable access to the water" (Holmes, 1895, p. 42). The water for the pools was pumped into the bathhouse through an innovative engineering device conceived by Sutro. A catch basin collected the water from
the ocean as the tide flowed in through an underwater tunnel, and water was then pumped into the pools twice a day during low tide. The fresh-water pool was replenished by a nearby spring (Flamm, 1977, p. 98).

But, the Sutro Baths were much more than just a collection of salt-water swimming pools. Adolph Sutro designed his aquatic palace to be a total aesthetic experience that could be enjoyed by swimmers and non-swimmers alike. Visitors to the Baths entered through a small, Greek-style facade and descended a grand staircase that cascaded over three levels, which were adorned with lush greenery: "broad-leaved palms, the flowering pomegranate, fragrant magnolias and the lance-like arms of the reaching maguay" (Holmes, 1895, p. 42). Off to the side of the entrance was a gallery filled with exotic curios and exhibits similar to those on display at P.T. Barnum's American Museum. As one author described:

> There were Aztec pots and Chinese swords, a piece of lava and 19 fans, a bird collection and an Indian skull, even the stump of a palm tree under which the fabled English explorer Captain Cook was killed. Stuffed animals looked back at visitors with glassy eyes: 60 parrots, a polar bear, a giant anaconda snake wrapped around a ferocious jaguar. Perhaps most curious was Mr. Ito, a lifelike self-portrait by a Japanese artist complete with hair plucked from his own body. Sutro referred to these treasures as "bric-a-brac that will help install in the minds of youthful visitors a desire for learning." (Rubissow, 1993, p. 34)

The entire facility was encased in 100,000 panes of glass, making it "the largest glass-roofed building in the world" (Flamm, 1977, p. 96). Balconies and promenades enabled visitors to stroll around the premises. Three restaurants offered patrons refreshments. Five hundred dressing rooms provided bathers with a place to change into their swimsuits; a nearby laundry room could wash 20,000 suits and 40,000 towels each day. Just outside the entrance to the Baths, an assortment of amusement rides beckoned: "the Firth Wheel, the Mystic Maze, the Haunted Swing — all veterans of the 1894 Midwinter Fair in nearby Golden Gate Park" (Blaisdell, 1987, p.2).

But the pièce de résistance of the Sutro Baths was an amphitheater that surrounded the salt-water pools and could accommodate up to 25,000 spectators. One author noted, "This was the core of Sutro's dream palace of pleasure, entertainment, and culture. Tier after tier of seats lined the east side of the hall, facing the windows which looked west out onto the ocean" (Flamm, 1977, p. 96). For it was this public viewing area that Sutro planned to make the most use of, by offering a myriad of special events and programs to the public as part of an elaborate publicity campaign intended to attract customers to and garner media attention for his vast aquatic playground.

### Publicizing the Sutro Baths

In the six years that passed between Sutro's original conception of the Baths, in 1888, and their completion, in 1894, public curiosity and interest in the project began to grow. Many local residents wrote to Sutro prior to the opening of the natatorium, seeking employment at the Baths (Sutro, date unknown). However, Sutro knew that the public's initial intrigue with the Baths would die down, and
that it would take more than just curiosity to keep the crowds coming once the facility officially opened. But then a twist of events in mid-1894 severely altered Sutro's plans for the grand opening of the Baths.

The Southern Pacific Railroad owned the railway line that traversed San Francisco and delivered passengers to Sutro Heights and the nearby Sutro Baths. At the time the Baths were completed, the one-way railway fare was ten cents, which Sutro thought was too high. He approached the owners of the railroad and asked them to lower their fare to five cents. When they refused, Sutro decided to construct his own railway line to the Baths, electing to delay the opening of the Baths for two years until this railroad was completed. While on one hand this seemed like an extremely egotistical gesture on Sutro's part, on another it actually worked in his favor by earning him the support of the public for taking a stand against the railroad (Stewart & Stewart, 1962, p. 199).

As a result of this stand, Sutro was asked to run for mayor of San Francisco in late 1894, a race he easily won, thanks to the public endorsement he had earned as a result of his battle with the railroad. Once in office, however, he was less successful, as his hands-on management style, which had served him well in his various business enterprises, proved less popular in the political arena. By 1896, Sutro's railway line was completed, his short-lived mayoral career was winding to a close, and he was ready to open his long-anticipated aquatic pleasure dome.

Both the public and the press had been eagerly awaiting the grand opening of the Baths, which took place on March 14, 1896. In anticipation of the big event, Sutro placed an advertisement in the San Francisco Call, announcing the grand opening of "Sutro's Coney Island," featuring an "athletic exhibition by the Olympic Club" and "concert by Cassassa's California Exposition Band" (Advertisement, 1896). The day before the opening, numerous articles appeared in local newspapers such as the San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco Bulletin, and San Francisco Daily Record, heralding the long-awaited event (California Historical Society, date unknown).

March 14, 1896, was a cold, blustery day at the Pacific Ocean. Nonetheless, a crowd of spectators filed into the amphitheater for the grand opening of the Sutro Baths. The San Francisco Examiner reported:

Nearly 7,000 people gathered at the immense pavilion yesterday to witness the dedication of the magnificent structure which Adolph Sutro has built on his lands near the ocean. Addresses were made by the Mayor...and others from a platform out in the middle of the largest tank in the bathhouse. After the speeches the tanks were given over to the bathers (Scene, 1896).

The San Francisco Call also reported the opening and printed part of Sutro's speech to the crowds. In welcoming visitors to his aquatic wonderland, Sutro said:

I would express the hope that these baths may serve to extend the reputation and fame of our fair city — may prove a source of health-giving amusement to our men and women, to our boys and girls, and fit them for the struggle of life. I now declare the baths open. (Great Baths, 1896)
From the moment the Baths opened, Sutro implemented an array of promotional activities designed to maintain the high level of public and press enthusiasm displayed at the grand opening. To begin with, Sutro hired a band to perform at the Baths every afternoon and evening, that patrons would be treated to musical entertainment as they swam in the pools or strolled around the grounds of the pavilion (Sutro, date unknown). The band performed from 1:30-5:00 p.m., and again from 8:00-10:30 p.m. A typical concert program included a selection of marches, polkas, waltzes, and operatic medleys (Official Programme, 1896). From time to time, Sutro hired musical director Fritz Scheel and his orchestra to perform at the Baths. Scheel was a German conductor who had traveled throughout Europe with his own orchestra (Official Programme, 1897).

Every Sunday afternoon, Sutro sponsored a series of swimming races and contests at the Baths. It was the innovative nature of these events that perhaps most obviously reflects his talent for promotion and publicity. The contests ran the gamut from simple 50- and 100-yard swimming races to more elaborate, themed competitions that often featured locally known athletes. The most off-the-wall of these was likely the "doughnut race," a 50-yard swimming competition with one quirky requirement: each swimmer had to consume six doughnuts before getting into the water (Official Programme, 1896).

Sutro occasionally invited well-known swimming champions to perform for the crowds at the Baths. An article in the San Francisco Examiner reported on swimmer Clyde Hawthorne's achievement in breaking the 100-yard record by swimming the distance in 1 minute and 5 seconds; 3/5 of a second faster than Don Renear, the previous record holder (Swiftest of Swimmers, 1896). Australian swimmer, Charles Cavill, was a frequent guest at the Baths and often attracted media attention by exhibiting some of his unusual swimming talents. For example, both the San Francisco Examiner (Cavill, 1896) and the San Francisco Chronicle (Swam, 1896) reported on Cavill's three-mile swim around Seal Rock, in the area of the Pacific Ocean just outside the Sutro Baths.

Sutro was also quite adept at organizing contests that would generate pre-event media coverage because of their unusual themes. In May of 1897, local newspapers reported that a "diving for gold" contest would be held at the Sutro Baths (California Historical Society, date unknown). Four $5 gold pieces were to be scattered on the bottom of the largest swimming tank; bathers could test out their diving skills by trying to retrieve the gold coins. A handful of silver coins would also be tossed into one of the smaller tanks for children to retrieve. The day before the event, the San Francisco Bulletin reported: "Everyone who can dive and swim under the water stands a good show to carry away one of the four gold pieces that will be thrown into the large tank" (Gold, 1897). The name of the winner was also reported by the media the day after the contest (Diving, 1897).

Some of Sutro's programs dazzled spectators with their imaginative content. One of these was a performance by "Professor Baker," who descended into the water fully clothed, holding a gunnysack in one hand. While underwater, the professor managed to slip out of his street clothes and into his bathing attire. A prize was offered to anyone who could find his clothes or the gunnysack.
Other attractions included Charmian, "the greatest girl aerialist in the world," Professor Karl, the "Anthropic Amphibian, who eats, drinks, smokes, writes and sleeps under water," and Jack, the "highest diving dog in the world" (Blaisdell, 1987, p. 3).

In addition to the regular weekly attractions, Sutro initiated a series of events to denote holidays or special occasions. An annual May Day festival, for instance, featured a May pole dance, crowning of the May Queen, and musical performances by local musicians. As reported, "Seven thousand parents cheered from the misty upper galleries at the first annual May Day festival in 1897" (Johnson & Reinhardt, 1979, p. 180). The Fourth of July was often celebrated with large-scale pageants — one year it was a Venetian water carnival, another, a salute to volunteers serving in the Spanish American War (Fitzsimmons, date unknown).

Most of these activities received extensive coverage by the local press. The California Historical Society houses a collection of scrapbooks containing hundreds of newspaper clippings that reflect the local newspaper coverage of the variety of contests, programs, and special events held at the Sutro Baths (California Historical Society, date unknown).

To complement these events, Sutro arranged for the production of numerous fliers, pamphlets, and event programs that were used to promote these activities to the public. Some of the fliers he produced featured promotional information about specific upcoming events, while others included more general information about the hours of the baths and the price of admission. Some, particularly those used to promote swimming contests, contained such catch phrases as, "Chance to win Valuable Prizes" and "Swimming Races and Trick Diving of every Description." Many of these fliers can be found in the Sutro Baths Collection at the San Francisco Public Library main branch (San Francisco Public Library, date unknown).

One of Sutro's more ingenious promotional tools for the Baths was a weekly, four-page program that was given to every patron who visited the aquatic pavilion on Sunday afternoons when many of the swimming contests and special events took place. Printed on newsprint, this program generally included an agenda of race activities for the day; a list of the musical pieces to be played by the band; descriptive information about the Baths; and an assortment of paid advertisements from local merchants. Admission costs for the Baths were prominently displayed on the program: 10¢ for spectators and 25¢ for bathers. Often a list of the winners of the previous week's races was included as well.

Many of the advertisements contained in these programs came from local companies who provided services to the Baths. Regular advertisers included the J.J. Pfister Knitting Company, which produced the swimsuits rented to Sutro Baths' patrons; Louis Roesch Co., which printed the promotional fliers for Baths events; and Coos Bay Coal, which supplied the fuel used to heat the smaller swimming tanks (San Francisco Public Library, date unknown).

Finally, in order to ensure that the awareness of the Sutro Baths remained high in the minds of his potential customers, Sutro ran regular, paid newspaper advertisements in many of the local
papers. Some of these were used to promote special events; others were simply intended to provide
general information about the Baths to the public. These ads were about two inches high and
couraged readers, for instance, to "Take a Swim [at] Our Seaside Resort" (Advertisement, May
1896), while including basic information about hours of operation and admission costs.

Adolph Sutro's intensive promotion of the Sutro Baths was highly successful, and many of
the activities he initiated were continued into the early 1900s, even after his death. As a result of this
promotion, one author has noted, "Thousands of people jammed the Baths on weekends" (Rubissow,
1993, p. 34). Another indicated that as many as 10,000 visitors in a single day had passed through
the entrance to the Baths (Stewart, 1980, p. 11). But, Sutro's personal involvement with the Baths was to
be short-lived; for only two years after the official opening of the Sutro Baths, Adolph Sutro died,
leaving the fate of his aquatic palace to his heirs.

Life after Sutro

When Sutro's mayoral term came to a close at the beginning of 1897, he retired to his home at Sutro
Heights. With an illustrious career behind him and his Tropic Baths up and running smoothly, he was
able to spend his days along the stretch of the Pacific Ocean near his home. But by the end of 1897,
there were rumors that Sutro's mind had begun to deteriorate, and today it is thought that Sutro might
have suffered from Alzheimer's disease in his final days (Jackson, 1993, p. 120). Adolph Sutro died at
his daughter Emma's home on August 8, 1898, at the age of 68, just over two years after the official
opening of the Sutro Baths. His death was reported in newspapers all over the country. As one
California paper acknowledged:

The death of ex-Mayor Sutro removes one of the most prominent figures of the State. He was
a man of great public spirit, immense strength of will, who has left his impress upon the
community in which he lived (Salinas Index, 1898).

For a decade or so after Sutro's death, the operation of the Baths continued in the same
manner as it had under Sutro's tutelage. The contests, special events, and programs continued to
attract crowds to the pavilion at the ocean's edge. But Sutro's heirs lacked his passion for the
enterprise. When the bathhouse began losing money, they tried, unsuccessfully, to sell the Sutro
Baths to the city of San Francisco. In 1937, Sutro's grandson converted the largest of the seven
swimming tanks into an ice skating rink, but the revenues were still not enough to sustain the
operation. One author explained: "By the late '40s the baths were running a $15,000 annual deficit
and looked it: Paint was peeling everywhere, moss grew on some of the walls" (Jackson, 1993, p.
120).

Sutro's heirs closed the swimming tanks shortly after the end of World War II, retaining only the
ice rink and the museum of exotic curios. In early 1966, plans were announced to sell the Baths to a local
developer, who planned to raze the building and construct a hotel and shopping complex on the site.
Before this happened, however, a fire of mysterious origin finished off the Sutro Baths in June of 1966. One writer remembered:

As smoke billowed hundreds of feet into the sky, diners at the nearby Cliff House stood at the window to gaze in sorrow while 30,000 others jammed the beach to watch as one of the City's most familiar sights was reduced to ashes. Sutro Baths was no more (Brill, 1974).

In 1980, the National Park Service bought the land where the Sutro Baths once stood and incorporated it into the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, along with the Cliff House and Sutro Heights Park, the remaining land that had originally surrounded Sutro's beloved cottage overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Today, visitors to the ruins of the Sutro Baths can climb on the rocks that once supported Sutro's magnificent glass-encased pavilion. The outlines of the six salt-water pools are still visible, and it is not hard to imagine the thousands of visitors who splashed in the salt-water tanks, strolled down the promenades, and came to watch the dozens of programs and events Sutro devised to promote his stately pleasure dome by the sea.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show how Adolph Sutro's creative promotion of the Sutro Baths equaled similar promotional efforts used by P.T. Barnum and his contemporaries and contributed to Sutro's success in generating interest in the Sutro Baths on the part of both the public and the press. As evidenced by the various publicity activities Sutro used and by the newspaper articles that reported on these activities, Adolph Sutro was able to secure the attention he sought for his Tropic Baths.

When Sutro first conceived the idea for a bathhouse by the sea in 1888, his vision might have seemed far-fetched to many San Francisco residents. After all, nothing like the Sutro Baths had ever been proposed — let alone built — in the city before. Even as Sutro began realizing his dream and supervising the actual construction of the Baths, he knew that in order to make the dream a successful reality, he would need to work diligently to promote his Tropic Baths to both the potential customers he hoped to attract and the local media who could help him generate interest in his aquatic palace. By using promotional techniques and gimmicks similar to those developed by 19th century press agents, Adolph Sutro was able to do just that.

From the beginning, Sutro sought to develop a deliberate, varied roster of promotional activities that would help him maintain this support in order to make the Baths a successful venture. This roster of activities included the development of entertainment programs, sponsorship of contests and competitions, hosting of special events, creation of promotional fliers and weekly event programs, and regular placement of advertisements in local newspapers. All of these planned promotional activities brought Sutro the media attention he sought for the Baths and ultimately the crowds he needed to keep them filled with bathers and spectators. Overall, by using an array of promotional techniques similar to those practiced by 19th century press agents, Adolph Sutro proved highly successful in promoting and publicizing his Tropic Baths to the residents of San Francisco.
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From the Last Frontier to the New Cosmopolitan:
A History of Casino Public Relations in Las Vegas

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Introduction

In the movie “Casino,” loosely based on the real-life story of Las Vegas casino owner Frank “Lefty” Rosenthal, Robert DeNiro’s Ace Rothstein comes to Las Vegas to run the fictional Tangiers casino. There’s just one problem: Ace is a noted gambler and bookie who has run afoul of the law on several occasions. Even in the rough and tumble heyday of 1970s Las Vegas, Ace knows he won’t be given a gambling license. The hidden “money” behind the casino, a Chicago mobster, suggests that Ace give himself a fictional job title that won’t tie him to the casino’s gaming function. And so Ace Rothstein becomes the Director of Public Relations for the Tangiers Casino.

Ace Rothstein’s work at the fictional Tangiers resembles nothing like what we know as public relations, but this raises the question: What role did public relations play in the promotion of Las Vegas’s hotel-casinos? This research seeks to chronicle the history of public relations by the gaming/tourism industry in Las Vegas. Overall, the definition of the term “public relations” has changed over the years, and a practice that was once limited to disseminating information via the mass media has evolved into one that utilizes a broad range of communication media to connect with interested publics. Similarly, public relations efforts by the casinos and hotels in this popular tourist destination have used a variety of communication tactics over time to promote themselves to potential Las Vegas tourists.

The history of the Las Vegas gaming industry, and the industry’s focus on promoting the city’s attractions to out-of-town tourists, provide an unusual and challenging context for a history of its public relations practices. As the industry and its targeted markets have evolved over the years, the use of communication to build relationships with these target publics has understandably changed as well. Communication used to promote the casino industry and the “Las Vegas experience” has also been dramatically influenced by changes in technology, most recently the evolution of social media as a direct-to-consumer communication tool.

This research examines the evolution of public relations efforts in the Las Vegas gaming industry in order to provide context for future study of the contemporary use of new communication technologies, specifically social media, by the corporations in this industry. An understanding of the history of public relations in this industry will help inform present-day research by providing background on the kind of efforts that have previously been undertaken to promote casinos, gambling, and the Las Vegas experience.
This industry-specific history will also provide an in-depth look at how public relations practices have evolved and been affected by environmental factors. By considering contextual factors such as the history of Las Vegas and its casino gaming industry, as well as economic pressures that have influenced the industry, this research will provide a fully informed and well-rounded picture of how public relations efforts have influenced the development of this tourist mecca and American cultural icon.

In 1905, the city of Las Vegas, NV was an unremarkable town, centered around a small train depot, in the middle of an unrelenting desert. Just over one hundred years later, Las Vegas is a controversial icon of U.S. success and excess. As the only U.S. city founded after 1900 to reach a population of over 1 million, Las Vegas has played an interesting and integral role in the development of the modern United States landscape. Its iconic casinos and hotels are recognized by people all over the world for their depictions of world landmarks such as the pyramids of Egypt and Paris’s Eiffel Tower. Few people recognize, however, the role played by public relations in developing, promoting, and popularizing this town as an “oasis in the desert” and a destination for generations of tourists.

**Literature Review**

**Settlement and early history of Las Vegas**

Originally a small Mormon settlement, and later an equally small railroad town, Las Vegas began to grow as workers on the Boulder Dam (later the Hoover Dam, built from 1931-1935) came to its friendly environs to escape the strict regulations of the workers’ residence town, Boulder City. Gambling was legalized in Nevada by the state legislature in 1931, but both gambling and drinking were strictly forbidden in Boulder City. Dam workers would frequently pick up their paychecks and head straight for Las Vegas, where both vices were legal (M. Land & B. Land, 1999). Almost since the town’s inception, Las Vegas’s economy has been based on gambling and associated with vice.

When the steady stream of gamblers from the dam project dried up after the structure was completed in 1935, many thought the town of Las Vegas would dry up as well. But several far-sighted entrepreneurs saw in Las Vegas a potential tourist destination for those drawn by the lure of legalized gambling. Some of these early hoteliers and casino owners were legitimate businessmen, often from the West Coast, but many of them came from places as far away as Chicago, Cleveland, and New York and had ties to those cities’ largest Mafia families. As the building boom began and hotel-casinos began springing up along Highway 97, later to be known as the Las Vegas Strip, city residents welcomed the prosperity and turned a blind eye to the Mafia connections of the casinos’ owners (Ferrari & Ives, 2005).
From mobsters to quasi-legitimate businessmen

Many of these Mob-connected casino owners were colorful, iconic characters whose presence dominated the early history of the town. In the 1940s and 1950s, they were not unwelcome; in fact, many believed that the unofficial “system” of mob justice helped discourage crime and petty theft in the town (M. Land & B. Land, 1999). Moreover, these mobsters were good for business and for the development of Las Vegas into a viable city rather than a railroad-stop town. By building increasingly large hotel-casinos on previously undeveloped land on the Strip, they brought jobs and tax revenue into the local economy (Rothman, 2002). Many Las Vegans welcomed even the dubious notoriety these mobsters’ presence and prominence in the local economy brought to the town (M. Land & B. Land, 1999).

The Howard Hughes era

As officials looked to clean up their city’s image in the wake of Senator Estes Kefauver’s investigations into organized crime in Las Vegas, the early mobster/casino owners eventually wore out their welcome in the city. In their place rose Las Vegas’s next larger-than-life figure – reclusive billionaire Howard Hughes, who purchased the Desert Inn in 1967. Although a respectable businessman like Hughes seemed to be an answer to reformers’ prayers, by that point he was already a bit of an oddball. However unconventional Hughes’s personal and business practices might have been, this era in casino ownership provided a transition to later phases of corporatization and conglomeration.

Hughes’s impact on Las Vegas was swift and significant. After he purchased the Desert Inn, he continued to purchase surrounding casino properties, making it clear that he intended to stay in Las Vegas for an extended time. Local leaders must have been delighted at Hughes’s grandiose vision for Southern Nevada:

Less than a year after he set up quarters in the Desert Inn, Hughes issued a statement to Southern Nevadans. He was going to improve the face of the Silver State. He promised to help diversify the economy by creating industry of the sort that had made him rich and famous.

Hughes painted a future in which Las Vegas would become a clean, bright, shining city in the sun. “We can make a really super environment: no smog, no contamination, efficient local government, where the taxpayers pay as little as possible and get something for their money,” Hughes wrote in a memo. (Smith, 2005, pp. 80-81)

Due in part to Hughes’s declining health and increasing eccentricities, his vision for Las Vegas was never realized.

When Hughes departed Las Vegas in 1970, the city was once more left to its own devices. Into the void of power created by the absence of Hughes’s overwhelming influence came a new breed of casino owners: entrepreneurial businessmen looking to cash in on Las Vegas’s ability to draw tourists willing to part with their money (Smith, 2005). Although brief, Hughes’s involvement in the
evolution of the Las Vegas casino industry brought a marked change in the amount of capital that developers were able to access for building improvement and expansion, construction of new casinos, and purchase of existing casinos. This change foreshadowed the coming trend of casino ownership by corporate interests, which were able to access far more capital than their predecessors from organized crime.

**Corporatization of gaming in Las Vegas**

The 1970s also saw the beginnings of the corporatization of the gaming industry in Las Vegas. Hilton Hotel owners Barron and Conrad Hilton successfully lobbied the Nevada Gaming Commission to change its rules on casino ownership, paving the way for corporations with multiple stockholders to acquire gaming licenses without requiring background checks for every investor (Ferrari & Ives, 2005). Many hotel chains, such as Holiday Inn and Ramada Inns, tried their hands in the Las Vegas hotel-casino business, but ultimately most were not well suited to gaming endeavors, and they sold their interests in Las Vegas (Gottdiener, Collins, & Dickens, 1999).

However, the face of the Las Vegas gaming industry was irrevocably changed by this revision to the Gaming Commission’s regulation. Potential casino owners now had the option of raising capital by offering stock shares in a publicly held corporation rather than relying on private financing. This ability to raise large amounts of capital made the old model of casinos funded and run by organized crime “financially obsolete” (Rothman, 2002, p. 22). In addition, public corporations could purchase casinos, once they had been approved for a gaming license, and having done so once, many corporations continued to buy and sell casino operations in Las Vegas and elsewhere (Gottdiener, Collins, & Dickens, 1999). The post-Hughes era of development in Las Vegas showed a strong trend toward incorporation and conglomeration.

Corporate investment was slow to take off because of the stigma of casino gambling: crime-ridden, mobbed-up, and socially unacceptable to the mainstream. To put it another way, “The general view on Wall Street was that the casino industry wasn’t nice. Investors would rather buy tobacco stocks” (Binkley, 2008, p. 22). Loans given by the Teamsters’ Union in the 1970s to casino-hotel operators to build large resorts including Caesars Palace and Circus Circus laid the groundwork by “legitimizing” these endeavors as worthy of investment, even though there was some shadiness with respect to the dealings between operators and notorious Teamsters’ Union president Jimmy Hoffa (Schwartz, 2003, p. 110).

It would be the 1990s, though, before Wall Street investors caught on to the potential for profit in Las Vegas gambling stocks, later sanitized and called “gaming” stocks to reflect a greater mainstream acceptance of gambling as an acceptable recreational pastime (Rothman, 2002). This greater acceptance could be attributed to a somewhat-misguided attempt, early in the city’s mega-resort development era, to turn Las Vegas into a family-friendly vacation destination (Binkley, 2008).
Once the gaming industry became corporatized, it paved the way for the staggering growth in the Strip casino-hotels, and by extension in the city, of the period beginning with the opening of the Mirage in 1989. In this way, “the publicly accepted truism that the corporations had driven out mob interests and made gaming respectable, which was a powerful idea that itself served to legitimize the industry, camouflaged the true crisis that corporations had solved, that of capital” (Schwartz, 2003, p. 163).

Corporate ownership brought pressure on the gaming corporations to generate the steady, predictable profit streams acceptable to investors and shareholders (Binkley, 2008). This has led to significant changes in the casino industry as gaming corporations attempted to create more consistent cash flows through non-gambling expenditures (Stein, 2004). For instance, after gaming revenues declined significantly following the 2008 economic crash, gaming corporations turned to new communication technologies, such as Facebook and Twitter, in order to promote their products in new and different ways (Schwartz, 2010).

In early 21st-century Las Vegas, the trends towards corporatization and conglomeration first seen in the 1970s have reached their high point. Three corporations primarily own the casinos that make up Las Vegas’s Strip: MGM Mirage, Caesars (formerly Harrah’s) Entertainment, and Wynn Resorts (Binkley, 2008). A fourth, Shelden Adelson’s Las Vegas Sands Corporation, owns two of the Strip’s largest high-end properties, the Venetian and the Palazzo, in addition to other gambling properties overseas. Two other gaming corporations own a number of casino properties in Las Vegas: Boyd Gaming, which also owns properties in Atlantic City and the Midwest, and Station Casinos, which owns and operates 10 “off-Strip” casinos in the Las Vegas metropolitan area which largely cater to a local audience.

**History of Modern Public Relations**

Most public relations histories portray the modern practice of the profession as one that has ancient roots dating back well back into the BC era. These histories often divide modern public relations history into distinct chronological periods for didactic purposes, and although the periods do vary in length and labeling, all generally provide “a development from manipulative beginnings to symmetric communication” (Hoy, Raaz, & Wehmeier, 2007, p. 197). Although there is no standardization of the history or chronological periods through which the profession evolved, the time period being examined in this research (post-World War II to the present) is commonly acknowledged as the “modern” era of public relations, separate from the primitive media relations practiced by Ivy Lee and the manipulation of public opinion ascribed to Edward Bernays (e.g., Cutlip, Center & Broom, 2006; Seitel, 2004; Wilcox & Cameron, 2006).

Although there has not been a comprehensive history of the use of the press release by public relations practitioners, most seem to agree that the practice originated when Ivy Lee responded to a
train crash involving Pennsylvania Railroad—then one of Lee’s clients in the early practice of corporate public relations—in 1906. Lee’s early work with corporations such as Pennsylvania Railroad and John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil focused almost exclusively on placing positive stories about his clients in the newspaper, which at that point was the primary way that most people received their news (O’Brien, 2005).

The press release, along with the media relations component of the practice of public relations, has been influenced over time by the change in mass media and communication technologies. The widespread use of the press release—and some might say its value—diminished with the introduction of the World Wide Web as a communication tool for public relations practitioners. A 2000 study showed that use of the Web for public relations purposes, while still minor in the public relations practitioner’s list of priorities, could help demonstrate the organization’s technological aptitude, supplement traditional media relations, help the organization reach new audiences, and build relationships (Hill & White, 2000).

Over time, Web sites became valuable tools for organizations to use to provide a nearly unlimited amount of information to audiences such as news media (Callison, 2003). In fact, some industry pundits have even taken to proclaiming the “death of the press release” (Dumenco, 2010), due to the Internet’s ability to distribute information more efficiently to publics, especially when social media are used effectively. Using these communication technologies allows organizations to reach their publics directly, eliminating the need to use the media as an intervening public.

The Web also began to be used for the purposes of invoking and promoting dialogue between organizations and their publics (Kent & Taylor, 1998), opening a new line of direct-to-consumer communication that had previously been unavailable to organizations, forcing them to communicate through intervening publics such as the media. With this evolution into “Web 2.0,” organizations were able to solicit feedback and interact with publics through tools such as blogs and, later, social media.

**Research Questions**

**RQ1:** How is public relations practiced by Las Vegas casinos?

**RQ2:** How has this practice changed over time?

**Method**

Research for this project was completed in the archive at the UNLV Special Collections Library during two weeks in March 2012. The researcher examined public relations and promotions archival material from 34 individual casinos and gaming corporations and took notes pertaining to common themes that arose in the materials. Seven trends were identified in the examination of the materials: an evolution from cooperation among individual casino properties to the corporate ownership and cross-promotion of multiple casinos; the use of various tactics to differentiate casinos from competitors in a
growing market; the market-specific evolution and use of the publicity stunt; the changing use of media relations, including press releases and increasingly elaborate press kits and promotional materials, by casinos; the increasing use of public relations agencies by casinos; and the changing trends in direct-to-consumer communication through magazines, brochures, newsletters, and ultimately social media.

Because this research focused on the topic of public relations in the casino industry, it faced a few challenges and limitations related to this focus. Due to the unique nature of the casino industry, it is often difficult to distinguish between efforts at public relations, advertising, and marketing. Hashimoto (2008) identifies public relations and publicity of one of four components to a casino’s marketing and promotion strategy, the other three being personal sales (i.e. group sales), sales promotion (i.e. tournaments and junkets) and advertising. In order to comprehensively consider public relations in the casino industry, this research cast a fairly wide net in considering actions and artifacts that could be part of this endeavor. The researcher also considered the broader definition of public relations as relationship building and maintenance in order to be inclusive of all potential public relations efforts undertaken by the casinos in the Las Vegas gaming industry.

Due to the nature of the materials available in the collection, this research took a macro level approach by looking at larger trends of change in casino industry public relations. The collection is in no way complete or comprehensive, and some casinos have more archival material than others. This research was completed over the course of one week in March 2012 during a residency fellowship funded by the Center for Gaming Research. Due to both time limitations and the inability to consider the materials possessed as a valid sample, a full-scale content analysis of materials was inappropriate, not to mention impossible.

Findings

RQ1: How is public relations practiced in the Las Vegas casino industry?
An understanding of how public relations has changed in the Las Vegas casino industry requires that one first describe how public relations is practiced in this industry. Examination of the archival material revealed how Las Vegas casinos practiced what could be considered as public relations in four different ways. This section starts by describing the four types of public relations practiced in Las Vegas casinos as personal relations, strategic relationship building, publications, and media relations.

Personal relationships have contributed to success for the corporations in the casino gaming industry since its inception. Early Las Vegas casino-hotels paid extraordinary attention to customer service and were known for attending to the needs of hotel patrons. This was especially true for celebrity guests, upon whom casinos were dependent to raise the casino’s profile and generate media coverage and buzz for the casino. As an example, archives from the El Rancho Vegas (open in the 1940s and 1950s) show the preparations made by hotel staff for the wedding of guests Joanne
Woodward and Paul Newman in 1958. Not only did the hotel completely arrange the wedding and reception, but the entire affair was provided free of charge to the famous couple and their guests. The importance of personal relationships in the successful operation of a casino corporation lives on today in the casino host, an employee whose sole responsibility is to facilitate the needs of customers expected to wager large amounts of money.

Casinos have also used public relations to develop advantageous relationships for business purposes. For instance, as air travel technology developed and Las Vegas’s visitors increasingly started arriving by airplane, casinos partnered with travel agencies to promote packages that combined the guest’s air and hotel fare. Archives for a number of casinos contained promotional brochures that were co-branded with the casino and a travel agency. Cross-promotions with products such as cars and other items used in giveaways also shows an avenue for relationship building employed by casinos.

Casinos have also long enjoyed and nurtured fruitful relationships with businesses. The evolution of Las Vegas as a “business” destination, as evidenced by archival material, is particularly interesting in light of recent controversies over the use of Las Vegas for a business purposes. Early “business” trips to Las Vegas were promoted primarily as “men’s golf trip” outings and clearly appealed to a higher socioeconomic class. Once Las Vegas’s casinos realized the potential for fruitful partnerships with those in the business world, they developed larger facilities and promoted their meeting spaces and convention centers for business purposes. These individual casinos’ meeting space was eventually eclipsed by the city’s enormous convention center, and Las Vegas secured its current status as a prominent location for conventions and conferences for businesses as well as associations and trades.

Public relations in the casino industry was often purveyed through the creation and distribution of controlled media such as magazines and brochures. These publications allowed casinos to communicate directly with patrons without the use of media as an intervening public. Publications of this nature were found in archival records dating back to the earliest days of Las Vegas’s casinos. Although we now think of these publications as quite commonplace, their prominence in the public relations efforts of casinos, even from an early date, is noteworthy. The evolution of these publications over time will be described in a later section.

Following the most conventional definition of public relations, the casino industry has also employed traditional media relations. The discussion of this use of media relations, which follows in a later section, highlights some important changes in the use of the press release and the need to use different approaches for niche media — here, the tourist/visitor magazine market. Casinos’ use of media relations also expanded to include the business press as their business operations became increasingly corporatized.

RQ2: How has the practice of public relations in the casino industry changed?
Returning to the brief history of Las Vegas given in the literature review, it is important to highlight two elements of Las Vegas that have changed considerably in ways that affect the evolution of the casino industry’s public relations efforts. The trend toward consolidation of many casinos under one corporate entity, and the increased focus on the business side of casinos, has created a state of public relations for the gaming industry that is, at present, vastly different than the same endeavor in the city’s early days. The number of casinos in Las Vegas has also grown exponentially, and with increased competition has come the need for individual casinos to differentiate themselves from other casinos in hopes of attracting customers. Both the increasing trend toward corporatization and the enormous expansion in the casino market have significantly impacted the development of public relations practices throughout Las Vegas’s history until the present day.

From cooperation to competition

These large-scale movements toward corporatization and expansion seem to have influenced the first notable change in Las Vegas’s public relations over time: Where individually-owned casinos in the city’s early days tended to cooperate with others for promotion, today’s casino corporations solely promote the casinos owned by that corporation to the exclusion of others. An examination of promotional materials from early casinos shows that these casinos often included information on other properties’ entertainment and attractions. In Las Vegas’s early days as a tourist attraction, there were more than enough visitors to fill the casinos’ hotel rooms, and it behooved each individual casino to promote the overall “Las Vegas experience” in order to increase the number of visitors to the city. Several brochures from approximately the 1960s show clear evidence of this cooperative promotion by listing the phone numbers of the showrooms of all casinos on the Strip. These brochures also often featured maps labeling not only the casino that produced the brochure but also the others that were available for tourists to visit.

However, the promotional efforts of today’s casino corporations solely feature that corporation’s casino properties. In the current landscape of oversupply (of hotel rooms, restaurants, and gaming options) and decreased tourist demand, corporate-owned casinos are in fierce competition with each other; it is therefore unsurprising that public relations materials by casino corporations make no mention of properties owned by other corporations. For example, the Pulse of Vegas Blog (http://lasvegasblog.harrahs.com) appears to be a tourist-oriented blog about things to do and see in Las Vegas, but it features only hotel-casinos that are owned and operated by Caesars Entertainment (which until recently was known as Harrah’s Entertainment).

Today’s promotion of corporate casino properties is the culmination of a trend that began in Las Vegas around the Howard Hughes era of the late 1960s. After Hughes purchased the iconic Desert Inn, he went on to own several other properties including the Frontier, Landmark, and the Silver Slipper. Promotional material for these casinos reflects some cross-promotion of the Hughes casinos, with no mention of other casino properties. A similar promotional strategy was seen in
promotional materials for the casinos owned by the Del Webb Corporation, including the Sahara (owned by Del Webb in the 1960s and 1970s) and the Mint.

The increased corporatization of Las Vegas’s casinos, seen in an increasing trend since gaming law changes in the 1970s allowed stockholder-owned corporations to own and run casinos, also created the need for increased activity in stockholder relations and financial media relations by gaming corporations. Document archives of modern-day casino corporations, such as the Circus Circus/Mandalay Group, featured an extensive number of press releases targeted to financial media with topics such as quarterly earnings or legal matters. The use of press releases about casino expansion was also important in the era of casino corporatization because they demonstrated the health of the company, encouraging investors to purchase shares of the company. Stockholder-oriented documents, such as annual reports and corporate social responsibility reports, also become more prevalent in the archives of modern casino corporations.

**The need for differentiation**

As the Las Vegas landscape has become more crowded, literally and figuratively, with casinos and other options for visitors (restaurants, shows, spas, etc.), casinos have tried to differentiate their property from the others in hopes of gaining the biggest share of the elusive tourist dollar. Archival promotional materials spanning nearly fifty years show an evolving trend in the ways that casinos attempted to differentiate their properties. Originally, casinos attempted to differentiate based on traditional qualities such as price, convenience, and luxury. The late 1980s through the early 2000s saw the dawning, apex, and eventual decline of Las Vegas’s signature element: the elaborate theming of properties such as the Luxor, which was shaped like an Egyptian pyramid, and Treasure Island, whose pirate theme was carried through in a communiqué that exclaimed, “Attention all privateers, buccaneers, and mutineers!”

Casino properties also attempted to differentiate themselves using more traditional public relations tactics and techniques. Many archives contained extensive press releases highlighting features of the property and its amenities, suggesting that media relations served an important role in this effort to make the casino stand out from its competitors. As will be discussed shortly, Las Vegas casinos have been known for their use of the media-attention-grabbing pseudo-event – Evel Knievel’s motorcycle jump of Caesars Palace’s fountain in 1967 is one of the most well-known – sometimes to the point of bordering on the Barnum-style hype of the “publicity stunt.”

But perhaps the most striking use of public relations – in its more modern conception – is seen in the casinos’ efforts to use communication to establish relationships with past customers in hopes of generating repeat business. Casino archives show repeated instances of personal communication with customers that shows efforts to differentiate the casino from its competitors by cultivating a personal relationship through apologies for past experiences, solicitation of suggestions for casino improvements, and promotion of customer-specific deals at the casino. A more
contemporary example of the use of relationships to differentiate the casino can be seen in the use of social media to cultivate relationships with followers and fans on social media such as Twitter and Facebook. Some casino-hotels are quite active in communication through this medium, while others are not; this participation in social media can potentially serve to set a casino apart from others that do not communicate with customers in this way.

The casino industry in Las Vegas, with its tendencies toward excess and unusualness, has been a fertile breeding ground for the type of outlandish “publicity stunts” that have historically been incorporated into public relations efforts for certain industries. Las Vegas’s casinos have faced two uphill battles: first, to convince the general public to consider the town as a vacation destination, and later, to encourage patrons to choose their casino property over the growing number of other, similarly equipped facilities. Publicity stunts and other outrageous efforts by these casinos have served to promote both the individual casinos and the overall Las Vegas experience: From the Frontier Hotel-Casino’s sending of an Old West stagecoach to pick up VIP passengers at the airport to the Silver Slipper’s hiring of an airplane to drop promotional materials over the parking lots of competing casinos, these efforts have been intentionally eye-catching. Some, like the Pioneer Club’s acquisition of a downtown lot and repurposing of that land for a public parking lot, have been directed toward both Las Vegas’s visitors and its residents; others, like that same casino’s purchase and public lighting celebration for its iconic “Vegas Vic” sign, were clearly intended to raise Las Vegas’s profile as a tourist destination.

In Las Vegas’s modern era, publicity stunts reached an entirely new level with the 1993 opening of the pirate-themed Treasure Island casino. The casino’s owner, Steve Wynn, planned to demolish the historic Dunes hotel, which he had purchased in order to build his next project, Bellagio. Never one to let an opportunity for publicity be wasted, Wynn arranged for the implosion of the Dunes to coincide with the grand opening of Treasure Island: From a replica pirate ship in front of the new casino, Wynn fired a fake cannon at the same time that crews initiated the demolition of the old one. This symbolic act drew the attention of nearly 300 reporters, and at least momentarily, the eyes of the nation were fixed on this metaphoric “out with the old, and in with the new gesture” that characterized Las Vegas’s building boom of the 1990s. Wynn also broke new ground in promotion when he purchased one hour of prime time programming on NBC (at an approximate price of $1.7 million) to air a program he produced, “Treasure Island: The Adventure Begins,” which prominently featured his new casino. This sort of revolutionary “adverprogram,” coming long before product placement became an accepted norm, introduced Wynn’s casino – as well as the city of Las Vegas – into thousands of homes across the nation.

As Las Vegas expanded exponentially through the 1990s and into the 2000s, it struggled to keep the attention of the nation with a series of increasingly elaborate, orchestrated events. Grand openings of new casinos became star-studded affairs, and demolitions of old properties were exploited for attention wherever possible. Documents from the 1996 opening of the Monte Carlo casino and the 1999 opening of the Mandalay Bay casino show the efforts taken to ensure the attendance of
celebrities, including entertainers and athletes, at the grand opening weekend. Rooms were complimentary, lavish meals were provided, and a red-carpet event ensured that media captured the entire event on film. Of course, the use of celebrities to promote Las Vegas dates back to the opening of the Flamingo in 1946; however, the pace at which these new casinos opened led these star-studded events to become almost commonplace, possibly diminishing their effectiveness in attracting attention.

Casinos also tried to attract attention by using media relations to place stories in national, local, and tourist publications. Press releases were sometimes used to attract attention through appealing to traditional news values such as accentuating celebrity (prominence), newness, or unusualness. Archives for a number of different casinos reflected a fairly consistent selection of press release topics, including expansion or new facilities, entertainment in the form of shows and special events, personnel changes at the managerial level, and jackpots won by casino patrons.

As more casinos put resources into public relations and press releases became increasingly common, casinos turned to different angles in attempting to stand out and earn a coveted media placement. Press releases began to promote human interest stories, such as the personal stories of performers in the casino’s shows, or use photos to show jackpot winners and casino facilities. The eventual increase in competition for press coverage lead casinos to explore the use of alternatives for communication through the mass media, including the use of some early advertorials, dating back to the 1980s, in addition to the aforementioned “adverprogram” in 1994.

Casino use of public relations agencies

Although records detailing these casinos’ use of the services of public relations agencies are sparse, there is some indication that elements of the casinos’ public relations activities, such as the production of press kits and press releases, were occasionally outsourced to agencies. There is some evidence as early as the 1980s that big events, such as grand openings, were promoted by external public relations agencies. However, the use of agencies became much more prevalent in the 1990s and beyond.

These agencies were primarily contracted for technician duties such as writing press releases and distributing press kits. Archival records provide some indication that casinos retained control of the content and directed the larger strategy for the casino’s public relations. Over time, the public relations duties for most casinos were consolidated under corporate auspices. Most of the public relations for today’s casinos is conducted by these corporate offices or outsourced to outside agencies.
Publications and other direct-to-consumer communication

Casinos’ efforts to communicate directly to consumers began in the form of magazines with a variety of content related to the property. These magazines, which were ostensibly sent to past guests of the hotel, featured stories and pictures about events at the property, celebrity visits to the casino, personnel news about promotions and new employees, and upcoming shows and entertainment at the casino’s venue. These publications, often around 10-12 pages in length, were at times very personal, reflecting a similarly personal relationship with the hotel’s guests.

Over time, these magazines simplified into shorter publications, often in newsletter format. By the 1980s, these newsletter communications were in a simpler brochure format and often emphasized bargains and special promotions at the casino. Likely due to changes in printing technology, they were usually printed in color. They were also sent to a wider audience, usually the casino’s entire roster of members for its players club, and were less personal than the direct-to-consumer communication of the early Las Vegas casinos.

As an evolution of the direct-to-consumer communication previously carried out over printed publications and other controlled media, today’s Las Vegas casinos have turned to social media such as Twitter and Facebook. This communication medium allows the casinos the valuable ability to connect with not only past customers (in hopes of generating repeat business) but also potential new customers for the casino. Social media allow these casinos the ability to differentiate themselves by establishing a brand personality and also allow them to provide customer service through this medium, further establishing relationships with current and past customers.

Limitations and Future Research

As mentioned previously, this research was primarily limited by two factors: the incomplete nature of the casino public relations archive in the Gaming Collection at the UNLV Special Collections Library and the relatively short amount of time (one week) the researcher was afforded in which to do this research. As such, this research focuses primarily on identifying industry-wide trends rather than providing thorough analysis of individual collateral material available in the casino archives. Several of the casinos’ archives were more complete than others, and these might provide for fruitful further research that delves more deeply into one casino’s efforts to promote its product using public relations.

There is a great deal more to be learned about the history of public relations in Las Vegas beyond what can be found in the Gaming Collection archives. A more complete history of the industry would require additional research methods, such as oral histories, to draw information from a wider variety of sources. In fact, this would be an excellent time to undertake such an endeavor: As a

* As early as the 1970s, casinos developed “players clubs” to collect customers’ information and track their play at the casino. These clubs were often used to issue complimentary food, beverage, and rooms (“comps”) to high-dollar gamblers, but the contact information collected through the signups became another way for casinos to communicate directly with customers.
relatively young city, many of the pivotal figures in Las Vegas’s public relations history, even from its early days, are still involved in the industry.

Because media relations was an important component of these casinos’ efforts to promote themselves, both to local and national audiences, additional research on newspaper coverage of the casino industry might reveal more about the way that news media helped (and harmed) these casinos in their quest to productively use media relations as a public relations tactic. Additional research could also be conducted on communication with specific stakeholder publics that are traditional to the industry in addition to the media, such as employees and investors. The use of public relations for the nascent casino corporations, which emerged into prominence in the 1980s and 1990s and grew larger through the 2000s, may provide some interesting history on how the investor relations aspect of this industry evolved out of nonexistence.

Conclusion

The use of public relations by Las Vegas casinos has changed over time in a number of ways, some that are similar to larger trends in the evolution of the field, and others that are specific to the gaming industry and the city of Las Vegas. Although this research is industry-specific and limited to the city of Las Vegas, it can still serve to provide context for contemporary study of public relations. For instance, the strong trend toward direct-to-consumer communication, as seen in the building and maintenance of personal relationships and the use of publications, continues in today’s use by these casinos of social media technologies such as Twitter and Facebook.

The casino industry of Las Vegas, NV provides a unique context in which to study the history of public relations, and demonstrates the value of focusing on an industry-specific history of the profession. While some trends in casino public relations, such as the employment of public relations agencies or the use of media relations to generate attention, mirror larger trends in the field of public relations, others — like the frequent use of P. T. Barnum-style “publicity stunts” — seem to be unique to this industry. Other industry-specific histories of public relations might uncover more nuanced practices that are common to one industry but uncommon to the practice of public relations at large.

This study of public relations in the Las Vegas casino industry has also revealed some interesting findings that supplement the existing history of this notorious town. For instance, few who are familiar with the hyper-competition between today’s gaming conglomerates would imagine an era where independently owned casinos would promote other casino properties. However, early brochures from casino-hotels such as the Dunes and Circus Circus show that this practice was commonplace. The gracious cross-promotion, without any direct financial benefit, by casinos of other properties speaks to a bygone era where independently owned properties worked together to promote a larger product — the Las Vegas experience.
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The Influence of Influence: Lobbies and Lobbyists in the Development of the American Political System

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Abstract

This paper traces the origins of lobbying in the United States, from Thomas Jefferson to Jack Abramoff, in a greater historical context. It further addresses the lobbying profession from the Roman Empire to present day, and the effect this “third party” has on government both in the development of the nation and today.

Introduction

“From the first political scientist, Aristotle, to contemporary social-psychologists, observations on the behavior of political man suggest that he does not act alone, but in concert with others.”

The practice of lobbying, “to attempt, as a private citizen or group, to influence governmental decisions,” likely predates written history. One can imagine various groups of Neanderthals gathering to pressure group leaders to hunt in a new area, to decide who would live in what cave and the like. The point is that as long as there have been groups of people, there have been leaders; and those who are not leaders have sought to influence those who are. For our hypothetical Neanderthals, that influence might have involved grunts, hand gestures, painting on cave walls or crude weapons – and though our tools of influence are far different today, the same spirit survives.

The term “lobbying” came into popular usage in the middle of the seventeenth century, referring to the large anteroom near the English House of Commons. The term refers to individuals or groups of individuals who would gather here in an attempt to urge particular measures, or reporters seeking to cover breaking legislative news. The term “lobbyist” in England came to refer to reporters, though in the early eighteenth-century in the United States, the term referred to those seeking to advance issues to lawmakers.

Lobbyists and lobbies have had such a pervasive effect on the American system of government that they have been referred to as the “third chamber” or “third house of congress.” Throughout their history, both lobbies and lobbyists have had a checkered past within the United

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3 Ibid.
States, and have maintained a reputation as back-room dealers, vote-buyers, and “sellers-out of the public welfare.” And while lobbyists today do not encompass the caricatures of large, cigar-smoking men with a smirk on their face, a wink in their eye, and pocketfuls of cash, the popular reputation as such continues.

Perhaps the most famous and illustrious example of how lobbyists have entered the modern political arena comes from Harry Truman, who in 1948 was asked if he would be against lobbyists working for his program. He responded, “We probably wouldn’t call those people lobbyists. We would call them citizens appearing in the public interest.”

From Romans to Romantics

It has been said that the Roman emperor Augustus propagated his political ideas “…so subtly that at the time his true intentions were not always understood, and even now are still a matter of debate.” In order to better influence the senatorial assemblies, he constructed a Vesta Temple at his residence, a tribute to the “old” way of doing things based in the house of Aeneas, but also brought together the various religious and political aspects of “modern” Roman society that had been spread throughout the city. By using such subtle manipulation, Augustus was able to effectively take over the Republic and reinstitute a seeming-legitimate hereditary monarchy.

On July 25 in 311, a representative from Autun rose during a celebration to thank the emperor Constantine for tax reduction and for five years of tax forgiveness. In the speech, the orator flatters Constantine’s reign, incorporating some “politically quite hazardous elements in his speech.” The original plan was to deliver the speech to Constantine, but the original audience was so small, it would not have helped Autun’s cause, and therefore the speech was delayed until the emperor was at Trier, along with the emperor’s closest friends and advisors. This unknown orator, though acting in a public setting, becomes one of the original lobbyists, promoting a cause to the government while representing a large group of people. The speech worked, and Autun retained its favored city status.

From the time of the end of the Roman Empire throughout much of recorded history, the Catholic Church became the ruling entity, though the feudal system existed in most of Europe, first in a limited and then an organized way. It might be said that the Catholic Church became too powerful, and corruption became rampant. While the political power held by the Church was not wholly absolute, their influence on the monarchies in Europe leads to the conclusion that they were in fact not only the most powerful organization, but that the pope was the most influential person at any given time. And while records of the influence on the Church’s decisions are limited, there is no doubt that

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5 Safire, p. 383.
6 Ibid.
some groups rose to power, such as the Medici family in the late thirteenth century. The Medici held great influence, not because of official titles, but their ability to influence both politics and religion.

The Medici family, perhaps more so than the Church, showed that one person acting alone has very little influence, but that a group of people, even a small group, can have tremendous power. Thus, even those individuals astute of the political process are able to do very little as individuals. “The individual citizen working by himself despairs of effective access or influence.”9 No one learned that lesson better than Niccolo Machiavelli.

Machiavelli gained position to the chancellery of the Florentine Republic after Savonarola Medici was hanged in 1498. During this time he was responsible for dealing with officials as high as Pope Julius II,10 and was responsible for the writing of many government documents. However, when the Medici family regained power in 1512, Machiavelli was replaced and banished to the countryside after being suspected of attempting to overthrow the Medici. In what was, and still is, perhaps the singular greatest plea ever by an individual to gain influence, Machiavelli wrote *The Prince*, a treatise on government directed to Lorenzo d’Medici. Its purpose was to show that Machiavelli still had use, and it was his hope that Medici would emulate his protagonist. This was not the case, however, and Machiavelli died out of favor, banished to his country estate, and his plea was not printed until years after his death in 1527.

**Lobbies and lobbyists form in the United States**

While the term *lobby* and *lobbyist* originated in England, the origin of the term is German:

The word is akin to the Old High German lauba, meaning a shelter of foliage; when adopted into English, it came to mean a covered walk or passageway. The lobby was a public room, and thus one in which Members of Parliament could be approached by special pleaders, with or without protective foliage.11

The term came to the United States, but much folklore surrounds how it initially became involved with the legislative process. Many stories are focused around the famous Willard Hotel and its lobby in Washington, D.C. Founded in 1850, it is equidistant from the White House and the National Mall. Lincoln lived in the hotel prior to his inauguration, and it was the site of a peace convention in 1861, a last-minute attempt to thwart the Civil War. The words to both the *Battle Hymn of the Republic* and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s *I Have a Dream* speech were penned in rooms of the hotel; and it was here that folklore tells us Ulysses S. Grant would use the lobby to drink brandy, smoke cigars and receive visitors looking for favors.

This concept of the formation, while important to publicists at the present-day Willard Intercontinental, is not necessarily an accurate portrayal of the origins of lobbying in the United States.

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11 Safire, p. 383.
States. In fact, both the verb lobby and the descriptive nouns were already in popular use in the
United States in the early 1800’s. Lynch\textsuperscript{12} described the state of New York politics as “corruption
(having) erected her court…Her throne is the lobby.”

However, while the term “lobby” didn’t come into effect, the practice was certainly not an
uncommon one. As far back as the first congress of the United States, efforts were being made by
individuals working on behalf of groups to enact legislation. Such was the case in the original federal
fishing bounty law, enacted to protect and stimulate the fishing industry, but generally focused toward
cod fishing vessels off the coast of Maine (Northern Massachusetts at the time).

The 1792 law provided annual government subsidies to the owners and crews of cod fishing
vessels. In the aftermath, the law would be repealed, amended, reenacted, liberalized, until finally in
1866 it was stricken from the books of the United States Congress.\textsuperscript{13} The law was a point of
contention between members of the Democratic Party, specifically, between Northeast (particularly
New England) Democrats and those from the South and West.

While there was much support for the act, it most likely would not have passed had it not
been for the influential guidance of two men, one Alexander Hamilton, and more importantly,
Thomas Jefferson. The account is given by O’Leary:

To be sure, Treasury Secretary Hamilton favored government bounties to industry, and he
said so in his famous “Report on Manufactures,” which appeared on 5 December 1791,
just…months short to the passage of the first fishing bounty law. Jefferson, however, had
addressed the subject in detail almost a year earlier in his “Report on the Cod and Whale
Fisheries.”…It was Jefferson who in this report first said of the cod fishery that it was “too
poor a business to be left to itself, even with the nation most advantageously situated.”…He
suggested “that duties be taken off; that bounties be given to the fishermen; and the national
influence be used abroad, for obtaining better markets for their produce.\textsuperscript{14}

While the subsidies were continuously debated until their repeal in 1866, Jefferson’s actions
are identified as being one of the original instances of an individual acting on behalf of a group, thus
making one of our founding fathers the first lobbyist in our nation’s history.

However, this would not be the last instance of an individual, or a small group, acting on
behalf of a large group, and it would not take long for such actions to be engrained into our political
structure. Lobbying would rise to prominence with the growth of our country as an agrarian
population.

\textbf{A population of farmers}

Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, and even for a time after that, farmers made up the bulk of the
U.S. population. In spite of a continuous decrease, the industry as whole has always played a large
role in the politics of the United States, and “the shift of farming interests from a preponderant

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p.111
majority position to that of a small minority placed a great strain on politics in these United States. And though the number of farmers is in continuous decline, production continues to rise. As automation and industrialization took over the farming industry, to the point that Jefferson even conceded that commerce and manufacturing deserved an equal place with agriculture, the farmers’ role in the political process was challenged.

But “no dominant social group ever yields its power ungrudgingly…and even today (farmers) play a role far out of proportion to their numbers.” Granges were among the first of the organized pressure groups, reaching a peak in 1874 of roughly 750,000 members. Declaring itself to be nonpartisan, it did not nominate or elect its own candidates, but rather both the National Grange and state granges sought influence through pressure. Delegations were sent to present lawmakers the Grange’s view, which were often nationally adopted stances on legislation.

Due to the even greater decline of farming following World War I, farmers were in jeopardy of even greater disadvantages with regard to legislation. The American Farm Bureau Association, an amalgamation of local and regional farm bureaus, came into being to continue the efforts of the National Grange, (which still exists today) but had waned in its political clout. Though the Bureau attempted to make changes to bring farming prices in line with that of commerce and manufacturing, their greatest victory did not come until 1933 with the passing of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the first in a long series of government actions meant to assist farmers.

However, while the farmers of the United States were able to establish national pressure group organizations, they were not without their problems. Different farmers, that is, different crops, have different needs. The National Grange represented farmers in general, but particularly the needs of farmers in the Northeast, whereas the Farm Bureau spoke for the coalition of cotton and corn, and the National Farmer’s Union (founded in 1902) spoke mainly for the wheat farmers in the Midwest.

The decline of farming in the United States has led to discontent by that small percentage who still farm, or who are sympathetic with to the “plight” of the American farmer. Mass frustration was, and remains, the main cause in the formation of political pressure groups, and in the case of the American farmer (facing industrialization, drops in market prices and threats to their current status), the reasons for organization become clear. Perhaps because farmers have always been one step ahead of the rest of the country, their early organization into a political power – their early formation of lobbying efforts, has led to their continued influence on the political process today.

15 Brown & Wahlke, p. 166.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, p. 166
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, p. 40
The rise of labor

The second major group of organized political pressure rose as a direct result of the industrial revolution. Changes in the workforce from 1870 on, the decline of the American farm and the explosion of manual labor workers following World War I changed the face of the American worker. And though a large percentage of the people in the United States were brought into the wage-earning class, changes were slow to occur. “Workers…do not uniformly share a sense of class consciousness…striking cleavages exist (due to)…national, religious and racial differences.”

New groups are often met with resistance by those who are already in power, in the case of organized labor; they were seeking to gain the favor the farmers already held. The earliest labor lobby, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), fought against the early stereotype of labor unions as anarchists or socialists, which to some extent, has existed to this day in the minds of some. In 1906, the AFL produced a Labor’s Bill of Grievance, “which demanded, among other things, the exemption of labor unions from antitrust laws and a cessation of the use of the injunction in labor disputes.”

The AFL also sought to limit immigration, to limit the use of convict labor, and urged legislation to benefit women, children and handicapped. Before long, the AFL began promoting legislation beyond the job focus. In 1939, William Green, president of the AFL, stated “We now seek benefit for the workers and all our fellow men by the use of either direct economic strength or legislation as the situation demands. Neither alone can suffice.”

In 1955, the AFL combined with the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) to form the AFL-CIO. Each unit of the organization focuses on specific professions, though the entire organization has a president who resides over the Washington office. While the individual unions operate with near autonomy, the national office operates on behalf of all of its member unions.

Key identifies the scope of lobbying activities as one in flux with the political ideology of labor. The adoption of a nonpartisan ideology has limited the attempts to form a national labor party, and also keeps its political objectives narrowly focused. While there has been much legislation adopted in relation to labor in the United States, organized labor has traditionally had difficulty in getting its members to vote as a unified group. “Union members, like the rest of us, manage to get along with a multitude of loyalties…membership in a union does not mean that a person is invariably governed by his interest…yet the influence of labor organization should not be dismissed as of no importance (in elections) because labor endorsed candidates do not invariably win.”

Labor unions, and thus the lobbying power of workers in the United States, continue to play a large role in the influence of legislation in the United States.

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21 Ibid, p. 46
22 Ibid, p. 57.
24 Key, pp.60-64
25 Ibid, p. 68
The Third House of Congress today

The role and tactics of lobbies today is varying. While traditionally questionable, most practices have become more standardized. Their involvement in government is both storied and changing, but they have two basic functions:

Apart from whatever power they may have to generate election-time assistance, the lobbies derive their strategic advantage by controlling the flow of information in and out of Congress. By this, lobbyists serve two functions; they take and they give. …They constitute…an informal intelligence network that can pick up advance and often confidential information, and use it to good advantage … Second, they supply Congress with the essential raw material of lawmaking.26

In fact, by 1950, it was estimated that there were at least 10 lobbyists for every member of Congress, lobbying efforts had become so pronounced that the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities declared lobbying to be a major industry.27 The proliferation of lobbyists and the lack of organization led to the formation of the American League of Lobbyists in 1979. Boasting more than 800 members, their mission is to enhance the development of professionalism and ethics.

The standard of practice by lobbyists has been a concern to Congress, newspapers and many others since the middle of the nineteenth century, when the amount of lobbyists in the nation’s capital sparked a letter from James Buchanan to Franklin Pierce, in it he wrote “the host of contractors, speculators, stock-jobbers, and lobby members which haunt the halls of Congress all desirous… on any and every pretext to get their arms into the public treasury, are sufficient to alarm every friend of the country.”28

Three main criticisms of lobbies as an extension of government exist today.29 First, that they are not democratically organized in that members of a lobby group have very little to do with the election of the lobby’s leaders, and even less with policy-making. In addition, the leaders of the lobby allow very little interaction from the groups’ members, and operate on their own time schedules. The second major criticism on lobbies is that their interests lie not in supporting the nation, but in advancing their agenda. Finally, lobbyists have been accused of being deceitful and false, though this is less of a problem today than it was formerly.

While states have been regulating the practice of lobbying since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the federal government did not begin regulating lobbies until the Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946, which regulated activity to “any person who solicits, collects, or receives money to be used principally to influence Federal legislation.”30 The act mandated that lobbyists

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27 Ibid, p.30
28 Ibid
30 Ibid, p.113
register as such, and reveal who their employers were. However, the new legislation did not restrict their behavior, there was little in the way of enforcement to control the actions of the lobbyists.

The American League of Lobbyists, according to their code of ethics,\(^\text{31}\) seeks to counteract the three common aforementioned criticisms. Their first article addresses honesty, and insists upon factual corrections at the earliest possible moment. Their second article states that lobbyists are to know and follow all laws, and their final article (Article IX) indicates that is the duty of the lobbyist to “not act in any manner that will undermine public confidence and trust in the democratic governmental process.”

But as much as lobbyists insist they are simply providing information to influential political members in an ethical manner, they are still under the employ of special interests. It has been said, from an historian’s perspective, that

…lobbying can be understood only as the reflection of interests shared by shifting coalitions made up by Members of Congress, outside pressures, and executive agencies…legislators frequently turn for assistance to those groups or individuals…who are in a position to render service…and outside pressure groups return the favor…If lobbying were a one-way track, the problem could be solved in a hurry simply by putting the finger of responsibility upon individual Members of Congress…but what is more natural than for a Congressman coming from a peanut-growing district to get together with a peanut lobbyist and a bureaucrat concerned with peanuts in the Department of Agriculture, to work out answers to the peanut problem. The initiative may come from the Congressman, from the agency, or from the lobbyist. The point of initiation is irrelevant. The fact of cooperation is not irrelevant.\(^\text{32}\)

That “cooperation” is still relevant. On January 3, 2006, lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to corrupt public officials, mail fraud and tax evasion, stemming from his and his partner’s theft of “tens of millions of dollars from Indian tribes; (setting) up a foundation that financed a trip to Scotland for public officials…and (providing) a stream of things of value to officials, including money, meals, trips and entertainment to entice them to help the lobbyist and his clients.”\(^\text{33}\) Between 2001 and 2004, Abramoff supplied made at least 1.7 million dollars in political campaign contributions to about 220 lawmakers.

“Lobbying is sanctioned by the constitution.”\(^\text{34}\) The First Amendment allows for people to petition the government for redress of grievances, and though the most visible are those lobbyists who register and work in Washington, D.C., any person who writes a letter to their representative also becomes a lobbyist. It is unclear the direction that the Abramoff scandal will have on lobbying, though future investigation will most likely result in a change to the current laws and policies

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\(^\text{31}\) Source: American League of Lobbyists


\(^\text{33}\) Bloomberg News Service: January 3, 2004

surrounding lobbies and lobbyists. But there is no doubt that lobbyists, in some way or another, will
continue to operate as a “third party” in the United States.

Tactics and messages may change, but to influence those in influence will remain an
important aspect of the U.S. political system.
PR history retrieved: The case for purposive sampling and empathetic interviewing

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to contribute to the process of constructing, and reconstructing, national histories of public relations. It demonstrates how purposive sampling and empathetic interviewing worked effectively in a study on the evolution of public relations as a profession in Israel. It argues that, in spite of the fact that personal oral narratives are not able to claim representation of the larger population under investigation, narratives of a purposively selected sample may provide valuable insights into significant historical developments.

The paper examines how narratives of key individuals, who practiced the profession in different times and in different organisations, exist in the intersections between personal and collective experiences. It argues therefore, that they extend the limits of individual stories and enable conclusions about the profession, not only as a personal experience but also as a part of socio-national history, a part of the larger cultural context.

Studies of individual narratives in their social and historical context are already recognised in contemporary qualitative research. In the social sciences, for example, Chase (2005) uses the term “narrative inquiry” revolving around “an interest in biographical particulars as narrated by the one who lives them” (p. 651).

In retrieving the history of public relations in the Israeli political, socio-cultural, and economic context, the researcher conducted narrative inquiry with key players in key organisations. The purposive sampling was guided by the following factors:

a) Generational reach: interviews were conducted with practitioners who had retired after more than thirty years of service, as well as young practitioners. Interviews were conducted also with surviving family members and secretaries of deceased practitioners.

b) Institutional importance: The selection took into account the role of the organisations they served in the history of Israel.

c) Diversity and location of practice: Organisational sources included non-profit organisations, the government, businesses, and private consultancies.

In some cases the study succeeded in tracing three to four generations of practitioners who had served one prominent organisation. This enabled the identification of specific and significant changes in the profession’s history over a long time span.

The subjective nature of narrative inquiry raises important issues around potential bias through the interviewer involvement. This can impact on the selection of interviewees, the
participant conversations, and the interpretation of all data generated. In classing this method as “empathetic interviewing,” Fontana and Frey (2005) observe that “empathetic’ emphasizes taking a stance, contrary to the scientific image of interviewing, which is based on the concept of neutrality” (p. 696). In many cases, qualitative researchers advocate these methods to create “a partnership between the researcher and respondents who should work together to create a narrative – the interview – that could be beneficial to the group studied” (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p. 697).

In the Israeli research, the collegial relationship between the interviewer and the interviewees made the empathetic style an obvious model. The interviewees, together with the interviewer, took the chance to reflect, sometimes critically, on the role of the profession and the process of change that it went through. The friendly conversations proved valuable for the construction of past events. The paper also hopes to encourage practitioners with knowledge of the evolution of public relations in their own countries, to consider undertaking this kind of research. Accordingly, the paper concludes that purposive sampling and emphatic interviewing can add significant academic value to many researchers into public relations history.

References
When the author of this paper entered the doctoral program at the University of Maryland in 1989, one of the first theoretical frameworks I was exposed to was the four models of public relations authored by James Grunig, a preeminent scholar in the field and my advisor in College Park. In 1984, in his textbook on public relations co-authored with Rutgers University scholar Todd Hunt, Grunig had distinguished between four major typologies of public relations: press agentry, public information, two-way asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical public relations (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984). Going into the 1990s, the models already were being dissected by many of Grunig’s protégés and other budding scholars in the field.

To Grunig, these models depicted a sort of evolutionary ascension of the practice. *Press agentry* arose from the late 1800s due to the hucksterism of P.T. Barnum (“a sucker is born every minute”), who sought results by flooding the public arena with information, regardless of any veracity (and this model prevails in entertainment publicity). *Public information* came from Ivy Lee’s idea that organizations should divulge at least some information in a truthful manner, and this pervaded government relations during and long after World War II. Post-war corporate growth ushered in the *two-way asymmetrical model*, wherein an organization uses research to understand its stakeholders but then relies on an imbalance of power to selfishly manipulate them in ways that achieve the organization’s purposes. Finally, *two-way symmetrical communication* entailed research-based, give-and-take facilitation of mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders who stand on equal footing to the organization (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).

Grunig (1992) viewed the two-way symmetrical model as the most ethical—a normative ideal to which all organizations should strive in their communications. However, the model attracted criticism from scholars such as Priscilla Murphy (1991), who viewed it as too idealistic for the practical world where large organizations would not likely release their power over their publics. In light of her skepticism, she proposed a “mixed-motive” approach to public relations. In devising this model, she was perhaps observing a practical world dominated more by asymmetrical public relations than by the symmetrical worldview.

Falconi (2010) classified Grunig’s first three models within the asymmetrical framework of persuasion, and argued along with Murphy (1991) that persuasion rules public relations. Persuasion has been viewed as a one-way transmission process focusing on message outputs (Macnamara, 2006), and Grossberg et al. (2006) concurred that this “transmission model is the more prevalent model of
communication in society today” (p. 20). Falconi (2010) noted that, due to the global influences of U.S. scholarship and practice, many other regions of the world mirror the U.S. in emphasizing this persuasive worldview. As he described it:

> The dominant scientific persuasion model of practice developed by Edward Bernays in the early decades of the 20th century, and adopted by most professionals all over the world to this very day … was the true cradle [of public relations]… Organizations listen to publics in order to more effectively craft persuasive messages so that consumers, as well as voters, be more inclined to embrace opinions, attitudes, behaviours and decisions aligned to the objectives of the communicating organization …. The pervasive adoption by collective imaginations of the “American dream”, of the American way of life as a globally diffused mass aspiration, can be considered the true masterpiece of twentieth century public relations (Falconi, 2010, pp. 7-8).

It can be argued that the first three models in Grunig’s conceptualization can be reduced to organizational behaviors that, first and foremost, serve the organization. These behaviors are focused mostly on getting stakeholders to do what the organization wants them to do: attend events in the case of press agentry; understand and support the organization (public information); or buy products, donate to the cause, vote in support of organizational desires, etc., (two-way asymmetrical public relations). While such activities can be perfectly appropriate and acceptable fundamentals of public relations (Burson, 2012), it may not be particularly easy in the activities to find “mutually beneficial” results for both organizations and their stakeholders, as is prerequisite in most of the basic definitions of public relations.

Falconi (2010), therefore, viewed persuasion as having “produced many collateral negative consequences and externalities” (p. 8). Some of these consequences are “widely defined with terms such as manipulation, propaganda, spin, visibility, image … all frequently used as synonyms of public relations” (p. 9). Falconi’s assessment is wholly consistent with what Grunig himself saw as problematic of his first three models. J. Grunig and White (1992) wrote:

> Although the asymmetrical perspective may sound like a reasonable position… organizations often expect publics to accept strange things as a result of “cooperation”: pollution, toxic waste, drinking, smoking, guns, overthrow of governments, dangerous products, lowered salary and benefits, discrimination against women and minorities, job layoffs, dangerous manufacturing plants, risky transportation of products, higher prices, monopoly power, poor product quality, political favoritism, insider trading, use of poisonous chemicals, exposure to carcinogens, nuclear weapons, and even warfare (p. 40).

**Relationships and Personal Influence**

If this focus on persuasion is accurate, it raises questions about the fundamental embodiment in the term public relations: relationships. Relationships by nature should be mutually beneficial, and therefore public relations should inherently be involved in seeking win/win scenarios. Yet, if Bernays started these efforts to get publics to do what organizations want, then did mutually beneficial relationship building go away somewhere along the line? Or, if Grunig’s models do represent the
evolution of public relations in the U.S., then perhaps relationship building did not even show up in the practice until conception of the two-way symmetrical model—and that was only in some kind of idealistic form.

It would be disingenuous to ignore the role of relationships in public relations history; numerous scholars have viewed public relations as largely a relational process. Still, the relationship model seems to have been fighting for its place in the field since its early modern days. Three decades after Cutlip and Center (1952) defined public relations as relationships with publics affecting or affected by organizations, Ferguson (1984) argued that relationships “should be the unifying concept of public relations” (Ledingham, 2003, p. 182). This suggested “a major shift in the core focus of the discipline” (Ledingham, 2003, p. 182). Ehling (1992) similarly highlighted relationships as “an important change in the primary mission of public relations” (p. 622). So, if relationships were an early element of U.S. public relations, why was a shift or change toward relationship building needed? It is possible that relationship building as an element of public relations was important only for scholars, but not actually seen as important in practice in the U.S.—a notion that Falconi (2010) proposes.

Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, who was finishing his Ph.D. at the University of Maryland when I arrived, perhaps saw this paucity of the relationship variable—and so after conducting research in India he proclaimed that a fifth model of public relations practice was necessary to complete Grunig’s models. This new category, which Sriramesh (1996) labeled as the personal influence model, filled out Grunig’s historical formulations with this relations-centric approach that Sriramesh had seen as missing. His observations no doubt stemmed from his innate understanding of traditional mores and practices of India that had been incorporated into public relations programs in that country—mores correlated with Hofstede’s (1980) cultural conception of power distance, which entails considerable gaps in equality between the elite power-bases of the country and the organizations and individuals who seek favor with those power bases. Sriramesh apparently did not see any of these factors at work within U.S. practice.

A connection between the personal influence model and relationship building was explained by Falconi et al. (2009) in a treatise for the Institute for Public Relations website:

Public relations scholarship increasingly points to the importance of relationships as an indicator of successful public relations…. Relationship-building is a complex process, and all relationships have a personal dimension that is based on social networking and interactions with other individuals. Therefore, personal influence is an important component of relational communication [which] considers how the influence of individuals contributes to successful public relations as a result of strong personal relationships with key constituents upon whom the success or failure of the organization depends (para. 14).

Once this non-American perspective was incorporated into the public relations models, other scholars from Asia launched investigations of personal influence in countries like China, Korea, and Indonesia,
where power distance, informal networking, and the requesting and granting of favors are also culturally common (Hung, 2007; Jo & Kim, 2004; Yudarwati, 2008). Huang (2000) described personal influence as a natural element of public relations in authoritarian or rigid cultures. Not long after these studies began, scholars started to examine personal influence in other regions where power distance or authoritarianism also seemed to exist. One study, for example, looked at personal influence in Croatia (Taylor, 2004). In 2008, at the conference of the European Public Relations Research and Education Association (EUPRERA) in Milan, additional studies examined applications of personal influence in Central or Eastern Europe.

Because of these studies, it is generally acknowledged that personal influence practices are prevalent in Asia and other parts of the world; but no one has seemed interested in studying personal influence in the United States. Such examinations, or even studies on the impact of interpersonal communication on public relations, are still relatively rare (Toth, 2000), for several reasons. One is the country’s previously mentioned focus on persuasion and the use of technologies for disseminating and controlling messages. Perhaps it stems from modern origins of public relations practitioners as journalists-in-residence, with the natural result being an emphasis on writing messages and persuading (Cutlip, 1995; Macnamara, 2006). Perhaps it was the subsequent placement of public relations scholarship mostly in schools of journalism or mass communication and the theory building resulting from those domains (Coombs, 2001). Or, it may be that scholars felt that personal influence simply was not applicable in the U.S. because it is not a hierarchical or authoritarian nation.

But Falconi et al. (2009) asserted that personal influence does exist universally in public relations practice. They explained:

> A public relator’s personal relationships network has always been considered an essential (when not the essential) part of her/his professional assets…. It’s an untold ‘truth’ that embarrasses scholars, educators and professionals alike, as it implies that the ‘people I know’ and the ‘little black book’ modes of practice may bear more relevance for a successful career in the public relations profession than any other professional competence (para. 2) …. It seems to be the most universally adopted, quite contrary to the diffused ethnocentric stereotype that it is mostly practiced in Asia (para. 1).

While not always labeled as “personal influence,” evidences of the phenomenon are found in the practice of relationship management in Western societies, according to Falconi et al. (2009). Rhee (2007) agreed that the interpersonal communication necessary for personal influence is recognized among communication scholars as a fundamental component of public relations. He further noted that face-to-face communication is preferable for developing relationships “with key individuals in the media, government, or political and activist groups” (p. 104). Coombs (2001) likewise said that interpersonal communication harbors exceptional values and clarifying qualities that are not seen in the typical U.S. mass communication (p. 106). Interpersonal communication differs from mediated communication in that it allows for immediate behavioral observation of others, such as facial expressions, vocal tones, emotional state and prompt feedback between communicators (p. 109).
Because of these inherent nuances, J. Grunig (1992) observed that “only the unsophisticated public relations practitioner would try to communicate with active publics through the mass media” (p. 105).

The remainder of this paper, therefore, delves into the “hidden” element of personal influence in United States public relations. If personal influence exists in U.S. practice, from where did it originate, and has it been carried into today’s public relations activities? The paper will lay out early evidences of the personal influence model in the U.S., and will argue that this model needs to be reexamined for its utility in the U.S. due to the increasing power of social media and “every-day stakeholders.” Such influence renders the most salient argument behind the persuasion model—that of carefully crafting and controlling the message—as specious and argues for a return to what some industry leaders are calling a “new model of public relations”—that of engagement and dialogue with stakeholders (Falconi, 2010). In such an atmosphere, it is time to examine the concept of personal influence in the U.S. and the greater promise it holds for returning to what public relations was and should again be all about in the first place—building and maintaining mutually beneficial relationships.

**Early roots of Personal Influence in the United States**

When searching for the roots of the public relations industry in the United States, it is easy to wander across the notion that public relations is what most people in the country still think it is: publicity or persuasion. In one of his two major books on public relations history, Scott Cutlip (1995) laid out this foundation from his earliest words. The first chapter, applicably titled “Hype for the Colonies, Colleges, and the Frontier,” begins with the sentences, “Utilization of publicity and press agentry to promote causes, tout land ventures, and raise funds is older than the nation itself. In fact, the U.S. talent for promotion can be traced back to the first settlements on the East Coast in the 16th century” (p. 1). Then Cutlip (1994) prefaced his other book with the section, “Antecedents of Today’s Practice.” That section is liberally sprinkled with the terms publicity, promotion, public information, press agentry, and propaganda—again reflecting Cutlip’s apparent view that public relations is primarily a means for promotion and persuasion.

Cutlip’s (1994, 1995) formulation of public relations is thus wholly consistent with Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) four models of public relations. This viewpoint is confirmed even recently by one of the venerable public relations forerunners, Harold Burson (2012), who commented: “The principal purpose of public relations is and has always been persuasion” (para. 5). Like Falconi, (2010), Burson traced these roots back to Bernays. “[This] public relations ‘process,’” he adds, “has changed little over the past century since it was first offered as a commercial service in 1900. But changes in how information is disseminated have been momentous” (para. 7).

While it may be easy, then, to deduce that persuasion has always dominated American public relations, such observation ignores the prevalence of personal connections and influence through at least the first 150 years of American civilization—before the term public relations even appeared in
general usage. As citizens spread throughout the land and congregated into agricultural communities, public relations-type activities helped to develop community pride and solidarity (Olasky, 1987; Sham, 1994). While publicity and promotion certainly played a role in these community building endeavors, personal relationships and face-to-face interactions were perhaps even more critical. And this is entirely consistent with the personal influence model of communication. As Wilson (1996) explained, “publics are made up of living, breathing, somewhat intelligent individuals” (p. 69). Persuasive efforts to manipulate these publics through mass communication, she added, fail to acknowledge this fact.

In the late 1800s, the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies (1971) developed a typology of community and society. He distinguished between the actual terms, community and society: the concept of community he viewed as a consensus of wills based on harmony and moral values; society, by contrast, is founded on a convergence of rational wills safeguarded by legislation and finding its justification in so-called public opinion. Wilson (1996) stated that as the United States moved into the industrial era,

Society was necessary for America’s particular approach to growth in a capitalist economy and the accompanying technological advancement and affluence enjoyed in the United States. At the same time, Tonnies believed that the transition to society required relinquishing community—our connectedness and cooperative relationships. The result was the isolation and alienation of the individual (p. 72).

Before mass society and its isolations began to occur, this community building observed by Tonnies (1971) and Wilson (1996) was prevalent. Although controversial, Marvin Olasky’s (1987) alternate interpretation of history pointed out the impact of community and its inherent personal influences in early U.S. society. As one who criticized the notion of a “public interest” as represented in Tonnies’ concept of society, Olasky noted that the corporate world has often manipulated publics for self-serving purposes. One of the first attempts was when the railroad industry “began using public relations to gain government support and protection of their enterprises” (p. 4). Ever since, Olasky argued, powerful corporations have used public relations to stifle competition, persuade government to create regulations that serve their interests, and manipulate publics in a variety of other ways. Olasky’s assessment is not generally accepted among public relations scholars and practitioners—but he did provide hints about how a natural communal environment, where personal influence reigned supreme, was replaced around the turn of the 20th century by the somewhat sanitized and impersonal activities of mass communication and its natural offshoot, persuasion.

Perhaps one reason that personal influence does not appear in writings about early U.S. public relations is that the term public relations did not become commonplace until midway through the 20th century. Therefore, many early activities that we might now link with relationship building and personal influence would not have been recorded or couched within literature that would subsequently be recognized or used by public relations scholars.
For example, many early community building activities took place in a decentralized, voluntary environment, rather than within any scenario of paid public relations. In the 1820s, Lafayette, a hero of the American Revolution, came from his native land of France and toured the budding nation. As Olasky (1987) noted, “There was no central planning committee to make the arrangements. Each community invited Lafayette on its own and made preparations to receive him properly” (p. 8). Influential citizens of each town presented invitations to Lafayette and committees were formed to handle various aspects of his journey. Some communities used the event to raise funds, but many welcomed the hero simply to express gratitude. Some efforts involved publicity, most not; but in every community, face-to-face interaction and someone’s influence was used to attract Lafayette and to help the welcoming events flourish. As Olasky wrote, “throughout the year of Lafayette’s ‘pilgrimage of liberty,’ arrangements were made, speeches were written, the press was used artfully, brochures were produced, funds were collected and distributed, public opinion was sounded, and a ‘good time was had by all,’ without professional public relations counsel” (p. 9).

Even Cutlip (1995), when framing his histories toward persuasive public relations, suggested that pre-20th century public relations mirrored the interpersonal communication that had to foster that early agrarian environment of the United States. “Public relations,” he wrote, “began when people came to live together in tribal camps where one’s survival depended on others of the tribe. To function, civilization requires communication, conciliation, consensus, and cooperation—the bedrock fundamentals of the public relations function” (p. x). Most communication scholars certainly would agree that all of these C-words take place within a context of interpersonal communication, which by sheer nature invokes two-way interaction. However, while recognizing these interactions as fundamental to the field, Cutlip quickly discredited their impact. “Earlier histories of public relations have usually telescoped and oversimplified a fascinating and complex story by tending to emphasize novelty and personalities,” he said (p. x).

Within Cutlip’s (1995) histories, a reader can discern hidden examples of personal influence. In his chapter on hype, he discussed the need for settlers to obtain funds so they could build a colony in Georgia. The colonists used publicity to gain favor from the governing trustees of Georgia so as to raise these needed funds. But one of the colonists’ first steps in appealing to these British trustees was to have ministers deliver sermons at meetings of the trustees—no doubt counting on the ministers’ personal influence and the inherent credibility of their positions. Then Cutlip recounted how publication of the legend of Daniel Boone helped drive settlers to the frontiers of what is now Kentucky, but face-to-face interaction precipitated the publicity. “The Boone legend has its roots in a chance meeting in a little log cabin in Lexington in 1783 between two men … Daniel Boone, intrepid frontier scout, and John Filson, a school teacher from Brandywine in Pennsylvania… Boone looked forward to the opportunity for retreats to Filson’s room, where he reflected on his Kentucky adventures for a sympathetic listener” (pp. 12-13). While Cutlip then proceeded to describe Filson’s
desires to promote Boone’s adventures, he downplayed the interpersonal genesis of the story and the personal influence that both Boone and Filson certainly brought to those conversations.

Cutlip’s (1994) other history, *The Unseen Power*, contains numerous situations where personal influence played a role in public relations outcomes—he just did not see them as personal influence activities. For example, the early counselor Ben Sonnenberg often used his influence in interpersonal interactions to accomplish his goals. Cutlip quoted the historian Leon Harris (1979), who described Sonnenberg as “America’s most successful and most colorful public relations man … [who] was paid enormous fees by corporations and by individuals because his advice was unorthodox” (Cutlip, 1994, p. 343). Just a few of his accomplishments included: (1) persuading Oscar Weintraub, manager of the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City, to hire him to promote the new hotel; (2) talking executives of Texaco into sponsoring radio broadcasts of the Metropolitan Opera and countering reports that Texaco’s chief executive was a Nazi sympathizer; and (3) helping his friend Stanley Marcus, founder of the retail chain Neiman-Marcus. Marcus once said, “I learned more from Ben Sonnenberg about life and business than from any other person except my father” (quoted by Cutlip, 1994, p. 359). As a result, Sonnenberg gained a reputation for delivering on his promises and stimulated word-of-mouth recommendations for his services. No doubt all of these accomplishments came about because of Sonnenberg’s influence with elite decision makers.

Cutlip related numerous other stories of more than a dozen public relations pioneers in the U.S. Most of the stories explained how the pioneers used their influence and reputation to help the organizations they served to achieve their goals. Yet, ironically, the importance of personal influence never gained any real attention in Cutlip’s books—they were mentioned almost in passing or as background information—because he was focusing on the power of publicity. Most of this publicity, however, never would have occurred without these public relations pioneers using their personal influence to obtain it.

Additional research identifies efforts of the late 1800s and early 1900s to form what Wilson (1996) referred to as *strategic cooperative communities*—cooperatives and associations established by likeminded influential toward the fulfillment of mutual objectives. For a cooperative to be successful, at least some of those organizing individuals need to have the credibility and trust of the others to be able to advance the mutually desired initiative. They must have the requisite influence to rally the support of others with similar interests and, in most cases, to then persuade government leaders and other decision makers to support the cause. Cooperatives of this sort, headed by these influential individuals, were instrumental in moving forward some of the early social and commercial causes of early America.

Among the innumerable cooperative efforts from post-Civil War into the 1900s, a few are worth noting. For example, most historical perspectives on the automobile industry would rightly laud Henry Ford’s production of inexpensive autos for the masses (Cutlip, 1994). But equally important was the voluntary creation of groups to promote transportation and satisfy the need for good, safe
roads across the country. Before the advent of the automobile, the League of American Wheelmen was founded in 1880 by two men who wanted to advance the cause of bicyclists and provide a forum for bicyclists to share experiences. The group persists today as the League of American Bicyclists, using various techniques to lobby governments for safer transportation and for better bicycling communities around the nation (Stanford Braff, 2007).

In 1895, the American Motor League became the first automotive association in the U.S. At the time the development of “horseless carriages” was haphazardly proceeding with dozens of potential manufacturers. Charles King, the influential founder of the League, wanted an entity that fostered the development of these autos. One of the main problems was that news media were publishing misleading technical information that made the developers look bad. Through individual visits to the newsrooms as well as through their own publications, King and his League members counteracted the false reports and restored the reputation of the automobile. King also held conventions where technical papers could be submitted and facilitated exchanges of ideas to help develop the automobile. The League, which became the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce in 1911, also started efforts to influence legislatures on state and national levels to create safer automotive travel (May, 1975).

Voluntary organizations also cropped up in the agricultural arena as it evolved from small family tracts to the larger cooperatives. The first came as early as 1785; with more than 90 percent of U.S. settlers involved in farming, the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture was organized to teach proper farming to new landowners and to promote colonial agriculture to the rest of the world. It was apparent from the outset that personal influence would be paramount in fostering this organization. “Most of the well-to-do gentlemen who organized the Society had traveled in Europe and were informed of scientific and economic progress abroad,” said Fletcher (p. 10). The Society was “not intended to include working farmers but only wealthy patrons of agriculture who could use their country estates to experiment and to test new methods developed at home and abroad. It was the conviction of these gentlemen … to do anything in their power to make agriculture, the chief source of the national wealth, more prosperous (p. 11).

While similar farming societies were organized in different colonies, only the Philadelphia Society survived. As Fletcher (1976) explained, “Some of the most epochal developments in American agriculture … may be traced to the activities of the little band of gentlemen farmers who comprised the Society. In addition to its important contributions to the improvement of farm practice, it was chiefly instrumental in the organization of many other agricultural societies and public agencies for the promotion of agricultural education and research” (p. 5). To this day, Fletcher added, many of the initiatives developed by this Society of influential farmers, including Pennsylvania State University, persist in U.S. agricultural circles.

There are lessons in these early activities that suggest the important role of personal influence in U.S. public relations history. One of the lessons from the voluntary cooperative efforts just
discussed, for example, is that the focus of many public relations historians on promotion or persuasion has caused the influence of the more interpersonal aspects of public relations to be overlooked. While the mass media of the day certainly were utilized by practitioners in a variety of ways, it is likely that the practitioners also used their personal influence to attract clients, to intervene on behalf of their clients through various face-to-face communication techniques, and to help move the opinions of influential decision makers to achieve organizational and societal goals. It even can be argued that ethical public relations was found more in moments of personal influence than in attempts to use mass media. As Olasky (1987) said, “Volunteers would carry out public relations labors because they were believed to be useful, not because they were paid for…. The past practice of voluntaristic public relations holds before us the concept that individuals should advocate only what they believe” (p. 13).

Although the overall impact of these interpersonal efforts may have been downplayed in U.S. history, the term personal influence itself shows up among the classics of United States communication literature. While not specifically attached to public relations practices, the concept is embodied in the book with the very title, Personal Influence, published around the same time as the term public relations was just beginning to gain widespread usage. During World War II, social science scholars Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) identified personal influence as a major element in American conversation and activity, still overriding even the emerging modern mass media system in importance for community decision making.

Even in those days, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) were able to acknowledge that “in underdeveloped areas … face-to-face contacts probably play a more important role than they do in Western society” (p. 3). However, they then described a study conducted in Ohio just before the beginning of the war in which they intended to identify the importance of mass media on presidential campaigns. Instead, what they found surprised them: “[The] study had focused attention on … persons who were influential in their immediate environments, but not necessarily prominent within the total community. The importance of this kind of leadership was discovered almost accidentally…. The findings of that study indicated that the effect of the mass media was small as compared to the role of personal influences” (p. 3). The authors then added that “there was ample evidence that these decisions [about voting and politics] were strongly influenced by the advice and suggestions of others whom the voters met in the course of their daily lives. For it develops that, in all walks of life, there are persons who are especially likely to lead to the crystallization of opinion in their fellows” (p. 3).

From their research, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) concluded that personal influence played an enormous role in the advancement of U.S. society, and that the emerging industry of public relations helped foster that advancement. They stated:

The way in which people influence each other is not only affected by the primary groups within which they live; it is co-determined by the broad institutional setting of the American scene…. It is not only the legislator, but also public opinion at large, which is being influenced, and the target is not only legislation, but also the choices and general
attitudes of the ultimate consumers. Whole new professions, such as advertising and public relations, have grown up in this connection. But purposive activities of this kind are not the only ones which are relevant for our topic. The beauty parlor, the disc jockey, the department store, while intended as means of selling commodities become, derivatively, agencies which affect the styles of life and way of thinking of those whom they influence. (pp. 9-10)

With their study, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) struck closest to the role of personal influence in public relations activities in early U.S. history. Because their studies were in the middle of the 20th century, it is apparent that personal influence practices existed on U.S. soil not only in the earliest days but into the widespread emergence of modern-day public relations. Also interestingly, while even then Katz and Lazarsfeld saw the strong role of personal influence in the cultures of developing nations, as is the stereotype noted by Falconi et al. (2009) today, their research also unveiled the use of personal influence in public relations and the impact of that influence in U.S. communities.

Recasting U.S. Public Relations through Personal Influence

Still today, significant public relations activity in the U.S. consists of individuals or organizations seeking favor from those in government and other bases of power. With more than 12,000 registered lobbyists and $3 billion spent annually by numerous organizations for lobbying at the federal level alone (Open Secrets, 2012), it would be difficult to refute their use of personal influence in offices throughout Washington, D.C. in attempts to gain support. These same activities also are carried out daily at state and local levels. Meanwhile, chief executive officers, executive directors, public affairs professionals, and others regularly participate in ongoing activities of chambers of commerce and other industry and community associations, using personal influence to help organizations elicit favor from political elites. Public relations officers maintain relationships with reporters, bloggers, and myriad traditional and social media sources to keep their organization in the eye of important stakeholders. Development officers regularly cultivate personal relationships with wealthy individuals to raise funds for their respective organizations. And the list of personal influence activities goes on, in confirmation of Falconi et al.’s (2009) assertion that personal influence endeavors in public relations are universal—including, it can be supposed, in the United States.

Given that social media is reducing the influence of traditional media and of one-way, controlled messaging, it may be time to reinterpret the impacts of interpersonal communication and the use of personal influence in early relationship building efforts. While many of these activities did not even show up under the domain of public relations, they are nevertheless important to identify and understand. Burson (2004) called for “developing people who can deliver on the full promise of public relations,” adding that “it is no longer enough to train ourselves to be communicators whose principal role is disseminating information. Rather we must prepare ourselves to be advisors and counselors serving as two-way interlocutors between our employers and their stakeholders” (p. 12).
Falconi (2006) advocated a return to strategic principles that foster relationships, rather than simply disseminating information.

Starck and Kruckeberg (2001) challenged the reputation of public relations as an all-powerful persuasive communication tool. This widespread acceptance of the transmission model, they said, “has the communicator doing something (persuading? advocating? to someone)” (p. 57). They claimed that as corporations get larger and spread farther around the world, it will be increasingly imperative to eliminate this old paradigm of all-powerful communication and replace it with dialogic communication that does not seek to control but to gain mutual understanding. This need will exist not to show that corporations want to be altruistic, but it will be imposed by societies that demand reciprocity as a prerequisite for corporate survival. Furthermore, as societal problems become more intense and more global, the solutions to these problems most likely will not come from one-way promotion by corporations, but from careful, persistent dialogue by persons whose credibility comes from their own personal influence.
References


Advertising Value Equivalence – PR’s orphan metric

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ABSTRACT

Although the academic approach to measurement and evaluation has mostly favoured social science methodologies (Broom & Dozier, 1990; Stacks, 2002; Michaelson & Stacks, 2011), there has been persistent and widespread practice use of Advertising Value Equivalence (AVE) to express the value of public relations activity for decades. Recent data (Daniels & Gaunt, 2009) found that AVE was used by 35% of a large international sample of practitioners.

Early significant US practitioners, including Ivy L. Lee and Arthur W. Page, instituted media monitoring of programme outputs and AT&T, led by Page, developed sophisticated opinion researching to guide and monitor its communication activity (Cutlip 1994). Literature in the 1930s and 1940s indicate that these practices were extant, especially basic monitoring of media coverage (Batchelor, 1938).

There are indications that AVE was in use from the 1940s onward and possibly beforehand as a subsidiary claim of performance, especially amongst press agents. Plackard and Blackmon (1947) refer to it in the US and provide an example of its calculation. In the UK, the first identified warning against AVE came in a 1949 edition of the IPR Journal (J. L’Etang, personal communication, January 10, 2011). Both sources thus indicate it was an established practice by mid-century, although it did not surface in professional or quasi-academic literature till the late 1960s. AVE was further operationalized by the emergence of computer based analysis, such as offered by PR Data, in the mid-1960s (Tirone, 1977). From that decade onwards, its use became widespread, as indicated by industry coverage of awards (Merims, 1972), case studies and award case studies.

Latterly, AVE has been directly challenged by the Barcelona Declaration’s Principle 5 which stated that “AVEs are Not the Value of Public Relations” (AMEC, 2010). It added that AVEs “do not measure the value of public relations and do not inform future activity; they measure the cost of media space and are rejected as a concept to value public relations.” Time will tell whether AVE is replaced by other, valid metrics.
This paper investigates the evolution of AVE, which has long been classed as an orphan with no known parents, and postulates whether it arose from clippings agencies, press agentry or from other influences on public relations, such as advertising and product promotion.

Keywords: AVE, evaluation, measurement, public relations
Introduction

AVE is a disputed method of calculating the value of public relations activity in the form of editorial publicity. “AVEs are calculated by multiplying the column centimetres of editorial print coverage and seconds of broadcast publicity by the respective media advertising rates. In most applications, the total amount of coverage is ‘valued’ as if it was advertising, irrespective of its tone and content” (Macnamara, 2008, p. 1). Although widely used by practitioners, it has never been considered to be a valued research method in academic literature (Watson & Noble, 2007). Some commentators are highly critical of it. McKeown (1995) describes it as “an early attempt to assign spurious monetary values to media relations activities” (p. 149) whilst Philips (2001) refers to it as “voodoo”, “make-believe” and “inventive nonsense” (p. 227). Lindenmann (2006) added to the dismissal of AVE’s validity by arguing that the notion of equivalence was not reciprocal: “opportunity to ‘buy’ advertising in space that has been specifically allocated to editorial coverage simply does not exist” (p. 21). It is, however, widely used by practitioners, mostly for product-oriented publicity activity. This author recently judged regional public relations awards in the UK (December 2011) and found that the vast majority of entries were setting objectives and measuring results in terms of AVE.

Although the academic approach to measurement and evaluation has mostly favoured social science methodologies (Broom & Dozier, 1990, Stacks, 2002; Michaelson & Stacks, 2011), there has been persistent and widespread use of Advertising Value Equivalence (AVE) by practitioners to express the financial value of public relations activity for decades.

In July 2010, the public relations industry began the process of barring future use of Advertising Value Equivalence (AVE) as a methodology for the measurement of public relations effectiveness with the adoption of the Barcelona Principles for PR Measurement (AMEC, 2010). In the following year, the International Association for the Measurement and Evaluation of Communication (AMEC) used the term “outlawed” (AMEC, 2011). In this set of seven principles supported by 92% of delegates at the Second European Summit on Measurement held in Barcelona in June 2010, principle 5 was that: “AVEs are not the value of public relations”. The statement supporting this principle said:

Advertising Value Equivalents (AVEs) do not measure the value of public relations and do not inform future activity; they measure the cost of media space and are rejected as a concept to value public relations (AMEC, 2010).

There has been an air of moral outrage about the longevity of AVEs despite their debunking by academic researchers and serious practitioners. Shortly after the event, Robert W. Grupp writing a
commentary about the Barcelona Principles for the Institute for Public Relations (IPR) commented that “The legitimate intent here is not to debate the validity of AVEs (which simply measure the cost of media space) but to move beyond this measure once and for all” (Grupp, 2010). During the second half of 2010, other organizations in the public relations sector moved quickly to support the Barcelona Principles, especially in regard to AVE. The Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) supported the initiative (PRSA, 2010). In the United Kingdom, the Chartered Institute for Public Relations (CIPR), which represents individual members, and the Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA), the trade body for PR consultancies and in-house communication departments, both decided on new policy to cease recognizing AVE as a valid measurement technique.

In November 2010, CIPR’s CEO Jane Wilson gave strong organizational support:

AVEs cannot be a part of serious business communication because they have no relevance to the value, financial or otherwise, of an organisation. They don't reflect what has actually been achieved. With any successful communications campaign there has to be a tangible result if it is to be deemed successful. Whether it's a product or a perception, something has to have shifted (CIPR 2010).

CIPR undertook to lead policy on measurement and evaluation. It identified entries to its annual awards programme as the route to enforce its policy by stating that “AVEs will no longer be deemed an acceptable form of measurement and evaluation (M&E), and judges will be briefed to this effect when shortlisting each category's entries” (CIPR 2010). PRCA’s chair Sally Costerton announced that evaluation would be at the heart of best practices. In a news release, PRCA said.

Endorsing the AMEC-PRSA new evaluation framework, Costerton revealed that the PRCA will embed evaluation within its own Awards, and within Consultancy Management Standard - the global mark of PR professionalism, created by the PRCA, and adopted in more than a dozen countries around the world (PRCA, 2010).

In addition to these national public relations organizations, the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management, which is the umbrella body for national public relations professional bodies, belatedly announced the Barcelona Principles as a new “global measurement standard” in April 2011 (Global Alliance, 2011).

Yet, only a year before the decision to outlaw the use of AVE, research had shown that it was a widely used metric. In Berlin in July 2009, the First European Summit on Measurement had been told that an international study of more than 500 public relations practitioners found that AVEs were the third most
popular measurement method for judgment of communication effectiveness, after clippings counts and internal reviews, and the first amongst methods of judging the value of public relations activity. AVE had risen from fifth place to third in the five years since the previous study. Some 35% of respondents were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with it as a measurement tool and are very loyal to it (Daniels & Gaunt, 2009).

This aim of this paper is to explore the origins of the AVE by considering the development of public relations measurement and evaluation methods and theory, and discussing possible influences and routes by which it became so obviously popular amongst practitioners. It will become apparent that it has never been given credibility by academics and serious practitioners (Macnamara, 2008; Paine, 2003) and was not proposed by the pioneers of public relations in any major countries. Indeed, for over 60 years there have been warnings against its use. But it has thrived and grown to be one of the mostly used judgments of effectiveness. AVE really is an illegitimate offspring of public relations, without a family heritage and few credentials, but aligned closely to that slightly wild world of publicity and consumer public relations where communication management and Excellence theory are unknown concepts. Watson has referred to it as “a pernicious weed” (Geddes, 2011). However, a long tradition of media monitoring and of the use of clipping counts as a proxy methods of public relations effectiveness may give some clues as to its illicit origins.

**Early monitoring practices**

Lamme and Russell (2010) argue that from George Washington onwards, US presidents monitored newspapers in order to gain intelligence on what was being said about them and the views of fellow citizens. In the 19th century, industries and groups from railroads to temperance societies and evangelists also tracked media coverage and public opinion. In the US and UK, news cuttings agencies were established in the latter part of the century. From some, there is lineage to today’s international computer-based evaluation companies.

As the 20th century started, publicity agencies began to be formed in the United States. Cutlip (1994) dates the first as the Publicity Bureau in Boston in 1900. One of its major clients from 1903 onwards was American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) based in the same city. AT&T and its agency “early saw the need for systematically gauging public opinion … collected and studied newspaper clippings from the nation’s press” (Cutlip, 1994, p. 18). It found that 90% were antagonistic. By modifying company behaviour and disseminating “real information through the press”, AT&T gradually reduced the negative coverage to “sixty percent and lower” (ibid, p. 18). In its work for railroad interests, the Publicity Bureau systematically monitored and influenced press coverage. Titled ‘The Barometer’, it
created a card index of the attitudes of editors, gained from visits, and media usage of publicity material. This allowed the agency to judge “whether a paper is “Good” or “Bad” from the standpoint of the railroads” (ibid, p. 21).

The pioneer of US public relations practice, Ivy L. Lee, who formed two of the earliest public relations advisory firms, took the view that he was engaged in an art (Hiebert, 1966) whereas another pioneer, Edward L. Bernays, saw public relations as an applied social science (Ewen, 1996; Tye, 1998). Bernays presented public relations as an applied social science to be planned through opinion research and precisely evaluated. There is, however, little discussion of measurement and evaluation of campaign effectiveness in his books and papers. The first book, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, (Bernays, 1923) set the foundations for a systematic approach to public relations (Pavlik, 1987). Advertising and the publicity side of public relations both expanded rapidly in the 1920s promoted by pioneers such as Lee and Bernays and through books on publicity and public relations. Bernays’ books and Lee’s privately published *Publicity Some of the Things It Is and Is Not* (Lee, 1925) were well known along with R.H. Wilder and K.L. Buell’s *Publicity* (Wilder & Buell, 1923) and several other books.

**Opinion research**

Although cuttings agencies monitored press coverage for clients, there was little discussion of the measurement and evaluation of publicity or public relations activity. It was the former magazine editor, Arthur W. Page, who introduced systematic opinion research into corporate public relations and organisational communication at AT&T. Although AT&T had been using opinion polling shortly before Page joined it, he championed the use of surveys which were to be an important factor in developing a customer-facing culture at the telecommunications giant. “He deserves credit for recognizing the need for feedback and encouraging development of systems to gauge the moods of AT&T’s publics. Integration of formal feedback systems into the public relations function is one of his contributions to public relations practise” (Griese 2001, p. 122).

AT&T continued to monitor media, although the examples are much less prevalent than the use of opinion surveys. Griese (2001) identified two studies of the use by newspapers of “clipsheets” (broadsheets with several AT&T news items which editors would select and send to typesetters) in 1932 and 1933. These were measured by the number of items published and the total of column inches of coverage. “Whilst the column inches of publicity a corporation gets are not a reliable indicator of the amount of good will being built, these studies show AT&T’s practice of systematically evaluating public relations devices” (Griese 2001, p. 153).
Page created a “public relations laboratory where PR successes and failures were gathered, studied and the lessons learnt passed on to his colleagues at AT&T” (Broom and Dozier, 1990, p. xi). This approach continued after his retirement in 1947 until the telephone monopoly was broken up in the late 1970s. It is notable, however, that AT&T was not measuring the results of communication activity (Tedlow, 1979). Page used the term ‘public relations’ in an organisationally holistic manner with a strong emphasis on the corporation understanding “the overall relations with the public it served” (Griese, 2001, p. 195). In 1938 he explained it further: “The task which business has, and which it has always had, of fitting itself to the pattern of public desires, has lately come to be called public relations” (ibid, p. 195).

Influence of advertising

Tedlow’s discussion of the nascent relationship of advertising and public relations may indicate formative influences on evolution of AVEs. He argues there was a tension between the advertiser who bought media space and press agents/publicists. The advertiser could “be absolutely certain that the message appeared therein. When he hired a publicity man to concoct a stunt, he could not be sure whether or how the papers would carry it” (Tedlow, 1979, p. 171). Later he discusses the media owners’ dislike of press agents, whom they called “space grabbers” (p. 177). They were not only recruiting their journalists to better-paid jobs but were also able to get coverage in their pages at the third of the cost of advertising space. “One estimate was that if a press agent could deliver equal linage to an advertisement at one-third the cost of paid space, advertising would end and with it newspaper revenue and reader confidence” (p. 177). In the first 30 years of the last century in the US, there is an obvious connection in the minds of advertisers, media owners, press agents and publicists that there is a relationship that expresses value equivalence between media coverage and advertising, whether it is in the fears of the media owners or its promotion by press agents and publicists panning for business from clients. It is not a large step for informal methods of calculating values from press clippings provided by myriad city-based and regional services to be introduced without reference to social scientists or experts in statistical validity. In the absence of specific archival information indicating a start date or action that created AVEs, this is a thesis that can be considered.

Media analysis by government

By the late 1930s, a wide range of measurement and evaluation methods were being used in the United States, notably by various levels of government. Batchelor (1938) provided two examples of the monitoring and interpretation of media publicity.
The Roosevelt Administration gives close attention not merely to the technique of publicity dissemination but also to the manner of its reception. In other words, it watches carefully all changes in the political attitudes of a community. The sum of these numerous local impressions constitutes, of course, a barometer of national opinion that possesses great value. (p. 212) [The method of data collection is not identified by Batchelor].

He also discussed Toledo Associates, which was a “cooperative publicity effort, sponsored by local business interests” set up to promote the city of Toledo, Ohio during the Great Depression.

Toledo’s experiment in cooperative industrial publicity became an unqualified success. Ninety-one per cent of more than 72,000 clippings, representing newspaper circulations totalling more than one and half millions, were regarded as favourable to the city’s interests (p. 214).

So it can be seen that at high levels of national and city government, measurement and evaluation were taking place using methods that are still in place today.

Evaluation practices to 1950

As can be seen, public relations practitioners and organisations had monitored press coverage of their own and others activities from early times. In 1942, Harlow wrote those public relations practitioners and their employers “should not be impressed by sheaves of press clippings” (p. 43) as a volume indicator of what was going on. Many books on public relations across the initial 40-50 year period discussed measurement of the volume of coverage, its length in column inches and whether it was positive or negative. Plackard and Blackmon gave this (dubious) advice in 1947: “The publicist must learn the art of “pepping up” publicity results. Publicity clippings as such are not sufficiently interesting to show to a client. However, they can be dressed up or dramatized in unusual ways” (p. 299). Examples given included “trick photography” by blowing cuttings up and then placing them on large sheets of folded card; graphic presentation of cuttings beneath newspaper mastheads; and displays on large boards, especially in hall corridors, all in order to emphasise the volume.

First sight of AVE?

Advertising Value Equivalence made what may be its initial appearances in text in 1947 in the US and 1949 in the UK. The nature of the references makes it clear that it was an extant practice. There may be
earlier references but they are not recorded in bibliographies such as organised by Cutlip (1965) or in the numerous texts on public relations that burgeoned in the post-World War 2 period. This paper does not claim the example to follow is the very first reference but it indicates that the use of AVE may have arisen from publicity practices carried out alongside advertising and have been promoted by clippings agencies seeking to add value to clients. Plackard and Blackmon (1947) introduced the concept of AVEs in their book, *Blueprint for Public Relations*, rather tentatively. After discussing valuable results from the “intangible realm – definitely present but not readily measured – namely good will, making friends, instilling confidence”, etc (p. 4), they presented the notion of valuing media coverage:

Only in a general way can these benefits be valued in dollars and cents. Newspaper publicity on a certain national institution may reach 100,000 inches. If all the publicity is good, an equal amount of space may be said to be worth $100,000. However, if the publicity is badly done, it could be more harmful than no publicity. (ibid, p. 4)

But later in the book, their cautious tone changed and Plackard and Blackmon provided a concrete example from a named clippings agency of the dollar valuation of media coverage, using the advertising value equivalence method:

From the results of his publicity thus obtained in the form of newspaper cuttings, he can much more effectively measure its value.

The following table is based on newspaper clippings supplied a company by the Allen Press Clippings Service. Although, like other services, Allen cannot guarantee 100 per cent return on material presented, the coverage is complete enough to present a satisfactory picture of the amount of space devoted to Company X throughout the country.

Translated into dollars and cents value to Company X at a column-inch rate of $1.06 (an average for large and small daily papers throughout the nation), the 169,629 column inches of material published in 1 year would be worth approximately $179,806.74 if purchased as display advertising. Even eliminating 50 per cent of this amount to allow for unfavourable mentions (of which there were very few) and stories not wholly devoted to Company X, the projection would result in a value of almost $90,000 being ascribed to the editorial space (p. 295)

It is notable that this exemplar uses a single national average metric for the calculation of AVE, which was a considerable task in the late 1940s when data collection was much more difficult than it is today. More recent practices, aided by computerised databases, will calculate the media coverage
according the rate cards or cost data for the specific media. Another point to note is that no multiplier is added to the calculation.

After this reference was found, the author undertook an online search to identify whether the Allen Press Clipping Service existed some 64 years after the book was published. A firm with the very similar name of Allen’s Press Clipping Bureau was identified in San Francisco and an email enquiring about the Plackard and Blackmon reference was sent to it. John N. McComb, the third generation owner of the business, replied that the firm had not prepared reports or calculations like those in the book. “I have not seen the example given. To my knowledge Allen's did not supply Ad Equivalence Reports in the 40's, 50' or even the 60's. I have worked here since 1958.” (Personal correspondence, February 2011). Mr McComb, before replying contacted a fellow veteran, Irving Paley, who had owned the American Press Clipping Bureau and the International Press Clipping Bureau in New York City. Mr Paley who had worked in the clippings businesses from 1947 “had not heard of Ad Equivalence Reports at that time …[McComb] It may have been that an individual client asked [Allen’s] for such a report and spelled out specifically what it was … Certainly the formula used portrayed very little except a guestimation of value. However the idea did catch on” (ibid).

Although a specific example AVE was found in text, it was not possible to validate its accuracy by reference to the clipping organisation named. As, however, John N. McComb noted, “the idea did catch on”.

**AVEs in the UK**

In the UK, the expansion of public relations was a post-World War 2 phenomenon. The first press agency, Editorial Services, had been set up by Basil Clarke in London in 1924 (L’Etang 2004) but the establishment and real growth of public relations came as a result of journalists and propaganda experts coming out of government and the armed forces in 1945 with knowledge of news management and propaganda methods. The Institute of Public Relations (IPR) was set up in 1948, mainly by governmental communicators in information officer posts, as the first step to professionalise their area of activity (ibid). From its outset, issues of evaluating public relations were discussed in the IPR’s *Journal*: mostly as methods of collation of cuttings and transcripts, and how to do it cheaply (J. L’Etang, personal communication, January 10, 2011). Unlike the US with its interest in social sciences and university education, there was a strong anti-intellectual streak in the IPR. This was expressed by its 1950 President Alan Hess who inveighed against “a tendency for too much intellectualisation and too much market research mumbo-jumbo” (L’Etang, 2004, p. 75). So the discussion of public relations practices was often a ‘belt-and-braces’ consideration of practical issues. In 1949, shortly after IPR started to publish its
Journal to the membership, the topic of valuing media coverage by advertising costs arose in the form of advice against its use by a founding member, F. Murray Milne:

F. Murray Milne (Wholesale Textile Association) emphasised that there should be no rivalry between public relations and advertising. It was a grave mistake for the PRO to try and evaluate his work at so many column inches calculated at advertising rates (IPR Journal, 1949, p. 4).

Later in the same edition, Milne again advised against the method:

Press cuttings are never measured in column inches and assessed at advertising rates. This practice has done more to undermine public relations than any other (IPR Journal, March 1949, p. 7).

A reasonable conclusion from Milne’s advice to fellow practitioners is that a form of AVE was already in use in the UK’s fledgling public relations sector and that it was already causing concern to industry leaders. L’Etang (2004) notes that the IPR “publicly disapproved of this method [AVE] for more than half a century. Originally their disapproval was rooted in the desire to separate the public relations occupation from that of press agentry” (p. 114). The author’s interviews with Tim Traverse-Healy, one of the few surviving founders of the UK and international public relations sector in the immediate post-World War 2 period, did not identify this form of measurement as a matter that was of interest to the British and European founders of the International Public Relations Association which came into being in 1955, after five years of negotiations. Their agenda was on higher issues such as ethics and recognition of professional standards.

In 1954, the IPR returned to the subject in a discussion of measurement of editorial publicity. The unnamed author comments:

Totting up column inches in terms of advertising still goes on. As Alan Hess [a former IPR President] has pointed out, matter of advertising nature should never be submitted for editorial use and, if it is, goes straight on the spike. Cheese cannot be compared with chalk. What matters in editorial publicity is whether the release is being read by the right people and whether they are reacting favourably (IPR Journal, October 1954).

**Hidden expansion**

By the 1950s, it can be argued that AVE was known to practitioners and probably to academics who were in touch with organisations, agencies and alumni. However, it remained an underground practice. It is not mentioned, even with a warning, in leading texts of the time, such as the first edition of Cutlip and
Center’s *Effective Public Relations* (1952) or in Edward L. Bernays’ texts of the period – *Public Relations* (1952) and *Engineering of Consent* (1955). Cutlip and Center discuss media analysis methods mainly by reference to audience measurement and message reception rather than clipping counts. Cutlip’s public relations bibliography (2nd edition, 1965) has a sub-section on Program Research and Evaluation covering 159 articles which started in 1939 and continued to the mid-1960s. There are 15 articles on mass media measurement and two on the effectiveness of clipping services. None referred to AVEs.

In Germany, the public relations pioneer Albert Oeckl discussed public relations research methods in his 1964 book, *Handbuch der Public Relations* (Handbook of Public Relation) including quantitative approaches such as coding of media coverage but not of valuation in the AVE style. In the UK, the IPR’s first text book, *A Guide to the Practice of Public Relations*, barely discusses evaluation in a chapter on media relations noting only that “the volume of press enquiries may indicate that the field is one of widespread public interest and concern” (IPR, 1958, p. 62) and recommending that analysis of press enquiries be undertaken regularly (IPR, 1958). In 1969, Frank Jefkins, a most prolific UK author of public relations books, also inveighed against the use of AVE in his trenchant style:

Nor is there any sense in trying to assess an advertisement rate-card value on editorial coverage, saying these inches would have cost so much if the space had been paid for, for the elementary reason that no-one would use the same space, the same quantity of space, or perhaps even the same media for advertising purposes. There is no logical basis for financial evaluation, although it is true that a count of inches does indicate that there was a substantial coverage of the story, and circulation figures – and readership figures, too – could be totalled to show the possible number of subscribers or readers who had an opportunity to read the report or see the pictures (Jefkins, 1969, p. 227)

Another British author, John Crisford, also attacked the valuation of “free space” as being “just plain silly”, like Jefkins indicating that it was being used widely, if not in common practice:

Should cuttings be counted? The practice of totting up column inches in the editorial columns, working out the advertising rates for a similar amount of space, and then claiming that the press office has produced so many pounds worth of “free space” is just plain silly. Statistics should, however, be kept – not to compare like with unlike, but to compare like with like” (Crisford, 1973, p. 59).

**AVEs emerge**
By the mid-1960s, there was anecdotal evidence that AVEs were being widely used by public relations operations in major organisations. John W. Felton, former CEO of the Institute for Public Relations, recalls their application in his own working experience at a major corporation:

Way back in 1966, when I was in the product publicity unit of US Steel in Pittsburgh, PA, our boss Tex Wurzbach, counted product clips we generated and equated the space we “earned free” to the amount that the same space would have cost if we had purchased it as ads. He justified our budgets for photos, travel, etc by using the amount of space we got “free” might have cost if ads had been placed. That’s not quite the same as multiplying by some number such as six but it is part of the same concept of AVEs …We generated a huge amount of clips so you can imagine how big the ad costs might have been if we had paid for that much space in major publications. He always got big budgets for us to spend! (J. Felton, personal correspondence, December 2010).

Other practitioners also recall industry use of AVEs in the 1970s and 1980s as being “in place” when they started work in agencies and organisations (L. Williams, personal correspondence, December 20, 2010; D. Michaelson, personal correspondence, December 20, 2010; S. Overcamp, December 21, 2010). Media measurement companies which had been formed from clippings agencies were also using AVEs by the mid-1970s. “Media values were pretty much in place when we got involved with BurrellesLuce in the 70s, but generally they were produced by agencies … and generally with a multiplier” (J. Waggoner, personal communication, February 9, 2011).

Service sector develops

US industry veteran Mark Weiner has commented (M. Weiner, personal communication, February 16, 2011) that PR industry growth in North American and Europe in the 1960s and 1970s was a key reason for the introduction of measurement services. Consumer public relations developed rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s during the post war economic boom, aided by the widespread access to television which had also fostered advertising’s expansion. The major US public relations groups (Barnet & Reef, Burson-Marsteller, and Hill & Knowlton) needed world-wide monitoring and management systems that gave systematic data back to client HQs. These developments led to the emergence of the service industries, especially in the measurement of PR activity. A pioneer was PR Data, formed from an internal General Electric operation by Jack Schoonover. It was the first to use computer based analysis – using punch-cards and simple programmes (Tirone, 1977). It was soon followed by other providers, mainly press cuttings agencies which became evaluators. Weiner says that the calculation of AVEs was amongst the services offered by PR Data, although not the primary service. By improving the speed and accuracy of calculation, these businesses enabled the wider use of AVE which became a mainstream topic, aided by
practitioner commentators. From the late 1960s onwards, the advertising value was often enhanced by multipliers. Ruff (1968) was one of the first to claim that non-advertising publicity could provide greater value than advertising. He undertook a comparative study of product inquiries in which promotional messages for a new product were distributed by publicity in key media and through print advertisements. “Ruff calculated publicity outperformed advertising for that … product by a seven to one ratio, but noted that for some publications the ratio was only 2.5 to one, and for others, the reverse was the case and advertising outperformed by publicity by a 2.5 to one ratio” (Macnamara, 2008, p. 2). These claims of public relations multipliers linked to AVEs were endorsed in public relations and marketing communications trade press and journals (Strenski, 1980; Bumsted, 1983).

1980s – Academic input

Following on from the initial conferences and academic journal discussion late in the previous decade, US journals came alive in the 1980s with papers on research-based measurement and evaluation methods from leading academics such as Glenn Broom (Broom & Dozier, 1983), David Dozier (Dozier, 1984, 1985), and James E. Grunig (Grunig & Hickson, 1976; Grunig 1979, 1983). From the consultancy side, Lloyd Kirban of Burson Marsteller (Kirban, 1983) and Walter Lindenmann of Ketchum (Lindenmann, 1979, 1980) were prolific and drove the subject higher on the practitioner agenda. In the UK, Jon White (1990) undertook the first study of practitioner attitudes amongst member consultancies of the Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA) and offered recommendations on ‘best practice’. All these authors emphasised the need for public relations to be researched, planned and evaluated using robust social science techniques. It was particularly fostered by Broom and Dozier’s influential Research Methods in Public Relations (Broom & Dozier, 1990).

AVEs thrive, despite education campaigns

By the early 1990s, public relations measurement and evaluation was a leading research and professional practice topic (McElreath, 1989; White & Blamphin, 2004; Synnott & McKie, 1997). There were major practitioner education initiatives in several developed countries, many linked closely to the Excellence Theory expression of public relations as communication management. However, AVEs became even more popular. “Very often high-level managers – and especially financial controllers – like this measure since it gives them results in the language they speak: dollars. As a result PR managers are often forced to use this criterion” (Leinemann & Baikaltseva, 2004, p. 59).

The late 1990s also saw the launch of extensive national campaigns to promote best practice in measurement and evaluation. The public relations consultancy bodies, PRCA and ICCO, its international
The major UK initiative was PRE-fix, a partnership between PRCA and IPR (UK) with PR Week, the weekly trade magazine. It ran for three years and was accompanied by seminars, research, online resources and best practice case studies. AMEC, then the Association of Media Evaluation Companies, was formed as a UK trade body. It is now the International Association for Measurement and Evaluation of Communications with members in nearly 40 countries, which indicates the expansion of the measurement and media analysis service industry. In the US, the IPRRE (later Institute for Public Relations) formed the Commission on Public Relations Measurement and Evaluation in 1999, which plays a major role in undertaking practice based research and disseminating it. AVEs were ignored or argued against by these bodies (Watson, 2012).

Barcelona Principles

There were further industry educational initiatives in the UK in the early part of the 21st century’s first decade with the CIPR preparing a version of its previous Evaluation Toolkit document that targeted media evaluation. The service business of media measurement and public relations effectiveness evaluation grew rapidly, mainly with corporate clients. Its debates resulted in the adoption of The Barcelona Declaration of Measurement Principles at the European Measurement Summit in June 2010 (AMEC, 2010). The Barcelona Declaration demonstrates that public relations measurement and evaluation is an important and growing service business and a long way from the local and regional cuttings agencies of 50 to 100 years ago.

Conclusion – PR sector in two parts

As noted earlier in the paper, measurement practice as evidenced by the author’s personal experience in the UK is that AVEs live on without a metaphorical Barcelona Principles stake in their heart. Their appeal is simplicity and a monetary outcome, as noted by Leinemann and Baikaltseva (2004), which is favoured by financially-minded managers. As Watson (2012) has commented: “Perhaps this signifies an immature profession, which is unconfident in its practices” (p. 17). It may also signify that the universe of public relations has for some time been separate into two distinct parts: Publicity and “PR” – a short-termist tactical approach that relies on intuition, past experience and crude metrics; and Communication Management or Organizational Communication which employs social science-led planning, research and evaluation methods in search of mutual understanding. The survival of that “pernicious AVE weed”, despite 60 years of well-researched warnings against its use, cannot be underestimated favours that interpretation.
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PRE-fix www.pre-fix.org.uk is no longer available. [31 March 2011].


Historical Development of the Public Relations Industry in Taiwan:
1950s-present

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Abstract
The growth of the public relations industry is closely related to the development of government, economy and news media, and thrives in a free society. Taiwan had been in possession of these advantages, thus the PR industry was able to become one of the quickest to develop in Asia (Wu, 2004). This study explores the historical development of the public relations industry in Taiwan from the 1950s to the present. Data were collected from literature reviews, interviews with professionals and from observers of the PR industry in Taiwan.

1. The Initial Period (1950s – 1970s): Initial development in the public relations industry relied on the government’s initial establishment of a public relations department with the objective of better communicating with the public. Taiwan’s earliest professional PR group was set up in 1956; the first PR company in 1968; the first university level PR education began in this period as well, in 1963.

2. The Dormant Period (1970s – mid 1980s): After the establishment of the PR industry in Taiwan, the government had yet to achieve the results they had hoped for. And so, in 1972, the government took measures to streamline its PR department. At this stage, the public was still fairly unfamiliar with the PR industry in Taiwan; it is for this reason that some scholars have dubbed this stage the “declining stage” in the history of Taiwan’s PR industry.

3. The Expansion Period (late 1980s – mid 1990s): The turning point in the development of Taiwan’s PR industry occurred in 1987 when the Taiwanese government announced the end of martial law. This allowed the formation of political parties and news media groups and stimulated the expansion of Taiwan’s economy and news media. Economic growth brought about similar growth in the PR industry. Media also became engaged with the PR industry, and a number of small professional PR companies were established to deal specifically with single market advertisement and sales in the medical, high-tech, banking,
and physical training industries. Political and election PR groups were also created. Many Taiwanese scholars that had studied abroad in the U.S. also returned during this period, using what they had learned abroad to train new PR professionals.

4. **The Restructuring Period (late 1990s – early 2000s):** From 1996 to 1999, Taiwan enjoyed a period of economic growth. The PR industry enjoyed similar success during this period. The number of PR companies increased along with the quality of professional PR consulting. After 2000, the PR industry saw a decrease in demand due to global economic instability. Also related to this downturn is the economic reform in Mainland China and its subsequent entrance into the global market. Mainland China’s economic growth affected the Taiwanese PR industry. This led to the redistribution of many of Taiwan’s PR professionals and thus influenced the further development of the industry. This period also saw intense competition between new small-scale PR companies and workshops, which led to disorder within the entire industry.

5. **The Transformation Period (mid 2000s – present):** After the beginning of the 21st century, the PR industry went through a complete restructuring to meet with changes in digital technology as well as the then burgeoning social media industry. Differences between old media and electronic media began to disappear, thus the PR industry needed to restructure and upgrade to meet the new needs of digital communication. After the sudden growth of social media, industries rushed to improve the ways in which they interacted with their online clients. Thus, they depended heavily on PR companies skilled in agenda-setting and relationship management. PR companies became invaluable in helping businesses communicate using social media. This has presented the current PR industry with an opportunity to reach new peaks of development.

In conclusion, we found that the first two periods of PR development in Taiwan were significantly influenced by politics for purposes of political propaganda (Wu, 2004). During the third period, a strong economy, demand from the media, activist pressures (Coombs & Holladay, 2011), and the number of PR professionals contributed to the development of the industry. We also note the importance of the web, especially of social media, in changing and empowering Taiwan’s current PR industry.
Introduction

The growth of the public relations industry is closely related to the development of government, economy and news media, and thrives in a free society. Taiwan was in possession of these advantages, thus the PR industry was able to become one of the quickest to develop in Asia (Wu, 2004; He & Xie, 2009). Compared with Mainland China, which did not begin practicing modern public relations until the economic reform in the early 1980s, Taiwan had adopted the industry 30 years earlier, in the 1950s. After six decades of development, public relations in Taiwan has emerged as a mature profession.

The progress of PR in Taiwan was influenced by politics, economic and social development, and the media environment. The developing trend of public relations in Taiwan can be roughly divided into five periods: initial (1950s-1970s), dormant (1970s - mid 1980s), expansion (late 1980s- mid 1990s), restructuring (late 1990s- early 2000s), and transformation (mid 2000s-present). The first two periods lasted over 30 years due to of the constraint of martial law. In 1987, the abolishment of the martial law opened up the period of expansion, in which professional PR developed rapidly. Unfortunately, the economic depression in Asia, starting in 1997, brought Taiwan’s PR into the stage of decline and restructuring. Not until 2009, when the social networking media was booming, did PR start transforming and become more mature.

This study explores the historical development of the public relations industry in Taiwan from the 1950s to the present. Data were collected from literature reviews, interviews with professionals and observers of the PR industry in Taiwan.

1. The Initial Period (1950s – 1970s)

The initial development in Taiwan’s public relations industry relied on the government’s establishment of public relations departments in public sectors, which began in 1949 when the KMT Party started governing Taiwan (Li, 1995). During this time, many government officials who had studied public relations in the U.S. returned to Taiwan with modern PR concepts. It was also during this time that the Taiwanese government began setting up PR sections in public organizations to better communicate with the public and facilitate government propaganda (Chang, 2004). The earliest professional PR organization in the public sector was established in the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (which incorporated postal services, telecommunications services, air travel, ship transport, rail transport, the port authority, and meteorological services) in 1953, followed by another PR department in the Ministry of Economic Affairs (including sugar corporation, electricity, and fossil fuels)(Li, 1995). In 1958, the Taiwan government announced that the central and local administrations were to designate a specialist or a special department to handle PR affairs. The PR industry
became popular during this period and began to expand into educational institutions and private enterprises (Chang, 1994).

The earliest PR education in Taiwan was at the university-level, which began in 1963 (Wu, 1998; Foundation for Public Relations, 2009). The first native PR firm was also founded in this period, in 1968.

2. The Dormant Period (1970s – mid 1980s)

Even after the establishment of the PR industry in Taiwan, the government had yet to achieve the results they had hoped for. The reason for this was that the public had little power to contest the government actions and little awareness of government actions due to martial law and strong-arm politics. And so, in 1972, the government took measures to streamline its PR department. They merged the PR departments at every level with various departments and secretarial offices, and in doing so forfeited the independent functioning and position of the PR system. However, the government proved the effectiveness of using PR for propaganda, and so they focused their use of PR on news media relations and press releases. They also stipulated that a vice senior officer serve as spokesperson for each government organization.

As to the private sector, a majority of companies had not yet established PR departments during this period. The reason was that at that founding stage, 98% of the corporations in Taiwan were small and medium-sized enterprises and thus had little need to practice public relations. The exceptions to this trend were branches of foreign corporations such as IBM and Du Pont. PR professionals in the private sector were especially rare, though at the same time there was little demand for such professionals. International PR companies from Europe and the U.S. (Ogilvy & Mather) entered Taiwan at this time and provided brand advertising services for international companies (Zang & Kong, 1989).

At this stage, Taiwan began to modernize and its economy developed rapidly, which set the stage for the subsequent development of important stages in the PR industry. At this stage, the many circumstances in Taiwan, including the economy, improved, and industry became more advanced. The government began promoting the development of industries dealing in fossil fuel, nuclear power, and high tech. It was only after this development that the PR industry had the requisite foundations for quick expansion. This is why some scholars believe that this stage was a “foundational period” or a “period of economic influence” in the development of Taiwan’s PR industry (Li, 1995). Moreover, the Taiwanese public was still fairly unfamiliar with the PR industry; it is for this reason that some scholars have also dubbed this time a “period of decline” in the history of Taiwan’s PR industry (Li, 1995; Wu, Lin, & Kuo, 2003)
3. The Expansion Period (late 1980s – mid 1990s)

The turning point in the development of Taiwan’s PR industry occurred in 1987 when the Taiwanese government announced the end of martial law. The economy, society, and mass media all opened up following the lifting of martial law. Taiwanese society became more liberal-oriented and the economy went through rapid growth, which brought about vigorous growth in the PR industry. Many Taiwanese scholars who had studied abroad in the U.S. also returned during this period, using what they had learned abroad to train new PR professionals. To sum up, the characteristics of expansion in the PR industry during this period include:

**The rapid increase in the number of PR companies and marked competition between international and local PR groups**

Before 1987 there were only about six registered PR companies in Taiwan. By 1993, this number surpassed fifty. (Zang, 1989; Huang, 1994; Wu, Lin, & Kuo, 2003). Foreign PR companies entered the Taiwan market during this period, including companies such as Hill & Knowlton and Burson-Marsteller. Many European- and American-based PR groups also established companies in Taiwan during this period, which then competed on equal grounds with two of Taiwan’s larger PR groups, Elite PR Group and Pilot Group (Xie, 2005a, b; Yan, 2006). Advertising agencies even began setting up PR departments to win over the advertiser’s PR work (Zhao, 1994).

**The emergence of the small and specialized PR service agencies**

A number of small professional PR companies were established to deal specifically with single market advertisement and sales in the medical, high-tech, banking, and physical-training industries. Political and election PR groups were also created.

**Recognition of the importance of Corporate Social Responsibility and Risk Management, which allowed further development in the PR industry**

After the lifting of martial law and the opening up of a market governed by free speech, the public and private sectors began to feel pressure from laborers, consumers and a society that was more conscious of the rights of the citizen; with the addition of environmentalism and other global movements, corporate image and social responsibility moved into the social eye. As a result of these varied changes, PR became that much more necessary (Zang & Kong, 1989). During this period there occurred a string of corporate crises that caused companies to feel the need for crisis management and better communication with the public. These companies commissioned various PR companies to handle such needs.
Creation of university-level PR courses and private sector foundations that supported teaching of PR concepts

PR courses began to open at four-year universities during this period, which brought more professionally trained workers into the PR field. Private sector groups also brought together PR workers from the professional world, academia, and government; these various workers came together to establish PR foundations with the objective of raising the field’s level of professionalism. This time also saw the first professional PR publication, *PR Magazine*.

4. The Restructuring Period (late 1990s – early 2000s)

The 1990s were a period of restructuring for the PR field in Taiwan. From 1996 to 1999, Taiwan enjoyed a period of economic growth. The PR industry also enjoyed similar success during this period, as companies were more liberal with their budget allocations for PR work. The number of PR companies also increased during this period, along with the quality of professional PR consulting. In addition to media relations, fields such as issue management and risk management became developed, which led to the PR industry becoming more proficient in professional consulting. After 2000, Taiwan was caught up in the Asian Financial Crisis. As a result, the Taiwanese economy saw its first ever signs of negative growth along with a fall in the growth rate for each of its industries. Companies were more prudent when budgeting for PR work, which naturally meant a decrease in the demand for the PR industry as a whole. Another challenge the industry faced during this period was absorption of economic resources after Mainland China implemented a market economy: Taiwan’s industries were drawn into Mainland China on a large-scale, leading to a runoff of funds and deindustrialization. This caused a recession in the PR industry in Taiwan.

But, in January of 2002, Taiwan became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), after which the markets in Taiwan opened up and taxes were lowered. This change in the economy drew in more foreign companies and products into the Taiwanese market. Industrial structures had to undergo many revisions and transitions during this period; similarly, PR companies also had to face their own changes and challenges:

**Growth in the PR Field**

The opening of the markets after Taiwan became a WTO member can be seen as a positive matter for the PR industry, though the entire Taiwanese economy would have to improve before it could attract more foreign investment and drive the growth of connected industries.
Greater demand for localizational PR

As international companies entered the Taiwanese market they needed to become familiar with the PR agencies operating locally in order to administrate effectively. However these international companies were often operating all over Asia, not only in Taiwan. And so, localization became a critical factor for the international merchants. This need provided local PR agencies great chances for expansion. Also, local PR agencies sought out both local and global association networks in order to deal with a rise in business from abroad.

A rise in the level of professionalism

After Taiwan had become a member of the WTO, the market opened up and competition within the market increased. There was also a rise in the demand for PR work as well as an increased need for PR companies to globalize. In addition to this, the need for PR “consulting” became more pressing by the day and eventually replaced the need for lower-level “administrating” (Wang, 2002).

After 2000, the PR industry saw a decrease in demand due to global economic instability. Also related to this downturn is the economic reform in Mainland China and its subsequent entrance into the global market. Mainland China’s economic growth affected the Taiwanese PR industry, which led to the redistribution of many of Taiwan’s PR professionals and influenced the further development of the industry. This period also saw intense competition between newly established, small-scale PR companies and workshops, which caused disorder within the entire industry.

5. The Transformation Period (mid 2000s – present)

In the period following 2000, both the Taiwanese economy and the local PR industry went through a transformation. In terms of economic changes, Taiwan was impacted by both the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, which directly beset Taiwan’s high tech OEM sector (the country’s economic lifeline), and caused it to depreciate. The Taiwanese economy of this period was already highly developed, which meant that Taiwan had to find another path on which to develop out of the economic aftermath. To accomplish this, the Taiwanese government drafted plans in hopes to transform the economy from one based on OEM to one based on value-added manufacturing. According to the Directorate-General of Budget Accounting and Statistics of the Executive Yuan, the 2009 Nominal GDP of the service industry in Taiwan made up over 68% of the total Taiwanese economy, which was economically similar to other service-based economies like the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands. On the industry side, economy and industry slowly
ceased to develop through several isolated markets and began to develop with cooperation between disciplines and even between different locations. This was done in order to get on track with regional economic integration and globalization of the knowledge economy (Xie, 2011).

In the beginning of 2010, Asia’s burgeoning economy grew by leaps and bounds, becoming the world leader in economic growth (Hua, 2012). In September of that year, Taiwan and Mainland China officially adopted the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or ECFA, which opened up the market of each country for mutual benefit. Under this plan, Taiwan gained an edge over competing countries in accessing the markets in Mainland China. ECFA later caused a domino effect within Eastern Asian in terms of the speed with which economies were integrating (Zhao, 2010). In February of 2011, Mainland China surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world (China Review News, 2011).

The PR industry in Taiwan, set against a backdrop of economic growth and industry transformation, also experienced its own growth and transformation. Public relations practice started to take on an important role and sometimes a leading role in marketing plans by means of only a small budget to produce a proportionately large effect. It also (Wu, 2009a). This was especially true with the emergence of social media, which became a determining factor in the transformation and advancement of the PR industry in Taiwan. The characteristics of the PR industry during this period include:

**Movement toward integrated, one-stop shop services**

The PR industry began offering an increasing number of services during this period. To cut costs while increasing the quality of service, “integrated PR companies” were rapidly developed, while PR companies in part turned to “group-oriented development.” In terms of operation, PR companies used a multivalent, yet coordinated, system of services to be able to do the overall planning for marketing budgets. The situation between advertising agencies, media agencies, and even small-scale PR companies became cooperative yet competitive. It was under these conditions that small-scale PR companies became more flexible in their operations and even formed strategic alliances with advertising agencies, media agencies, and marketing companies. Large-scale PR agencies reacted differently to the situation. They established various function-specific subsidiary agencies in order to provide a wider range of services to their customers.

This period became a point of public concern due to Corporate Social Responsibility. Companies needed to compile larger budgets than they had in the past; similarly they had to
broaden their interactions with stakeholders and show that they were responsible corporate citizens. Under the CSR framework, PR operations required more professional skills than they had in the past, including the promotion of corporate image and social welfare. As a matter of course, the PR industry saw overall improvement (Wu, 2010).

The value of PR is increased through social media

The rise of social media was one of the largest factors that influenced the transformation and advancement of the PR industry. As social media began to prosper, it brought about the situation where anyone could disclose information. Communications became complicated and brand crises were more easily widespread. In response, PR agencies began to offer longer term of PR strategies, including risk management, crisis communication and stakeholder management as services that would deal specifically with online social media. The value of professional PR work changed to stress the necessity of understanding how to best use various social media applications (e.g., Plurk, Facebook, YouTube, BBS, Blog, Microblogs). These applications could be used to speak for a brand, to break news stories, to lead internet users into heated discussions, or to spread information by word-of-mouth (Yeh & Sun, 2011; Wu & Yeh, 2011; Yang, 2010). When professional PR agencies obtained these skill-sets, they became much more competitive on the market.

Traditional media becomes a strong competitor in the PR field:

Due to the accelerating spread of the Internet, traditional media lost the advantage it had once had. In order to transform their traditional business structure, television, newspaper and other media in Taiwan established subsidiary companies which then entered the PR field. These companies used their already abundant resources in the field to compete with public and private sector PR companies for clients, all to cover for the losses incurred in traditional media. According to the magazine Brain, nearly 30% of PR firm operators see the media industry as the biggest threat to their own industry, while they consider the second biggest threat to be marketing companies that can operate using new media and digital resources.

Conclusion

This paper has summarized the history of PR in Taiwan and has updated the current situation in PR practice. As noted in the five stages, the termination of Martial Law in 1987 acted as the watershed between traditional PR and professional PR. Before it was ended (Period 1 and 2), PR was mostly used for political propaganda (Wu, 2004); afterwards (Period 3 to 5), PR became an important and effective tool for two-way communication between government/corporations and their publics. This was especially true in the third period, the period of dramatic improvements in democratization and economic liberalization, when PR in Taiwan had become
a professional field. We also note that in the fifth (current) period, both the changes in the economy and the popularity of social media helped to empower and advance Taiwan’s PR industry. PR has also been regarded as playing a critical and sometimes leading role in implementing marketing strategies.

Professionals, who have obtained degrees in PR education abroad and then returned to devote themselves to Taiwan’s PR field, have contributed much to improvements in Taiwan’s PR field. International corporations and PR agencies have also helped industry development by introducing updated information about PR practices. In recent years, professional PR organizations have devoted their efforts to establishing competitive disciplines, market rules and ethics for PR practitioners. The Foundation for Public Relations and the Public Relations Association in Taiwan, both acting as the PR industry’s leading voices, have conducted PR Awards to honor the most outstanding PR campaigns, programs, tactics and individuals. The awards offer outstanding PR practitioners the honor and recognition that they deserve, and also help to advocate a greater understanding and adoption of professional public relations services.

Down the road, the PR industry in Taiwan will benefit from cooperating with China as its economy continues to grow and become more globally competitive. This paper foresees an optimistic and prosperous future for the PR industry in Taiwan.
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Introduction
Gray (1992 p9) asked readers to “imagine men are from Mars and women are from Venus”. The increasing presence of women in public relations in the 1970s and 1980s provides an opportunity to explore “Life on Mars” – the title of a television series (BBC press office 2005) that looked back to this period when male attitudes were “positively archaic”.

Female experiences have largely been missing from histories of public relations (Cutlip 1994), with more recent research into their historical role focused on the US (O’Neil 1999, Gower 2001, Horsley 2009, Patterson 2009) including biographies of a few prominent women (Miller 1997, Henry 1998, Martinelli and Toth 2010). One of these, Doris Fleischman (1928) noted, in respect of careers in public relations, the “ultimate possibilities for women lie in the future” (p385).

This prediction came true, as evidenced by the “trend towards women’s greater representation in public relations” “that began early in the post-World War II period” (Donato 1990 p129). However, L’Etang (2006 p162) states, “trying to recapture something of the her-story of public relations in Britain is a challenge”. In response, this study sets out to foreground the career experiences of women working in the field during the 1970s and 1980s, a time of increased feminisation of the occupation. It also aims to enhance understanding of career development within public relations; another understudied area (Wolf 2006).

Literature Review
The contribution of women to US public relations from the 1940s to 1970s has been researched by Gower (2001) and Horsley (2009), who observed initial optimism and acceptance in industry publications regarding women’s role within the occupation in the 1940s, being replaced by derogatory remarks in the mid-1950s and omission of their contribution by the end of the decade. Nevertheless, Gower (2001) noted women entering the field in the US during the 1960s had positive feelings about their future as a result of perceived feminine aptitude for the occupation. She felt this reflected a generational shift that may account for subsequent domination of women in public relations.

Another shift appears in relation to routes into public relations. Horsley (2009) suggested women entered public relations in the US via journalism in the 1940s, gradually assuming positions that required “more skill and independent work” (p10) increasingly in agencies and consultancies. Although Gower (2001) noted women took varied routes into the occupation, she suggested it was easier for them to succeed by opening their own business, or by focusing on targeting women as a public. By the mid-1960s, women in public relations in the US were being advised to learn secretarial
skills and complaints regarding gender inequity were increasingly reported, despite women’s greater presence in senior roles (Gower 2001). Thirty years later, Mathews (1998) reported similar concerns, emphasising in particular a lack of focus on career paths for women in public relations in the US and Britain.

L’Etang (2006, p163) observed public relations in Britain was a patriarchal industry in the 1940s and 1950s where women tended to be excluded from “fast career progression”. An article in Women & Beauty magazine in 1959 stated, “being a public relations officer is fun and varied – just the career for an ambitious girl!” (p33), emphasising “she will probably work in the field of fashion, beauty, household and charity enterprises”. Collier (1957) interviewed female public relations consultants who also represented industrial firms, describing them as “chromium-plated, brightly smiling women, non-stop smokers and talkers about business ethics, about soap-powders and public service”. Although women in Britain were increasingly attracted to the occupation in the 1960s and 1970s, L’Etang (2004) claimed this was due to “the growth of consumer markets in which, it was felt at the time, women would naturally be more expert” (p257). These representations appear to reflect a gendered nature of emotional labour (Yeomans 2007), which Froëlich (2004, p8) identifies as a friendliness trap for women’s career development in public relations.

The career experiences of women working in public relations in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s is lacking in the literature. US studies report women at the time were engaged primarily as communication technicians rather than in management roles (Broom 1982) as a result of social expectations (Toth and Grunig 1993).

Feminization of public relations as an occupation in Britain lagged behind the US, where Broom (1982) reported women accounted for 10% of practitioners in 1968, 14% in 1970 and 27% in 1982. Toth and Grunig (1993) observed women working in US public relations were the majority (58.6%) by 1989. Surveys undertaken by the British Institute of Public Relations (IPR) indicated women accounted for 12% of its membership in 1975, increasing to 20.8% in 1987, 40% in 1991, 44% in 1994 and 47.8% in 1998. Although it is not clear the extent to which this data reflected the wider population of British public relations practitioners, the 1970s and 1980s saw women enter the male dominated field in greater numbers, making this an interesting era to study. Moloney (2000) cites an estimated 4,000 people worked in public relations at the start of the 1960s. Figures in IPR membership handbooks claim 10,000 people were employed in public relations in 1986, and 35,000 in 1989 (including 15,000 in support roles). Regardless of the accuracy of these figures, they indicate this was a period of notable growth for the occupation.

Factors favouring women’s employment and career advancement in the 1970s include the impact of second wave feminism (Henig and Henig 2001). From a UK perspective, critical incidents include “three major pieces of legislation designed to improve the situation of working women” (Morris and Nott 1991 p69): the Equal Pay Act in 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975, and the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act in 1978, which were followed by the election of Britain’s first female prime minister in 1979 (McDougall 1998).

Summerfield (1994) cites data showing women accounted for one-third of those in employment in the UK in 1961, increasing to two-fifths by 1981; primarily accounted for by married women undertaking part-time work in low paid occupations. She recounts how attitudes towards women workers changed during this period with emphasis on recruiting talent to promote economic growth and opening up opportunities for females to participate in higher education, which has been cited as an important aspect of gender differentiation in work (Wickham 1982) and career success (Sweet and Meiksins 2008). Hakim (2004) noted a significant change in the working experiences of women in the 1970s and 1980s, with greater representation in all but the upper levels within organizations and traditional male occupations (such as construction and transportation).

Nevertheless, literature from the US suggests many barriers faced women seeking to develop a career in public relations. These include role (Dozier and Broom 1995) and vertical (Crompton 1997) segregation, gender inequities (Wrigley 2010), the concept of a ‘glass ceiling’ (Wrigley 2002), the role of male mentors (Tam et al 1995) and societal and organizational constraints (Hynes Huberlie 1997).

Toth and Grunig (1993) undertook quantitative research regarding the gender shift in US public relations, but individual experiences during this period have not been explored to any depth. There has been little historical consideration of women working in public relations in the UK. L’Etang (2004) included 13 women in her oral history interviews; out of 67 subjects selected for their age or “importance or renown in the field” (p256). Her history of professional practice (2006) listed some prominent women working in British public relations in the 1940s and 1950s, with brief career histories provided for a few, such as Joyce Blow who graduated in classics and history and recounted frustrations in developing her career.

Collier (1957) did not name any of the women described in her article, although one may be presumed to be Mrs Gina Franklin, managing director of Link Information Services Ltd, a 40-strong, all female agency (De Vita 2006). In an interview for Advertiser’s Weekly (1958) Franklin shared her experiences of meeting fellow women practitioners on a visit to New York. She was the first president of the Association of Women in Public Relations (AWPR) formed in 1962 with a membership limited to 30, which sought to “help advance woman in PR, increase knowledge and elevate professional standards within the field, provide opportunities for discussions of mutual PR problems, and establish contact with executive PR women from other nations” (Public Relations News 1961). L’Etang (2006) observes AWPR reflected a networking culture for senior women practitioners rather than evidencing a feminist development in the field.

Other women sought office in the IPR, which was open to both sexes. Founded in 1948, Margaret Nally became its first female president in 1975, with Nora Owen appointed as the second in 1981 and Carol Friend the third in 1986 (CIPR 2012). L’Etang (2006) outlines Nally’s path into
public relations came via experience as a wartime radio mechanic, freelance journalism and secretarial work, whilst Owen had worked in fashion journalism. Friend (Walker 2010) graduated in business studies and French before working for Air France and moving into PR first for a property developer and then in consultancy, co-founding PIELLE Consulting Group in 1980.

At the start of the 1970s Allen (1971) noted public relations “has proliferated over the past decade; there are almost as many varieties of the species as there are PROs”. This paper sets out to examine the female of the species.

**Methodology**

This study reflects a “straightforward definition of a career is synonymous with the work-life history of an individual” (Mitch et al 2004 p5) seeking to capture subjective career experiences, which Khapova et al (2007 p115) define as “the individual’s own interpretation of his or her career situation at any given time”. It is not concerned with whether or not individuals experience “a succession of related jobs arranged in a hierarchy of prestige, through which persons move in an ordered (more or less predictable) sequence” (Wilensky 1961, cited Arthur et al. 1999 p4) in order to explore how women customised their careers (Valcour et al, 2007) rather than impose a vertical progressive model on their experiences (Sullivan and Crocitto, 2007).

An interpretive approach (Daymon and Holloway 2002) is taken reflecting a constructivist philosophy (Guba and Lincoln 2005), which presumes individuals seek meaning and sense in their work-life history. Oral history interviews are undertaken to obtain rich descriptive accounts with the aim of informing knowledge of women’s careers in an era when male domination was being challenged. Fontana and Frey (2005 p709) claim this approach is “seen as a way of understanding and bringing forth the history of women in a culture that has traditionally relied on masculine interpretation”.

Participants were located through public relations membership organizations and a snowball technique to identify additional contacts. The sample avoided focusing on those of renown in the field in order to record the stories of women who may not have followed a traditional hierarchical career path.

The study recognises the subjectivity of the researcher through personal reflexivity on the process of the interviews, relationship with the participants and their narrated career life-histories. A mindful approach is taken (Cousin 2010) in acknowledging the experience and observations of the researcher, along with how the stories of the participants are represented.

The method of analysis reflects a grounded theory approach (Charmaz 2005) to seek understanding of participants’ interpretation and construction of their experiences in the context of emerging conceptual knowledge.

The research set out to address the following questions:
1. How did women develop careers in public relations in the 1970s and 1980s?
2. What factors (drivers and barriers) affected opportunities for women’s advancement in public relations?
3. Did the gendered nature of emotional labour at the time affect women’s experiences of career development in public relations?
4. Did women who worked in public relations in the 1970s and 1980s act as change agents (Colgan and Ledwith 1996) in opening up career opportunities for younger female practitioners?

Interviews were arranged with seven participants, with a flexible approach offering the option of written emailed responses and/or telephone conversations; in one case conducted by Skype (Hanna 2012). An interview guide was provided outlining the following areas of interest:

- Brief career biography in terms of dates, jobs and employers, including any experience prior to entering public relations.
- Story of entry into public relations.
- Insight into career experiences during the 1970s and/or 1980s, including identification of any critical incidents that influenced decisions made.
- Thoughts on people who influenced career moves (positive or negative experiences).
- Experiences of public relations at the time, including views on how women were treated and observations of change with more women entering the field.
- Impact on subsequent generations.

These areas range from the personal to the more general, although the approach taken with participants was to invite them to tell their stories with minimal input from the researcher. In the interviews completed with all respondents, this enabled a continuous narrative to be told, allowing for a flow of ideas rather than specific answers to a prescribed series of questions. Overall, participants covered each of the research areas although not necessarily in a linear order.

In two cases, participants were known to the researcher through membership of the Motor Industry Public Affairs Association, two others were secured via shared contacts, two came from a request made to the Women in Public Relations group, and one through a post on the Chartered Institute of Public Relations LinkedIn group. Details of the researcher’s own career in the field could be accessed readily online and with all participants a common understanding of working in public relations was either explicitly or implicitly stated.

A typed transcript was produced for all interviews, which the researcher was able to take verbatim. Interviewees asked for confidentiality in reporting their experiences and this is respected by anonymity in discussing their work-life histories. The interview transcripts and emailed documentation were coded inductively on the basis of participants’ own words and connected to the research questions and concepts found in the literature.
A story of exciting opportunism

All of the women told of an opportunistic entry into public relations during the 1970s. Each continues to work within public relations, although some described their involvement today as strategic consultancy. Two respondents are employed in in-house roles; the other five work as consultants. The majority had changed employment several times during their career (working for up to ten different organizations), with one woman remaining with a single employer (although her role had changed over time). All participants now work in a management position having started their careers in a technical function. This suggests they had not experienced role (Dozier and Broom 1995) or vertical (Crompton 1997) segregation. Indeed, the concept of a ‘glass ceiling’ (Wrigley 2002) was overtly mentioned and denied by several respondents, with others emphasising they had made their way without encountering any insurmountable barriers. Each of the women had worked at some point in traditional male sectors, including farming, politics, trade unions, finance, transport, manufacturing and heavy industry.

A variety of career starting points was recounted: teaching, secretarial/clerical work, journalism and publishing, each of which can be described as a communicative occupation. The connection to public relations was made post facto, echoing the observation of Broughton (1943) that those who were established in their careers in public relations by the 1940s “backed into the field, as it were, by accident, and sat down. Afterwards it seemed natural enough, and their preliminary experience seemed as though it created public relations opportunity later” (p77). Yaxley (2011) observed this as a common thread that could be traced to the origins of careers in the occupation, and it would appear to link through to the 1970s. Indeed, it reflects the researcher’s experience entering public relations at the end of the 1980s.

The women described their move into public relations as occurring “by accident”, “chance”, “opportunity” or “a bit of a bluff”. Some had left school without knowing what they wanted to do; others were graduates (not in public relations which was not taught at undergraduate level in the UK until 1989; L’Etang 2004). None of the women previously had a clear idea of what public relations involved, but each felt at home in the occupation.

All respondents said entering public relations was “exciting”. Other terms connected with their initial experiences were “great”, “loved it”, “friendly”, “a good thing”, “terrific”, “glamorous”, “lucky”, “pure serendipity”, “I had a ball”. Nothing negative was associated with their entry into the field.

These experiences contrast with Bowen’s observation (2003) among undergraduates who were surprised to find public relations was not as glamorous as they expected. In the 1970s, with no preconceptions, public relations work was universally felt by the women in this study to be an exciting occupation.
Agentic self-efficacy

None of the women described a planned series of job moves; indeed, one commented, “I wasn’t looking for a long-term PR career – not many of my peers had a long-term master plan and the job market was buoyant”.

Despite their lack of purposeful career direction, the women reflected agentic self-efficacy, which “may be defined as individuals’ judgements of their capability to be assertive in the protection of their rights, to persist in the pursuit of their goals, and to change their situation to achieve a better fit with interests, aspirations and expectations” (Sadri 1996 p62). This is unexpected as Sadri (1996 p62) cites “socialization experiences of women lead to lower self-efficacy expectations with respect to a range of career-related pursuits”.

One respondent recounted, “I think an awful lot of one’s career is about being in the right place at the right time”; a role Cline (1989 p273) criticises as a “passive” and “more typical of women”. However, this interviewee demonstrated agentic self-efficacy in the narrative of her career decisions. For example, she said, “I woke up one day and didn’t think I’d been to University – that my mother and father had scrimped and saved – for me to promote toilet cleaner, so I decided to move”. She also recalled declining an opportunity for which she had been headhunted.

The stories that evidence the decision-making behind the participants’ career moves reflect personal agency (Bandura 2001 p11) whereby “in the modern workplace, workers have to take charge of their self-development for a variety of positions and careers over the full course of their worklife”.

In addition to seeking new opportunities on a pro-active basis, participants recounted they had been given additional responsibility, promoted and headhunted. Specific incidents were told where the women acted assertively to “jump in at the deep end”, “step up further”, “be feisty” and argue their case for pay equality.

Two of the women described critical incidents (Chell 2004) relating to gender inequalities; which one stated she resolved by “being assertive and not emotional”. This respondent said she “had to fight really hard to be paid the same as my predecessor who was male, not a graduate and not, I was told, as good at the job as I was”. Salary discrepancy is found in UK data (IPR 1975) that indicate men were paid on average 40% more than women. In the US, Cline (1989) termed the issue “a million-dollar penalty for being a woman”, and a gender salary gap remains evident in UK practice today (Gorkana Group 2011). However, the second incident involved a female graduate press officer being given more holiday allowance than a non-graduate male colleague. The participant, who worked in the same department, argued, “It was wrong. We would have stood up if it was the other way round, but not sure if it would have changed then”.
Career influencers – role models and chauvinism

In considering career influencers, the study identified examples of what Bandura (2001 p1) describes as “proxy agency that relies on others to act on one’s behest to secure desired outcomes, and collective agency exercised through socially coordinative and interdependent effort”.

Singh et al (2009) identify mentoring as an influence on career success. Although one respondent was adamant that the idea was “namby pamby” and that “if you want to get on you will… it is all done on competency. Those who succeed do so on merit”, she credited a number of “robust, demanding, absolutely terrific, exciting, bright, clever, energetic people” who inspired her as role models.

Several participants identified women already successful in public relations as informal mentors (Eby et al 2011). One described “the strongest and most wonderful role model – I would still hold her up as someone pioneering; I loved her”. Another reflecting on a former colleague said, “I saw women could get to the top and was lucky to see women doing an excellent job”. However, one interviewee related how she was headhunted by a “woman who was what I’d wanted to be, but when I had the opportunity, I decided that I didn’t want to do it as I’d lost faith in the agency world. I felt it had become a flippant practice only interested in promoting media coverage; it was too superficial”.

At least one male colleague was considered as influential by all of the women. One said she had left a job when her male mentors had moved on, praising how they had “thrown me in at the deep end; allowed me to sink or swim, but always caught me”. She reported other bosses who “made work more difficult” and consequently led her to look for new opportunities.

Others told of chauvinistic managers, some of whom aided their career progress and others who had to be persuaded. For one woman, standing up to a “typical Australian” boss gave her confidence: “inadvertently he helped make me more assertive – if you didn’t shout back, you didn’t get heard”. Most of the women narrated experiences of working in traditionally male environments, which were “sexist up to a point but very friendly”. The existence of an “old boys’ network” was mentioned, although being a woman in a man’s world was primarily seen as an opportunity to learn; “I was treated with respect and as a novelty”, explained one participant. Another concurred, “The men when I started were still old school gentlemen who treated me fantastically with respect”.

One respondent said she experienced “no barriers in being a woman” and found male colleagues to be “supportive”; although she did reflect, “I may have been lucky”. Another told of a boss who was “tough – he scared the living daylights out of everyone, but I wasn’t deterred by this”. She concluded by saying this job gave her a “good grounding” that she relied on today.

In one job, a respondent spoke about working for “misogynist, 50-60 year old, Knightsbridge/Sloan Square type gentlemen” who saw her as “a PR girl”, but she concluded, “It was a very enlightening, marvellous time”. Similarly, one woman talked of a boss who “took me out to lunch and I learned about wine – absorbed life things”, another explained how her bosses “made sure I mingled with people”.

One respondent had a less positive story. She worked for an organization in the north of England during the 1980s, which was “a real man’s world”. She recalled experiencing “constant bullying” and men who “tried to undermine my every move”. Nevertheless, she recounted this experience as one of overcoming obstacles. Previously she had worked in another traditionally male industry, which was a “world of G&Ts and long lunches, boozy events” for a boss who was a “lovely guy”.

This respondent was the only one to mention having a child. She did not present motherhood as a barrier, but did recount being asked at an interview whether she intended to have further children: “as it wouldn’t be very convenient for us in a top job like this”. Her response was presented as, “I said I was not prepared to answer and was told I was risking being turned down in that case. I took the risk”, concluding, “I was appointed and survived for 20 years”.

Partners and husbands, when mentioned, were universally portrayed as supportive and influential. In the early years of the respondents’ careers, the women’s decisions were often related to their husbands’ careers, but this was never presented as a barrier.

Although most of the women belonged to one or more professional network, they did not cite these as being supportive in their careers. One woman recalled, “a sense of collegiality” but had chosen not to join the women’s networks she was aware were emerging.

Collective agency (Bandura 2001) was expressed more in terms of working with other practitioners. One participant explained she and two other women were invited in the early 1970s to become the first female members of a newly formed public relations group. Although aware that they were asked to join to do secretarial tasks (she was the third interviewee to recall using a Gestetner duplicating machine) and noting, “we were taken for a ride”, she also said “we had so much fun. We enjoyed life. Feminism was not an issue and we just got on with the job”.

Surviving and thriving in a man’s world
Yeomans (2010 p9) identifies “emotional labour as a resource” within public relations, where female practitioners have to balance professional and social identities. Whilst recounting similar stories to the participants in Yeoman’s contemporary study, the experiences encountered in the 1970s and 1980s were not presented in this research as emotional labour (Hochschild 2003). The women did not express any sense of conflict in undertaking gendered work, and did not report feeling they were playing a role or supressing their emotions. They did not object to being described as “a PR girl”, and used terms such as “ballsy” and “feisty” to describe themselves rather than to indicate a role they enacted.

Several respondents related stories evidencing glamorous experiences. One recounted representing the Italian sports car brand, Lamborghini and being assigned a chauffeur as she was too young to be insured to drive the cars. Another described chaperoning Page 3 models (who appeared
topless in the Sun newspaper from 1970; Aitch 2010) at photo shoots as “scary” and involving an incident of personal grooming! A third promoted “luxury lifestyles”; travelling overseas, “looking after very wealthy people” and organising “social events with top echelons”. However, she said, “It was all strategic”.

Another woman commented, “I found the best way to get respect was not to display female responses to challenging situations. I worked with people who had to persuade others. I had very good teachers – I watched and learned how to persuade”. She went onto to say that “You did have to be feisty, but I feel I’m like that naturally”.

As with several other participants, this woman used the word “fight” when discussing her generation. Whilst acknowledging the influence of equality legislation, she emphasised personal responsibility in career success. This was evident in comments made by all the other participants, revealing a liberal feminist perspective (Grunig et al 2001). Indeed, one woman overtly dismissed radical feminism (Colgan and Ledwith 1996) saying “I remember when someone opened a door for me and I said, thanks. Everyone stopped dead but I said I had bigger things to worry about. They were glad I wasn’t a feminist”.

Another interviewee claimed, “I think women have an advantage if gifted in reading others and listening. Men go in as bulls in a china shop and we think more naturally. I didn’t use my female… I was quite attractive – but if people see you are confident, they will trust you and so I got over my nervousness and found a way through. I had great fun”.

**Criticising the subsequent generations**

The study also explored whether women working in the 1970s and 1980s saw themselves playing a role as change agents (Colgan and Ledwith, 1996) in opening up career opportunities for younger female practitioners. One woman did identify herself as a “pioneer” who had “opened the door” to other women. But another said she was a “maverick”, with a third claiming, “I should think I’m a monster rather than a role model”.

All of the participants commented on changes as a result of more women entering the field. One respondent recalled in the early 1980s “a whole lot of young girls getting into PR roles” who “ran around with Filofaxes and champagne glasses. They did us a disservice as the ones who’d done the hard graft. The Harriets and Charlottes were always about at night – always busy, but what were they doing? I doubt they were writing a press release – they seemed to be on the phone a lot”.

Another woman said, “PR is a more girly job now”. In relation to her own generation, she reflected, “it was probably more of a struggle then. Women came in as a PA and got promoted”. She continued, “I’m not a trail blazer, but people have learned things working for me and moved on; gone to bigger and better things. I would like to think that by example people picked things up. Younger
people don’t have the same attitude that they could be doing things wrong and could do better; they just want praise and approval all the time”.

A further respondent commented that today “all this technology means people live in ivory towers and few build relationships”. Another felt “the next generation haven’t had to fight so hard. Maybe they don’t care as much – we were passionate to do the job as well as men”.

One respondent observed, “PR became an easy option for rich women, well dolly birds, who held parties. I don’t think that is the situation now – the world is too tough”. She also said, “There’s nothing mystical about the career I’ve had. I like to think I have influenced others I’ve picked out that I felt were worthwhile”.

Another woman said she was “proud to see my team develop. I had a rule about employing people who were better educated than me and I got some really superb people who taught me as much as I did them”.

Although not expressed explicitly, criticism of the next generation may link to the claim by Fitch and Third (2010 p6) that “the increase in women mapped onto and amplified pre-existing anxieties about both public relations’ claim to be a legitimate profession and the role and influence of public relations in organisational settings and corporate structures”.

The opportunistic, individualistic approach evident in attitudes towards younger practitioners, along with the lack of an apparent “gender awareness” or “feminist consciousness” (Colgan and Ledwich 1996 p29) indicates the women this study were not influential change agents despite having experienced successful public relations careers.

**Reflexive discussion and conclusions**

This was a limited study into the career experiences of women working in public relations in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. It sought to explore and fill a gap in existing knowledge. While the women interviewed were not necessarily typical or representative of all those employed in the occupation during the period, their stories are valid evidence of particular experiences and indicate a common narrative with threads that link to the past and challenge perspectives in the feminist literature regarding employment in public relations.

It should be noted the women were identified primarily because they continue to work in the field, and this may suggest a level of self-efficacy and identification with public relations work that would not be found among those who left the occupation earlier in their careers. They also responded proactively to the researcher’s request for participation, indicating an interest in the topic. Further, the study relied on memory of lived experience, which is valued within oral history (Janesick 2010), although it is also problematic (O'Donoghue 2007).

By their own admission, the participants were “feisty”, “ballsy” and “passionate to do the job as well as men”. They did not recognize a glass ceiling and had overcome barriers that may have
impacted negatively on the careers of other less-determined women. Only one of the women mentioned having had a child, and although several did refer to partners or husbands, they were not presented as a barrier to career decisions. It is likely other women employed in public relations during the 1970s and 1980s did prioritise family over work and consequently their experiences would differ from those participating in this study.

The researcher recognised elements of this study as continuing narrative threads identified in relation to those working in public relations in its formative years (Yaxley 2011). These include the development of careers in an opportunistic and agentic manner, taking advantage of chance and making their own opportunities. Another thread reflects von Bertalanffy’s concept of equifinality (1968); “the ability to reach the same end by following different paths” (Alvarez and Svejenova 2005 p210), since the interviewees had various entry points, reflected individual career paths, but each works today in a management or senior consultancy role.

Despite careers in public relations having existed for over fifty years by the 1970s, none of the women interviewed had a clear idea of what the occupation involved, but each felt at home. Making a personal connection to public relations post facto reflects another thread back through time (Yaxley 2011). The women also universally identified their entry into the field as “exciting” with only positive connotations reported, which contrasts with 21st century entrants who find the occupation less glamorous than they expected (Bowen 2003).

A lack of purposeful career direction was evident, although the interviewees seemed to reflect agentic self-efficacy (Bandura 2001), which is not expected typically from women (Sadri 1996). Job opportunities were sought on a pro-active basis and respondents reported they had been given additional responsibility, promoted and headhunted. They recalled overcoming incidents of gender inequality, which indicates they were not passive (Cline 1989) in their career decisions.

Both female and male role models and mentors were identified as inspirational and influential proxy agents (Bandura 2001) on women’s careers in public relations in the 1970s and 1980s. Chauvinistic male bosses were observed to have made women more assertive, with old-school attitudes viewed as respectful of women and providing an opportunity to learn. Rather than seeing experiences of gendered work as reflective of emotional labour (Hochschild 2003), the women appeared to accept gendered work and not feel they were playing a role or suppressing their emotions. This reflects a liberal feminist perspective (Grunig et al 2001) emphasising personal responsibility in forging careers.

Rather than evidencing a role as change agents (Colgan and Ledwith, 1996) in opening up career opportunities for younger female practitioners, the women interviewed were critical of subsequent generations, who were felt not to have had to “fight” for their opportunities. Nevertheless, several respondents felt they had influenced those they identified as worthy of their support, albeit not from a radical feminist position.
In conclusion, in this study the narrative career life-story of women entering public relations in the 1970s and 1980s is one of an initial chance opportunity after working in another communicative occupation, followed by personal self-efficacy and proxy agency from role models as drivers in career advancement. Barriers, such as misogynistic colleagues and gender inequality, were overcome by personal capabilities, reflecting a liberal feminist approach, which was also applied to gendered work experiences, and evident in criticisms of younger practitioners.

This narrative provides some insight into the career experiences of women working in public relations during the 1970s and 1980s and contributes towards understanding of career development in the field. At a time of increasing feminisation of the male-dominated occupation, the study demonstrates that females in public relations could experience career success; defined as “the positive psychological or work-related outcomes or achievements one has accumulated as a result of one's work experiences” (Judge et al 1994 p3). This can be measured objectively, in terms of women’s ability to attain management status, and subjectively through their reflection of positive experiences of enjoying an exciting career.
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