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NOMINATION OF ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1981

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 1202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Boschwitz, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. General Haig, good morning. We welcome you and Mrs. Haig back.

By arrangement with all members of the committee, this will be the last session. The estimate we had was that there was an outside figure of 7 hours. Obviously, if we can expeditiously move this along, I would hope we could break by lunch and not have an afternoon session. But our commitment and your commitment, of course, is to fulfill the request of every member of the committee for whatever questions there may be.

As I understand it, there are no further questions from members of the majority. Therefore, Senator Pell, we will turn to you.

Senator PELL. I will pass at this time; thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas.

But first, are all members of the minority on notice, Senator Pell, who do wish to ask questions, that we are ready for them?

Senator PELL. Certainly; this is the agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Tsongas. Good morning, General Haig.

General Haig. Good morning, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We are, by the way, still working under the 20-minute rule.

Senator Tsongas. I would like to explore the issue that I was going to explore yesterday, and that is the issue that I think you are going to face when you take office, which is the dilemma in southern Africa.

I would like to insert in the record if I might, Mr. Chairman, three editorials on southern Africa, which refers to the conference taking place in Geneva on the issue of Namibia.

[The editorials referred to follow:]

(1)
Geneva, January 13.—A U.N. conference called to implement independence for Namibia collapsed tonight when South Africa, which administers the territory, said it was "premature" to fix a date for a cease-fire and elections.

The South African statement came after the leader of the internal government established by South Africa in Namibia in defiance of the United Nations had said more time was needed to assure impartiality of the United Nations, which is to supervise the election, and to gain assurances that a democratic form of government would be established in the territory.

A spokesman for the South-West Africa People's Organization, which has led the guerrilla war for independence, immediately announced that it would demand U.N. Security Council action to impose "comprehensive, mandatory sanctions, including an oil embargo" against South Africa.

That will pose an early test of the Africa policy of the incoming administration of President-elect Ronald Reagan. There has been speculation that South Africa may have been relying on an American veto in the Security Council under the new administration to protect Pretoria from sanctions.

South Africa said it acted because requirements for establishing trust and confidence in the United Nations had not been fulfilled.

The rejection came as a surprise because:

In October, the South African government had been secretly assured by the United Nations that formal U.N. action would clarify the troubling issues in connection with trust and confidence, according to Western sources.

Earlier in the meeting here, South Africa had been secretly informed that SWAPO was prepared to issue a declaration reassuring the people of Namibia on the question of democracy under an independent government, according to informed diplomats.

However, Western sources reported that Dirk F. Mudge, chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance that heads the interim internal government in Namibia, Sunday told representatives of the five Western nations sponsoring the independence plan that he would not agree to implementation until the internal parties were assured of at least a 50–50 chance of defeating SWAPO in the proposed election for a constituent assembly.

Mudge said SWAPO would turn Namibia into a one-party, totalitarian state.

The collapse of this conference means that independence will be postponed at least until next year. Under the U.N. plan, the cease-fire in the guerrilla war was to take effect in March with elections in October under U.N. supervision and in the presence of a 7,500-member U.N. peacekeeping force.

In a press conference today, Mudge said he could not say how much time would be required to satisfy the conditions he had set forth. There were unconfirmed rumors that he may have said 18 months to two years in conversations with some diplomats.

"I do not regard the U.N. plan as dead," Brian Urquhart, U.N. undersecretary for special political affairs and conference chairman, told reporters earlier in the day.

Urquhart said it was now up to the governments concerned to decide what action to try next, emphasizing the global risks involved in continuation of the fighting.

At least some of the leaders of the internal parties set up with the approval of South Africa as rivals to SWAPO indicated their full agreement with Mudge's statement, insisting that "the ball is now in the United Nations court."

"Our aim now is to find ways to keep the whole independence process alive by keeping lines of communication open between the parties concerned," U.N. spokesman Francois Giuliani said.

A spokesman for SWAPO, which had remained largely silent in the proceedings, was sharply critical of the outcome. More will be heard at the final session Wednesday when Sam Nujoma, head of SWAPO, is scheduled to speak.
AGAIN, SOUTHERN AFRICA

At Geneva, the United Nations has finally brought together for the first time the contenders for power in Namibia, the huge, sparsely populated, mineral-rich former German colony that South Africa has run since World War I. On one side of the table are the local Namibian groups, led by the multiracial DTA, formed under the eye of the South Africans. On the other side is SWAPO, the black liberation organization imperiously blessed by the U.N. General Assembly as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Namibian people. Can the two come to peaceable agreement on independence and democracy for Namibia?

It’s a tall order. The white South African government believes the United Nations long ago proved itself to be an unfair bully determined to shove the Soviet-armed, radical-talking, terrorist SWAPO down its throat. SWAPO fears that the South African government is bent on applying its economic and military muscle to perpetuate its own or a client’s Namibian rule. It is against those twin presumptions of U.N. partiality and South African chicanery, both of which have surely been in evidence in the past, that the sponsors of the conference are struggling. These last include five Western states in a position to assure and lean on South Africa, and African group in a similar position in respect to SWAPO, and assorted international types. All of them are keen to ease the Namibian affliction and go on to other things.

As with so many other international situations these days, a key figure, President-elect Reagan, is missing. The Geneva conference is unfolding against the troubling possibility that he may step back from the Carter effort to support a U.N. solution and, instead, encourage the residual South African tendency to set up an internal anti-SWAPO group as the independence government. Important Republican figures, dazzled by thoughts of South Africa’s strategic potential and Namibia’s uranium and diamonds, are advising the president-elect to lean this way. Fortunately, other Reagan administration figures, including (to judge by his caution at his confirmation hearings) Secretary of State-designate Alexander M. Haig Jr., are aware that virtually the United States’ whole African position is in the balance. The last thing Mr. Reagan’s foreign policy needs for openers is a collapse of the Geneva conference on Namibia.

MUGABE’S EYE ON THE WEST

The simmering three-way power struggle in the Zimbabwe has culminated in Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s firing of radical cabinet minister Edgar Tekere and the demotion of Joshua Nkomo, the guerrilla leader with whom Mugabe shared power during the seven-year Rhodesian civil war.

Both Tekere and Nkomo are Mugabe’s political rivals. Tekere is secretary general and leader of the radical wing of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), Mugabe’s own party. Nkomo is the leader of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union). Tekere has been trying to force Mugabe farther to the left; Nkomo has been pulling in the opposite direction. Watching apprehensively from the sidelines have been Zimbabwe’s whites.

Mugabe has tried to accomplish another of the counterbalanced actions that have won him a reputation for political artfulness since he came to power last April. It is an action designed to shore up Western confidence in Mugabe’s stated intention to transform Zimbabwe into a multiracial society running on a mixed economy rather than a black supremacist socialist state.

Tekere, despite signs that he was unstable, has developed grass-roots popularity among black Zimbabweans by agitating for more rapid societal changes. After he was acquitted, on a technicality, of murdering a white farmer, Tekere also became a symbol of black domination over whites, a powerful narcotic in a country that was very recently as oppressively segregated as its neighbor, South Africa.

Mugabe, a moderate African socialist, has been resisting the draconian schemes of Tekere and his sympathizers, who have been calling for confiscation of white-owned land and nationalization of industries. Zimbabwe’s economy is beginning to boom again and Mugabe wants to avoid the fiscal disasters that have befallen neighboring black-led nations that too quickly tied their futures to radical ideologies.
The Tekere wing of the party also wanted Nkomo stripped of power and Mugabe made that his quid pro quo for Tekere's removal. Mugabe leavened Nkomo's demotion from Home Minister, with control over the national police, to Minister of Public Service, with control over civil service, by giving Nkomo's party a fifth cabinet post. Actually, Mugabe need never have offered Nkomo's party any government portfolios because Mugabe won his election by an absolute majority last year.

Mugabe undoubtedly also took his actions with an eye on political realities in the two Western powers he has chosen to rely upon for massive economic aid. In the United States, President-elect Ronald Reagan is about to take office, having ridden a conservative tide into the White House. Among the Reaganaughts, there will be no weeping over Tekere, who was viewed as a dangerous leftist, or Nkomo, whose cozy alliances with the Soviet Union made him suspect. In Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government is likely to view Tekere's removal with approval and try to persuade Nkomo to face the fact that, given the size of Mugabe's landslide victory last April, the sensible thing to do is to accept a lowered profile.

The dual move will put great strain on Mugabe's ability to steer down the political center as he has been doing. Nkomo still influences 20,000 armed guerrillas and Tekere has a following among Mugabe's 40,000 guerrilla soldiers. Both guerrilla factions have been slow to allow themselves to be integrated into the regular Zimbabwean army, which is still largely commanded by whites.

What Mugabe now needs is the wherewithal to counter his inevitable internal critics by implementing the purchase of unused white-owned farms for the land redistribution that is central to the African agricultural development he has promised. If the United States and Britain hope to keep him within the Western sphere of influence, now is the time to make that possible by substantial foreign aid investments in Zimbabwe's future.

Senator Tsongas. I will not read the editorial but will read the last lines from the editorial in the Washington Post of January 12. "Fortunately, other Reagan administration figures, including, to judge by his caution at the confirmation hearings, Secretary of State-designate Alexander M. Haig, Jr., are aware that virtually the United States' whole African position is in the balance," referring to the Geneva Conference. "The last thing Mr. Reagan's foreign policy needs for openers is a collapse of the Geneva Conference on Namibia," which, as you know, is exactly what happened yesterday.

I would like to get into that issue generally and start off with Zimbabwe.

As you recall, there was an attempt on the Senate floor, a successful one, to lift sanctions against Rhodesia after the UDI elections in which Bishop Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister. Sanctions were lifted in the Senate, but not so in the House. That was a process that led to Lancaster House and the eventual election in which Robert Mugabe became the Prime Minister.

Would you comment for us on how you see the evolution now in Zimbabwe and whether you think the United States would be in a position to support that evolution? There is an editorial today in the Boston Globe which is very concerned about whether we are going to ignore Mugabe or whether we are going to support him.

Would you address the Zimbabwe issue generally, please?

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

General Haig. Well, I will do that with a considerable degree of caution that I don't get out beyond what I know to be the concerns of the President-elect, and with the caveat that the committee is aware
that I have not had an opportunity to discuss this with Mr. Reagan and feel that that is a prerequisite to any definitive statement on my part.

I think one can look at that situation over a range of many months. There are understandable views on both sides of that issue, both in the context of the earlier elections to which you referred, the attitude of Her Majesty's government in that evolution, and the extensive and, I think, brilliant work done by Lord Carrington in the aftermath of what was clearly a failure of Washington to join enthusiastically, if at all, in the first solution based on the earlier controversial elections.

Events would tend to suggest that the assessments at that time were not necessarily reflective of the mood of the electorate in Rhodesia. So now we are faced with another situation, and that situation has put into power a man described as an avowed Marxist.

I suppose you can parse that term in many ways. The last chapter is yet to be written, and I think it is going to depend a great deal on the behavior and attitude of that government. Clearly, it is not in our interest to leave that government with no alternative but to turn to the East. On the other hand, it is also important that we look carefully at its performance, its de facto alignments, its support for violent change in the area, and above all, its performance with respect to both the expectations and the need of the people of Zimbabwe.

I hope from this that you have a general feel of my attitude on it, which is very much one of watchful waiting without compounding frustrations that would close out other options.

Senator Tsongas. I also have a general feel for the flexibility you retained on that issue. Remember when Mrs. Thatcher was elected, one of the issues she ran on was a promise to lift sanctions when she was elected. Then, faced not with the rhetoric of a campaign but the problems of an actual administration, she set in motion what led to Lord Carrington's tour de force at Lancaster House.

My guess is that this administration, yours, will be in a not dissimilar situation. That is, most commentators have been impressed with Mugabe's opening to the West. I believe the U.S. Chamber of Commerce visited Zimbabwe recently and came back very impressed. When Mugabe came here this past fall, he spoke to the banking community and financial community in New York and then had lunch with Members of Congress. He spoke about the need for investment.

I would hope that, given the fact that Mugabe comes in, as you say, an avowed Marxist, but a Roman Catholic Marxist, which is a qualifier—

General Haig. They are the best kind, I think. [General laughter.]

Senator Tsongas. With your brother behind you, it is hard not to say that, I would suspect. [General laughter.]

But I think what is happening there, and this is just my own view, is that Mugabe lived in Mozambique for 4 years and saw the economic disarray in Mozambique. He has now witnessed in both Mozambique and Angola the attempt by those two governments to begin to make contacts with American businessmen.

He is alleged to have said—and this is fourth hand, so I don't pretend it to be fact, but I think it is probably true—that having seen Mozambique, he was not going to do the same thing in Zimbabwe,
and therefore has reached out to the West. I thought this was a remarkable move. He has kept on much of the old Rhodesian Government personnel.

What I think is a particularly interesting move is he for some time kept the lobbyist that Ian Smith employed in Washington, who then worked the right side of the aisle, that is, the right ideologically side of the aisle. That lobbyist was quite helpful when the issue of aid to Zimbabwe came up, and there was not a great deal of opposition.

I think Zimbabwe is the most important economic entity, absent South Africa, in that region, and if we are going to have regional economic development, it is the key. I would hope that you would be willing to meet with Mugabe before there was a definitive U.S. policy established because I see him very much as a linchpin: If he can be stabilized and moved away from that Marxist ideology that you referred to, the signal that will then go out to Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, and Tanzania, a signal which I think would be very powerful.

Do you have any plans, even tentative, to swing through southern Africa and meet with some of the people there?

General Haig. Well Senator, clearly, and I hope early on, it will be necessary for me to make several regionally oriented trips. I would hope that would include South Africa, or southern Africa is a better terminology, because of the vital importance of that area. I would put Zaire as a very important asset to Western industrialized nations in the context of its raw materials and the importance of its orientation, as I would Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia.

I don't want to commit myself specifically to a date or even a quarter in which that trip would take place, but it is an area that I have not visited and I am very anxious to do so.

Yes; I am confident I will.

Senator Tsongas. I made a journey a year ago at this time and found it very instructive.

Let me also for the record, Mr. Chairman, introduce a list of conference participants of the African-American Institute Conference. The Conference was held at the Kennedy Library in Boston on June 13 and 14. It was a conference between the former Portuguese speaking colonies in Africa and American businessmen.

The African-American Institute and I were the cosponsors of that Conference. The motion of that Conference was to bring together your hard line or soft line Marxist nations with American corporate executives to see whether there was a potential for promoting self-interest in both parts. The list of participants is a who's who of American corporate life, including most of the major oil companies, banks, and so forth.

What was important about that Conference—Bechtel, Texaco, Gulf, Chase Manhattan Bank, Shell, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, the Export-Import Bank, Lockheed Aircraft, Ingersoll-Rand, Harry Winston, Inc., Combustion Engineering, et cetera—was that this was the first real attempt to, as you describe it, open the doors so that these nations have somebody else to rely upon except the East, and that what is important to these companies over time is trade, investment, and technology, none of which they can get in any appreciable size from the Soviet bloc.
I would like to have that noted in the record, and perhaps you might take a look at it at some point.

[The attendance list referred to follows:]

THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE, JOHN FITZGERALD LIBRARY
BOSTON

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS—AS OF JUNE 11, 1980

Raymond T. Adams, Manager, Foreign Development, Superior Farming Co.
David Anable, Overseas News Editor, Christian Science Monitor.
Clarence Avant, Chairman, Maytor, Petroleum Co.
Frederick W. Bantz, Manager, Administration-African Region; General Motors Overseas Distribution Corp.
Hon. Ms. Arcilia Barreto, Adjunts Director-General, The Cumere Complex, Guinea-Bissau.
Hon. Dr. Humberto Bettencourt, General Director, Ministry of Fisheries, Cape Verde.
Raymond T. Adams, Manager, Foreign Development, Superior Farming Co.
Clarence Avant, Chairman, Maytor, Petroleum Co.
Frederick W. Bantz, Manager, Administration-African Region; General Motors Overseas Distribution Corp.
Hon. Ms. Arcilia Barreto, Adjunts Director-General, The Cumere Complex, Guinea-Bissau.
Hon. Dr. Humberto Bettencourt, General Director, Ministry of Fisheries, Cape Verde.

Martin J. Boganovich, Vice President Procurement Production and Development, Star-Kist Foods, Inc.
Hon. Alfredo Cabral, First Secretary, Guinea-Bissau Delegation to the United Nations.

Elizabeth Caine, Manager, International Operations, Kaiser Engineers, Inc.
Donald C. Campbell, Manager, Marketing and Geographic Research, Corporate Marketing, Bechtel International Services, Inc.
William D. Carmichael, Head, International Division, Middle East and Africa, The Ford Foundation.

Walter C. Carrington, Executive Vice President, African-American Institute.
Johnnie Carson, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Africa, U.S. House of Representatives.

Chris Chamberlin, Legislative Assistant, Office of Senator Paul E. Tsongas.
William M. Chapman, Government Relations Representative, Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc.

Enelis Comiche, President, Bank of Popular Development, Mozambique.
Stanley Cooks, Vice President, Young Ideas, Inc.
Hon. Jose Victor de Carvalho, Governor, Bank of Angola.
Aguna de Sousa, Executive Director, Coal and Hydro-Carbons, Mozambique.
Peter J. de Vos, Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

Jerry Dunfey, Vice President, Dunfey Hotels.
William D. Dunfey, President, Dunfey Hotels.
William W. Durney, Director, Mampeza Industrial, S.A.R.L., Angola; President, Oceans of the World, Inc.; Chairman, Carnation Seafood.


Preston P. Eddy, Vice President, Bechtel International Services, Inc.
Dr. Luis Corvalho Fernandes, Attorney, Portugal.

Hon. Dr. Virgilio Fernandes, General Director, Ministry of Planning, Cape Verde.

Frank E. Ferrari, Senior Vice President, African-American Institute.
J. Wayne Fredericks, Executive Director, International Governmental Affairs, Ford Motor Co.


Gary Gibson, Assistant Manager, Africa Desk, Citibank, N.A.
Palmiro Gilgo, Vice President Procurement and International Operations, Star-Kist Foods, Inc.

Ken Guscott, Ken Guscott Associates.

Herbert E. Hansen, Vice President Government Agreements, International, Gulf Oil Exploration & Production Co.
Nance Guilmartin, Boston Press Secretary, Office of Senator Paul E. Tsongas.
Wilbur Jones, Director of Administration, African-American Institute.
Haydee Marcondes, Interpreter.
Lina Meyer, Interpreter.
Loretta Slover, Professor, Portuguese Language, University of Massachusetts.
Mary Helen Thompson, Press Secretary, Office of Senator Paul E. Tsongas.
Mary F. Wortman, Executive Assistant to the President, African-American Institute.

Senator Tsongas. I think that the major historic movement in southern Africa today, beyond the issue of a partheid, which will play itself out, as you know, is that the days of Julius Nyerere's African socialism as the ascending star in the philosophical firmament in Africa is over.

There is a much greater appreciation that when you get out of the bush and put down the rifle and you talk about administration, what counts is the economy and the economic infrastructure you can put together. I would hope that we would lead with that as our major card because I think that is our strength.

The recent decision, apparently, in Liberia to turn away from the East again was because the East cannot provide that kind of economic advantage.

Let me talk about Namibia. According to the Post this morning, the talks collapsed because South Africa said that it was premature to set a date for those elections. Could you comment on that development yesterday in Geneva?

General Haig. Well, clearly I haven't had an opportunity to study this, either the events leading up to the conference and the various positions of the participants, certainly with the kind of care that I should have for someone who will occupy, hopefully, the position I will occupy.

Senator Biden. There are 24 hours in the day, General. What have you been doing with yourself?

General Haig. I am beginning to learn that, Senator. [General laughter.]

Clearly, I don't think anyone should be surprised that the South African Government would enter into these discussions in a very skeptical way and in a very cautious way and in a less than forthcoming way. There are aspects of the issue from their point of view, strategic aspects, that have been longstanding and historic.

That doesn't mean that we have to give up in our efforts to—I guess this has been described as the last vestige of colonialism, that loaded term. So it is in our interest, of course, to bring about a solution which is not going to put in jeopardy the interest of those who share our values and the interest, above all, of a broad, strategic sense.

That sense is related and associated intimately with the geographic location, the control of lines of communication, the raw materials and historic and traditional friendships and alignments. All of these factors have to be very carefully considered.

The United States cannot demonstrate impatience if that impatience is going to jeopardize the progress we are seeking. Now that, again, is a broad, general observation which is designed to insure
that I have flexibility to deal with this subject. Were I to do otherwise, I would be less than prudent, I think.

This is a turn of events that should not overly shock us and it does not necessarily represent a fundamental departure from the efforts being made, which should continue among the five powers as well as among the nations of the region.

Senator Tsongas. Do you support the notion of elections in Namibia generally to determine their government?

General Hail. Again with a degree of caution. I just think I would prefer to have an opportunity to assess this. It has been 1½ years since I followed it with day-to-day interest as I did in Europe where the interests are very, very keen, I can assure you. I have been engaged in other events and I just think it is better to withhold comment.

The Chairman. Senator Tsongas, would you mind an interjection? I read the story with great interest this morning. It has been 5 years since I was in South Africa and had a rather heated session with Prime Minister Vorster, at which time he did say that he would negotiate with SWAPO.

He said I could quote him to that effect, providing I precede it by the fact that he considered SWAPO essentially Communist and conceived in sin. I did just exactly that. But at least the process of talking was started. I met with Dirk Mudge in Namibia. I think some real progress has been made but has been painfully slow, disappointingly slow. The American position has been raised from a very low level to a leadership position now.

We have been exerting the force and influence of our country to move it, but it is a painfully slow process. I am somewhat hopeful that it will be eventually resolved, I hope in the foreseeable future in this administration. I think it can be.

Senator Tsongas. If it will make you feel any better, I was there a year ago and I got the same assurance. He probably took out the same speech and read it to me, too.

The reason I raised the question is this. I have been involved with the African issue for about—it has been 18 years now—and I am convinced that the person who can have the most influence in bringing about a peaceful evolution in Southern Africa is the person looking at me at that table, yourself; and very much like it took Richard Nixon to open up China, it is going to take a conservative administration to convince South Africa that a nonpeaceful evolution will end up with a Marxist government in both Namibia and South Africa.

It is in the interest of the West that a peaceful evolution take place. You cannot approach South Africa on that issue from the left; you have to approach South Africa on that issue from the right. You are in a unique position to make that happen. Very much like Richard Nixon who refers to China as the major accomplishment of his administration, I think you are handed a remarkable opportunity to be the architect of peaceful evolution in Southern Africa.

I would hope that you would recognize that. I suspect that you do. I look forward to working with you on that issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to get into the Angola issue but I see my time is up. I will discuss that on my second round.
The Chairman. The time obviously is available for division among the minority. If any member of the minority would prefer for you to continue, you certainly can do so, but we felt yesterday that probably the 20-minute rule would allow Senators to plan their time a little bit better.

Senator Biden. I will yield to Senator Tsongas to continue.

The Chairman. Why don't you continue? In fact, I owe you a minute, maybe even two.

Senator Tsongas. Thank you. Let me begin on this subject, and then we can pursue it later.

I was in Angola last year and had a 3-hour session with the Foreign Minister. The session began with a diatribe very much like what I got from Machel in Mozambique about past bitternesses about the United States supporting Portugal through NATO and those arms being used against their liberation struggle.

I indicated to them that if they wanted to have better relations with the United States, they should send signals to the United States. My own view is very similar to yours, and that is that you have to open a door to them if they are going to move away from the East, which I think they desperately want to. Anybody who has dealt with the Soviet in the Third World comes away very hardened by that experience.

I asked them to release an American prisoner who was an alleged mercenary, which they eventually did, and I invited them to the conference referred to earlier, which they came to.

Is it your judgment that the United States cannot reestablish a relationship with Angola? Is it your judgment that Savimbi represents “America’s best hope” in Angola? What kind of thought processes will you go through? I won’t ask you for a position because I know I am not going to get it, but what kinds of criteria are you going to consider in this issue?

I raise it because I am convinced that President Carter would have recognized Angola had it not been for the SALT Treaty and not wanting to antagonize conservative elements in the Congress. As you know, Cyrus Vance in his first speech after his resignation at Harvard called for the recognition of Angola, arguing, in essence, that we not pursue what Senator Zorinsky would refer to as the cut-and-run approach to Marxists, namely, if you see one Marxist in the country, you fold up your tent and run away from him; that we should go in there, in essence, and fight for our influence.

What are some of the issues you would consider on the issue of Angola?

General Haig. Well, there are many. Perhaps first and foremost and the matter of greatest concern to me, and which I think should be to all Americans, is the fact that there are 18,000 to 20,000 Cuban mercenaries funded, supported, equipped, and transported largely by the Soviet Union. These mercenaries maintain what degree of control and stability the Angolan Government enjoys today.

Now, that is not to suggest that that Government is comfortable with the burden that they bear today, but I would think that the situation is clearly a major factor in efforts to consider improving relationships. There are many others. One is the degree of opportunity afforded to Western private enterprise.
I think most people know that there are enclaves even today in Angola which have been carved out for Western fishing interests, for example. There have been some contacts with not only American and European business but there have been contacts with their former so-called colonial rulers. I have gotten to know intimately President Eanes or Portugal over the last 5 years. He is both a personal friend and an official to whom I have had access, so I have had an opportunity to follow the situation there very, very carefully.

I think you know also there is a very strong independent movement which represents a substantial portion of the popular will. These things have to be sorted out clearly because I don’t think that dealing with a government, Marxist or otherwise, that does not represent the wishes of the people is necessarily characteristic of the American way.

I believe in sanctions. I think that’s a factor.

I think the factor of base rights and the evolution of the relationship with the East at large, and the Soviet Union, in particular, is very important as we assess these issues.

Senator Tsongas. Let me raise another one.

I think the Angolans have made moves to encourage the United States to recognize it. From what I get back, there is a sense of frustration that they have made those moves and nothing has come back.

As you know, their economy is a function of Gulf Oil. If Gulf Oil pulls out, there is nothing there. Many of those Cuban troops are up in Cabinda Province, protecting Gulf Oil, which sounds like the kind of thing you would write a book about or have a movie on.

My concern is that 3 or 4 years down the road, if there is not serious attention given to it, they may say, “Goodbye Gulf and Texaco,” and welcome in the French or someone else to do their oil exploration and production. I think we’d be worse off under those circumstances because then we would have no leverage; we would have no entree.

As long as you have Gulf, Texaco, Arthur D. Little, and Boeing in there, it seems to me now is the time to take advantage of that situation.

My concern, listening to your discussion of Angola and what is a clear sense of frustration that we were not able to continue our activities there back in 1974–75, is that before a decision is made, even with the consultation of Congress to potentially support Savimbi, at least an attempt be made to see what this present government would do in terms of opening to the West in arriving at a rapprochement with Savimbi, so that there is some sharing of power. This is exactly the position taken by every single black African nation.

You may decide not to do that, but I think it would be unfortunate not to at least have looked at that option initially.

Would you care to comment on that?

General Hair. Well, first, let me tell you that I have made no decisions whatsoever on this subject. I am not aware that there has been a decision made, and indeed, in a very practical sense, no such decision could be made until Mr. Reagan is installed appropriately, after January 20, at which time I think there will be a very extensive review of the situation, where we are today, how we got there, and what options are available to us to bring about an outcome which hopefully will result in an orientation of Angola along the lines you have described—not to the East but, more importantly, to the Western family of nations.
Senator Tsongas. There has been much discussion, or the hope has been expressed that if there were a solution in Namibia, Angola would be far more able to send many of those Cuban troops home. That's why I was particularly concerned about what happened in Geneva, because I think that would have been the case. Those issues are going to be on your plate anyway because they are breaking at this point.

General Haig. Absolutely.

Senator Tsongas. I will get back to this point later.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very kindly, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Sarbanes. I will defer for the moment, thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, it is good to see you again, today.

I assume, Father, that you are here for the benediction. [General laughter.]

General, yesterday, in response to a question from the chairman you gave a very definite answer. I want to be sure you understand the scope of what you agreed to.

The chairman said, and I quote:

On behalf of both the minority and the majority, I would like to ask this question. Would you agree to provide this committee access to State Department cables, memoranda, and studies that are judged by the chairman and ranking minority member to be important to the committee's oversight responsibility, with the understanding that they would always be placed under proper classification for security purposes?

General Haig. Of course.

End of quote.

General, if you do that, you've done more than most have agreed to and I would not have any more questions on congressional-executive relations.

Do you mean what you say?

General Haig. Since you've raised it, you really have jingled that little button, paranoia, in my system. I hope that my response to you, Mr. Chairman, did not convey to you that you have carte blanche to rifflle through all of the communications of the executive branch or the Department of State.

The Chairman. No. This was a question relating to practices that this committee has had in the past, when an issue is before the committee.

General Haig. That's the way I understood it, in conjunction with earlier practices.

The Chairman. For instance, I will just give one example.

There was a question about the Voice of America. I was very concerned that the Voice of America might become a propaganda instrument and also subject to veto power by ambassadors in countries who might have occasion to simply say we don't want the Voice of America to say this because it would upset the government, or something like that. So I sponsored language which became the law, statute, to insure the absolute independence of the VOA charter—to insure that it will be an authentic, factual, truthful voice and not just a propaganda voice. They could give editorials; but on news, it ought to be just like the BBC. That was the standard that I promoted.
It came to my attention that there had been attempts to influence the VOA unduly. I called the State Department and asked to see cable traffic between some of our ambassadors. I am happy to report that, though some of our ambassadors did attempt to influence VOA, VOA did not cave in and the integrity of the system was maintained.

That's the kind of example I had in mind. It always has been done in cooperation with the Secretary of State. In my 14 years, I have never been turned down by a Secretary of State. I have never made a request that I felt would be considered by them to be an improper request and not consistent with our oversight authority to see that the law of the land is being carried out.

General Haig. I know, Senator Biden, that there are many constitutional and legal aspects to this question in the context of separation of powers and both the responsibility and the necessity for the executive branch to function with some degree of integrity in its own intercommunications.

But, in a practical sense, what would concern me about a carte blanche of the kind that you're asking—

Senator Biden. I wasn't asking. I was just wondering.

General Haig. I'll tell you why it would be a disaster for all of us. There wouldn't be a communication I ever got from the field from my ambassadors, who are at the cutting edge of our burden carrying, that wasn't postured for legislative purview. I think that is not the kind of system that you or I would want for our country. I want my ambassadors to be able to communicate with me with frankness and with the assurance that that kind of communication is not going to be on the front page of the Washington Post or the Star or be bantered around before decisions are made and when people are reflecting on the ebb and flow of things.

Senator Biden. I understand your point, General.

We have the living expert on memorandums and cables with us today. His name is Senator Jesse Helms, from North Carolina. [General laughter.]

I can recall, and Jesse and I were comparing notes the other day—it's amazing what a transformation in attitude there is when you move from majority to minority and minority to majority. As a matter of fact, we just exchange questions. [General laughter.]

I'm being a little facetious about this, but it really is very serious. Senator Helms can tell you that the fact of the matter is we have had protracted discussions in the Foreign Relations Committee and outside of the committee about access to cables relating to the Panama Canal, memorandums, working papers relating to the Panama Canal treaties. It was a matter, I think, of some serious consequence whether or not we had access and, if we had access, under what circumstances.

That's why I asked the question whether or not you believe, as part of our oversight function, as Senator Helms does—or did—

Senator Helms. Does. [General laughter.]

Senator Biden [continuing]. That we should have access to, in a classified context, the working papers relating to treaties, for example, that you may be concluding or that you have concluded and for which you are asking our advice and consent for ratification,
General Haig. Well, I clearly need some education from our State Department counsel on that subject and would prefer to defer.

Senator Biden. Well, I think in fairness to you I will not pursue that. You are a wise man to try to keep your options open.

Senator Helms. If the Senator will yield, we may give him a little bit of education ourselves as time goes by.

Senator Biden. I'm sure you will, Jesse. As a matter of fact, I am prepared to be educated along with him and I will be right there with you.

The Chairman. Would you want a response from General Haig after he has discussed this with counsel, to prepare a statement from the Reagan administration insofar as how it would handle such requests from this committee?

Senator Biden. That's fine. I don't insist on that, but it makes good sense.

The Chairman. I think it might be well.

Senator Tsongas, I believe you were starting to frame a unanimous-consent request but never quite finished the request. Was that a request for insertion of material, and if so, without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator Helms. What was it?

Senator Tsongas. Yes, it was a request and I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. The papers already have been given to the reporter for insertion.

Senator Helms. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Biden. Sure, I will.

Senator Helms. We have engaged in a bit of levity here this morning about the availability of information.

I want to say, in fairness to the Secretary—and, Mr. Secretary, I believe I may be the first to call you that—that it is awfully difficult to answer a hypothetical question with respect to documents. I don't think you will find that any member of this committee will make an unreasonable request for information and I don't think you'll take an unreasonable position on it. At least, we will start on that basis.

I thank you, Senator Biden.

General Haig. I share that confidence, Senator.

Senator Biden. You have more confidence than I do, General.

[General laughter.]

Senator Biden. General, let's move down the line a little bit. The reason I asked the question relates much less to you and your attitude, based on anything you have done in the past or said thus far, than it does on what I am concerned about, a development in the Reagan administration that already is occurring.

I am the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and, in an unprecedented move, in the recent past at least, the last 8 years, the Reagan administration transition team, I guess, has made the judgment that FBI files relating to nominees will not be available for review by the minority members of the committee, including the ranking member; that we will go back to the good old days of 25 years ago, where the chairman of the committee was able to see the raw file and if we wanted to know about that, we would all go to the chairman and say, "Is everything okay, Mr. Chairman?" The chairman would then say yes or no.
Now that is a very, very significant reversal in the practice of comity that has been developed over the last 8 years, some of it fought and rangled over, some of it borne out of really serious conflict, but much of it I think is borne out of a working practice and it worked pretty well.

I don't expect you to comment but I must say that I have been very impressed with the way in which you have responded to us—not merely with the substance of your answers but the manner of your answers. You have convinced me that you will go out of your way to be forthcoming with this committee, in large part because I think you are a man who values your reputation above all else. If I were to be cynical about it, I would say you have been so boxed in here that I believe if, at a Cabinet meeting, someone were to say let's try to figure out a way to get around the War Powers Act, you would be the one to say, "Hey, wait a minute, I made a promise, it is happening on my watch now and we are not going to do that."

I am not being sarcastic when I say I have become convinced of your sincere desire to be forthcoming with this committee. I think the degree to which that will be spontaneous will depend upon your continuing judgment of the responsible attitude of this committee and whether or not we play fair with you.

I would hope you put into the back of your mind what I hope is only a transition team attitude and not a retrenching attitude on the part of an administration.

I honestly am not passing judgment. I just hope that that is not the start of a trend.

You say, kiddingly, that certain questions I ask you trigger a paranoia. Well, having gone through the last four Presidents, there are certain things that trigger my paranoia, and one of them is when someone says you can't take a look at the file even if you are the ranking member of a committee. That is what prompted my pursuing this matter a little bit.

Let me take this one step further in terms of access.

There has been, in the past, developed through the administrations of President Nixon, President Ford, and President Carter, occasions when we, for various reasons in this committee, have wanted to have direct access to a subordinate of yours—and I know you have spoken to this generally before—where the subordinate either has disagreed with a policy judgment that has been made, or we are convinced that he or she disagreed and we want that person to adopt a posture that we expect our military people to adopt. We expect, when we call a member of the Joint Chiefs to testify about SALT or anything else—and they have, in my opinion been very honorable and forthcoming—and we say, "I know you are going to carry out the policy the President has dictated, I know you are going to carry out the policy the Secretary has suggested, but do you agree with it" we want and expect an answer. We are anxious that we have access to your subordinates who may have a disagreement in policy and that they will not be either chastised for answering the questions directly or in any way put into jeopardy in terms of their career path.

I think I know what the answer will be, but I would like to have it on the record that you would not in any way interfere with an Ambassador, or an Ambassador to the United Nations, as in the case of
the McHenry affair that occurred a little while ago—if you remember, we had a little vote problem in the U.N. We want on the record that you would be willing to give us access to your people, assuming that they were the ones who really either exercised the decision or disagreed with the decision that you put forward.

Would you not?

General Haig. Golly, Senator, there are so many imponderables in that question that it would not be prudent to give you a yea. I would be more inclined to give you a yea than a nay, but I don't think that would be prudent.

Senator Biden. Then let me put it in another way.

Will you object to our questioning State Department personnel or people under your jurisdiction who are the operatives involved in whatever policy is being carried out?

General Haig. I don't think so, in general, at all. But I think that places, as it has traditionally done, a level of responsibility and good judgment on the part of the subordinates. I have confidence that they will exercise that.

Senator Biden. What we seek are personal and professional views without fear of recrimination on the part of the person expressing those views.

General Haig. I can't see that. I could see if a subordinate just fundamentally disagreed with an approved policy, that we would have to replace that subordinate. I would hope, whatever process the controversy involved, it wouldn't be a reflection of imprudence on the part of that dissenting member. When those kinds of things happen, I think we have trouble.

You know, you can have bureaucratic anarchy if we are not very careful. I haven't seen any signs of that, and I don't visualize it.

Senator Biden. General, I will move now to another subject which has not been mentioned by anyone. It is probably a parochial interest of mine, but I think it is one of the overwhelming issues facing this country and is never viewed in terms of having any international dimension, therefore not having any real profile within the State Department. It is the matter of international drug abuse.

We all have our special projects and our special concerns. For the last 4 years, an overwhelming amount of my time has been spent, as a consequence of my involvement on this committee, the Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee, in doing background work on organized crime and international drug trafficking. I have become convinced that until we have a Secretary of State who is willing to escalate to a much higher profile the dimensions of the international drug problem, the source problem, we are not going to get really much movement.

I apologize for this little speech but I wanted to give you a bit of background.

General, we estimate that about 2 to a maximum of 5 percent of all of the heroin coming into this country is intercepted. You read in the paper about great drug busts, multimillion dollar drug busts. If you add them all up, they may account to up to 5 percent, but probably only 2 percent of all the drugs that come into this country. Once they hit the street, we ask much too much of our police agencies to be able to do something about it. Unless we can deal with source countries,
unless we can deal with international cooperative ventures, in terms of police action, before the drugs reach our borders, we don’t have a snowball’s chance of making a dent.

Now I don’t want to nail you down. You probably would need more time to think about this. But I would mention the efforts of Mathea Falco, who now is in the State Department, though she might not be in the future—I am not talking about a particular personality, of course—she is a woman who is very involved in trying to increase the profile of the drug problem in the Carter administration. I would sincerely hope that you would entertain spending half an hour or so, once you get underway, with me or anyone else who is interested to give me a chance to make the hard sell as to why you really should have as high a profile as in any other aspect of State Department activity, and I mean everything from nonproliferation to SALT, for the question of a concerted policy and coordinated policy relating to drug trafficking. Would you be willing to do that with me?

General Haig. I’d welcome that opportunity because I share your concern in this area.

Senator Biden. I appreciate that.

I have a whole series of questions which I will submit to you, not for you to answer for the record, but so that after you get underway and organized you will be aware of, as the young kids say today, where I am coming from on this issue.

I really cannot emphasize this enough. It accounts for about 60 percent of the violent crime in this country. It is estimated to be a $52 billion game that is going on. It clearly involves organized crime. It involves a situation where we have infiltration of legitimate businesses, banks and insurance companies, owned by organized crime—all of it funded by this international drug network.

I need not tell you, a former military man, about the problems we have been having in the military with regard to drug abuse, although I think we are making headway. If there is anything that can bring our country down faster than an inability to grab a hold of this problem, I have not figured out what it is. It seems as though State Department officials trained in foreign policy matters somehow think it is beneath them, beyond them, or unrelated to them to be talking about that problem, as though that’s something the local sheriff takes care of.

Well, enough of a sales job. I appreciate your agreement to talk to me about this anyway.

General Haig. Incidentally, Senator, it might interest you to know that this was a major area of concern to me as U.S. Commander in Europe. I have worked very, very closely with Ambassador Stoessel to engage the Federal Republic of Germany in just the kind of activity that you are expressing concern about, and I think with some effective coordination and modification of then-existing policy.

Senator Biden. I think you are correct. I’m sure your efforts were very positive. The most positive thing that occurred, in a horrible sense, is once their drug overdose death exceeded ours, they all of a sudden began to pay attention to it. I think it is very important.

Senator Boschwitz. Would you yield?

Senator Biden. Sure. I’d be happy to yield.
Senator Boschwitz. I'd like to join Senator Biden in his remarks and to express my satisfaction that you were engaged in that during your period as NATO Commander.

I share your belief, Joe, that it is indeed a very pressing problem. I would also observe, General, that you seem to be doing quite well this morning. Senator Helms is calling you "Mr. Secretary" already, and you are referring to "your" people in the State Department.

Also, Joe, you are speaking about your own paranoia, so he seems to be progressing along very well.

Senator Biden. It comes with minority status.

Senator Boschwitz. Is that what it is? [General laughter.]

The Chairman. I have had it for 14 years.

Senator Biden. Well, then, I won't comment on your situation. [General laughter.]

General, I probably have two or three more rounds of questions. I would like to get into clarifying a little bit on strategic matters to make sure that I understood your answers. It is not totally new ground, but ground that I would like to go back over a little bit. Then I will be finished with my questioning. So I will wait until my next round comes up.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

General Haig, in his questioning you on Monday, Senator Mathias made two points with respect to the multilateral approach to providing foreign assistance. First, he said that it assures that other countries contribute $3 for every $1 contributed by the United States; second, that it provides $3 of increased U.S. GNP for every $1 we pay into these institutions. We promised to provide you with the supporting data behind these figures.

I understand, General Haig, that your staff has been provided this material. Inasmuch as Senator Mathias is unable to be here with us this morning, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the record the excerpts of Senate Report 96-700, issued by this committee last year to accompany S. 2422, which provided for an increase in U.S. participation in the International Development Association. This report elaborates on the two points made by Senator Mathias on Monday. He calls particular attention to page 8.

[The information referred to follows:]

**COMMITTEE COMMENTS**

A. THE OPERATIONS OF THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS

The United States participates in four multilateral development banks (MDB's):

1. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or IBRD);
2. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB);
3. The Asian Development Bank (ADB); and

The United States joined the IBRD in 1945 as part of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. Subsequently, two other organizations were created as Part of the World Bank Group; the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA). The United States joined these organizations in 1955 and 1960 respectively. The United States joined the IDB in 1959 and the ADB in 1966. This bill would authorize U.S. membership in the African Development Bank. The United States has been a member of the African Development Fund since 1976.
The principal function of all the development banks is to generate capital and lend this money to the governments of less developed countries (LDC's) to provide supplementary financing for their economic development efforts. Technical evaluation and assistance in connection with the projects financed by MDB loans are also provided. In addition, the banks—particularly the IBRD—also serve as a source of economic policy advice aimed at ensuring sound policies and effective management of the overall development efforts of recipient countries.

Table 1 provides the total of all loan commitments by Multilateral Development Banks from 1947 to 1979.

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Each MDB has two lending facilities, one for loans at market terms and one for concessional, or soft, loans. The hard-loan window is financed primarily by the MDB selling bonds on the world's capital markets, and to a smaller extent, by capital paid in by members. These resources are then loaned to less-developed countries at interest rates that cover the cost of borrowing plus the bank's administrative expenses. The security for these bonds is the money members have pledged to the capital of each MDB. These pledges are of two types, paid-in capital and callable capital. Paid-in capital is funds actually provided to the MDB by its members. Callable capital is a promise to pay on demand by an MDB member to meet obligations to bondholders. Callable capital would only be "called" if there were such large and widespread defaults on the MBD by countries which had borrowed at the hard loan window that the banks resources of paid-in capital and accumulated reserves would be exhausted so that these obligations to bondholders could not be met. There has never been a "call" on the capital of any MDB.

Hard-loan windows must operate on terms based upon the commercial price of money to the MDB, plus the MDB's own costs. This is because of the requirement of the MDB to pay off the bonds when they mature. In the case of hard loans, the MDB substitutes its credit-worthiness for that of the LDC and acts as a financial bridge from the capital markets to the LDC's. Critical to the performance of this function is the credit-worthiness of the MDB's themselves. Presently, the bonds of the MDB's of which the United States is a member, are rated AAA.

The soft-loan window of each MDB is financed entirely differently. Due to the long period of maturity and the low-interest rate of soft-loans, these win-
21

dowscannotborrowfromthecommercialcapitalmarket.Softwindowsoperate
exclusivelyonthecontributionsmadebythememberstates.Furthermore,to
keepupasupplyofloans,thesoft-loanwindowsmustbereplenishedatspeci-
fiedintervals.Thetotalsumofthese replenishments,aswellasthepercentage
ofthe total to be assumed by each member, are the subject of negotiations among
the members of the MDB. The soft-lending facility of each MDB is as follows:
1. IBRD—International Development Association (IDA);
2. IDB—Fund for Special Operations (FSO);
3. ADB—Asian Development Fund (ADF); and
4. AFDB—African Development Fund (AFDF).

Inadditiontoits hard- and soft-window operations, the IBRD has a third
financial institution associated with it, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC). The IFC makes hard-loans or equity investments in private industry
in less developed countries for the purpose of economic development. In essence,
it functions as a private investment bank.

For the purposes of S. 2422, the executive branch is requesting an authoriza-
tion of appropriations for two MDB's; the International Development Associa-
tion and the African Development Bank, and changes in the budgetary treat-
ment of callable capital in the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment and the Asian Development Bank.

Table 2 provides the cumulative commitment by MDB to individual countries.

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1 IDB commitments are net of cancellations, refundings and terminations.

Source: KDB annual reports.
**IMPORTANCE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP**

The Committee believes that there are substantial direct economic benefits to the United States of participation in the multilateral development banks. These economic benefits are discussed in section C. While this case is compelling, the Committee believes that there is a more fundamental issue of U.S. leadership with respect to the banks at this time. The United States was in the forefront of the establishment and operation of the banks over the past 35 years. During that time, the banks have proven themselves as an effective mechanism for channeling additional resources into sound investment projects in developing countries and have become an important element in U.S. relations with the developing countries. From the U.S. perspective, they were also instrumental as a mechanism for encouraging other developed countries to make larger contributions to the development of the poor countries.

Three years ago the Congress expressed its belief in a Sense of the Congress Resolution that the United States share in each of the multilateral banks should decline from its previous level. The administration has been responsive to this viewpoint in subsequent negotiations of U.S. shares in capital increases and in replenishments. In each of the MDB's, the U.S. share of subsequent replenishments has declined from its previous level, with other countries, including OPEC and a number of more advanced developing countries increasing their relative contributions to these institutions. In the case of the IDA sixth replenishment included in this bill, the U.S. share for the first time is smaller than the combined share of Germany and Japan. Thus, we have succeeded in assuming equitable participation by other countries in the international development effort managed by the multilateral banks.

Table 3 provides the cumulative authorizations, appropriations and arrearages to the MDB's.

### TABLE 3.—CUMULATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS AND ARREARAGES TO THE MDB’S

(In thousands of dollars)

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1 Figures include $12,305,000 in paid-in capital and $110,745,000 in callable capital not yet requested.
2 Figures assume full authorization of fiscal year 1980 request as established in conference report.

**THE U.S. ECONOMIC STAKE IN THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS**

In addition to the role of the banks as channels for sound investment projects, the Committee notes an element of growing importance to the United States which can be directly related to the operations of the MDB's—that of the rapidly increasing trade and financial ties between the United States and the developing countries. At present, developing countries purchase about 40 percent of our exports and represent the greatest potential for expansion of our overseas markets. Developing countries already provide the United States with more than 25 percent of the raw materials we require. Jobs in the United States are becoming increasingly dependent upon these export markets and upon access to, and the security of, critical raw materials which we import from developing countries. This is particularly true for energy, an area in which the MDB's are making major effort to develop additional supplies. The economic growth of the developing countries and their ability to increase their pay for increased imports from the United States is critically dependent on the continued flow
of resources through the multilateral banks, particularly in the present uncertain international economic environment.

Testimony by officials of the U.S. Treasury in support of this bill indicates that every dollar contributed to the MDB's results in $1.57 being injected directly into the U.S. economy in balance-of-payments inflows. The total economic effects, however, are much larger and more broadly based than the effects directly observable from our balance of payments. That $1.57 becomes the income of a U.S. exporter, bondholder or Bank employee residing in the United States. It is in turn respent, resulting in multiple increases in U.S. national income, employment, and Federal Government and local tax receipts.

The Treasury analysis shows that over the period 1977–78 every dollar contributed to the MDB's has resulted in an increase of U.S. GNP of $3. This three for one multiplier effect is sizable and stems, in part, from the unique characteristics of the MDB's that is, their multilateral character which provides for other donor country contributions and the availability of callable capital which permits substantial borrowing on private capital markets. Total U.S. GNP growth directly attributable to MDB activities averaged $2.7 billion over 1977–78, raising net Federal tax receipts by $720 million annually and reducing the net cost to the Federal budget for our participation in the banks to $170 million each year. If increased local tax receipts were included the net cost to the American taxpayer probably would be minimal.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one or two short questions on ANZUS. I don't believe our allies in that part of the world have yet been mentioned in this hearing.

Certainly you know better than anyone that Australia and New Zealand have been among our longest and most steady allies in many, many different areas. Australia has been helpful just recently.

We have had useful discussions between our governments, particularly since the Iran-Iraq war broke out, and the use of air and naval facilities in Western Australia has been offered.

What should be the role of our ANZUS allies in maintaining stability in the Western Pacific?

General Haig. Well, Mr. Chairman, of course in general their role is extremely important. I am very pleased that I have had an opportunity to discuss these issues with Prime Minister Frazier of Australia during visits that he made to Europe.

I think there is another very important aspect of the Australian and New Zealand relationship with Japan which has emerged, the strong economic ties that are unprecedented in recent months and years. So, it is not only within the ASEAN family itself but in a broader regional sense that this role of ASEAN, under the great influence of the Australian Government and New Zealand Government will play an increasingly important role. That already will be superimposed on long-standing historic and traditional ties with the United States, which have been so productive over the years.

The CHAIRMAN. Specifically, do you believe that U.S. use of facilities or bases in Western Australia is needed?

General Haig. Well, I have, over the years, been privy to some of these activities, and, of course, I very strongly feel that they are essential.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, should the United States encourage greater defense cooperation between Australia and ASEAN nations or should the United States itself take the lead?

General Haig. Well, I think, given relative changes in power, that we should welcome regional reinforcement of one another's defense capabilities; but it is not going to relieve us of our traditional need to be sure that that occurs and perhaps from time to time assist.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I don't believe we have talked much yet about the refugee situation around the world. At least I don't recall hearing it while I was here, and I have been here most of the time. It is a horrendous problem. There is terrible suffering. I think one estimate is that there are as many as 16 million people in refugee status now in different parts of the world.

We tend to concentrate on the immediate problem that we have, people coming across the strait from Cuba or the Vietnam "boat people," things like that with which we have been directly concerned. But out of those 16 million refugees, it is estimated that 12 million are in Africa.

I wonder if you have any thoughts that you can share with us about what we possibly can do about this.

Do you have any ideas?

General Haig. Well, Senator, unfortunately just during the period you were absent yesterday we had quite a discussion on that subject.

Senator Glenn. You did?

General Haig. I hope not to bore the committee with a rerecitation of my concerns, and what I think will be our responsibilities.

Clearly we continue historically to be the refuge for generations of Americans, who have come in a refugee status to our shores. I don't think that basic philosophy has changed, although it must be modified in the context of our ability to absorb this burden, the burden-sharing among those states that are better able to do it, but most important—

Senator Glenn. But will we burden share? That is the question.

Sitting in on the confirmation hearings of Mr. Stockman and questioning him left me very disturbed about the direction we are going in some of these areas. I doubt that we are going to find money in the budget for refugee matters, except in miniscule amounts, if he has his way. He said he wasn't going to necessarily take care of the people who are in our own country. He said that unless you have a visible physical impairment he does not thing you should get help in our own country. Visible physical impairment.

I can't imagine that we are going to send many millions of dollars abroad if that is going to be the attitude of OMB. And, as I said yesterday, the second most powerful man in government is the head of OMB.

What are we going to do about refugees? Hundreds of millions of dollars are required. Are they all going to have to have visible physical impairment before we can help them? I don't think we would want to draw a line like that.

General Haig. Well, Senator, I think I understand your concerns.

I have not had the ability or the opportunity to discuss these matters with Mr. Stockman. I hold him in the highest regard.

Senator Glenn. You are in a rude awakening, General, if he continues with the line that he had in the committee the other day. It got very little notice.

General Haig. Well, that job is traditionally one which calls for a green eyeshade and it has to be very, very tough at times.
Senator Glenn. I agree about being tough on outbacks. But, in the foreign relations context, with which we are here involved, I am very concerned if we will have anything, if he has his way. I doubt if we will have anything to provide of the refugee help that we would like. Some of the foreign aid that we provide is far less, on a percentage basis, at least, than that of other nations around the world. I am sure there are going to be some very tough times in this area.

Senator Tsongas. Will the Senator yield?

General Haig. I have had an opportunity to discuss some of these things in general with President-elect Reagan and I think he will be the man who makes the decision.

Senator Glenn. I hope there is a voice of reason which will prevail because it was not in that hearing the other day.

I yield.

Senator Tsongas. The Senator referred to the No. 2 man in power in the government. To whom was he referring?

Senator Glenn. To the Director of OMB, Stockman.

Senator Tsongas. How do you feel about that?

[General laughter.]

General Haig. It disappoints me because I liked your version better.

[General laughter.]

Senator Glenn. Purse strings carry the power. I have become convinced, over the last 6 years, that whoever sits at the head of OMB has more to do with what goes on, certainly domestically at least, in government than anybody except the President himself.

Senator Tsongas. I'll take book on that if you wish.

[General laughter.]

Senator Glenn. General, Zimbabwe is a very important nation. We authorized foreign assistance to that country in 1980, $29 million; in 1981, $25 million to $30 million; 1981 is very much in contention. It is supposed to be around $75 million. Rumors are that the Reagan administration will probably drastically reduce that figure. Zimbabwe is in real need.

We made a commitment to that country and we have not carried it out as yet. I think with the rather tenuous situation there, this could well be a factor with whether they keep themselves aligned in a direction favorable to us or find themselves going over more toward the Soviet line of thinking.

You talked earlier in your testimony about taking precautionary, preventive action to prevent some of these things from happening. What would be your view on help to Zimbabwe?

General Haig. Senator, I would like to have the opportunity to review the entire situation in the context of the earlier exchange we had here before I would give the committee a definitive recommendation or view.

Senator Glenn. Would you give us that view after you have done that?

General Haig. Clearly we are going to be faced with this issue very early on and at that time of course.

Senator Glenn. How about the prospective resumption of military sales to El Salvador?

General Haig. This is a highly dynamic issue on which there has been a daily dialog between Mr. Muskie's Department and the Gov-
ernment, the junta in El Salvador. I think, given the tenseness of that situation there, we would be best served by my saying that I think a recent decision has been made that I support. I would perhaps want to see even a more extensive decision.

Senator Glenn. We talked earlier just very briefly about Angola and about the 20–20 hindsight we have now with regard to what may have been a whole series of actions that followed Angola—Zaire, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, North Yemen, et cetera, as we discussed yesterday very briefly.

But, regardless of what our 20–20 hindsight might have been about what we might have done or should have done at that time—I think you indicated an amount that you thought might have helped out in Angola—the question is what do we do in Angola now. What should be our view today?

General Haig. Well, that again returns to the dialog that Senator Tsongas and I had a few moments ago and again suggests a number of criteria that I have discussed—the presence of Cuban forces, the attitude that is demonstrated in a de facto sense with respect to Western investment and a continuation of already thriving Western activity.

Senator Glenn. Should we recognize the government?

General Haig. I would not make such a recommendation so long as there are 20,000 or 18,000 Cuban mercenaries within their borders.

Senator Glenn. You have talked at considerable length about working in close harmony with our allies. I believe we are the only member of NATO that has not recognized Angola. I think that is correct.

Does that impact on your thinking at all?

General Haig. I'm not sure that that is true of the full 15-nation group. I would have to double check that, but I think it is true.

Senator Tsongas. It is correct.

Senator Glenn. Would that bear on your thinking on working in concert with our allies?

General Haig. Of course it would. Absolutely.

Senator Tsongas. John, before you get off that subject, may I ask a question?


Senator Tsongas. Thank you.

Just as a point of clarification, you expressed the feeling that you would not recommend recognition as long as there were 18,000 to 10,000 Cuban troops. Does that mean that there would not be recognition as long as any of them were there or does it mean if there were movement to de-escalate——

General Haig. If there were commitments and bona fides to confirm that commitment, then you have an entirely different situation. After all, what we are after is the result and not some rigid formula for achieving those results.

Senator Tsongas. Thank you.

Senator Glenn. There has been some indication that perhaps Angola might be viewing the Cuban troops there with a bit more concern than it did in the past, and that it might be willing, under the proper incentive, to ask them to leave. I think that would be a very productive thing for you to get into at the very earliest.
General Haig. It would be very productive.

Senator Glenn. General, the last Republican Administration advocated the introduction of American nuclear materials into Egypt and Israel. The Iran-Iraq situation clearly shows the problems that can arise when such materials are placed in what could be termed tinderbox regions. The Iraqis have refused an informal request by the International Atomic Energy Agency for an inspection of their nuclear facilities on the grounds that the war presents presently insuperable difficulties for such activity. The Egyptians are apparently willing to accept full scope safeguards in order to get nuclear materials, the Israelis are not.

Were you involved in the 1974 decision by President Nixon to send nuclear materials to the Middle East?

General Haig. I don't recall specifically making a contribution to that decision, Senator. But it raises an issue about which I have some views.

I think that not only America, but Western industrialized countries in general will have to reply on peaceful nuclear power and we are going to have to meet to find a way to provide the safeguards to prevent the abuses for which you express concern.

I remain convinced that a nation that has created nuclear power is every bit up to meeting the challenges of creating the most reasonable and assured safeguards to prevent abuse.

So, I would have favored that probably at the time with assurances that abuses were not going to creep in. That is the great danger and I share your concerns about that.

But I do not feel that those dangers should dominate our policies because they exist as a danger. Our problem is to deal with them along the lines of which you spoke, inspection and what have you.

Senator Glenn. Well, the spread of the benefits of nuclear power I think we agree on completely. Where your previous testimony indicated we might have some differing viewpoints is in the area of how we prevent the spread of reprocessing equipment, uranium enrichment equipment, plutonium shipments, all three of which are keyed to spreading nuclear weapons to more and more nations around the world. There is a difference there.

I agree with you completely in what you just said about nuclear power. I presume you meant by that such things as electric power generation.

General Haig. Yes.

Senator Glenn. How about your views on reprocessing equipment, shipments of plutonium, on uranium enrichment plants?

General Haig. Well, I would never be a proponent for policies which had the practical consequence of raising the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In no way. There, of course, I am talking about weaponry.

Senator Glenn. You just mentioned safeguards methods a moment ago. Are you talking about something different than the International Atomic Energy Safeguards?

General Haig. Well, I think there are bilateral assurances that must accompany the transfer of nuclear technology. There are technical assurances that must accompany the transfer of nuclear technology. There are a host of safeguards that can be applied, related to such a decision.
Senator Glenn. Do you favor the idea of full-scope safeguards before we make shipments?

General Haig. In general, yes.

Senator Glenn. You indicated earlier some discomfort at the reaction of some of our European allies to the pressures that we put on them to alter their nonproliferation policies, policies that resulted in the French, for instance, attempting to send reprocessing plants to Pakistan and South Korea and the Germans transferring reprocessing technology to Brazil. Would you agree that at least the pressures created by our own change in policy have had the beneficial effect of at least raising the consciousness level of our allies so that, as I think has been indicated more recently, such transfers are less likely to take place?

General Haig. That would depend on a great number of things, Senator. It would depend, first and foremost, on the continuing regard that these other advanced industrialized nations hold for the U.S. point of view. That is an issue which remains to be determined.

Senator Glenn. We have 108 nonnuclear weapon nations that, at our request and at our leadership, have followed us in agreeing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NNPT. What benefits do you think should accrue to those nations as opposed to those which do not agree with us? Should we go ahead and continue shipping to other nations, too, whether or not they have signed the NNPT?

General Haig. Well, first, as I stated earlier, I was a great proponent of the nonproliferation treaties and worked diligently during my time in Washington to get additional signatories.

Those nations which have not agreed—the panorama of differences for that nonagreement is very, very wide. Some of them might be understandable; some far less so.

I think what is important as we address this issue and continue to try to broaden acceptance of the nonproliferation agreement is, above all, not to pursue ancillary or related policies which contribute, as I said, to the insecurities which raise the appetite. For example, in a regional sense, if one nation, a have-not nation is threatened by a have nation, the appetite is rather large. We have to deal with that in a host of possible ways.

Senator Glenn. Let's go back over this again.

The other day we talked about India and Pakistan. Now there is a have and have-not, side by side. Pakistan is scared to death and wants the bomb. Qaddafi is backing it, is sending them yellow cake for developing the bomb.

Now you also indicated that our policy should be the same to different nations, and you specifically said Pakistan and India.

Would you favor our shipments to Pakistan, then, so that we are evenhanded because we have just sent nuclear fuel shipments to India?

General Haig. Well, that would have me join the syndrome that one mistake begets another. Perhaps that's true, but I would like to think about that very carefully. I am not comfortable with that thesis.

Senator Glenn. Well, you are going to be faced with it in about 6 days. You don't have a lot of time to ponder this thing.

General Haig. That, including a host of other things, gives me pause.
Senator Glenn. Excuse me?

General Haig. I said that, among a host of other things, tends to give me pause.

Senator Glenn. Well, we tried and, of course, have cut off our support for Pakistan. We went ahead and cooperated with India, which has not signed the NNPT and rubbed our nose in it all the way through and has been just as antagonistic as it can be.

General Haig. Senator, I don’t like to leave you with some cute exchange from me on a subject of this gravity and importance. There are a host of ways of dealing with this. There are assurances, American commitments, and in the case of Pakistan, it is rather long-standing—since 1958, as I recall.

Senator Glenn. You mean our commitment to Pakistan to what?

General Haig. To be reassuring with respect to their future and their viability. There are things in the area of conventional armaments which can relieve the kind of tensions that feed an appetite for nuclear weaponry.

Senator Glenn. Well, in that particular situation, while I would hate to disagree with a learned gentleman like you, but I don’t think anything is going to persuade them that if you give them some other, conventional military equipment, they should cease and desist in their efforts to make the nuclear weaponry they obviously are bent on making in Pakistan.

General Haig. Well, I think this remains to be seen. I may be somewhat more optimistic and therefore will be soon disappointed, as apparently you are.

Senator Glenn. I think, further, that the Pakistan situation shows that the “trigger list,” as it is called, of sensitive nuclear components adopted under the London Suppliers Agreement, is not sufficient to prevent nations bent on acquiring a weapons capability from buying the materials they need on the world market. Indeed, the Pakistanis received materials from most of our major European allies, including Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and even got some of their electronic equipment from a firm in California in our own country.

What steps would you take to plug the leaks that presently exist in this international safeguard system?

General Haig. Well, I hope that I have an assistant secretary who will have responsibilities in this area who will be sure we are doing all we can to prevent this.

Senator Glenn. The red light is on, so I guess my time is up.

This is all so extremely complex. I agree with you. Much as I would like to pin you down to specifics, I think you are wise not to get pinned down too tightly here. I guess it is not in any of our interests to pin you down that tightly at the moment.

This is all so extremely complex. I was a bit disturbed in our first or second day of questioning when we got into nuclear proliferation and you had an exchange with Senator Dodd. You came back on one of his questions and indicated—or at least I received the impression—that you felt it had been a big mistake that we had not just let business go on as usual around the world in this regard, that American business involvement had been held back, and you didn’t like that. I think that was Senator Dodd’s impression also of what you said that day.
It has “bugged” me a little bit since then and that is one reason I wanted to follow up on some of those questions today.

We made a very positive governmental decision in 1978 with the NNPA as to whether we were going to encourage American business to get involved everywhere in the world, to use our influence through American business to try to influence peaceful nuclear expansion—all over the world and to control the weaponry aspect of it, or were we going to try the government-to-government relationship. Well, we opted for the latter.

Your opening remarks on that subject left a little bit of doubt as to whether you thought we had made a mistake in going that route. That left me with the impression that perhaps you might not be as willing to back up our view of this as we would like to see.

In all fairness, we wrote into that law a requirement for GAO to do a study at the end of 2 years on how it was working. Were we really preventing proliferation or not?

They have had a lot of people working on that for 6 or 7 months and that report is due out in March, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator GLENN. It should give us advice on this. We may want to make some changes—I don’t know. But right now, the law is, and what we are trying to make work is, to prevent the spread of reprocessing, enrichment, and plutonium. That was the objective of that NNPA.

I hope we have your very, very full support in carrying out that law.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would suggest that that Assistant Secretary be sent up to the Hill to be briefed by Senator Glenn and Senator Percy on nuclear nonproliferation. [General laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. Would you say it is fair to say that you favor a more activist foreign policy in influencing events and developments around the world?

General HAIG. I’m not sure that the term “activist” is precisely what I had in mind, Senator. I think rather a more consistent and reliable and predictable one in which the principles by which we hope to continue our affairs are clearly understood and the contradictions, for example, are minimized. They will always be there. More activist probably in the sense that to some degree at least our articulation has been one of noninvolvement in areas where unfortunately we are involved and in some instances have become involved, although we disclaim so.

Senator SARBANES. When you talk about our involvement, what form are you thinking about that involvement taking?

General HAIG. Well, most importantly and primarily, the issue of illegal Soviet activity, whether direct or through proxies, is an issue that we must view with greater gravity than we have heretofore.

Senator SARBANES. How much importance do you attach to the use of our economic power and our economic policy to influence events and developments elsewhere in the world, as opposed to what I would take,
from your response to a previous question to this activity that you just described?

General Haig. Well, I think clearly Western economic power is the most important asset the free world has to influence events. I don't mean to suggest by that a theory of economic determinism. I reject those theories.

But clearly that, international legitimacy for those who violate international law—when we concede that to them, we are conceding to them an incentive to continue. This is a problem with terrorism. I think we just have to take a somewhat more steely-eyed view of breaches of international law and the standards and mores of Western civilization.

Senator SARBANES. To what extent do you think we can use our trade policy, our aid policy and our economic monetary policy to influence events and developments elsewhere? To what extent would you put that as the lead method for influencing developments?

General Haig. I wouldn't like to give it a precedence because I think in each instance the menu—and I use that term guardedly—of assets available to the West will vary.

In some areas economic levers would be of substantial importance, and perhaps primary. In other issues and other areas, the issue of international legitimacy for those who violate accepted codes of international law, perhaps scientific or technological assets would be the most important. It would depend on where, whether it was a regional manifestation, whether you wanted it to go directly. If you are talking about how we would deal with the Soviet Union in an explicit sense, I think the economic side is very high on the agenda.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that the economic relationships with other countries—leaving aside the Soviet Union and the direct East-West question—should essentially proceed on a separate track, or that judgments with respect to economic relationships should be made in the context of the total, broader foreign policy considerations which in some instances may mean, for instance, that we make an independent economic policy decision about which we would say that it is not such a good policy from our point of view, but rather that it is part and parcel of a broader policy which it is essential to follow in order to meet broader strategic and foreign policy considerations?

General Haig. I feel very strongly and share the latter opinion. I feel it is absolutely essential for the Department of State to get a better handle on American economic policy, technology transfer, issues of nuclear proliferation as well. All of these factors must be integrated into the fundamental bedrock of what is politically in the best interest of the United States—and I use the term "politically" guardedly.

Without that, we have a host of functional policies being pursued which have no coherence and which are not a part of the fundamental mosaic that we are seeking to assemble.

Senator SARBANES. I think that is a very accurate statement. It anticipated my next question, which is this.

What policymaking mechanism would you anticipate existing within the administration to insure that the making of our international economic policy would be done in a way that met that standard?

General Haig. Well, these are battles yet to be fought in the establishment of the interdepartmental mechanisms for which we are now
drafting arrangements. But I participated in such battles in 1969 and I know how crucial they are.

I think the answer to your question is this establishment of interdepartmental committees where the Chair rests essentially in the hands of those who can reflect on the broader political issues.

That is the essence of it.

Incidentally, the White House staff, the National Security Council staff has, statutorily, a broad coordinating responsibility here. But I would hope that when our issues get to the National Security Council they reflect, first and foremost, an integrated view.

Senator SARBANES. In the speech you gave in October 1976, before the Association of the United States Army, which I understand is one of the most important speeches you refer to in terms of a statement of your views, or so I have been told, you suggested that if the West is to deal effectively and responsibly with the emerging Third World, it must do so as a collective of consumers. Would you elaborate on what you meant by this proposition?

General HAIG. Yes; Senator. Of course, there has been an evolution of events since the date of that speech. I think in most instances it has reaffirmed my view.

At that time, we were in the wake of the OPEC problem and I felt that the activities following the first Paris meeting designed to coordinate Western energy policy were not being properly attended, that there were not adequate efforts to carry on with what was not an agreement at Paris but at least an elegant dialog, and we should have continued to give that high priority.

I would apply that also to a host of other raw material attitudes, that rather than have a jungle of competition and escalating prices in the spot market, we in the West should work in greater concert.

Senator SARBANES. What is your view on commodity agreements, which developing countries have been seeking?

General HAIG. I am not a fundamental enthusiast for those. I do not reject them, on the other hand. I think they have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, whether they are cost effective in the long run and whether or not there is some other way of accomplishing the same desirable outcome.

This is not to say I am for or against, but maybe I have a degree of skepticism that in some instances we can do it better.

Senator SARBANES. Do you see a framework for addressing the economic relations between the developed countries and the developing countries different from the confrontational mode it has tended to take in recent times, in which the developed countries are there as a bloc and the developing countries are there as a bloc and all efforts to try to deal with the problem are seen in that light?

General HAIG. Well, I think it is a dreadfully complex problem—that is the first point I would want to make—and if we go about it—and that is why I referred to how self-defeating it can be to refer to the Third World as though it were some kind of coherent, consistent set of developing nations. It is not. Some are extremely wealthy, almost too wealthy. Some are absolutely destitute.

I am very much aware of the French influence on the north-south dialog, the evolution and development of it. I would hope we could
come up with some more imaginative and constructive ways to accomplish the ends you seek.

I haven’t, unfortunately, got any broad vision for how best to do that, other than to be sure that we avoid just posturing ourselves in this confrontational mode. I think it is self-defeating.

Senator SARBANES. Are you concerned about the problem—well, you may not see it as a problem—that may emerge from U.S. banks privately extending significant credits to other nations which are then unable to carry them with a serious economic problem as the result, or in some instances, perhaps, banks making a private decision to extend credits to a nation where in a broader judgment we may feel that is not the best policy to serve our overall national interest? First, do you see that as something of a problem? If you do, how do you think it can be addressed?

General Haig. Senator, I think it has been an increasing problem, primarily as a result of the energy problem itself, where recipient nations are faced with much unanticipated and devastating escalations in energy costs, sometimes on the order of magnitude of 10 times, as with Turkey.

This, again, makes it impossible for them to service these debts that they have incurred and debt servicing, together with escalating energy costs, consume a larger and larger proportion of their overall national income as a result of international trade. For some of them it is in the neighborhood of 60 to 70 percent today.

I think you have touched upon an extremely urgent and extremely important problem.

It has been my experience with our banking community, whether done formally or informally, that they are seeking the kind of advice Government can give them before they engage in high-risk investments in these developing areas. In general, I have found them rather responsive to that kind of partnership, if you will. I would hope we could do a better job and, if that is not good enough, then look to other alternatives.

Senator SARBANES. Many of the most serious economic problems that we face—for instance, the imports of automobiles, competition and export credits, barriers to U.S. exports—often place us in direct conflict with our major allies. How should we go about achieving close cooperation with our allies in the political-military sphere while contending with this problem of divergent economic interests?

Where do you place the weight in trying to resolve these contradictions?

General Haig. Well, there are a combination of factors that perhaps any kind as the solution. That is merely an escalating, self-defeating route.

First, I would reject either tariff or nontrade barriers, barriers of can be used to alleviate it.

We must understand—and I, in my speeches 5 years ago, 4 years ago, highlighted this issue—that frequently this kind of thing is a manifestation of a more fundamental lack of confidence in the United States in the broadest sense politically. These are not disconnected issues.

For example, as we see Europe coordinating within its regional context, whether it is the Nine or some family of interrelationships,
if that is combined with or is even incited by a fundamental lack of confidence in the United States, then it is going to develop exclusive and protectionist overtones. There are some signs that that has been occurring.

So we have to deal with the heart of the matter as well as tend the matter itself. Tending the matter itself I think is best done by, I guess in the labor world we refer to it as jawboning. We have to insist that there is balance and equity among our major partners in this area.

Senator S(82/\&5: How would you address the OPEC countries on the question of seeking to achieve a stable oil supply, both in terms of quantity and price, and also addressing their demand to index the price of oil to the price of industrialized products in the developed world?

General Haig. Well, I have not had an opportunity to study the indexing solution with the care I should. I am very skeptical of it.

I am also sympathetic, perhaps more than some, to the incentives that exist among the OPEC nations to have to deal with the spiral of inflation in the industrialized nations, the prices they must pay for the fundamental goods they need for their finished products.

I think one of the greatest ways to deal with this is in the free enterprise market economy approach. We must seek alternatives to OPEC oil. We must make more headway on conservation and we must work as intelligently and as actively as we can with the OPEC nations so that they do not develop a “we-they” mentality. That is not easy.

Senator Sarbanes. How important is the question with respect to oil supplies as it involves one or another of the members of OPEC, as you see it, when they are seeking a particular American policy in some other area—for example, arms, or any other range of problems as we interrelate?

General Haig. I think we have to be extremely careful on that issue, the United States, and not conduct our own policies in such a way that we provide an incentive for what in the rawest of terms is oil blackmail. If we succumb to it, we are going to experience it and in increasing ways.

Senator Sarbanes. Do you think that in Africa and in Latin America, for example, the effective use of U.S. economic policy can be the primary instrument by which we shape developments? Or do you think that it will not be adequate and we will need to use other instruments?

General Haig. I think we need the entire panorama of demographic assets—and I use that in a classic sense—available not only to the United States but, most importantly, to the Western World and those who share our values.

One of the first tasks is always to try to develop a common perception of what the problem is, not only here at home, in the executive branch, in the Legislature, and in the American people, but abroad, among our allies. You know, if you don’t view the problem with a common sense, you can never attempt to achieve coordinated actions with which to deal with it.

This has been an area where I think we have failed badly over the last 20 years. We haven’t done it well.

Senator Sarbanes. I see my time is almost up, but on this question of coordinated action, I wanted to refer to discussions that have been
held over the last few days with respect to the international financial institutions. Again, I would underscore the point that Senator Mathias made, that our continued participation in some of those institutions as a full member is very much in jeopardy; and I would add a point that has not been made, which is that the U.S. quota or subscription share in those institutions determines not quite, but almost exactly, our voting posture in those institutions. In fact, in some instances we have been negotiating down our participation in order to ease the financial burden of membership, which is one plus, but the consequences of that is to diminish our vote and therefore our influence over the decision of the institution.

Congress has had difficulty in passing some of the measures needed in this area. In any event, I think it is a problem that needs to be addressed, and addressed immediately, because our role in those institutions may well suffer. We are being sharply criticized, as you know, by other countries for entering into complicated negotiations to determine the percentage contributions expected from each country in each instance, which has resulted in the diminution of the U.S. contribution because that has been one of our objectives, and then failing to carry out the agreements which have been reached after extended negotiations.

It seems to me that the agreement you seek constitutes one judgment. But having made that judgment and negotiated an agreement, it seems to me imperative that the United States then measure up to what it undertook to do in concert with the other countries.

General Haig. I am not uncomfortable with that thesis at all, Senator. That seems to me to be the obligations we incur.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

In view of the fact that the Chair has been advised that there will be about 3 hours of questions still remaining, including answers, it would seem best to take a 5-minute break at this point.

We will continue until 1 o'clock and will take a 45-minute lunch period.

Senator Pell. Could we make it an hour?

The Chairman. A 1-hour lunch period is requested by the minority. We will resume again at 2 o'clock. But we will take a 5-minute break now.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The Chairman. Senator Cranston.

Senator Cranston. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, it is obvious that before we vote on your confirmation, we will not obtain the logs much less hear the tapes or review transcripts of the time period May 4, 1973, to July 12, 1973. I think this is most unfortunate and I am hopeful that the log and relevant tapes will be produced during the limited post-hearing investigation to be conducted by the committee.

We do have a partial transcript of one tape, and only one. It covers a meeting between you, President Nixon and Ron Ziegler on June 4, 1973. That partial transcript was part of the Watergate Special Prosecutors Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry and is a matter of public record.
That partial transcript has led some to charge that you counseled President Nixon to commit perjury, the lie, or, at the least, to have a convenient and selective memory.

You have dealt specifically with those charges in the appendix to your statement. I am now dealing with this matter because of the obvious relevance of such accusations to this hearing and because this is a subject that I agreed to take responsibility for looking into when minority members of the committee informally discussed who wanted to, intended, or perhaps should cover certain issues.

Since this particular partial transcript was available to us, it was obviously important to analyze the validity of any of the accusations made based upon it.

First, let me state that the tape, as you know, is called "partial" because significant portions of it are simply unintelligible. My investigation has demonstrated to my complete satisfaction that the transcript that we have is as accurate and complete as is possible to obtain from the tape. It is my understanding that the House Committee on the Judiciary had the aid of the most sophisticated equipment and well-qualified personnel available in its efforts to extract all that it could from that tape.

There appears to be nothing that could have been done, or could now be done, or that could be done in the foreseeable future to obtain a more accurate or complete transcript of that particular conversation. Accordingly, it appears that it would serve no purpose now to have access to the original tape of that particular conversation, nor would listening to it enlighten this committee in any manner whatsoever.

Second, I and others have reviewed the transcript carefully and, we hope, objectively. I have considered every opinion, charge, explanation, comment, innuendo and interpretation of that transcript of which I am aware. I have considered carefully your testimony set forth in the appendix as well as all of your relevant testimony these past days in both open and closed sessions.

General, both you and Senator Sarbanes observed yesterday that no one has either a monopoly on morality nor is infallible in judgment. I concur. But I must say to you in all candor that, based upon the most objective and thorough review and judgment that I could make of the transcript of the June 4, 1973, conversation between you, Nixon, and Ziegler, I am satisfied that that transcript in no way suggests that you intended to counsel the President to commit perjury, to lie, to have a convenient or a selective memory, or in any manner to suggest or to imply anything of the sort.

Moreover, I would add that this appears to be substantiated by the President’s statement on the top of page 1 of the transcript:

Now, this is through February. Well, I've got one other half hour. I don't know what the hell is on it.

Then, a few sentences later, on page 2 of the transcript, the following exchange takes place between you and the President:

PRESIDENT. So we'll see what else is in the goddamned—
HAIG. Unintelligible. That's the thing for you to do for your own, really, your own peace of mind right now.
PRESIDENT. Yeah.
HAIG. You just can recall. It was in a meeting.

And then more “unintelligible.”
General, I know that reasonable people can differ, but I do not believe that the June 4 tape can provide any reasonable basis for this particular accusation against you.

If my exploration of this matter had led me to a different conclusion, I would, of course, have said so. That being the obvious case, I have no proper alternative, except to set forth, as I have done now, the conclusion that I indeed reached.

Senator Dodd. May I interrupt you for just a moment?

Senator Cranston. Yes.

Senator Dodd. Thank you for yielding to me. I will give back some time if I take more than a minute or so.

It just occurred to me, and you know, I raised the first question with you 5 or 6 years ago about whether or not you would be willing to ask the former President if he would be willing to release these tapes. You may already have answered this to someone else and, if you have, I will withdraw the question. Did you keep any kind of diary yourself during that period, from May 4 to July 18, where you would record your own feelings and thoughts at all?

General Haig. No; I did not, Senator.

Senator Dodd. There was no record of any kind that you would have of your own feelings and so forth?

General Haig. No, not at all.

Senator Dodd. Thank you.

Senator Cranston. I do have some more questions about SALT, which I want to get back to. But, for the sake of variety, I will now go to another matter that concerns me, and that is the war powers resolution.

General, you have testified that you are familiar with and support both the letter and the spirit of the war powers resolution. I would like to explore with you what your understanding is concerning that resolution and why it exists.

Would you please first describe in your own words what you believe to be the constitutional relationship of the Congress to the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces?

General Haig. I think basically that the conduct of our foreign affairs is one of the President’s primary responsibilities. However, it is the Legislature’s—Congress responsibility to endorse, if you will, to participate, and to provide the means—to provide the means through which those policies can be carried out. The very provisions in the act concerning the authority to declare war requires Legislative participation in such an act.

Now, the War Powers Act itself was a matter of some concern to me at the time that it was raised. At that time I believe President Nixon vetoed it and his veto was overridden. I was concerned because of the climate at the time rather than the particular inhibitions of the act itself.

I am very comfortable with the act today. In today’s environment, we can, and indeed must, live within the provisions of that legislation.

Senator Cranston. Did you think the bill was a good idea at that time?

General Haig. I did not at that time, but that was intimately related to my concerns about the successful termination of our conflict in
Southeast Asia in such a way that we would obtain the return of our prisoners of war, and retain an unchallenged sanction to convince Hanoi that as a nation, were not only willing to sign an agreement but were willing, in the event of a violation of that agreement, which subsequently occurred, to employ those sanctions. Historically and traditionally such sanctions and the will to use them have been essential to convince any participating nation to enter into such an agreement. I was fearful that that act, the subsequent act of July of 1973, in which there was a bombing halt legislated, was a signal to Hanoi that it could, with impunity, violate the accords arrived at and that the United States would have great difficulty in responding in any way. Indeed, I think those fears were well taken and justified because that is precisely what happened.

Senator CRANSTON. In retrospect, then, how do you feel about the fact that Congress overrode the veto?

General HAIG. Well, as I say, my attitudes on it are a reflection of a host of things: concern at that time, probably in the sense of timing, that we would have been better served had it occurred later. I continue to believe that this is so. I think, also, that it was a reflection of the Watergate situation in large measure. It was also a reflection, and a very understandable one, of the tremendous frustrations associated with the conduct of the conflict itself which, despite our best intentions, when the mood of the country departed from supporting the President in the war, very early on in the 1970's probably about the time of the Cambodian incursion, the vehicle for crystallizing that dissent, we had to go on for a number of months, indeed 2 more years, before we could successfully resolve it. So I understand that.

Perhaps, had I been an observer, I would have been a strong proponent of the War Powers Act.

Senator CRANSTON. What is your view now of the role of the Secretary of State with respect to the powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and in relation to the war powers of Congress?

General HAIG. I think it is clear that the President has an obligation, not only if he were to move, Heaven forbid, to introduce American forces into conflict, to notify the Congress immediately, and the Congress has the right, within 60 to 90 days to overrule that decision. That is not a matter of concern to me because Heaven help us as a nation if we, once again, indulge in the expenditure of precious American blood, without a popular support for it. I think the legislature is the best manifestation of popular support. I think anyone who achieves office by vote must be, not in every instance, but certainly over time, act somewhat consistent with the concerns of his constituents. So that is not a problem to me.

Now there are other aspects of the War Powers Act which involve notification if the President were to place U.S. Forces, Armed Forces, in a position where the likelihood of conflict was high. There he has an obligation to notify as well. I think it is here where there are some uncertainties, simply because there has been no usage. It is like every other piece of legislation where there is not usage. Usage itself develops elaboration and enhancement or modification into fundamental law. That question came up, as I noted earlier, as I understand in the AWACS decision in
Saudi Arabia, as to whether or not that kind of an introduction of U.S. Forces really constitutes what should be encompassed in the War Power provisions, and that the executive branch should have been obligated to come here to both consult and get advice and consent, if you will.

Now that is a question that I would like very much to leave to legal experts. I am inclined to think that that was too miniscule an American act to engage the War Powers Act per se.

Senator Cranston. What do you see as the principal purposes of the War Powers Resolution? Is it to define clearly the relationship between the Congress and the President? Is it to insure that the President does not usurp the war powers of the Congress? Is it to reduce the danger that the President alone will take us into armed conflict? Is it a mix of those three? Is there anything else significant to its purpose?

General Haig. I think all of those notifications were involved in the drafting of the act, and, above all, the recent experience of the American people and the American Government in Southeast Asia. That could include all of the motives you mentioned. I would put a very high priority on unilateral Presidential action.

Senator Cranston. That was certainly an issue that had the highest priority in the thinking of the Congress at that time.

As set forth in the resolution itself, the express purpose is:

To insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President of the United States will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

The resolution requires that, "the President in every possible instance shall consult Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces" in such situations; in short, that in the absence of a declaration of war, the President's power to use armed force is limited and might only be exercised in consultation with Congress or to deal with an imminent threat of attack.

General, do you agree with that stated purpose?

General Haig. Yes, I do, Senator.

Senator Cranston. Do you think that the resolution should be changed in any way?

General Haig. At this juncture, no, I do not.

Senator Cranston. Do you think there is anything in the War Powers Act that would impede the President from exercising his full constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?

General Haig. No, unless something were to develop in actual practice that has not yet developed that would give me pause.

Senator Cranston. Is there anything in the resolution that would impede you in performing your own responsibilities as Secretary of State?

General Haig. No, sir.

Senator Cranston. As Secretary of State, will you feel a responsibility to advise the President to comply fully with the letter of the resolution?

General Haig. I would feel a very keen responsibility to do that.
Senator Cranston. As Secretary, would you advise the President to comply fully with not only the letter but the spirit of the resolution; that is, that absent a declaration of war by Congress or the need for immediate self-defense, the President's power to use force is limited and might only be exercised after consultation with Congress?

General Haig. Absolutely.

Senator Cranston. You are aware that Congress passed the war powers resolution largely because we believed that the secret bombings of Cambodia in 1969 and the Cambodian incursion of May 1970, were improper commitments of U.S. Armed Forces by President Nixon, in that these unilateral acts usurped the constitutional war powers of Congress. I know you have stated that you felt consultation was occurring at that time. It did occur to some extent, not to the degree that we felt was constitutionally required in view of the dimensions of the consequences of those decisions.

Recognizing that the 1969 bombings of Cambodia were done without the consent of the full Congress, do you think that was a proper exercise of the President's power as Commander in Chief?

General Haig. At the time, yes.

Senator Cranston. And the incursion of May 1970, you would feel the same way about, I presume?

General Haig. Yes.

Senator Cranston. Would the 1969 bombings of Cambodia and the incursion into Cambodia of May 1970, be proper under the war powers resolution, now the law of the land?

General Haig. I think clearly the ground force and Air Force entry into Cambodia, into the sanctuaries, which is one very separate and distinct set of operations from the bombing along the 5 kilometer border area, I would suggest—and I have not had a chance to think about this with great care—that the incursion, limited in time and limited in scope as announced by the President would have fallen under the provisions of the War Powers Act and should have been preceded by the more formal consultations that we would now visualize under war powers. At the time, it was in the context of precedence and normal procedures of the past because that was discussed with the leadership of the Defense and Appropriations Committees of both Houses, majority and minority, as we pointed out yesterday.

Now, with respect to the so-called menu, the bombing operation, I would be more inclined to put that into the category of covert activity which should have been discussed with the Intelligence Committee under the provisions now existing as a result of recent legislation.

Senator Cranston. I thank you for your clear and unequivocal responses to my questions on this issue.

I would like to turn to the subject of human rights for a while. But I see that I am practically out of time, so perhaps I will reserve it for the next round.

Senator Dodd. I will reserve a minute or so of my time to you.

Senator Cranston. It will take more than a minute or two, so I will wait for the next round.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, General.

The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Cranston, I might not take all of my time, so if there are a few minutes left, I will come right back to you at the end.

General, I would like to pursue a line of questioning that was started the other day and that you have addressed a number of times already. It has to do with East-West relations.

On July 16 of this year, you gave a speech to the Republican National Convention in Detroit. I would like to quote a couple of sentences of yours in here and will ask if you can enlighten me as to a change in some policies that you would be suggesting.

I am quoting now from page 2 of your speech. You said,

You know, some years ago, America, together with our allies in Europe, adopted a twin pillar of policy: détente on the one hand, efforts to improve East-West relationships and the maintenance of our necessary security policy on the other.

I am going to skip down now. You identify a series of events that have occurred around the world in the last several years involving Soviet adventurism, as you described it. Then you conclude with this phrase as part of a sentence:

We must ask ourselves, have these twin pillars of policy and the way they have been applied in recent years served the American people and the interests of the Free World. My answer is a categoric no.

You then go on in the next paragraph and say,

So I remain convinced tonight that America must replace these twin pillars of policy with a new twin pillar of policy involving reciprocity and strength.

My question is twofold. No. 1, I read that your interpretation is that détente, as a policy, is dead, that it serves no purpose any longer; or that you equate the words “reciprocity” and “détente” in some way or that you distinguish between them. I would like you to enlighten me on that if you can.

General Haig. I think it is a very important question and I am glad you raised it, Senator.

I would not want those words, which were carefully chosen and drafted by me, to suggest that I think détente, as a process, is to be junked or is discredited. I think the emphasis in that speech was on the manner in which we have conducted those policies. In that instance I think they were bankrupt, to be very frank and to use blunt terms.

You know, we Americans sometimes forget where détente really came from. We seem to have given it to Henry Kissinger or to the Nixon administration in the early 1970's. I can assure you that our European allies conducted a study, I think about in 1967, in which the true generation of the term “policy of détente” was born. So, the United States alone, in my view, couldn't junk détente per se if it wanted to.

I know there have been efforts to do that in, I think, the Ford administration. They really turned out to be rather unsuccessful, in hindsight.

My point is not to get into the business of labeling policy, and the terms “reciprocity” and “strength” are more designed to describe a state of attitude, a state of mind, and a state of American perception, hopefully in which our allies will join us, in conducting whatever we
want to label our policy to be. In some capitals, détente is bankrupt. In other capitals, it is not.

Therefore, we do not unilaterally have the ability to do that. We can state, however, what U.S. policy is.

I think it is far less important than the objective of getting greater reciprocity in our dealings with the Soviet Union.

For example, there is the opening of consulates here in the United States, which we have moved ahead on with great publicity, provided real estate, construction, and vast facilities in a number of areas for the Soviet Union. And yet, today we are still waiting for consulates in the Soviet Union and any progress.

Now, to me that is not reciprocity. We have to insist on reciprocity. Now if we, under the War Powers Act and other proclamations, made it clear that we are not going to muck around in the internal affairs of developing nations by American interventionism, I think we have a right to expect that the Soviet Union will do the same. We have seen precisely the opposite in their conduct. I think we have a right to insist on greater reciprocity.

I would apply the same to arms restraint. The United States, historically for 20 years, has exercised arms restraint. Now I recognize that we were involved in a conflict in Southeast Asia, the cost of which in 1968 was some $28 billion. But, on balance, American military power has been on a steadily declining plane. The Soviets have consistently and resolutely built, perhaps to the limits of their capability. That is not reciprocity.

I hope that tends to answer the question.

Senator Dodd. Those are some good examples to shed some light on it.

Let me follow that with this question: You have described throughout these hearings—in fact, most recently in response I think to Senator Sarbanes' question about what your highest priority would be—and I wrote down your words. You said the issue of "illegal Soviet activity" or words to that effect, was your No. 1 concern—not a priority, necessarily, but a No. 1 concern. Again, throughout the hearings, there has been talk about East-West confrontation, the issue of East-West confrontation in Africa and Latin America and whether or not that ought to be our priority, or rather the bilateral relationship with those nations.

I think I understand your views pretty clearly on that score. But what should be the objective of a bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union? Do you have any thoughts on that? What should be the purpose of our relationship with the Soviet Union other than the confrontational questions that will come up in a global context? I am now talking about the relationship between these two great super powers.

General Haig. Well, I think improved East-West relationships, which is a very desirable objective for American policy, has to be premised first on the recognition that while there are some convergences in interest, there are still profound differences, which will continue for a considerable period. So it would be naive and perhaps illusory to set an objective which calls for complete convergence.

Senator Dodd. Complete?
General Haig. Convergence. I think if we as Americans establish such an objective, we are going to be profoundly disappointed.

I think, above all, we should seek a civility between two superpowers whose relative superiority is somewhat in question, in terms of post-World War II. It should, above all, be based on civility, the rule of law, international rule of law, and some adherence to the standards and mores of international behavior that the world, the civilized world, with 2,000 years of experience, has evolved and developed as guideposts for international behavior. I cannot include in that the use of Soviet forces in the developing world, the suppression of free peoples by Soviet military power, the training, funding, manning, and equipping of so-called forces of liberation or terrorist forces throughout the world. I just cannot include that in my lexicon of appropriate East-West relationships.

Senator Dodd. That is very helpful.

Would you share this with me as well. There has been over the years, I don't want to call it a disdain, but some aversion within the State Department, as I have sensed, anyway, during my 6 years in the House, for bringing up or talking about the issues of human rights within the Eastern bloc countries. Resolutions have been offered any number of times and there is usually a pretty strong effort to downplay them, resolutions calling for the independence of the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and other nations.

First of all, do you share my view about some of the disdain that has existed? Secondly, if you do, do you anticipate a change in policy with regard to our approach to the captive nations?

General Haig. I do. And I do share your concern and I do share your critical analysis of recent performances. There have been very notable exceptions, but in general, I share your view.

I would anticipate changes in the human rights area, both in the broader context I addressed earlier and in the context of even-handedness.

I think it is important for the committee to recognize that as I sat in Europe for 4½ years, those with liberal tendencies, philosophic orientations, were appalled by American application of human rights. They felt we had fenced off those who were the greatest violators of human rights from American criticism.

That's rather harsh because it was not always true, but that was the general trend. That supports your thesis. Those who tended to orient toward more conservative views—and I hate both labels—were appalled by our application of human rights because they felt we were singling out traditional friends and allies to bludgeon on this issue.

Now that was too harsh, too. But it had some reality.

Senator Dodd. Do you see your response to the last question running into problems with the previous question on the objectives of the relationship between the two?

General Haig. No. That gets to the issue of Helsinki and the CSCE and the launching of it in the first instance. There was great skepticism about the desirability of doing it. There was even greater skepticism that it would serve any useful purpose but a forum for Soviet propaganda. I think those criticisms were ill taken.
I think we have seen great benefits from the various baskets. The freer flow of people and ideas, and in the context of human rights, has put great pressure on the Soviet Union within its sphere of influence to at least consider reform. I am not pleased at all with the pace at which that has occurred, and there has been a great retrogression in recent months.

Senator Dodd. I am pleased with your response to that. I guess the difficult problem I am having is that I could not agree more with you that this application of a human rights policy ought to be universal. It ought to be applied equally, regardless of the ideological twists that any given nation may have, left or right, for purposes of simplification. And yet, at least in the postelection period, and I should say during the election period itself, as well, the President-elect, on a number of occasions, has indicated that human rights, as you have indicated throughout the last several days, ought to play something than the priority position it has held in the present administration, particularly when it comes to nations that are more bent to the right, such as Somoza and Argentina, for instance.

My concern is that this thing may be out of balance again. There is a tendency to want to downplay the issue of human rights in that part of the world, and based on your response to my previous question, to heighten our activity in that area, in the Eastern bloc countries. I wonder if you might try to explain the apparent contradiction in that.

General Haig. Well, Senator, that requires, again, some lengthy pontificating, which is subject to your challenge, of course.

But, you know, historically the American political system is such that the incumbents pursue a set of policies; those who are outside of office have free reign to challenge those policies, and they have never been shy about doing so on either side. Then, when the power changes, those who achieve power seem to enter office historically with a vested interest in proving that everything their predecessors did was wrong. The last two or three administrations, to my memory, have not departed from that policy.

I would hope that we would avoid that trap, what I call the political dialectic. I would hope that we would seek to build a truly bipartisan consensus. This does not permit thoughtless or excess criticism of the policies of our predecessors. It involves, rather, turning to the future and the needs of the American people in the period facing us, a period of unprecedented danger.

I may be naive, but I think we can do that better than we have in the past. And I put human rights right into that category.

I don't think Governor Reagan would be in any way inclined to discard a value which is fundamental to the American psyche and to our body politic. I would expect that he would give it somewhat less attention.

If you will think back to the early period of the last administration, a series of straw men were established, suggesting immorality in the conduct of the preceding years' policies. That got a momentum of its own, and unfortunately I think it was sucked in, if you will, to the human rights policy issue and propelled some of the excesses which we subsequently saw.

Every time you start down a court, it get a momentum of its own. It is vitally important that we stop and check ourselves to be sure
that we are not letting partisan politics or whatever other less important motivations we have disrupt sound, bipartisan, truthful, and practical American policies.

Senator Dodd. I appreciate your response about the Soviet Union and about either existing or previous right wing regimes in Latin America. But what about our allies? A case in point is Northern Ireland.

Here is Britain, a close ally, having tremendous difficulties, and yet there are some very serious, and substantiated, allegations about the denial of human rights in Northern Ireland. Would you feel restrained, as Secretary of State, of bringing to the attention of our allies in Britain our concern over the treatment of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, if you share this concern? I am not necessarily asking you to draw that conclusion yourself, though I do have an opinion.

General Haig. My past policy in the military and whether it be in Whitehall or in Downing Street has been to speak very frankly always with our British friends and allies. I don't want that answer to suggest to you that I necessarily share a comparable degree of concern, although I am not oblivious that where there is bloodshed and terror there are always abuses.

But I think it is awfully important as we address this issue, anguish as it is—and it has historic roots in my own heritage—that we always know what the consequences would be if it were not for the anguish British sacrifices in that very difficult situation.

Senator Dodd. I will not ask for an answer on this question, but there has been for some time a ban on the shipment of arms to the Royal Ulster Constabulary. I would like to know at some point, unless you feel free to comment on it now, whether or not you want to maintain that policy.

General Haig. I am not familiar with it, Senator, yet.

Senator Dodd. I wasn't really anticipating that you would be.

Senator Sarbanes brought up the question of energy policy. Well, I see that the yellow light is on, so I will wait. I am not going to get into that one with 2 minutes to go.

Thank you very much, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston, I will take about 5 minutes and then will yield back to you so that we can go through to 1 o'clock. I think that might give you time to finish up the remaining questions you had in this round.

Senator Cranston. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. General Haig, we have touched on the vulnerability of the free world's dependence on oil from the gulf. I am increasingly concerned, as I think all of us are, about this vulnerability. From many possible standpoints something could erupt and cause chaos. The Iran-Iraq war could be expanded. There is potential danger from terrorists, from regional wars, from civil war in these oil producing countries.

We have seen what happened in recent occasions when we had just a shortfall of oil and what a crippling effect it had on our economy and on the economy of other nations.

Heretofore there has been an almost unwritten rule in the gulf area that damage to or attacks on oil facilities was off bounds, just off limits. Until the Iran-Iraq war erupted, that had been preserved. But now all
those rules are out and damage is not only extensive, it is far more severe than our intelligence felt it was going to be. The length of time to repair that damage is going to be greater.

I have two questions.

First, what thoughts could you share with this committee to what you think the Nation ought to do to prepare for future disruptions. It affects the whole strength of our economy, our ability to finance our Defense Establishment, et cetera.

Second an organizational question. In view of the fact that energy security is an interagency problem involving the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the CIA and the National Security Council, would it be well for the President to designate one high official to be responsible for energy security and have that as one of his or her primary functions?

The thought just occurs to me that we are always looking, and always have in the history of this Republic, for things for the Vice President to do besides the stimulating job of presiding over the Senate. In this case, we have a Vice President-elect in George Bush who is uniquely qualified, because it also requires coordination with Members of Congress who are directly involved and concerned with this particular problem. Is it possible that there could be some possibility of designating one top level person, such as Vice President-elect George Bush, to coordinate this activity?

General Haig. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would not presume to butt into the prerogatives of the President-elect other than to make the broad observation that I would hope our Vice President would be available across the spectrum to President Reagan. I am always suspicious of the creation of czars, whether it be a czar for our dealings with the East, or a plethora of roving ambassadors for special problems.

It has been my experience in government that, as well meaning and as important—and sometimes for a brief period that is a good way to get attention to a critical problem and to get some unusual progress and cut red tape—as this is, as a general rule they outlive their utility, very, very quickly, and they generate a lot of confusion and trouble. That is an observation of experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Organizationally, then, where does this problem now stand? As you understand the way we are organized in the executive branch, who is the person or is it a group or a committee that is responsible for energy security for this country?

General Haig. Well, I think, clearly, the RDF and all of the related activity of this administration in that area is representative of the high level of concern that exists for both the turmoil in the Persian Gulf area and access to raw materials. I have been somewhat critical of our inability in the areas even outside of oil. Regarding vital minerals, I think we are now totally dependent or largely dependent for 9 of the 11 strategic materials on imports. Other nations who share our values are even more dependent.

Some years ago we eliminated the Office of Emergency Planning and all of the other iterated names that it had. I think it was a mistake in hindsight. Somewhere in this bureaucracy there must be a repository of responsibility, not just for oil but for the raw materials, for the industrial mobilization planning that any prudent nation
should carry on in a dangerous world. It is increasingly urgent that we do so.

I'd like a lot more time to think about that and to make my contributions in the executive branch to these concerns and see where it comes before I go further.

The CHAIRMAN. But you share our concern about oil as well as other raw materials as we become increasingly dependent——

General Haig. And industrial mobilization.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. On outside countries for those raw materials?

General Haig. As one who has been in the business I have been in, it is shocking that three companies, generally, in the Western World handle all of our heavy gear manufacturing, and their ability to expand dramatically is very, very limited. They are at about peak today. There is just something imbalanced and wrong about that and highly dangerous for us. We have to correct it. We have to deal with it.

The CHAIRMAN. We have talked in these hearings extensively about many areas of the world and, of course, your own particular knowledge of Europe. We will continue to pay extremely close attention to those areas.

I was told by the Mexican Ambassador last night how truly successful President-elect Reagan's visit was with President Lopez Portillo in Mexico. It seemed to say to a close neighbor, that we consider them so important that even before his inauguration the President-elect made himself available for that meeting.

I had recommended strongly also to President-elect Reagan that, because President Carter had not been able to visit Canada at any time during his period in office, he put a very high priority on a visit to Canada. Canada is a close neighbor with which we work intimately, but I see some real problems there facing us which have to be worked out.

There is not a meeting scheduled for the President-elect to be there until a regular conference in July. Would you inform this committee as to what the President-elect might have discussed with you with respect to his desire to visit very early on the government in Ottawa?

General Haig. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I have discussed this with the President-elect. I did not raise it. He raised it with me. He made it very clear that top on his agenda for foreign visitors and meetings—now that does not necessarily mean here or there or how the venue will be worked out; that remains to be seen—but a discussion and early meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau is high on the President-elect's agenda, as was the Mexican preliminary visit and others that will follow.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be wise in your judgment to have early contacts by representatives of the administration? The President will have a major job here at home for a number of months and everyone in the world will recognize that. Our economy is bound up with the economies of other countries in the world. What about a high level mission to Latin America to encourage the stability we hope is now being developed in places like Jamaica? What about visits by a top level official to other countries—by you, the Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs? It could be the Vice President of the United States or even a former President, such as Gerald Ford. Would you feel it would be wise for the State Department to make a determination that our own hemisphere needs attention by representatives of the United States of America and its new administration and that this should be high priority?

General Haig. I share that view, especially with respect to the Caribbean area.

As you know, Mr. Reagan had his transition staff host a dinner for Prime Minister Seaga during his recent visit here. I think that is a reflection of the President-elect's very, very high concern for hemisphere, and especially Caribbean developments.

The Chairman. Finally, I would like to make a suggestion that should be considered by you in your capacity as Secretary of State. I have indicated that we all have a very strong desire to establish not only a bipartisan foreign policy but also to speak with one voice whenever possible, that is, within the executive branch and as the United States of America, both the legislative and the executive branches.

We in Congress take our own independent separate study projects abroad. We have all been on them. We all value that expertise and find it essential.

But there has not been as much traveling jointly by the executive and the legislative branches. President Truman did this. Obviously at the formation of NATO there were representatives of the Congress present as there were at the surrender in the Pacific.

After talking with a few of our members I can convey to you a great willingness to have a member of the majority and minority in the Senate, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and certainly the House would be interested—to accompany executive branch representatives. We would not presume to usurp the responsibility of the executive branch, but to convey the attitude of the Congress on a particular issue and to allow us to benefit from the information available.

It might be a unique opportunity for us to take one step closer to speaking with one voice in foreign policy.

I simply make that as a suggestion and would be happy to discuss it with you at any time. If you have any response now, I'd appreciate it.

General Haig. No; other than to say that I think historically it has been a great asset on significant trips to include members of the Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle to give just that additional weight, importance, and significance both to the event and to the projection of unanimity.

The Chairman. I thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator Boschitz. Mr. Chairman, it is 2 minutes before 1 o'clock.

Senator Cranston. Weren't we going to stop at 1?

The Chairman. Did you then want to pick up at 2 o'clock?

Senator Cranston. Yes.

The Chairman. Then in that case, the committee will recess until 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston, would you continue and complete this particular section of your questions to General Haig?

General Haig, I think we probably have an hour to an hour and a half, at which time when we complete our questioning. I will then yield to you for any concluding comments that you may wish to make and you will be excused at that time.

The committee should be on notice that we will have a working executive session in room 4219 immediately following the completion of this confirmation hearing. And for the press, there will be no announcements after that meeting. Thank you.

Senator Cranston?

Senator CRANSTON. General, I just wanted to follow Senator Dodd's line of questioning about human rights matters at this point. In your opening statement, you argue that:

The assurances of basic human liberties will not be improved by replacing friendly governments which incompletely satisfy our standards of democracy with hostile ones which are even less benign.

I certainly do not quarrel with your preference for non-Marxist authoritarian regimes that are friendly to our country in contrast to Marxist dictatorships that are hostile.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, the Ambassador-Designate to the U.N., has written some very provocative and searching articles on this subject, as you well know. I think it is important, as we reappraise our human rights approaches, that we do not view human rights violations perpetrated in nations with which we are allied as minor matters, or, as you suggested, as "warts." They are, unfortunately, in terms of their impact on their human victims, far more significant than that term "warts" suggests. They are also far more significant than that in terms of what they say about the nature of a society that perpetrates violations of human rights.

Our recognition or nonrecognition of these facts relates to our capacity to defend basic American values. It relates to how we will view ourselves and others. It relates to how others will view us. It really relates to what we are all about as a people.

There was, what I thought was a quite remarkable article, in the Wall Street Journal on January 2, written by Robert Reilly, who worked on President-elect Reagan's transition team. It was entitled "America's Destiny Is in Its Beginnings." And there was a sentence or two that stood out for me that I want to read for you:

If the American people were to give up the idea of freedom as a fundamental perspective in their foreign policy, however many compromises may be required in practice, they would not just betray others, they would betray themselves. They would undermine the legitimacy of their state, founded 200 years ago.

Now, I have just a few questions relating to this topic. Do you believe that it is in our national interest to use our influence to promote reform of repressive governments friendly to the United States, particularly where the long-term consequence of foregoing such reform is most likely to be a takeover by extremist forces hostile to U.S. national interests?
General Haig. I have always believed that that is in our interests and is also the easiest course for us to pursue.

Senator Cranston. As an example, is there not a danger that if we do not use our influence to encourage reform in the Philippines, the long-term result may be the overthrow of the Marcos regime, which could threaten our important national security interest in maintaining access to Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay because of our identification with the repressive Marcos regime?

General Haig. Senator, I am comfortable with that thesis, but as a general rule I would be very, very remiss if I did not suggest that comments in a public venue which create tests of manhood and threaten incumbencies and restrict incumbent leaders from the kind of flexibility they must have is a dangerous practice for America to pursue. And I hope to avoid it in the period ahead.

Senator Cranston. I fully understand that and accept that response in the spirit in which it is given. I assume the same line of thinking would apply to the matter of our exerting a continuing influence upon the South Korean authorities to encourage timely political reforms that would serve our interests. I will not press that point.

Would you elaborate further on how you view U.S. support for human rights advancing our diplomatic and security interests?

General Haig. I think clearly, again, that this is a fundamental aspect of the objectives we must seek if we are to be an example, if you will, for especially developing nations who are in the process of making choices. So I would not be inclined to suggest for a moment that human rights or the achievement of high standards of human rights is not a very important aspect of American foreign policy.

We are, after all, in the process of seeking not necessarily to re-create other nations as a mirror image of our own democracy—and I think that would be a naive objective for us to pursue. But there are certain fundamental values which must remain high on our agenda of objectives.

Senator Cranston. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Pell?

Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, I would like to get your general reaction to a thought of mine, and I speak as one who as a diplomat lived behind the Iron Curtain under communism in the late 1940's, and has gone behind the curtain often since then. I have always been of the view that communism, to paraphrase Mr. Marx, has the seed of its own destruction in it, that as people acquire consumer goods they want more; that as they acquire education they ask questions; and both of these are destructive processes for communism.

Also, the desires of people everywhere for freedom, freedom to work, freedom to travel, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, et cetera, are about the same, although we may have a little more advanced attachment to these freedoms than other nations. And therefore, in the long haul the Communist system will simply rot away.

And I have seen in the last 30 years how the system has already rotted to a certain degree. It is far less effective and not working well and has far less appeal now than it did 30, 20, 10 years ago. One of your main jobs will be to keep the peace so this process may continue.
You talk about the advance of Communist influence. We all are conscious of countries like Ethiopia that have gone the Soviets' way, but we are not quite as conscious of Egypt or Somalia or the other countries that have gone the other way.

And I was wondering if you would give us your reaction to this general view that in the long haul it is going to destroy itself because it is such a rotten system?

General Haig. Well, I think I spoke to this at some length the other day, to a question from the majority side.

Senator Pell. Not from me, I do not think.

General Haig. No; not to you.

Senator Pell. I am sorry, excuse me. I am now minority. I keep forgetting that.

Senator Boschwitze. I keep forgetting it, too.

General Haig. I think I pointed out that I consider Marxist-Leninist policies to be in a posture of historic failure, and that the failures in a host of governing functions: Agriculture, economics, satisfaction to the public sector—I use that term, "the public sector"—growing dependency on energy from sources outside of the Soviet Union, fundamental shifts in demographic character, and I think certainly combined with the fundamental human aspirations you touched upon—all suggest to me in a historic sense, not in the contemporary sense but in a historic sense, that we are indeed witnessing the unraveling or, if you will, the demise of Marxism-Leninism as the wave of the future.

Now, my problem with this situation is my corresponding concern that totalitarian systems of that kind, when faced with internal failure and when armed with excessive levels of military capability, a position the Soviet Union is rapidly approaching, raises temptations for incumbent leaders to indulge in external diversions so that they can insure their incumbencies.

We have seen some of this in the past. And so it is my view that for a span of time, perhaps a decade or more, we are entering an extremely dangerous period. And while we can take great comfort, and should, from the manifestations of Marxist-Leninist failure, Communist failure, we must also be especially alert and posture ourselves in such a way that temptations for external diversions are dispensed with as a relief to the leadership in the Soviet Union for the failures they are now experiencing, failures that will continue and will worsen in the period ahead.

Senator Pell. Well, I was struck by a statement of a high Polish official that was reported in the press recently. And he said words to the effect that the one process that the use of force cannot preserve the Communist system against is erosion.

And is not our objective here basically to keep the peace while the eroding process continues?

General Haig. Yes; I think this is a very clear both potential achievement and objective for American policy, in fact for free world policy.

But again, one must draw on the lessons of history and recognize that even that process could take turns which would bring dreadful consequences, whether it would be in Eastern Europe, where this erosion has proceeded most dramatically, or within the socialist re-
publics themselves. And it has not been the habit of totalitarian regimes to accept peaceful change.

And so, while I share your optimism—and I share it, I sincerely do; I have always spoken to it—it again alerts me to the consequences of that internal failure.

Senator Pell. Do you not think, General, that it is a question of the speed with which erosion occurs? Because the point I was making earlier I think is pretty valid: erosion has occurred in all the countries behind the curtain, and the system has eroded from what it was 10 and 20 years ago.

But if it erodes too fast, as was happening in Czechoslovakia in that glorious spring of 1968, or as might be happening in Poland today—then the use of force comes into play. So the problem is a delicate one, where you play a major role in keeping the eroding process moving, not letting it go too fast, and cause the use of force against it, but obviously not slowing it up either. Would that be a correct view on your part?

General Haig. In a sense, there is a great deal in our risk assessments, in our policy formulation today, and it is justified. But we also must be very, very conscious of the fact that the process itself may not be in our power to influence substantially. And it would be rather presumptuous for us to believe that this were a simple task.

It is a high-risk task and I do not think we have any reason for complacency that it is an inevitably achievable task, as desirable as it would be.

Senator Pell. But you can see the danger of bringing about the use of force. I remember being tear gassed in Poland in 1956, when they had some problems in connection with the Hungarian uprising. And you saw the excesses of force.

And we, I think, have a responsibility, as the Catholic Church is doing in Poland today, to tamp down some of these explosive forces so that the erosion can continue, but not produce the inevitable counterreaction if it goes too fast.

Would you think that is roughly in line with your thinking?

General Haig. It is not too distant from my thinking. And of course, you are always, in discussions of this kind, you get into the relative importance of ideology versus pragmatic forces. And there is one school of thought that believes that pragmatic influences, economic and other human aspirations dominate the process. There are others who feel that ideology, in which case we could take far less comfort from the process, dominates.

I think the truth is somewhere in between. Both influence it, with perhaps ideology being used by men in power who seek to retain it.

Senator Pell. Ideology changes. I think there are very few individuals behind the curtain who believe in Marxist-Leninism. And I think that can change, too.

But we have talked probably too long on the subject, which I hope we can resume on another occasion some time.

General, a question you have not been asked so far in the hearings—and as I said earlier, I am trying to insure that all pertinent questions are asked—is your view of the United Nations, an organization that was born with such hope. I remember serving at the San Francisco conference in 1945 that drew up the U.N. Charter. We thought
of the great things we would do and hoped we would not make the mistakes the League made.

Well, I think a great many wars have been prevented and a great many people have been educated and a great deal of starvation has been avoided because of the U.N., although more could be done.

But I would be interested in your own views. Do you believe that we should do what we can to strengthen and bolster the United Nations, with a view toward eventually having a really forceful organization that will have some impact upon the sovereignty of individual nations?

General HAIG. Well, first let me suggest that America has worked for the United Nations, which was built in the vision of post-World War II America. And I am somewhat hopeful, but I think with a measure of skepticism. I am sure there would be some breakdown of total sovereignty in the conduct of foreign affairs. It has really confined itself primarily to functional areas of service, which I think the United Nations has performed very well.

In recent years majority rule, as the membership has exploded, really, has begun to put the United States on many key issues at variance with the majority, and it has raised renewed skepticism. Some of the very thoughtful concerns expressed by the Senator from New York when he was Ambassador to the United Nations, were observations which needed to be made.

Now, we have not written the last chapter in what we hope for the United Nations and what we could reasonably expect from it. At this juncture, surely we must continue to make it the best and anticipate and seek to make it the best vehicle and mechanism we can, both for peacekeeping and for the continual realization of basic human needs and the functional requirements of international society.

But I think in each case we must take a hard look and be sure that our American interests and our global objectives are being carried out by the policies we pursue day to day.

Senator PELL. The other day you touched on the Law of the Sea, which has been a long time in gestation. I think it was about a dozen years ago that Arvid Pardo, Malta’s Ambassador to the U.N., and I here in the Senate advocated the idea of a law of the sea, or for ocean space. It has moved down the road and progress has been made. We are almost at fruition.

What is your view with regard to really moving on this treaty? I realize you said the other day you had not had a chance to examine it. But we are so close to arriving at a common ground prepared by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Your old friend Elliot Richardson has been the negotiator for it and done a magnificent job. And I was wondering if you had discussed this with him.

You must have some thoughts. I would like to draw out a little bit more from you than you were willing to tell us the other day.

General HAIG. No; I have not had an opportunity to discuss this with Ambassador Richardson. I have high on my agenda an early meeting with him as soon as these deliberations are concluded, to make sure that I have the benefit of his thinking and experience.

I reiterate, I have not had an opportunity to study with care the some 300 articles contained in the draft, the current draft.
Senator Pell. But you know the general outline of it?

General Haig. Yes. And I probably will find my greatest problems in the area of seabed exploitation and some fundamental clashes, perhaps with either the overseeing mechanism that would be established or the free flow of market economy flexibility. And I just have to look at that with great care.

Senator Pell. I would hope that you would look at it very sympathetically, because some of us have followed this for many years.

And we cannot get a good treaty unless there is a give-and-take on both sides. We will not get free passage through straits unless we give on other issues.

Another beauty of this treaty, another virtue of it, is that it will contain the elements of what we sought in the United Nations with articles 43, 44, and 45 on maintaining peace, because somehow or other there will have to be international inspection and somebody will have to do the inspection. There will be platforms from which to inspect. That will most likely be our Coast Guard, which is the most well equipped to do it, and maybe some kind of international sea guard.

But I think the potentials of this treaty are far greater than just the words would show, as far as the general drift of the world afterward.

That is it for this round—I have one more question for later on.

The Chairman. I would suggest, Senator Pell, that each of you just finish your round.

Senator Pell. I am not ready.

The Chairman. You are not ready; I see.

Senator Pell. But I have one question right here, if I may. Would you give us your perception of how the Soviet leadership looks at the United States? Following Talleyrand’s admonition, spend 10 minutes of every 60 in the skin of your adversary, what do you think their perception is about foreign policy and of our country?

General Haig. I think it is very difficult at any moment to offer such an analysis that would have currency.

Senator Pell. Just your perception, your impression of how our opposite numbers look at us.

General Haig. Well, one can turn to the classic Marxist view of the capitalist states and draw some frightening assessments.

Senator Pell. I hope you would agree with me that none of them at this point are too Marxist. They have learned that that is claptrap.

General Haig. I have always been disappointed. In practice, although I tend to share this view, when they are put to the vote sometimes their Marxist purity is rather amazing.

But I think one of the recent problems in Moscow has clearly been what they would view as mixed signals from the West, from the United States in particular. And without answering the broader question, which I really would not presume to do, these are subjective things with differing views held by well-meaning people across the whole spectrum—

Senator Pell. Well, forgive me for interrupting. But do you not think as Secretary of State you are going to have to have perceptions as to how your opponents or adversaries think, because that will involve your own negotiating position?
General Haig. I have never been accused of being devoid of those perceptions, Senator. I think I do have some. I do not know that they are classically anti-Marxist perhaps as much as they are attuned to the realities of international affairs.

Senator Pell. I guess what I am saying is, are they as frightened of us as we are of them? Or how do you see it?

General Haig. I think there is great concern in Moscow about American motives and intentions. That is a consequence not only of genuine concern by a few, but more importantly, conditioned concern by a totalitarian state. From that we must not draw any comfort.

For example, I think everything we offer or suggest is immediately translated into, what is in this proposal that is designed to do us in. We have seen great paranoia in Moscow about China. In contemporary terms it is not justified. But the Soviet leaders and the Russian mentality at large think historically and in longer terms. And so that kind of paranoia could be justified as they view a billion people on their border by the turn of the century.

As we seek to achieve international stability, the most important ingredient, if you will, is to strip away misunderstanding. That can be best achieved by consistency and reliability.

I have never been anything but convinced that the Soviet leadership is more influenced by tough, clear, concise Western policies. They understand them.

I would also suggest that they are never influenced by Western rhetoric. Never in my experience have they been influenced by Western rhetoric. They are influenced by Western deeds. And when that involves the expenditure of capitalist resources to support policies, whatever they may be, the preparing of defense forces or supporting developing nations, these are the bona fides in the Soviet calculation of true Western intent and will, never our rhetoric.

Senator Pell. My time has expired. But I would still like to know, do you think they visualize themselves as being surrounded and beleaguered, or do they visualize themselves as moving out over the world?

General Haig. I would say that recent Soviet conduct cannot but lead to the conclusion that they are in an expansionist, imperialist phase.

Senator Pell. With any elements of worry on their part?

General Haig. I would not discount the historic paranoia, if you will. But I would not attribute that paranoia to the exclusive motivation of the risks that they are currently taking outside the sphere of Soviet influence.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

The Chairman. Without objection, I will insert in the record at this point an article in the Baltimore Sun of this Monday, January 12, based on an interview with Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Ambassador to Moscow, and an interview in the January 19, 1981, issue of U.S. News and World Report with Ambassador Watson.

Our current Ambassador certainly supports the conclusions drawn by you, General Haig, just now in response to Senator Pell.

[The articles referred to follow:]
DEMISE OF SALT COULD SPELL DISASTER, SAYS OUTGOING U.S. ENVOY TO SOVIET

(Moscow.—Thomas J. Watson, Jr., the outgoing U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, believes that the Kremlin will bargain "hard and long" over any substantive changes in the second-phase strategic arms limitation treaty, now pending before the Senate but apparently dead as written.

Mr. Watson, who is leaving the Soviet Union Thursday, called the probable demise of SALT II "a tragedy, perhaps a disaster," and said it would be "reckless [and] imprudent" for the United States to seek a margin of security by attempting to regain a strategic edge over the Soviet Union.

"We can easily get [the Soviets] into an arms race in the flick of an eye," Mr. Watson said. "It would be the simplest thing in the world to do. It would also be totally disastrous, and a complete failure."

Mr. Watson, who was 67 last Thursday, took over the American Embassy here in October, 1979, four months after President Carter and President Leonid I. Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty at the Vienna summit conference.

The former IBM chief executive, who had little previous diplomatic experience was chosen in 1979 to take over the American Embassy here by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance largely because of his long interest in nuclear arms control and disarmament.

But that field quickly became a backwater in Soviet-American relations in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the sharp increase in East-West tensions.

Instead, Mr. Watson, whose appointment was seen as something of a goodwill gesture to the Soviet Union, found himself in the unexpected role of helping to map out sanctions against the Kremlin while watching the SALT II treaty being put on the shelf.

It was an experience, he says, that has left him somewhat pessimistic about the future of nuclear arms control—partly because of the political atmosphere in the United States that made it easier to oppose SALT than to favor it, and partly because of the Soviet failure to understand "that sudden forays outside their accepted areas of influence just won't go anymore."

He said it was inevitable that such things as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should affect American public opinion regarding the SALT treaty, but that in the end such "linkage" is counterproductive.

"Myself, I think there is literally no connection," Mr. Watson said. "I deplore the Afghanistan invasion, and I favor all the sanctions we put on the Soviets. But Afghanistan does not have the possibility of destroying the world in a matter of a few hours."

Mr. Watson said that after the inauguration—"when the transition is over and the briefings are for keeps"—defense and foreign policy officials in the Reagan administration will gradually come round to the same view.

President-elect Reagan campaigned against the SALT treaty, arguing that it had been negotiated from a position of weakness and that it would institutionalize Soviet nuclear superiority over the United States.

During the campaign, the President-elect called for greater American efforts in the field of strategic weapons.

"I don't want to prejudge our new President, whom I wish well," Mr. Watson said, "but I was concerned by the remark, 'a margin of security.'"

"If that means being prepared in conventional arms and negotiating and staying even on thermonuclear arms, then I'm for that."

"But if it implies that there is a way to get ahead of each other—the Soviets or the Americans—in thermonuclear arms, then I think such an effort would be reckless, imprudent."

Mr. Reagan has said he would be willing to renegotiate SALT II to remedy what he believes are its defects and to provide for genuine arms reduction on both sides. The Soviets have been unenthusiastic about the idea of reopening SALT talks, though they have indicated they would be willing to sit down with the Reagan administration soon.

"I will guarantee you that the Soviets will bargain hard and long over any substantive changes in that treaty," Mr. Watson said.
"If what bothers President Reagan's administration are minor definitional kind of problems, they can be attended to. But if we are going to go back and argue through real weapons decisions, that will be a very long process, and furthermore, they [the Soviets] will be going into this process very disillusioned."

Mr. Watson said he believed that the SALT II treaty as now written is a "fair bargain" for both sides, but he said it fell victim in part to what he called the "arm up, stand firm," political atmosphere in the United States.

He conceded that while there had been "serious questioning" of the treaty, "there was also a tendency, since it became popular to question SALT II, for those people with political problems at home to posture a bit about whether or not it was a good treaty."

"All of these forces came together and unfortunately prevented the treaty from being ratified, which I think is a tragedy, perhaps a disaster."

Still, there are lessons to be learned from the fate of SALT II, Mr. Watson said, and no time should be wasted in applying them.

He called for the new SALT negotiating team to be constituted—at a higher level—in the first few months of the Reagan administration.

Members of the U.S. Congress, he said, should be making a greater effort to understand the technical details of nuclear arms negotiation.

"Since the Senate and the House of Representatives have to make decisions in the area, they really ought to become familiar with it, almost above anything else," he said. "This has not been the pattern."

He said that in Geneva, where SALT II was negotiated, visiting senators had ample opportunity to observe the evolution of the treaty and to register their objections. "Yet when it came down to the crunch," he said, "there was an awful lot of backing and filling about the treaty."

Even without the invasion of Afghanistan, Mr. Watson said, ratification of SALT II in the Senate would have been very close.

"A life-and-death kind of thing relative to the future of the United States shouldn't rest on one or two votes," he said, "That's why I'd like to involve the Senate earlier."

Finally, he said he is convinced that the way for the United States to assert its leadership over its Western allies is not through grandiose nuclear arms programs, but through tough domestic political decisions regarding the use of conventional arms—such as the reinstatement of the draft.

"The U.S. has a very clear choice. What does it want to do? Does it want to hack around and argue about thermonuclear treaties that are approximately balanced, or does it really want to put its money where its mouth is?" he asked.

"Putting its money where its mouth is, Mr. Watson suggested, would mean greater expenditures on conventional arms—which he believes have been neglected—as a means of "demonstrating that the United States is going to continue to be a world leader."

He also believes that the Soviets may have pulled ahead in European-based theater nuclear weapons—as opposed to intercontinental strategic missiles—and that this imbalance must be corrected, too.

But an effort to achieve strategic superiority, he said, "is just pointless. It adds to the danger, and it doesn't add one whit to security."

For one thing, Mr. Watson said, the Soviets will not hesitate to compete in an arms race—despite the relatively higher burden such a race would place on their creaking domestic economy.

"I have had just enough experience here to guarantee you that the Soviets will build weapon for weapon with the United States," he said. "The people here are well above the subsistence standard of living now, and these people can be led downward in living standard if they think it is vital to the future of their country."

"So the theory that the U.S. can build enough weapons so that the Soviets go broke keeping up is not only unworkable," he added, "it would put the world in a very, very dangerous state and accomplish nothing."

Such a policy, he said, would lead to production of nuclear weapons "that will come back to haunt us." He believes that this has been the outcome of past decisions and that it appears to be the result of current ones.

Among such decisions, he said, was the development of the hydrogen bomb in the 1950s and the building of rockets with multiple warheads, each of which can be individually targeted, during the 1960s.

He said he believes that today's decision—such as trying to make the U.S. Minuteman missile force less vulnerable to attack by deceptive basing, or
building the low-flying cruise missile that can evade Soviet radar—will result in equally large expenditures without any accompanying increase in security.


INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS J. WATSON, JR., AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA—
VIEW FROM MOSCOW: A WORLD "MORE DANGEROUS THAN EVER"

AFTER MORE THAN A YEAR OF SPARRING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE U.S. ENVOY IS
RETURNING WITH ADVICE FOR REAGAN: OPEN A "NEW DIALOGUE" WITH THE KREMLIN—BUT AVOID AN ARMS RACE

Question. Mr. Ambassador, what should the Reagan administration do to bridge the gap between the United States and the Soviets?
Answer. I wouldn't presume to advise a President-elect. But I hope a new dialogue with the Soviets could commence at once, with very competent people on both the American and Soviet sides exploring the problems, staking out the parameters of our differences and then trying to work out acceptable solutions.

As you know, I have been involved in arms control. As of now, my conclusion is that it would be very unwise for the United States to get into an arms race. There must be, of course, equality in arms, both conventional and nuclear. But building more nukes, hoping to get ahead of the Russians, is pointless. We know the Soviets will match anything we build, and this will merely take the world into an uneasy situation, much more tense than it is now.

Let me add this: The 15 months I've just spent in Moscow have been among the most tense moments I have ever lived through, perhaps because I've been so very close to the conflict.

Question. Is the world headed into a period of growing danger, with the Soviet Union using its military power more aggressively?
Answer. I perceive the world to be more dangerous than it has even been in its history.

I do not anticipate that the Soviet Union will use its military power any more aggressively in the future than in the past two decades. However, the United States must do everything it can to continually demonstrate its national will.

We must keep ourselves appropriately armed with conventional arms and do everything in our power to avoid a nuclear-arms race.

General de Gaulle said that all you need is enough in connection with nuclear weapons. While I am strongly for parity, I just don't think there is any way to win an arms race in thermonuclear weapons.

Question. Why have relations between the United States and the Soviets turned sour?
Answer. The primary reason is found in the Soviet action in Afghanistan, followed by the very sensible actions the Americans took.

Question. But the Soviets claim that the relationship had been deteriorating long before they invaded Afghanistan—
Answer. They've certainly accused us of bad faith. They cited our demands for withdrawal of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the criticism in the Senate of the SALT II treaty and the administration's failure to push for its ratification. I have explained to them very carefully that if SALT II had gone up to the Hill, it would have been defeated, and the treaty would be worse off than it is now. But they insist détente was ruined before they went into Afghanistan. They use these so-called actions—or inactions—on our part to justify what they did in Afghanistan.

Question. Do you see any signs that the Soviet Union would be willing to re-negotiate the SALT II treaty?
Answer. First of all, I think they would entertain only very minor changes; and secondly, they would insist on matching every change we asked for with a concession on our part. This trade-off could lead to fairly long negotiations simply because the Russians are not easy negotiators.

Question. How do the leaders of the Soviet Union view the United States—as a decadent capitalistic paper tiger or as a worthy adversary?
Answer. They know we are formidable—perhaps the only force in the world they really have to worry about. A paper tiger? Not at all.

However, the Soviets do grossly misunderstand the United States. I don't think, for example, that they foresaw how fast and how strongly we would
react to Afghanistan. And they didn’t realize how the position we took would make it easier for other nations to take a stand.

But even now, the Soviets question our willingness to make the enormous sacrifices that their own people have been willing to make.

For better or for worse, the leaders of this country have been able to get their people to accept a low living standard, or even to reduce it, to provide the arms the leadership decides are necessary.

The Russians, it seems to me, are perfectly willing to make these sacrifices again. They can and will do it. Their leaders are not going to let us move ahead of them in any arms race.

Question. Are you suggesting neither side can win an arms race?

Answer. That is precisely what I am suggesting. The Russians will not allow us to move ahead of them in conventional arms. They've made sacrifices to draw even with us in thermonuclear weapons.

Now both sides have thousands of such weapons, and it takes only one to three of them to eliminate any of the major cities of the world. So one wonders if the risk of a flat-out arms race is worth any possible temporary, minuscule gain that either side might make.

Question. How do you size up President Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders in the Kremlin?

Answer. They are extremely tough, shrewd leaders, very knowledgeable and confident of their ability to hold their own as a superpower. I have found Soviet officials generally polite and at some levels deferential. But at no level have I detected a lack of confidence.

The Soviets say they want to put limitations on certain weapons or weapons systems because building them “will hurt our living standards, and this is not going to help anyone very much.” But if the U.S. is unwilling to agree to SALT II levels or lower current ones, they say, “We are perfectly willing to race you at whatever level you want and in whatever arms areas you want to include.”

Let me make this point: I’m sure we’re behind the Russians in conventional arms. We ought to balance out what we actually need because it’s not necessary to match the Soviets on a tank-for-tank basis. Their defense problems are different than ours. But we must draw even in conventional forces. And that presumes that, should we establish controls over thermonuclear weapons, somewhere down the road we should try to control conventional weapons.

Question. Will the next generation of leaders in the Politburo be more flexible than Brezhnev’s group?

Answer. Not really. The system is to bring senior officials into the Politburo as candidate members, presumably to test their ideology, their devotion to the system and to see if they match the current philosophy. If they don’t match, the candidate members never move up to full membership. They go back to whatever job they came from.

I would expect very few changes in philosophy inside the Politburo in the foreseeable future. Of course, there is likely to be a period of uncertainty when the top leadership changes, but the system has survived similar periods in the past. You’ll probably see some kind of collective leadership developing, with the real leader emerging much later.

It’s one of the weaknesses of the system. There is no formal mechanism to ease the changeover.

But remember, this is in the Russian tradition, and it goes back a long way. One-man control doesn’t date just to the Communist Revolution.

Question. Are the Russians unhappy about the slow development of trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

Answer. Of course. Expanding trade would allow them to buy technology that otherwise would take enormous time and manpower for them to develop on their own.

But the Soviets don’t seem to worry. When they talk to me about sanctions, they say, “We are able to make what we need ourselves” or “We’re getting it from others.” And then they add that “You fellows are shooting yourselves in the foot.”

Question. Would you give the Soviets access to the American technology that they need to exploit their oil resources?

Answer. That’s a tough question. On balance, however, if the two-country dialogue was under way again, progress toward détente would move faster if the Soviets were able to develop their resources quickly.

There is going to be an oil shortage here, and that will produce stress. We have stress at home already, even though we are coping with our oil problem. But if
we lost access to Middle East oil, we'd come under greater stress. We'd be pushed to make difficult decisions on what to do about that Mideast oil. The same thing is true here. They have the oil, and they will develop it on their own. But it will take longer. Our technology would probably help them avoid a crisis.

Question. Would that be to the advantage of the United States?

Answer. If you are counting on the Soviets' collapsing if we don't provide them with technology, don't believe it. They won't run out of oil.

I see nothing that will make the Soviet Union weaker militarily or bring about an internal rebellion or do the other things that might seem advantageous to the West.

All that is wishful thinking. I see no possibility of the Soviet system folding.

Question. On the basis of your experience as the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

Answer. Perhaps I am more hopeful than others think I should be.

On one side, I have respect for the demonstrated common sense of General Haig. He is knowledgeable in military affairs and international relationships. He certainly knows everything about arms.

On the other side, such people as Defense Secretary Harold Brown in the Carter administration have told me that in their experience—and Secretary Brown has been working with the Russians on SALT for a decade—the Soviets live up to their treaty obligations once they're made.

I'm sure that, like most countries, the Soviets would break any treaty they thought threatened their national security. But on the whole, if you work out with them one of these very difficult arrangements, the Soviets will live up to its terms.

I would go beyond that, however, and try to create the framework of a relationship in Geneva that would be constantly at work, not just on arms control or treaty obligations, but on crisis control.

It simply isn't sensible to have a superpower dialogue drop to the level it has been on for the past year. We should have a group of authoritative Soviet and American experts in Geneva at all times examining and consulting on the scenarios of potential crises as they emerge and develop.

Question. What are the most important qualities an American ambassador to Moscow needs to deal with the Soviets?

Answer. First off, he's got to have common sense. Then he needs a lot of experience in managing organizations. Actually, I don't see a great deal of difference in the experience gained in diplomacy and that in business. As an ex-businessman, I haven't found my work here particularly difficult. I've enjoyed free discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko and his associates, just as I formerly enjoyed discussions in the business world. The challenges in each case were great.

Of course, an ambassador should know the history of how this country has developed and changed over the last thousand years. Knowledge of the language is certainly helpful. But I haven't found my background as a businessman a handicap.

Question. So you think that being a career diplomat is not necessarily the most important requirement for successful diplomacy in Moscow?

Answer. I hope not, else you would have to categorize my term as unsuccessful.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, Senator Tsongas has a time commitment problem here. He has to be at another meeting very shortly. He says he has about 8 or 10 minutes. I would ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to do the remainder of his questioning now, without me losing my place after him, if that is all right.

The Chairman. Certainly, without objection. And Senator Tsongas, if you would continue until you have completed, and I hope that you can join us in our executive working session when we recess here.

Senator Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank Senators Glenn and Sarbanes for their courtesy.

I would like to use this opportunity to commend the chairman on his conduct of these hearings. And I have no hesitation about the relationship that we will have in the future.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, indeed. I failed yesterday to express appreciation for your very, very thoughtful comment.

Senator Tsongas. I have a meeting at 3 o'clock. My State is running out of natural gas and, as I am as interested in that as I am in you, General Haig—if I do not have a State that freezes out, I have no capacity to continue to inquire about foreign policy.

During the break I went running up and down the Mall, and all the way down and all the way up I could hear them practicing "Hail to the Chief." I think there is going to be a change in the city rather soon. And this is winding down and that is beginning, and there is going to be a new era. And we are a democracy and that is the way it should be. I do not have to like it, but that is the way it should be.

I want to get into the issue—there are a number of issues I wanted to raise in what I would hope would be my last round because of that session. I will not go into that.

Just one comment. You said that Allende was a failure. I think you are quite correct. Even people who are leftists would acknowledge that as an administrator he was a failure. I think history would have argued he was much more of a failure had there not been, as Mr. Helms, the CIA Director, had testified to the charge that we make the economy of Chile scream. Had that not been the policy, then I think the true failure of Allende in Socialist theory would have been clearer to Latin Americans today.

Let me just get into one issue, and that is your comment that Marxist-Leninist theory is unraveling. I think you are right. I do not think you are right because I am paid to think you are right in this instance. I do not think you are right because this is a traditional chamber of commerce philosophy.

But looking at the Third World and what is happening, you have to be impressed with exactly that, that the appeal of Marxist-Leninist theory has diminished because it does not work. And the problem with it is that it requires a level of commitment by the citizenry in general that you can sustain for a period of time, but eventually is not possible.

And our system is based on self-interest, the free enterprise system. It is far more sustainable over time and provides many more economic opportunities. And that is why I think Marxist-Leninist theory is in decline, because they simply offer a less attractive package to the ideological consumer.

The Soviets, however, have managed, even with a lesser theology—or ideology, rather—to use a target of opportunity approach. We stumble and they go in and pick up the pieces. They have done that very well.

Let me suggest to you the four areas I think the Soviets will look to as their targets of opportunity in the future:

One obviously is the Palestinian issue. The Soviets have gone into Afghanistan with a brutal invasion, and the Islamic community has united against them. But what lessens their agitation about that is the Palestinian issue. As long as the Soviets can keep that festering, they have that great advantage. Remove that advantage, and I do not know what the Soviets are going to argue in the future, especially given what they did in Afghanistan, because it is a Third World nation.
The second issue they will exploit, as they are now beginning to do seriously, is apartheid, the traditional black-white racist issue of South Africa. And I think that that is an issue which will play itself out, perhaps within your tenure as Secretary of State. It is the ideal situation for them. It requires no economic capacity. All it needs is guns and ideology, and they have both, which is the only two things they can bring to bear.

The third area I think they are going to be active in is Ethiopia. I think that Ethiopia is a very tragic situation. I spent 2 years in that country, and I went back there in 1977, after the coup, after the military takeover. There is a remarkable level of pro-American feeling among the people of that country, because I can still speak that language and I went out on my own to speak to Ethiopians.

But that country is becoming in many ways a Communist state. And I say that very unhappily, because I think it should be different. I think we really blew that one. But that is what is happening. There are indications that they want to move away from that Soviet Bear's embrace, but it is going to take a lot of very delicate negotiations, and I think we simply have to live with that for a period of time.

This is not Angola, it is not Mozambique, it is not Zimbabwe, though I think they can be plucked rather easily. Ethiopia potentially could be the Cuba of the future, with Ethiopian troops being used as surrogates in Africa. I wish it were otherwise, but I think it is the case. I think there are ways around it, but it is not going to be easy.

The last area that I think that they will exploit will be other Somoza-like situations. You said the other day that on Somoza you would have talked tough with him. I am sure you have that capacity and I wish that that would be used to those Somoza-like situations that we see around the world. Because your talking tough to them may preclude the need for what happened in Nicaragua.

And I just wanted to raise those points with you, because I do think if I were a Soviet leader, knowing that, yes, my ideology is in decline, knowing that the military situation is going to come into balance, seeing what has happened in Poland, seeing the decline of my economy, the only thing I have got going for me are those targets. And those are the four that I would delineate and try to go after.

Would you care to comment on any of those?

General Haig. No; I agree with you. I think in each instance these are very exploitable opportunities—I do not say assets; I say opportunities—for Soviet interventionism, whether you label it imperialist wave or interventionist wave. Yes, I think it is true. There are several others, of course.

Senator Tsongas. I think the Ethiopian case is the most tragic, because it is the section whose people have the most favorable attitude toward the United States, built up over 25 years. I think it is still salvageable, but it is a very tough situation.

There are other issues I wanted to raise, but could not because of time constraints.

Let me say finally, you and I have had some interesting discussions during these 5 days, and I have sought to do my job as I saw it. I am concerned about my relationship with you in the future. But if what I did precludes that, so be it. I did the job as I felt it was important, and indeed I will continue to do it in the future. If I think you are
wrong, you are going to hear about it both privately and publicly, because I take my job seriously, as you do yours.

So I look forward to working with you, if that is what is going to happen. But if it is not, I can live with that. I can live with that rancor, if that is what it is. I do not think it will be. And I can live with that of your Jesuit brother, if that is what the case is.

But I find it very difficult to live with that of your wife. Being blessed with a very loyalist wife, I know the feelings that are expressed at home. And that is my one reservation as to what has happened these last 5 days.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas, thank you very much for your gracious comments.

Senator Glenn!

Senator Glenn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, I followed very closely your comments to Senator Pell and Senator Tsongas on this erosion of Soviet power. I agree there is some eroding and there are some centrifugal forces at play here, I think, in the Soviet sphere of influence.

But what concerns me is, what happens if they lose control of some of these things and if they then start blaming their failures on us, which seems to me to be the likely way they will go? Realistically, I think what we have to watch out for is, the more erosion that occurs, the more there is likely to be some Soviet convulsion, as they claim we are the font of all problems and make some incalculable military errors that could be devastating.

And I just wanted to follow on with a comment to that. And I think you shared that view.

You touched a moment ago on what I think is the single biggest problem in dealing with the Soviets—their almost monstrous, enormous paranoia about anything to do with us and Western Europe. They keep the buffer states—they call them buffer states, we call them the slave nations. And we could discuss that all day, but I will not get into that now.

But I think that is where we may get into trouble in the future, is that if there is a dismemberment underway in the Soviet orbits, they might lose control or strike out and do some stupid things, try to blame us, that is the biggest danger I see coming out that erosion process.

You did not list in your statement starting out as one of the tools of statecraft, I believe as it was termed if I am not mistaken, intelligence systems. Would you care to comment on that? It seems to me of all the things we have going for us in knowing what we should do around the world, perhaps a good intelligence system is far and away ahead of what is in second place, and that was not in your listing here.

Was that an intentional omission?

General Haig. It was intentional, Senator, primarily because it is not an area that comes under my purview, although certainly it is an area of major concern to me. And we do have in the Department, of course, our own bureau that deals with intelligence.
I would merely wish to say, I have been close to this discipline for a number of years, probably since the early 1960's, at a fairly high policy level. And I have watched an unfortunate dialectic occur there, and that is a dialectic which was a product of technology, innovative, almost miraculous breakthroughs in technology.

But it began to influence the mentality of policymakers. It suggested, for example, if we did not have a photograph or electronic intercept, that a fact could not exist without that kind of hard information. It began to suppress the vitally important role of the greatest technological computer in the world, of the human brain, the analyst, the human side of American intelligence, where a host of things are synthesized, where good sense, rationality, and even human chemistry comes into play.

I think in the period ahead we have got to strengthen the human side of our capability along with continuing the necessary expansion of what technology can provide us.

Senator Glenn. The way you would state that, it would juxtapose one against the other. I never really looked at them that way. I look at them as complementary.

General Haig. They must be complementary. But we must understand that the human side has got to play an increasing role. In my view, it has been too suppressed in favor of hard technology. That is not to suggest that hard technology is not invaluable. It is to suggest that our intelligence core—you know, the willingness, for example, to accept a misjudgment in human terms tends to lessen as you get increasingly enamored with technology. And I think we have got to reassess that.

Senator Glenn. I think I agree with you. But I would say I look at our intelligence system as being absolutely invaluable. We have to have the facts. Then the human intelligence as applied to those, as to what you do with those facts, is something else again. I think that is the area where maybe we have lacked something, as you point out, and I share your concern.

But I think that all the human concern that we could muster, all of us sitting around being concerned all day, is also going to need some facts to put to work here, so we know what to do. So I think they are complementary; they are not one against the other.

I think we need some beefing up in our whole intelligence operation. I want to see that you get the best facts you can possibly get.

Could you give your views on verification? We have touched on this just a couple of times, I think once the other night in our executive session just a little bit. But I have been concerned, and in SALT, SALT II, my main concern was not exactly the balance that was set. I think what we lost in one area we gained in another. It was a reasonable balance overall.

But I was very concerned that we be able to know what the Soviets are doing. And that feeds right into this whole intelligence business. Now, at the time when people were coming over and telling us at the committee when we were considering SALT II that, yes, we had a good intelligence capability, a sufficient intelligence capability, my judgment of it was we absolutely unequivocally did not have an adequate intelligence capability at that time.
Could you give us your views as to how you see this? Do you think there has to be an absolute verification capability? Are there degrees in it? What are your views on it?

General Haig. Well, first, I share your view that we do not have an absolute assured verification capability. And I would suggest that in our acceptance of SALT I and even the discussions associated with Vladivostok and subsequently SALT II, there was a tendency to continue to accept risks in this area.

Now, those risks were less significant in SALT I but became somewhat more significant in SALT II. If we get down to the kinds of negotiations that I hope we will achieve in the period ahead, where we are really visualizing reductions in nuclear armaments, then those risks are going to be far less acceptable than they have been when we were seeking certain functional controls, as we did in SALT I in certain specific areas, the ABM and a limited number of offensive systems.

Second, there is the problem of advancing technology, not only in the context of our ability to inspect and verify, but also in the ability of the other side to circumvent patterns that we have established. Now, this is an ongoing phenomenon. We have certain patterns that visualize status quo. And when you get breakthroughs in accuracy combined with breakthroughs in yield, some of these patterns no longer potentially are going to provide us the kind of assurance that we need.

That is about all that I would care to say.

Senator Glenn. I would trust that in future negotiations that you are liable to get into that you would make verification a key matter and that we would not agree to anything that we cannot adequately verify, “adequately” being subjective.

General Haig. I do not think there are many disagreements on that.

Senator Glenn. Well, I did want to bring that up and get it on the record here.

Senator Dodd. Would the Senator yield on that one point?

I have an interest in this as well. And just for the public record, I asked you the other evening, General, about whether or not you would insist upon onsite inspection as part of verification. You indicated you would not the other evening.

Is that still your position?

General Haig. No. But I want to be careful. I am talking about the arms control, nuclear arms control. There are other aspects, reduced armaments or ancillary things, where onsite inspection might be somewhat more desirable, such as radiological weapons and what have you. I have not studied that with the degree of care that I would like to before I answer your question.

I want to be sure when I say, no, I do not insist on onsite inspection, that that is not across the whole spectrum of potential—

Senator Dodd. As far as strategic arms go, that would be responsive?

General Haig. No; I do not insist.

Senator Dodd. All right, thank you.

Senator Glenn. That gets us into a very complex area and I do not want to pursue it. I do not want to get into the test ban, like that the Soviets might accept an onsite seismic
General Haig. That is why I answered with that caveat, Senator.

Senator Glenn. I think it was good for you to do that.

In the area of foreign policy, I have been a little concerned—and I expressed this the other day. I would appreciate any additional remarks you can make on this, to be as specific as you can. I had a feeling for a long time that our military buys were determining our foreign policy, not the other way around. And I do not know what your views are on that. You are going in as Secretary of State and you have had experience in the Pentagon, you have had a life in the military, as I did.

And yet, we both adhere, I am certain, to civilian control. We both adhere—I would be surprised if you did not agree with me that we should have as well thought out a foreign policy as possible, and our military buys should reflect that and not the other way around. And yet, we do not seem to operate along that line.

If I just increase defense spending by 5 percent, what are we going to do with it? Well, I do not know and I am over on the floor getting an amendment passed for the B-1 bomber. Not a B-1, but a multirole bomber. It is probably going to be based, if we build it, on some of that same technology, at least, modified to bring it up to speed now. And how does that fit in?

And yet, we should have a foreign policy that says, here are our objectives and here is a military buy we really need to project power for these purposes or whatever. And we do not seem to really do it that way.

Do you have any comments on this?

General Haig. Well, I certainly agree with you that it is very necessary to structure your force composition on the foreign policy and national security policy objectives that we seek. We have tried to do that with mixed success over the years.

I remember the idea of the DPRC, the Defense Policy Review Committee, which was created when I was in Defense to do precisely that. Unfortunately, it fell into some disrepute or it was not used the way I think we had hoped it would be.

I think we have grounds for a review of this and a focus, to see if we can accomplish this somewhat better than we have been able to do in the past.

Senator Glenn. I agree with that. And let me give you an example. We have a Rapid Deployment Force now, and we mentioned this briefly the other day. That is being more accepted now as the conventional way we are going to go—a Rapid Deployment Force. We are going to take all of this equipment and it is going to be stockpiled, which, as I told you the other day, it is the first time that I know of in our military history that we have ever put the logistics, our supply lines, out ahead of the troops and expected them to be there when the troops somehow get flown in to use this equipment.

Do you see the rapid deployment force now as being a legitimate backup, a legitimate extension of a well-thought-out foreign policy?

General Haig. I hate to give too strong a position on this on the public record before I have had a chance to talk to Cap Weinberger about it in some detail. It is an area of primary responsibility to him, although to me as well.
I think we do need an increased presence of some kind, a manifestation of some increased presence in the Persian Gulf area. Whether the RDF is the best solution or not, I have had some skepticism about it on two grounds:

No. 1, we have got more rhetoric than we have got fact; and second, I am not sure that the concerns you have expressed are not overriding.

Senator GLENN. We cannot bluff in these cases. A bluff is worse than nothing at all. It just seems to me that some of the things we are doing are bluff and bluster, just so there is some reaction some way, somehow. And it is not going to do that much good if you come to a combat situation. And they will sit and laugh at us, perhaps, trying to get to our stockpiles someplace, wherever they may be. You cannot bluff in a situation like this, as you know.

So that is a concern we could talk about some other time, also.

We have not said much about economics. Do you have any idea how we can repatriate or redistribute some of these concentrations of wealth we see in the Mideast, for instance? This is something you have to work out with commerce and international trade. We have a number of international financial institutions.

How does all of this fit together? It is a monstrous problem that is building every day. Do you have any views you could give us on that before we end these hearings?

General HAIG. I share your concern about it, Senator. I think I am going to put together the best economic team the Department of State has had in many a day. At least that is my current outlook. And we would have to get onto it very hastily and as a matter of utmost priority.

Senator GLENN. I will not push that any further. I have one more question, about a minute of final remarks here.

I am sure you have seen some of these cartoons out of the paper. They appeared last weekend, last Friday and Saturday, both of them out of the "Star." The Lone Ranger galloping throughout the Mideast with a German accent.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. I am sure you have seen both of those. And someone here having to remind certain people that they are no longer Secretary of State, "You do not sign that document," and so on.

This is indicative of concern. It is funny and we all laugh at it. But it is indicative of a problem.

Does Dr. Kissinger speak for you? Does he speak for the Reagan administration in his efforts in the Mideast now?

General HAIG. Well, I think Mr. Richard Allen made a very precise statement on this the other day, which was a reflection of Governor Reagan's view, which I was aware of. In that statement he pointed out that Dr. Kissinger was on a long-scheduled private visit and that he was not enfranchised, if you will, to represent Governor Reagan's administration, although I know that we will welcome his comments or observations, as we would any former Secretary of State's observations, in that important area of the world.

Senator GLENN. Well, I am not concerned about our understanding it here. I think that the welcome that he had there and a lot of things that happened were probably because there was a perception, at least,
abroad in the Mideast that he was some sort of stalking horse or pseudo-representative for you and/or the new President-elect.

He fills a unique role now. I am not belittling that role. It is a very important one and you may want to use him on a great many missions in that area, for all I know, and he may do a tremendous job.

But I think when this has been in this rather delicate situation between administrations, I hope these other nations have not misunderstood his role, even though we may understand it here at home.

General, just a couple of wrap-up comments. I know these have been rather interminable hearings from your own standpoint and your family, I am sure. But I would point out something. I think these are in the best tradition of our system of government.

Last Monday's paper indicated—it quoted the new President-elect as saying that the committee had—the quote in the paper was—"certain elements of extremism in our questioning." Now, I do not agree with that, Joe. I do not agree with it at all that we were extreme.

Now just let me finish and then you can make your remarks.

This is not just your confirmation. It is a two-way flow of information, as I see it. I think you come out of these hearings better informed about our concerns and more knowledgeable, perhaps. I think it is a two-way flow, although it has been primarily for the purpose of your confirmation.

In our system of government power is shared. And it is hard sometimes for all of us to realize that. But we do have these institutions in which power is shared, and even a President is not omnipotent. Next Tuesday is not a coronation; it is an inauguration. And we need to sometimes keep reminding ourselves of that.

And this sharing of power, as I see it, is a protection for all of us. And I am reminded of the night when President Nixon resigned. I happened to be in Washington that night. I drove over and around the White House. And thinking about it later, it was remarkable. There were no tanks. No troops were drawn up. There were not any sandbags around the White House. There may have been inside where you were, but there were not outside.

There was no indication that anything was amiss at all. It was quiet. The lights were on. It was beautiful, as it is around the White House grounds at night. And that was the transfer of power in our system, because I think, at least in part, of this shared responsibility that we have.

So I think these hearings are but a very small part of that overall system, but I think our confirmation process is an important part, nevertheless, of that sharing of views. And I think you have seen in your too many hours here with us very diverse viewpoints of the members of this committee. And I would guess that that is reflective of the very diverse viewpoints of the people of our Nation in this shared responsibility we all have.

But out of this, all of this give and take, it seems to me comes some of the moderating of views, of yours and of ours both, that is necessary under this shared system if we are ever getting around to what I am sure the objective of all of us is in our role in government and our concern about foreign policy, and that is that somehow we can all in our time help to make more gentle life on this world.
Thank you. You have been a good witness.
General Haig. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Biden. I guess I am chairman, General.
Senator Sarbanes?
Senator Sarbanes. General, I have just a few questions left. One is, leaving aside current instances in which we are withholding recognition of a regime as a tool for affecting the situation, do you generally favor using recognition in that way or do you in effect favor recognizing whatever the existing facts or situation may be?
General Haig. Senator, I favor being sure that we can communicate, that we can conduct exchanges of views, regardless of the participants in that. I do not necessarily equate that with recognition, although in many instances they are very closely related.
Senator Sarbanes. What is your view of shuttle diplomacy?
General Haig. Of shuttle diplomacy? It is like any other diplomatic tool, summitry and the rest. When such thing succeeds, it generally generates more enthusiasm than subsequent events would justify.
As a general rule, I would place shuttle diplomacy in the same category as summitry. And that is, that I would hope that when we engage in the highest level talks that we know pretty well where we are going to come out. And then again, some general guidelines; and there are some exceptions, and those exceptions have been notable and perhaps constructive in certainly one case.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you think the Secretary of State should be a traveling man or do you think he should be pretty well here?
General Haig. Well, there are several options on that. As a rule, I like to travel. I like to eyeball, if you will, as we have done here for the last 5 days, those with whom we deal.
Modern technology permits a Secretary to move his command post, if you will, right along with him, as it does permit a President to do that. I think it is better to have a Secretary of State the activist in the traveling world and not the President, as a general rule. So again, when he does engage himself, we know where he is coming out. It has been sufficiently prepared that achievements and progress will be the consequence, and not failure and rising and falling expectations.
Senator Sarbanes. How important do you think it is for the Secretary of State to communicate to the American people about the substance of American foreign policy?
General Haig. I think as a rule it is important that he do so. And there a number of vehicles for doing so. We learn from articles in official State Department publications and public speeches, press conferences. I think it is important not to start out an administration with commitments which you may later wish to recant on in this area. And so I would say I believe the issue is important. The way it is done may be of somewhat less importance.
Senator Sarbanes. Let me pursue this just a little. Do you think the Secretary of State should hold regular press conferences?
General Haig. It is in that category. I would not want to say yes and then have someone say, well, you promised to meet with the press once a month. These things are always better judged by the sense of need. It is almost a chemical thing. It is in an executive's senses, as it is in a politician's senses. He does not let this thing run too long. He does not
let them go so long that it begins to erode his own credibility or even the
tolerance of people listening to them.

And that can happen.

*Senator Sarbanes.* I can understand you do not want to be on a fixed
timetable. But let me ask you: Do you think the Secretary of State
ought to have press conferences?

*General Haig.* Yes, I do; indeed, I do.

*Senator Sarbanes.* And would you be inclined, in the absence of a
strong reason to the contrary, to hold them on fairly frequent basis,
or on a rare basis?

*General Haig.* I think quite frequently. That was the style I pursued
in my NATO position and more people thought I overdid it.

*Senator Sarbanes.* Is it your view that the Secretary of State must
stay free of partisan politics?

*General Haig.* Very much so.

*Senator Sarbanes.* General, it has been an interesting 5 days. We
have tried to do our job and you have tried to do yours, and I thank
you.

*General Haig.* Thank you, Senator.

*The Chairman.* Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

*Senator Cranston.*

*The Chairman.* Senator Dodd, may I ask, do you have further
questions?

*Senator Dodd.* I will not use the entire time, Mr. Chairman, just a
couple more.

*Senator Biden.* I have two more.

*The Chairman.* You have two more. And Senator Cranston, you will
be about how long?

*Senator Cranston.* I do not really know. I do not think too long,
probably in excess of 20 minutes, not much beyond that.

*The Chairman.* General, if at any time you would like a 5-minute
break, we would be happy to take one.

*General Haig.* Fine, Mr. Chairman.

*Senator Cranston.* Let's turn to the War Powers Act for a moment.
As you know, General, all military commanders operate under policy
guidance instructions authorizing them, "to take necessary preventive
action, including the use of force," in certain extraordinary circum-
stances that do not permit consultation with higher authority about
the use of force.

These emergency guidelines are obviously necessary and wise pre-
cautions in all areas of potential conflict. My question is, do you think
these guidelines are subject to the War Powers Act?

*General Haig.* I could not conceive of them not being in the ultimate
sense of your question.

*Senator Cranston.* In that case, Congress should be informed of
such guidelines when they are outstanding; is that correct?

*General Haig.* Yes. I think anything that we are speaking about
in the War Powers Act applies to whatever echelon you might be ad-
dressing the problem.

*Senator Cranston.* Thank you.

Three quick questions on the Middle East: First, I remain concerned
about the Carter administration's decision to sell 200 of our top of the
line M60-A3 tanks to Jordan. The first 100 were sold last year, and it is the Carter administration’s intent to send forward the next 100 later this year.

Because of Jordan’s role as a vehement opponent of the Camp David accords and as a supporter of the anti-Israel rejectionist front, would you oppose the sale of additional tanks and military equipment to the Jordanians until they indicate a readiness to play a constructive role in bringing a more broad, enduring peace to that part of the world?

General Haig. I cannot answer that, Senator. I prefer to give you a subsequent answer.

Senator Cranston. Fine; I can understand that.

My next question relates to Egypt and the experience I believe we should have gained from our involvement in Iran, where we provided sophisticated weaponry to the Shah far in excess of Iran’s absorptive capacities. I am concerned that if we create too great an Egyptian reliance upon the United States for military and economic support, we may find our long-term interests compromised in whatever post-Sadat era comes upon us.

Do you share that concern? And if so, how can we avoid a repeat of the situation that occurred in Iran?

General Haig. Well, I share your concern about what happened in Iran, and I expressed that to two Secretaries of Defense at the time. I do not see it as a short-term likelihood in the case of Egypt. In fact, very much the opposite.

I am very much concerned that we have got to be sure that we do not let President Sadat fall from incumbency because of the failure of the United States to meet his urgent needs. We must also insure that there is some value in his relationship and his contributions to the peace process, which he is taking great risks to undertake. But that is not a contradiction or a disagreement with you.

I wanted to add, and I do not see that. If anything, I would be more concerned that we have not been as responsive as we should be.

Senator Cranston. How would you characterize our relations with Israel in a nutshell? I presume you view Israel as a strategic asset?

General Haig. I always have, and I have always described it as that. And I combine that with our longstanding obligations dating the post-World War Two creation of the state.

Senator Cranston. I would like to briefly explore your views regarding the desirability of trade between the Soviet Union and NATO countries, including the United States. This was gone into a bit this morning. But there is one more aspect of it I would like to explore with you briefly.

As originally conceived, the détente in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1970’s had as one of its anticipated benefits the creation of a disincentive for any Soviet action hostile to Western interests. The design was to involve the U.S.S.R. in a web of economic relationships with the West, the breaking of which would prove extremely costly to the Soviets.

However, with these ties which potentially restrain the Soviet Union came the accompanying risk that the creation of a strong Western stake in the maintenance of commercial ties with the Soviet Union might possibly reduce our leverage because of the reluctance
of certain allies and possibly reluctance on our part—witness the struggle over the grain embargo—to break important, established commercial ties with the Soviets.

So my first question on that point is, do you believe the prospect of greater trade with the West can be an effective restraining factor upon Soviet leaders?

General Haig. Yes, I do. But I do not accept the theory that building bridges of trade leads necessarily to improved relations. I have never believed that thesis, and I believe that was the position your question suggested.

Senator Cranston. Do you have any thoughts on what we can or should do to reduce the danger that trade will have the impact of reducing our ability to work together on embargoes when necessary if there is Soviet aggression or other steps we should take?

General Haig. If we reduce trade?

Senator Cranston. No. How do we handle the trade so that we reduce the danger that it will lead to a reluctance to engage in embargoes or other steps that may be deemed appropriate?

General Haig. I can only suggest that we accomplish that by careful assessments on a regular basis of the direction in which we are going. You know, one of the problems, for example, in credit provisions, in the earlier period, in the 1970's, we visualized somewhere in the neighborhood of $40 billion in credits to the Soviet Union, very carefully managed in the context of improving relationships under the guise of détente. And we turned it over to private institutions and that very rapidly escalated into a multibillion dollar set of credits, the full scope of which are hard to track. They run perhaps $50 to $70 billion today.

I would hope we would have a better handle on trade in general and be able to assess it in the context of our overall relationships with the Soviet Union.

Senator Cranston. Finally, regarding those overall relationships, do you believe cultural, athletic and scientific exchanges and the like with the U.S.S.R. are desirable generally because of their potential for opening up that extremely closed society and increasing somewhat the understanding between our two peoples?

General Haig. Yes; I do in general. But again, with the moderating impact, that we must not delude ourselves that these are the vehicles for resolving fundamental political differences.

Senator Cranston. When Henry Kissinger was handling our foreign policy, he used the word “détente”—and you spoke of its origins this morning—to characterize what the state of relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. should be.

How would you characterize that relationship now in a word or a phrase, and how would you characterize what you would like to see it be?

General Haig. Our relationships between the Soviet Union—

Senator Cranston. Yes; now and what you hope them to be.

General Haig. Well, we are clearly in a low peak of what has historically been a sine curve of relationships with the Soviet Union since the Second World War. Sometimes in our frustrations we forget progress that has been made, since it has been a sine curve direction. I think right now we are where we are as a result of the activities of,
the Soviet Union over the last 3 or 4 years, or actually 6 years, starting with Angola. They have ultimately contributed to worsening relationships.

That is heightened by the still unresolved situation in Poland. I would hope that subsequent Soviet activity, both in the Polish situation and in the context of their developing nations activity, would give us a basis for improvement.

Senator CRANSTON. I hope it goes that way.

General HAIG. Yes; I think we all do.

Senator CRANSTON. Returning again to SALT for a few more questions on that subject, are there any quantitative restraints on the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal contained in SALT II which you believe should be carried forward in any new or revised agreement that we may work out with them?

General HAIG. I welcome any quantitative ceiling. I would like to see substantially reduced ceilings, providing it represents a practical objective to carry the process forward. Whether you talk about the aggregate or the subceilings in SALT II, these are all per se desirable, of course. I would like to see far more substantial reductions.

Senator CRANSTON. What do you mean when you talk about reductions? Qualitative, quantitative, both?

General HAIG. I would hope both, but certainly quantitative.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe it would be desirable for the Soviets and the Americans to continue adherence to the mutual restraints provisions of both SALT I and SALT II until the Reagan administration has had time to formulate a detailed position on future negotiations with the Soviets?

General HAIG. I think I would like to withhold on that, Senator, until I have a chance to consult both with the President-elect and the Secretary of Defense, the Director of ACDA, and be sure that the work we do is designed to achieve progress and not ultimately be counterproductive.

Senator CRANSTON. That is understandable.

In your opening statement, you said:

I believe that equitable verifiable arms control contributes to security, but restraint in the growth and proliferation of armament will not be achieved by policies which increase the very insecurities that promote arms competition.

What “policies” did you refer to there?

General HAIG. Well, I would suppose I could refer to a host of them. Clearly, I was not trying to be cute in that statement, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. I know that.

General HAIG. I generally found that those balances that I listed there were designed to address what I personally consider to be some recent excesses. I think, for example, we talked with Senator Glenn about India. While I was not close enough to speak with total authority, I have a feeling that we contributed greatly to the insecurity of Pakistan in our policy vis-a-vis India.

I think when developing nations are threatened and when we perhaps leave unchallenged the kind of activity sponsored by not just the Soviet Union but their proxy forces, Cuba—Libya in Africa has just completed overrunning Chad—these instabilities, this rule of force, if it is condoned by U.S. policy or overlooked, can contribute to appetites for threatened nations.
Senator Cranston. What did you mean when you referred to the “insecurities” that promote arms competition? What sort of insecurities?

General Haig. The fundamental insecurity about the vitality of a nation. Pakistan has historically viewed itself as threatened by India, just as India has felt probably the same way about Pakistan. And Egypt sees itself threatened by a southern neighbor whose predatory policies not only throughout Africa but beyond the African continent is mind-boggling, when you look at the size of that country. Central American countries that recognize that Cuban subversion is on their doorstep.

Senator Cranston. Are there specific policies that increase insecurities that we would have the capacity to change?

General Haig. I believe so. I believe so.

Senator Cranston. Could you indicate generally what you have in mind?

General Haig. I think most importantly I have in mind establishing a more vigorous position vis-a-vis the kinds of activities that we see running rampant today—terrorism, wars of liberation, and blatant Soviet interventionism.

Senator Cranston. Could you indicate what securities, as contrasted to insecurities, you think promote equitable and verifiable arms control?

General Haig. I am sorry?

Senator Cranston. What securities could we pursue that would promote an atmosphere where equitable and verifiable arms control would be more attainable?

General Haig. I think perhaps the most underlying—I do not know whether it is a security, but I think the most underlying proposition for America to recognize and to accept is that those with whom we seek arms control agreements must know, must understand that, if we do fail to achieve limitations and hopefully reductions, that we Americans are going to continue to do what we have to to be sure that they do not get into a posture of advantage over us.

I think that is the greatest incentive.

Senator Cranston. Let me ask you a broader question. How would you like or hope to have the history books describe your tenure as Secretary of State? What achievements would you hope would stand out to be most memorable?

General Haig. That is a difficult question to answer. Certainly I think the furthering of the objectives and ideals that we as Americans cherish; hopefully the maintenance of peace, stability, and a return to international civility and the rule of law in international affairs.

I think all of the rest we can handle, the competition, in appropriate channels; we are more than capable of dealing with it.

Senator Cranston. Those are certainly goals I think we all share.

I would like at this point to make sort of a summary statement of how I see where we stand now from my vantage point as a result of these hearings. Tomorrow we vote on your confirmation as Secretary of State. It is apparent that you will be confirmed by this committee and by this Senate.

But that does not change my duty to make my own independent judgment and to fulfill my constitutional duty of advice and consent.
I would like to list some of the factors that seem to me to be involved in that decision for me and I think for all Members of the Senate.

Generally, a newly elected President should be entitled to choose his Cabinet and particularly to have his first choice for that most important post for which you have been designated, Secretary of State. Yet, I have a constitutional duty to render an independent judgment and not be a rubber stamp, regardless of whether I am of the same political party as the President or his nominee.

The people of California in 1980 gave me a greater vote of confidence for a third term in the Senate than they did to my fellow Californian, Ronald Reagan, in his races for Governor in the past and his victory on the Presidential election last November. And I say that not in a boastful sense, but simply to lay the foundation for my next point.

My constituents expect me to perform my constitutional duty, to exercise my independent judgment, but with the realization that Ronald Reagan will be the President for all of us.

You are obviously an able, dedicated, loyal, tough, hard-working public servant. Your military background brings important experience and understanding to the problems of managing Soviet power, the problems of our national security, and to the real and awesome consequences of the use of military force. And I think you as a military man know more about what commitment of force would mean than a man who does not have that background and who would have the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

You have the unique understanding of, acceptance by, and trust from our allies, particularly in Europe.

In your long career, however, there does not appear to be a position you have held that has been a real test of your policymaking capability, your capacity for original and innovative solutions, and your ability to distinguish between shades of gray.

Your statement that decisions are “either right or wrong,” and that you expect to make right decisions that will necessarily get bipartisan support, creates a concern that you see the world and problems too much in terms of “right or wrong,” “black and white,” “good or bad.”

In all civilian government, as in the daily lives of all of us, we often are forced to make decisions where there is no clear right or wrong, where frequently we not only do not know what is right or wrong, but we are faced with a series of options—and you will be getting those from your aides—where we will never know which option is right or wrong. And I think that is particularly true in the area of foreign policy.

Your experience at the White House, particularly with respect to the National Security Council, should be invaluable in helping you operate as the policymaking Secretary of State you clearly intend to be. And you should be well able to handle any attempt to resurrect the dominant role that the President’s National Security Adviser played in past administrations, both Republican and Democratic.

Considerable concern, however, has been raised by your testimony in both open and closed sessions as to your appreciation of our constitutional separation of powers, and in particular, in the respective roles of Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy, as compared to its execution, and in the exercise of the war
power, taking into account both the responsibilities of Congress and
the powers of the President as Commander in Chief.

These concerns are coupled with a concern as to your basic respect
for and appreciation of Congress as an institution. There is a concern
also that your experience in the Nixon White House exposed you to
abuses of power upon which you refused to pass moral judgments un-
til pressed by this committee.

Although these concerns may have been alleviated for some by
your testimony, for others in the Senate they may be a decisive fac-
tor against confirmation. I hope you will understand why a reason-
able and conscientious Senator could come to such a conclusion.

Nothing in this hearing has been produced that would establish that
you were disqualified in any way for the office of Secretary of State.
Indeed, you have been given an endorsement by Leon Jaworski, a
Watergate Special Prosecutor, and he has declared your perform-
ance honorable.

The fact of your presence in the Nixon White House raises the
concern in some that, notwithstanding the known evidence and your
testimony, it simply was not possible that your mantle of duty, in-
tegrity, and service did not incur the slightest blemish from all that
was going on around and through you. Indeed, one Republican Sen-
ator yesterday based his opposition to you essentially on that premise.

On policy matters, General, you have declared that you are dedi-
cated to a bipartisan foreign policy insofar as possible, and that you
will consult and work with Congress. On the major issues of na-
tional security, nuclear arms, the SALT process, the special needs
and circumstances of developing nations and the Third World, as
well as numerous other issues, you have ably expressed your posi-
tions. And although differences may exist between you and some
Members of this body, the reasons for those differences do not ap-
pear to relate to your qualifications to serve as our Nation’s Secre-
tary of State.

Ultimately, of course, even if a Senator is satisfied with your ques-
tions, under our system of representative government, each Senator
is responsible to his or her electoral constituents and must reserve
the right to vote for or against your confirmation on that basis. That
is the final decision that each of us must make.

I have tried to be very candid in listing these factors, General. By
listing any factor I do not mean to indicate that I am giving it any
particular weight or have reached a conclusion on its merits. And
I do not mean to indicate that you or any other Senator would agree
with the list that I have run through.

General, before the hearing started I was leaning toward a “no”
vote on your confirmation. I will now tell you that I am leaning
toward a “yes” vote. But I want a period of calm reflection before
I make a final decision, which I have to make by tomorrow.

I would like to ask you one final question now, General. Is there
any other factor or matter that you think I and others here should
consider in deciding how to cast our votes as to whether you should
be confirmed as Secretary of State?

General Haig. No, Senator. I do have some remarks I would like
to make at the conclusion of my presence here, and I would like to
reserve it until then,
Senator Cranston. That would be very appropriate. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston, thank you very, very much indeed. And if ever there was a demonstration of the value of a hearing, you have just provided it. We thank you for the open mind that you have had, the persistence and patience with which you have asked the penetrating questions. They have been responded to in a very forthright manner.

And again, we value your presence as a new committee member, but an experienced Senator that we all respect.

Senator Cranston. Thank you very much. The process has been educational for everyone involved, everyone listening and watching. I have been educated about the general and about issues. I think he has been educated, as I believe all of us have.

Thank you for sharing your fine performance as chairman of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd?

Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My remarks and a couple of questions will be very brief.

First of all, I would like to join with the chairman in complimenting my seatmate here, Senator Cranston, for what I think was an extremely thorough analysis of what each of us has to go through in making the decision that we will make public tomorrow morning. And he has been a good adviser in my long 8 days as a U.S. Senator in this process. He has been of good assistance to me sitting here, and I appreciate it very, very much.

And second, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for the way in which you conducted these hearings, and particularly for the graciousness and the kindness which you extended to me as a new member of a new minority. And I am grateful to you for that.

To you, General, just very briefly—and there is not a lot of consistency to these questions—I am just trying to fill in some gaps as a result of some of the questions that have been asked before.

First—and I do not believe you answered this earlier; if you did, I apologize—is it your feeling and the feeling to the best of your knowledge of President-elect Reagan to as quickly as possible fill our strategic petroleum reserve?

General Hair. I think that is a very urgent and important task. I have not had an opportunity to speak to Governor Reagan about this. But clearly because of the Iraqi-Iranian War, we must view it with great urgency.

Senator Dodd. I am glad to hear you say that. I hope you will have more success than the present administration. As I am sure you are aware, one of the problems has been that our ally Saudi Arabia has expressed its concern and in fact the course of action it would follow should we take that step.

And I am not going to ask you what specific steps you would take to try and deal with that problem, because I think it is a thorny one. But I would hope you might have some comment on it. I would hope you would be able to get back to us as soon as possible on how we might contribute to achieving that goal.

General Hair. I would prefer to come back to you, Senator.
Senator Dodd. The President-elect visited Lopez Portillo the other day on the Rio Grande River, on the bridge in the middle there. I am told, anyway, that there is a policy to try to develop a North American energy alliance between our neighbors to the south and the north.

Has that matter been discussed? And if so, would you clarify for us what the present position is with the incoming administration?

General Haig. No; it has not been discussed. I am familiar with some of the observations made during the recent campaign. I am also acutely conscious of the reservations that our neighbors, both north and south, have with respect to that issue. And I think it is one that we have to look at very carefully in the period ahead.

Senator Dodd. The reason I raise this—and I do not mean to imply that, because it is the last question that I am really raising, it should be last in importance. Senator Tsongas before he left enumerated some four issues that he thought were areas of targets of opportunity that the Soviets might aim at in the next 5, 6, or 10 years: the PLO, apartheid, Ethiopia, and other Somoza-type situations.

I would add a fifth—and I am sure everyone else on the committee would have their own list. But the whole question of global energy supplies I think is the most threatening problem we face, both here at home and in terms of international tension. And it would seem to me that any and all steps that can be taken to try and deal with not only our own domestic problems—as we now find Senator Tsongas at a meeting on natural gas, I have got a meeting a little bit later about an absence of coal supplies in Connecticut; and those of us from the Northeast and Midwest particularly are feeling the intensity of the energy issue at this particular time—that this would be an extremely high priority for you as Secretary of State to work in the arena of energy, global energy issues.

The last question I have—and again, this may have been asked. I don’t believe it was, but it has to do with the PLO. You correct me if I am wrong on a quote I have from you, two quotes, that point up what appears to me to be a contradiction. And I would like you to just comment on it if you would.

I am not sure of the date of this remark or in fact even where it was given. It is cited to me as a quote from several speeches that you have given around the country, and it refers to the PLO. And the quote is, and I am quoting you now:

So long as the PLO advocates views incompatible with the peace process, the United States will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO.

That is the quote that I have from a series of speeches. Then on December 18, apparently in an interview with the New York Times, again in reference to the PLO, you are quoted as follows:

One must be careful in the use of the term “PLO.” The PLO is an organization made up of elements with various interests. Some are just and reasonable, while others are obviously dominated by the East, financially as well as ideologically. Such a phenomenon is not unusual. We should not despair over it. It is simply a reality we must live with. Our problem is to be careful not to assimilate disparate interests and forces which only appear to be coherent.

Would you clear up what appears to me, anyway, to be a contradiction there?

General Haig. Yes, Senator. As a policy statement, the first citation you made would be an articulation of policy. I cannot be sure. I do
not recall an interview with the New York Times. But I have said in the past that when people refer to the Palestinians at large, they are talking about a number of factions and geographic sources and attitudes, ranging from the most benign to some who are clearly under the wing and sponsorship of the Soviet Union.

And I think that is—I hope that is how the confusion got generated. One was Palestinians per se and the other the PLO and the peace process.

Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.

General Haig. And the first one I would live by.

Senator Dodd. The first one is a policy statement?

General Haig. Yes.

Senator Dodd. Thank you.

That is all the questions I had, Mr. Chairman.

I want to compliment my fellow nutmegger, if I may say so, from Connecticut and his family. That has been a long hard 5 days for you. I think you have stood up very, very well.

I am not leaning one way or the other, General. But I will be sitting down this evening with my brother with his broken arm back here and a few other people that have been with me over the last several days. You have your brother behind you with a collar on. My brother teaches at Georgetown, but he does not wear one of those collars, at the foreign service school. By tomorrow morning I will announce my decision.

But I compliment you on the way in which you have conducted yourself in the last several days.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Dodd. I wish you a peaceful, restful, and prayerful evening. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. And I know Father Haig will be happy, either speaking as the president of a great college in West Virginia or just as a member of the clergy, to give you any advice and counsel you would like of an impartial nature. He might even have some direct words of advice.

Senator Dodd. Having received Jesuit training, Mr. Chairman, I know he would love to impress me with some Thomistic logic before the evening is out.

The CHAIRMAN. And now, as I understand it, Senator Pell has about 10 minutes, and Senator Biden 5 or 10 minutes. And to the best of my knowledge, that will complete the questioning.

I sent a letter to Senator Byrd yesterday to ask if there were any other Senators. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other Senators that do wish to ask questions. That is probably the best sounding we can give you at this moment.

I want to thank once again my distinguished colleague and dear friend Senator Pell for his help in these hearings and his constant support for an orderly procedure.

I turn to you for the final questioning.

Senator Pell. Thank you very much.
General Haig, how do you account—and I am just curious—for the difference between the views expressed by Mr. Jaworski in his book and his very glowing letter to, was it, General Klein—I think it was General Klein, that he wrote about the same time he wrote the book—and his very glowing speech about you a few weeks ago? I am just curious as to if you had a view as to the reason for the difference?

General Haig. Well, I would not presume to suggest there are too many differences, Senator. I read the book. I would take exception to parts of it. But I think the bottom line conclusions of that book are very clearly stated in the final chapters of it, and they would suggest that Mr. Jaworski holds for me the comparable high regard that I have had for him since the period I asked him to come and take on the Special Prosecutor's job—and I did that—until this date.

Senator Pell. Maybe it was just some specific comments that were in here and a more general view that he expressed later. But at this point I would like unanimous consent to insert in the record a comparison of the statements made in the book with the statements made in the speech.

Senator Helms. Without exception, so ordered.

[The document referred to follows:]

Attached is a comparison on Jaworski's views on Haig, excerpted from Jaworski's book *The Right and The Power* published in 1976 and a more recent review by Jaworski published in the *Armed Forces Journal* in 1976.

**ARMED FORCES JOURNAL**

HAIG AS A FUNCTIONAL PRESIDENT

Now let's get to more discussions of Haig: "I considered Haig, and still do, one of the unsung Watergate heroes. As Nixon became immobilized by the ordeal around him and consumed by the effort to save his job, Haig ran the White House. It is not altogether unlikely that in the final days of the Nixon Administration, Haig ran the country. He was our 37 1/4th President," the way I described it. "It may be quite a while before anyone knows the extent to which Haig became the acting President. But he's owed a debt for being the moving force in convincing Nixon to resign. I dealt with the general under circumstances that were unique; we were adversaries. At times we engaged in stern and grudging discussions. But I recognized the loyalty of an officer serving his Commander-in-Chief, and I respected him. I do not believe he ever lied to me. He drew some conclusions that were far afield, and I told him so. But he had a goal to keep his President in office, and he tried."

**THE RIGHT AND THE POWER, 1976**

More and more I was becoming convinced that Haig, not Nixon, was making the executive department of government function. The President, it appeared to me, was so enmeshed in Watergate, and spent so much time trying to get untangled from it, that he apparently had few hours left for regular business. Haig, therefore, had many jobs, not the least of which, I once mused, was trying to placate me while helping Nixon frustrate me in my efforts to move forward in the search for truth. (page 160)
HAIG CULPABILITY

I told him that in all my dealing with Haig, I knew of nothing that I thought rendered Haig culpable; that I thought that he did no more than what I would have done under those circumstances myself; and that he was free, as far as I knew, of any wrongdoing. So Stennis asked me if I would put that in writing. And I said, "Well, I wouldn't have told you this if I wasn't prepared to put it in writing, because that's my position." And so he said, "Well, would you send me a letter?" And I said, "Yes, I will." And I sent him such a letter.

HAIG'S ROLE

But Al was just a messenger boy in those instances. I think the reason [that] many are trying to scalp Al is that they just don't put his role in the proper perspective. And if you circumstance Haig—if you circumstance anybody, as Haig found himself in those days—I don't see how he could have done any differently.

"On the evening of February 28, just as I was preparing to leave my office, General Haig called. Rumors were afloat, he said, about a possible indictment and a sealed report. "Is there anything you can properly disclose to me Leon?" he asked. "Nothing about the indictment or the report," I said. "If the grand jury does make a report you should expect Judge Sirica to accept it and act on it."

"Let me ask you this," he said. "Is there any indictment involving present White House aides?" I'd need to make arrangements to meet the situation."

"Don't worry about arrangements," I said. He seemed relieved. "You're a great American Leon." (p. 119)

"Haig did say so, but the Washington grapevine throbbed with the story that Haig had been holding the administration together, and that it was he who had finally convinced Nixon that there was no benign alternative to resignation." (p. 261)
JUNE 4TH HAIG-NIXON TAPE

APJ. [Asks about some of the Nixon-Haig discussions on the Watergate tapes.]

Mr. Jaworski. No. I'll tell you what tape it was . . . it was [June 4th] when Nixon was in the Executive Office Building. Haig was already with him—Haldeman was gone, and Nixon was listening to the various tape recordings. (I mention it, I think, in the book.) And he came to the tape recording of March 21st. He had spent several hours running over these tape recordings. Steve Bull was bringing them and was taking them out. Al Haig came in—[Nixon had] sent for Haig—and so [their conversation] was very clearly on record. You see, the replaying of a tape recording made it very difficult to pick up [from the June 4th recording] what was said [on the March 21st recording]. But then here comes this very clear discussion between Haig and the President, and this was when Nixon said to Haig, "These are all right," or something like, "They're all right." He said, "If it just wasn't for that damn Mar. 21st tape recording."

And Haig just said [something like], "Oh, well, that's all right; that can be taken care of"—or something like [that]. Now some have tried to say that what Haig was doing [was] saying, "Don't worry, we'll cover that up." I don't think that's the way he put it. I think what he was saying is, "Well, I wouldn't worry about that." I've forgotten his exact words.

JUNE 23 "SMOKING GUN" TAPE

But I can tell you when this June 23rd tape recording came out—what we called the "smoking pistol"—when that one came to light, both Haig and Sinclair called me. They were both on the phone at the same time. And they were very much upset—very much perturbed. And both of them said to me, "We want you to believe us now." See, they were concerned, because they were aware of all of this—they could perhaps be implicated. So both of them had just said, "Now, we want you to believe us; we had no way of knowing that that was on them. He wasn't letting us listen; he had these recordings under his own control and was listening to them himself. And we did not know what was on this tape recording."

I told Haig I also wanted to listen to a tape of June 4, 1973, a recording of the President listening to a number of tapes he played to refresh his memory. Haig said there would be no problem. But there was a problem—with Buzhardt. He refused to let me hear the tape. He said that Haig wasn't aware of a matter or two that occurred during the playing of the tapes . . . He finally acquiesced, and I spent the better part of two days listening to the hours-long recording. The President had listened to the tapes made during early months of 1973. It was almost impossible to distinguish the words on the tapes, but the President's voice, as he listened and talked with Haig (and others) . . . was clear. The reason for Buzhardt's reluctance . . . was obvious. At one point, when the President was talking to Haig, he said, "We do have one problem—that's that damn conversation of March twenty-first. (pages 63–64)

General Haig called me at home on the morning of August 5 . . . "We didn't know it Leon," Haig said, "He didn't tell us about it. He didn't tell anyone. St. Clair and I have been pushing him to come out with a statement saying he was the only one who knew about it . . ." Haig said "I'm particularly anxious that you believe me, Leon. I didn't know what was in those conversations."

The President's statement did "clear" Haig and St. Clair, as they told me it would. (pp. 248, 249, 258)
HAIG’S SUPREME COURT REFERENCE

I want to tell you what I’ve heard [about] the only thing that Al didn’t like. And this is according to somebody who knows Al well and who knows me. He said Al was embarrassed and didn’t like my reference in my book to the fact that he had said to me, before I accepted the job: “You know, you’re very high on the list for appointment to the Supreme Court.” Al did say that. And it was just a part of Al’s maneuver, you see. But I don’t think there’s anything...now, it’s a little embarrassing to Al, because it looks like... See, they had said that to others, you know, once or twice. But it’s just a part of what happened and it’s a part of my not having to say that I wasn’t impressed by it. Because I didn’t care anything about sitting on the Supreme Court, and never had. And if Al had known that, he wouldn’t have said it. But to me, it was just words wasted.

EILLSBERG AND NATIONAL SECURITY

AFJ. I guess the most surprising thing to me is Al’s suggestion that the Fielding break-in was so sensitive because of national security affairs...

Mr. Jaworski. I don’t know how much of that he fully understood. The one thing you must remember is that we have to make allowance for Al being terribly sensitive to ideas of national security, because of his own background, his work with Kissinger, and so on.

THE 18½ MINUTE GAP

AFJ. Could I ask a question [about] the 18½ minute gap—at one point in your book you tell about Haig’s so-called “devil theory,” some “sinister force?”

Mr. Jaworski. Sinister force, yes. He was in Sirica’s court, and he testified, “I don’t have any idea who did it.” He said, “Maybe some sinister force.” Well, this is Al’s humor, you see; oh, he didn’t mean that seriously, no! The trouble was that Sirica stepped in and said something: “Do you have idea who that sinister force may have been?” or something like that. Well, Al meant it just as a “side-bar” remark, I think. That’s my construction of it.

“Your name cropped up around the country,” he said with a warm and friendly smile, “and the suggestion that you serve as Special Prosecutor was virtually unanimous.” He talked on for a while in this vein, charming me, and then said, almost as an afterthought, “You’re highly regarded and it’s no secret that you’re high on the list for appointment to the Supreme Court.” I suppressed a smile. The remark could have been part flattery, part fact, but I suspected it was all bait. (pages 4, 5)

Haig was at his persuasive best. I listened...the national security matters he described didn’t appear to be very grave to me... Haig and Buzhardt moved directly to the Fielding break-in. Daniel Ellsberg had taken the Pentagon Papers and released them. (They) had a hearing on the country’s international affairs and thus security. Therefore it was a matter of national security to break into Dr. Fielding’s office to obtain more information on Ellsberg. (pp. 27 and 28)

During the hearing several possible causes of the gap were offered by the White House. The most interesting was advanced by Haig, who facetiously remarked that he and White House lawyers had discussed the possibility that “perhaps some sinister force had come in and applied the other energy source and taken care of the information on the tape...” Reporters referred to this as Haig ‘devil theory.’ Taking the remark at face value, Judge Sirica asked Haig if he had any idea who the sinister force was. Haig said no. (page 34)
HAIG AND MARCH 21 NIXON TAPE

Mr. Jaworski. That whole thing, I remember so clearly, step by step. Because to me this was one of the very important crises, one of the turning points in the whole affair of Watergate. I was getting ready to go home for the Christmas holiday, and I told Al, "Now, in my judgment, having listened carefully to this recording of March the 21st, I think that Nixon is criminally culpable. My advice to you is to get the very best outside counsel. Don’t listen to your counsel here at the White House. Get the finest criminal lawyer in the whole country. Submit it to him, and then see what he says."

AFJ. Yet, he didn’t.

Mr. Jaworski. Well, by the time I got home the telephone was ringing. It was Al, and he said, "I’ve done what you’ve told me to." And then he tried to discuss with me the legal aspects of it which Buzhardt and somebody else had planted in his mind there at the White House, and that was that there was no overt act that really followed up on that. And I said, "Al, where did you get this advice from?" And he said, "Oh, Buzhardt and Powers." And I said, "Oh Lord, they’re not criminal lawyers to begin with. And in the next place, get your outside counsel. That’s what I encouraged you to get." I was really, very disappointed. Now he may have good reasons why he didn’t get outside counsel. I don’t know what all the discussions were, but the fact remains that he didn’t get it.

AFJ. There are various summaries of Al’s “dastardly conduct” during the final days—his culpability in trying at whatever cost to save President Nixon; his blind dedication to the man who made him a four star general. And then, on the other side, there are those who, to oversimplify it, would say, "Al Haig is the man who saved the Republic." How would you summarize his role?

Mr. Jaworski. It’s a little hard to say. I find myself not at either of the extremes, of course. I don’t know about Al having “saved the Republic.” I don’t know, the matter was so serious at that time that—along with others, but as one who knew the situation half as well as anyone else—I was tremendously relieved that the President resigned, very much relieved. What the eventualities would have been had he not resigned, I just don’t know, except that he would have gone out in some fashion or another.

It was December 21 and I was going home for a few days, but Haig called. We met in the Map Room . . . We began talking about the tapes, the March 21 tape in particular, and Haig said it was terrible beyond description. I told him it was unbelievable. But, Haig said, the White House lawyers had told him there was no criminal offense involved as far as the President was concerned. I shook my head. I can’t agree. Al. Based on what I heard—and what we already knew—I’m afraid the President engaged in criminal conduct.”

I had barely arrived in Houston before Haig was on the phone. He said he had reviewed the contents of the March 21 tape again. He said he had talked with lawyers, as I had strongly urged. "We’re convinced there’s no criminality involved . . . " “Who were the lawyers Al?” He said Fred Buzhardt and Samuel Powers . . . I considered Powers an able civil lawyer. “That’s not what I suggested” I said, “I think you should get the best possible advice—from outside the White House. Someone whose forte is criminal law.” He indicated he was satisfied, and I said, it’s your problem, Al. and I hope you’re right.” (pp. 60–62)

HAIG’S ROLE IN RETROSPECT

AFJ. There are various summaries of Al’s “dastardly conduct” during the final days—his culpability in trying at whatever cost to save President Nixon; his blind dedication to the man who made him a four star general. And then, on the other side, there are those who, to oversimplify it, would say, “Al Haig is the man who saved the Republic.” How would you summarize his role?

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Haig said the resignation speech would be short, that it would not be rancorous, that Nixon would express appreciation to those who had supported him and assure those who had opposed him he held no animosity for them. “Are you going to stay on and help Ford?” I asked. “Yes but I don’t know how long. Certainly a number of weeks.” The conversation was near its end so I asked Haig if congressional supporters were going to pass a resolution that would, in effect, tell me not to move against him (i.e., Nixon). Oh yes! I think it will be passed within a day or two. With no difficulty.” . . . Watching him (Nixon) on television, listening to him, I remembered how firmly Haig had spoken when he had said that Congress would pass a resolution to halt any proceeding against Nixon. Not after this speech, Al, I thought. He hasn’t even given Congress a crumb of remorse to chew on. (pages 261, 262, 263, 264)
Senator Pell. And on another subject, in your war college thesis some years ago, a case study of Britain's use of force in the 1956 Suez crisis, you concluded that Great Britain, when judged by the traditional Western standards, particularly those embodied within the U.N. Charter, was, quote—

Legally, politically and morally culpable in its adoption of force in response to Egypt's provocation. However, when viewed in the broader context, Suez, like so many instances in the Cold War, confirms that traditional political, legal and moral standards of international conduct are incompatible with the realities of Communist historical determinism.

In this regard, is it your view that Communist adventurism around the world sort of relieves us of adhering to a policy in accordance with the fundamental premises upon which our society is built? In other words, do two wrongs make a right?

General Haig. Senator, first, may I make a comment? I am just delighted that you have had an opportunity to read that thesis, written some 15 years ago. And I was never even sure my proctor read it.

Senator Pell. I did not read it before, either.

General Haig. I am really delighted.

I must say, I do not think I would have changed my observation there, and I do not know that I would in the period ahead, that there are exceptions when the letter of the law—and I am talking international law and the laws of other states—might be in some contrast to the performance of the Soviet Union, you know, in an international sense, which has certainly moved historically in sharp contradiction to whatever existing body of international law we had and certainly the mores that accompany that.

If we were to equate that as an observation—not as a value judgment—it can result in some serious problems for us; and so that is really one of the things I am suggesting today, that we have got to start to hold the Soviet Union to higher standards of international behavior, more in line.

But I would not interpret what I have said as a suggestion on my part that we enter into violations of law, but rather insist that the other participant in the world community of such importance start to do so.

Senator Pell. But if the other participant is a bad fellow and he is not willing to raise his standards, do you think then we should lower ours?

General Haig. No; not at all.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Now, on another subject, General Haig—this is one we have touched on, too, this morning, I think—on January 9 you discussed, in a discussion of nuclear superiority with Senator Hart—you said that in general you agreed we should not pursue a policy of nuclear superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And then on January 12, in responding to a similar question from Senator Cranston, you said that together with our allies we have got to be unquestionably superior in the broadest sense of that term.

Then this morning we touched on this subject also, and I am left a little confused. Could you clarify kind of simply for us whether the United States alone or the United States and its allies should seek nuclear superiority, or are we content with equality on the basis of the United States and its allies or just the United States?
My own preference, as you know, is I believe we should be in equality. But I am much more interested in your views, knowing mine.

General Haig. Well, it is clearly a very difficult question to answer because of its complexity, because it involves not only our defense resources but those of our allies, because it involves an interrelationship between conventional, regional nuclear, and central strategic systems, to which three of our allies contribute; and because I am very sensitive to avoiding in this forum what has now become, let's say, viscerally related terms, whether it be No. 1 or superiority.

And every time these terms are used they generate a counterproductive debate all their own. I have tried to avoid that, I think for constructive reasons, not because I am trying to be less than clear.

I think adequacy in the sense of our ability to assure ourselves of a guaranteed unacceptable response in the nuclear area to a Soviet first strike, which leaves us with residual capabilities, to be a fundamental, a fundamental disincentive to the Soviets to ever consider such an option. I would reject, for example, the thesis that visualized a strike a warning, a counterstrike on warning, which would be an essential aspect of mutual assured destruction capability.

Senator Pell. Thank you very much.

Senator Helms. Senator Biden?

Senator Biden. General, will the maintenance of Yugoslavian independence and nonalinement be a U.S. policy objective in the administration of Ronald Reagan?

General Haig. If I have any voice in that policy, it would indeed be that, Senator.

Senator Biden. Could you share with us your thoughts on how we could best accomplish achieving that policy, that is, a policy of independence and nonalinement of Yugoslavia?

General Haig. In large measure that is going to be the consequence of the policies and actions of the people of Yugoslavia and its incumbent leaders. I think it is vitally important for us to make it clear to the Soviet Union that interventionism to bring about change, either by indirect or direct means, is an unacceptable course of action to the Western World.

What the consequences of that would be are similar, in my view, to what would occur if the Soviets were to move on Poland.

Senator Biden. General, you indicated that you think that the Secretary of State should not engage on partisan politics. Would it be your intention to participate in fundraising events and political events of either political party? [Laughter.]

General Haig. I suppose that is a bipartisan question.

Senator Biden. Yes. Yes; it is. But I would like you to cover all of the parties in your answer.

General Haig. I tried to avoid this when I was in the NSC and did. I even tried to avoid it when I was chief of staff at the White House, because of the peculiar circumstances of my incumbency there.

Senator Biden. It would have been a little hard raising funds in those days, too.

General Haig. Well, it was a dicey game, yes.

I do not visualize engaging in that kind of activity. But it is clear, as a member of the President's Cabinet, that there will be a number
of occasions when I will—I could see myself in forums that were highly political. But I do not intend myself to engage in political activities.

Senator Biden. For example, doing fundraisers for Senators and Congressmen; do you picture yourself doing those things? I ask the question because it was an issue with Secretary Vance, and he resolved it by setting a firm policy of not doing that.

General Haig. I would love to set that policy and I would hope to live by such a policy.

Senator Biden. I am trying to help you here, General.

General Haig. Now, in a personal sense it is a very comfortable policy.

Senator Biden. I can save you a lot of trips to North Carolina. [Laughter.]

Or Georgia or anyplace.

You know, General Marshall, whom you have cited several times, even had a policy of going so far as rejecting invitations to Democratic fundraising dinners, Democratic dinners.

Would you envision extending your policies as going that far with regard to the Republican Party?

General Haig. It would depend upon the nature of it.

Senator Biden. And on the price of the ticket?

General Haig. Well, certainly that.

Senator Biden. I think I have probably gone as far as it is worth going there.

General, I was going to get into the question which is the one that still troubles me. But I guess the only way to do it is to go back and review the record tonight and review your statements. And it was brought to mind again by the comment made in the question and answer period with you and Senator Pell a moment ago, as to whether or not you make the distinction between adherence to international law and adherence to U.S. constitutional law, U.S. statutes.

I for one could see a circumstance where you as a Secretary of State potentially would have to recommend to the President of the United States in a matter of vital national interests that international law be violated. I could live with that if that were your answer. I would have real trouble, as a matter of fact I could not possibly live with an answer that said you could envision saying to the President of the United States that there is a need in the national interest to violate the Constitution. I do not think that that is a Jesuit autolog I am constructing here.

General Haig. Well, Senator, let me say, to save you the burden of going back through the record, I was very explicit on that earlier, and that is to say that I myself could not live with a recommendation that violated U.S. law.

Senator Biden. Well, I know you said that. But then when you said to Senator Pell, as I understood it, you did not think you could recommend or see where vital interests might overtake international law, I quite frankly did not believe you.

General Haig. I hope that is not the impression you gained from my answer to that question.

Senator Biden. Well, let us take 2 minutes and go back to it. Your War College thesis indicated that the British had clearly violated
international law, the U.N. Charter, but because of overriding international events—that is, communism and its global impact—the British were justified in acting in a way that exceeded stated or existing international law.

I thought that was the thesis of your thesis.

General Haig. Not really.

Senator Biden. No?

General Haig. I think this is so long ago.

Senator Biden. Why do I not just give it one shot out here:

However, when viewed in this broader context, Suez, like so many incidents in the cold war, confirms that traditional legal, political and moral standards of international conduct are incompatible with the realities of Communist historical determinism as they apply in the nuclear age.

That Western statesmen have remained confused and befuddled by the Soviet dialectic in foreign affairs is evidenced by the disastrous.

And then it goes on. But anyway—

General Haig. And I would stand by that today, although I do not necessarily stand by things that I have written 16 to 17 years ago in today’s environment. But really, in that instance, I would not change it. I think it says what I mean.

Senator Biden. I think it does, too. But let me read the statement, not as you wrote it, but I am going to edit it in a way that would scare the living hell out of me. Let us say it said:

However, viewed in this broader context, Watergate, like so many other instances in domestic American politics, confirms that traditional legal, political and moral standards of national conduct are incompatible with the realities of the power of the President, the responsibility of the office of the Presidency and the great power that is held at that level. Period.

General Haig. I could not conceive of writing such a thing 16 years ago or today, Senator.

Senator Biden. Well, you must admit that we are making a distinction, then. We are making a distinction that it is consistent on occasion to reject international law, but it is never warranted to reject constitutional law.

General Haig. Yes. And I think you reject international law under only the most unusual circumstances.

Senator Biden. I am not trying to put you in a trap.

General Haig. What I prefer to do, as I think I answered Senator Pell, was to raise the standard of conduct of the Soviet Union to meet international law.

Senator Biden. But in international law you are acknowledging that there is a possibility of an exception.

General Haig. It is a very imperfect body of laws in the first place.

Senator Biden. Now, in domestic law—please think of the answer—in domestic law you are not acknowledging the prospect of any exception, are you?

General Haig. Not that would be appropriate or legal, no.

Senator Biden. I think I will stop there.

General Haig. No.

Senator Biden. Thanks.

Senator Pell. I would add, if the Senator would excuse me, that in answer to my question earlier the General said that, while he would attempt to raise the opponent to our level, he said his tendency would
be for us to continue to practice and follow international law. Is my recollection correct?

General Haig. Yes. But let me just raise an issue on this. This body, this Congress, in its recent deliberations and in the established procedures with the Senate Intelligence Committee visualizes approved covert activity.

Senator Biden. That is the point I am trying to make, General. And that is why it is so important that I, for me at least, put that on the record. I happen to disagree with Senator Pell and what I thought your answer to Senator Pell was. If the opponent steps so low, I can picture stepping as low.

Now that is me. I am an imperfect human being. I can picture that happening.

General Haig. I did not agree with—I did not interpret it that way. But I agree with both of you, Senator.

[Laughter.]

Senator Biden. General, you have created more of a problem for me than any nominee that has ever come forward, in order for me to reach a conclusion as to vote for or against you.

And I am not going to say any more. I will yield the floor.

Senator Helm. Senator Biden.

Senator Zorinsky? Senator Biden.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have nothing to add other than to thank General Haig for his patience with our committee. He has undergone a most strenuous few days of interrogation before this committee, and I certainly feel that he will be a tremendous asset in his position as Secretary of State for the United States of America.

And I would like to thank also the chairman of the committee and the ranking minority member for the excellent manner in which they have conducted these hearings. All of us have had ample opportunity to ask questions of the witness. And I, for one, want to show the respect I think is due to the leadership of this committee for, under very trying circumstances, delivering to the American people an openness in this hearing I believe is without precedent.

Thank you.

Senator Helm. Senator Pell?

Senator Pell. I have one question, Mr. Chairman. And that is, Do you believe that the present stalemate in Cyprus damages the United States and NATO security interests in the eastern Mediterranean and how would you resolve that problem?

General Haig. I think first and foremost it is both the obligation and the responsibility of the parties, Senator. And I think our role should be, together with our Western allies, who are equally concerned, to create the climate which would contribute to that kind of meeting of the minds, and I am optimistic that it will occur.

Senator Pell. Do you think it is interference if we withdraw assistance? I remember when I was opposing the junta in Greece 14 years ago. The administration at the time said it would be interference when I suggested we stop sending them weapons. And we reached sort of an "Alice in Wonderland" state, where we considered it interference if we stop a military aid program.

In this case, are we interfering if we embargo weapons for Turkey that are being used in the occupation of Cyprus? It would seem to me
that that is not interfering; it is stopping sending weapons that we have been gratuitously sending.

General Haig. Well, I have such a long history of a strong viewpoint on this subject. As you know, as NATO commander, I repeatedly returned to Washington to urge a lifting of the embargo, which I felt was self-defeating. I felt it was self-defeating because I felt the very act of it was making more intractable the progress we were seeking. And I think I was right, because we did manage to get Greece back into the integrated command despite the fact that we have offered substantial help to Turkey.

I do not mean to suggest by that that these are easy problems. I always think they are best solved in an atmosphere of respect and sensitivity, and not coercion and Washington-created departures from anticipated policy.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Senator Helms. Senator Cranston?

Senator Cranston. I have nothing further.

Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, the distinguished chairman of this committee will be back momentarily. But before he returns, I want to say to you, sir, that you made an impressive appearance here under sometimes difficult circumstances. You had a varied career. You have been a doer, and that is not always conducive to comfort when you are confronted with a confirmation proceeding.

But out of this I believe you have disclosed yourself to the American people as a man who loves this country and is dedicated to it and its principles. And I, for one, have great confidence in you. You are going to make a fine Secretary of State.

I hope you will surround yourself with associates who believe as you believe, who cling to the principle which you have enunciated clearly here today, because a signal is being sent around this world that there will be something of a redirection of American foreign policy. And I think the American people on November 4 have indicated a wish for that.

But in any case, Mr. Secretary, I look forward to working with you as a member of this committee. And I compliment you on the way that you have conducted yourself during these hearings.

I now return the gavel to the distinguished chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Helms, and I concur with your comments completely.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record of the hearing a letter from Ken Rush, a former Ambassador and also a distinguished industrialist, and a longtime friend who is very knowledgeable about General Haig. And also a statement from the Coalition for Human Priorities.

General Haig, we are going to conclude with your comments. But I would just simply like to say that I began these hearings with a feeling of strong support for you based on everything I have known about you. I left my mind totally open, because the whole purpose of the hearing is to draw everything out that possibly can be drawn out.

I leave the hearings now at this stage with an absolutely firm conviction and enthusiasm for your nomination. I commend President-elect Reagan for his selection. I think at these times of our national history, you are uniquely qualified and endowed with all of the attributes and
characteristics necessary to stand side by side with the President of the United States in developing a foreign policy for this country that assures the future safety and well-being of every American and every person living in the free world.

I asked the staff to research how long other hearings have taken for Secretaries of State. I did say to President-elect Reagan when he made his selection that I fully supported you, based on everything I knew, but I realized this hearing might be somewhat longer than even he might anticipate.

John Foster Dulles, 1 day of open hearings; Christian Herter, 1 day of open hearings; Dean Rusk, 1 day of open hearings; William Rogers, 1 day of closed hearings; Henry Kissinger, 12 hours of open hearings, 9½ hours of closed hearings; Cy Vance, one informal committee meeting and 1 day of open hearings; Ed Muskie, 1 day open hearings.

General Al Haig, taking into account 2 hours and 15 minutes this afternoon, 32 hours and 15 minutes; over 28 hours in open session, 4 hours in closed session. That is 5 days and 1 fairly long evening.

There were, obviously, as I said in my opening statement there would be, questions asked of you other than foreign policy questions. But the hearings, as I look back on them, have primarily been devoted to the economic, military, and political challenges faced by the United States of America today.

So we thank you for your patience, for your indulgence. All of us, even those of us that have known you, have come to know you much better than we have ever in the past. The time has been well spent.

You have, as one of our colleagues said, learned more of what our concerns are. We have learned a great deal about your concerns. John Foster Dulles once said to me that the foreign policy of this country is never any better than the understanding and support given it ultimately by the people.

I think this country is much more knowledgeable now on many of these crucial issues as a result of the way that you have discussed many of these problems and explained the positions that you would take. You have shown the willingness to be flexible and adjust those policies as circumstances change and to work with the Congress and, obviously, the President of the United States in developing them.

We thank you very, very much, indeed. And we will be pleased now to hear any concluding comments that you would like to make.

General Haig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, did you wish to say anything in conclusion? Excuse me.

Senator Pell. Well, I guess I had better.

I wish you well and I think you have conducted yourself in an excellent manner, with considerable although not complete restraint, and with tremendous intelligence. And you have proved to be a very skillful witness indeed.

And as Senator Percy says, our Chairman says, I think we have gained by knowing you. And if you are confirmed, we look forward very much to working with you, those who vote against you and those who vote with you. Both will be wanting to work with you.
General Haig. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman, let me make a brief comment of my own about the past 5 days of hearings. This has been an extraordinary experience for me, a special education for me. I have learned a great deal about the thinking of the individual members of this committee.

The variety of views expressed attests to the very complexity of the problems we face, for we all share the same objectives: a strong America, working with honor and grace to fulfill its global responsibility.

There have been some sharp exchanges and there are sincerely held differences. I considered it my duty to set forth my views with candor, just as the members of this committee have expressed their views. I hope that our exchanges in the future will always be as candid if I am confirmed by the committee. I pledge, for my part, to assure that.

I chose the problems we face very carefully, using that term, because above all, the lessons of these hearings and the experiences and the laws of the past decade make clear that the Congress and the Executive must talk and think and act together in foreign policy. And I believe our Nation will be the stronger because of the decision to share these complex responsibilities.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me state that these hearings represent what is great about our Nation, the institution of the Senate, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee itself. The few clashes that occurred should not obscure, either among our own people or the nations of the world, the fact that we cherish the same values, share the same goals, and most importantly, that we leave this room better equipped to work together to preserve those values and achieve those goals than when we entered this room.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add one thought here. I hope that peace would also be a worthy objective, that not only will you be Secretary of State, but that you have the responsibility as well as secretary for peace. And we hope that, recognizing your background and your thoughts, you still think peace should be added to our objectives.

General Haig. Absolutely.

The Chairman. I am certain that that amendment is accepted.

In accordance with the unanimous-consent request, we will meet in this room tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. The chairman will recognize any member that wishes to make any comments at that particular time.

We will then proceed, hopefully, to begin the vote at 10 o’clock. But in accordance with the unanimous-consent request, if there are still Senators to make comments, we will then vote no later than 10:15, and then proceed immediately to the confirmation hearing of Dr. Kirkpatrick, nominated by the President to be our U.S. representative to the United Nations.

If there is no further business, these meetings are now recessed.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the committee was recessed.]
NOMINATION OF ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.,
TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m., in room 1202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. I couldn't help but think, driving in this morning, how a half an inch or a quarter of an inch of snow in Washington seems to cripple the city. We don't get crippled in Chicago until it has reached about 7 feet in the drifts. When it did reach 7 feet in the drifts a few years ago, the Democratic candidate for mayor, Bilandic, was defeated in the primary because of the snowfall.

We may not have a quorum here for a while. Senator Boschwitz has called me. He is back at home. He has made two attempts to get on the freeway, and he is simply unable to—the traffic is totally immobilized. So he is going to try to get here, but he has given me a proxy in case he does not. I think we will have enough by the time we make our statements, but no one has to feel hurried in making their statements. This will be a planned bipartisan filibuster in order to gain a little time so that our colleagues can get in.

As you know, Senator Baker is in the hospital, but he has requested that his closing statement be inserted in the record. Without objection, it will be inserted at this point.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your allowing me to submit for the record a closing statement on the nomination of Alexander Haig to be the Secretary of State. I deeply regret that I was unable to attend the hearings this week, but should add that I have followed them closely to the extent permitted by the situation.

As the hearings have progressed and the views of General Haig have been fully and thoroughly explored, my initial judgment that Alexander Haig is to become a historic Secretary of State has been strengthened and reinforced. I look forward with great anticipation to working with him in the fulfillment of our respective Constitutional roles in the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States.

I would like to commend the Chairman, Senator Percy, for his leadership and guidance during this initial and extremely important test of the ability of the Committee to work together in a spirit of cooperation and common purpose. Finally, I would commend the Committee. These hearings, which held the potential for great divisiveness, were conducted in the best and finest tradition of
the Committee. It is my firm belief that the Senate, the Secretary, and the nation have benefited thereby.

The Chairman. I take great pleasure in calling first upon Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as I said 6 days ago, I entered these hearings with a completely open mind. But I also said I had very real concerns about General Haig which would have to be allayed before I could vote to confirm him as Secretary of State.

This nomination has been the most controversial one I have seen in the past 16 years I have been on this committee. The primary reason that it has been so controversial is that General Haig was present at some of the most distasteful episodes in our Nation's history. In this connection, members of both parties represented on this committee have agreed that General Haig's past activities could be relevant in deciding how he might perform his duties as Secretary of State.

* * * strong, consistent foreign policy, as I am sure he will, he and President Reagan will be able to say, as President Carter is, that not a single American has been killed in combat.

The Chairman. Senator Pell, I would like particularly to comment on your statement. I know from our initial discussions the concerns that you expressed privately to me, and the way you have articulated openly those concerns. I think that as General Haig concluded yesterday this process really works. These hearings, though long, extensive and thorough, have proven their great value and the value of the process of advise and consent. And I think the conclusion that you have reached is absolutely right. But on the other hand, you have expressed your reservations, and certainly General Haig as Secretary of State will be well aware of those as he will be meeting with us many, many times, and you will have an opportunity to continue that questioning.

But I congratulate you on your decision, sir.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I will not repeat my comments of yesterday. I do agree with you that the process that has been followed here in the long run will prove beneficial to our country and to Secretary Haig as well in the conduct of his affairs.

And I think the compelling aspect of these hearings is that General Haig emerges with, I think, the respect of all members of this committee, including those who may not vote for him.

I think this has been a beneficial process, and I for one am grateful to the members of the minority for not only pressing their inquiry, because that is part of the system, but for the manner in which they did it. There have been comments about abrasiveness. I think that has been held to a minimum considering the nature of the inquiry. And I think the committee has performed admirably. And again, I want to pay my respects to the minority, and I certainly want to pay my respects to the distinguished chairman of this committee and to General Haig.

The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Helms, and thank you for the tower of strength you have been and for the position you have
taken in the absence of Senator Baker as second ranking member of
the majority.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I will vote to confirm Alexander Haig. At the outset
I anticipated that I would vote no. One by one, most, but not all of my
questions about General Haig began to be resolved. I was tempted at
one stage to tear a leaf from the general's book. When he testified on
SALT last year, he said he would refuse to vote either "yes" or "no"
on the treaty if he was a Senator until all the facts were in. I con-
sidered following that same course as it became clear that—courtesy of
Richard Nixon—all the facts would not be in when the roll was called
on Alexander Haig.

As more of my doubts were resolved, however, I decided that Gen-
eral Haig's choice of a word to describe what America's objective
should be in nuclear capability offered an appropriate standard for
assessing his own qualifications to be Secretary of State and that
word is "sufficiency." I believe there is a sufficiency of evidence on the
basis of the hearing record to indicate that General Haig can be an
able and effective Secretary of State. Indeed, despite some lingering
uncertainties, I believe that Alexander Haig could be a truly great
Secretary of State.

I found his closing statement reassuring, particularly on the issues
of the abuse of power, the role of Congress in foreign affairs, and the
supremacy of our Constitution and our laws.

I will vote for Alexander Haig for an additional reason. A unani-
mosous vote for him is neither possible nor, I think, desirable in view
of all the circumstances. However, since the fact is that he will be our
Secretary of State, and that this hearing in its entirety justifies that
fact, it is important in my view that he take office with a showing of
strong and bipartisan support.

This will help General Haig to be the strong and effective Secretary
of State we all want him to be. And at the outset, it will help him meet
a goal he expressed in his final words to us, that the clashes that oc-
curred in the course of the hearings should not obscure the fact, either
among our own peoples or the nations of the world, whether friends
or adversaries, that the members of this committee and General Haig
share the same objectives: a strong America working with honor and
with grace to fulfill its global responsibilities.

I wish Secretary of State Alexander Haig well. He has my support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I would like to
just address a comment to you as assistant minority leader. On behalf
of this committee I have asked the majority leader to schedule all
of the noncontroversial confirmations enbloc; it takes unanimous con-
sent to do it. I understand that there will be objection to that. There-
fore there probably will be a vote on each individual nominee
separately.

The session will be limited in time, obviously, on the inaugural day,
but I have asked that because of the representations I have made to
this committee, and that other members have made, that it is more
urgent that we have a Secretary of State in place than any other
Cabinet official. We hope that the Secretary of State nominee be
then the next one that would be laid down on Tuesday, but the
length of time that would be required would mean that there probably could not be a vote on it until Wednesday. I would very much appreciate your discussing that with Senator Byrd. I had hoped that Senator Byrd, having expressed some reservations about the nomination, would have wanted to come over to question the witness, and he was, of course, cordially welcome to do that.

I trust that maybe the thoroughness of this hearing has answered some of the questions, hopefully all of the questions that Senator Byrd might have had. We do deeply respect his judgment, and he will be an important factor, of course, in this.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I did meet with the Minority Leader Senator Robert Byrd last night. I told him where I thought I was headed, although I had not yet made my final decision at that time, but I told him what my thinking was. I do not know what his own decision will be. I will do all I can to work with him and others to expedite action on the nomination, and I think we should be able to complete it Wednesday if not Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. I can assure the distinguished Senator it will not be done on Tuesday, not because of the minority. There is one Senator on the majority side who has indicated that he would like to talk a maximum of 2 hours, but that 2 hours alone would preclude action on Tuesday.

So it will not be the minority who will hold it up, but I think in this case, 24 hours, with the reasonable assurance of a vote on Wednesday, will not harm the Republic.

And I thank my distinguished colleague for his comments and for his total cooperation throughout the course of these hearings.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

And thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for the bipartisan manner in which you have guided.

The CHAIRMAN. And now the junior Senator from California, a very distinguished member of this panel, the Chairman of the East Asia Subcommittee, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Chairman, may I say that as a semanticist I have been disturbed by the extraordinary redundancy of ideas presented before not only this committee but before the body of the Senate as a whole, and therefore I feel that everything, almost everything that is necessary to be said I have already said, and others have said.

I have said that General Haig has struck me as a gentleman and a soldier and a diplomat, fully qualified for the position of Secretary of State. He himself has said that he held the Office of the Presidency rather than any particular President in great reverence, and acted to protect that Presidency.

I have been convinced that he acted with honor and dedication to that purpose, and I have had no hesitation whatsoever in declaring my full support for him and his appointment as Secretary of State.

I intend to vote for him.

I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Sarbanes, you are next in recognition, unless you would prefer to have someone else go ahead.

Senator SARBANES. I will defer for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Over the past 5 days, the Committee on Foreign Relations has conducted what the chairman very accurately pointed out on the basis of research as the most extensive hearings in modern history for a President's nominee to be Secretary of State. The hearings have been informative, exhaustive, and I believe very fair.

On November 4, 1980, the American people elected a President of the United States. That President should have the opportunity to choose the men and women he wants to serve with him in high office. It is the duty of this committee and the full Senate, to determine whether his nominee is fit to serve as Secretary of State.

Before beginning this process I set out for myself three broad areas that I thought deserved examination. The areas I believed must be considered were: One, the nominee's positions on substantive foreign policy issues this country faces; two, his past experience; and three, his understanding of our constitutional form of government and the role of the legislative branch in foreign affairs.

I would like to go through each one of these areas very briefly.

One, in substantive foreign policy views, during these hearings we have discussed a broad range of issues and foreign policy objectives. These have included nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, relations with Latin American nations and Africa, and United States-Soviet relations, among others. And while I have noticed significant differences between the nominee's positions and my views, I do not feel that those differences warrant a vote against his nomination.

No. 2, his past experience, General Haig has served in powerful positions in Government before. He was the White House Chief of Staff in the final days of the Nixon administration, he served as Assistant to the President's National Security Adviser, and as the military assistant to the Assistant for National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Such controversial events as Watergate, the secret bombing of Cambodia, and the covert operations in Chile took place when he held those high offices.

This Committee has examined to the extent possible the record of those events, including General Haig's sworn testimony, which he voluntarily gave, and has found no concrete evidence of any illegal or unethical actions on General Haig's part.

We have attempted to collect other documentation, including the so-called Watergate tapes, but unfortunately we have been unsuccessful. I am disturbed by the fact that we will not have the opportunity to review these materials before we come to a decision this morning. However, we have no choice but to vote without reviewing the documents and tapes we as a committee sought.

General Haig in sworn testimony has assured us he has never taken any action which would make him unfit to assume the duties of Secretary of State, and I accept that assurance.

No. 3, understanding of the Constitution and the role of the legislative branch. We have also discussed General Haig's understanding of the constitutional role of Congress in foreign affairs. As a committee and as a Congress we must know that we will be given the critical information on Executive decisions and other matters which we will need to fulfill our responsibilities. To be frank, on many occasions during these hearings over the past 5 days, I wished that General Haig
had been more forthright in answering our concerns on this issue in light of his past experience. However, General Haig has assured us that he will comply with both the spirit and the letter of our laws, and that he will make it a special point to consult with Congress on foreign policy matters.

General Haig has proven he is a man of remarkable ability, intelligence, and experience. Concerns I have expressed today and during the hearings do not, however, override our Nation's need for a Secretary of State.

Mr. Chairman, I will vote to confirm the nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to be our Secretary of State, and I thank you again and repeat the comments I made yesterday for your fine leadership of these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, we thank you very much indeed not only for the conclusion you have reached, but for the immense contribution that you have made to these hearings. We value you as a member, and we look forward to many, many years of close association in this committee.

Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I now recognize the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret that I had to miss a couple of days of this most interesting hearing. There certainly has never been any doubt of my support for General Haig and my intention to vote for his confirmation.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that General Haig has been a most impressive witness in his own behalf and has given us a far-ranging view of the skills that he will bring to his role as Secretary of State.

While the immediate end of these hearings is to make a decision on confirmation, I think that they have a more organic importance in that they begin the continuing cultivation of views from which our foreign policies will grow.

I think a statement of President Kennedy's regarding consultation is worth remembering. In many ways this is an exercise that we have been conducting, or starting, which I think will continue. President Kennedy said:

Consultation does not always, regardless of how long it may go on, does not always provide unanimity at the end of the consultation. But there is a more precise understanding of those areas where there is agreement, and there is a more precise understanding of the reasons for positions which may be taken on which there is no agreement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a pleasure to be a part of this very important hearing on this internationally significant confirmation.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum, I thank you very much, and I must say in your case, if you don't mind my saying, while you were thinking about a decision to join this committee, I lobbied about as hard as I could lobby for anyone to come on this committee because I felt your point of view is terribly important. I think it important simply because of the power of your intellect, but also because there is no question but what the women of this country have uppermost in their minds, if there is any difference in the two, women outstandingly want peace and are willing to work for peace, and I think you repre-
sent more than half the Nation in that respect, in that unique opportunity to have to give voice to their deep desire to have a world of peace, but also peace with honor. And I think that is what we want to achieve.

Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, this nomination confronts me, as I assume it does many others in this committee, with a choice between my hopes and my fears. No one disputes that General Haig is an intelligent, experienced, forceful, and loyal American. I congratulate him on his unflagging stamina, his consistency of effort, and his very prodigious memory.

We recognized before these hearings began that we had an experienced man in the area of foreign policy. We were aware that he possessed great loyalty to his superiors, and that he exhibited qualities of leadership to those with whom he had a command relationship.

Unfortunately, even though he has demonstrated these qualities, there remains, I believe, an element of doubt. I still have unallayed and significant fears about how he would conduct himself in an office that wields such power and influence.

Coming into these hearings, I feared that General Haig might display a predisposition to choose obedience over independent judgment, and I confess that he still has not entirely relieved that anxiety.

General Haig served in important positions during his career and during the crises in Vietnam and Watergate. He appears to have displayed, in my opinion, a troubling insensitivity to many of the moral, legal, and constitutional issues involved. His repeated refusals to assess his own past performance with an appropriate degree of self-criticism leads me to fear that he does not sufficiently appreciate the ever-present dangers of the abuse of power. General Haig’s demeanor is one of unusual self-confidence and certitude, and I am slightly concerned that these qualities may make it difficult for him to conduct what he himself told us should be, and I quote, “active consultation” with the Congress.

My fears, I must admit, are not proofs of disqualification, nor are they confident predictions of how he may perform in office. They are concerns I feel explain why this is the single most difficult decision on any nominee that I have had to cast a vote on in 8 years, including membership on the Judiciary Committee where literally hundreds of judges have come before us.

But the same body of evidence which makes me fearful also offers grounds for hope. General Haig sought by his responses to demonstrate his intention to comply with existing legislative provisions governing the conduct of national security policy, his acknowledgment of the importance of the moral aspects of public policy, and his commitment to work with rather than against the Congress.

General Haig has committed himself to this committee, indeed, to the American people on these and other issues. I am confident, after having observed him carefully throughout these hearings that he is a man of his word who, once committed—and I must note parenthetically it is very difficult to get him committed—adheres strictly to his commitments. It is this character trait which, as I mentioned
earlier, was the most troubling aspect of General Haig as far as I was concerned about his past which also, strangely enough, gives me the most hope about his future.

I am reluctant to side with my fears about General Haig because I recognize that he has the potential to fulfill my hopes for his stewardship as Secretary of State. Therefore, I shall give him my support, notwithstanding my fears, and my prayers that he will in fact be the man of his word, be the man who is going to stand up and be clear on the issues that relate to the moral questions we have raised here, and also be the man who will be forthcoming with this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would also ask at this time unanimous consent that a longer version of my opening statement be submitted for the record, and I wish him well. I think he has the potential to be a great Secretary of State, and I sincerely hope that he keeps near him the team that he assembled for this hearing.

And I mean that sincerely because I think they have had a very positive influence on a man who has great ability. They bring out the best in him. I would like to see that continue. I took forward to working with him.

And I would like to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, on the gracious attitude that you displayed in the conduct of these hearings, and, also, although he is not the chairman nor the ranking member, a man with whom I had some considerable political disagreement, but we have always worked well together, the gentleman sitting to your right. I suspect he and I will be equally vigilant with regard to General Haig's stewardship over the State Department.

Thank you.

[Senator Biden's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, this nomination confronts me with a choice between my hopes and my fears.

No one disputes that General Haig is intelligent, experienced, forceful and loyal. No one doubts that President-elect Reagan considers General Haig the most able man to help fashion and implement his plans for foreign policy.

He has responded to this Committee with intelligence, sometimes with candor, occasionally with his special brand of cool passion. I believe I can speak for most of my colleagues on the Committee when I congratulate him for unflagging stamina, consistency of effort and a prodigious memory.

We recognized—even before these hearings began—that he had experience in foreign policy. We were aware that he possessed a great sense of loyalty to his superiors and that he exhibited qualities of leadership to those in his command. Most of us sensed that he might be an excellent manager in times of crisis. And nothing he has said here nor the manner in which he has conducted himself since last Friday has dispelled any of those initial impressions.

Unfortunately, even though he has demonstrated these qualities, there remains, I believe, an element of doubt. The question this Committee and the Senate still must answer is whether this man merits our trust and our support as Secretary of State.

I still have unallayed and significant fears about how he would conduct himself as Secretary of State, in an office which wields enormous power and influence over our nation's security and consequently over our nation's survival.

Coming into these hearings, I feared that, whether by personal inclination or because of his military background, General Haig might display a predisposition to choose obedience over independent judgment. As we come to the end of these long sessions, I confess that he still has not entirely relieved me of that anxiety.

General Haig served in important positions during the most wrenching and traumatic political crises of recent American history—the Vietnam War and
Watergate. On many occasions when decisions were made with regard to these crises, he appears to have displayed a troubling insensitivity to many of the moral, legal and Constitutional issues involved. His repeated refusals to assess his own past performance with an appropriate degree of self-criticism leads me to fear that he does not sufficiently appreciate the broader requirements of public service and the ever-present dangers of abuses of political power.

General Haig's demeanor, no doubt useful and effective in his past positions, is one of unusual self-confidence and certitude. I fear these same qualities, however, may make it difficult for him to conduct what he himself told us should be an "active consultation" with the Congress "in an atmosphere of mutual respect, trust and confidence, recognizing the special role of the Senate. The cooperative spirit we need to build a unified and bipartisan foreign policy can disappear in an instant if there is a lack of mutual respect.

These are some of my fears—nagging doubts that the shadows of General Haig's past actions and views may foretell behavior as Secretary of State which I believe could be inappropriate and objectionable. My fears are not proofs of disqualification, nor are they confident predictions of how he may perform in office. But they are concerns I feel obligated to offer to explain why this nomination presents me with the most difficult decision on a confirmation I have faced during my eight years as a Senator.

But the same body of evidence which makes me fearful also offers grounds for hope.

General Haig sought by his answers to our questions to demonstrate his intention to comply with existing legislative provisions governing the conduct of national security policy, his acknowledgement of the importance of the moral aspects of public policy, and his commitment to work with rather than against the Congress. Also on the positive side of the ledger are the specific assurances he has provided us—sometimes at our prompting—particularly regarding his intent to adhere strictly to the War Powers Resolution and to manifest—as our Constitution envisions—a spirit of cooperation with the Congress in information-sharing and consultation, including uninhibited consultation with all those in his department who share in formulating policy.

General Haig has committed himself to this Committee, indeed to the American people, on these important issues. I am confident—that having observed him carefully throughout the course of these hearings—that he is a man of his word who, once committed, adheres strictly to the fulfillment of his commitments. It is this character trait, which was at times most troubling to me about General Haig's past, which gives me the most hope for his future.

His pledges, coupled with his wealth of experience and his eminent stature abroad, give him an extraordinary opportunity to be successful as Secretary of State. And I am sure those who may vote against him will wish him well.

I am assuredly concerned about the future of our country, about whether we have the capacity to accept the burden to solve our many problems, about whether we will find the wisdom to practice statesmanship rather than partisanship. In the 1980's, the preservation of our peace and security is no certainty. The character and performance of the Secretary of State in the next few years will make a difference.

I am reluctant to side with my fears about General Haig because I recognize that he has the potential to fulfill my hopes for his stewardship. Therefore, I shall give him my support, and my prayers.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Senator Biden, for your conclusion and for your typically thoughtful comments about the Chair. We all have to learn in this process. This responsibility, after 26 years, is somewhat new to the Republicans.

But I have felt I had the help of every single member of this committee—and even a few barbs here and there—that has been extraordinarily helpful to the Chair, and deeply appreciated.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I hope you do not learn it so well that you become accustomed to it.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope I do not have to become accustomed to it. Thank you.

Senator Pressler.
Senator Pressler. Mr. Chairman, let me briefly say that I have very much enjoyed this initiation into the Foreign Relations Committee. It has been, in addition to doing our duty, a seminar for me on foreign affairs throughout the world. It has also been a lesson in the relationship between the legislative and the executive branches of our Government.

Let me also say that I am happy that we on the Republican side took the initiative and supported the subpena and showed leadership in that area. I do not know the outcome of that, but I feel we handled it, under your leadership, in a very fair and correct way.

During the past few days I have had a chance to ask questions in the areas of arms control, U.S. aid and security levels, some of my concepts in sharing of the burden in both security and development aid, questions on Israel and the Middle East, the Law of the Sea Treaty. And let me say that I think our committee should pay much attention to the Law of the Sea Treaty, because in 1985 it may well be a very controversial matter when it comes to the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened and learned and, I hope, contributed. I shall vote for General Haig, and I look forward to working with him.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Pressler very much, indeed. And particularly as chairman of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, your discussion in that area has been very helpful, and we deeply appreciate it.

Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to comment briefly along the lines that I made a few remarks, I think, yesterday afternoon with regard to the hearings, and then some remarks with regard to General Haig.

I was somewhat surprised a few days ago to read in the press that President-elect Reagan's statement that he's quoted as saying he saw "certain elements of extremism" in our hearings.

I disagree with that strongly, because I think these hearings have been in the best tradition of our political system, our political processes. And I think this was not just General Haig's confirmation, as such, just us getting information from him. It's a two-way flow of information, because he winds up better informed of our concerns as a result of these processes and our views on the world political situation than he was prior to these hearings.

And that's important because power is shared in our system, in our institutions. And even the President is not omnipotent. We are not having a coronation next Tuesday, we're having an inauguration. I think that's important to remember: Power is shared.

And I would be the last to say that these hearings are the absolutely end-all of power sharing, but they are a small part of that power sharing in Government, because it is up to us to recommend to the whole Senate what we think is important. And this power sharing is a protection in our checks-and-balances form of government.

I was reminded of the fact that I happened to be in Washington the evening of the day when ex-President Nixon resigned. And I happened to drive around past the White House that evening. There were no tanks pulled up for protection; there were no helicopters hovering overhead; there were no troops surrounding the White
I said to General Haig yesterday, "There may have been a few sandbags in some parts of the White House inside on that day, but there were none evident on the outside." In fact, it was quite beautiful. The lights were on, as normal, which I am sure belied the turmoil that was going on inside.

But these hearings are a part, a small part albeit, of that power sharing that is reflected in our Government. And I hope that our questioning has, for the most part, reflected that concern that we take very seriously, our power sharing in this Government.

General Haig heard the very diverse views of the members of this committee, and we have our own wrangles internally in this committee here, and differences of viewpoint on what should be done in different parts of the world. But out of this give and take come some of the best effects of the moderating of views of those who might be exercising power in a way that others might feel was wrong.

And so I think our overall objective, as has been quoted out of the past, has been that we're all trying to somehow make more gentle the life of this world. And I am sure that that is General Haig's view as well as ours, and the overall objective of our foreign policy.

As to General Haig specifically, I think, in confirmation, we judge persons by two criteria, basically: One, are they qualified by their background and their past experience to fulfill the job that they are about to embark upon? Second, do they have the integrity, the honesty, the forthrightness to do that job without fear or favor?

As to the first, I am very much encouraged by General Haig's background and his qualifications. I do not share the view of some that a military background should preclude him from filling that position. Perhaps my own background leads me in that direction. But as I said opening the hearings, I do believe there is life possible after a military career.

General Haig's military background, to me, rather than being a discouragement, is an encouragement, because I think those who have known tough combat are the least likely to put their finger on the nuclear trigger and pull it or to be willing to embark frivolously upon paths which might lead us into military conflict.

As to integrity, questions were raised about the General's performance when he was chief of staff at the White House at most difficult times. Out of that part of the hearings, I found nothing that would lead me to believe that General Haig is anything but of the highest caliber of integrity, of decency, of devotion to duty which he has displayed throughout his military career.

General Haig for 5 days fielded questions in open session on his views of foreign policy and international issues. I am sure the embassies of the whole world watched with great interest and, I am sure, many times marveled and were sometimes perplexed, even, by our democracy in action. But these proceedings demonstrate how our system does differ from the many other regimes around the world, particularly the totalitarian regimes, and even in this latter half of the 20th century too many people are deprived of expressing their voice in shaping the destinies in those nations.
It's General Haig's responsibility in office to see that our American foreign policy implementation lives up to the high ideals that have been expressed during these hearings. And I certainly believe he is up to that job. I think he has in his past displayed exceptional leadership and management skills throughout his long career. And I think during the last 5 days, while we might have preferred some more specific answers to some of our questions, he has nevertheless demonstrated a grasp of world problems and an understanding of U.S. interests abroad that would be matched by not too many people in public office today.

So I will be pleased to vote for his confirmation. And I want to truly achieve that bipartisan support we discussed during these hearings and to which he pledged himself. I know that quite often these pledges are routinely made at the beginning of a new administration. I hope General Haig and the new administration is truly serious about wanting that bipartisan relationship and takes the followup actions to make certain that we have it.

He stressed repeatedly during the hearings the need for a partnership between the executive branch and Congress, and I certainly concur wholeheartedly. I think we do need, as he stated, to speak with one voice. Those of us, as almost all members of the committee who have had contact with heads of foreign governments, know that they are continually perplexed by American foreign policy and the changes that sometimes occur in it. And so I share his view that we need to speak with one voice.

He stressed that we need a foreign policy that is consistent, humane, and wise. And in these times, nothing less will do. And I wish him good luck in his new assignment and plan to vote for him in a few minutes.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Glenn, first, may I say that we are operating under unanimous consent agreement that the vote on General Haig's nomination shall occur no later than 10:15. Without objection, we will extend that time until such time as all Senators have completed their statements, and then the vote will occur.

Senator Glenn, I would like to say that when you mention the fact that an exciting life can exist for a person after they leave the military, there are few people in the world who have had the kind of excitement in their life that you have had. The Senate is privileged to have two astronauts, two men who have gone through the most vigorous and difficult selective process, almost more difficult than election. And you've gone through both of them. You are one of the two Members of the Senate who have seen the world as an entity down below you from outer space. And it's quite remarkable, I think, that one of the great achievements in your career in the Senate has been in the area of nuclear nonproliferation, that you recognize the terror that we present and the potential that we present if we cannot stop the proliferation. And I think the questioning that you have done of General Haig in that area has been important. We have worked so closely together in that area.

But it's also interesting that last night it was the first thing—a graceful and eloquent statement by the President of the United States,
President Carter—it is the first admonition that he left for the American public and for the people of the world: that nuclear proliferation must be contained and controlled.

And your leadership in this area in the Senate of the United States is a masterful piece of work and alone justifies all of the effort you made through the elective process to get here.

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize to you and the other members of the committee for being a few minutes late.

It was my privilege this morning to attend the annual Martin Luther King breakfast in the great city of Baltimore. I knew that it would be an inspiring occasion. And it was. But I found the trip to be more exhilarating than I had anticipated. And as a result, I can cast one optimistic note for the business community this morning. The automobile repair business along Route 95 between Baltimore and Washington is going to be very, very good in the next few days. [Laughter.]

The Chairman. We’re sorry to hear that.

Senator Mathias. Well, the insurance companies will be equally sorry.

Mr. Chairman, I have known General Haig for a number of years and have transacted business with him on many occasions. But I must say that these days of hearings before this committee have brought forward many new facts about General Haig, things that I had not known before. I was impressed, for example, by his interest and knowledge of the subject of international economics, specifically, I was impressed by his recognition of the fact that today economics plays an enormous role in the relationship of nations to each other, and by his recognition of the fact that shortages of natural resources can be as great a threat to the security of the United States as a military threat from some potential adversary.

I was glad to see his awareness of the importance of the Third World and the need for the United States to play a constructive role in the development of the Third World and in assisting the Third World to avoid the kind of turmoil and revolution which breeds violence and terrorism threatening the whole world.

And I was also glad that he recognized the importance of the international financial institutions as instruments which can assist us in the field of international economics and in the global job of assisting the Third World to reach a level of at least survival economics.

Of course, these hearings have a role which is not only to give us an opportunity to learn more about the nominee, but in my judgment they have an equally important purpose in forging a contract between the nominee and this committee. By his responses to the questions of the members of this committee as to how he will conduct the office of Secretary of State, the way in which he will execute his duties as a member of the Cabinet. I believe that Alexander Haig has made a contract with us, an important contract. I expect and I have confidence that he will abide by the terms of the contract which he has
made. This contract becomes an important point of reference for us in the months and years ahead. It is a benchmark by which we can now measure his performance.

On the basis of what I knew about General Haig and what I have learned about him in these hearings, I believe that the Senate should consent to his confirmation; we should act positively on our half of the appointive process to complete his appointment. And I shall vote for confirmation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mathias, very much for your continued contribution to the course of these hearings, which has been very important, indeed.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I first want to commend you for the skill and fairness with which you have conducted these hearings. I think they have been notable. While you made reference to not having had the experience for 26 years, you are obviously a very fast learner. And therefore I want to thank the Chairman for his conduct of the hearings.

Mr. Chairman, I said at the outset of these hearings that General Haig was a man of considerable abilities and that view has been strengthened by our 5 days of hearings.

My concerns have centered primarily upon sensitivity to the use of power under our constitutional system and the judgments General Haig would make in this regard. He was a major figure in the White House, including 15 months as chief of staff, during the years when serious abuses of power occurred that it resulted in the resignation of President Nixon in the face of a certain impeachment.

As Secretary of State, General Haig will be in the leading policymaking position in the Cabinet, making policy as well as executing it. It has, therefore, been pertinent to try to ascertain the kinds of value judgments he would bring to his responsibilities and the limits on constitutional power which he would draw. While that effort has brought some reassurance, my concerns on this fundamental question remain too strong for me to be able, in good conscience, to support his nomination. I sincerely hope that General Haig's performance in office will prove these continuing concerns to be unwarranted.

As a member of this committee, which has constant contact with the Secretary of State I anticipate working closely with the new Secretary of State to strengthen our nation's foreign policy and to insure the vitality of our democracy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Several of you took on a role, which I anticipated in my opening statement, a role that General Haig would know would have to be performed if this committee was to perform its duties.

It was not a pleasant task. It was undertaken with tremendous grace, and an historic occasion, I think, when the power of the reason that was used caused General Haig to think through and reexpress his sense of moral values. And we're deeply grateful, indeed, for the minority taking on this responsibility, which we fully backed, the right and duty and obligation of the Senate of the United States no matter how difficult that role was. And you performed extraordinarily well.
Senator Tsongas, Senator Zorinsky is next to me, recognized. And Senator Boechtitz, I think we have completed our side. If Senator Zorinsky would like to yield to you, Senator Tsongas, he certainly can.

Senator Zorinsky. Yes, I would like to yield to Senator Tsongas. I have no closing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas.

Senator Tsongas. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comments. It has not been an easy process for some of us. And all I can say, after hearing Senator Sarbanes and knowing what I am going to say, I hope he does not take it out on the country of Greece. It has nothing to do with this.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to state the reasons for my vote on the confirmation of General Alexander Haig as Secretary of State. I sat through 5 days of extensive and at times exhaustive questioning of General Haig. I listened to his answers on the broad range of issues discussed. And I have observed Alexander Haig the man as he endured the hours of inquiry.

What we have before us is an extraordinary man. The talents given to him are not to be taken lightly: capable, intelligent, tough, pragmatic, a sense of history, a knack for retaining his options. In terms of raw talent, General Haig is clearly the most impressive man I have encountered in a confirmation hearing.

He will use this talent to dominate this administration. I have absolutely no doubt about that. There are within this man all the ingredients necessary for an historic tenure as Secretary of State, not average, not sufficient, but historic. A man who has the potential to be honored by both Republicans and Democrats, by both Conservatives and Liberals.

We are dealing here with a high-risk, high-gain opportunity. What risks are involved here? The risks inherent in having all of those enormous skills not properly focused by a dominant sense of moral purpose, the risk of expediency despoiling an otherwise solid performance.

How real is this risk? I for one do not know. I am not convinced either way. Only time and history will tell.

So what then is my function? My function is to let General Haig know that there is a Foreign Relations Committee dedicated to its oversight function, that there are some of us who believe strongly that America stands for a certain set of principles that are not to be disregarded, that indeed we are a nation of laws, not men.

If this coincides with General Haig's own view, then my caution and my role will have been unnecessary. If it does not, then I will have served my function as I see it, no matter how lonely the task.

I admire talent, capacity, and strength. General Haig has them all. Combine that with a sense of moral limits and you have the stuff of legends. Absent that sense of limits and you have the potential for tragedy.

Given my feelings of doubt, my function then is one of vigilance. And I feel that I can best express the seriousness of my commitment to that vigilance with a nay vote. I wish General Haig well, because above all I am an American, whose life and whose family's lives are to a real degree in his hands. God gave him much. It is up to him to write this upcoming chapter in a way that will honor us all. I truly hope for his success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. And again, our appreciation for your contribution, Senator Tsongas.
Senator Boschwitz?
Senator Boschwitz. Mr. Chairman, my comments will be brief. They also begin with a commendation to you. This is the first hearing that you have served in as chairman. It is the first confirmation hearing that I have attended as a Senator. And I have sat, as you know, through almost every hour of the 5 days of hearings.
And clearly we have witnessed an extraordinary person, an extraordinary man, who I hope will make a great Secretary of State. I will vote for him.
I also was impressed, as was Senator Mathias, with his grasp of international economics, and also very impressed with his historical perspective, which I think is very important that it be brought to the office of the Secretary of State. That should not be surprising, really. General Haig has an advanced degree in foreign relations. General Haig has been involved in the whole business of foreign relations for over 20 years. And I hope that the others around him are people of similar background and similar talent.
Because we always, I suppose, make a comparison with our principal opponents, if they should be so seen, the Russians. And there, through my entire lifetime, they have had just two secretaries of state or ministers, and that is Mr. Molotov and Mr. Gromyko. And even in the case of Mr. Dobrynin, he has been here for almost two decades. So that they train and they stay with their people.
I hope that General Haig will be in the office of Secretary of State for a good long time. And Mr. Chairman, if he handles our opponents and indeed our friends with the same abilities and the same firmness that he handles Senators, I think we are going to have a very great Secretary of State.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz. And again, your contribution as chairman of the subcommittee dealing with the Middle East, the Near East, has been immensely helpful and has enabled us to see the comprehension that General Haig has of this vital area that you have devoted so many years of study to yourself.
Thank you.
And now, certainly last but not least, alphabetically last but certainly not in ranking, a valued member of this committee, Senator Zorinsky.
Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Chairman, I have no concluding remarks. I do not believe you were in the room yesterday when I complimented the chairman of the committee for the outstanding manner in which this hearing was conducted, and in addition I addressed a few remarks to General Haig. I think that will suffice. I believe we have spent enough time on rhetoric.
I will yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
I will formally announce, then, the conclusions of our executive committee meeting last night of the committee, which is a very important, integral part of this hearing process. I would like to say that
there have been three pleasant surprises politically that have occurred so far as the Republicans have been concerned:

First, to myself, the overwhelming mandate and plurality received by President Reagan. I do not think he perceived the day before the election, when we were together in Peoria, Ill., the size and scope of that mandate.

Second, when I went to bed on election night, I went to bed as a minority member of the Senate and was prepared to stay that for at least 2 more years; and was astounded to wake up and find that we were the majority.

And third, I never would have anticipated that there would have been as much unanimity in this committee on this vote. The grace did not surprise me, however, of the expressions of those even who have cast their votes in the negative. But the way they have done it I think, will strengthen the hand of the new Secretary of State.

I would like to indicate once again that all of us have recognized that this is a time of peril for the free institutions and free societies in many countries of the world and in the United States of America. If the United States is to play a constructive leadership role for stability in the world, we do require at the helm of our foreign policy a President and a Secretary of State who have the strength to lead. I believe that in President-elect Reagan and in Secretary of State-designate Haig we have that strength, which has been demonstrated on a number of occasions.

I mentioned yesterday that I would read into the record a letter that I received from Gerald R. Ford, former President of the United States, dated January 9:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to you in support of the nomination of General Alexander Haig for the position of Secretary of State. As you and the members of the committee know, General Haig has had an outstanding military career. A graduate of West Point, his personal and professional career have reflected the precepts of duty, honor, country. He has served this Nation as a combat leader in two wars, in both of which he was wounded and decorated for valor.

But he is not simply an able and valiant soldier. His more than 30 years of distinguished military service portray a dimension of leadership I would describe as that of the soldier-statesman.

I first observed General Haig's many talents when I served as minority leader of the House of Representatives. And he held a key post on the staff of the National Security Council during my tenure as Vice President and later as President. I saw firsthand his performance of the demanding duties associated with the office of Chief of White House Staff. Dedicated and hardworking, he was a skillful administrator with an in-depth knowledge of the Executive Branch of Government.

Throughout this period, in all of my personal relationships with him he reflected great strength of character and integrity.

In 1974 I nominated him Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forces in Europe. The leadership he brought to that command won him respect at home and abroad. Perhaps more than any other assignment, it indicated his unusual qualifications for the post for which you are now considering him.

Because I am convinced he is eminently qualified, I strongly support his nomination and hope your committee and the Senate will confirm him as Secretary of State.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

GERALD R. FORD.
I commend President-elect Reagan on his selection of General Haig, and I do feel that these hearings have clearly demonstrated that we have a nominee who is one of the best prepared by previous service at the highest levels of government to be presented for this position.

And fortunately, through the media, the support of the media, I think this confirmation hearing has been followed probably more closely by the citizens of the world than any other hearing ever held before.

We have before us for confirmation a nominee who has unique qualifications to help the President-elect restore confidence in American leadership and to reestablish a sense of will, determination and direction to the conduct of American foreign policy. His strong leadership at the Department of State is needed to enable our country to meet the many dangers posed by an unsettled world order.

I therefore fully support the confirmation of Alexander Haig to be Secretary of State. I have deeply appreciated the opportunity to participate with my colleagues in these extensive hearings, during which General Haig has so well articulated his views on international affairs.

The committee met in executive session late yesterday afternoon and evening, and the committee adopted in executive session the following resolution:

Resolved, That in anticipation of its vote on reporting to the Senate the nomination of Alexander M. Haig to be Secretary of State, and other nominations which may come before it for consideration, the Committee on Foreign Relations:

One, adopts this resolution for the purpose of continuing the jurisdiction of the committee over matters relating to such nominations and its general oversight responsibilities, and:

Will continue all reasonable efforts, including those actions taken by the committee to date, to obtain materials relating to such nominations and such general oversight responsibilities.

The vote in the committee was 14 to 3, with Senators Percy, Baker, Hayakawa, Mathias, Kashebaum, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd voting in the affirmative, and Senators Helms, Lugar and Boschwitz voting in the negative.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record and to make public the text of the committee's recent correspondence with the White House concerning Senator Pell's request for certain documents relating to the National Security Council. These documents are also available at the press table.

[The documents referred to follow:]

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RESOLVED, That in anticipation of its vote on reporting to the Senate the nomination of Alexander M. Haig to be Secretary of State, and other nominations which may come before it for consideration, the Committee on Foreign Relations:

(1) adopts this resolution for the purpose of continuing the jurisdiction of the Committee over matters relating to such nominations and its general oversight responsibilities, and

(2) will continue all reasonable efforts, including those actions taken by the Committee to date, to obtain materials relating to such nominations and such general oversight responsibilities.
Hon. Charles H. Percy,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to Senator Claiborne Pell's letter of December 30, 1980 requesting materials relating to General Alexander M. Haig. On January 9th you advised the President that the majority members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were requesting that he respond to Senator Pell's letter on an expedited basis.

Among the materials requested are:

(2) All documents and, in particular, but without limitation, memoranda, notes, correspondence, cables, telexes, or other writings, written or received by, to, or concerning Alexander M. Haig, Jr., which relate directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, to the following U.S. policies and activities in Cambodia:
   (a) Bombing questions “Breakfast” and “Menu,” February-March, 1969;
   (b) Alexander Haig’s 1970 trip to Cambodia;
   (c) All correspondence with Jonathan “Fred” Ladd or Thomas O. Enders;
   (d) NSSM 89, “Cambodia Strategy”;
   (e) NSSM 99;
   (f) February, 1973, shift of bombing operations to the U.S. Embassy;
   (g) Negotiations involving, or counsel to, the government of Lon Nol during 1973;
   (h) Haig-Enders-Moore-Lowenstein memoranda of March 26, 1973 and also April 10, 1973, justifying U.S. bombing operations in Cambodia;

(3) All documents and, in particular, but without limitation, memoranda, notes, correspondence, cables, telexes, or other writings, written or received by, to, or concerning Alexander M. Haig, Jr., which relate directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, to U.S. efforts to reach any truce, accord, cease-fire, or peace in the conflict in Vietnam during 1972 and 1973;

(4) All documents and, in particular, but without limitation, memoranda, notes, correspondence, cables, telexes, log entries, diary entries or other writings, written or received by, to, or concerning Alexander M. Haig, Jr., which relate directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, to any conversations, deliberations, policies, meetings, or conversations on people, events, or the political situation in Chile from September 1 through December 31, 1970.

Senator Pell's letter requests materials from the National Security Council. After carefully reviewing the files of the National Security Council, we have determined that there are 25 documents which are responsive to Senator Pell's request. Three of the documents are responsive to paragraph (2) of Senator Pell's letter, three are responsive to paragraph (4) and the balance are responsive to paragraph (3).

All of the documents are highly classified minutes of meetings of the National Security Council or a subgroup thereof, attended occasionally by President Nixon and attended always by high-ranking members of the government. The advice offered to the President or to the chairman of each meeting is open, candid and sensitive. General Haig's role in the meetings varied. General Haig served as Chairman of seven of the twenty-five meetings. In other instances, he spoke during the course of the meeting, but did not serve as chairman. At some meetings there is no record of his participation, except that his attendance is recorded. In one instance, he apparently received minutes of the meeting, but did not actually attend the meeting.

I have caused the documents to be reviewed by Mr. R. Stan Mortenson, of the law firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin. Mr. Mortenson is counsel for President Nixon. Following his review of the documents, Mr. Mortenson advised me that President Nixon objects to their release to the Committee and that President Nixon was asserting a claim of privilege over all of the documents. Mr. Mortenson’s letter of January 13, 1981 to me, a copy of which is attached, confirms that he has consulted with President Nixon and that President Nixon asserts a governmental privilege with respect to each of the documents.

The Office of the Counsel to the President has reviewed the documents and consulted with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It
would take a considerable period of time to determine whether access to the materials in these documents relating to General Haig could properly be granted without adversely affecting the conduct of foreign policy, jeopardizing the security of intelligence sources and methods or chilling the frankness of the advice available to future Presidents. Among other steps, it would be necessary to consult the departments and agencies whose representatives participated in the meetings of the National Security Council and its Committees. Even if the incumbent President concluded that access could be granted to some of this material in its original or paraphrased form, it would still be necessary to give reasonable advance notice to counsel for President Nixon before access is granted so that he could seek such relief as he deemed appropriate.

Under all of the circumstances, and in view of the Committee's desire to act on the nomination of General Haig in the very near future, we respectfully ask whether the Committee wishes us to conduct these further steps.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL H. CARDOSO,
Deputy Counsel to The President.

MILLER, CASSIDY, LABOCA & LEVIN,

MICHAEL H. CARDOSO, Esquire,
Deputy Counsel to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CARDOSO: I have reviewed copies of the National Security Council materials referred to in your letter of January 11, 1981, and we have discussed with former President Nixon the position he wishes to take with regard to the possible disclosure of these documents to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After careful consideration of this matter, President Nixon has instructed me to inform you that he objects to the disclosure of any of the referenced documents. Each contains confidential communications among the highest levels of White House and Executive Branch officials, including the President, and were for the purpose of providing the President advice and information concerning positions he might deem appropriate with regard to the Nation's foreign affairs. These communications are within the privilege of confidentiality inherent in the President's powers under the Constitution, and necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the Chief Executive. Mr. Nixon has concluded that the disclosure of these communications to members and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would constitute an unwarranted invasion of that confidentiality. Accordingly, he asserts the presidential privilege with respect to each of the documents specified in your letter.

In addition, President Nixon has asked me to suggest that appropriate officials of the National Security Council carefully review each of the documents to determine whether other privileges should be asserted on behalf of the incumbent Administration. The documents contain sensitive information which may effect the country's foreign affairs. Mr. Nixon recommends that a careful analysis be conducted to determine whether the disclosure of any of these documents might, in fact, jeopardize relationships with other countries at this time.

Before you take any action with regard to these documents which could lead to their disclosure, we ask that you provide us prior notification sufficient to permit Mr. Nixon the opportunity to pursue any further course of action that he deems appropriate.

Sincerely,

R. STAN MORTENSON.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

MR. MICHAEL H. CARDOSO,
Deputy Counsel to the President,
The White House, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CARDOSO: In reference to your letter to me of January 13, 1981, I appreciate your efforts to respond to Senator Pell's requests for materials on an
expedited basis. In light of the problems you outlined the Committee will have to consider the matter further, and I will inform you of the Committee's decision.

Sincerely,

CHARLES H. PERCY, Chairman.

Both of these actions of the committee indicate that we will continue to consider the necessity and appropriateness of further action to obtain materials relating to this nomination and to other nominations which may be coming before the committee in the next few months. The committee will have to decide in the near future what actions may necessarily be required to fulfill its continuing responsibility in these matters.

If there is no further discussion by any member of the committee, the chief clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Baker.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Baker has a proxy, a written proxy, aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Helms.
Senator HELMS. Aye.

Senator GLENN. What is the motion we are voting on?
The CHAIRMAN. The motion before us.

I think, to follow the formality, we should have our distinguished colleague Senator Helms actually present the motion before the committee.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I move approval of the nomination.
Senator PELL. A legalistic question. The nomination is not before us because the Senate is not in session. So it could be phrased a little differently.

Senator HELMS. The Senator is correct.
Mr. Chairman, I move that in anticipation of the nomination, that it be approved, subject to the formal receipt of it from the new President of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there a second to that motion?
Senator MATHIAS. Second.
The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion. The clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Baker.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a written proxy for Senator Baker. Senator Baker votes aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Helms.
Senator HELMS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hayakawa.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a written proxy for Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Hayakawa votes aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Lugar.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a written proxy for Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar votes aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mrs. Kassebaum.
Senator KASSEBAUM. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Boschwitz.
Senator BOSCHWITZ. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Pressler.
Senator PRESSLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Pell.
Senator PELL. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Biden.
Senator PELL. Aye by proxy.
The CLERK. Mr. Glenn.
Senator GLENN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes.
Senator SARBANES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Zorinsky.
Senator ZORINSKY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Tsongas.
Senator TSONGAS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cranston.
Senator PELL. Aye by proxy.
The CLERK. Mr. Dodd.
Senator DODD. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

There are 15 ayes, 2 nays. The motion is carried.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, there is one other point of language in the motion that we ought to address, because the nomination does not come from the President-elect. It comes from the Senate. It does not come to our committee from the executive branch. It comes to us from the Senate. This is just a detail.

Senator HEILMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the motion be modified so as to fit.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee will recess for 5 minutes and then commence the hearing on Dr. Kirkpatrick as nominee to be delegate of the United States to the United Nations.

[Whereupon, at 10:47 p.m., the hearing was recessed.]
Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the confirmation of President-elect Reagan’s choice of Alexander Haig to be Secretary of State. Because of his service to the Nation as President Nixon’s Chief of Staff in the White House, there has been some controversy over this appointment, much more than would otherwise have been the case. As a former Chairman of the Republican National Committee and as a ranking minority Senator in those days, I was there, and know how difficult it was not only to be in the administration, but anywhere in the national government, as a Republican. Questions were asked and doubts raised, not only of General Haig, but of others of us as well. In the years since then, however, there has been a great deal of information about the events in the Nixon White House, many books have been written, and it is my belief that all the leads have been pursued. By all accounts, General Haig’s integrity and devotion to his duty—which was to the service of his country—has been exemplary.

The record of General Haig’s past experience and accomplishments is an impressive one. During this delicate and tense period with the foreign policy crises facing the United States and our allies in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, the job of Secretary of State requires someone with the background and strong leadership exemplified in General Haig. His selection by President-elect Reagan is based on compelling logic: There is much work that needs to be done and General Haig is someone with the devotion to country, willingness to strive to the utmost and pragmatic ability to solve problems, who can get the job done.

Much is made of Mr. Haig’s military status. The post of Secretary of State is known for finding solutions based on diplomacy, negotiation and compromise, not the use of military force. In the modern strategic era, however, our highest-ranking military leaders have been required to exercise the same degree of diplomatic skill and ability to maneuver in negotiations that their predecessors needed to show only on the battlefield. On the other hand, the ability to command, to lead and to create organizational efficiency is a legacy of his military training, and something General Haig can bring to the State Department with the same urgency as a cavalryman to the rescue.

In recent years, some of our most highly accomplished—and ultimately most successful—statesmen have been generals. General Eisenhower became one of our most beloved modern Presidents and was the last to serve two full terms in office. General Marshall, also a Secretary of State, was the instigator of the European recovery plan that bears his name and was the chief architect of the return to strength that made NATO a successful alliance. At the same time, General Douglas MacArthur was the man most responsible for setting post-war Japan on the path to economic recovery on a sound, democratic basis.

One of General MacArthur’s aides during that period was Alexander Haig. He later was an aide to Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. General Haig’s military experience included more than staff work and diplomacy. Like most military men, he understands better than the civilian the horrors of war and the bitter finality of the resort to force. He participated in the Inchon landing in the Korean War, one of the most successful, large-scale U.S. military operations since World War II and received a distinguished service cross during the battle of Ap Gu in the Vietnam War when he served with the Big Red One Infantry Division, ultimately as a brigade commander.

General Haig is a man who can face the hard facts and make the tough choices, something I believe America needs to put back into its foreign policy. The American people understand that, and I think that is part of the message they sent to Washington on election day. The United States can only hope to meet peacefully Soviet challenges and aggression by acting in unison with our allies, coordinating our action and policies and by enforcing them jointly.

Alexander Haig is quintessentially the man to do that. He knows the NATO leaders personally. They give him high marks for his service under Presidents
Ford and Carter as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for NATO. His relationship with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in many ways our most important ally in Europe, is particularly close. General Haig has the confidence of the leaders of our allies and the respect of our potential adversaries. He is articulate, intelligent, and has the broad strategic sense that ought to be the primary criteria for this position. By designating General Haig as this Nation's next Secretary of State, President-elect Reagan has sent a clear message to the Soviet Union and to the rest of the world about America's new foreign policy.

General Haig's abilities and unexcelled competence are recognized across the board, by people of both the Republican and Democratic parties who hope for a positive change in the foreign policy of the new administration. An outstanding Democrat of my own State of Kansas, John D. Montgomery, the editor of the Junction City Daily Union, reflects this view in a recent editorial on the nomination, which I request be reprinted in the hearing record following my statement.

Alexander Haig obviously possesses the qualifications to be Secretary of State. I trust he will be judged on that basis. I would like to thank the chairman and the committee for the opportunity to offer this statement for the hearing.

[From the Junction City Daily Union]

EDITOR'S VIEW

Opponents to the nomination of Gen. Alexander Haig as secretary of state can say whatever they want to about his prior service as a security adviser and White House chief of staff in the Nixon era. They can use his memoirs or anything else they desire to probe for some of the dark doings they say he was responsible for while holding the presidency together under the onslaught of Watergate. Their argument that he will provoke disharmony and controversy in the Senate sounds like an attempt to rehash old memories of both Watergate and Vietnam.

The alternative is to come up with a constructive search for an answer to the main question raised by Gen. Haig's nomination. That question is whether a career military officer is the right choice to be secretary of state. But the problem facing the opposition is that the only precedent in modern times provides a persuasive argument in Gen. Haig's favor. That was President Harry Truman's selection of Gen. George C. Marshall to that position. And still another successful career military man who comes to mind is Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, a Kansan who served his nation superbly in military, diplomatic and political positions.

Gen. Haig retired a year ago as supreme allied commander in Europe after four successful years of reviving morale and mending weaknesses on the military side of the North Atlantic alliance. He is respected in Europe as a tough, articulate leader with a realistic grasp of strategy and diplomacy. Haig, incidentally, is a 1st Infantry Division combat veteran, having served as a battalion commander with the Big Red One in Vietnam.

President-elect Reagan obviously is satisfied with Gen. Haig's approach to foreign policy. He also apparently has satisfied himself that the Haig record in the Nixon White House is basically the one the public already knows—that of an honorable man trying to steer the presidency through a crisis.

We are seeing a new beginning in negotiating arms limitations with the Russians. And there is a new urgency in meeting the challenges to security in the Middle East and elsewhere.

All of this gives a sense of logic to the choice of Gen. Haig as secretary of state. It is a logic that even those who are raking over the past will find difficult to deny.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,
Washington, D.C., January 5, 1981.

Hon. Charles H. Percy,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, 4321,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck: As you undertake your awesome responsibilities as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I hope you will take every feasible step to assure that the hearings with respect to the advice and consent of the
Senate on the appointment of Alexander Haig as Secretary of State will be fair, thorough, but not become a long, drawn out repetition of the Vietnam and Watergate hearings. Our country's interests will not be served by once again raking over the coals of the past. It is time, indeed past time, to put the agonies of Vietnam and Watergate behind us.

I understand and appreciate fully that the Senate has an important constitutional responsibility to examine with care the record, integrity, and character of such appointments. But only our adversaries could benefit from a hearing which would resurrect past divisions in our country. The Reagan administration has a fresh opportunity to bring greater coherence and direction to our foreign policy in the face of the difficulties of the decade of the 80's, and I hope that the hearings with respect to the Secretary of State designate will contribute to this end.

Knowing you as well as I do, and your commitment to the overall interests of our country, I have every confidence that with your leadership the hearings will be an impressive, positive opening chapter in the deliberations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Respectfully,

JOSEPH J. SISCO.


Senator CHARLES PERCY,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHUCK: For those of us who are deeply concerned about the overwhelming need for our country to formulate and conduct a strong, wise and far-sighted foreign policy, your becoming Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the designation of Al Haig as Secretary of State are two of the most reassuring things that could occur. Happily for all of us, your post is secure. Al, however, is still to be confirmed and it is about this that I wish to submit some of my views, which, I know, are shared by many.

Throughout most of my eight years in Government, from 1969 to 1977, I worked closely with Al in several areas and saw him perform brilliantly and with absolute integrity on all of them. When I was Ambassador to Germany and negotiating the Berlin Agreement, Al was Henry Kissinger's Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and I was in touch with him frequently. When I was Deputy Secretary of Defense and Deputy and Acting Secretary of State, we were both deeply involved in many of the same pressing problems of foreign affairs and national security, particularly with regard to the Vietnam War. From May to October, 1974, the traumatic period of Watergate Crisis and Presidential transition, we were both in the White House, he as Chief of Staff of the President and I as Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy, and we talked together several times daily. President Ford announced Al's appointment as SACEUR and mine as Ambassador to France on the same day and in our respective posts in Europe we maintained a close social and official relationship. I was able to observe at first hand his superb performance there which earned him the great respect and admiration of our European allies and their leaders. He was often described as the best SACEUR of all time.

Based on this background of close acquaintance, I feel safe in saying that in experience, judgment, character, and all-round ability, no appointee in our history has been better qualified to become Secretary of State than is Al Haig. Our Country sorely needs him in that post. President-elect Reagan thinks so also. In my opinion, the President's views concerning the occupant of this most important post in his official family should prevail. Few appointees to high governmental positions have been so thoroughly investigated as has Al, and he has emerged unscathed and with enhanced stature and prestige.

Therefore, I feel strongly that Al should be confirmed in the best interests of our Country. If I can be useful to your Committee in its Hearings or otherwise, please let me know. I should be grateful if you would put this letter in your official record of the Hearings. Thank you also for taking my views into consideration.

Sincerely yours,

KENNETH RUSH.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The tradition of service to our country which has typified General Alexander Haig's career, is not unusual among those who dedicate their lives to the American people. Throughout the years, we have seen Generals of the Army serve as Presidents of our Nation... with distinction and continuing effectiveness and ability. Military men have gone into all aspects of government activity with equal success.

General Haig's experience during his military career, as Commander of NATO, as Chief of Staff at the White House, and in the private sector... show him to be a person of great intellect, discernment, and talent.

I strongly endorse President-elect Ronald Reagan's nomination of General Alexander Haig to serve as our Secretary of State.

He will, I am confident, conduct the Department of State and its myriad duties in the fine tradition established by another great General, George C. Marshall, when he was entrusted with similar responsibilities.

The respect we have for General Haig at home is mirrored in the esteem with which he is viewed by your friends abroad... and in the awareness of his personal strength and dedication... which exists in the minds of those not quite so friendly to us.

No people better know and fear the horrors of war than the military, who have been so close to war and truly understand its accompanying devastation. General Haig's devotion to peace is a crucial aspect of his strength in dealing with our enemies.

He fortunately also brings a certain tact and humor that will serve us well during the sensitive diplomatic meetings... indeed, confrontations... the future holds.

I urge favorable action in this new son of Connecticut... and most honorable son of all America.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE J. DE NARDIS,
Member of Congress.

DECEMBER 10, 1980.

Hon. ROBERT C. BYRD,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: Recent press reports have indicated that you intend to raise a number of questions about the possible nomination by President-elect Reagan of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., for the position of Secretary of State.

It is, of course, not only proper, but necessary, that the Senate not give its consent to such a crucial appointment lightly or in any reflective "rubber stamping" manner. A balanced appraisal of nominees of policy-setting positions can only be achieved through a thoughtful examination of the qualities and attributes the nominee brings to the proposed assignment.

General Haig's fitness has been publicly questioned on two counts: (1) his role during the Watergate period; and (2) his actions in winding down the war in Vietnam.

I am convinced that, during Watergate, General Haig, subjected to more political and psychological pressure than most Americans can even imagine, acted with a sensitivity and a scrupulous awareness of the requirements of the Constitution which well served the country's short and long term interests. Rather than impede justice, as has been charged, Al Haig kept the needed lines of communication open that permitted an orderly transfer of power.

As for Vietnam, those who criticize General Haig's role in ending U.S. involvement are often those who conceived of and called for an even greater early commitment of U.S. power in Vietnam. Safely returned to law firms, foundations, college campuses and the media, these critics can never forgive General Haig and all others who liquidated their massive blunder.

On the positive side, General Haig enjoys a level of esteem in Europe that has never been surpassed, in post-war history, except by Dwight Eisenhower. Like Eisenhower and General George Marshall, General Haig has a background of
military service. At this dangerous moment in our history, I suggest that such a background should be viewed as a positive qualification, rather than a hindrance to, an assignment as the President's principal foreign policy advisor.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States earnestly recommends that the Senate, after a non-partisan review of General Haig's qualities and attributes, grants its consent to his appointment as Secretary of State.

At the time of the applicable Senate hearing, we shall formally present these views to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would appreciate an expression of your views.

Cordially,

ARTHUR FELLWOCK
National Commander-in-Chief, VFW.

STATEMENT OF PHELPS JONES, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, my name is Phelps Jones. It is my honor and privilege to serve the more than 1.9 million members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as their Director of National Security and Foreign Affairs.

I am pleased to appear before this body of the 97th United States Senate to extend, unhesitatingly, the support of the V.F.W. for the confirmation by the Senate of the nomination by President Reagan of General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret.) for the position of United States Secretary of State.

In this regard, I attach hereto a letter dated December 10, 1980 from Mr. Arthur Fellwock of Evansville, Indiana, National Commander-in-Chief of the V.F.W. to Senator Robert C. Byrd (W. Va.), Majority Leader of the 96th U.S. Senate. Mr. Fellwock regrets his inability to appear here and personally convey his support for General Haig's nomination, and has asked me to do so on his behalf.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., is widely known and respected throughout the V.F.W., having been awarded two of our highest honors: the Armed Forces Award and Citation and the Dwight David Eisenhower Award.

His battlefield courage is beyond question, having participated in the Inchon landing during the Korean War and having been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his service in Vietnam.

But while courage is the most important quality, making, in Churchill's phrase, all other attributes possible, General Haig brings far more than demonstrated gallantry to his nomination.

His nomination has been widely and enthusiastically received by the political leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member states.

His writings and speeches (normally delivered without reference to written material) reveal a broadly-gauged sense of the political and strategic whole and not, as some critics contend, the inherent limitations of the so-called "military mind."

Mr. Fellwock's attached letter to Senator Byrd makes several cogent points and I am pleased to quote from it:

"It is, of course, not only proper, but necessary, that the Senate not give its consent to such a crucial appointment lightly or in any reflective 'rubber stamping' manner. A balanced appraisal of nominees of policy-setting positions can only be achieved through a thoughtful examination of the qualities and attributes the nominee brings to the proposed assignment.

"General Haig's fitness has been publicly questioned on two counts: (1) his role during the Watergate period; and (2) his actions in winding down the war in Vietnam.

"I am convinced that, during Watergate, General Haig, subjected to more political and psychological pressure than most Americans can even imagine, acted with a sensitivity and a scrupulous awareness of the requirements of the Constitution which well served the country's short and long term interests. Rather than impede justice, as has been charged, Al Haig kept the needed lines of communication open that permitted an orderly transfer of power.

"As for Vietnam, those who criticize General Haig's role in ending U.S. involvement are often those who conceived of and called for an even greater early commitment of U.S. power in Vietnam. Safely returned to law firms, foundations, college campuses and the media, these critics can never forgive General Haig and all others who liquidated their massive blunder."
I would add to Mr. Fellwock's last point that recent and impartial scholarship (The Prestige Press and the "Christmas Bombing, 1972: Images and Realities in Vietnam" by Ambassador Martin F. Herz and Leslie Rider) has done much to set the record straight on the December 1972 bombing campaign which brought the North Vietnamese to the armistice table and our POWs home. It was not indiscriminate "carpet bombing." It was powerfully effective. Unhappily, media critics of this bombing effort carried the day politically, given the then Administration's decision—taken against General Haig's advice—not to explain publicly the extent and precise nature of the campaign.

While I don't expect these savage critics of that needed application of power to repent, their mindless references to the so-called "Christmas Bombing" to discredit General Haig is not born out by the facts and should not, I suggest, be given weight by this distinguished body.

For it is to the future that we must all turn and General Haig brings to this time of unquestioned peril to our country and the wide cause of freedom a breadth of experience plus qualities and attributes that argue powerfully for his confirmation.

General Haig has successfully avoided confusing personal policy preference for the real world. He displays no blinkered nostalgia for the more predictable world of the 1950s. Equally, he demonstrates a keen awareness that American power, prudently marshalled and carefully applied, is not only relevant to the 1980s and beyond. It is central to the survival and success of freedom.

Finally, not to place too fine a point here, the results of the November national elections offer broad evidence that America both expects and demands the type of leadership in foreign affairs envisioned by President Reagan and his nominee for Secretary of State.

This mandate, the V.F.W. both believes and urges, should be honored.

Thank you.

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

CHAIRMAN,
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Only rarely have I felt impelled to address your Committee in support of a nominee of the President, seeking your and your fellow Senators' confirmation. If I now feel so impelled it is because I believe that Alexander Haig, as Secretary of State, will serve the national interest with wisdom, firm resolution and selfless devotion.

As U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, 1976-1977, I had the privilege of working closely with General Haig, then SACEUR. He brought to his task not only that professional competence that his command required, but also a superb diplomatic skill that, at the time, proved as essential to maintaining the cohesiveness of the Alliance as did his military leadership. He won the respect of the political leaders of the allied countries.

On a recent visit to Europe I had occasion to call on members of government in several capitals. Without exception, they hailed Alexander Haig as the most highly qualified candidate for the Secretaryship of State. Those I met with subsequent to his nomination expressed themselves both delighted and reassured by the President's choice.

Sincerely,

ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN,
SCHOOL OF LAW,
Austin, Tex., December 29, 1980.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The Foreign Relations Committee, under your chairmanship, will shortly be considering the nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to be Secretary of State. I write to give enthusiastic support to that nomination.
From May 29 to October 27, 1973, I was at the White House as one of Mr. Nixon's lawyers on the Watergate matter and what was to become the tapes case. Indeed during that period I had the pleasure on several occasions of corresponding with you and talking with you on the telephone.

Among my happiest memories of those very difficult months was the opportunity to work with and get to know Al Haig. Indeed there were many days when I spent more hours in his office than I did in my own. I formed the judgment then—and nothing that has happened since has caused me to alter it in the slightest—that the United States was fortunate that a man of Al's ability and character held that position at that time.

The position was a difficult one. On the tapes issue, with which I was concerned, Mr. Nixon had definite views of his own, while a wide variety of other ideas were being put forward by me and the other White House lawyers, by Attorney General Richardson, and by others entitled to communicate their ideas to the President. Al Haig had the enviable job of seeking to sort all from all of these positions that would be honorable and workable, and to obtain Mr. Nixon's agreement to the decisions that were made. And yet in this period the Watergate tapes were only a small part of the critical problems with which he was engaged. In particular, during the most difficult days on the tape matter the Yom Kippur War, and the confrontation that seemed to be developing between this country and the Soviet Union, naturally occupied much of his time and attention. All of these weighty matters he handled with intelligence, skill, and grace.

There has been some suggestion in the press that the confirmation hearings should include a detailed examination of the nominee's role in what history has come to know as the 'Saturday Night Massacre.' I am confident that such an examination would produce nothing to the discredit of Al Haig. I would caution, however, about the difficulty of trying to reconstruct more than seven years later the tangled events of that very hectic week. In an article in the Washington Post for December 9, 1973, Susanna McBee quoted me as saying of this that 'different people have different notions of what happened. During the week after Cox's dismissal, Haig, Garment, Buzhardt and myself... were trying to reconstruct the exact course of events, and our recollections then—though obviously no one in that group had any motive whatever to be distorting memory—we could not agree among ourselves whether or not the particular matter had been proposed by Elliot or by Al and Elliot had said. 'Oh, that would be a great idea.' Even that close to the time, we had varying recollections.'

I am proud to have come to know Al Haig and to be able to call him a friend, I believe that all America will be proud of the way he will represent this nation as Secretary of State. I hope very much that he will be quickly confirmed so that he may begin on the challenging tasks that will await him.

Sincerely,

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT.

SCARSDALE, N.Y., January 6, 1981.

GENTLEMEN: We believe in our democratic form of government and part of that is the right of Congress to screen and question Presidential Cabinet choices. However, the media is full of accusations that the committee is out to "get" Haig. This, if true, is hardly the fair and just thing to do.

Mr. Chairman, you will do more harm to your party than a crucifixion.

Think about it.

Respectfully,

E. RABINOWE
(and 20 others).

ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC.,

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4229 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: This letter is in support of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., President-elect Reagan's nominee as Secretary of State. It is written primarily from my point of view as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) from 1966-1973.
I first met Alexander Haig in January 1969 when he began his service on Dr. Kissinger's staff. Our association continued through the period when he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Our interactions were largely concerned with the nuclear weapons posture of the United States. It was particularly gratifying to me that he was deeply thoughtful about means to increase the deterrent value of our nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical. I found him to be an exceptionally profound thinker, deeply concerned with the national welfare.

Subsequently, I have kept in contact with him since I left DoD in June of 1973. In particular, I have had an opportunity to exchange views with him on the relations of the U.S. with its allies in Europe. Again, I found him very thoughtful and constructive.

In my opinion Alexander Haig will make an outstanding Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

CARL WALSKE.

NATIONAL FORUM OF HISPANIC ORGANIZATIONS,

Hon. CHARLES PERCY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: As a member of the Hispanic Advisory Committee to the State Department and as Chairman of the National Forum of Hispanic Organizations, I would like to express my strong support for the confirmation of Alexander Haig as Secretary of State.

General Haig will bring to the State Department a background of vast experience in foreign affairs and 35 years of dedicated national service. He has worked effectively and efficiently for our national interests under several administrations. As Commander of our NATO forces, he won the respect of Europe's military and political leadership. His proven diplomatic skill and intimate knowledge of the broad range of American interests will enable him to successfully manage American foreign policy during these times of global uncertainty.

I look forward to working with the new Administration to assure that U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Latin/South American relations continue to improve. The President-elect has already demonstrated his deep concern in this area by his recent meetings with President Lopez Portillo of Mexico. I am confident that as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig will be instrumental in the assertion of American leadership abroad. Under General Haig's capable leadership, I am sure we can look forward to a foreign policy that is clear, consistent, and strong.

Sincerely,

RODOLFO BALLI SANCHEZ,
Chairman.

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

The administration of President-elect Ronald Reagan enters office with a mandate given it by the American people to reverse the policies of the past four years. This mandate indicates the following policies of our nation in the defense of our national interests abroad:

The most critical problem facing the United States is our relationship toward the nations of the developing sector, the so-called North-South relationship. The constant crises and threats to the vital interests of the United States over the past four years are largely the product of instability and chaos in the regions of the developing sector, points of crisis which threaten to become points of global confrontation. The Carter administration, whether it is in Central America or the Middle East, has pursued a policy which has furthered instability, a policy of "controlled disintegration" of the international order. The creation of "areas of crisis" in which we have undermined and abandoned our own allies has been the objective of Carter administration policies.

The national interest dictates a reversal of such policies and the pursuit of a policy of stabilization of potential crisis spots through the fostering of industrial and technological development among the nations of the developing sector. The stability of nation-states and the guarantee of peace among nations can only be created through economic development.
The United States, as the leading nation of the North and as the most successful product and example of such development, is obliged to provide leadership in defining this kind of North-South relationship. In combination with our allies in Europe and Japan, we can define solutions to the crises created over the past period through development-based stabilization policies. The international and domestic economic policies appropriate to such a task have been defined in detail elsewhere in the proposals of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Chairman of the National Democratic Policy Committee’s Advisory Board. We would only briefly note here that the key to large-scale industrial development, and the creation of vast new markets for the exports of this country, is the transformation of the largely speculative bubble of the $1 trillion Eurodollar market into credit, at reasonable interest rates, to finance such development.

The Department of State has the responsibility to define this in specific terms, particularly in those areas which are most vital to our nation’s interests. We will, in brief, touch on the outline of such specific policy areas.

The nations of this hemisphere, our neighbors to the South, are of special concern since the earliest days of this republic. It is in this region that the incoming administration must take the first steps to define a new North-South relationship. The starting point should be our relations with Mexico and the establishment of ties based on the transfer of advanced industrial technology from the U.S. in exchange for Mexican oil and gas exports. The oil for technology agreement will foster Mexican economic development, strengthening Mexico as a center of stability for the entire region including Central America. A U.S. stabilization policy toward Central America can only succeed on the basis of this kind of joint approach with Mexico. The same type of development approach should be extended to our allies in Latin America.

The establishment of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East must similarly solve the Palestinian issue through U.S. guarantees for economic development for both Israel and the Arab nations. Israeli security can not be achieved without a solution to the severe economic crisis faced by our Israeli allies. U.S. policy towards Israel should consist of three basic elements: one, a guarantee of the security of Israel’s 1967 borders; second, U.S. assistance in the stabilization and reorganization of Israel’s financial situation, easing the burden of Israeli debt obligations in the immediate period ahead; and third, U.S. cooperation in the rapid industrialization of Israel, providing capital assistance which combined with Israeli skilled manpower will make that country a center of high-technology industry for the entire region.

U.S. policy towards Israel should be coordinated and in support of the efforts of our allies in Western Europe to strengthen those Arab nations committed to a policy of economic-modernization. The creation of stable nation-states in the Arab world provides the circumstances for generalized Arab-Israeli peace based on economic cooperation among all the nations of the region. The Europeans should be given the primary role in this process, particularly towards Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

American policy in Asia has been totally undermined over the past period by the so-called “China Card” policy which has subordinated American national interests to the misguided pursuit of a strategic alliance with the Peoples Republic of China. The dangerous drift toward a military axis with the PRC, far from fostering stability in Asia or aiding American interests, has harmed our long-term alliances with our friends in Asia, including Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The China Card policy should be replaced by a strengthening of our strategic alliance with Japan and of the direct American presence in that region. The stability of Asia and the pursuit of American Interests can best be accomplished through large-scale economic development assistance to ASEAN and to India. The neglect of India as a major emergent power in Asia, a product also of the China Card policy, should be corrected with offers of advanced industrial and agricultural technology and expanded trade.

This overall policy properly defines the context for the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Peaceful relations with the Soviet Union should be pursued in the context of promoting the stabilization of the developing sector and preventing the growth of areas of confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Without such stabilization, the pursuit of arms control and disarmament agreements per se with the Soviet Union is a total fraud.

To the extent that the Soviet Union cooperates with this nation and our allies in fostering stability and development then our relations can improve and be conducted in a cooperative manner. To the extent that the Soviet Union
places obstacles in the path of this policy and itself fosters destabilization then the U.S. should devote the resources necessary to defending our national interests wherever they are threatened.

If these policies are clearly enunciated to the American population, to our allies, and to the nations of the developing sector, then the question of detente with the Soviet Union and its allies is clearly defined. There can be no question that our major allies in Western Europe and Japan will concur with this approach. The tensions in our relations with our allies over the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union are the result of the inconsistent and provocative behavior of the Carter administration. There is no fundamental disagreement between American national interest and the interests of our allies on the basis of this policy approach.

The basic reality of the conduct of American foreign policy over past years has been that it is not our national interests that have been determining our policy. For the past four years we have watched with dismay and anger as the Carter administration has systematically destroyed the most fundamental tenets of an American-interest foreign policy. They have brought our relations with our allies to the lowest point in post-war period; they have conducted a selective “human rights” policy which has undermined our friends and aided our adversaries; they have enthusiastically promoted a Malthusian doctrine of population reduction, genocide and famine which denies the very foundations of the American system of scientific and technological progress; and they have supported the forces of destabilization and enforced backwardness throughout the world.

These policies continue today in the efforts by the unwholesome combination of forces led by the radical social-democrats of the Socialist International, the Heritage Foundation followers of Milton Friedman, the proponents of religious fundamentalism, and elements of the leadership of the Soviet Union. The shared involvement of these various groupings in destabilization policies is a product of their common oligarchical outlook, an outlook intrinsically opposed to scientific progress.

The nominee for Secretary of State bears the responsibility for confronting these oligarchical forces and facing the reality of the current status of American foreign policy. The mandate of the American population demands a return to a national-interest policy which rests on the sound foundations of our republican tradition.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD,

Hon. Charles Percy,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
4220 Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Council for a Livable World—dedicated to the prevention of nuclear war—let me express our grave misgivings over the prospect of General Alexander Haig conducting the foreign policy of the United States. Haig’s record in the Army and in the White House is one of an individual who views international relations as a military contest and armament as the primary component of diplomacy. We hope that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will conclude that President-elect Reagan—and the country—should do far better.

We do not suggest that military hardware is not an important component of international relations. It is certainly vital for the United States to maintain a strong and credible strategic and conventional force.

But recent history suggests that General Haig is quite unrealistic when he writes: “The best way to approach military power is to conceive of it in its essential role as guarantor of diplomatic success.” The United States possessed much greater military force than the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, yet that strength was insufficient to win that war. The United States has the weapons to destroy Iran’s armed forces, oil supplies and industrial productive capacity, but that strength did not prevent the fanatics who dominate Iran from holding 52 American hostages for more than a year.

The Soviet Union, while it has shown a propensity for using its military strength in Afghanistan and elsewhere, has also discovered that an overwhelming preponderance of military might has not succeeded in taming the Chinese,
the Afghans or the Romanians, nor guaranteed the continuance of Russian military presence in Egypt or Somalia.

Unfortunately, General Haig lacks the breadth of knowledge and experience to deal with the non-military problems that dominate international discourse: oil supply questions, trade and economic problems, ancient rivalries or Third World concerns that are beyond the reach of new weapons systems. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms competition is only one part of a many faceted relationship and a myriad of issues to which, on the record, the General has paid little attention.

General Haig seems to lack appreciation of the complexities of the nuclear age. Haig has written: "We must tell the Soviets that we shall not agree to any more arms control talks . . . as long as they violate international law." Soviet violations of international law—like those of which the United States has sometimes been guilty—do make the world more dangerous. But lessening the chance of a nuclear holocaust is not a reward to the Soviet Union for good behavior; rather it is in the most basic interest of the United States to reduce the risk of nuclear war. It is incredible that General Haig would prefer to see an increased risk of nuclear devastation of the United States as a means to force the Soviets into good behavior.

The potential for a nuclear conflict, whether by accident or by design, increasingly threatens us all. A Secretary of State cannot ignore this fundamental problem while waiting for the Soviet Union to shape up. General Haig attempted to evade this question when he testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on the SALT II Treaty: he refused to endorse or to reject the Treaty, but called for it to be held "in abeyance."

In short, the United States needs a Secretary of State who recognizes and grapples with our serious differences with the Soviet Union, but also is prepared to work with the Soviet Union against the common foe of nuclear war. We need a Secretary of State who can appreciate the non-military concerns of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the rest of the world. Alexander Haig fails on both counts.

A Secretary of States who believes in military solutions to political, economic or human problems is an inappropriate chief diplomat for the 1980's. Confirmation of Alexander Haig's nomination would place the wrong man in the wrong position at the wrong time.

Yours sincerely,

DR. GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY,
Chairman.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP,
Washington, D.C.

Hon. Charles Percy,
Chairman, and Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
4229 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: The widespread public discussion regarding the place which the implementation of human rights among nations has in United States foreign policy impels us, each a person whose career has been dedicated to the advance of individual rights, to write you and each member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in connection with the forthcoming hearings on the nominations of General Alexander Haig to be the Secretary of State and of Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick to be the United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

We are concerned that the endorsement of human rights as one of the important factors in our relationship with foreign nations is being perceived by some as a recent aberration and a misguided policy.

As all Committee members are aware, as long ago as 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt protested the cruelties imposed on Armenians in Turkey; in 1906 the United States Congress memorialized the Russian Government to express its shock against the programs inflicted upon Russian Jews. In 1973, during the administration of former President Richard Nixon, this tradition of expressing concern for human rights abroad received full articulation in an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which declared that:

"It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes."

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In the following year, a Congressional Subcommittee reported:

"The human rights factor is not accorded the high priority it deserves in our country's foreign policy... unfortunately, the prevailing attitude has led the United States into embracing governments which practice torture and unabashedly violate almost every human rights guarantee pronounced by the world community. Through foreign aid and occasional intervention... the United States supports those governments."

These Congressional findings aroused the nation's concern that the United States neither be identified with nor support governments which grossly violate the human rights of their people. One of the major laws enacted in response to that concern was the 1976 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which provides that assistance may not go:

"To the government of any country which engages in the consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (except where such assistance) will directly benefit the needy people in such country."

Since then, more than twenty-five laws have been enacted which take into account the observance of internationally recognized human rights before a government receives United States aid, security and military assistance, trade benefits, or support for loans through international financial institutions, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank.

These laws, as stated in Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, have been enacted "in accordance with... international obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States..." While still recognizing other important policy considerations, these laws raise legitimate and important issues of international concern which contribute to our long term national security interests as well as to world peace.

It is in this context that we call upon you, in the exercise of your constitutional responsibility to give your advice and consent to the appointment of the Secretary of State and of the Ambassador to the United Nations, to obtain from these nominees assurances that they will faithfully execute these legislative provisions and continue to regard respect for human rights as one important factor in international relations.

Respectfully yours,

SIGNATURES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP LETTER TO SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Frank Askin, Attorney at Law, New Jersey.
Prof. Richard B. Bilder, University of Wisconsin Law School.
John Carey, Attorney at Law, New York.
David Carliner, Chairman, International Human Rights Law Group.
Dean Gordon Christenson, University of Cincinnati Law School.
Richard P. Claude, Editor, Universal Human Rights Quarterly.
Adrian W. DeWind, Attorney at Law, New York.
Prof. Norman Dorsen, New York University Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union.
Robert Drinan, former Member of Congress; Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
Prof. Richard Falk, Princeton University.
Prof. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Harvard University Law School.
Prof. Adrian S. Fisher, Georgetown University Law Center.
Judge Lois G. Forer, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
Donald T. Fox, Attorney at Law, New York.
Prof. Ann Fagan Ginger, President, Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute.
Hurst Hannum, Executive Director, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute.
Prof. Louis Henkin, Columbia University Law School.
James Hyde, Attorney at Law, Connecticut.
Harry A. Inman, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
Robert Kapp, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
Prof. Virginia A. Leary, Faculty of Law, SUNY at Buffalo.
Paul M. Liebenson, Executive Director, Inter-American Legal Services Association.
Prof. Richard B. Lillich, University of Virginia School of Law.
Prof. Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Director, Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati Law School.
STATEMENT OF THE INTERRELIGIOUS TASKFORCE ON US FOOD POLICY

We understand that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will begin hearings this week on the appointment of General Alexander Haig as Secretary of State. We hope these hearings will be used to explore fully the foreign policy views of the candidate as well as to evaluate his personal qualifications for this highly critical Cabinet position.

We write particularly to express the hope that the hearings will be an occasion to solicit General Haig's views on US relations with developing countries. Much has been reported in the press about his interest in East/West issues; in particular, his views on relations between the US and the Soviet Union. However, very little attention has been directed thus far to his views on US relations with the developing countries (North/South issues). We feel this is an equally important dimension of US foreign policy.

Moreover, we share the view of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger that our nation needs a broader understanding of national security, one which recognizes the potentially explosive threat to world peace posed by the frustration and anger of poor and hungry people in the developing countries. In recent public discussions of foreign policy, strong emphasis has been placed on the importance of military preparedness to safeguard the vital security interests of the United States. There has been insignificant discussion of the broader view of national security which holds that the US response to poverty in developing countries is as important to the protection of US national interests as are political and strategic considerations.
The upcoming confirmation hearings offer a unique opportunity for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to frame some of the key issues in the foreign policy dialogue between the Congress and the Executive branch in the coming years. The following are the sorts of questions which we feel might well be raised:

1. What should be the essential elements and objectives of U.S. relations with the developing countries?

2. While there have been attempts in recent years to improve the U.S. economic issues, progress has been limited. How can the U.S. government most effectively organize itself to assist developing countries in meeting their pressing social and economic problems? What should the role of the State Department be in this effort?

3. Discussions, presently stalemated, are under way in the United Nations on the framework and agenda for global negotiations on international economic issues such as energy, trade, and monetary reform. In your view, would it be in the U.S. interest to participate in global negotiations on international economic issues, and if so, under what conditions? If not, why not?

4. What is your reaction to the approach reportedly recommended by the foreign policy transition team, namely, that U.S. policy toward developing countries should focus primarily on key actors (such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea), the major oil exporters, and strategically-located countries allied with U.S. foreign policy objectives?

5. Does the U.S. have an obligation to help poor countries, regardless of their economic and political systems, eradicate hunger and poverty within the foreseeable future? If so, what kinds of U.S. policies and programs would most effectively contribute to the achievement of these goals?

6. What in your view is the proper role of human rights considerations in U.S. policies toward the developing countries?

7. In terms of development assistance policy, it has been suggested that bilateral aid is preferable to multilateral aid because it allows better accountability and greater political leverage. Do you agree with this view? If so, should the U.S. also continue its support for multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the development programs of international organizations? What position should the U.S. take on its outstanding commitments to the multilateral development banks, such as the sixth replenishment of IDA?

8. What steps could be taken to promote a more cooperative relationship on foreign policy issues between the Executive branch and the Congress?

As the work of the Committee proceeds during the coming months, we look forward to sharing with you the concerns and recommendations of our Taskforce on a variety of international development and economic issues. Our organization monitors those issues on behalf of a number of national religious agencies.

[From the Boston Globe, Dec. 2, 1979]

HAIG EDGES TOWARD CANDIDACY; EYES THE PRESIDENCY

(By David Nyhan)

A former military man running for office in this country is like a quarterback throwing left-handed. There’s no law against it, but it doesn’t work very often. After 18 weeks of making speeches in 38 states, retired Army Gen. Alexander Haig, former North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander, is about to become the 11th candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.

When Haig enters the contest—and a spokesman for the Draft-Haig Committee says it is now a foregone conclusion that he will declare—he will be following a course once considered by his hero, Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

And unlike any of the men running in his party, Haig can accurately claim he’s already run the executive branch. When Richard Nixon’s White House defenses were crumbling near the end of the Watergate saga, Haig served as chief of staff, presiding over a government that folded in unprecedented fashion.

Haig has told newsmen that he does not think Watergate will be a dragon in his chances, nor does he believe that a military man is automatically a loser in the primaries.

Many a general has dreamed of emulating Ulysses S. Grant or Dwight D. Eisenhower. But many have failed in politics, like Gen. Curtis LeMay, Gen. William Westmoreland or Adm. Elmo Zumwalt.
LeMay ran for Vice President on George Wallace’s American Party ticket in 1968, and earned the sobriquet “The Mad Bomber.” The former Strategic Air Command chief used colorful phrases like resorting to “the rusty knife,” or “bomb ’em back to the Stone Age,” and in the process frightened a goodly portion of the electorate.

Military men, used to the automatic salute and unquestioned obedience, traditionally have had problems dealing with cantankerous voters and uppity reporters.

But Haig likely will avoid coming across as a Colonel Klink on the stump. His exposure to Washington politics in the Nixon White House and his demonstrated skill in speechmaking will make him a more formidable campaigner than some of his predecessors who returned to civvies with visions of political victories.

In a Washington speech in early November to a group of about 150 businessmen, Haig demonstrated an oratorical style that is reminiscent of a younger Ronald Reagan.

Haig may yet founder on the shoals of domestic policy questions, or the voters may refuse to credit a military man with an understanding of an inflationary economy. But when it comes to foreign policy and military security, Haig is in his element.

In his Washington appearance, Haig displayed the expectable conservative anti-Soviet rhetoric. But he leavened his standard talk with a few chuckles. Discussing the assassination attempt that damaged his car in June when a terrorist bomb exploded under a bridge he was crossing, he said he later received condolences from a high-ranking Carter Administration appointee.

Haig said he told the Carter man that when he reflected on how the assassination was bungled: “I immediately thought of your people.”

Perhaps the most startling aspect of Haig’s Washington speech came in response to a question of how he would have handled the Iran hostage problem. After initially calling on Americans to “rally round the President,” Haig lowered his voice and said the Administration should consider every option. Then, after a melodramatic pause, he added, “even the unthinkable.”

No one asked him what “the unthinkable” amounted to. The businessmen appeared genuinely impressed with the speaker, who orates easily over the geopolitical situation around the world, who drops world-class names in remarks like “when I spent four hours talking with Chou En-lai, he told me . . .”

Many GOP pros insist Haig is really running for Vice President, a suggestion Haig’s staff is eager to scotch. Haig also had considered running for a vacant US Senate seat in Pennsylvania, his home state. He currently operates out of an office at the University of Pennsylvania’s Foreign Policy Research Institute.

His people talk about an early-December announcement, but their plans for seeking delegates in the early primaries and caucus states are up in the air.

Haig soon will release two geopolitical studies for publication. A spokesman says he is the top drawing card on the GOP lecture circuit in terms of money raised for the party. His policies are basically pro-military, pro-big oil and anti-Soviet. He attached four big conditions to his support for the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II), conditions the Carter Administration is unlikely to meet.

He will criticize President Jammy Carter for announcing to the world initially that he would not employ force in an attempt to free the hostages in Iran.

His basic pitch will be that the US role in the world has deteriorated to a dangerous level; that European leaders are disdainful of Carter’s performance in office; and that the United States is going to hell in a handbasket because we are not tough enough and consistent enough overseas.

[From the Boston Globe, Jan. 15, 1981]

A GAP IN THE GENERAL’S MEMORY

(By David Nyhan)

Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he does not recall criticizing the Carter Administration last November for renouncing the use of military force to free the hostages in Iran. Ronald Reagan’s nominee for Secretary of State testified last Friday that he recalled neither the incident nor saying, as reported by me 13 months ago in this newspaper, that the President should consider every option, “even the unthinkable.”
To refresh Gen. Haig’s memory: Shortly after 10 a.m. on Nov. 8, 1979, he strode into a basement function room at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington to address a seminar for about 150 public relations executives assembled by the Public Affairs Council. Wearing a business suit and escorted by several aides, Haig waited at the rear of the room for the conclusion of a panel. While he was being introduced, he moved up and down on the balls of his feet, like a boxer preparing to make his way to ringside.

After welcoming applause, he launched into a speech criticizing the Carter Administration’s conduct of foreign affairs. The hostages had been seized only four days earlier, and two days after that the White House publicly renounced the use of military force.

At the time, Gen. Haig, retired from NATO, was considering running for the GOP presidential nomination. A National Draft Haig Committee operated out of Philadelphia, his hometown. Haig had made speeches in 38 states during the preceding 18 weeks, some of them for fees of $10,000 or $15,000. His committee said it was “virtually certain” (Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1979) that Haig would declare.

Haig in his talk joked about the unsuccessful assassination attempt when his car was blown up by terrorists in Brussels. When one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called Haig to express relief, Haig said he cracked to the Carter-appointed general that, considering the Administration’s reputation and the fact that the job was bungled, “I immediately thought of your people.” The joke, indeed the whole speech, went over well.

Haig talked about relations with Helmut Schmidt; an occasion “when I spent four hours talking with Chou En-lai”; the threat to western industrial nations posed by the toppling of the shah; tension in the Mideast; his belief that we needed to stand up tougher against the Russians.

In the subsequent question period, when asked about the hostage seizure four days earlier, he said it was a mistake for Carter to have ruled out the use of force so early in the game. The President, under such circumstances, should strive to maintain as many options as possible, “even,” and here Haig lowered his voice after a pause, “the unthinkable.” Nobody asked whether that meant nuclear weapons, or precisely what he meant, until Sen. Claiborne Pell (D.Rhode Island) questioned him last Friday:

Pell: I was relieved this morning when you said there had been no event that had arisen since World War II that would have justified the use of nuclear weapons on our part. But, in connection with that, didn’t you say to a group of Washington businessmen, quoted in The Boston Globe of Dec. 2, 1979, that in connection with the hostages, every option should be considered, including “even the unthinkable.” What did you mean by “the unthinkable?”

Haig: In the first place, senator, I am not sure I am familiar at all with what you are referring to. In The Boston Globe?

Pell: The Boston Globe of Dec. 2, I would get it in my hand—I don’t have it in my hand—from the library next time, but I am told that this was a quotation. Haig: Including “the unthinkable”? And it said, “including the unthinkable?”

Pell: Including “the unthinkable.”

Haig: I don’t even recall the incident. It does not sound like my language—“unthinkable.” I would have been more precise if I had felt it was justified.

Pell: Somebody gave me the article.

Haig: I’m glad. He probably gave you the question too. So he’s probably the expert on it.

Pell (quoting the article): “Perhaps the most startling aspect of Haig’s Washington speech came in response to a question of how he would have handled the Iran hostage problem. After initially calling on Americans to ‘rally round the President,’ Haig lowered his voice and said the Administration should consider every option. Then, after a melodramatic pause, he added, ‘even the unthinkable.’”

Haig: Well, senator, I don’t recall that.

Pell: Well, good, I’m delighted. And I trust the story is inaccurate and I’m glad to assume it was.

It isn’t inaccurate. The Public Affairs Council said Monday it does not keep tape recordings or stenographic transcripts of its sessions. I don’t have a tape, but I took notes.

Haig doesn’t remember the incident or the quote. I say he said it. Haig did not flatout deny he said it. He just said he didn’t recall it and that, if he had used language like that, he would have been more precise. Gen. Haig was not terribly
precise when he blamed the infamous gap on the Watergate tapes on "a sinister
force."

But is the fuss over whether one fellow used a word a year ago that another
fellow says he did? Or is the real issue at what point do we retaliate with "the
unthinkable," whatever that means? Like Haig, I hold there are things worth
fighting for. Like America's survival. Or the truth.

STATEMENT OF THE COALITION FOR HUMAN PRIORITIES, NEWARK, N.J., IN OPPOSITION
TO THE NOMINATION OF GEN. ALEXANDER HAIG AS SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator Percy and members of the Foreign Relations Committee: The Coalition
for Human Priorities consists of civic and religious leaders in the Essex
County, New Jersey area who are concerned about national priorities which
seem to place military might above human needs.

The Secretary of State is our country's ambassador to the world. He is the
person to whom the world's billions must look for assurances that the land of the
free and the home of the brave will honor its commitment to peace and social
justice, will continue to be a bulwark for human dignity.

We believe that General Alexander Haig is not well suited, by training or tem-
perament, as revealed by the public record, to perform in that tradition. Worse
yet, no matter how General Haig may intend to perform in the role of Secretary,
his very appointment will be viewed by millions as a renunciation by the United
States of its historic commitments. How would we view it if the Soviet Union
appointed one of its leading generals as Foreign Minister—especially after elevat-
ing a former KGB director to vice-premier? The clear implication of this appoint-
ment is that the United States is ready to abandon the diplomatic search for
peaceful solutions in favor of reliance on military might.

General Haig's military training and career is not an absolute bar to his
assuming the position of Secretary of State, but it does urge caution in consider-
ing his nomination. General George Marshall once served admirably in that role, but
General Marshall was an uncommon soldier at the end of his career. Furthermore,
his appointment was always recognized as an anomaly, not as a precedent.

General Haig has been the paradigm of the military man. His total professional
commitment has been to the development of military strategies and the enforce-
ment of military-style discipline. He has devoted total devotion to the command
function, giving orders and following them. In this regard, he has been an exem-
plary soldier. But this background and training ill suits him to deal in the com-
plex give-and-take world of international relations, where the key to success is
accommodation, not command.

General Haig's role as Chief of Staff in the Nixon White House does nothing
to ease our concern about his lack of devotion to humane values. While there
are still a number of unsettled questions concerning General Haig's role in the
Watergate affair and other related incidents, questions we assume the Senate
will explore during the course of its hearings, there is already a good deal of
disquieting information on the public record concerning his performance.

For example, there is the widely reported Nixon tape on which Gen. Haig is
heard advising the President "You just can't recall . . . " during a discussion
of ways in which Mr. Nixon might avoid allegations of wrongdoing. There is in
that conversation at least a hint of the overeager soldier trying to serve his
commander, right or wrong.

Another example of General Haig's unswerving loyalty to the command struc-
ture even at the expense of legal and constitutional principal is his role in the
infamous "Saturday night massacre", when he ordered the firing of Special
Prosecutor Cox and the sealing of the Special Prosecutor's office, in an effort
to prevent the Prosecutor from gaining access to tapes that later turned out to
be incriminating to Mr. Nixon.

And most disturbing of all is General Haig's role in the illegal wiretapping of
his former colleagues on the National Security Council. While General Haig's
position, as we understand it, is that he was merely a courier who transmitted
the names of wiretap targets and the logs between the White House and the
FBI, he was certainly not unaware of the events he was aiding and abetting. He
was, at least, a witting and knowing agent of whoever was responsible for that
unconstitutional undertaking.

General Haig's insistence on blind loyalty—from himself to his superiors and
from his subordinates to himself—is further illustrated by the December 31
column of Anthony Lewis in the New York Times concerning an incident at West
Point when Haig was a regimental commander. A copy of the Lewis column is attached.

While there may be open questions in regard to the facts of all of these incidents and none in and of itself may disqualify General Haig from serving as Secretary of State, they all point to a rigidity of mind and single-mindedness of purpose which may be admirable in a military man but are unacceptable in a Secretary of State.

Most disturbing of all, each of these incidents is indicative of a person who by training and temperament constantly subordinates concerns for the dignity and sanctity of the individual to what he perceives to be paramount "political" objectives.

This concern is strengthened by recent statements by General Haig denigrating the importance of the human rights policy enforced, albeit haltingly and inconsistently, by the State Department during the past administration. General Haig has indicated he would be much more amendable to supporting autocrats and dictators when he considered it in the strategic interests of the United States.

We deny that it is ever consistent with the best interests of the nation to support torturers and dictators. Such a policy is inconsistent with our paramount need to project a positive world image and to assert leadership in the free world. It is further incompatible with the 1976 Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act which forbid American aid to the government of any country which "engages in the consistent pattern of gross violations" of human rights.

General Haig may have many admirable qualities. Flexibility, patience and accommodation do not seem to be among them. Nor a concern for the dignity of the individual or a recognition of the strivings of people all over the globe—and especially Latin America—for liberation from centuries of exploitation and oppression.

Yet these are the very qualities most needed in today's complex world in a Secretary of State whose main function must be to avoid exploding the nuclear powder keg on which the world sits. His entire history suggests that General Haig is much too prone to confrontation and demand, would be too quick to seek military solutions and would be too likely to rely on the information and advice of his old friends in the Pentagon. The Department of State should remain in the hands of diplomats, not turned over to the militarists.

For all of these reasons, we urge the Senate, in the execution of its constitutional function, to withhold its consent to the nomination of General Haig as Secretary of State.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK ASKIN,
Coordinator, Coalition for Human Priorities.

A GLIMPSE OF HAIG EN ROUTE

(By Anthony Lewis)

BOSTON, Dec. 31.—When Colonel Alexander Haig became commander of the Third Regiment at West Point in 1967, his first order was about marching. Every cadet in the regiment, he said, would march with his fingers cocked squarely at the second knuckle, thumb running stiffly along the index finger and pointing "like an arrow" to the ground. Elbows rigidly locked.

That and much else about Haig at West Point was recalled in a 1973 article by someone who had been a cadet in his regiment, Lucian K. Truscott 4th. Truscott's piece, published in The Village Voice when Haig became chief of staff to President Nixon, gives an unusually intimate glimpse of a man on the way to becoming a four-star general and, now Ronald Reagan's designee as Secretary of State.

The most arresting episode in the piece concerns a West Point rule that every cadet, regardless of his beliefs, attend chapel of one kind or another every Sunday. Truscott and a classmate, after three years at the Military Academy, questioned the lawfulness of the regulation under the First Amendment. They asked to see the Inspector General, as posted notices said they had a right to do.

The two cadets were sent to see Colonel Haig. He said: "Tell you what I'm going to do, men. I'm going to do you a big favor. I'm going to send you on back down to the company and forget this ever happened. You see, if you go forward with this request (to see the I.G.), you can only hurt yourselves, and I don't want to see that happen."
That was in the spring of 1963. In September Truscott and three other cadets returned to the issue. This time they questioned the practice of automatically deducting chapel “donations” from their pay. They asked to see the Inspector General. Colonel Haig called Truscott and the others in.

“I’m going to attach this green memo-routing slip to these requests,” Haig told them, “and fire them back on down. Do you a favor. Because if these go up, Mr. T., you’ll leave the Commandant with no recourse but to eliminate all four of you from the Academy. Do you understand that? You’re boxing him in, Mr. T.”

Truscott replied that he thought the Commandant could either approve the requests or deny them without eliminating the four cadets. At that, he writes, Haig became agitated. He moved toward Truscott, stopping inches away, his fist raised. “You little bastard,” he said, “I will personally see you out of here one way or another.”

In the following weeks Truscott found himself the target of a covert campaign. He was charged with an honor violation that, when tested, no one in the honor system believed. Proceedings were begun, and then dropped, to eliminate him for lack of “aptitude.” His room was ransacked and papers said to be of a “subversive nature” taken; they were letters to an editor.

What Truscott noticed, in all this, was that Haig never allowed any discussion of the chapel issue on its merits. In fact, the Federal courts later held that compulsory chapel attendance at the service academies was unconstitutional.

In 1969 Truscott, by then an officer at Fort Carson, Colorado, met Gen. Bernard Rogers, who had been Commandant at West Point during the episode. But he knew nothing about it—nothing about Haig’s statement that Rogers would have to eliminate the cadets if they pressed their complaint about compulsory chapel. Rogers was “flabbergasted,” Truscott says.

Haig was not interested in the merits, Truscott concludes, because his interest was in his own career. He was afraid that the constitutional challenge, if allowed to go forward, would be a blemish on his record—a sign that he could not deal with upstarts.

Interestingly, Truscott concedes that he became a rebel. The son and grandson of military men, he turned against the life and soon resigned his commission under other than honorable conditions. He credits Haig with sensing that in him but says Haig could not deal directly with his moral and psychological position. Instead Haig used threats and covert pressure to make him withdraw the legal challenge.

“Haig,” he writes, “is the ultimate action/reaction addict . . ., a distruster of what he must see to the frailties of lesser men: ideology, morality, a sense of the inevitability of one’s death, the acceptance of sin and redemption, in short all those qualities which give man a context in which to live, a reason for being . . . .

“He did not have a center. There was never a core off which his various selves had to bounce. He is the abominable no-man, a man for whom the only true authority, inner or outer, is the Action.”

Military men have played great civilian roles in American history. General Haig himself mentioned Secretary of State Marshall as an example. But the point about General Marshall is that he was not a mere military careerist or martinet; He had a center. It is impossible to imagine George C. Marshall threatening a subordinate.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Hon. Charles Percy,
Foreign Relation Committee,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck: I may be away at the time of your confirmation hearings on General Alexander Haig as Secretary of State. General Haig’s original roots were in my Congressional District although he is certainly known nationally in constituency. He has served our Nation with great distinction in times of extraordinary crisis.

I believe he is eminently qualified to be Secretary of State and heartily encourage his confirmation.

With all best wishes,
Cordially,

Lawrence Coughlin.
THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, SCHOOL OF LAW,
Athens, Ga., January 8, 1981.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman Senate Foreign Relations,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I do not know General Haig and have no personal views on the issues which may arise during the course of his confirmation hearings. I do hope, however, that the questions which may arise can be dealt with promptly and that a decision will be made (up or down) without the kind of long drawn out spectacle which could cripple the office of Secretary of State.

With personal best wishes,
Sincerely,

DEAN BUSK.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
New Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHUCK: When I tried to call you this morning and found you were in Committee meetings and unavailable, I asked to be transferred to Scott Cohen, but he wasn’t available either.

The principal message I wanted to convey to you, without seeming to be presumptuous, is that as a person formerly involved in the foreign affairs of this country and still very much interested in them, I would like to urge that you, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thoroughly investigate nominee Alexander Haig’s views on foreign policy and his qualifications to implement them as you determine his qualifications for assuming the position of Secretary of State.

However, for the good of our country and for our standing in world affairs I hope that your hearings do not dwell too long on the relationship of Al Haig to former President Nixon, except insofar as he was attempting to serve the Chief Executive Officer of our country and carry out the foreign policy as laid down by the President and the Secretary of State.

Having worked with Al Haig when he was Deputy to the National Security Advisor and I was Ambassador to Japan, and again when he was Chief of Staff for President Nixon and I was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Deputy Secretary of State, I can attest that all of the actions that he took during his service in the White House were in his judgment in the best interests of the United States. I sincerely hope that your Committee can quickly review all of Al Haig’s background that you think is pertinent, but particularly his views on foreign policy, and clear him for approval by the full Senate at as early a date as possible so that he can be sworn in and begin serving our country in that most vital position in the very near future.

Sincerely,

[Western Union Mallgram]

MAJ. GEN. EUGENE A. SALET,
201 East Greene Street,
Milledgeville, Ga., January 8, 1981.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: In the very near future you and your committee will be considering General Alexander Haig for Secretary of State. The purpose of this letter is to give you my considered judgment on the qualification of General Haig for this highly sensitive position. I do so as a private citizen.

I have known General Haig since he was a student of mine at the Army War College in the class of 1966. At that time, General Haig was a young full colonel and even then he was truly outstanding among his peers, all of whom represented the cream of the Army’s Officer Corps. It was during this period that I soon learned that Al Haig was a man of rocklike character and that he possesses a fine intellect. In fact, in many respects, he has a brilliant mind; he is an innovator, and above all, his integrity has shown forth as a beacon in the night.
I am sure you would have to agree with me that during the agonizing days of Watergate General Haig’s integrity emerged unsullied. I’m sure you would also agree that had there been a hint of impropriety on the part of General Haig in the handling of the very crucial issues confronting him during this critical period in the history of these United States, those lying in ambush would have certainly pounced upon them.

There is no question in my mind and, I’m sure, in the minds of all those who know General Haig, regardless of their political persuasion that he has very clearcut qualifications for this highly important Cabinet post. His records as a soldier, as a diplomat, and as a key contributor to the formulation of national security policy attests to the soundness of his qualifications.

While I agree that General Haig should be asked to review his service during the Watergate period, and as to his views on war, peace, dictators, and so on, and while I’m sure that he welcomes an opportunity to respond to such questioning, it is my hope that it is conducted in a totally fair and unbiased manner. What this country needs today, as much as it ever did in its history, is men of unquestioned integrity and ability in top governmental posts, of these, the Secretary of State is certainly one of the most important. What we do not need is purely partisan squabble for the sakes of partisan politics in this critical period of our country. I am confident, however, that men of your integrity and understanding of the complexity of the foreign affairs arena will insure that our country gets a man of the caliber of General Haig as Secretary of State. That man is General Alexander Haig.

Warm personal regards.
Sincerely,

EUGENE A. SALET,
Major General USA (Ret.),
President, Georgia Military College.