REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

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EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FOR THE YEAR 1954

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*The Honorable Pat McCarran was active in the work of the subcommittee until his death, September 28, 1954.*
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**KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS, RESPECTING HEARINGS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE**

- **U. N.**—Activities of United States Citizens employed by U. N.
- **IPR**—Institute of Pacific Relations.
- **Ed.**—Subversive Influence in the Educational Process.
- **H.**—Hearing (Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments unless otherwise indicated).
- **R.**—Report.
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

SECTION I

"FIGURES IN A PATTERN"

This report of the subcommittee is merely a pause for breath to examine the figures which have been added to the pattern since the last report was issued. Four years ago, for example, the subcommittee began its existence with a far-reaching investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In the course of this investigation we examined the activities of a group of political advisers assigned by the State Department to Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer who was Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the years before the Chinese Communist triumphs.

"If we had followed their advice," General Wedemeyer told the subcommittee, "communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly than it did."

In the Institute of Pacific Relations investigation we also studied the activities of Communist and pro-Communist individuals who directed the Pacific operations of the Office of War Information and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

In the early part of this year we disclosed serious Communist penetration into the Information and Education Division of the United States Army during World War II.

At the end of the year we had under scrutiny a group of Americans who have been and are giving aid and comfort to the cause of Red China, both in the Far East and the United States. Virtually every one of these individuals has some connection with persons or institutions which had been scrutinized in previous investigations mentioned above. Some were attached to the Institute of Pacific Relations and some worked for the Office of War Information and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. One was a research scientist with the atomic bomb project at Los Alamos. One was in the United States Information Service. One was in the Information and Education Branch of the Army. One worked for the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund.
Almost every one made his way to the Far East at the expense of the American taxpayer. Their story, like all the others scattered throughout our entire record, emphasizes the myriad entanglements of the Communist pattern.

A Year's Work

During the year 1954, the Subcommittee on Internal Security held hearings on the following subjects:
1. Activities of Soviet secret intelligence.
2. Interlocking subversion in policymaking.
3. Merchant marine radio operators and subversive files of the United States Naval Intelligence.
4. Communist infiltration of the United States Army's Information and Education Division of World War II.
5. Activities of United States citizens in Red China.
6. The Korean war and related matters. (The subcommittee has presented a separate report on this subject.)
7. Strategy and tactics of world communism.
8. Communist printing and propaganda.
10. Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc.

SECTION II

Changes in the Laws

Before presenting its report on the matters outlined above, the subcommittee calls attention to the record of legislation of the 83d Congress in regard to anti-Communist legislation. The subcommittee believes that no previous Congress ever made such an impressive record in this field. The record disposes once and for all of the argument that congressional investigations of Communist activity have no legislative purpose.

Of the 10 antisubversive bills enacted by Congress and approved by President Eisenhower, several were the direct result of information developed in hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee.

For instance, immunity legislation was recommended by the subcommittee in July 1952, in its report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, and was introduced by the then chairman, the late Senator Pat McCarran. It is intended to provide a means through which a reluctant witness can be required to testify.

Legislation requiring the registration of printing equipment used in producing Communist propaganda, was initiated by Senator Herman Welker, a subcommittee member, after he had conducted a series of hearings which revealed the variety and enormous volume of Communist literature produced in this country.

Legislation recommended by the subcommittee and initiated in 1951 by the late Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, then chairman, to curb the Communist influence in labor unions was enacted in 1954 as Public Law 637.

This law denies bargaining power to unions which have been found by the Subversive Control Board to be dominated by Communists.
Senators Butler and Welker, committee members, Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican of Michigan, and Senator Barry Goldwater, all of whom had sponsored legislation in this field, were cosponsors with Senator McCarran in the final draft.

The legislation passed the Senate as recommended by the subcommittee and the Judiciary Committee, but with amendments adding provisions to outlaw the Communist Party.

Another bill, S. 23, containing other safeguards against Communist infiltration in labor unions, also was recommended by the subcommittee and by the full Judiciary Committee, but Congress adjourned before it was considered by the Senate. Among its provisions is one which would permit an employer, without being held accountable for an unfair labor practice, to discharge an employee who is a member of a subversive organization.

Supporting data for provisions of new legislation strengthening the foreign agents registration laws was provided by our hearings on espionage activities of personnel attached to the Iron Curtain embassies, activities of Soviet secret service, and subversive and illegal aliens in the United States. The need for such legislation also was emphasized by testimony of Col. Ismail Ege and Nicolai Khokhlov, former Soviet secret police officers, and by other testimony before the subcommittee.

There also can be no question that the subcommittee's hearings on Government infiltration, particularly the phase involving former Treasury officials, generated support for such legislation as that authorizing the FBI to conduct investigations of Treasury personnel, to prohibit payment of Federal annuities to persons convicted of subversive activities, and for forfeiture of United States nationality upon conviction of advocating, or conspiring to advocate, the overthrow of our Government by force or violence.

In addition to the legislation which is now public law, the Senate passed six other antisubversive measures on which the House did not act. All of these undoubtedly will be reintroduced in the new Congress. The new legislation referred to follows, with the public law number:

Public Law 600. To provide immunity for certain witnesses before congressional committees.
Public Law 557. To require registration of printing equipment owned or operated by subversive organizations.
Public Law 637. To bar Communist-dominated unions from benefits of the National Labor Relations Act and to strip from the Communist Party all its legal rights.
Public Law 264. To authorize the seizure, under the Espionage Act, of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft used in illegal transportation.
Public Law 725. Authorizing the FBI to investigate irregularities among Treasury personnel.
Public Law 777. Making the death penalty applicable upon conviction for peacetime as well as wartime espionage and sabotage and otherwise strengthening the espionage law.
Public Law 772. For forfeiture of United States nationality upon conviction of advocating, or conspiring to advocate, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence.
Public Law 709. To prohibit payment of Federal annuities to persons convicted of treason, sedition, subversive activities, and other crimes.
Public Law 602. To increase the penalties for harboring fugitives from justice.
Public Law 603. To increase the penalties for bail jumping.
The following bills were passed by the Senate but the House adjourned without acting on them:


S. 3428. Ferguson—To authorize the Federal Government to bar from strategic defense facilities any individuals who are subversive or may be disposed to commit acts of sabotage, espionage, or other subversion.

S. 19. McCarran—To suspend the statute of limitations during the period an officer or employee of the Federal Government is in the public service.

S. 2719. Goldwater—To authorize the discontinuance of veterans' educational benefits to an individual when it is found that the pursuit of such activity is not to the best interest of the individual or the Government.

S. 3660. Watkins—To make unlawful the employment of any alien known by the employer to have entered the United States illegally during 3 years prior to such employment.

S. 3661. Watkins—To make unlawful the transportation of an alien who has entered the United States illegally within 3 years prior to such transportation and to provide for seizure of the vehicle used in such transportation.

SECTION III

WORK OF SPECIAL TASK FORCES

Throughout the 4 years of its existence, the subcommittee has persistently sought to expose the power wielded by Communist elements in certain labor unions and to reveal the sinister influence imposed on millions of loyal workmen by the infiltration, and sometimes the domination, of Communists in such unions.

In previous years we have disclosed, in published testimony, the situation we found in the telegraph industry, the Dining Car and Railroad Food Workers Union, the United Public Workers of America, the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.

As early as 1951 the subcommittee proposed remedial legislation, which was introduced by the then chairman, the late Senator McCarran.

Beginning in December 1953, and extending well into 1954, a task force of the subcommittee, consisting of Senator Butler, as chairman, Senator Welker, and Senator McCarran, conducted a series of hearings on subversive influence in certain labor organizations.

During the course of these hearings, the task force heard 61 witnesses and published four volumes of testimony.

On the basis of this evidence, the task force reviewed four similar bills, S. 23 and S. 2286 by Senator McCarran, S. 1254 by Senator Goldwater, and S. 1606 by Senator Butler and produced a new bill which, approved by the Committee on the Judiciary and enacted by the Congress, became Public Law 637.

This law denies bargaining powers to any union which the Subversive Control Board finds to be Communist infiltrated. The Senate bill was passed without change in its labor provisions, but with an amendment from the floor which added additional sections which outlaw the Communist Party.

The Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, Jr., in a press conference after the legislation had become law, described its labor features as "this new and powerful weapon given to the law enforcement agencies of the Government."
This same task force also processed H. R. 9500, the Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954, which is now Public Law 777.

While this legislation follows a draft prepared by the Justice Department, the subcommittee feels that its hearings on the labor situation, as well as numerous other inquiries it conducted on the subject of espionage in the past generated support which materially aided in approval of the bill.

Legislation to strengthen protection against sabotage in defense facilities also was processed by this task force. The bill S. 3428 passed the Senate, but was not acted on by the House.

Under a task force consisting of Chairman Jenner and Senators Welker and McCarran, an enlightening picture of the Kremlin's efforts to use international trade as a weapon against the free nations under the same old phony slogan of "peaceful coexistence" was developed. Seeking a documentation of the strategy and tactics of world communism, the task force examined 17 witnesses. Among them were an Army general, several international traders, a lawyer, and 3 writers who specialized on foreign trade, a college teacher active in an organization of anti-Communist Russians, 2 former intelligence officers, and 2 expatriated Russians.

These witnesses revealed an outwardly plausible but highly dangerous and historically worthless trade program offered by the Communist dictators.

Many of the witnesses advocated severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government; some suggested withdrawal from the United Nations.

Members of the task force joined in introduction of a bill making it a felony to import or ship in interstate commerce any commodity or goods produced by slave labor.

This task force also processed Senate Joint Resolution 169 introduced by Senator Welker authorizing the President to proclaim the first Sunday of each month as a day of prayer for people enslaved behind the Iron Curtain. It passed the Senate but was not acted on by the House.

Legislation designed to check the Communist propaganda machine in this country evolved from a series of hearings conducted by a task force consisting of Senators Welker, Butler, and McCarran. This bill was enacted by Congress and became Public Law 557.

In 1954, the task force took testimony from 27 witnesses in 11 hearings and this record, supplementing earlier hearings in which Senator Eastland participated, furnished a picture of a Communist printing and propaganda machine of astounding proportions.

In addition to the many types of Communist propaganda originating in this country, the task force examined a vast amount of Communist material shipped here from Iron Curtain countries.

The subcommittee published one volume of hearings with a report on Communist underground printing facilities and illegal propaganda. It also published, in three parts, task force hearings on Communist propaganda directed at political subversion.

Legislation introduced by Senator McCarran to strengthen the controls exercised under the Foreign Agents Registration Act over foreign propaganda also was processed by this task force. This bill, S. 37, would apply to the importation of foreign propaganda. It passed the Senate, but was not acted on in the House.
Senator Eastland headed a task force assigned to an investigation of the Southern Conference Education Fund, Inc. Testimony was taken from 13 witnesses in a public hearing.

Members of the subcommittee, as designated by the chairman, conducted hearings on communism in the District of Columbia, Communist infiltration from abroad and Communist activities of naturalized citizens.

In addition, task forces conducted many exploratory, investigative hearings held in executive session.

In 1 case in 1954, an executive hearing contributed to the removal of 8 American citizens from an international agency. They were removed because their records, as reported to the subcommittee, indicated substantial subversive activity.

The subcommittee has learned that no phase of its study of Communist influence can be completely closed so long as the Kremlin conspirators remain in power. Indeed, the Congress recognized that fact when it created the subcommittee and charged it with a continuing study of subversion in all its forms.

One paragraph of the enabling resolution declares that those who seek to evade the laws on subversion, espionage, and other efforts to destroy our Government "constantly seek to devise and do devise clever and evasive means and tactics for such purpose."

Thus, the subcommittee emphasizes that its exposures of Communist penetration of labor organizations, Communist propaganda, and of the strategy and tactics of world communism must go on with unrelenting zeal.

SECTION IV

ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET SECRET INTELLIGENCE

To properly understand the Communist fifth column which has its agents in our midst, it is necessary to have an insight into the nature of the Soviet Secret Service, the parent body. We had as a witness on May 21, 1954, Nikolai Evgeniyevich Khokhlov, who had been in the service of the Soviet MGB, the organization dealing with intelligence and counterintelligence. Highlights of his testimony were as follows:

During the last war, Mr. Khokhlov belonged to the fourth administration of the MGB (later known as the ninth section), which was in charge of guerrilla or partisan warfare. The real purpose of the organization was diversionary and terroristic activity abroad in behalf of the Soviet Union, including the assassination of anti-Soviet individuals. (Diversionary activities were described by Mr. Khokhlov as preparation or organization of explosions, sabotage, setting fires in ports and harbors, and throwing bombs in cities to create panic. Mr. Khokhlov said that for 13 years he had received training from this organization, studying foreign languages and being schooled for life abroad.)

In October 1953, Khokhlov was assigned to Berlin for the job of assassinating Georgi Sergeeyevich Okolovich, a leader of an anti-Soviet Russian emigre propaganda group known as the National Labor Alliance or NTS. The assignment was made by Khokhlov's superior, Col. L. A. Studnikov, a subordinate of Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Sememovich Panyushkin, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States.
As a precautionary measure, Khokhlov was forbidden by Studnikov to carry out the assassination personally. He was instructed to recruit two German agents and prepare the necessary documents and weapons for the purpose. He was assigned to make a study of the extensive file of Okolovich and his organization. Over $11,000 was allotted to him for the project and he was equipped with a suitable passport.

Despite his education under the Soviet regime and his long career in the MGB, Khokhlov balked at his assignment. He was influenced by his wife, Yanina, educated under the Soviets, but nevertheless, a devoutly religious woman. She declared that she would not be the wife of an assassin.

Determined to save his wife and child from the Soviet regime and to free himself from the terrors of the MGB, Khokhlov decided that he would seek the advice of the man he was assigned to kill, Okolovich, the only person he felt he could trust not to betray him to the Soviet police. He thought he might be aided by the National Labor Alliance. He prepared systematically for his meeting with Okolovich.

Addressing himself to Panyushkin, the official in charge of such matters, Khokhlov requested the construction of special weapons for the assassination, including a cigarette case and a 3-shot pistol, both equipped to fire explosive poison bullets noiselessly. These were to be manufactured by MGB laboratories 12 and 13, which produced secret weapons. (Khokhlov presented these two deadly weapons as exhibits in the course of his testimony before the subcommittee.) He also collected documentary material from the MGB file and forwarded it to a hideout in Lausanne, Switzerland. All this material, he felt, would be useful in his effort to enlist aid for his family.

For his agents, he selected two German Communists who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. (In view of the fact that a number of American Communists had fought in the Spanish Loyalist forces, Mr. Khokhlov was asked by committee counsel, "Was it the practice of the MGB to use persons who had experience in the Spanish Civil War for such activity?" He answered, "Yes; this is a widespread practice." He was then asked, "Would you say it is the practice of the Communist Parties throughout the world to make available such agents for enlistment by the MGB?" He answered, "The Communist Party always served faithfully the Soviet Intelligence Service.")

Khokhlov's agents were carefully trained for their assignment by a champion pistol shot in Moscow. They were shipped by plane from Moscow to Berlin and then to Vienna, where Khokhlov arrived on January 13, 1954, in a Soviet civil aircraft. Having checked on the training and the directives issued to his associates, on the transmission of funds, mostly in dollars, Khokhlov was ready for his mission. Suddenly orders came from Moscow ordering delays so as not to interfere with diplomatic maneuvers at the Berlin Conference.

Khokhlov was prepared with the greatest of care for his macabre mission. He received precise information as to Okolovich's mode of living, the floor on which he lived, the number of windows, and similar details. He knew that it was possible to enter Okolovich's residence only between 6 and 7 in the evening, when the guards left and the street door would not be locked.

February 18, at about 6:30 p.m., Khokhlov appeared at the Okolovich apartment. He explained that he had been sent from Moscow to
murder Okolovich and offered to furnish proof. Khokhlov described the details of previous attempts to assassinate Okolovich, which could be known only to the MGB. He said he could not be an assassin and pleaded for aid in saving his wife and child through the aid of the National Labor Alliance. Okolovich said that this was impossible but offered to place Khokhlov in contact with Western authorities, which was done. (At the close of this phase of his testimony, Khokhlov made a plea to the President of the United States to save his wife and child.)

In 1943, during World War II, Khokhlov had been assigned to assassinate a German gauleiter named Kube in western Byelorussia. With the aid of a household servant and a magnetized mine placed under Kube's bed, that job was successfully accomplished. Khokhlov said the MGB used highly trained personnel for its murders, individuals with previous experience in the gory business.

From 1946 to 1949, Khokhlov carried out an assignment in Rumania. In 1952 Khokhlov was designated by Lieutenant General Sudaplavov to carry out the peacetime murder of a certain Russian emigre in Paris. He was instructed to go to France with forged Swiss documents, accompanied by an MGB woman, Major Ivanova, who was to serve as a watchdog over Khokhlov and perhaps assassinate him after the completion of the project. According to schedule he was to liquidate, not only this emigre, but also his friend who was to be the finger man for the job. Khokhlov told his superior that he was physically and morally incapable of carrying out this mission and his assignment was canceled.

In the course of his testimony, Khokhlov described the internal structure of the MGB, especially the Ninth Section headed by Sudaplavov, which included an American desk for terrorist and diversionary activities against the United States. According to him, operatives were told that their main target was American military installations, warehouses and harbors. Laboratory 13, he said, produced the chemicals and technical devices for incendiary action against such targets, these materials being packed in containers to give the appearance of ordinary American products like soap, etc. Soviet Embassies, trade missions and other Soviet organizations abroad, he testified, are used for collecting intelligence information; officials functioning in such legal organizations do not participate in terroristic or diversionary activity, nor are they in contact with those so engaged.

Khokhlov said that the Russian people were not in sympathy with any war against the United States nor were they in sympathy with the present regime in the Soviet Union.

Since Mr. Khokhlov is an escapee from Soviet Russia, and, since it is impossible to check the authenticity of his testimony, the subcommittee does not vouch for its veracity.

SECTION V

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN POLICYMAKING

In its report on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments issued on July 30, 1953, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee pointed out that “the Communists who infiltrated our Government worked behind the scenes—guiding research and preparing memoranda on which basic American policies were set, writing
speeches for Cabinet officers, influencing congressional investigations, drafting laws, manipulating administrative reorganizations—always serving the interest of their Soviet superiors."

The exposure of these individuals and their works is a continuing project of the subcommittee. It cannot be said in any sense that we have learned the names of all the secret Communists who infiltrated the Government service. It cannot even be said that we have learned all about those whose names we have brought to light.

In terms of present knowledge, however, the most important underground Communists were Alger Hiss and the late Harry Dexter White. Hiss recently completed a term in Federal prison, after perjuring himself before a Federal grand jury which questioned him about his Communist activities. White died in 1948, a few days after he was publicly exposed as a Communist conspirator by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. Throughout its entire existence, the subcommittee has put into the record accumulating evidence about the part Hiss, White, and their confederates played as underground agents of the U. S. R.

Hiss and White occupied positions of parallel significance both in America’s foreign affairs and in international organizations. Hiss went to Yalta as the late President Roosevelt’s top international organization specialist. He was one of the architects of the United Nations. When the U. N. organization meeting was held in San Francisco, Hiss became the U. N.’s first Secretary General. He had complete control of the International Secretariat and helped to put a great number of persons on the U. N.’s payroll (U. N. R. pp. 10–12).

J. Anthony Panuch, one of his State Department colleagues, told the subcommittee that Hiss exercised Svengali-like influence over Secretary of State Stettinius (H., p. 853).

White was the Treasury’s representative at the San Francisco Conference, and was one of those who established UNESCO. He was the chief architect of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which are specialized agencies of U. N. (U. N. R., pp. 12–13). He was also the first United States executive director of the fund. As long ago as December 15, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau gave White “full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department has to deal, having a bearing on foreign relations” (ibid., p. 29).

The wording of this order is of the greatest significance. White’s full responsibility not only included foreign relations in which the Treasury was engaged, but all matters having a bearing thereon. To a Communist agent, the opportunities this offered were incalculable.

During the past year, the subcommittee heard two witnesses and studied many documents, which throw light on the parts played by Alger Hiss and Harry White in making the policies of the United States and of international organizations.

Spruille Braden

Spruille Braden appeared before the subcommittee on December 22, 1953, and again on March 25, 1954. He had held the following posts in the American Government during 14 years’ service: Head of the American delegation to the Pan-American Commercial Conference; American delegate in charge of economic and financial discussion at the 17th International Conference of American States at Monte-
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video, Uruguay, appointed by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; chairman of American delegation to the Maintenance of the Peace Conference of the 21 American Republics at Chaco; United States Ambassador to Colombia; United States Ambassador to Cuba; United States Ambassador to Argentina; and Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. In these capacities, he necessarily became familiar with the Communist line as it applied to Latin American affairs.

Hiss Opens Pandora's Box

Mr. Braden told a story involving 134 American airbases in the Panama Canal, in which Alger Hiss seemed to have opened a Pandora's box of trouble for the United States and then vanished from his office so the box could not be closed.

Testimony and surrounding documents indicated that the Panama Canal Zone is neither a possession of the United States, leased territory of the United States, or territory administered by the United States under an arrangement which contemplates eventual self-government. The Republic of Panama stated its official interpretation of the Canal Zone's status, in an address delivered to the General Assembly of the United Nations by Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, president of the Panamanian delegation, on November 14, 1946. Dr. Alfaro said:

The strip of land known as the Panama Canal Zone has been neither purchased, conquered, annexed, ceded, nor leased, nor has its sovereignty been transferred by Panama to the United States. The United States administers this strip of land by virtue of a very specific stipulation in article II of the treaty concluded between the Republic of Panama and the United States on the 18th of November 1903, which reads as follows:

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use, occupation, and supervision of a zone of land and of land covered with water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said canal. * * *"

Article III of the same treaty concedes ample "rights, power, and authority" to the United States within the zone mentioned in article II, but establishes in unequivocal terms that Panama retains its sovereignty over the canal strip. * * *

The idea that the Canal Zone is a leased territory is a rather generalized error which doubtlessly stems from the fact that by the treaty of 1903 the United States agreed to pay to the Republic of Panama an annuity of 250,000 balboas in gold coin (today equivalent to approximately 430,000 balboas in devalued dollars). But it was never maintained that this annuity would be, nor has it ever been, nor is it now, the fee for a lease, and moreover, the word "lease" is not even found in the treaty with relation to the Canal Zone.

By the treaty of 1903 the Republic of Panama made many concessions to the United States, and for all these concessions the United States agreed to pay as compensation the sum of $10 million immediately and an annuity of $250,000 beginning with the year 1912, in accordance with the following stipulation, from article XIV of the treaty in question:

"As compensation for the rights, privileges, and powers granted in this convention by the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Government of the United States agrees to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of $10 million in gold coin of the United States on the date of the ratification of this treaty, and also an annual payment during its life of $250,000 in the same gold coin, beginning 9 years after the date mentioned above."

In reality, then, the annuity was not nor is it in any way a compensation. The reason for the annuity was that among the concessions made by Panama to the United States was that of the right which Panama possessed, in conformity with the contract with the Panama Railroad Company, of receiving from that private company, which the Government of the United States had absorbed, the aforementioned sum of $250,000 as a tax debt. Thus the Government of the United
States, as a grantee of the right to collect this sum, would receive $250,000 from
the company and would deliver exactly the same amount to the Republic of
Panama.

There is no native population. There is no permanent population. * * * In
accordance with the purposes for which were granted the "use, occupation, and
supervision" of the Canal Zone, that strip of land is inhabited solely by officials,
employees and workers of the Panama Canal, by the Army and Navy forces
stationed in the zone and adjacent waters for the protection of the canal, and
by the families of all these persons.

These employees and their families do not constitute a permanent population.
They live in the zone while they are working for the canal. And it has to be
thus, since the treaty between Panama and the United States signed the 2d of
March 1936 establishes in article III, paragraph 2, that only those persons who
directly or indirectly are occupied in the operation, maintenance, the sanitation,
or the protection of the canal or those connected with these duties have the right
to reside in the Canal Zone. When a person who lives in the zone has stopped
working for the canal or in connection with it, he must depart from the said
zone. In consequence, the population of that territory changes constantly, and
as is natural, it has no interests there nor political aspirations for independence
or self-government (H., p. 1360).

During World War II, the United States also had 134 airbases in
the Republic of Panama itself, for the specific purpose of defending
the canal. These bases were the subject of a special agreement which
stated:

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the temporary use for
defense purposes of the lands referred to in the memorandum attached to this
agreement and forming an integral part thereof. These lands shall be evacuated
and the use thereof by the United States of America shall terminate 1 year after
the date on which the definitive treaty of peace which brings about the end of
the present war shall have entered into effect. If within that period the two
Governments believe that, in spite of the cessation of hostilities, a state of inter-
national insecurity continues to exist which makes vitally necessary the continu-
uation of the use of any of the said defense bases or areas, the two Governments
shall again enter into mutual consultation and shall conclude the new agreement
which the circumstances require (H., p. 1396 footnote).

As Mr. Braden pointed out, a “definitive treaty of peace which brings
about the end of the present war” had not been signed by 1946. (As
a matter of fact, such a definitive treaty has not yet been signed.)
Nevertheless, agitation for return of the bases to Panama arose among
Panamanian Communists 1 year after V-J Day. Simultaneously, the
Soviet delegation to the United Nations opened its attack on so-called
American aggression. The proof of such aggression, according to the
Soviet propaganda line, was the location of American airbases outside
the boundaries of the United States.

About this time, the Governor of the Canal Zone, an American offi-
cial, submitted a routine annual report on canal operations to the
Government of the United States. Alger Hiss was then Director of
the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs, which han-
dled American relations with the United Nations. In this capacity he
wanted to submit the Canal Zone report to the United Nations. His
reasoning was that the United States was required to do so under
article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter. This calls on—

members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government * * * to transmit regularly to the Secretary General for
information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional
considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical
nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories
for which they are respectively responsible (H., pp. 1358–1359).
Mr. Braden was then Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

Mr. Braden. My officers maintained that was perfectly ridiculous; that article 73 (e) anticipated self-government. That was the phraseology used in it.

The Canal Zone, so far as the Republic of Panama is concerned, is self-governing. * * *

Moreover, we knew that if it were presented that it was just going to enrage the Panamanians. It was going to play into the hands of the Russians with their allegations about our bases scattered all over the world, and particularly in Panama.

It was going to alienate a lot of the other Latin Americans, who would say, "See what the United States is doing in the Canal Zone?"

It was a thoroughly bad move to make and particularly with the Assembly starting up in New York. * * *

Mr. Braden. It would complicate us with the Republic of Panama. It brought the United Nations into something where they had no right to be.

Mr. Grimes. It might give them a claim to some stake in the operation of the Panama Canal?

Mr. Braden. Exactly.

Mr. Grimes. Was that part of the argument?

Mr. Braden. Absolutely. * * *

My boys reported to me they were quite concerned. They feared Mr. Hackworth was veering over to the side of Alger Hiss, but I stormed around quite a bit on this problem and finally Mr. Hackworth would not give a decision.

At that point it was appealed to the Under Secretary of State.

The Chairman. Who was that?

Mr. Braden. Mr. Acheson.

I remember very vividly that I went in to see Mr. Acheson. I think Mr. Hiss had already been there for some time.

This was all 7 years ago, so my memory may be a bit off, but I think it is substantially accurate.

When I tried to state my case, Mr. Acheson, as a lawyer, agreed with Mr. Hiss, and I didn't even have a chance to state my case. I remember that I came out of that meeting boiling with rage at what happened.

Senator Welker. Mr. Hiss was present there?

Mr. Braden. Oh, yes. The only thing we got out of Mr. Hiss' office was an expression which today I don't understand very clearly, and he said this—he put in a phrase that this was submitted to the United Nations, this report of the Governor, on a pragmatic basis for this year, for the year 1946. What that means, I don't know, but that was supposed to take care of our objections, which needless to say, it did not.

As we predicted, the Panamanian Foreign Minister made a speech in the United Nations (H, p. 1354–1360).

Senator Watkins brought out that a similar ruling applied to our making reports to the United Nations on Alaska. The subcommittee finds that Alger Hiss exercised remarkable ingenuity in applying article 73 (e) to the detriment of the United States.

About the same time Hiss did something else.

Mr. Braden. At that time, and you have to get the picture of the United Nations, the Russians making their speeches about our being aggressors, and the proof being the bases, the Panama bases, 134 outside of Panama Canal Zone being brought in as proof positive of our aggressive intentions, and I desperately trying and praying that I would be able to keep the lid on everything until the Assembly was over in New York.

And that we could get Mr. Alfaro down to Washington and quietly and calmly in luncheons and in our offices work out an agreement with him about these 134 bases which the military informed me were vitally necessary for the security of the Panama Canal—therefore, of the United States.

You can, therefore, imagine my utter astonishment when one morning I picked up the Washington Post at my apartment and here on the front page was an announcement that we had reported to the United Nations on the Canal Zone as an occupied territory. When I read that, I realized that was really putting the fat in the fire in our relations with Panama in the substantiation of the Russian allegations and in our relations with all of the American Republics; it was such a nasty situation.

*Chas. P. Grimes was subcommittee counsel in January 1954.
Mr. GRIMES. In other words, our State Department had officially reported it to
the U. N., that Panama was one of our occupied territories?
Mr. BRADEN. Yes. * * *
Mr. GRIMES. This was a matter under your Jurisdiction as Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin American Affairs?
Mr. BRADEN. Exactly.
Mr. GRIMES. You learned about it for the first time in the newspapers?
Mr. BRADEN. I learned about it for the first time in the newspapers.
Mr. GRIMES. What did you do?
Mr. BRADEN. I dropped the newspaper, and I tore down to the State Depart-
ment. I called in the Director of the Office of American Republics Affairs, Mr.
Briggs, who presently is our American Ambassador in Korea; and my first special
assistant, Mr. Wright; and Mr. Murray Wise was then called in as the officer
on the Panamanian desk.
I may say I was using some pretty strong language around the place at this
outrage. None of them knew any more about it than I.
They also had read it in the newspapers.
We then tried to run it down, and we found that this report had been submitted
and the employment of the words "occupied territory" by the Office of Special
Political Affairs, that is to say, Mr. Alger Hiss.
I immediately went from my office on the third floor down to the second floor
to the Office of the Acting Secretary of State with fire in my eye.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?
Mr. BRADEN. Mr. Dean Acheson.
I went down to demand this report be withdrawn from the United Nations.
Mr. Acheson said that "We can't do anything about it. Where is Mr. Hiss?"
Mr. Hiss was not to be found that day in Washington. He had left his home.
He had not come to his office. He was presumed to be in some meetings, but his
office said that he had not come in, that they had telephoned to the places where
he was presumed to be but they couldn't find him anywhere.
That whole day went by without the appearance of Mr. Alger Hiss.
In the meantime this whole thing was stymied. The delay, I may say, of
course, was doing great harm because of inaction during this whole day.
We ought to have hit it and we didn't.
Finally, that afternoon at 5 o'clock. I was engaged in an important conference
in my office from which I could not leave when I received word from Mr. Acheson's
office that Mr. Hiss finally had been located. He had shown up and he was in
Mr. Acheson's office.
Mr. Briggs, therefore, as my deputy—
Mr. GRIMES. Did you send somebody?
Mr. BRADEN. I instructed Mr. Briggs to go down and make the demand that
this report be withdrawn.
Mr. GRIMES. Did he do so?
Mr. BRADEN. He did so.
Mr. GRIMES. Did he make a report to you?
Mr. BRADEN. He came back from Mr. Acheson's office and reported that Mr.
Acheson had sustained Mr. Hiss and Mr. Hiss had been very apologetic. He
had been very charming about it. He said that he was oh, so sorry; that, of
course, this should have been submitted to the Office of American Republics
Affairs. We should have been consulted before this was submitted to the United
Nations, but it was just one of those things that happened that slipped by, a
mistake somewhere, and he was very regretful about it.
But it was there and that it would do great harm for it to be withdrawn after
it was already submitted.
Mr. Acheson sustained Mr. Hiss on that. That is where the thing rested. We
did subsequently get Mr. Alfaro down to Washington. We did have negotiations
that were carried on for some time.
We kept the bases so long as I was Assistant Secretary of State, up until
June 28, 1947, but I think it was the fall of 1947 that I read that we had to give
up those bases which our military said were highly essential for the defense
of the canal and of the United States. (H., pp. 1364-1365.)

56025—55——3
Mr. Braden related his experience with an effort to reorganize the State Department in 1945. His testimony both supported and supplemented information supplied by Eugene Dooman in the IPR hearings (IRP-H, p. 703) and by J. Anthony Panuch (p. 841) in the subcommittee’s hearings on interlocking subversion in Government departments.¹

Eugene Dooman was one of the Far East experts in the State Department replaced in a general shift in personnel in that area which brought the anti-Nationalist China group into power.

Mr. Panuch, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in charge of security, testified before the subcommittee on June 25, 1953, on plans in 1945 to reorganize the State Department and to “blanket in” the wartime agencies.

In his appearance before the subcommittee, Mr. Braden also described this attempt “to take all of these various alphabetical agencies—OWI and BEW-FEA, and the Coordinator’s office—and superimpose them on the State Department.” He said that he had resisted the effort to have “this swarm of people coming in from these outside agencies,” and that he had considered many of these people to be “utterly inexperienced and incompetent.”

Mr. Braden directed his testimony primarily toward one phase of this 1945 reorganization, a project to be known as the Office of Research and Intelligence, involving over a thousand people to be brought into the State Department. He said this proposal was made by Dean Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, at a top echelon meeting in his office. A memorandum of about 1,000 pages was presented to the meeting in the late afternoon with the warning that “this is going to the Hill this afternoon.” The assembled officials were asked for their immediate comments.

Mr. Braden testified that he protested that there was “not one single item or function I can find in these pages which is not being fully and competently performed by the Office of American Republics Affairs.” He called the plan “a complete duplication,” “an extravagance” and “an inefficiency.” Loy Henderson was quoted by Mr. Braden as stating at the meeting that “this same thing applies to the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. This is a duplication * * there is no rhyme or reason for it.” The proposal which would have involved “a complete reorganization of the State Department” was finally abandoned. Mr. Braden said he was told that this proposal had emanated originally from the Office of Special Political Affairs, then headed by Alger Hiss.

After General Marshall was appointed as Secretary of State, the officials who had opposed these reorganization plans were either ousted or dispersed. J. Anthony Panuch, Deputy Assistant Secretary, author of the memorandum opposing the plan, was ousted immediately. James C. Dunn was sent as Ambassador to Italy. Loy Henderson was sent to India and later to Iran. Braden withdrew from the Department a year and a half later in 1947.

¹ In our IPR hearings, we have referred to the cordial comment of the Daily Worker of October 7, 1945, on the proposed changes:

"With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which had been held up in committee herefore **."
Mr. Braden characterized the group he was fighting in the State Department as "opposed to private enterprise and to our system and way of life" and as opposed to his efforts "to defend American legitimate interests."

**BRADEN'S WARNINGS IGNORED**

The danger of Communist penetration in Latin America had been the subject of repeated warnings by Spruille Braden to the State Department beginning in 1941. One such warning, dated July 22, 1944, declared:

Attention is respectfully invited to my several dispatches commenting on the strong, intelligent, and efficient Communist organization in Cuba; their drive for Negro membership; their tie-in with the Russian Legation; the unnecessarily large staff in that mission; the Communists' employment of secret inks and ciphers ** (H., p. 1378).

Another, dated December 6, 1945, stated that "Communist anti-United States action throughout the hemisphere is so coordinated and synchronized that there is no doubt that it is being directed from one central point" (H., p. 1383). To these repeated warnings, Mr. Braden never received any acknowledgment. "I had the feeling," he declared, "of walking up the stairs in the dark."

Mr. Braden described the pattern of operation of the group which he characterized as collectivists in the State Department.

Then these collectivists, even though underlings, would draw up these papers proposing policies and action and with the tremendous volume of work coming on the top echelon, the Secretary of State, or even the Assistant Secretaries, frequently then cannot go over every single one of these papers. The decisions are made by these people working at the lower levels writing these papers, writing the agreements, doing all the rest of it **. They take advantage of their superiors' ignorance of a given area or subject (H., pp. 1391–1392).

**JONATHAN MITCHELL ON HARRY D. WHITE**

Jonathan P. Mitchell added additional significant details to the subcommittee's record regarding Harry Dexter White. Mr. Mitchell was formerly a reporter and European correspondent for the New York World. He was Washington correspondent for the New Republic magazine from 1935 to 1941, writing under the nom de plume of TRB. Subsequently, he attended the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

In 1939, Mr. Mitchell was asked by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to draft a speech on the advantages of venture capital as furnished by private enterprise. The speech was never delivered, however. Mr. Mitchell was informed by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gaston that Harry Dexter White "wouldn't stand for it" (H., p. 1425).

Mr. Mitchell testified that while he was at the Institute for Advanced Study, a number of his colleagues were advisers to the Treasury. He said that they reported to him their observations of White's conduct.

These colleagues of mine attended quite regularly the staff conferences of the Secretary. There was a general meeting with perhaps 50 or 60 persons present, once a week, and the people from the institute would very often have worked out plans for technical—they were interested in the technique of carrying the very large war debt at that time. They had worked out procedures, plans, and so on, with Secretary Morgenthau; that is they had given
him their advice, and the Secretary accepted it. At these meetings, these plans would be chewed to pieces.

After a great deal of careful observation and comparing of notes, they were convinced that each time the opposition came from the same quarter; namely, Mr. White, and they took to watching him at the meetings, and they caught him passing notes to people who then got up and raised extraneous subjects or presented opposite views. They found that whenever these devices didn't work, Mr. White himself would wait until he was certain the Secretary was about to leave, and then rise and say, "I would like to sum up what has been said here today," and he would summarize it without any relation to what actually had been said (H., p. 1426).

* * * * * * * * *

Either the action would be taken in the sense that Mr. White desired, or no action would be taken at all (ibid.).

Mr. Mitchell decided to interview White on or about August 5, 1945, at a luncheon. In the course of this discussion, White outlined his basic philosophy. The fact that this philosophy dominated so important a policymaker in our Government is highly significant and would tend to explain his conduct. White revealed that he was an ardent devotee of the views of Harold Laski as outlined in the latter's book, Faith, Reason, and Civilization. White in the conversation held that more and more in the future, international trade and private business in general would be dominated by governments, both during the war and thereafter. He called Laski's work the most profound book written in his lifetime. Summarizing the thesis of the Laski book, Mr. Mitchell described it as follows:

I think the thesis could be put as saying that the Second World War was the end of a great historic period, and that private business or capitalism had proved itself inadequate, and that the faith which underlay it, the Christian faith, no longer had any validity for the people who were living then; and that, happily, the Russians had worked out a new system of economics and a new faith which could replace capitalism and Christianity (H., p. 1430).

In the course of the hearing, the subcommittee inserted into the record a review of some of White's functions in Government, as follows: Member of the Interdepartmental Group To Consider International Economic Problems and Policies in 1940; head of Treasury Department's Division of Monetary Research which produced a memorandum entitled "Proposal for a Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations"; member, with V. Frank Coe and Lauchlin Currie, of an interdepartmental group known as the Cabinet Committee which met in Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau's office on May 25, 1942, to consider the "Preliminary Draft Proposal for United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United Nations and Associated Nations"; chairman of the interdepartmental committee known as the American Technical Committee, of which V. Frank Coe was a fellow member, and which was to a large extent responsible for the final form of the Monetary Fund and Bank; writer of a letter to British representative Lord Maynard Keynes dated July 24, 1943, reconciling United States and British monetary proposals; September 4, 1943, received from Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle, Jr., the State Department's proposal for an International Investment Agency; presented the Morgenthau plan on Germany at meeting of State, Treasury, and War Departments; praised by the Daily Worker of November 20, 1953, for his "demand for a program to consolidate Soviet-American economic and political cooperation" and for calling for real aid to "Latin Amer-
ica and to China—instead of the ‘aid’ with political strings attached which the Wall Street bankers required”; author of memorandum dated March 7, 1944, to Secretary Morgenthau on “Proposed United States Loan to the U. S. S. R.”; author of memorandum dated March 31, 1939, together with William Henry Taylor, Irving S. Friedman, and Sonia Gold, cited in testimony as involved with an underground group of the Communist Party; coauthor with Harold Glasser of a memorandum dated September 7, 1944, on “Is European Prosperity Dependent Upon German Industry?”; coauthor with Harold Glasser of the memorandum, dated March 31, 1939, calling for closer economic ties with the U. S. S. R.; given “full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department has to deal having a bearing on foreign relations” by Secretary Morgenthau on December 15, 1941.

The record also reflected that Harry Dexter White was the official Treasury representative on the following interdepartmental and international bodies: The Interdepartmental Lend-Lease Committee; the Canadian-American Joint Economic Committee; the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy; the Executive Committee and Board of Trustees of the Export-Import Bank; the Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs; the National Resources Committee; the Price Administration Committee; the Committee on Foreign Commerce Regulations; the Interdepartmental Committee on Post-War Economic Problems; the Committee on Trade Agreements; the National Munitions Control Board; the Acheson Committee on International Relief; the Board of Economic Warfare; the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy; the Liberated Areas Committee; the O. S. S. Advisory Committee; the United States Commercial Corporation; the Interdepartmental Committee on Planning for Coordinating the Economic Activities of United States Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas; White was also chief architect of the International Monetary Fund as well as its first United States executive director.

As already pointed out, White had “full responsibility” for all matters “having a bearing on foreign relations” in which the Treasury was involved from December 15, 1941. Beyond this, the colleagues of Mr. Mitchell observed White’s technique of domination over general Treasury affairs. Against this background, there is considerable significance in the following passage from the Memoirs of Cordell Hull, former Secretary of State:

The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who ranked next to me in the Cabinet, often acted as if he were clothed with authority to project himself into the field of foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course of foreign policy in given instances. He had an excellent organization in the Treasury Department, ably headed by Harry White, but he did not stop with his work at the Treasury. Despite the fact that he was not at all fully or accurately informed on a number of questions of foreign policy with which he undertook to interfere, we found from his earliest days in the Government that he seldom lost an opportunity to take long steps across the line of State Department jurisdiction. Emotionally upset by Hitler’s rise and his persecution of the Jews, he often sought to induce the President to anticipate the State Department or act contrary to our better judgment. We sometimes found him conducting negotiations with foreign governments which were the function of the State Department. His work in drawing up a catastrophic plan for the postwar treatment of Germany, and inducing the President to accept it without consultation with the State Department, was an outstanding instance of this interference (H., p. 1445).
As the subcommittee has previously shown, the “catastrophic plan for the postwar treatment of Germany,” was actually the brain child of Harry Dexter White.

On July 2, 1952, the subcommittee recommended that consideration be given to investigation by some appropriate agency of the following:

(a) Possible Communist infiltration into and influence upon the Treasury Department and other agencies forming and administering fiscal and monetary policies and affairs of the United States;

(b) The role of Alger Hiss in foreign affairs and the formulation of foreign policy of the United States and his influence on personnel decisions in the State Department (IPR R., p. 226).

Nevertheless, as far as the subcommittee is aware, no study of the policymaking activities of Hiss and White have ever been made by either the State Department or the Treasury.

**Conclusions**

1. Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and their confederates in the Communist underground in government had power to exercise profound influence on American foreign policy and the policies of international organizations during World War II and the years immediately thereafter.

2. They had power to exercise profound influence on the creation and operation of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

3. This power was not limited to their officially designated authority. It was inherent in their access to and influence over higher officials, and the opportunities they had to present or withhold information on which the policies of their superiors might be based.

4. Hiss, White, and a considerable number of their colleagues who helped make American foreign policy and the policies of international organizations during crucial years have been exposed as secret Communist agents.

**Recommendations**

1. The State and Treasury Departments should immediately institute comprehensive studies to determine the whole extent of the policymaking activities of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and other State and Treasury officials who have been exposed as members of the Communist underground.

2. These studies should be under the control and direction of persons who were not identified in any way with Hiss, White, or any of their confederates, either in the making of policy or the exercising thereof.

3. The results of these studies should be made public at periodic intervals.

**SECTION VI**

**Radio Operators and Navy Files**

**Admiral Staton’s Story**

Throughout its entire existence, the subcommittee has concerned itself with these questions:

How did the United States Government become infiltrated with underground Communists?
Why were Communists allowed to remain in Government service after they had been exposed by committees of Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other qualified agencies?

Who had the ultimate responsibility for a soft attitude toward the Soviet Union which turned the course of history against us after we had won the greatest triumph of arms in our history?

The subcommittee took testimony from Rear Adm. Adolphus Staton, retired, which contributes to the historical answer to these questions. Documents adduced during this testimony, which involved distinguished members of both political parties, were additionally illuminating.

Admiral Staton is a holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor. At one time he was assistant director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Then, at the outbreak of World War II, he was called out of retirement to head the Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel.

According to Admiral Staton, this Board was set up as a result of a "one-man campaign to try to get more security for our radio communication" (H., p. 1309 ff.). The "one man" was Rear Adm. S. C. Hooper, who was responsible, during the Second World War, for the safety of communications at sea. The importance which Congress attached to this Board is indicated by the fact that the act which brought it into being was the first legislation passed on December 8, 1941, after President Roosevelt had notified Congress of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only vote against it was cast by the late Vito Marcantonio, American Labor Party, New York, long regarded as the voice of communism in the House of Representatives.

The act stated:

It shall be unlawful to employ any person or to permit any person to serve as a radio operator aboard any vessel (other than a vessel of foreign registry), if the Secretary of the Navy has disapproved such employment.

The purpose, clearly, was to empower the Secretary of the Navy to remove subversive individuals who were serving as radio operators in the merchant marine. The method of making the act effective was through Admiral Staton's Board, which obtained information regarding possible subversives from the Office of Naval Intelligence. If the Board voted unanimously against the individual in question, he was removed from his ship, although he had a right of appeal which will be noted below.

Admiral Staton testified that the Japanese, pro-Nazi and Fascist radio operators were disposed of without difficulty. But the removal of Communists was a different story (H., p. 1310 ff.).

"We began to get violent protests from the Communists," said Admiral Staton. "They would come down personally and see me or the Secretary of the Navy (Frank Knox) or the President of the United States or Mr. Bard" (Assistant Secretary of the Navy) (H., p. 1314).

Admiral Staton's story continues:

When these fellows began to go to the White House, then Mr. Knox got interested in the thing and he got his Assistant. He brought in a man as his Assistant when he became Secretary of the Navy by the name of Adlai Stevenson, and I had never heard of Mr. Stevenson before that. He called me up one day on the phone and asked if I would come over to his office (H., p. 1315).
He had 6 or 8 sheets of paper and on each one of them he had briefed one of the cases that our Board had acted on, and he had said "Admiral, I don't think you fellows have anything against those people, any of them" (H., p. 1316).

Senator Butler. Do you know who they were?
Admiral Staton. They were radio operators who my Board had passed on and discharged.

Senator Butler. I appreciate that, but do you know the names?
Admiral Staton. No; I never saw the names (H., p. 1318).

Senator Hendrickson. Were they discharged unanimously by your Board?
Admiral Staton. Yes (H., p. 1316).

Admiral Staton. When Mr. Stevenson said that he thought we didn't have anything against them at all, I said, "Why, Mr. Stevenson, we are not charging these fellows with any crime. This is emergency legislation and I think that the only thing we are saying in effect, is 'you can't work in this job during this emergency' that these fellows are in convoy with our naval ships and carrying these valuable cargoes over to Europe in connection with the war and that we have felt that we didn't have to give the fellow a reasonable doubt under the common law of a crime, but we were resolving our reasonable doubt in favor of Uncle Sam." So he finally said, "Well, Admiral, I don't think we ought to be too hard on the Commies," and that was that (H., pp. 1316-1317).

THE MEETING WITH SECRETARY KNOX

Admiral Staton then identified the minutes of a meeting he had attended on May 19, 1942, in the office of the late Frank Knox, then Secretary of the Navy. This document is of such importance, that it is presented here almost in full.

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY UNDER PUBLIC LAW NO. 351 AND UNDER DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS BOARD ORDER NO. 3

A meeting was held in the office of the Secretary of Navy at 10:45, May 19, 1942, at the request of Rear Admiral Hooper, in order to discuss matters relating to the administration of authority of the Secretary of the Navy under Public Law No. 351 and under Defense Communications Board Order No. 3. The particular points on which decision was desired were whether the Departmental Qualifications Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel would discontinue to disapprove employment of Communist radio operators, and whether Communists should be accepted as members of Defense Communications Board Committees.

Present: The Secretary, Mr. Frank Knox; the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Ralph A. Bard; Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Adm. F. J. Horne; Rear Adm. T. S. Wilkinson; Rear Adm. S. C. Hooper; Rear Adm. Adolphus Staton; Capt. J. B. W. Wailer; Lt. Comdr. F. C. B. Jordan; Lt. Comdr. F. G. Caskey; Lt. K. Baarslag.

At the Secretary's suggestion, Rear Admiral Hooper outlined the situation as he saw it. He showed how Congress had seen the necessity of legislation to safeguard the merchant marine against the dangers of subversive radio operators; how various laws were drafted, including H. R. 5074; how the language of some of this proposed legislation clearly showed that the intent of Congress was that adherence to Communist Party doctrine was to be considered as subversive to the United States; that this legislation was strongly opposed by Communist Party organizations (including the American Communications Association), but was supported by many other factions, including labor, as represented by the American Federation of Labor; and how our entry into the war crystallized matters by causing the final passage of Public Law 351.

Admiral Hooper then stressed the danger of Communist Party cells in the transportation and communications industries and in the armed services, and how the Communist Party was striving with all its power to establish such cells.
He said it was an obvious and primary military principle that these cells should not be allowed to exist for a minute in military or naval units; that the commercial communications systems were an important and integral part of the military and naval communications networks; and that it, therefore, became a duty of those officers in the Navy Department that were charged with the security of naval communications to bring the gravity of the situation to the attention of the Secretary. The contributory effect of foreign cells in a country's system of communication was amply demonstrated in the fall of Norway and of France, stated Admiral Hooper, giving details of each.

Admiral Hooper pointed out that the time to destroy such cells was the present, and that our temporary military alliance with the U. S. S. R. was no reason to condone the establishment of Communist Party cells in the United States. A change in the international political situation, though possibly not imminent, might occur at any time and without advance notice, at which time everybody would agree to the necessity of abolishing these cells, but it would then probably be too late for successful action. He emphasized the particular danger of a cell among radio operators and brought out the example of the Spanish Fleet at the very start of the 1937 revolution, when some 700 officers were murdered by the Communist Party cells in the fleet because of the fact that the radio operators delivered the announcement of the Communist revolution to their comrades rather than to the responsible ship's officers, which permitted the revolutionists to commit the crimes, the officers not expecting it.

Admiral Hooper further stated that the problem of purifying our communications systems was an internal matter which had nothing to do with our being a military ally of Russia; nor was it in any way an effort at union busting. To prove this latter fact, he pointed out that the American Federation of Labor, an important communications union, had heartily approved and endorsed the Navy's energetic action regarding subversive radio operators. That the American Communications Association was Communist Party controlled and the nucleus of the Communist Party cell in United States communications was a well-known fact in the industry, and was shown by the fact that 7 of its 10 officers were known Communist Party members, and by examining its record of 100-percent adherence to the Communist Party line in recent years. Admiral Hooper then asked the assembled officers if they had anything to add or modify as to the outline he had just given, but there were no suggestions.

The Secretary then spoke and said that he held no brief for the activities of the Communist Party, but that the President had stated that, considering the fact that the United States and Russia were allies at this time and that the Communist Party and the United States efforts were now bent toward our winning the war, the United States was bound to not oppose the activities of the Communist Party, and specifically, to not disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was active in Communist Party affairs. The Secretary further stated that he was an order and must be obeyed without mental reservation.

Mr. Bard then said that he was on our side, but that he had seen Congressmen Bland and Ramspeck recently regarding the removal of active Communist Party members as radio operators, and they both thought it should not be done. Rear Admiral Hooper remarked that it was quite possible that the Congressmen did not have all the facts in the case.

Rear Admiral Staton then said that he was not officially concerned with the policy involved but that he believed that in view of this change in policy, the instructions to the board contained in its precept should be modified to conform to this change of policy. Specifically, the instructions now state that: "The board will determine * * * whether such service by the person concerned would be detrimental to the national defense and national safety," and that the members of the board could not bring themselves to feel that the employment as radio operators of militant members of the Communist Party would not be detrimental to the national safety. He gave the Secretary a copy of the instructions in question and indicated where he thought that the instructions should be modified. The Secretary said that he would take the matter up with the Judge Advocate General as to the change to be made.

Rear Admiral Wilkinson then asked the Secretary if membership in the Communist Party constituted a general "whitewash" for all sorts of illegal and other subversive activities. The Secretary answered that it did not (H., pp. 1320-1321).
The Senate of the United States and the people of the United States are asked to ponder the implications of this document. Particularly, they are asked to ponder the following paragraph:

"The Secretary then spoke and said that he held no brief for the activities of the Communist Party, but that the President had stated that, considering the fact that the United States and Russia were allies at this time and that the Communist Party and the United States efforts were now bent toward our winning the war, the United States was bound to not oppose the activities of the Communist Party, and specifically, to not disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was active in Communist Party affairs. The Secretary further stated that this was an order and must be obeyed without mental reservation" (H., pp. 1320-1321).

No Change in Written Orders

As the minutes of the 1942 meeting make clear, Admiral Staton believed that the policy of his board, which was based on the intent of Congress, had been changed on orders from the Chief Executive. He asked for written instructions to ratify this change in policy and got a promise from Secretary Knox that the latter would "take the matter up with the Judge Advocate General."

Admiral Staton. Well, the first thing I remember happening was Mr. Bard sending for me. He had this precept, as we call it, the Secretary's instructions to the board, in his hand, and he said, "I don't think that this precept ought to be changed." I said, "Well, Mr. Bard, I do. I think you put us in an impossible position because we have been under oath administering the law as we thought the intent of the Congress was." * * * So we had quite a discussion on a friendly basis and finally I said, "Well, Mr. Bard, why don't you do what the Secretary suggested, take it up with the Judge Advocate General?"

He said, "Well, that is a good idea. Do you want me to do it or will you do it?"

I said, "Well, I am down here to do your legwork for you. I will go down there and take it down to them and, if he and I don't agree, I will ask him to come back up here."

Mr. Grimes. Now, in other words, you thought that there should be a written authority to your board to administer this law the way the President had said, and that you should have the protection of the written authority from someone since the change was plainly against what your board regarded as the intent of Congress; is that correct?

Admiral Staton. That is right.

Admiral Staton. Well, I went down to the Judge Advocate General.

Mr. Grimes. Who was he?

Admiral Staton. Rear Admiral Woodson. He is since deceased. So I gave him a general picture. I said, "We have run onto a dead center up here in regard to this admission of evidence about Communists, and Mr. Bard has asked me to come down here and talk it over with you."

I told him that the Secretary didn't want us to discharge Communists or suspected Communists.

So he read over this precept, and then, in the very paragraph that I had suggested to the Secretary as an appropriate place to put it, he wrote in there in pencil, "Membership in the Communist Party or suspected membership is not to be considered as evidence before the board."

So I said, "Initial it," and he put his W. B. W. on there, and I took it back to Mr. Bard and I said, "Here is what your Judge Advocate General thinks about the thing." He said, "My God, don't get anybody to sign that."

* * * * * * *

Admiral Staton. Then I went ahead again on the idea of being in this impossible situation, and so he then said—I know we had 2 or 3 interviews about
this thing, but I think this was pretty much after that incident—he said, "Admi-
ral, if I were in your shoes, I would resign from the board."

* * * * *

Admiral Staton. I said, "Mr. Bard, if I felt like you say you feel about this
thing, I would fire me from the board." I said, "I don't quit under fire and I
am not going to give you fellows the satisfaction to find somebody in my place
who will be a rubberstamp for you. I have been around too long not to know
what this is about. If you fellows want to keep these Communists, do it on
your own responsibility. Don't pass it on to the board." That was the intent
of what I said to him. I said during one interview, "Mr. Bard, I am talking to
you not as a naval officer but as a patriotic citizen of the United States, and,
if I were in your shoes, I think I would march right into Mr. Knox's office and
say, 'Come on, let's go to the White House and make the President change this
order because it is all wrong"" (H., pp. 1322–1323).

Shortly after this, according to Admiral Staton, the board was sim-
ply emasculated. No more cases were referred to it and it was finally
dissolved, on the pretext of "eliminating unnecessary paper work."
Admiral Hooper was retired for "physical disability." Admiral
Staton, himself, was also retired after almost a year had intervened
during which he drew full active pay without performing any duties
whatever (H. pp. 1325 ff.).

ROOSEVELT, KNOX, STEVENSON DOCUMENTS

The documents which later came into the possession of the subcom-
mittee were:

(1) A memorandum, dated April 30, 1942, to the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy from Adlai E. Stevenson.

(2) A "confidential" letter to the President, dated May 1, 1942,
and signed "Frank Knox."

(3) A memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, dated May 4,
1942, and signed "FDR."

They are reproduced here in full.4

APRIL 30, 1942.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy:

Public Act 351 (approved December 17, 1941) makes it unlawful during the
emergency to employ as radio operator on any American merchant vessel any
person whose employment has been disapproved by the Secretary of the Navy.

This act is administered by a five-man board consisting of Admiral Staton
as chairman and representatives of the Navy Department, Coast Guard, and
Maritime Commission. The board has considered some 90 cases and discharged
88 men. About 25 have appealed and 8 have been reinstated.

Appeals are heard by local boards convened by the commandants of the
districts. The "defendant" is not informed as to the basis for his discharge.

The cases involving cowardice, insubordination, drunkenness, and pro-Nazi
sympathy present little difficulty. But most of the cases involve operators
charged with Communist Party membership or Communist sympathy. The board
automatically discharges any operator whose investigation record is sufficiently
convincing on the score of Communist sympathy, irrespective of his competence
and record of conduct in his job.

Many of the members of the American Communications Association (CIO),
including the president, vice president, and possibly other officers, have been or
may be discharged. The total number of radio operators on the ONI suspect
list is about 600 and about 500 of them are "Communist" suspects.

I understand that the board rests its practice of automatic discharge of all
alleged Communists on the policy of Congress expressed in various enactments
prior to the Russo-German War, which forbid Federal employment of Com-
munists, bundists, etc.

4 The documents were transmitted to the chairman by Secretary of the Navy Anderson
with a letter dated April 14, 1954, which contained the statement that "This material
has been declassified under the provisions of Executive Order 10501."

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ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

The problem presented by the present method of administration of Public 351 is whether identification with communism, even if sufficiently proven, is sufficient grounds to disqualify a man without some other evidence of incompetence or unreliability in his job as a radio operator on a merchant ship. In other words, in view of the present military alignments, political considerations, and shortage of qualified radio operators, should we discharge operators because of their political opinions only? Or should we say that hostile political opinion is only one element of fitness and a man must not be discharged whose record in his job is in all other respects satisfactory.

Adlai E. Stevenson.

May 1, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Mr. President: I hate to bother you with things like that but this involves a policy which can only originate with you.

I am attaching a report by Adlai Stevenson on the subject of disbarring men from service in the merchant marine as radio operators under the present law. My present disposition is to disregard a charge against the radio operator who, in other respects has done his duty well and obeyed orders, solely because he is called a Communist, even where the proof is pretty substantial that he has been a Communist. Of course, in other respects where there was insubordination or drunkenness or any other thing, we make short shrift of them.

With Russia as our ally, it seems to me the course I have outlined above is the only one we can pursue, although I confess to you a grave doubt as to the ultimate loyalty of these men if later difficulty of any kind should arise between us and Russia. For some strange reason, these American Communists seem more loyal to Russia than they do to the United States but, as I said, this difficulty is not present at the present time, although it may be later.

I should like to have you confirm to me whether my thought runs along parallel channels with yours on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I agree with your memorandum of May 1 in regard to the employment of radio operators whose only offense is being a Communist. The Soviet people in Moscow are said to have little liking for the American Communists and their methods—especially because it seems increasingly true that the communism of 20 years ago has practically ceased to exist in Russia. At the present time their system is much more like a form of the older socialism, conducted however, through a complete dictatorship combined with an overwhelming loyalty to the cause of throwing every German out of Russia. That being so, the American Communists are going along with us almost unanimously in the help we are giving to Russia in winning the war.

There are, however, a good many cases of radio operators who have failed in the prewar period to give the weather information to other ships or to planes; or who have sought to foment what amounts to a form of mutiny on the high seas.

Against this background of Admiral Staton’s story, the subcommittee took testimony regarding the disposal of Navy files on the Communist underground, and of anti-Communist activity in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
John J. Wendt said that he served as a yeoman first class in the Third Naval District office of ONI from about May 1941 to June 1944.

Mr. GRIMES. Were you familiar with the method by which the files of the Communist desk were kept?
Mr. WENDT. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRIMES. Would you state how they were kept and what they consisted of?
Mr. WENDT. The Communist files consisted of 3 by 5 cards in addition to other reports, dossiers, and regular general information in file form (H., p. 1333).

Mr. GRIMES. Around 100,000 cards would be your best estimate?
Mr. WENDT. Yes. (H., p. 1334).

Mr. GRIMES. What happened to those files?
Mr. WENDT. To the best of my recollection, I remember coming in one day and those files were missing (ibid.).

Mr. GRIMES. Is your recollection that the incident that you have stated that you recall, and which took place then, took place about June of 1944?
Mr. WENDT. Around that time (ibid.).

The CHAIRMAN. You were off for 1 day and when you returned the files were cleaned?
Mr. WENDT. Yes, sir (H., p. 1335).

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you know what was done with the contents?
Mr. WENDT. No, I do not. All I know is that they were missing on the day I arrived (ibid.).

William J. O'Hara was a commissioned officer in the same office, who served on the Communist desk.

Mr. GRIMES. Would you describe in your own words what the Communist desk consisted of and what it did?
Mr. O'HARA. Well, Lt. Robert Morris was the officer in charge of the desk and he had under him Lt. Kenneth Slocum and myself as officers and we had 2 agents, a Thomas Meehan and Nelson Frank, and approximately 3 yeomen (H., p. 1336).

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, radio operators came under your jurisdiction?
Mr. O'HARA. Yes sir; we had information in our files.

The CHAIRMAN. Activities of the longshoremen?
Mr. O'HARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRIMES. And did you have information on the Communist Party in general as supplementing or enlightening the Navy Department as to the particular activities under your supervision?
Mr. O'HARA. Yes, sir; in fact, every week the head of the desk sent to all naval districts his thoughts pertaining to the activities of the Communist Party in the United States for that week and for the coming week and that was disseminated to all naval districts, the FBI, and the Army.

Mr. GRIMES. In other words, advising the Navy, so far as you were able to obtain the information, as to what the Communist Party policy was.
Mr. O'HARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRIMES. And who the top operatives of the Communist Party were?
Mr. O'HARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRIMES. And as bearing upon what particular Communists might do as affecting the Navy. Is that correct?
Mr. O'HARA. That is correct.

Mr. GRIMES. And how would you characterize the Communist files of the 3d Naval District?
Mr. O'HarA. Well, they were the best files that could possibly be gathered on
the subject (H., p. 1337).

Mr. GrIMES. My question was, without mentioning any names, did your or-
ganization succeed in having a Navy officer, who of course could not operate in
uniform, penetrate high up in the Communist Party and give your unit informa-
tion as to the activities of the Communist Party, their plans, and their purposes?

Mr. O'HarA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GrIMES. Did he give you information?

Mr. O'HarA. He gave us the best information that was obtained, I believe,
during the war, on that particular subject.

Mr. GrIMES. And was it your impression that your district really knew what
the Communist Party top officials and others were up to throughout the entire
war?

Mr. O'HarA. Yes, sir. In fact, the FBI thought so much of our particular
informant that they requested that he appear in court for them on hearings on
the Hatch Act, but we advised him that because of the work that he was doing
that we could not allow him to be used as a witness at that time.

Mr. GrIMES. In fact, you, at that time, did not reveal him to any source
including the FBI?

Mr. O'HarA. Never, sir.

Mr. GrIMES. He was, in short, too valuable, in your opinion, to take the
slightest risk of losing his services?

Mr. O'HarA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GrIMES. And I presume he did this at risk of life. Is that correct?

Mr. O'HarA. He did, absolutely.

Mr. GrIMES. And I presume he did this at risk of life. Is that correct?

Mr. O'HarA. That is correct.

Mr. GrIMES. Was this information in your files?

Mr. O'HarA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GrIMES. And you heard Mr. Wendt testify about the composition of the
files, some 3 by 5 inch cards. He gave an estimate of about 100,000 items of
specific information on the Communist Party.

Mr. O'HarA. That is correct.

Mr. GrIMES. Was that your impression, too, and was that the fact insofar
as you know it?

Mr. O'HarA. The particular files that Mr. Wendt made reference to were all
3 by 5 cards. In addition to that we had much other information that we would
put in cabinets or in legal file or letter file drawers. For instance, this gentle-
man that you spoke about would send us in writing perhaps twice a week all
the information that he obtained during that particular week in his own hand-
writing and we had those files in the Communist section of B-7 (H., p. 1338).

Mr. GrIMES. Would you state what you know of your own knowledge—and
you are a lawyer—as to what happened to these files?

Mr. O'HarA. Sir, I left the office after Lieutenant Morris. He was first sent
out, I believe, to the Advanced School of Naval Intelligence and then I was sent
out. That was after the end of 1943. At that time, all of the files that we had
gathered in B-7, Communist section of B-7, were there and I was sent to the
Advanced Naval Intelligence School and from there I went to France, and when
I returned home in August in 1945, I was sent back to the 3d Naval District
Intelligence Office and at that time all of the files that were there when I left in
1943 were missing (H., p. 1339).

Mr. GrIMES. Do you know what happened to them?

Mr. O'HarA. Well, inasmuch as I was very interested I asked the
officer who was in charge of the section at that time—and his name was Lt.
Tom A. Brooks—what became of the files. "Well", he said "we had to get rid
of them because there was too much duplication." And that was the end of
that (H., p. 1339).
Mr. GRIMES. In this period of 3 or 4 years you had acquired a great deal of information; is that correct?

Mr. DANIELS. Yes.

Mr. GRIMES. That was principally about Communists and Communist activities in the area?

Mr. DANIELS. That was principally about Communist activities in the area and everything else that we could pick up that other naval districts might be interested in.

Mr. GRIMES. And as was the case with the Third Naval District you exchanged information with others?

Mr. DANIELS. That is correct.

Mr. GRIMES. And you also received information from the Third Naval District, did you?

Mr. DANIELS. Correct.

Mr. GRIMES. And did you regard that as important information?

Mr. DANIELS. Oh, yes.

Mr. GRIMES. Will you state then, to the extent of your knowledge, what happened to these Communist files? I think you may state what you learned from your fellow officers in the course of an inquiry. Tell the story in your own way.

Mr. DANIELS. On the 14th of September, I was assigned temporarily—

Mr. GRIMES. That is 1943?

Mr. DANIELS. I was assigned on temporary additional duty to Providence, R. I., and the officer in charge of Providence, R. I., station was supposed to come up and take over my duties, the reason being that for training purposes they wanted to have the outside zone officers get a little idea of headquarters and the headquarters officers get a little idea of what went on in a zone, and while down there one of my officers, whose name I would not like to mention, called me up and said, "There is something going on up here." He said, "It looks as if there is going to be a consolidation of B-7 and B-3."

Mr. GRIMES. What was B-3?

Mr. DANIELS. That was the investigative section (H., pp. 1345–1346).

Mr. DANIELS. I was never returned to B-7. After my course in commerce and travel I was assigned to what is known as the F section.

Mr. GRIMES. What happened to the files of the Communist desk of B-7 in the First Naval District?

Mr. DANIELS. Because of, you might say, of scuttlebutt; particularly did not want to know what was going to happen.

Mr. GRIMES. What was going to happen? Did you find out what did happen?

Mr. DANIELS. Well, I was told that they had a pretty good fire and there was quite a bit of red smoke (H., p. 1346).

Mr. GRIMES. Do you know whether those files are still in existence?

Mr. DANIELS. I do not think they are still in existence.

Mr. GRIMES. What is the basis of your opinion?

Mr. DANIELS. From the fact that I have heard that these B-7 cards now in the general file are being taken out because they have nothing to refer to (H., pp. 1346–1347).

Mr. GRIMES. Did you ever examine the filing cabinet where these cards had been kept while you were there?

Mr. DANIELS. At one time, sometime during the summer of 1944, I just looked into one of the cabinets and the cabinet was empty (H., p. 1347).

A historical summary of the Navy Department relating to the files of the Communist Desk of the Third Naval District declared:

In May of 1944, Capt. E. B. Nixon, USN, succeeded Capt. W. B. Howe, USN (retired), as District Intelligence Officer and Captain Nixon immediately proceeded to reorganize the DIO * * * Under the direction of Captain Nixon, the
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

Officer in charge was directed to drastically reduce the office personnel, eliminate maintenance of files which did not have a direct naval interest so far as counter-intelligence activities were concerned, and to retain cards only on persons in the Navy employ or under Navy control. Pursuant to instructions, the section disposed of numerous 3 by 5 cards which were filed according to ideologies, with the exception of the cards relating to Communists and Orientals (H., pp. 1331–1332).

The subcommittee staff has been accumulating data on the subject of file disappearance both in the ONI and elsewhere. It is obvious that since the Communist problem can be expected to be a grave one for some time to come, the maintenance and amplification of all files on this subject is an indispensable task. To keep a record of Communist radio operators for future use would seem to be the essence of foresight and judgment.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel of the United States Navy was established by law on December 8, 1941, to protect the people of the United States against subversive activity by radio operators serving at sea in the American merchant marine. The Board carried out its duty by removing potentially subversive radio operators from ships at sea.

2. The Board found that among these potentially subversive operators were several hundred Communists. It instituted proceedings to remove them from their ships.

3. Communist protests against the removal of Communist radio operators were brought to the attention of the Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

4. The Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy criticized the policy of removing Communist radio operators and took the matter before the Secretary who, in turn, took it to the President of the United States.

5. The Assistant to the Secretary, the Secretary himself, and the President had full knowledge that there was widespread Communist infiltration among radio operators and that it probably included, "the president, the vice president, and possibly other officers" of the American Communications Association.

6. The President and the Secretary of the Navy had full knowledge that members of the Communist Party, United States of America, "seemed more loyal to Russia than to the United States." Regardless of this, the Secretary of the Navy reported that it was the President's view that "* * * considering the fact that the United States and Russia were allies at this time and that the Communist Party and the United States efforts were now bent toward winning the war, the United States was bound to not oppose the activities of the Communist Party, and specifically to not disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was active in Communist Party affairs."

7. The President, through the Secretary of the Navy, therefore, orally ordered the Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel to reverse its previous policy in order to permit the employment of Communists as radio operators in the merchant marine. The Board asked for written instructions authorizing it to reverse its previous policy, but no written instruc-
tions were ever transmitted to the Board. Shortly thereafter, the Board was abolished.

8. This policy of protecting American Communists, which was established as a matter of wartime expediency by the President and the Secretary of the Navy, weakened the security program in the United States Navy.

9. This policy had grave effects in other areas. Substantially, it notified the U. S. S. R. and the Communist Party, United States of America, that American Communists operating in our midst constituted a specially favored category of citizens not subject to legal restrictions and penalties of other American citizens, but to be dealt with strictly in accord with the current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

10. Communist files were destroyed or immobilized in the First and Third Naval Districts. Anti-Communist units in these districts were abolished.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All agencies of Government should avoid the appearance or actuality of granting preferment to any group of citizens because of their connections with any foreign state. All citizens have equal obligations under the law and should be treated accordingly.

2. It is recommended that the executive branch of the Government adopt procedures which will guarantee the retention of all files containing information concerning subversive activity in such form as to make these files reasonably available in current situations.

3. Communists, or those subject to Communist discipline should be barred at all times from all sensitive posts in the armed services and from plants or installations serving the Armed Forces.

SECTION VII

THE NET OVER THE MIND

"IF YOU LEARNED THE WRONG THINGS—"

"In 1952, when the Subcommittee on Internal Security conducted an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), we took testimony of great significance from Igor Bogolepov, a refugee from Red tyranny, who had been attached to the Soviet Foreign Office during the 1930's.

"If you learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union," he said, "your thoughts are also wrong."

The subcommittee commented on this statement as follows:

* * * with these words, Mr. Bogolepov may have put his finger on the spinal nerve of recent world history. If it is true that the Western World learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union, then it is certainly true that its thoughts were also wrong. If its thoughts were wrong, the actions it took in dealing with the Soviet Union, the agreements it signed, the compromises it agreed to, the concessions it allowed, were wrong too (IPR, R., p. 31).

It is no longer debatable that at Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and elsewhere the Western World took the wrong actions in its wartime and postwar dealings with the U. S. S. R. The Red lava flow
released by those actions has since engulfed the 700 million inhabitants of Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, mainland China, North Korea, and part of Indochina.

It is no longer debatable that these wrong actions gained wide acceptability, if not approval by a controlling percentage of policymakers, scholars, writers, and other molders of policy and opinion, because they had the "wrong thoughts" about the Soviet Union. It is no longer debatable that the people of the United States—at least—had the wrong thoughts about the Soviet Union because they learned the wrong things about it.

So this question inevitably arises:

How did so many Americans learn so many wrong things about the Soviet Union that they approved so many wrong actions which erupted in such volcanic disaster? This question has lain at the base of our activities throughout the subcommittee's entire existence. What has the Kremlin done, what is it doing now to throw its "Net" over the Western mind?

"IT WAS A VERY BIG BUSINESS OF OURS"

Mr. Bogolepov offered one of many explanations to be found in our record. "In the Foreign Office," he said, "we have had a special, I think you call it joint committee, where representatives of different branches of the administration were present ***. This important body was responsible directly to the political commission of the Politburo for carrying out the infiltration of ideas and men through the Iron Curtain to the Western countries ***. It was a very big business of ours ***" (IPR, R., p. 1).

Mr. Bogolepov described this "very big business" in detail. It involved, he said, "the creation of fellow travelers, inducing the Western intelligentsia to write books and articles which were favorable to the Soviet Union" (IPR, pp. 4496 ff.).

A large part of the subcommittee's investigation of IPR was an examination of this "very big business," as far as Soviet and American Far Eastern policy was concerned. We found overwhelming proof that Communists and pro-Communists had seized control of the Institute—which was set up to conduct scholarly research—and transformed it into a Soviet propaganda apparatus.

The subcommittee learned that the members of IPR's inner

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6For example, it now seems incredible that any literate American could either propagate or accept the idea that the Soviet Union was one of the "democratic powers," which had joined with us to establish the principles of the Atlantic Charter "everywhere in the world." Yet, literate Americans who made policy during World War II did propagate this lunatic fantasy, and literate Americans who were the major force in public opinion did accept it. It seems equally incredible that literate Americans could either propagate or accept the idea that Prosecutor Vishinsky, who had been the hammer of Stalin in the blood-soaked Moscow purge trials, would cooperate in creating the brave new world envisioned by the United Nations Charter. Yet, literate Americans propagated and literate Americans accepted this fantasy too.
circle established a direct connection with the Communist International in Moscow as long ago as 1934. They went to the Comintern's Far Eastern chief himself for instructions on "editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles." They wrote books, articles and pamphlets, not only for the IPR itself, but also for an interlocking group of other organizations.

It was chiefly because of them that America learned "the wrong things about the Soviet Union" in the Far East. It was chiefly because of them that America's thoughts about the Far East were "also wrong." It was chiefly because of them that the actions America took in dealing with the Far East were wrong too.

As a consequence, there was set in motion a chain reaction of disaster, which has not yet run its course.

### The Helping Hand of NKVD

During his testimony on IPR, Mr. Bogolepov was asked by Senator Ferguson: "How do you get people to write books without paying them subsidies, and so forth?"

This question provoked a most extraordinary response.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Why do we have to pay for books? There are American publishers to publish the books and pay for them. Why do we spend our own money? (IPR, pp. 4496–4497).

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You certainly remember the British labor leaders, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, very reasonable people. They visited the Soviet Union in about 1935 or 1936, and the result of their visit was a two-volume work, Soviet Communism and New Civilization. **

The materials for this book actually were given by the Soviet Foreign Office. **

The chapter concerning the very humanitarian way of Soviet detention camps and jails was written by the Soviet secret police itself.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I received it from the chief of one of the divisions of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police ** (IPR, pp. 4509–4510).

Another book that got the same sort of treatment, according to this former Soviet official, was the Great Conspiracy Against the Soviet Union, which was published in the United States as the alleged work of two American authors, Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The largest part of this book which is known to me was written by a certain Veinberg, who was a vice chief of the southwestern division of the Foreign Office in Moscow. ** I saw myself the Russian manuscript before it was sent to New York.

Senator FERGUSON. ** Have you read the book now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I looked through it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the same as the manuscript?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; it was. They rearranged it, perhaps, but the facts and the ideas are the same (IPR, p. 4514).

The subcommittee had good reason to remember the Bogolepov testimony regarding this book, in later inquiries.
THE NEW YORK TEACHERS UNION

In 1953, in our investigation of "Subversive Influence in the Educational Process", we paid particular attention to the New York Teachers Union. The evidence amply demonstrates that this union was an extremely significant weapon in the Kremlin's campaign to teach the Western World "the wrong things about the Soviet Union." At the height of its power, the union had a membership of 10,000 to 11,000 teachers in the New York school system (Educ., pp. 104-111).

The president of the union from 1935 to 1945 was Charles J. Hendley. At the time he appeared before us (September 1952), he was secretary and treasurer of the corporation which publishes the Daily Worker, official newspaper of the Communist Party, United States of America. Hendley himself told the subcommittee that he joined the corporation for the "express purpose" of seeing to it "that the Daily Worker should carry out the party line." In 1952, he was still an active member of the union's educational policy committee.

Dr. Bella Dodd gave the subcommittee a very revealing picture of how the teachers' union operated to teach "the wrong things about the Soviet Union" not only to American schoolchildren, but also to the American public generally. Dr. Dodd was New York State legislative representative of the union from about 1936 to 1944. She was also New York State legislative representative of the Communist Party, and a member of the party's national committee.

Dr. Dodd. The teachers' unions were used a great deal to formulate public opinion in America. The teachers were active in the parents' organizations; they were active with the students; they were active in their own professional cultural organizations, and in the American Federation of Teachers we had our conventions.

So that anything the Communist Party wanted to be popularized they would see to it that it had a copy of a resolution, which you then modified to meet your own individual needs (Educ., p. 16).

* * * Whether it was collective security, whether it was prowar, whether it was against war, whether it was against the Dies committee, whether it was against some congressional legislation their resolutions would be introduced, and simultaneously you would have a large number of resolutions popularized in the newspapers, delegations going to the various men in public office, telephones, telegrams (ibid).

THE TEACHER NEWS

Like IPR, the teachers union operated within a constellation of Communist fronts and Communist propaganda agencies. The gravitational force in this constellation was chiefly supplied by the union publication, Teacher News.

Here, union members themselves were instructed in the Communist line, introduced to the publications of other front organizations, and taught how to bring the line into the classroom. Every opportunity was taken to drape the wolf's policies of the U. S. S. R. in the sheep's clothing of "peace" and "democracy."

One Teacher News column was of considerable significance in view of the Bogolepov testimony.
Since 1917, worldwide reaction has labored to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet Government through the fomenting of war from without and conspiracy from within. Sayer and Kahn's The Great Conspiracy, appearing shortly in a $1 edition, gives a detailed documented history of these maneuvers and intrigues. The book clarifies some of the principal causes of World War II, for the great conspiracy had a great deal to do with making the war inevitable. A reading of the book also helps one understand the present drive to end Allied Big Three unity, to isolate the U. S. S. R., and to prepare favorable political and military conditions for an anti-Soviet antidemocratic war.

Senator Pepper,* who considers this book high-priority reading in the battle to win the peace, supplies an introduction to the new edition. The TU win-the-peace committee will engage in a summer campaign to sell the book to teachers in towns and at resorts. Every TU member is urged to purchase a copy and to persuade friends to do likewise.

The Great Conspiracy, to which union members were urged to devote an entire summer campaign, was the book Mr. Bogolepov described as having been secretly written in the Soviet Foreign Office. Underground Communists in America's tax-supported school systems were thus clearly carrying out the Soviet Foreign Office line to the end that not only American schoolchildren, but the American people as a whole were taught "the wrong things" about the Soviet Union.

**THE COMMUNIST TEACHER GOES TO WAR**

Dr. Dodd was asked what assignments Communist schoolteachers sought during World War II in the armed services of the United States. Here is her reply:

Dr. Dond. Many of our teachers did seek to go into the educational division of the Army, the indoctrination course.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that, Dr. Dodd?

Dr. Dond. From time to time the members would come back and we would discuss the question of what their work was, and they would discuss particularly the indoctrination courses where they were very eager to make the turn for the American soldier in a pro-Soviet fashion. Many of our soldiers were anti-Soviet, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was in the war with us. It was the question of making the turn and establishing the idea that the Soviet Union was a democracy and was, as a matter of fact, the most perfect democracy in the world.

The purpose of the indoctrination courses was to get as much of that in as possible. Of course, in some places they got a lot in; in some places they had to take little. They were very anxious to get it in.

Mr. Morris. You know this, Dr. Dodd, because of the fact that you knew these particular Communist teachers who did come back and as a matter of fact reported to you at Communist Party headquarters how they were carrying on their own indoctrination courses in their service?

Dr. Dond. As a matter of fact, no Communist went to the Armed Forces or came out of the Armed Forces without reporting to the party his experience, his work. No man came in on leave without reporting to the party and finding out just what the pitch was.

Mr. Morris. In the postwar period, in the immediate postwar period, Dr. Dodd, did these Communist teachers participate in any other work? Do you recall the "bring the boys back home" movement?

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* Former United States Senator Claude E. Pepper, of Florida.
* Robert Morris, former chief counsel to the subcommittee, now a judge of the Municipal Court for the Ninth District, City of New York.
Dr. Dodd. Yes. I guess all of us remember the tremendous agitation to bring the boys back home from the Pacific and from Europe. The American mothers wanted their boys home, the boys wanted to come home. We are a nonmilitaristic people. The campaign, however, achieved organized proportions. Those of you who remember reading the papers will remember the almost sit-down strikes there were in the Philippines, in Austria, and Italy; and I at the time, reading the newspapers, remembered the names of some of the leaders and among them were not only some of the trade-union leaders whom I knew as Communists, but also some of the teachers whom I knew as Communists. There is no doubt that we brought the boys home, 14 million men were disbanded, and our Armed Forces were disbanded; and that was the time when Russia marched into Eastern Europe and made her advances in China (Educ., H., pp. 522, 523).

Gen. Mark Clark, who was the American commander and United States High Commissioner in Austria after the German surrender, gave the subcommittee the picture of what happened in Austria.

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have any demobilization demonstrations in your command at the end of the war?

General Clark. My command at the end of the war moved into Austria. When the demonstrations began, my headquarters was located in Vienna. There had been some demonstrations prior to that time in Germany, I recall, and I was very much disturbed that some of my soldiers might march on my headquarters demanding they be returned home. I knew that would give great comfort to the Soviet troops who were right there with us, and it would be a devastating blow to the morale of the Austrians who looked to us as their liberator.

So we did everything we could to forestall, to tell our men why we were not able to send them all home and demobilize them. Actually, there was no march on my headquarters. The group sent a telegram back to the President of the United States, and to Members of Congress. I think they included Drew Pearson and some other commentators in their distribution list protesting about being kept in Austria and alleging many of the men had no real jobs and the generals were keeping them because they wanted more to command. That was the effect of the telegram.

Mr. Carpenter. Were those demonstrations fomented by Communist acts?

General Clark. My belief was that there was at least one Communist organizer who fomented this particular demonstration. Our intelligence agencies were activated and had been active. The result of their investigation led me to believe that at least one man was the Communist organizer who had been a member of the Communist Party, had been with my Fifth Army during the war, behaving and waiting for the opportunity to do the most damage and cause me the most embarrassment (H. 1657).

History again becomes ruinously entangled in the net which the Kremlin threw over the western mind. As already pointed out, because we learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union, we had the wrong thoughts about it. Because our thoughts were wrong, our actions were wrong. And because our actions were wrong, 700 million people in 2 continents suffer the agonies of Red tyranny today.

SECTION VIII

WHAT IS I. AND E.?

On September 5, 1944, the War Department issued a circular on Orientation, Information, Education, which described the functions, powers, and purposes of the Information and Education Division.

It is obvious by the terms of this circular that the Information and Education Division had unlimited access to the minds of 8 million American soldiers during World War II. The I. and E. program was comprehensive. It was continuous. And it was compulsory. (H., p. 1508 ff.)
Much of this program, of course, was harmless. Some was useful, perhaps even beneficial. But at the focal points, at the points where it touched the subject of the Communist world conspiracy, the "education" program of the United States Army taught this captive audience of 8 million young Americans "the wrong things about the Soviet Union." It taught them the wrong things about Communist China, too.

The basic document in the entire program was a Guide to the Use of Information Materials. This pamphlet, according to its own foreword, was "an outline of principles to govern the use of ideas so that they may become more effective weapons in the war." It was a book of instructions for those who administered the program, both at home and in every foreign theater. Here are some passages from the Guide, under the heading "Our Allies, the U. S. S. R."

Whether their present government is the kind of political system that is most satisfactory to the Russian people has been sufficiently answered by a war in which the political faith of the people as well as of the armed forces has stood the trial by fire.

Speak of the Red army and the Red navy, not the Russian Army (H. 1523).

The Moscow Pact, one of the strongest Allied acts of the war, recognizes as a first condition of peace the protracted cooperation of all the Allies. In view of this agreement anything written or said that tends to alienate the U. S. S. R. from the United States may be counted as a self-inflicted wound (H., p. 1523).

**Army Talks**

The subcommittee found ample documentation to show that the "principles" stated here were scrupulously obeyed in "the stuff they gave the troops." The major instrument for the indoctrination of 8 million young Americans was a weekly publication known as Army Talks. Army Talk 53, published on January 6, 1945, was entitled "Checking the Score on Our Soviet Ally." Here is a passage that appeared there:

They [the Communists] early believed that a dictatorship "of the Proletariat" was necessary in order to destroy capitalism and set up socialism; that then the dictatorship should gradually evolve into a democracy, as now provided in their constitution. Thus, although they now have a secret police and a Government-controlled press, their ultimate political ideals are directly opposite to the stated ideals of Fascist dictatorship, and their hope is to drop the appurtenances of dictatorship in the process of democratic evolution.

Red: This was the color of the Russian Revolution's flag, and thus has become identified with the whole nation in the way that "Stars and Stripes" has become a national phrase for us. In the period right after World War I, it was used to contrast the revolutionists with the "white" forces, the Czarist group which fought against the Reds. In some cases, too, the word that means "red" in Russian has the further meaning of "beautiful."

Army Talk 64 was on fascism. Here is part of what appeared in that document:

It is accurate to call a member of a Communist Party a Communist. For short, he is often called a Red. Indiscriminate pinning of the label Red on people and proposals which one opposes is a common political device. It is a favorite trick of native as well as foreign Fascists.* * *

Learning to identify native Fascists and to detect their techniques is not easy. They plan it that way. But it is vitally important to learn to spot them,
even though they adopt names and slogans with popular appeal, drape themselves with the American flag, and attempt to carry out their program in the name of the democracy they are trying to destroy. * * *

What is the difference between communism and fascism? Aren't they essentially the same?

In any discussion on fascism there will be some who will argue that there are strong similarities between fascism and communism. Under both systems, there is neither freedom of speech nor of press as we know it. Both forms of government permit only one political party. Both have a secret police. But beyond this, there are important and fundamental differences in philosophy, aims, purposes, and methods. * * *

While the early leaders of communism in the Soviet Union advocated world revolution, Stalin modified that policy in 1927. * * * Through pledges at the conferences at Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta, and through daily repetitions to its people, the Soviet has reaffirmed its aim as lasting peace through international cooperation. * * *

* * * The Russians have great confidence in the future improvement of their lot, although the average Russian is poor in comparison to American standards. Russians are now confident that their upward march will be rapidly resumed with the end of the war, the resumption of production for civilian use, and the expansion of their great resources.

Army Talk 66 discussed Our Ally China. Here is part of what was said:

* * * When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords.

THE I.AND E. MESSAGE

What has been quoted here are mere fragments of the whole message with which I. and E. indoctrinated 8 million American soldiers. The text of these Army Talks (originally published as Army Fact Sheets) clearly indicates that those in charge of their preparation wanted 8 million American soldiers to believe that—

1. Communism is "most satisfactory" to the Russian people.
2. Communism differs fundamentally from fascism.
3. It was communism—not their native land—that the Russian people defended when they rose against the Nazi invader.
4. When the war is over they will return to communism's "upward march."
5. The Communist "overrunning of the Baltic provinces" was justifiable.
6. To write or say anything critical of communism "may be counted as a self-inflicted wound."
7. The Communist dictatorship is a transitory phenomenon, which ultimately will be laid aside by the dictator himself in favor of democracy.
8. The Red flag of the Communist revolution is not a fearful bloody thing—it is beautiful.
9. Americans who fight communism are probably false patriots and "native Fascists."
10. Stalin abandoned the original Communist program of world revolution in 1927.
11. Communism's whole international aim is "lasting peace through international cooperation."
12. China's Communists are not really Communists at all. They are merely agrarian reformers and their aims are "quite in accord with what we think of as liberal democracy" while their opponents, the Nationalists, are reactionary and fascist.

13. America is a land in which prejudice is widespread, but there is no such prejudice in the Soviet Union.

14. The entry of Communists into the Government of China was desirable.

This is a compendium of certain major falsehoods which the Kremlin itself sought to instill in the American mind during the war years. As Mr. Bogolepov said, in speaking of the Soviet Foreign Office:

Why do we have to pay for books? There are American publishers to publish the books and pay for them. Why do we spend our own money?

The American publisher, in this instance, was the United States Army.

**The I. and E. Personnel**

The subcommittee's study of material already cited made it clear that I. and E. gave aid and comfort to the cause of world communism through the methods it developed for wartime indoctrination of American troops. As a result it became necessary to call witnesses in order to determine—

1. Who was responsible for the preparation and dissemination of this outright pro-Communist propaganda?

2. Was it done innocently, under the stress of a wartime alliance?

3. Or was it done deliberately by underground Communists, who gained control of the I. and E. apparatus for the specific purpose of teaching "the wrong things about the Soviet Union"?

The methods by which Communists burrowed into the United States Government were fully familiar to us. In our first report on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, the subcommittee described these methods as follows:

Almost all of the persons exposed by the evidence had some connection which could be documented with at least one—and generally several—other exposed persons. They used each other's names for reference on applications for Federal employment. They hired each other. They promoted each other. They raised each other's salaries. They transferred each other from bureau to bureau, from department to department, from congressional committee to congressional committee. They assigned each other to international missions. They vouched for each other's loyalty and protected each other when exposure threatened (R., p. 21).

The testimony of only half a dozen witnesses was needed to show that most of these methods were used by Communists and pro-Communists who seized key positions in the Information and Education branch of the United States Army during World War II.

**Julius Schreiber**

The most important of these was Dr. Julius Schreiber. Dr. Schreiber is presently a psychiatrist in Washington, D. C., and chairman of the Washington Mental Health Association. He is a former Reserve officer of the Army, who served in the Civilian Conservation Corps.
from 1933 to 1936. From October 25, 1943, until July 4, 1945, he was in I. and E. as chief of the Programs Section in its Orientation Branch. He came into I. and E. as a captain and retired as a lieutenant colonel.

The mission of this Branch was described in a document found in Dr. Schreiber's service file, which was turned over to the subcommittee by the Department of the Army.

Mission of Army Orientation Branch: The mission of the Army Orientation Branch as stated in Circular 360 WD 1944, is "To formulate policies, plan and supervise procedures for orientation of military personnel in the background, causes, and current phase of the war and current events relating thereto, and for eventual return to civilian life; to prepare and select War Department materials for these purposes, including motion-picture film, recordings, pamphlets, fact sheets, books, maps, and other visual aids, and weekly reports of military and world events; and when practical to provide such other materials as may be requested for the special morale purposes or programs of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Services Forces."

The orientation program is compulsory throughout the Army, both in the United States and in all overseas theaters. Not less than 1 undivided hour per week of normal training time is devoted to Army orientation (H., pp. 1530–1531).

Schreiber's own duties were as follows:

Job description: The officer has the following duties and responsibilities:

As Chief of the Program Section, Major Schreiber plans orientation programs for such important specialized needs as those of recovered prisoners of war, AGF and ASF redistribution stations, staging areas and ports of embarkation, transports going overseas and returning, rehabilitation centers, replacement training centers, and overseas replacement depots. This involves close coordination with high-ranking officers of the WGDS, AAF, AGF and ASF. This officer has demonstrated ability of an unusual order in establishing and maintaining sound policies of orientation in these specialized and difficult fields.

After planning the contents of these special programs, this officer directs the actual production of required materials, by a staff including 6 officers, 8 enlisted men, and 4 civilians. He has demonstrated judgment of a high order in his control and coordination of a vast amount of such production.

As liaison officer for the Information and Education Division with the Office of the Surgeon General, this officer is charged with a special set of extremely important and responsible duties in connection with the educational reconditioning and reorientation of sick and wounded personnel. This involves overall direction of a training program to instruct hospital personnel in conducting orientation for patients, directing the preparation of approximately 60 hours of material especially designed to meet hospital requirements, and the continuing coordination through service commands of the application of these programs.

As supervisor for the assignment and conduct of orientation pilot teams, this officer has the responsibility for maintaining close contact with the I. and E. directors of AAF, AGF, and ASF, and filling the needs of various units and posts by sending out orientation instruction teams to conduct schools as required. Included in the personnel of these teams are 4 officers and 8 enlisted men.

During the frequent absence of the Chief of the Orientation Branch, this officer acts as Chief, attends conferences, and handles the large number of official visitors to the Branch, handling a large variety of complex problems.

Among this officer's special duties is that of conducting 2 hours each week of orientation discussions for the 93 officers of the I. and E. Division. He also represents the I. and E. Division on a number of required speeches before large public bodies, especially those concerned with medical and psychiatric problems. In all his varied responsibilities and duties this officer makes an especially valuable contribution to the I. and E. Division by drawing upon his experience in civilian life as a professional psychiatrist (H., p. 1031).

When Dr. Schreiber appeared before the subcommittee, this colloquy occurred:

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United States?

Dr. Schreiber. I am not now a member of the Communist Party, and I have not been a member of the Communist Party since January 1, 1941. However, for the period prior to that date, I must respectfully decline, on the advice of counsel,
to answer the question on the basis of the first and fifth amendments and all other constitutional rights available to me (H., p. 1555).

Chairman JENNER. When did you cease to be a member of the Communist Party?

Dr. SCHREIBER. Sir, I have stated, from January 1, 1941, and thereon after, I have not been a member of the Communist Party.

Chairman JENNER. Did you resign?

Dr. SCHREIBER. May I consult my counsel, sir?

Chairman JENNER. You may consult your counsel at any time, Doctor.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Dr. SCHREIBER. May I respectfully decline to answer on the same grounds stated?

Chairman JENNER. Did you make any kind of a formal severance?

Dr. SCHREIBER. I am sorry, I must respectfully decline.

Chairman JENNER. You want this committee to understand you were a Communist up to a certain time, and then you were no longer a Communist, and yet you will not tell us how in the world you severed your connection with the Communist Party?

Dr. SCHREIBER. Sir, I would like this committee to understand that since January 1, 1941, I have not been a Communist; I am not now a Communist. During my entire Army career I was not a Communist. I participated in no Communist activities; I saw no Communist activities. I am thoroughly opposed to communism.

Chairman JENNER. Doctor, don't you know it is a tactic of the Communist Party for their members to make a tactical withdrawal from the Communist Party when they go into the armed services? Don't you know that is the pattern of the Communist Party?

Dr. SCHREIBER. I don't know anything about the Communist Party tactics or activities, sir, at the present time.

Chairman JENNER. You must know something about it. You decline to answer questions from the period 1933 on up to 1941.

Dr. SCHREIBER. I decline to answer from the moment of my birth until 1941, sir (H., pp. 1536–1537).

It will be noted that Dr. Schreiber insisted that he is now "thoroughly opposed to communism" and "participated in no Communist activities" after January 1, 1941. He further insisted on introducing documents to show that:

My work in the Army was not only of a superior quality in terms of actual work, but that I was regarded by my superiors and colleagues as a very able, patriotic American citizen, and I insist that I am that and was that all through the war [italics ours].

At another point, he discussed the part he played in the production of Army Talks, which have been shown above as the fountainhead of pro-Communist indoctrination in I. and E.

Dr. Schreiber not only approved of the pro-Communist indoctrination of American troops during World War II but he still approves of it.

The record shows that as late as April 1949, Dr. Schreiber was a speaker at the notorious Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. This was fully exposed as the shabbiest of Communist fronts well in advance of the actual conference itself. Secretary of State Dean Acheson characterized it as "a sounding board for Communist propaganda." The House Committee on Un-American Activities issued the following findings regarding the conference:

Parading under the imposing title of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, the gathering at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on March 25, 26, and 27, 1949, was actually a supermobilization of the inveterate wheelhorses and supporters of the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations.
The purpose of the Scientific and Cultural Conference can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. To provide a propagandist forum against the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Defense Pact, and American foreign policy in general.
2. To promote support for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
3. To mobilize American intellectuals in the field of arts, science, and letters behind this program even to the point of civil disobedience against the American Government.
4. To prepare the way for the coming World Peace Congress to be held in Paris on April 20 to 23, 1949, with similar aims in view on a world scale and under similar Communist auspices.
5. To discredit American culture and to extol the virtues of Soviet culture.

(Review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace released by HUAC April 19, 1949.)

Thus, Dr. Schreiber's self-serving declaration that he is a "very able, patriotic American citizen" who is "thoroughly opposed to communism," falls to the ground.

There is more evidence than this in the record to paint the Schreiber portrait. Most important is the testimony regarding those he assembled around him at the top of I. and E. One such was Sgt. Luke Wilson.

**Sgt. Luke Wilson, Pioneer Conspirator**

Luke Woodward Wilson testified that he was a graduate of Dartmouth College.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you a member of the Communist Party and the Young Communist League at the time of your graduation from Dartmouth College?
Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer that question (H., p. 1400).

His first employment was in an organization called the National Institute of Public Affairs. This was an organization that brought college students who were interested in Government service to Washington to learn something about the workings of the Government.

"They worked as interns in various Government agencies," Mr. Wilson explained. "As I recall, I went around and made some of the arrangements for these interns to work in different offices... I think (the Institute) got funds from some foundation."

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were working for the National Institute of Public Affairs?
Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer (H., p. 1494).

Mr. CARPENTER. Was it your practice to train and place students, at the Institute of Public Affairs, who were Communists, into positions with the United States Government?
Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer (H., p. 1496).

After his service with the Institute, Wilson worked for 4 years as a staff member of a Senate Subcommittee on Education and Labor headed by the late Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. Senator LaFollette himself stated that the staff of this subcommittee was "infiltrated" by "Communist sympathizers" (R., p. 33).

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were on the staff of the LaFollette committee?
Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer (H., p. 1490).

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in contact with the Communist Party of Michigan when you were investigating the Michigan sitdown strikes for the LaFollette committee?
Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer (H., p. 1395).
Dr. Schreiber testified that he first met Wilson in Stockton, Calif., about 1938, when the latter came there on the business of the La Follette committee. Wilson was later inducted into the Army.

**Mr. Carpenter.** Were you a member of the Communist Party while you were in the Armed Forces?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * * (H., p. 1491).

The witness seems to have had a clear distinction, in his own mind, between espionage and subversive activity.

**The Chairman.** When you were in the Armed Forces, did you engage in any espionage activities?

**Mr. Wilson.** No.

**The Chairman.** When you were in the Armed Forces, did you engage in any subversive activities?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * * (H., p. 1495).

In the early part of 1944, Wilson was transferred from Randolph Field, Tex., to the Army's Morale Services Division, which later became I. and E. He went immediately to the Morale Services School at Lexington, Va.

**Mr. Carpenter.** When you went into the Information and Morale Section did you request assignment to the Morale Service?

**Mr. Wilson.** As I recall it, I did.

**Mr. Carpenter.** Do you know to whom you made your request?

**Mr. Wilson.** It is my recollection that I requested it of Major Schreiber (H., p. 1490).

**Mr. Carpenter.** Were you a member of the Communist Party with Julius Schreiber?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * * (H., p. 1491).

Wilson worked at Morale Service Headquarters both in Washington and New York.

**Mr. Wilson.** Then I went to Europe in July 1944. I was in the Information and Education Division Headquarters, first in London and then in Paris, until sometime in December 1945 * * * (H., p. 1489).

**Mr. Carpenter.** When you were in the Armed Forces in France, were you in contact with the Communist Party of that country?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * * (H., p. 1496).

**Mr. Carpenter.** When you were in Washington, how many people were on the staff, the immediate staff of Colonel Schreiber?

**Mr. Wilson.** As I recall it, there were around 4 or 5 * * * (H., p. 1493).

**Mr. Carpenter.** Did you ever consult with any Communist Party official regarding your work in the Information and Education Division?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * *.

**Mr. Carpenter.** Did you meet with and work jointly with members of the Communist Party within the Information and Education Division?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * *.

**Mr. Carpenter.** Were you a Communist Party member together with Carl Fenichel?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer.

**Mr. Carpenter.** Steve Fischer?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * *.

**Mr. Carpenter.** Do you know Steve Fischer?

**Mr. Wilson.** I decline to answer * * * (H., pp. 1493–1494).

The final brush strokes in the Wilson portrait were forthcoming when he was read a passage from the Nixon memorandum. The subcommittee has previously shown that this memorandum was an overall description of the Communist conspiracy in Government, which was
prepared by a Federal intelligence agency. It was presented to then President Truman and several of his Cabinet members in the winter of 1945-46. The memorandum contained information on the activities of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, William Remington, and others whose names have become bywords of infamy in American history. None of these individuals was punished in any way until the story of their conspiracy was forced into the open by committees of Congress. Here is what the chairman read about Luke Wilson from the Nixon memorandum and here are Wilson’s own comments.

Chairman JENNER (reading):

"Luke Woodward Wilson was last known to be serving overseas as a morale officer in the United States Army. Confidential reliable sources have indicated that Wilson is a close friend of Louise Bransten—"

Do you know Louise Bransten?

Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

Chairman JENNER (reading):

"and that his wife, Ruth Wilson, is a Communist Party functionary in the Stockton, Calif., area. Wilson for a number of years was employed by the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee of the United States Senate investigating labor matters. A highly confidential source has advised that in May 1941 Wilson was attempting to determine how information contained in the files of the FBI might best be obtained in order to assist in the defense of Harry Bridges."

Is that a fact, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously stated.

Chairman JENNER (reading):

"It is further reliably reported that Wilson desired Charles S. Flato, then of the Farm Security Administration, to approach John Abt, formerly connected with the Department of Justice, and at that time counsel for Sidney Hillman, on how best to obtain such data."

Is that true, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. I decline to answer * * * (H. p. 1495).

This was one of the “4 or 5” men whom Dr. Julius Schreiber selected out of all the millions in the United States Army, to assist him in caring for the “morale” of the troops.

STEPHEN M. FISCHER

The subcommittee noted that Wilson invoked the fifth amendment against self-incrimination, when asked whether he knew Stephen Fischer. This was particularly interesting in view of a memorandum dated April 7, 1943, which was among the documents provided for us by the Department of the Army. The memorandum was addressed to Colonel Farlow, from Major Schreiber. Here is what it said:

I have been advised by Sergeant Wilson that 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army Air Forces Flexible Gunnery School, Tyndell Field, Fla., is an outstanding young officer.

Lieutenant Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and after completing his 25 (?) bombing missions came back to the mainland. According to Wilson “this guy’s terrific—he already knows as much if not more than the instructors at the school.”

In civilian life he was a newspaperman on the San Francisco Chronicle. Prior to that Wilson believes he completed a course in journalism at Columbia (?) University.

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for 2 weeks temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in materials or Field Operations Section (H. p. 1494).

Among other things, this sheds an interesting light on I. and E.’s theory of the chain of command. A sergeant told a major to tell a colonel to employ a lieutenant; and it was done!
After this memo went to Colonel Farlow, Major Schreiber telephoned Lieutenant Fischer in Florida and summoned him to I. and E. headquarters in Washington. Fischer was immediately put to work "helping in the preparation of 'Army Talks'" (H., p. 1500).

Fischer acknowledged to the subcommittee that he had joined the Communist Party when he attended the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University in 1940. "For approximately 1 year," he said, "up until some time in the early fall, as I recall, of 1941, I considered myself and was a member of the Communist Party, with a group of newspapermen in San Francisco. And I just left in the fall of 1941" (H., p. 1501).

He had no recollection of having met Schreiber prior to his induction into the service, although the latter professed to have known him. He said he never heard of the memorandum in which he, Fischer, was described as "terrific" by the Communist agent, Wilson. Among others who admired Fischer, according to a document found in his files, was an attorney named John T. McTernan. McTernan recommended Fischer's appointment as a flying cadet in the United States Army. One of the reasons for his recommendation, according to the document, was that Fischer was a "devout believer in the principles of our Constitution."

McTernan himself made use of the Constitution's fifth amendment against self-incrimination when the California Committee on Un-American Activities asked him about his own Communist affiliations (H., pp. 1504, 1505).

Fischer's I. and E. duties were as follows:

This officer's primary duties are editorial research and writing. He recommends and initiates subject matter, directs and conducts research work, and does actual writing of weekly Army Talk fact sheets and orientation discussion guides for distribution to all Army units in continental United States and to all overseas theaters. In addition, this officer is in charge of conducting pre-tests of discussion material by directing discussions in field units. The assignment calls for a high order of judgment, wide knowledge of world affairs and Army policy, and sympathetic understanding of troops in the field. This officer's duties carry great responsibility because of the global use to which the materials are put (H., p. 1506).

Fischer refused to tell the subcommittee who were the other Communists, besides himself, in the "group of newspapermen in San Francisco" (H., p. 1506).

**CARL FENICHEL**

Carl Fenichel was another of the individuals Luke Wilson refused to discuss, on the ground that to do so might involve him in criminal prosecution. Fenichel was called as a witness.

He testified that he attended the I. and E. school at Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Va.

Then I went to Washington and I was told I was assigned to this Division involving the writing of Army Talks and training discussion leaders. That is the work I did from about August, I think, 1944, * * * up until the time I was discharged in 1945.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Fenichel, were you a member of the Communist Party when you were in the Armed Forces?

**Mr. FENICHEL.** No sir; I wasn't. (H., p. 1588.)

* * * * * * * * * *

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you a member of the Communist Party a week before you entered the armed services?
Mr. FENICHEL. I refuse to answer for the same reason.
Chairman JENNER. The day before?
Mr. FENICHEL. The same.
Chairman JENNER. Two minutes before?
Mr. FENICHEL. The same.
Chairman JENNER. Before you held up your hand to take your oath, were you a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. FENICHEL. I refuse to answer for the same reason. (H., p. 1588.)

He testified that he was a former member of the executive board of the Communist-dominated New York Teachers’ Union. He refused to say whether he had attended Communist Party meetings with other members of the Board (H., p. 1590).

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you at any time make your Communist record known to the Army authorities?
Mr. FENICHEL. I refuse to answer (H., p. 1592.)

The subcommittee’s record shows that the teachers’ union had been fully exposed as a Communist instrument long before Carl Fenichel of its executive board was summoned to I. and E. headquarters. In view of this fact, there is the clearest implication that Carl Fenichel was brought to join Luke Wilson, Stephen Fischer, and Julius Schreiber at I. and E. headquarters for the specific purpose of aiding the Communist cause.

HOW THEY LOOKED TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER

Daniel James, a writer, was a second lieutenant, working under Schreiber at Washington. He also served in I. and E.’s New York office. James testified that he had “always opposed communism and any other form of totalitarianism.”

He told of a lecture that Major Schreiber delivered to officers at the Pentagon as part of his duty, during the course of which he used a chart setting forth the structure of the Soviet Government.

Mr. JAMES. The intent and purport of that lecture, in my opinion, at that time, was to attempt to portray the Soviet Government, the Soviet State, as democratic. The chart consisted of a breakdown of the various organs of the Soviet State.

Mr. CARPENTER. This was to a group of officers, did you say?
Mr. JAMES. This was to a group of officers in the War Department.
Mr. CARPENTER. What were their ranks?
Mr. JAMES. * * * I would say there was a good sprinkling of colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants. I don’t recall having seen any generals there, but there may have been (H., pp. 1623–1624).

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THE I. AND E. OFFICE CLIQUE

Mr. JAMES. The nature of my work in the New York office was to participate in the writing and publication of the Army weekly discussion guide called Army Talk.

* * * * * * * *

Mr. CARPENTER. * * * How were you accepted among those who were working both in the Washington office and the New York office?
Mr. JAMES. I would say that when I got to New York I very early discovered that I was not a member of the group that seemed to be running the show. That is to say it became clear to me that there were a number of individuals in the branch who operated as a sort of clique working together.
Mr. CARPENTER. In other words, in that clique they had enlisted men, did they not?
Mr. JAMES. Yes, they did.
Mr. CARPENTER. And those enlisted men rated more favor than you as an officer, and their counsel was accepted more readily than your recommendations?
Mr. JAMES. Well, there were any number of what you might call closed discussions that went on between members of this group, among the members of this group, from which just about everyone of us in the office outside the group was excluded. There were other officers there, too, and other enlisted personnel. They also were excluded.

I want it clearly understood, Mr. Counsel, that this was distinctly an impression I got. It is a very intangible thing, something that is difficult to put your fingers on.

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you give the names of those people who seemed to be in the clique?

Mr. JAMES. I know that frequently Major Schreiber would come up to New York and go into a huddle with Forstenzer, Hyman Forstenzer, and Carl Fenichel, particularly. I think possibly on one or more occasions Stephen Fischer was usually consulted. I better strike out "usually," since perhaps it was just a few occasions.

That would be about it. They would have these discussions. They would go into one of the smaller offices in our establishment. Of course, I had no idea what they were talking about, but it was quite obvious that the rest of the office was excluded from these discussions (H., pp. 1624, 1625).

* * *

PILOT TEAMS TO CAMPS

Mr. CARPENTER. From this installation in New York there were certain individuals selected from the New York office to travel throughout the United States to the various camps and stations in order to carry out the work of the I. and E.?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you ever included on any of those trips?

Mr. JAMES. I was included on only 1 inspection trip to Atlantic City and Fort Monmouth, which covered a period of perhaps 2 or 3 days. I was once scheduled to go on a trip to Texas, but for some unaccountable reason that was canceled. However, Forstenzer and Fenichel and other individuals in the office were frequently en route to some post or camp to give indoctrination courses and run orientation schools and so on.

Mr. CARPENTER. They were the ones who belonged to this particular clique?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

I might add, Mr. Counsel, if I may, that I was not the only one so excluded to the best of my knowledge.

* * *

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever have a discussion with Forstenzer?

Mr. JAMES. Well, on one particular occasion I was about to relate, we went to lunch together and had a rather lengthy discussion of the nature of communism and the structure of the international Communist movement. I exhibited a good deal of curiosity as to why the Communist Parties of the various countries of the world always seemed to act together, in concert, and I put the question to Forstenzer of whether or not there wasn't some central direction that would explain why all of these parties usually thought and acted alike. It was his opinion that they did so because they came to the same conclusions independently. That, I may add, is a favorite phrase that is used in Communist circles (H., pp. 1625-1626).

Mr. James' recollections speak for themselves in the light of the documents already cited, plus the testimony—or non-testimony—of those who hid in the silence afforded by the fifth amendment.

GERSON, FAXON, SVENCHANSKY, AND GANDALL

The quality of the pro-Communist material produced for worldwide distribution, and the character of those at the top who produced it, made unnecessary a widespread survey of I. and E. at the lower levels. However, as in the cases of Camp Crowder and Camp Pickett,

*Forstenzer appeared in executive session and denied that he was a member of the Communist Party.
the subcommittee took samplings. The results of these samplings were what might have been expected. They may best be illustrated by the fact that one Simon W. Gerson was assigned in 1945 to I. and E. work at the important convalescent center at Camp Upton, N. Y.

As the record shows, Gerson had been an open and notorious Communist careerist for at least 17 years before his assignment. At one time, he was city editor for the Daily Worker, official mouthpiece of the Communist Party.

On November 21, 1929, according to an article in the Daily Worker, he openly proclaimed "the correctness of the new line of our party as laid down by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International." About a year before this he was arrested in a Communist demonstration outside the Brooklyn Navy Yard (H., pp. 1602–1604). He is presently legislative chairman of the New York Communist Party.

Walter L. Kirschenbaum, who was at Camp Upton simultaneously with Gerson, submitted a sworn statement describing Gerson's conduct.

I recall only twice—although there might have been other times—when the Communist line was injected into our work. One time when we were instructed by Gerson, who apparently was guided by Army Talks, that we tell the GI's who came to our classes to be re-created into enlightened civilians that the Chinese in the north who were stirring at that moment were "agrarian reformers, like Jefferson." I had known Mao Tse-tung's record from reading Comintern material and I recall raising the issue privately with Gerson ... (H., p. 1600).

* * * It was then that he asked "What is your background anyway?" I do not recall my precise answer, but it stirred suspicion in Gerson's mind. On another occasion, during an Information Please type program, GI's were asked this question: "Who is the labor leader who is urging that all GI's be brought home from the Pacific?" There was a pause of silence. "Come, come," Gerson exhorted, "let's not burn our Bridges until we come to them. Let's not burn our Bridges." Obviously the winner had the name of Harry Bridges on his lips (H., p. 1601).

Harry Bridges, of course, is the notorious west coast labor leader who has been identified many times as a Communist.

Besides Gerson, other I. and E. personnel included George A. Faxon, Alexander Svenchansky, and William Gandall.

Faxon worked for I. and E. at the Pentagon in Washington as well as at many other installations both in the United States and Europe. He was a Boston school teacher who invoked the fifth amendment regarding his Communist activities when testifying before the subcommittee during our education hearings (Ed. H., pp. 681–684).

Svenchansky, another fifth amendment case, was an I. and E. officer in Alaska and Montana, at stopping points for airplanes on their way to and from the U. S. S. R. Before he entered the Army, Svenchansky was employed by the Amtrc Trading Corp. which is an official agency of the Soviet Government (U. N. H., pp. 666–679).

Gandall, another who invoked the fifth amendment, was with I. and E. at Marbury Hall in England. Like Gerson, Gandall was also a well-known Communist agitator. He characterized himself in the following exchange:

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever get any instructions in dynamiting, espionage, by representatives of the Soviet military forces?

Gandall was also a veteran of the International Brigade which served in the Spanish civil war. As pointed out above, Mr. Khokhlov testified that it was the practice of the Soviet MGB to use veterans of the Spanish civil war in terroristic activity.
The CHAIRMAN. Let the record again show the witness confers with counsel before responding to the question.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. GANDALL. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before (H., p. 1633).

IPR AGAIN

Another part of the I. and E. equipment was a "Prospectus ASF Troop Training Orientation Program," designed for instructors. Among other things, it contained a list of 39 books which were recommended to the troops as basic reading. Twenty-two of the 39 were published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Two hundred and thirty thousand copies of these IPR volumes were purchased by the Army for distribution at installations throughout the world (IPR, H. pp. 1520–1522).

In our report on IPR, the subcommittee said:

The IPR has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda, and military intelligence.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policies toward Communist objectives.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Many of the persons active in and around the IPR, and in particular though not exclusively Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, Frederick V. Field, T. A. Bisson, Lawrence K. Rosinger, and Maxwell Stewart, knowingly and deliberately used the language of books and articles which they wrote or edited in an attempt to influence the American public by means of pro-Communist or pro-Soviet content of such writings (IPR, R., pp. 223–225).

Lawrence Rosinger was identified as a member of the Communist Party during the IPR hearings. When questioned about this accusation, he invoked the fifth amendment against self-incrimination (IPR, R., p. 156). China's Wartime Policies, by Lawrence Rosinger was among I. and E.'s 22 IPR recommendations.

Maxwell Stewart was another IPR author who "knowingly and deliberately used the language of books and articles" for "pro-Communist" or "pro-Soviet" purposes (IPR, R., p. 225). Wartime China, by Maxwell Stewart, was one of I. and E.'s 22.

Miriam S. Farley was for years a key figure in IPR. After the Japanese surrender, she was sent to General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. In a letter describing her position, she said: "I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with" (IPR, H., p. 395). Speaking of India, by Miriam S. Farley, was another of the I. and E. 22.

Kate Mitchell was one of those arrested in the Amerasia case in connection with the theft of 1,700 Government documents. She was
also a member of IPR’s inner ring. Both she and Kumar Goshal were identified as members of the Communist Party (IPR, R., p. 156). Twentieth Century India, by Mitchell and Goshal was included in the 22 I. and E. titles.

Frederick V. Field, one of the most important influences in IPR throughout the crucial years in its history, was identified as a Communist Party member. He was also a writer for the Daily Worker, official organ of the party. He is, or was, a registered agent of China’s Communist government. In answer to all questions about his Communist activities, he invoked the fifth amendment (IPR, R., pp. 153–154). Field instigated an IPR pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, which was drafted by Eleanor Lattimore, though it was published under the signature of then Vice President Henry A. Wallace (IPR, H., pp. 937 ff., 1297 ff.). Our Job in the Pacific was one more of the I. and E. 22.

All this establishes the open and visible connection between I. and E. and IPR. There is a possibility that there may also have been a connection beneath the surface. Attention is called to the passage quoted above from Army Talk 66, Our Ally China:

** When we speak of the Chinese “Communists,” we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word “Communist.” In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China’s farmers** ** (Army Talk 66).**

In 1946, Eleanor Lattimore published a pamphlet, China Yesterday and Today, which contained the following passage:

*When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word “Communist.” They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control. Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic conditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party (IPR, R., pp. 208, 209).*

The similarity between this language and the language in Army Talk 66 if it is a coincidence, is a remarkable one.

**THE VICTIMS**

The subcommittee did not attempt to survey comprehensively the activities of I. and E. at the point where it reached the soldiers themselves in camps, hospitals, and embarkation points. However, we did take a few samplings. It was hardly surprising to discover that the line handed down from the top was faithfully adhered to and even “fattened up” in the lower echelons.

Capt. John Kenneth Kerr, who was a captain in the Counterintelligence Corps and Chief of the Investigations Branch of the Third Service Command, told of an investigation he undertook at Camp Picket, Va., in August of 1945. He learned of a mimeographed publication which was being circulated among the men on the post. Its title was The GI Plan for Postwar America. The record shows that it contained proposals which were crucially advantageous to the Soviet cause at that time.
Captain Kerr also stated that among the documents on hand at the Camp Pickett Library was the thrice weekly Information Bulletin issued by the Soviet Embassy (H., p. 1472).

**MISEDUCATION BY COMPULSION**

Ralph de Toledano told the subcommittee more about the “fattening up” process. Mr. de Toledano is presently an associate editor of Newsweek magazine. During World War II, he was an I. and E. officer.

Mr. de Toledano. * * * From the information and education point of view, my most important job was to brief the orientation noncoms and officers once a week on what was called the orientation line. The material for this briefing was prepared in part by I. and E. in Washington, and was the Army Talks which were mentioned earlier in the testimony, and then it was sort of fattened up by the Information and Education Branch of the Antilles Department, which was right above Fort Brook.

I read the material very thoroughly each week and prepared my briefing on the basis of it. The incident that comes to mind concerns a briefing on the Chinese Communists. Material had come from Washington on the Chinese Communists and, as I said, it had been fattened by the Antilles Department, I. and E. I received the material, read it very carefully, and it was very clear that this material followed the Communist Party line completely. It described the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers. It said they were not really Communists. It said that we should get along with them; that they were friends of the United States (H., p. 1479).

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I read the material and realized exactly what it was, and I called up the colonel in charge, whose name I don’t remember. He was a perfectly loyal American. He had been a Vermont schoolteacher, and he just wasn’t “hep” when it came to propaganda. I explained to him precisely what I was supposed to pass on to orientation noncoms and officers. We had quite a hassle over it, and I refused categorically to pass it on. He made it very clear that I had four stripes and that I could be court-martialed for this, but I still refused to pass it on.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

After considerable discussion, he agreed to let me read the material as it was prepared, and then answer it. That is precisely what was done (ibid.).

May I add one other small incident which occurred in the course of my duties as Information and Education chief of section. One of my jobs, as I said before, was to put out the newspapers that we distributed to the troops. One of these papers was a weekly called the Sentry Box. I wrote the editorials. During the summer of 1945, I wrote an editorial on the Soviet Union, highly critical of the Soviet Union, and in the editorial there was one line that the world cannot exist half slave and half free.

As a result of that editorial and that line in particular, censorship of a sort was placed on the newspaper where no censorship had existed before. That is, I had to submit my editorials each week, from that point on, to Antilles Department, Information and Education, for O. K. (H., 1484–1485).

Mr. de Toledano described another part of the Army “education” program, in which “the wrong things about the Soviet Union” were jammed down the throats of patriotic young Americans.

Mr. de Toledano. I was sent up to Cornell University under the area and language program to study Italian. There were four language study groups at Cornell—Italian, German, Chinese, and Russian. It was the practice to have the entire unit, all 4 language groups, hear 1 lecture by the head of each language group on the geography and customs of that particular area. We were called in to hear a speech on Russian geography and customs, and so on, by the head of the Russian program whose name was Vladimir Kazakevich.

Kazakevich was known to me then as a Soviet propagandist. I believe, although I am not certain, that he had registered with the State Department as
a Soviet propagandist. He had been on the staff of Science and Society, a Communist theoretical organ. I knew his record.

So when he began to speak, I took notes. Instead of talking about Russian geography and Russian customs, he delivered a political speech. It was a rip-roaring speech, in part attacking the United States Army, praising the Soviet Union, criticizing the military record of the United States Army (H., p. 1478).

THE CAMP CROWDER DOCUMENT

As is already apparent, praise for the U. S. S. R. and criticism of the United States, Great Britain, and other non-Communist nations was a common characteristic of I. and E. material. The most unblushing example of this was found in a voluminous document drawn up for a week-long orientation course on Russo-American Relations in War and Peace, at Camp Crowder, Mo. This purported to be the work of “2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbrod and Pvt. Edward Dassin, of Company D, 804th Signal Training Regiment.”

Its general tone may be indicated by a glance at one of its concluding paragraphs.

* * * We can now feel well certain that ultimate victory is ours, but while congratulating ourselves upon our successes there is not one among us who is unmindful of the fact that those successes would not have been possible if it were not for the heroic sacrifices of the Russian people and the valiant achievements of the Red army. Had the Soviet Union, instead, succumbed to the onslaught of the Nazi blitzkrieg, the course of the entire war would have undoubtedly been vastly different. Perhaps this gratitude may prove to be an important factor in overcoming the last vestiges of the Bolshevist bogey and in insuring that the words “Bolshevist,” “Communist,” “Red,” “Soviet,” and “Russia” can no longer be used to lead the world into mistakes such as those that were made in the past (H., p. 1649).

CONCLUSIONS

1. During the latter part of World War II, the Information and Education Division of the United States Army had powers of compulsory indoctrination over 8 million American soldiers. This in itself is not unreasonable, since the people have a right to require that their Government explain to the members of the Armed Forces the purpose for which they are asked to lay down their lives. However, adequate precautions were not taken to insure that loyal Americans were in charge of the compulsory indoctrination program.

2. A group of Communists or pro-Communists infiltrated into controlling positions in the Information and Education program and brought it about that 8 million American soldiers were taught the wrong things about communism, the wrong things about the U. S. S. R., the wrong things about Communist China, and the wrong things about Americans who oppose communism.

3. Evidence is lacking to establish how much of the Information and Education program was accepted in good faith by the 8 million American soldiers who were forcibly exposed to it. Nevertheless, the subcommittee believes there is grave danger that some of the wrong things may have found lodging in the minds of many loyal Americans.
Recommendations

1. The teaching of traditional American doctrines and beliefs to the members of the United States Armed Forces and the explanation of the causes for which they are asked to fight are a major function in the whole effort of the United States to keep itself free. Those who conduct this teaching occupy posts of the highest sensitivity. Consequently, they should be subject to high security standards.

SECTION IX

INDOCTRINATION OR DEATH!

As already stated, since the subcommittee came into existence we have conducted a continuing study of methods by which the Kremlin cast its “net” over the western mind.

Mr. Bogolepov described Moscow’s “very big business” of producing pro-Communist books and articles in the Soviet Foreign Office, which western “intelligentsia” published falsely as the products of their own “scholarship.” The Communist-dominated New York Teachers’ Union devoted a whole summer campaign to the circulation of one such book, The Great Conspiracy.

Dr. Dodd detailed other methods by which Communist teachers taught “the wrong things about the Soviet Union,” not only to American schoolchildren, but also to the American people as a whole.

The IPR investigation revealed an effective propaganda apparatus, partially financed by great capitalist fortunes, which helped turn American thinking about the Far East, and helped turn American policy with regard to the Far East into channels of disaster.

The investigation of the Army’s I. and E. program showed the tiniest Communist fraction forcing Communist propaganda down the throats of 8 million American boys.

There is a progression here which must be carefully noted.

The “very big business” of producing books in Moscow to be published under the signature of British and American “intelligentsia” made a mockery of honest scholarship. Nevertheless, it had no aspect of compulsion about it as far as the western mind was concerned. The IPR apparatus was sinuous, malicious, and ubiquitous, but again it had no power within itself of compulsory indoctrination. But when the “very big business” in Moscow laid hands on the Teachers’ Union in New York City, compulsory indoctrination began to show its face, for teachers in public schools have a captive audience, which must attend their classes and give heed to their views. When the IPR Communists combined with the I. and E. Communists, the minds of 8 million young Americans also came under the lash, since the entire I. and E. program, contrived by Communists whose leader was also a psychiatrist, was compulsory for every man who wore an army uniform. At least one man, Ralph de Toledano, was threatened with court-martial for attempting to resist it.
The last chapter in this narrative of Communist indoctrination is concerned with the group of Americans, previously described, who have been and are giving aid and comfort to the cause of Red China both in the United States and the Far East.

WILLIAM H. HINTON

The first witness called in our investigation of this group was William H. Hinton. On the basis of his testimony, the chairman subsequently described him as follows:

* * * Hinton is a former American newspaperman. He had been farm manager for the Putney School at Putney, Vt. Toward the end of World War II, he was sent to China by the Office of War Information. He returned to the United States in the spring of 1945 and was organizer for the National Farmers Union. He went back to China as an official of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in 1947. When the Moscow-armed Chinese Communists took over the Chinese mainland in the fall of 1949, this man Hinton remained as an employee of the Communist Government.

He returned to the United States in August 1953, after a stopover in Moscow. Since his arrival in this country, he has been propagandizing on behalf of the brainwashing, soul-killing Red Chinese, whose soldiers were torturing and slaying Hinton's fellow Americans at the very moment he was on Red China's payroll (H., p. 1819).

* * * One sister, Jean, was a friend of the notorious Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and worked under him at the old Farm Security Administration. Another sister, Joan, was an atomic research assistant at the Los Alamos project where she had access to classified material. Like her brother, William, Joan also went to China and stayed there after the Communist triumph. She got a job through another American, Gerald Tannebaum, who was executive director of the China Welfare Fund headed by Mme. Sun Yat-sen. * * * In China, Joan married Erwin Engst, who was also an old UNRRA man. Today the Engsts are somewhere in the depths of Inner Mongolia, serving the Communist cause. Joan came out of obscurity long enough to make a bitterly anti-American speech at the Communist-inspired fraud known as the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference, regarding which the subcommittee also expects to reveal a great deal.

The Putney school, which is run by William Hinton's mother and where he himself was employed, is a story in itself. One of its faculty members was Edwin S. Smith. Smith later became a registered propagandist for the Soviet Government. He distributed photographs attempting to prove that the United States practiced germ warfare in North Korea. Another person closely associated with Putney was Owen Lattimore. The subcommittee found, after a 15-month inquiry, that Lattimore was a "conscious, articulate instrument in the Soviet Conspiracy."

Lattimore built the Pacific Operations Branch of OWI, for which Hinton later worked in Chungking. John K. Fairbank was at the top of OWI's Chinese organization. Benjamin Kizer ran the Chinese branch of UNRRA for which Hinton also worked. Lattimore, Fairbank, and Kizer all were key figures in the Institute of Pacific Relations. All three were named as Communists in sworn testimony before us. All three denied the charge, but when counsel for the subcommittee asked Hinton about his connections with Lattimore and Kizer, he said it might incriminate him to give a true answer to the question (H., pp. 1819–1820).

Hinton also wrote an article for the China Monthly Review which was reprinted in the Daily People's World, west-coast organ of the Communist Party. The editor of the China Review, which carried the original article, was one John W. Powell, the most important individual so far examined in the group of Americans described above.

The China Review, for which John W. Powell acknowledged absolute editorial responsibility, was published in Shanghai, China,
throughout the period of the Korean war (H., pp. 1864, 1882, 1888, 1893).

**MAJOR SHADISH SKETCHES THE PORTRAIT**

Maj. William Raymond Shadish, an Army physician who was a prisoner of the Chinese Communists in North Korea for 33 months, painted Powell's original word picture. His testimony was supported and amplified by the widow of one of his comrades, by a dozen other POW's and by comprehensive documentation prepared by the subcommittee staff.

Major SHADISH. I was in three permanent camps. The first camp was known to the prisoners as Death Valley. We believed it was in the town called Hofong.

* * * The second camp, No. 5, at Pyoktong. The third was camp No. 2 at Ping-Chon-Ni.

* * * Forced indoctrination was practiced in the camps in which I was held. The first contact I had with the organized indoctrination was in March of 1951, at which time I came to camp No. 5. It was being practiced with all of the prisoners there. I was in the position of being the sick-call physician and therefore was exempt from this study program until July of 1951, at which time I was relieved of my duties as sick-call physician, sent to the officers' company. And from there, then until March of 1952 we had a continuous concentrated program.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the sick and wounded required to attend?

Major SHADISH. The sick and wounded that were not in the hospital, and that was a larger number of men, were required to attend regardless of their condition.

The program varied in time consumed, but would consume on the average about 6 hours a day of formal education. This was all indoctrination and outright Communist type of studies.

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you tell the committee what material was used in order to indoctrinate the prisoners of war?

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. We had a large assortment of material from which our lecturers would present their programs. Among them was the China Weekly and China Monthly Review. Also, the Shanghai News, the New York Daily Worker, the London Daily Worker, the San Francisco Peoples World, a magazine called Masses and Main Stream, another called Political Affairs, a large number of Chinese and Russian magazines, New Times from Russia, and Soviet literature from Russia. There were a large number of books. William Z. Foster of the United States had a number of books in camp. Among them was his History of the Communist Party of the United States, his History of the Americas. There were a large number of books by Howard Fast. There were books by Russian authors such as Gorky, all of which had the Communist theme as their centerpiece.

Mr. CARPENTER. I call your attention to the easel over here at the side of the room. Are there reproductions of the China Monthly Review as you saw them in prisoner-of-war camps? Are those reasonable reproductions?

Major SHADISH. Yes; they are.

Mr. CARPENTER. You have seen these various magazines in the camp?

Major SHADISH. I believe I have seen all of these before in the camps.

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you tell us how they used the China Monthly Review in their propaganda activity?

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. The ordinary program for study was divided up among various types of approaches. There would be lectures by English-speaking Chinese, there would be discussion periods in which we were supposed to discuss various articles. Before these discussion periods various publications were distributed to each squad of men to read, and in these publications there would be articles marked with red crayon as required reading. Among the publications most commonly received was this China Monthly Review. Many of the articles were required to be read, and comment was required to be made upon it.

I would like to say there was no middle-of-the-road affair. The Communists did not practice that. They were told that you had one opinion. It had to be one side or the other side. If you did not comment for the article, you were
against the article. Consequently, a large number of prisoners got into a
great deal of trouble and a large number of the deaths were directly or indi-
rectly responsible or occurred, rather, because of the difficulties starting over
these articles (H., pp. 1831–1832).

"STUDYING" ON A BLOCK OF ICE

Chairman JENNER. What would happen to a man if he did not cooperate,
follow the line of the China Review?

Major SHADISH. Anything which the Chinese would consider appropriate.
It would begin with standing a man at attention on a block of ice for a large
period of time, in which a number of men froze their feet or it would end up
with a man being thrown in a hole in the ground with little or no food and no
method of sanitation, not permitted out of the hole. And he would eventually
contract double pneumonia in the cold moss and would die. It would vary from
one end of the scale to the other (H., p. 1832).

PLENTY OF CHINA REVIEWS—NO MEDICINE

Mr. CARPENTER. Tell us something about the transportation of the propaganda
into the camps. Did they come in large quantities?

Major SHADISH. They certainly did. One thing which we felt very strongly
about was the way they came. We were situated on the Yalu River and there
was a small harbor at the town of Pyoktong. Into this harbor would come these
large barges and they would be loaded every time. A portion of their load
would be propaganda material, including this China Monthly Review. They
would bring in tons of this stuff at a time, and yet when we would ask them
for more medication or one little bottle of sulfa which would cure a lot of men,
we were told they had no means of transportation to bring this. But they always
had the means of transportation to bring in this propaganda material. That
was from the beginning.

Chairman JENNER. What was your situation in regard to medication for the
American prisoners?

Major SHADISH. Medication was not the main problem. We did not have
any medications but we felt, we physicians felt that the main problem was
food. If we could have sufficient food, we would not have needed those medica-
tions. Consequently, because we did not have food—we were on a starvation
diet for at least the first 6 or 8 months, although, from thereon, the diet improved.
It was never adequate. Because of this, men were malnourished and were
suffering from disease and had no resistance to any infection. When they did
get an infection, it was a matter of a few days before they died. Not having
any medications made it all the worse.

Chairman JENNER. Did the Chinese have medication?

Major SHADISH. Yes; they did. The Chinese during these early months had
no physicians and asked me to treat their men. As a physician, I said I would.
They had their own stock of supplies and they had all of the antibiotics and
the necessary medications there to treat their men and more.

Chairman JENNER. How about surgical instruments? What did you have
for the American prisoners in the way of surgical instruments?

Major SHADISH. We had no surgical instruments at first. Eventually we
got an old scalpel and 1 or 2 hemostats. We made some scalpels and made a
stethoscope.

Chairman JENNER. Prior to that time did the Chinese doctors perform surgery
on some of the American prisoners? (H., pp. 1832–1833.)

A CAMERA FOR A DYING MAN

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. There was one case where a Korean physician came
to our camp in about mid-January 1951, about 2 months after we were captured,
a month and a half. He claimed to be a surgeon with 5 years' training. He
said he would like to see any surgical cases we had. We had a large number
of them. He picked four of these men to do surgery on. One of these men
had a gangrenous thumb from a shrapnel wound and his thumb had to come
off. This surgeon, as he called himself, took him to a room.

I asked to be allowed to go along. The man was given no anesthetic, although
there was morphine available to them. This surgery was done in a very shocking
manner to a surgeon. It was what we would call hacking. He took the man's
thumb off. The man had a terrific amount of pain. We pleaded with him to
give him something afterward. They dressed his hand, took him outside of a room, set him on a chair.

There was a Chinese there with a Leica camera. He set the man down. The Korean then went in and put on a gown and mask and came out with a syringe and needle, a syringe which I had hoped was something for the man's pain. He stood beside this man, a Negro soldier. There is a picture of this in one of the Communist publications showing this physician standing by this Negro man with the syringe up against his arm ready to give him an injection with printing underneath saying something to the effect that here is a corps aid man treating an American prisoner.

The picture was taken. The man was shoved off the chair, not given a shot, and told to go down to his room.

Chairman JENNER. What happened to the man?

Major SHADISH. He died within 3 weeks from infection to that hand.

Chairman JENNER. You have seen that picture reproduced in the propaganda showing where they are giving aid to the American prisoners?

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. I recognize the man.

Chairman JENNER. Do you recall what publication you saw that picture reproduced in?

Major SHADISH. It is a publication called POW's Calling, made up entirely of statements and experiences and a number of these petitions that were signed, supposedly voluntarily, by the prisoners (H. pp. 1833-1834).

MONICA FELTON, CHINA REVIEW "REPORTER"

Mr. CARPENTER. I have here a document captioned "An Interview With Monica Felton—Stop the War." Monica Felton was a British representative of the Women's International Democracy Federation and the group which investigated conditions in North Korea in 1951. Did you have any occasion to see Monica Felton while you were in a prisoner-of-war camp?

Major SHADISH. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you read this document in the China Monthly Review of January 1953?

Major SHADISH. Yes, I read the document.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Felton describes the housing of the POW's: "They sleep on mats on the floor with blankets and hard pillows. I think they keep warm in the winter because the homes have central heating. The winters are extremely cold but the men have quilted clothing."

Is that an accurate description?

Major SHADISH. No, it was not an accurate description. She thought wrong. The houses in Korea, as you know, have the under-the-floor heating. The only difficulty was that in all of our homes the heating system was broken down, not repaired. We did not have the wood anyhow to build a fire, so it did not do us much good. The first winter was the hardest winter, in that we lost almost all of our men that died. We had no clothing, blankets, bedding issued to us that winter. We had nothing issued until the spring thaw, that following spring, 1951, at which time we no longer needed them.

Mr. CARPENTER. In the issue of the China Monthly Review of May 1951, there are four photographs of American POW's carrying overcoats, blankets, and towels. A quote from Clevenger says, "When Mom sees this, she need not worry about us in the cold." Are these truly representative of conditions in the POW's camps?

Major SHADISH. They are not. They certainly are true photographs but the methods used to obtain these photographs are not proper. The pictures over here, we remember seeing those things and we were a little upset about it. You see a man holding a large hunk of meat in his hand with a smile on his face. If you have gone 6 months without seeing meat and someone hands you a large piece of meat and says, "This is going to be for you," I think every man would smile.

The thing they do not tell under that caption is, this was the first meat this man had in about 6 months, or maybe 4 months if he was lucky. The second thing is that that piece of meat would be 1 month's ration for approximately 500 men. That is a little bit when you look at it that way.
Mr. CARPENTER. Going back, Major, I have just now received a copy of American POW's Calling From Korea, and I have here a picture captioned "A Chinese Medical Orderly Dressing a Prisoner's Wounds." I will ask you if this is the picture you have just testified about in relation to medical treatment.

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. This is the picture that I was talking about.

Mr. CARPENTER. That is the same picture?

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. You saw this picture taken?

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. I was there when the picture was taken.

Mr. CARPENTER. This is captioned "American POW's Appeal to the United Nations" (H., pp. 1834–1836).

PREPARING THE "STUDENTS"

Mr. CARPENTER. Major Shadish, can you tell how they prepared a prisoner of war to accept the indoctrination you are speaking about here?

Major SHADISH. Yes. The methods used appeared to be the same as that used anywhere by the Communists. The prisoner was first intentionally deprived of the necessary food, clothing, and shelter to sustain life at a healthy level. He was taken physically to a level which was bordering upon death, and there were a number of deaths. There was no idea in the prisoner's mind where he was standing. He was just a little bit away. Then the indoctrination teams and material would be brought into the camp. The men would be told that if they accepted indoctrination and did not resist that they were going to give a feast for us. The feast was rice, rice we had not seen up until then.

Chairman JENNER. What were you fed?

Major SHADISH. Cracked corn or whole corn or millet is about all we saw. It was painfully made clear to the prisoner that if he did not cooperate he would not only revert back to his old status but most probably below that. A prisoner after a while got to know if he were ill for any reason and could not eat his food for about 3 days, he would die. That was so. He had no reserve whatsoever, and I have seen a large number of men who through illness or some other cause would go off their food and they would die. This was made clear to the prisoners. As long as the prisoners cooperated without resisting too strongly, the food would stay at a level where all the men or practically all the men could live. As soon as resistance came up, conditions became worse (H., pp. 1836–1837).

LETTERS HOME

Mr. CARPENTER. Major Shadish, will you describe fully from your own personal knowledge and experience the treatment of POW's in regard to letters to their loved ones?

Major SHADISH. Yes, sir. There was a concentrated effort by the Communists to procure letters from the prisoners with political content. At the very first it was impossible to get a letter out of camp without political content. I remember an individual by the name of Shapiro who is a Caucasian. He posed as a correspondent from the London Daily Worker, came into Death Valley in January 1951 with the Chinese. He was armed. He had a camera. He was well fed. He supposedly came in to cover the situation, and all he did the entire time he was there was promote a petition and the signing of a petition and to promote the project of getting letters out, of political content.

At this time I have a letter which he sent out—I do not have it but it is printed in the Communist publications in which the quote from me is in a letter to my wife: "Please use your influence to see that the war in Korea is settled peacefully and that all foreign troops are removed from Korea."

The story behind that is, first of all, I was seriously ill at the time. I was told by the other physicians in camp I was not going to live. I wanted to write a letter home, and Shapiro came around and said that we all could write a letter home. He gave us paper, and we wrote. The letter was brought back to me by the Chinese and they said there was nothing in the letter for peace. They said there was no use for that letter to go home. I couldn't get it home.

So another letter was brought up by Shapiro showing a form of how it should be written with all types of anti-American slogans in it. We all discussed this among ourselves and with the senior officers, and we decided we would all pick this one same phrase and include it in our letters. I chose to write home because I felt this was my last opportunity to talk to my wife. I wrote a long letter in which I told my wife how I felt about her and the children. The only
part which appeared in the publication was the portion which they thought they could use. My wife never received that letter (H., p. 1837).

**POW “PEACE CONFERENCE”**

Mr. Carpenter. In the China Monthly Review Mrs. Felton has stated that POW's got together and decided they wanted a peace organization and they asked permission of the Korean Government to get together with other POW camps on this subject: "They held general peace meetings with all camps participating, and they are now issuing a peace magazine. I talked with six American POW's and many British prisoners who were active in the peace movement. They felt the majority of prisoners supported their views."

Is this an accurate statement of the facts?

Major Shadish. That is not. The Peace Committee, as I remember it, was formed somewhat like this: The Chinese came up to our compound and told us there was going to be a Peace Committee. And you would have members on this Peace Committee. They suggested we elect members. We refused to elect members, so they appointed members to the Peace Committee.

Eventually what happened to this Peace Committee, I do not know, but I know the members of the officers' compound refused to participate and participation was by appointment and was forced. I do not know of any case where prisoners went up to the Chinese and asked permission to form a Peace Committee. That is beyond my scope, and I know a lot of prisoners who were over there.

Mr. Carpenter. What means were used to get these signatures?

Major Shadish. Various and sundry means; about the same type that were used to get attendance at the classes of indoctrination, all types of threats and carrying out of threats if the man persisted in not signing these things. I remember one group of men, one room of them that were presented with a petition to sign and refused. They were told if they did not sign this petition, all of their food rations would be cut out from that day on. And they were very sincere about it. So these men signed the petition. It was that type of thing.

**“GREETINGS” TO CHU TEH**

Mr. Carpenter. Do you remember the occasion when the POW's were asked to send a New Year's greeting to Communist General Chu Teh in 1952?

Major Shadish. That is right. At the officers' camp we were given printed cards that we could send home for New Year's. Most of us altered the cards. They all had "Peace" on them. Of course, we felt very bitterly at that time about the way the Communists felt about peace. We felt they were using it for propaganda only. We altered the cards as much as possible to eliminate any use of propaganda and thereby would sign them and send them home. I altered mine. Mine didn't get home because it was altered, I suppose.

They came to us and told us they wanted us to sign a New Year's greeting to Chu Teh. We did not particularly want to give any New Year's greeting to Chu Teh and wish him good luck. We wished him just the opposite. They insisted. Eventually we talked them out of it. I know some of our senior officers shortly thereafter were taken over to the headquarters of the Chinese on a charge of attempting to form a group of men who would oppose indoctrination. One of the charges put out against them was they instigated against this good-will message and sabotaged the peace and good-will message to Chu Teh. They were punished by long terms of solitary imprisonment (H., p. 1838).

**BOMBINGS AND “GERM WARFARE”**

Mr. Carpenter. In the China Monthly Review, Mrs. Felton says: "The POW camps were bombed by the American planes in spite of the fact that their locations were clearly marked by agreement between both sides."

Do you have any information on the bombing of prisoner-of-war camps?

Major Shadish. Yes. These were a sore spot with us. I know that some of these articles came out, I am certain, in July of 1952, or earlier. Our prison camps were not marked until approximately September or later in 1952. All of these articles told how our camps were so well marked and yet our own planes were bombing our men, and this was all a lie. We did not have our camps marked. We asked a large number of times to let us mark our camps, or to

**Vice President of the Red Chinese Government.**
mark them in some manner and were told that if our camps were marked it would just allow our planes to come over and bomb them. They would know where they were. But they were not marked at the time a number of these articles were published.

Mr. Carpenter. In the China Monthly Review, Mrs. Felton charges the United States with conducting germ warfare. Are you familiar with the charge of germ warfare?

Major Shadish. I am familiar with the charge of it, and my impressions of the situation of course are limited because of my position at that time. But it was interesting in that we were given the opportunity to see the proof of germ warfare in—I cannot state the exact time. I think the spring of 1953 or the fall of 1952 a large building was erected near the officers' company in camp 2, seemingly for the sole purpose of setting up this exhibit which consisted of about 1 or 2 large photographs.

These were placed in the room in a number of rows so parties could walk up and down these rows and view all the exhibits. All the prisoners were marched through here, and all the Chinese and Koreans were marched through here. Under these pictures were English and oriental inscriptions describing the subject. These were supposed to be pictures of proof which—well, one was the International Democratic Lawyers Guild and the other was a group of scientists and physicians who were supposed to have said that this was definite proof. We saw them and we considered it a ludicrous thing to have a picture of a dead rat lying in the snow. This was supposed to be proof this rat was dropped in Korea laden with germs.

Another picture, a casing of a shell. This is supposed to be proof germ bombs were dropped. I daresay we could do the same thing out here on the Capitol steps and have proof in the other direction. We felt there was no basis to it.

Senator Johnston. Major, I believe that was in the China Monthly Review, too; was it not?

Major Shadish. There were pictures of that in the China Monthly Review (H., p. 1840).

THANKSGIVING IN CAMP

Mr. Carpenter. In the issue of January 1952 of the China Monthly Review, pages 70 and 72, it describes Thanksgiving in a POW camp. Do you have any recollection about that?

Major Shadish. That was 19—

Mr. Carpenter. 1952.

Major Shadish. What month?

Mr. Carpenter. January.

Major Shadish. That was describing, I imagine, the Thanksgiving of 1951. This was at the time the negotiations were beginning to look fairly good. We were told by the Chinese things were going well and we may be home within several months. This time they brought a large amount of food, of meats, bread, candies, cigarettes, some sake—all kinds of things. They gave us a Thanksgiving party. It was fabulous to us at that time because we had not seen anything like it. Being back here at home it was not so hot. But the interesting thing about all that is this was a onetime affair. It happened on two Christmases and a Thanksgiving. It was interesting after this happened, the negotiations deteriorated. That is about January of 1952. It appeared to us after this, as after all the other ones, our rations for the next 3 months were cut into deeply to help pay for this feast which we had which was so widely publicized (H., p. 1840–1841).

THE STAR SPANGLED BANNER

Mr. Carpenter. Major Shadish, in the issue of July 1952 of the China Monthly Review, it argues against the rights of Korean and Chinese war prisoners to voluntary repatriation. In this connection, pages 24 and 25 cite article 118 of the Geneva Conference as follows: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." It quotes article 7, "that prisoners under no circumstances shall renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured by them by the present convention." Do you have any personal knowledge of how the Chinese Communists exploited the provisions of the Geneva Convention?

Major Shadish. Yes. It appeared to us they were using the Geneva Convention any time they were attempting to press a point. However, in our camp
we constantly referred to the Geneva Convention and were told every time that
the Chinese do not recognize the Geneva Convention in any manner. We pointed
out when they brought out this article about prisoners not being able to renounce
any of their rights, we pointed out to them they were attempting—as a matter
of fact, insisting that we were no longer members of the Armed Forces, we were
liberated officers or liberated men, we were students and we were not members
of the Armed Forces in any way. They attempted to make us feel this way.

We pointed out they could not do it because we could not renounce our right.
Our right was to still be a soldier and still to have our own jurisdiction among
ourselves, et cetera. But this made no impression whatsoever, although they
used the same argument at Kaesong.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you allowed to sing our American songs, our national
anthem?

Major SHADISH. We were forbidden to sing the national anthem, although
with a group of men it is impossible to keep it down all the time. It would break
out here and there. Men would be punished as ringleaders on each one of these
occasions. It was interesting, a number of hymns were forbidden because it was
felt these hymns were national and political in character. And thereby the
chaplain was called over and told we would not sing hymns in the services unless
he wrote out each hymn to be sung in longhand and take it over to the Chinese
for approval. (H., p. 1041).

CORROBORATION

As has been stated above, every detail of Major Shadish's story was
supported or amplified by other witnesses, or documents.

One of these documents was an article entitled "Medical Experience
in Communists POW Camps in Korea," which appeared in the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association for September 11, 1954.
This was written by five American medical officers, who had been
prisoners of war. Major Shadish was 1 of the 5. Another was Maj.
Clarence L. Anderson, who also testified before us. The article, plus
the testimony of Major Anderson, makes clear that the murderous
tactics of forced indoctrination which Major Shadish witnessed were
typical of the treatment accorded all American prisoners.

Major Anderson gave his own interpretation of the Communist
method for throwing a net over the mind, not only in North Korea
but everywhere in the world.

THE PAVLOV METHOD

Major ANDERSON. I believe that Communist indoctrination, as it was applied
to the prisoners of war in Korea, is a general plan of Communist indoctrination,
applying to our group, to the fringe Communist subject nations, and elsewhere.

This has been stated by some of the English language Korean periodicals which
I came in contact with. It is based essentially on the Pavlov conditioned reflex
theory. If I may, I will give you a very brief background on that theory.

In the original experiments, experimental animals were subjected to certain
basic stimuli. The one picked out was the taking in of food; the seeing, the
smelling, and the taking in of food. The parotid (eparotid) gland, one of the
salivary glands, was intubated so that the quantity of flow from this gland
could be measured.

Under experimental conditions, then, the animal was allowed to see, smell,
and taste the food and the quantity of salivary flow from this parotid gland
was measured; then a period of conditioning, during which time, let us say, a
bell would be rung at the same time that the animal was allowed to see, smell,
and take in food.

After a period of time of the conditioning interval; the animal would respond
to the bell alone in the same way that he had responded to the food previously.

Now, to make it more applicable to human experimentation, as it was used
in our prisoner group, deconditioning can also be carried out in which, if the
condition stimulus which produces salivation, the bell for instance, is rung and
at the same time a painful stimulus—any sort of an electrical stimulus—is
used, then the animal will more or less forget his previous conditioning; so that this condition reflex is no longer in existence, he has been deconditioned.

Now, to apply this principle to the indoctrination of the prisoners of war in Korea, it is my feeling that every day of captivity from day one of the prisoners' existence as prisoners to the time of their release was a part of a planned indoctrination program which was based on this Pavlov conditioning system (H., pp. 2237-2238).

Major Anderson also noted an article appearing in the November 1951 issue of the China Review. It was allegedly written by an American POW and gave a glowing account of conditions in a POW camp. Major Anderson dissected this article in detail, on the basis of his own experience, and characterized it as "pure and simple Communist propaganda," which had undoubtedly been written under "marked duress."

THE MONITOR SYSTEM AND "THE HOLE"

Carroll Wright, Jr., explained the monitor system through which the China Review was distributed.

Mr. WRIGHT. * * * This periodical was at first distributed to us through this monitor system in our squads. The political commissars in the camp, the English-speaking Chinese that controlled the study program, would issue this magazine to the squad monitors, giving them instructions as to what articles were to be read, and have them conduct or request them to conduct, and where possible to see that it was done, that they were discussed. Normally they require that each member of the squad write some sort of article or comment relative to the article (H., p. 1909).

Cpl. Thomas Page Baylor, Jr., told what happened to him when he resisted forced indoctrination of China Review material.

Corporal BAYLOR. * * * They said I was cunning and cute, so they put me in the hole for a period of 15 days. The first 3 days I was in this hole I didn't receive no kind of medical care or any type of thing to keep my body going. When I was released from this hole—during the time that I was in the hole, I was treated pretty bad. I got a couple of beatings by a rifle butt and a shovel, and during this tragedy they took and knocked my front teeth out and bruised my back pretty bad, and they gave me no kind of medical care at all. When I came back, I showed it to some of the fellows, and they asked me what they could do for me. And I told them just if I would write something to the propaganda, they would give me something to heal my wounds, and so forth.

I still refused to do what they wanted me to do. Then I was sent back to the hole about a month later on another article from this China Monthly Review. It was an article on economical something about the capitalism, and I still refused to voice my opinion the way they wanted me to. So I was sent back this time for 33 days. That was the time I caught pneumonia. I had a cold in my back, and in my legs, and in my side. I didn't never see nobody or ever hear of anything for 33 days while I was in this hole. Then I was released and they told me did I realize my mistake, and they forced me to write a confession that I was never to try to overthrow their powers in the prisoner-of-war camps, and not to try to keep the other prisoners from learning what they were teaching * * * (H., p. 1906).

Mr. CARPENTER. This morning in executive session you told about what you had to do in order to keep your mental equilibrium. I wish you would explain that to the committee now.

Corporal BAYLOR. Yes; I will. In Camp 3 after I came out of the hole for the 33 months—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean 33 days?

Corporal BAYLOR. Thirty-three days. I was so weak that I didn't know whether I was going to go crazy or what. My mind was just about ready to leave me. So there was another fellow there named—I can't recall his name, but anyway he was from Gary, Ind. We referred to him as Dr. Buzzard. He told me to get some kind of roots and stuff and eat it and that I would pull out of it. Well, the stuff tasted bitter, and nasty, but I took it and did it anyway. Then
I took and bit off my fingernails down to the very edge and rubbed them into the sand and that sort of brought my nerves back to me, and brought back my mind, and it kept me from losing my whole mind altogether. I kept rubbing them in this dirt until I did get my mind back to normal. (H., pp. 1907, 1908).

Capt. Joseph L. O' Connor testified that The Great Conspiracy was used as a "textbook" in the indoctrination course (H., p. 1960). This was the book which Mr. Bogolepov swore was actually written in the Soviet Foreign Office, though it was published as the alleged work of two Americans, Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn. It was the book which the Communist-dominated New York Teachers' Union circularized during a whole summer's campaign.

CONSPIRACY TO EXTERMINATE

Lt. Col. Jack R. Todd, Chief of the Army's War Crimes Division in Korea, told the subcommittee:

* * * On the basis of 18 months of investigating alleged reports of atrocities and mistreatment of American prisoners of war, I can truthfully state that everything that these ex-prisoners have testified to here before this committee have been true. They are backed up by hundreds of written statements that I have taken over there, sworn statements, from returned Americans as well as South Korean prisoners of war. It is my considered opinion that there was a conspiracy on the part of the Communist high command, both Communist and North Korean, to exterminate prisoners of war.

I believe they would have exterminated every single solitary one of them had it not become apparent in the Panmunjom peace talks that they must be able to return some living prisoners of war (H., p. 1946).

"A Murderer"


Captain MANTO. * * * It was inconceivable to us, as prisoners over there in North Korea, to realize that an American citizen would let that sort of business go on, that he would print such slander, terrific, filthy lies. That is all it amounted to.

As a matter of fact, it was more than one time that prisoners in my compound remarked that they would like to get their hands on this particular gentleman, Mr. Powell (H., p. 1963).

Captain O'CONNOR. Sir, yesterday I sat here and I ran the gamut of all my emotions. I cried when Mrs. Gill was on that stand, and I was angry when a man, Mr. Powell, was on the stand. I have lost a lot of friends in Korea, sir, good friends. And to think that a man like the man that sat in this chair can come back to the United States and feel free to go around and call a press conference and spread this vicious propaganda in the manner in which he does it; I was angry, sir, filled up to the top.

Chairman JENNER. I can understand your emotions.

Captain O'CONNOR. And I personally feel that if we have laws—and I know we don't have any on the books now but that we get them to take care of people like Mr. Powell. And I am afraid my emotions might overshadow me and I might take it into my own hands if I go down to see the gentleman who writes this type stuff that I was forced to read (H., p. 1961).

Lieutenant WRIGHT. * * * I feel in my own mind, in my own opinion on it, that any individual that would publish and be responsible for a magazine that
contains such slanderous propaganda and is still able to enjoy the rights and privileges of an American citizen—I feel that it is an injustice to those boys that have given their lives and those boys that endured punishment, such as the corporal, and many others, in trying to resist them. I think that I speak on behalf of all the prisoners, and I am holding myself up on the record as representing them. If I do not, then I hope that they will write and say that they do not share my opinion that this man should definitely receive punitive action, that he does not deserve the rights and privileges of an American citizen that so many boys have given their lives to maintain.

I also think, as I have been sitting here in this trial, trying to restrain the emotion I have felt at the testimony that has been given, and the resort that this man, if we can call him that, has resorted to under the fifth amendment, I can't help but wonder how many of our boys would have come home if they had had something like that. I really feel that in my opinion this man is responsible for physical injury, and also I think directly through his magazine or indirectly, whichever you want to call it, must bear some of the stains of the blood of the boys that did die there, and who did receive punishment. In my opinion I would classify him as a murderer (H., p. 1909).

THE LETTER TO MRS. GILL

John W. Powell himself was present in the hearing room when many of these stories were told. He gave every appearance of being amused by them. He seemed to take particular delight at the testimony of Mrs. Dolores Holmes Gill of Kansas City, Mo.

According to her testimony, Dolores Holmes was married to 2d Lt. Charles L. Gill in June of 1950. Before the end of the month, he was on his way to serve with the United Nations forces in the Korean war.

On November 2, 1950, he was reported missing in action. His wife received no word from him during the next 2 months, but on January 9, 1951, the Associated Press reported that he made a broadcast over the Peiping radio. Shortly thereafter, she received this letter.

DEAR MRS. GILL: Perhaps you have already received the original copy of your husband's letter to you, but as a fellow Missourian I wanted to make sure that you saw it and in good time. We know from the clippings and magazines we receive from home that there has been little, if any, news on the American POWs except for fabricated atrocity stories, and we felt the enclosed clippings from the local papers here might give you some reassurance.

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners—captured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals—with the greatest leniency and fairness in order to win over their support, and we are sure this is the same policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts for the numerous statements of gratitude and expressions of good will by the American POWs which appear in our local newspapers almost daily.

In addition, there have been several demonstration groups of American and British POWs demanding the end of the "dirty war," for after they have seen the hatred of the Korean people against the Syngman Rhee government and the help being given by the Americans for that hated clique, they cannot help but feel this has all been one tragic mistake. We imagine many people in America must feel the same way also.

We should have sent the enclosed clippings of a letter to Mrs. Foss before, but we did not think of it at the time. Perhaps you would be kind enough to send it on to her. If you would like us to send any further clippings about the POWs or the news on Korea that appears in our local press, please feel free to write us.

Very sincerely,

JOHN W. POWELL (H., p. 1823).

Major Anderson testified that he was with Lieutenant Gill in the prison camp at the time Powell sought to assure Mrs. Gill that the lieutenant was being treated "with the greatest leniency." From his
own knowledge, Major Anderson described Lieutenant Gill's condition at that time.

Senator Welker. He was starving to death; was he not?
Major Anderson. Yes, starving to death; yes, sir (H., p. 2246).

Eventually he died of dysentery and malnutrition.

The Closing of the Net

Mrs. Gill revealed to the committee a picture of Communist propaganda at its lowest level. It seems unlikely that human beings anywhere have ever stooped lower since the printing press itself was invented.

Two months after she heard from Powell, she had a letter from her husband, telling of his capture. This letter was utilized by the Communist press all over the world. It was reprinted, by the American National Guardian (a pro-Communist publication), the London Daily Worker, and by a Communist newspaper in East Berlin, Germany. Immediately thereafter she became inundated with Communist propaganda from individuals and publications in the United States, Scotland, Czechoslovakia, and China.

Subsequent investigation developed that Mrs. Gill's case was typical. Staff Member Robert C. McManus visited Boston, Mass., and found widespread evidence that relatives of other American POWs had become targets of Communist propaganda, in precisely the same way as Mrs. Gill had. They also received letters from the China Review and the National Guardian.

Evidence collected by Mr. McManus indicated that, "This device of working on the relatives of prisoners is also a means of trying to drum up subscriptions and circulation for Communist publications." He produced for the record, cards soliciting subscriptions which were received by William D. Scott, 4 Auburn Street, Wakefield, Mass., who was the father of an American POW who is still missing. One of these cards was sent to Mr. Scott by the National Guardian which was an agent for the China Review inside the United States. Another was sent by the Blue Heron Press to advertise The Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti by Howard Fast, a Communist author known throughout the world. Both cards bore the addressograph plate No. 9564-53-S.

Mr. Scott also received subscription solicitations from the New World Review headed by Jessica Smith. Jessica Smith is the widow of the late Harold M. Ware, an agent of Lenin from the earliest days of the Bolshevik revolution and the man who directed the original infiltration of the United States Government by secret Communists (H., pp. 2217, 2218).

"Peace"

The subcommittee found that one theme appeared again and again in all this worldwide propaganda barrage. That was the false cry of "peace." This propaganda was intended to tie the hands of the American military forces.

It is clearly self-evident that when the Chinese Communists crossed the Yalu River to attack the United Nations forces they were not seeking peace. They learned later, however, that they had to beg for it when they were in danger of defeat. The various senior com-
manders of United Nations forces, who testified before us, have emphatically agreed that our forces had ample opportunity to win the Korean war in the field. But they were unable to do so, because of orders from the United States, which stripped them of the power to take the necessary action. General Stratemeyer, who was in command of United Nations Air Forces under General MacArthur, made the flat statement that, "We were required to lose" (H., p. 1724).

REVIEW USED AS TEXTBOOK IN CHINESE COMMUNIST SCHOOLS

Kenneth Colgan, an American who had been in business in Shanghai until 1951, told the subcommittee that Powell's magazine was used in Shanghai schools after the Communists took over. He said:

* * * I taught football at St. Johns University as a sideline activity to my marine-insurance business which I operated in Shanghai during the years 1947 and 1948. I got to know a lot of young Chinese at St. Johns University, who, in 1950, the last time that I had a talk with any of the boys that I taught out there, said that the English-language classes had been abandoned except those that used as textbooks, in part, Powell's China—I think it was still the Monthly Review then—and the Shanghai Times.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was it still a monthly, or a weekly, review?

Mr. COLGAN. I mean it was still a weekly review. One of these boys—I don't know where he is—he was formerly a pilot trainee in the Nationalist Air Force at the time the war ended. He was an exceptionally tall boy, weighed 190 pounds, was 6 foot 1. He played fullback for them. He gave me the idea, the slant on the ideology that was being preached to them in Powell's magazine, amongst others.

He said that the massacres that were going on—the mass reprisals they called them—were a kindness to the Chinese people. And I asked him how he explained that.

He said, "We can only get to so many people to reeducate them, and if they persist in taking the old imperialist way, will not take to our teachings through these magazines and newspapers, then we merely liquidate them so that we can teach more of those with an open mind and can spread the word of the peoples' government to more, and so bring so-called enlightenment to them."

And Powell's magazine was used in some middle schools—that is comparable to our high schools—as English language advanced reading.

The last time that I had word of Powell was in the spring of 1951, when I met Captain Tannebaum at the International Sporting Club, which was a club in the interior of the Shanghai race course. It was operated by a group of British board of governors at that time to promote athletic and social welfare amongst the foreign community. It was then, however, open to Chinese, should they care to join.

I saw Captain Tannebaum. I mentioned to him that he and Mr. and Mrs. Powell were members of the International Sporting Club of the Shanghai Race Club, were they going to participate in the summer sports?

He said at that time John and Sylvia Powell were on a cultural tour to Moscow and the Soviet Union * * * (H., pp. 1914, 1915).

SWORN TESTIMONY VERSUS PRESS CONFERENCE

When he took the witness stand, Powell assumed full responsibility for everything that appeared in the China Review.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did any others share responsibility?

Mr. POWELL. No. I was the editor. I just told you (H., p. 1861).

Mr. POWELL. I decided what went in and what did not (H., p. 1882).

Despite this acknowledgement, Powell cloaked himself in the fifth amendment in answer to virtually all questions about his conduct in Communist China, his relationship with the Chinese Communist Government, the articles he published in the China Review, and the other Americans whose names appeared in the magazine as contributors.
correspondents, or associate editors. He refused even to acknowledge his own signature on a State Department passport application which contained the following statement:

I solemnly swear that the statements on both sides of this application are true and that the photograph attached hereto is a likeness of me.

I have not been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted or performed the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, voted in or participated in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war; been convicted by court martial, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, of committing any act of treason against, or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

Further, I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation, or purpose of evasion: so help me God.

(S) JOHN WILLIAM POWELL
(Signature of applicant) (H., pp. 1871, 1872).

After his testimony, or nontestimony, Powell called a press conference, at which he declared, "I am not a Communist, not now and never have been."

He added the preposterous falsehood that the China Review, "was not considered pro-Communist by the Communists in China."

It is to be noted that, when he made these statements at his press conference, Powell was not under oath. This is in sharp contrast to his refusal to answer nearly all questions while he was under oath on the witness stand.

Among the questions he refused to answer on the stand were those regarding his membership in the Communist Party, either in the United States or China.

The record shows that Powell's magazine carried nine separate articles, some of which were illustrated, charging the United States with practicing germ warfare. They appeared under such captions as "Crime Against Humanity," "United States Extends Germ Warfare," "United States Germ Warfare Fully Proved," "Why United States POW's Admit Germ Warfare," etc.

He was questioned about the germ warfare charges at his press conference. He answered, "Something must have happened up there. Something sure as heck must have happened up there."

When asked if he had seen any evidence to support the unspeakable charges he had repeatedly published against his own countrymen, when so many of them were dying of torture in Communist prison camps, Powell replied: "I didn't see any evidence."

POWELL GOES INTO HIDING

When he left the witness stand in Washington, Powell was warned by the chairman that he was still under subpoena. Subsequently, arrangements were made to hold a hearing in San Francisco on December 13, 1954. San Francisco is the residence of Powell and his wife,
the former Sylvia Campbell, as well as other of their associates whose testimony the subcommittee sought.

Efforts to subpoena Powell and most of these others, were unavailing. Mrs. Powell was served at her place of employment. She was an associate editor of the China Review. She is also described as part of "the entourage of Madame Sun Yat-sen" who is a supporter of the Chinese Communists and has been a senior member of the Peiping Government since 1949. Mrs. Powell, like her husband and nearly all of their American confederates, got to Communist China at the expense of the American taxpayer. She was an employee of the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration (H., p. 2163).

Mrs. Powell sought the protection of the fifth amendment even more zealously than her husband. After declaring, "I love my husband, I am proud of my husband," she refused even to acknowledge him by name (H., p. 2170).

She refused to state whether she had taken information from United States Government files and whether she had any connection with either Soviet or Red Chinese military intelligence.

She also refused to identify her own signature on a passport application blank in which she swore that she had not "been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state, taken oath, or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state."

Mrs. Powell was confronted with an article published over her own name in the February 13, 1950, issue of the Portland (Oreg.) Daily Journal. The article stated in part:

> We have heard a lot about the wonders of the Red army, and now we have seen for ourselves. They are truly Spartans and devoted to the cause of building up China. But what has impressed us most is the new spirit. I wanted to cry, it was so wonderful (H., p. 2191).

She invoked the fifth amendment when asked if she were actually the author of this article.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, did you write an article entitled "Today's Guest Editorial—Red Shanghai," by Sylvia Campbell Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I feel this is an abridgement of my right under the first amendment. I also use my constitutional privilege.

When she left the stand, five former POW's swore that John W. Powell had given aid and comfort to the enemy in time of war.

**INDICTMENT SOUGHT**

The record of the Washington hearing was submitted by the chairman to the Attorney General of the United States, for determination as to whether John W. Powell could be prosecuted. When Powell failed to appear at the hearing in San Francisco, Acting Chairman Welker made the following statement regarding him:

(1) John W. Powell was the responsible editor of the China Monthly Review, which was used for indoctrination purposes and compulsory reading by the Chinese Communist armies among American prisoners of war. Failure to comply with Communist indoctrination orders resulted in severe punishment, torture, and deprivation of food and medical supplies for American prisoners of war, resulting, in some cases, in death.

(2) His magazine printed false and glowing descriptions of conditions within Chinese Communist prison camps in Korea, which were circulated both to GI's in Korea and to their relatives in the United States. These articles could be
intended only to encourage defection and desertions among American troops and the encouragement of such action by their loved ones in the United States.

(3) His magazine consistently supported the policies and activities of the Chinese Communist government and opposed those of the American Government during the entire period of the Korean war. Articles to this effect were circulated to GI's in Korea and to their relatives in the United States.

(4) His magazine carried accounts alleging American atrocities and bombing of Korean civilians and American prisoners of war.

(5) His magazine attacked so-called American intervention in Korea, demanded the withdrawal of American troops, and praised the Chinese Communist "volunteers."

(6) His magazine carried clumsily concocted tales to the effect that the United States was engaged in germ warfare in Korea.

(7) His magazine attacked American civil and military leaders during the Korean war, including President Truman and General MacArthur, while praising the Chinese Communist leaders.

(8) His magazine carried articles featuring American losses and defeats in the military field.

(9) The China Monthly Review, edited by John W. Powell, was regularly used as a medium for the circulation of official statements of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist government.

(10) The contents of Powell's magazine and the conditions under which it was published in Communist China indicate strongly that the publication was controlled and supported by the Chinese Communist government.

(11) His magazine cooperated with Chinese Communist police authorities against American personnel in trumped-up charges; witness the cases of William Olive and Angus Ward, both United States State Department employees.

(12) John W. Powell established communication with relatives of American prisoners of war and circulated his magazine within the United States in furtherance of the above objectives.

(13) His magazine promoted Communist-front organizations operating both on an international scale and within the United States as part of the vast international Communist apparatus.

(14) His publication supported Communist leaders on trial in the United States under the Smith Act and the defendants in the Rosenberg atomic espionage case.

(15) His magazine supported the Communist contention against the American policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea.

(16) His magazine featured statements against the American Government carrying the names of American prisoners of war as signators. Testimony disclosed that these names were, in many cases, obtained under duress or that they were false.

(17) The China Review published from time to time, and caused to be reprinted within the United States in a pro-Communist publication, lists of American prisoners of war obtained from Communist sources and independently of the American Government. In some cases, the information circulated was definitely false. The publication of these lists through nongovernmental channels tended to cast doubt upon the reliability of American Government channels. It could be interpreted as a move to encourage relatives of American POW's to consult publications filled with Communist propaganda for news in regard to their loved ones—a most dastardly plot indeed.

(18) Powell circulated his magazine in the United States despite rulings by United States post-office authorities as to its nonmailability.

(19) He refused to say under oath whether his sworn statements as to his Communist affiliations in the passport application and on his application for Government employment were true or false.

(20) He is presently lecturing in the United States, in support of the Communist government in China although not registered as a foreign agent.

The case of John W. Powell was called to the attention of the Department of Justice on October 1, 1954, and the Department still has the case under consideration.

That an American should be allowed to engage in such activities as those of John W. Powell, so detrimental to the welfare of his countrymen and his country itself, without any punishment, is an insult to the prisoners of war who faced the tortures of the Chinese Communist prison camps in Korea.
And I may say it is an insult to freedom-loving Americans all over our land and to freedom-loving people all over the world. It is, in a sense, an encouragement to other conspirators to act likewise without fear of punishment. If this is an expression of our desire for coexistence, then God help America. I believe I am expressing the sentiments of every member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, of every POW who suffered in Korea, and of the great mass of the people of the United States when I say that conduct such as has been established in the case of John W. Powell should be subject to most severe penalties.

Unless the Department of Justice can deal adequately with this man under existing legislation, then the Congress should take the necessary legislative steps to assure that such conduct as his will be subject in future to the heavy sanctions it merits.

Furthermore, I might say to you, for the record, that if such conduct is condoned in this country of ours, people like John W. Powell and others, who are lecturing throughout the United States and taking the fifth amendment, if you please, when asked what organization they are lecturing for—then it is a dark, a sad day for our Republic and freedom-loving people everywhere (H., pp. 1241–1242).

At the conclusion of the San Francisco hearing, Senator Welker announced that he, too, would submit this record to the Attorney General of the United States.

**Powell Comes Out of Hiding**

As has been indicated, every step was taken to insure that Powell would be present at the San Francisco hearing. He had previously been notified that he was not excused from his original subpoena, thereafter another subpoena for the San Francisco hearing was issued, and extraordinary efforts were made to serve this on the witness. Acting Chairman Welker went so far as to issue a public request for Powell to appear which was reprinted in the San Francisco newspapers.

Mrs. Powell herself was asked the whereabouts of her husband but refused to answer this question as she had refused to answer others—because a true answer might involve her in criminal prosecution.

After the subcommittee returned to Washington, Powell came out of hiding. The Palo Alto Times for January 8, 1955, contained an account of his appearance at a forum on China policy, which was conducted at a tax-supported high school in Palo Alto. The Palo Alto Times account stated in part as follows:

**600 at Controversial Forum Hear Powell Urge Recognition of Red China**

After more than a month of embattled controversy surrounding its preparation, a much-ballyhooed forum on China policy was executed in orderly fashion here last night.

Some 600 observers jammed Palo Alto High School auditorium to hear Red apologist John W. Powell and two other speakers present widely differing proposals on United States policy toward Communist and Nationalist China.

Storm-center Powell advocated immediate recognition of Red China and a lowering of trade barriers • • •

**Powell Says He Saw Evidence of Germ Warfare in Korea**

John Wesley Powell said in Palo Alto last night that he “saw evidence of germ warfare” in the Korean war.

Powell has been accused of conspiracy with the Chinese Communists by various congressional investigators. He participated here last night in a panel discussion of United States policy toward China.

He was asked by another panel member, Dr. Robert C. North, of Stanford, whether he still believes what he wrote in the China Monthly Review in March
1952—that “the United States is resorting to one more act of bestiality by using germ warfare.”

Powell replied: “I know it is hard to believe, sitting here in Palo Alto, and I'll take more than my 2 minutes, if I may, to explain.”

Powell said he “saw evidence of germ warfare” collected in Korea. He said doctors and scientists, trained in the United States, presented the evidence.

“I saw a warehouse filled with peculiar mechanical contraptions not used in ordinary warfare,” he said.

He said it was a great tragedy the United States and China could not agree on a responsible neutral group to make a study of germ-warfare charges.

“Something happened in Korea,” he said. “I found it almost impossible to believe.”

North asked Powell if he found enough evidence to justify his editorial statement. Powell said there was evidence of germ warfare right outside the town where he was living. He said the villagers washed down the streets and walls of buildings.

Powell said that in areas where plague, cholera, and smallpox had been wiped out, there suddenly were a few cases.

He said villagers told him they heard a plane go overhead one night and that the next day they found rats in the streets, in their doorways, and on their roofs. The rats were bruised and many had broken legs, he said.

“It's too big a hoax to perpetrate,” Powell said.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE DEFIED

Attention is called to Powell's statement that he saw evidence of germ warfare. This is a direct refutation of his own statement made several weeks before in the presence of newspapermen in Washington, “I saw no evidence.” There is no precedent in recent American history—if indeed there is precedent in all American history—for the conduct of John W. Powell. His unspeakable betrayal of America's cause in the Far East is matched only by his arrogance toward the Senate of the United States. It is obvious that he must be brought back to the witness stand at the earliest opportunity, so that the subcommittee may complete its investigation of him. It is equally obvious that the subcommittee must complete its investigation of his China Review associates and all the so-called Americans who collaborated with him in this international ring of treason.

At the Washington hearing, the chairman gave this preliminary description of the entire group.

The story has several parts. It begins slowly, as the members of this group assemble in the Far East. Like their predecessors from the State and Treasury Departments, most of them got there at the expense of the American taxpayer. One served in the Information and Education Branch of the United States Army. The subcommittee has already shown that I. and E. was grievously penetrated by underground Communists during World War II.

One was in the United States Information Service. One was a newspaperman and broadcaster. Others were part of the IPR apparatus which, as we revealed in a previous investigation, was used by the Communist world conspiracy as an international cover shop. Still others, like Hinton, worked for OWI or UNRRA or the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund.

They formed a little cluster in Shanghai around a once honorable publication, the China Weekly, later Monthly Review. At their center is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, one of the world symbols of Chinese communism. The China Review became the instrument by which they advertised and brazenly proclaimed devotion to Red China * * * Devices were created to bring the poisonous lies of the China Review back into the United States.

The group formed another little cluster in Peiping in 1952 when the international Communist conspiracy rigged up another of its familiar, and utterly false, peace conferences. To that conference came so-called delegates from the United States itself. The record will show their activities, too.
Directly after the Korean armistice, some of the members of this group started slipping back home. One, Hinton, came through Moscow. Another took off from Calcutta. Still others passed through Hong Kong. Since their return, as we will show, they have raised Red China’s banner at every opportunity (H., pp. 1821, 1822).

If it develops in the opinion of the Attorney General, that there is no law under which these individuals may be punished for the brazen infamy of their conduct, then such a law should be passed immediately.

The Government of the United States has no right to take the flower of its young manhood from their homes and careers, put them into uniforms, and send them to die for their country in every quarter of the globe, if it will not protect them from the activities of such creatures as John W. Powell.

Conclusions

1. John W. Powell was the responsible editor of the China Weekly (later Monthly) Review.
2. Powell’s magazine contained false and criminally derogatory information about the policy of the American Government, the deeds of American diplomats, and the conduct of American soldiers who were at war. Powell was in a position to know the falsity of much of the material he published.
3. Powell’s magazine was used extensively in the Chinese Communist effort to brain-wash American prisoners of war under inhuman conditions of indoctrination, starvation, torture, and death.
4. The evidence strongly indicates that the China Review was both controlled and supported by the Chinese Communist Government.
5. The China Review was part of an international Communist apparatus of great significance. This apparatus seeks to mislead the peoples of the world and lull them into the false beliefs that the international Communist conspiracy is actually a program of peace.
6. The program of this apparatus includes an effort to propagandize relatives of members of the Armed Forces in order to encourage defection on the home front.
7. Powell remains at large defying the Senate of the United States.

Recommendation

Appropriate administrative, legislative, and judicial steps should be taken so that no American national may, without fear of retribution, give aid and comfort to a nation engaged in armed combat with the Armed Forces in the United States.
SECTION X

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

THE ARMY’S INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM

1. During the latter part of World War II, the Information and Education Division of the United States Army had powers of compulsory indoctrination over 8 million American soldiers. This in itself is not unreasonable, since the people have a right to require that their Government explain to the members of the Armed Forces the purpose for which they are asked to lay down their lives. However, adequate precautions were not taken to insure that loyal Americans were in charge of the compulsory indoctrination program.

2. A group of Communists or pro-Communists infiltrated into controlling positions in the information and education program and brought it about that 8 million American soldiers were taught the wrong things about communism, the wrong things about the U.S.S.R., the wrong things about Communist China, and the wrong things about Americans who oppose communism.

3. Evidence is lacking to establish how much of the information and education program was accepted in good faith by the 8 million American soldiers who were forcibly exposed to it. Nevertheless, the subcommittee believes there is grave danger that some of the wrong things may have found lodging in the minds of many loyal Americans.

UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

1. John W. Powell was the responsible editor of the China Weekly (later Monthly) Review.

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6. The program of this apparatus includes an effort to propagandize relatives of members of the Armed Forces in order to encourage defection on the home front.

7. Powell remains at large defying the Senate of the United States.

SUBVERSION IN POLICYMAKING

1. Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and their confederates in the Communist underground in government had power to exercise profound influence on American foreign policy and the policies of international organizations during World War II and the years immediately thereafter.

2. They had power to exercise profound influence on the creation and operation of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

3. This power was not limited to their officially designated authority. It was inherent in their access to and influence over higher officials, and the opportunities they had to present or withhold information on which the policies of their superiors might be based.

4. Hiss, White, and a considerable number of their colleagues who helped make American foreign policy and policies of international organizations during crucial years have been exposed as secret Communist agents.

RADIO OPERATORS AND NAVY FILES

1. The Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel of the United States Navy was established by law on December 8, 1941, to protect the people of the United States against subversive activity by radio operators serving at sea in the American merchant marine. The Board carried out its duty by removing potentially subversive radio operators from ships at sea.

2. The Board found that among these potentially subversive operators were several hundred Communists. It instituted proceedings to remove them from their ships.

3. Communist protests against the removal of Communist radio operators were brought to the attention of the assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

4. The assistant to the Secretary of the Navy criticized the policy of removing Communist radio operators and took the matter before the Secretary who, in turn, took it to the President of the United States.

5. The assistant to the Secretary, the Secretary himself, and the President had full knowledge that there was widespread Communist infiltration among radio operators and that it probably included, “the president, the vice president, and possibly other officers” of the American Communications Association.

6. The President and the Secretary of the Navy had full knowledge that members of the Communist Party, U. S. A., “seemed more loyal to Russia than to the United States.” Regardless of this, the Secretary of the Navy reported that it was the President’s view that “* * * considering the fact that the United States and Russia
were allies at this time and that the Communist Party and the United States efforts were now bent toward winning the war, the United States was bound to not oppose the activities of the Communist Party, and specifically to not disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was active in Communist Party affairs."

7. The President, through the Secretary of the Navy, orally ordered the Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel to reverse its previous policy in order to permit the employment of Communists as radio operators in the merchant marine. The Board asked for written instructions authorizing it to reverse its previous policy, but no written instructions were ever transmitted to the Board. Shortly thereafter, the Board was abolished.

8. This policy of protecting American Communists, which was established as a matter of wartime expediency by the President and the Secretary of the Navy, weakened the security program in the United States Navy.

9. This policy had grave effects in other areas. Substantially, it notified the U. S. S. R. and the Communist Party, U. S. A., that American Communists operating in our midst constituted a specially favored category of citizens not subject to legal restrictions and penalties of other American citizens, but to be dealt with strictly in accord with the current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

10. Communist files were destroyed or immobilized in the First and Third Naval Districts. Anti-Communist units in these districts were abolished.

RECOMMENDATIONS

THE ARMY'S INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM

1. The teaching of traditional American doctrines and beliefs to the members of the United States Armed Forces and the explanation of the causes for which they are asked to fight are a major function in the whole effort of the United States to keep itself free. Those who conduct this teaching occupy posts of the highest sensitivity. Consequently, they should be subject to the most rigid security standards.

UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Appropriate administrative, legislative, and judicial steps should be taken so that no American national may, without fear of retribution, give aid and comfort to a nation engaged in armed combat with the Armed Forces of the United States.

SUBVERSION IN POLICYMAKING

1. The State and Treasury Departments should immediately institute comprehensive studies to determine the whole extent of the policymaking activities of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and other State and Treasury officials who have been exposed as members of the Communist underground.

2. These studies should be under the control and direction of per-
sons who were not identified in any way with Hiss, White, or any of their confederates, either in the making of policy or the exercising thereof.

3. The results of these studies should be made public at periodic intervals.

RADIO OPERATORS AND NAVY FILES

1. All agencies of the Government should avoid the appearance or actuality of granting preferment to any group of citizens because of their connections with any foreign state. All citizens have equal obligations under the law and should be treated accordingly.

2. It is recommended that the executive branch of the Government adopt procedures which will guarantee the retention of all files containing information concerning subversive activity in such form as to make these files reasonably available in current situations.

3. Communists, or those subject to Communist discipline, should be barred at all times from all sensitive posts in the armed services and from plants or installations serving the Armed Forces.

William E. Jenner, Chairman.
Arthur V. Watkins.
Herman Welker.
John Marshall Butler.
James O. Eastland.
Olin D. Johnston.
John L. McClellan.