ALL HONORABLE MEN
All Honorable Men

by James Stewart Martin

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1950
To my children,
members of a generation
entitled to ask,
“What did you do about it?”

The material from *Decision in Germany* by Lucius D. Clay is
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ANY man has a right to stop after a chain of harrowing experiences and to ask why things happened as they did. Our generation has had its share of harrowing experiences and therefore the peculiar chain of circumstances that kept me enmeshed for five and one half years was not unusual.

It is not simply the rebirth of German nationalism and Nazism that occasioned the writing of this book, nor even the return to power of the industrialists who put the Nazis in. These events in themselves are significant. But more so is the fact that, along with them, action was aborted on other questions in Germany: questions of the treatment of organized labor, the improvement of agriculture, the reform of public education, the public ownership or control of industry, and others just as basic. As the postwar pattern unfolded, this chain of events in Germany became more and more of a piece with a larger pattern.

In this book I have tried to tell the story of an important problem and some of the things that happened when we tried to deal with it. Though many of the events occurred in Germany, before and during the military occupation, they seemed in an increasing degree to be echoes of something more fundamental that was happening back in the United States. For whatever reason, the larger pattern is a repetition of what followed after World War I; but the pace has been quicker, as though greater powers were moving more rapidly toward a more catastrophic result.

Some people assume that everything is somehow connected with the cold war, and that any other course than the one we are pursuing has been rendered impossible by disagreements with Russia.
This is surely an oversimplification. Disagreements with Russia have been a major issue for only twenty or thirty years, whereas the pattern I have traced in this book has been unfolding for a much longer period.

If this work has any lasting value, acknowledgment is due to the men and women who staffed the Economic Warfare Section of the Department of Justice and the Decartelization Branch of Military Government, and whose reports of their researches and investigations brought together the fabric of this story. Mention should also be made of the many factual materials furnished to us in Germany by the Foreign Funds Control Division of the Treasury Department and the Finance Division of Military Government.

For her help in the preparation of this book I owe a debt of gratitude to my wife, Caroline Collins Martin, who not only worked with me during the last strenuous year in Berlin, but also cast a critical eye on the manuscript at every stage of its development. For help of various kinds I owe thanks to Johnston Avery, Charles C. Baldwin, Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, Norman Bursler, Francis W. Laurent, Russell Nixon, Alexander Sacks, Peter Weiss, and others too numerous to mention. Special thanks are due to Virginia Marino, who returned from Germany to work tirelessly on every phase of the book from first rough draft to finished page proofs. Many of the highlights are the result of the thoughtful suggestions of these people. The faults are my own.

For the necessary time away from other employment to do the writing, I am indebted to the generosity of Leon and Sonia Mohill; for time to prepare the manuscript for the press, to my present employers, the Foundation for World Government; and for research facilities, to the Library of Congress.

JAMES STEWART MARTIN

Annapolis, Maryland
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**Index**

**PART I**

Private Worlds
The Fraternity House

The day I started to write this we discovered termites in the basement. We were preparing to build a wing on our old house and found a colony of them in the heavy timbers.

Termites are able organizers, and thoroughly attached to their way of life. The area they occupy is small in relation to the house—just the heavy underpinnings. They object vigorously to outside interference from the people who live in the other parts of the house. They object especially to structural changes, which they are bound to consider unwarranted. They have two good reasons for objecting to changes. In the first place exposure to light and air kills them. In the second place any movement of the underpinnings ruins the whole structure of tunnels and channels which their enterprise has built within the framework of the house.

We hated to disturb them. They looked busy and enterprising. They seemed to want nothing more than a comfortable existence in accordance with their way of life.

We cleared the termites out to save the house, but I think I know how they looked at the whole matter. At the end of the Second World War I spent two and a half years in Germany dealing with some people who must think pretty much the same way.

My story goes back to 1938, when I was a lawyer recently turned college professor. I was serving as general counsel and treasurer, as well as teaching, at St. John's College in Annapolis, the "Great Books" college. Between reading the famous list of one hundred great books and untangling the college finances I found only occasional opportunities for the pastime of studying international affairs and the movements of international business. Certainly I had no
intention at the time of becoming actively involved with international monopolies or with the Germans who backed World War II.

My introduction to the specific problem of the German cartels was casual, almost accidental. On my infrequent days off I usually took a busman's holiday and went to Washington to listen to arguments in the Supreme Court or to visit friends, most of whom were government lawyers. Washington was a happy place in 1938. Except for a lawyer's usual concern to keep the details of pending cases confidential, the exchange of fact and opinion between citizen and public servant was normal. The talk with my friends was about law. I swapped stories about our troubles in carrying a half-million dollars in debts without throwing the college into bankruptcy, for stories about their troubles in enforcing the Securities Exchange Act and the antitrust laws.

Throughout this period there were occasional rumblings in the press from Thurman Arnold, who was complaining about the international affairs of some American corporations. These companies were often mentioned in connection with the German dyestuffs and chemical trust formed about twelve years earlier, known as the I.G. Farbenindustrie. Other foreign companies too were mentioned. Most of them would have been familiar to constant readers of the financial pages, but they were not as well known among the general public as their American counterparts would be.

Later on, during the war, the subject of private international arrangements among business firms, especially when they took the form of cartel agreements, got a considerable amount of public attention. But in those earlier days it was different. Many people could see no important principle at stake when the government announced some new antitrust suit against a group of American and foreign firms. On the surface these international cases appeared to be no different from any other government lawsuit such as one involving a monopoly of Wisconsin cheese or California hardwood.

At first the only remarkable feature of the operations encountered in the international cases was their size and scope. Even judging from the brief summaries in dispatches from Washington something in the giant stature of the companies involved, some hint of the vast sweep of their arrangements, reminded one of an ancient Greek epic. I began to piece together a story from a growing collection of newspaper clippings. The cases Arnold and his men were talking about had to do with a series of arrangements dating back for a decade or so, to 1926 and 1929, when international agreements among some of the biggest American, British and German firms had quietly divided up the world.

What I heard and read of these antitrust cases and the new sort of international brotherhood they implied—a business brotherhood more solidly built than the "international finance" of past generations—began to bring other events closer to home. In mid-March 1939, when a group of some of the largest British and German industrialists gathered at Düsseldorf to map plans for the economic collaboration between their two countries, the press barely reported the meetings. I might have skipped the news items entirely had I not been already familiar with the subject matter. It was impossible to overlook the fact that the industrialists who were meeting at Düsseldorf were from the same groups of companies which ten years earlier had arranged the three-way split of the world's markets.

The growing conviction that these private international arrangements were important was brought to a head by my encounter with the German ex-chancellor, Heinrich Brüning, early in 1940, during the period of the "phony war." St. John's College invited Dr. Brüning to give a lecture about the last days of the German Republic and how he had been deposed to make way for Hitler. His lecture was largely a description, by hindsight, of his own blindness during the time he was chancellor.

Dr. Brüning's story was one of being always a step behind the events. By his own account he never knew what hit him until after he had been deposed and was hiding out in the mountains of Austria. While gangs of Nazis combed the countryside looking for him, he spent his days reading and for the first time understanding Thucydides's classic history of the Peloponnesian War: a work that generations of British diplomats have used for a teething ring, and that Dr. Brüning had carried with him from his early youth. As he reread Thucydides's story of ancient power struggles, he suddenly began to realize what forces had been combined against
him in Germany: how under the pressure of administration he had
assented to decrees that weakened the “equal protection of the
laws,” and how large-scale economic forces had made inevitable
some developments he had tried to stem by “voluntary” agreements
among business interests.

Even in the retelling, however, it seemed to me that Dr. Brüning
again showed some of his former blindness. The main point in
Thucydides’s history was the discovery of the large part that eco-
nomic forces play in bringing nations into conflict. Yet, even when
pressed by questions, Dr. Brüning showed no particular concern
over the role of the large German industrial corporations. He related
the entire story of Franz von Papen’s intrigues, his posting of
gunmen to prevent Brüning from seeing the aging von Hinden-
burg, and the other events of the last days, without once alluding
to von Papen’s conferences with the bankers and the Rhineland
industrialists who agreed to back Hitler and who put up the
funds. It was, throughout, a story of politics without economics:
a story of a man who had felt that no harm could come from
temporary dictatorship so long as the laws and the courts pro-
tected civil rights, who showed no feeling for the ways in which
great economic power and unlimited funds could get around an
inconvenient legalism.

In Dr. Brüning’s view it was the refusal of groups like the Ger-
man winegrowers to improve their export markets that had cur-
tailed Germany’s export trade and intensified the depression. His
talk would be comparable to an American’s blaming an economic
depression in the United States on the activities of the Farm
Bureau Federation, with scarcely a word about our industrial firms,
or the level of industrial employment. This was quite puzzling, in
view of all that had happened in the preceding seven years. I knew
that before he was ousted, Dr. Brüning’s political enemies had
called him the “I.G. Chancellor”—a suggestion that the gentlemen
of I.G. Farbenindustrie had got pretty much what they wanted
under his administration. Yet the man himself was far from pre-
senting the appearance of a person likely to be influenced by or
to have much influence with “big business.” He looked a great deal
like Woodrow Wilson. He had risen to the chancellorship from
the post of Minister of Education, not from the board of the
Deutsche Bank. Even his manner was Wilsonian: a combination of
professorial bewilderment and amazed indignation at the way the
world goes.

This man who had been at the top in Germany when Hitler’s
Nazi program was put across had seen too little at the time to plan
any counterstrokes. Later, sitting in a mountain hideout and read-
ing an intelligent account of an ancient Greek war, he had felt
the stirrings of an awareness. Things unknown to him at the time,
trathings he had not even heard about, had been moving under his
feet. In the end they had deposed him and plunged his country
and the world into a major catastrophe. Yet still later, in looking
back on the events, he seemed to be missing the point.

I thought at the time that I might be just seeing ghosts. It was
too easy to draw parallels between what had happened economically
in Germany and what could be happening in the United States.
Thurman Arnold seemed to be saying, sometimes patiently, but
more often with an emphasis reminiscent of Donald Duck, that
great forces were at work through the channels of what we in the
United States had regarded as ordinary business. Arnold was
charging that some of the transactions of ordinary business had
crippled productive power in the United States, regardless of the
motives that prompted the individual deals.

If Arnold was right, there was something of serious general con-
cern in the private arrangements made in the twenties and thirties
among American, British, and German industrialists. Yet Arnold’s
boss, Attorney General Francis Biddle, did not appear to be im-
pressed by the noise Arnold was making. By 1941 it seemed even
that Biddle had become resentful of Arnold’s constant harping. A
newspaper column by Thomas L. Stokes hinted that Arnold and
Biddle had clashed over the investigation of international agree-
ments between Sterling Products, Inc., a drug firm, and Germany’s
I.G. Farben. Stokes said that Thomas G. Corcoran, late of the
Roosevelt brain trust, acting as attorney for the Sterling company
headed by Corcoran’s brother, had prevailed upon the Attorney
General to quash an antitrust prosecution and to accept a “consent
decree” instead. This legal move took government investigators
out of the files of the Sterling firm and closed the curtain on the
details of what had been going on between Sterling and Farben,
in return for the Sterling company's promise to clean house and
behave in the future.

The newspaper stories of the Sterling case were fragmentary.
They stated only that a business arrangement between the two
companies had allowed the German firm to keep a tight grip on its
overseas markets in Latin America during the war in spite of a
tight British naval blockade. By arrangement between Germany's
Farben trust and the Sterling firm, drugs manufactured in the
United States had been shipped in bulk to Farben agencies in Latin
America. These German agencies labeled the drugs “made in
Germany” and kept right on supplying their customers while they
laughed at the British blockade.

Early in 1942, Washington announced the creation of a new
agency to deal with the economic side of the war. The Board of
Economic Warfare, consisting of several members of the cabinet
under the chairmanship of the Vice President, was to have jurisdic-
tion over this agency, which would have a variety of duties con-
ected with “economic warfare.” The idea of economic warfare
seemed simple enough. Germany and Japan were enemy nations.
To produce war materials and to keep their people alive they had
to get some kinds of goods from territory outside the areas their
armies controlled. To keep them from getting these items, the
nations on our side could resort in the first instance to naval block-
de. Beyond blockades there were the possibilities of buying up
scarce commodities to keep them out of enemy hands, or of
persuading nonbelligerents not to sell to the enemy. These ac-
tivities would, of course, connect up with the Air Force's “strategic
bombing” of important production facilities in enemy territory —
the attempt to undermine enemy war production by knocking out
key factories.

One night in February 1942 I had a phone call from Edward H.
Levi, one of the members of Thurman Arnold's staff. He asked
me to leave my post at St. John's College and take a position as
special assistant to the Attorney General. I was to help organize a
unit in the Department of Justice to work with the newly created
Board of Economic Warfare. Soon after the Board was set up, Milo
Perkins, its executive director, had written to the Attorney General
asking for reports on the international business ties between Ameri-
can firms and firms in enemy territory, wherever these ties could
be expected to work to the advantage of the enemy. Also Mr.
Perkins had asked for any information that would give details of
industrial plants and industrial production in Germany and Japan.
Such information would be useful to the Air Force as well as the
Board of Economic Warfare.

A short time later, in conversations with Johnston Avery, ad-
ministrative assistant to Thurman Arnold, I found out more of
the details and agreed to join the team. I worked with members of
the Antitrust Division in setting up in the Department of Justice
the Economic Warfare Section, of which I finally became chief. We
set up field offices in principal cities, the largest part of the staff
being maintained at New York, where Robert Wohlforth headed
some twenty or thirty lawyers and investigators. Our object was to
test the possibilities of viewing the enemy through the chinks and
loopholes of international business arrangements.

Once we knew which American companies had agreements with
which Japanese or German companies we knew where to find
engineers and technicians who had visited, and in some cases even
had drawn the blueprints for, plants making synthetic rubber,
synthetic gasoline, tetraethyl lead, precision ball bearings, and the
like.

This kind of reporting became known as “bomina" work and we
found ourselves quickly dubbed the “bottleneck boys." Air In-
telligence wanted to find out as much as possible about the industry
in all areas where the Air Forces might be operating. They wanted
to know the relative importance of different plants, partly to help
plan the targets for bombing missions, and partly to help in figur-
ing out what they had hit after the raid was over. We had neither
the staff nor the facilities to make sweeping economic studies of
German industries. But we could find out, from men who ought to
know, which plants producing what materials were likely to be the
“bottlenecks” in German production.

We had no way of knowing where all the coal mines or steel
plants in Germany were; but we did find out that, by agreement among the biggest producers of precision antifriction bearings, practically all such bearings of any importance in Germany were made in only three factories grouped around the railway yards in Schweinfurt. We could not locate all the gasoline refineries; but we did find out that there were only three plants equipped to make the tetraethyl lead which is necessary for high-octane aviation gasoline, and we found a man who could draw pictures of all three. We did not know where to locate all of the mills producing brass for cartridge cases; but one of our men did find out that there were only two ways of making the special high-grade zinc that goes into this type of brass, both ways being the subject of patents, and he found blueprints and diagrams of all plants in Germany capable of making this zinc by consulting the files of two American companies. While other agencies hired economists and technicians to lay out large studies of the German industrial economy, our men interviewed men from Du Pont, Standard Oil, International Telephone and Telegraph, Anaconda Copper, General Motors, General Electric, and investment bankers and other businessmen who had been to Germany on what turned out to be "bottleneck" deals.

As we worked on the search for bottlenecks in German production, we began to find a close relation between international business agreements for the restriction of production and the kinds of products which were especially critical in wartime. The trouble was that these international arrangements which pointed up the importance of certain commodities in the German economy had also resulted in restriction of production in the United States. Arnold's men found that one company, Rohm & Haas of Philadelphia, was not able itself to produce enough transparent plastic sheets for bomber noses. But because Rohm & Haas of Philadelphia had Du Pont under a special agreement, as part of a more complex and wider four-way arrangement involving Du Pont and two German firms, I.G. Farbenindustrie and Rohm & Haas of Darmstadt, Du Pont was permitted to turn out only a limited quantity of the plastic sheets. While government expediters were tearing their hair over slow deliveries, Du Pont was writing to Rohm & Haas of Philadelphia that they would have to tell the government about the agreement unless Rohm & Haas would lift the restriction.

We discovered even more spectacular complications, such as those in the three-way arrangement among the aircraft-equipment firms, Bendix of the United States, Siemens of Germany, and Zenith in England. Under one of these arrangements the American firm in 1941 had stood by an agreement with the Siemens firm of Germany and forbade British Zenith to grant patent licenses so that the British Air Ministry could expand production of aircraft carburetors. Almost a year after Dunkerque, Zenith wrote to Bendix that:

The Ministry suggested they would prefer to manufacture the carburetors themselves and asked us to waive all our rights in this matter.

We have told them plainly that we are not prepared under any circumstances to agree to this or to alter one item of our contract with you. . . .

You know that we have got to win the war if we are going to survive and it is because we know we shall win and survive that we are anxious that post-war business should not be complicated by departing from the conditions of the contract in the meantime and under the excuse of war conditions. . . .

As the war went on Senate committees probing production bottlenecks in the United States helped to compile and make public the records of a staggering number of similar arrangements, differing in detail but all having the same effect. They were widely denounced but principally on the ground that they represented "business as usual" during wartime. Editorials solemnly pronounced that all such arrangements should be "out for the duration."

These business arrangements operated at focal points where it was possible to turn on and off the main valves in economic pipelines. It was not long before we found that the arrangement of valves and pipelines was a two-way affair. Our elation at the discovery that practically all of Germany's fine optical glass came from one factory, the Schott Works at Jena, was counteracted by the discovery that under the same working arrangement only one such
factory of any importance existed in the United States. The pin
point for bombing in Germany could be the blueprint for sabotage
in the United States.

As if to add point to such thoughts about sabotage, during the
summer of 1942 the Justice building in Washington played host
to the trial of eight Nazi saboteurs who had been landed by sub-
marine to blow up some of the key factories in the United States.
Morning and evening the black vans of the United States Marshal
trundled the prisoners under our windows and all day long the
drawn blinds on a row of windows two stories up and across the
courtyard were a reminder that sabotage in the literal sense of the
term was not just a theoretical possibility.

But sabotage in its literal sense was not the point. As our piece-
meal reports stacked up a picture began to emerge of an enemy that
did not need the services of trained, professional spies and saboteurs.
By agreement between German and American producers of mag-
nesium—needed for aircraft—production in the United States
before the war was limited to no more than 5000 tons per year. In
contrast, Germany in 1939 alone used 13,500 tons and during the
next five years consumed magnesium at the rate of 33,000 tons per
year. Here was a case where American "business-is-business" men
had, knowingly or unknowingly, helped a German firm to close
some valves over here, with far more effect than the eight saboteurs
could ever have achieved even if they had been allowed to do their
utmost. Plants which have never been built are more dead than
plants which have been bombed. A bombed plant may still live in
its blueprints and in the trained labor force that had been operating
it. As the evidence piled up to show German success in negotiating
restrictive arrangements, the contrast between the limited possi-
bilities of cloak-and-dagger sabotage and the greater possibilities of
safely negotiated business arrangements became more and more
heavily underlined with each passing of the Black Marias under
our windows.

Unfortunately, Francis Biddle and Thurman Arnold were still
like stiff-legged fighting roosters with each other. Some of Biddle's
public remarks, including humorous references to the "bombing"
work of Arnold and his boys, seemed to confirm our impression

that the Attorney General considered what we were doing to be the
product of a somewhat amusing mental aberration.

Finally, combined pressure from the War and Navy Departments
and the War Production Board prevailed in suspending the en-
sforcement of the antitrust laws for the duration of the war in all
cases affecting industries considered important to the war effort. All
that was necessary to stop an investigation or the prosecution of a
case was a certification from Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of
War, James V. Forrestal, Undersecretary of the Navy, and John
Lord O'Brien, General Counsel of the War Production Board,
that any attempt to press the case would interfere with the war
effort. This signaled the end of Thurman Arnold's great trust-
busting drive. A short time later Arnold allowed himself to be
kicked upstairs. He accepted an appointment as judge of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

With Arnold's departure the Attorney General showed signs of
more serious interest in the evidence of how the German program
of economic warfare had been carried out. Biddle called for more
and more thumbnail sketches of what we were discovering. By the
spring of 1944 the time came to add up the score. In three years,
with a staff of less than sixty people, we had prepared thirty-six
hundred of these snapshots of German economic power in action;
but the Attorney General wanted to know the conclusions of all
these findings. We began to summarize our picture of an enemy
that could survive a military defeat because it did not need or use
military weapons.

This enemy did survive military defeat after World War I. We
had in front of us the story of what lay behind the Ruhr occupation
of 1923, the runaway German inflation, the Dawes and Young plans,
the Dillon, Read and the Schroder bond issues, the growth of the
Ruhr as the "industrial heart of Europe," Germany's strange ob-
session with heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods—
"guns, not butter."

As we summarized these findings, the Attorney General took
more and more interest, became fascinated, began to speak in favor
of doing something to prevent it all from happening again. He
talked to President Roosevelt. In the fall of 1944 the President
wanted some of these findings publicized, to pave the way for serious postwar policies to deal with the problem. He wrote his famous letter of September 6, 1944, to Secretary of State Hull: "... The history of the use of the I.G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. Defeat of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons of economic warfare."

We had started out to get a picture of our military enemy and had found a much bigger enemy, of a quite different sort from the popular picture of hobnailed Nazis with guns and tanks.

Late in the summer of 1944 Francis Biddle, the man who three years before had found nothing very important in the Sterling Products case, and who two years before had been amused by Thurman Arnold’s “bombardment” of Germany, told a Senate committee what he thought must be done during the occupation of Germany.

... As we approach the occupation of Germany, we will have to decide what is to be done with the great German monopolistic firms. These are the firms that made the contracts in which [we] are interested. The period between the wars was only an armistice during which the firms of Germany conducted war against us. The British representative on the Inter-Allied Commission Supervising German Disarmament stated in a lecture in 1923:

"We, in this country, flatter ourselves that the war ended on January 10, 1920; a future generation may yet describe the period in which we are living as an armistice during which the war was continued by other methods than rifle and howitzer, only to be resumed in all its carnal horror after the lapse of a few ambiguous years."

These firms in reality operated as departments of the German Government. They evaded and violated the peace treaties in order to build up Germany’s military strength. It was the theory of the German Government that operating under the guise of ordinary commercial arrangements, these firms could be used to weaken Europe and America so that when the military war was resumed, we would lose. Through the techniques of industrial penetration, they hoped to be able to cripple American production, to gain from us technical know-how, to conduct espionage upon us, and to establish centers of propaganda throughout the world.

The shadow of the Sterling case moved across Mr. Biddle’s account. Sterling had taken over the American Bayer Company after World War I and it was what Sterling and I.G. Farben had agreed to do with the business of American Bayer that had been the nub of the Sterling Products case in 1941. Mr. Biddle in 1944 told the Senate committee:

I.G. Farbenindustrie is the principal combine which has been used by the German Government to attempt to restrict American production. It is the successor to the German dye trust which attempted prior to the last war to keep an independent American industry from developing. The president of the American Bayer Co., which was owned by the German dye trust, was told by his German superiors that his accomplishments in holding down American production before the last war could be compared to the work of an army leader who had succeeded “in destroying 3 railroad trains of 40 cars containing 4½ million pounds of explosives.”

After amplifying these conclusions with further facts he pounded home his point:

I hope, as the years go by, we will not forget... not because I wish to have individual American companies condemned, but because these things should not be permitted to happen again. It is the system under which Germany was able to make these cartel agreements that must be broken up.

At the present time it is probably inaccurate to speak of separate combines or cartels in the German economy. They are all linked together — the munition makers, the potash industry, the machine trust, the oil industry, the electrical manufacturers, the steel trust, and the chemical companies. They exist as part of the Nazi government. We may expect, however, that when the government falls they will appear again as separate combines. The companies which were used as instruments to violate the peace treaties, to dominate industry in Europe, to support the Nazi war machine, and to restrict production here will then appear in the guise of ordinary commercial firms.

The Attorney General put his finger on the gist of what we had learned when he underscored the fact that “The pattern of the activity of these firms was established before the Nazis came to
power and during the early days of the German Republic. The
German Government and the German people as a whole have never
accepted the doctrines of economic liberalism which run through
American history. The monopolistic firms of Germany have sur-
vived in that country through two wars and constitute a definite
menace to the future peace of the world. As long as they survive in
their present form it will be exceedingly difficult to develop in-
dependent industry in Europe outside of Germany.”

He called for action. “I propose that we break the power of the
German monopolistic firms. The purpose of such a program would
not be to destroy German economic life in its entirety, but to put its
industries into a form where they will no longer constitute a menace
to the civilized world. I do not underestimate the difficulties in-
olved in such a program. . . . Such a program cannot be worked
out in any definite form on paper and at this distance from the field
of operations. It will have to wait the period of supervision over
these companies that should come during the occupation period. But
this is a procedure which we did not follow after the last war. It
will not be followed in this war unless we make up our minds to
do it now and prepare for it . . . [We must] have some picture of
what this complicated industrial interconnection is when, after
Germany has been conquered, we sit down and say: ‘What will we
do to break up this industrial domination?’”

CHAPTER 2

The Termites

THE Battle of the Bulge was just over. The German juggernaut
was grinding to a stop for the third time since 1870. There was still
the possibility that the Nazis would pull out all the horrors of poison
gas and bacteriological warfare for a Wagnerian finale. Looking
ahead to the end of the shooting war, nearly everyone wanted to
know what could be done to keep Germans from starting the same
kind of thing all over again.

The United States was in a mood to propose new ideas. This was
true especially on the economic side of international relations, where
so many troubles begin. We were tired of trade barriers, restrictions,
nations playing their cards close to the chest. We were becoming a
little ashamed of having farm “surpluses” and industrial “over-
production” in one part of the world while people starved and did
without things in other parts. The tremendous wartime produc-
tion in our own country, outstripping all estimates, had itself been
an eye opener. Why not have full production and full employment
in peacetime, too? We were beginning to have some feeling for the
idea that economic restrictions, depression, and war are not un-
related.

Francis Biddle’s demand for curbs on the big German financial
and industrial combines was not ignored. The Financial Branch of
SHAEF, General Eisenhower’s headquarters in Europe, asked for
help in planning the necessary steps. They were preparing to in-
vestigate the concentration of economic power in Germany. They
wanted to discover how the German leaders were smuggling great
fortunes abroad to provide a future base of operations after the
coming military defeat.
With the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, a few of us were formed into a small team sent over jointly from the Economic Warfare Section of the Department of Justice and the Foreign Funds Control Division of the Treasury Department to help the Financial Branch. I was in charge of the Department of Justice contingent.

It was going to be our job to uncover records, and to find and talk to the German masterminds who had laid their plans for turning military defeat into economic victory. We had to find out what they had done and how they had done it. This was no job of criminal investigation. That would be for the war crimes staff. We would not be concerned directly with the intentions or the good or bad faith of the handful of Germans who had shaped the building of Hitler's New Order. Neither would we be concerned with the good faith or patriotism of their helpers in other countries.

The men who turned the policy of France before 1940 toward economic collaboration with the Third Reich have never admitted that they intended digging a grave for France. The men of the Federation of British Industries, who in March 1939, at Düsseldorf, worked out a plan of economic collaboration with the Reichgruppe Industrie, have denied any intention of helping to set the stage for war. Even the German bankers and industrialists who called in Hitler to bolster their tottering financial empires later denied any intention to produce what followed. Whatever their story might be, we had to know how such men came to have power and what forces determined the use they made of it.

Sitting on the management boards of six large banks and seventy huge industrial combines and holding companies, fewer than one hundred men controlled over two thirds of Germany's industrial system. Their international ties gave them a central location within the framework of European heavy industry and finance. Long before the war these companies and their relations to one another had set the economic pattern for most of Europe. During the German occupation of the neighboring countries they had had new opportunities to strengthen their hold.

Even before we left the United States it took no powers of divination to realize that German finance and industry would have made the most of these opportunities to set up new vested interests in hands that would appear to be French, or Dutch, or Belgian, or Italian. We could expect to be greeted by these "allied" defenders of the Nazi economic New Order, who would resist our countermeasures by wailing that they had already "suffered" under the Germans.

It would have been hard to maintain any illusion about the job ahead. Finding out what to do would be bad enough. Getting different agencies of our own government to recognize an unfamiliar danger and agree on a course of action might be something else. We had already been through a preview of such difficulties in dealing with a case that came up early in the war. I was reminded of it just as we were leaving for Europe.

On a bleak night in February 1945 I found myself standing with my small party of investigators in the mist at the Washington airport, waiting to take off. As I stood in the gloom, observing all the security measures that shrouded our routine departure—the blackout of the field and plane, the silence, the sudden orders—I remembered our discovery earlier in the war of how easily the "secrecy" of ship sailings had been penetrated by the Germans.

In 1940, 1941 and 1942, ships leaving American seaports had had the same security measures to protect their departure. Yet many of their broken hulls and water-soaked cargoes had washed up onto the beaches of New Jersey, Virginia and the Carolinas, where German submarines had spotted them within sight of shore. In case after case, every man on board had been marked before the captain opened his orders. Though they may not have known it, the cargoes they carried were reinsured with Munich. The routine system of placing insurance had put precise information on their sailing date and destination in the hands of the Germans before the ship left port.

In the summer of 1941, before there was any Economic Warfare Section, several trust busters discovered that while the American public was looking more and more askance at German business connections, insurance companies doing an international business seemed to have no such doubts about their foreign commitments. Insurers of large risks, such as ships, cargoes, and industrial plants,
customarily spread the risk among other companies willing to take fractional shares. The big insurance and reinsurance companies in the United States which handle the largest risks have such treaties on an international basis, through arrangements with the Lloyd's group in England, or with the Zurich group in Switzerland.

It had long been the custom of the American companies to place the reinsurance on ships and cargoes with the Zurich group by cabling information to them so that they could accept responsibility for a share of the American insurer's risk. The information cabled would include the name of the ship, the sailing date, the cargo carried, the destination, and the value of the insured property. One detail that should have raised someone's eyebrow, but did not until the government stepped in, was the fact that the Zurich group in turn had a reinsurance treaty with the Munich reinsurance pool in Germany. The result was that during 1940 and early 1941, by the time a ship had cleared New York or Baltimore harbor headed for a European port, the German intelligence service already had the sailing data in hand.

When men from the Department of Justice called a conference of insurance representatives, the companies agreed to stop sending such information by cable. But even then no one realized what an efficient pipeline the Germans had set up. It appeared later that everyone concerned, both government officials and insurance men, assumed that sending the information by mail to Switzerland would be perfectly all right. Nothing was said about stopping completely the transmission of reinsurance information.

In the spring of 1942, after we had started to set up the Economic Warfare Section, we found that reinsurance information sheets, or "bordereaux," were still going to Switzerland by mail. We also discovered that the reinsurance business, far from being confined to ships and cargoes, also covered industrial plants, and more especially those very large new plants being built for war production, the ones with security guards at the gates to see that no unauthorized eyes got inside.

In the case of industrial plants, we found that the reinsurance bordereaux did not account for the full extent of the leakage. The usual reinsurance treaty on such risks provides that the reinsurance group has the right to demand copies of a full report by the insurance inspector. This includes blueprints of the installation, description of the fire hazards and risks, and inventory of the contents of the buildings, room by room. We found that, before 1938, the Zurich group had asked for the full insurance inspector's report in only 5 or 6 per cent of the cases. After 1938, the full report was requested with increasing frequency, until the percentage was closer to 90.

It had seemed obvious to us that the government ought to stop this transmission of shipping and industrial information through Switzerland to the Reich. Unlike the United States, the German government as early as 1936 had closed off such information about Germany. As soon as the Germans occupied France, Belgium, and Holland in 1940 they put a stop to all such transmissions from those countries. We proposed to have the Attorney General send a letter to each company warning that transmission of marine and industrial plant information of this type came within the scope of the Espionage Act. Issuance of such a letter in the name of the Attorney General, however, required approval by the Solicitor General, Charles Fahy. Mr. Fahy would not take this responsibility without consulting the other interested departments of the government.

At first, no one could believe that Americans were handing the German intelligence service information on a silver platter. At one of Mr. Fahy's interdepartmental meetings, Joseph Borkin, then of the Antitrust Division, slapped down on the table a stack of insurance inspectors' reports on various prominent buildings. He had purchased these from sources open to anyone in the insurance business without any special "security" clearance. For fifty-five cents he had the plans of the White House, showing the location of fire extinguishers and other protective apparatus. For seventy-five cents he had the plans of a large new magnesium plant. One of the blueprints had an arrow pointing at a valve, with the legend: "Under no circumstances must this valve be closed while the plant is in operation, as an explosion would result."

To complete our case, we had obtained from the Office of Censorship copies of insurance bordereaux photographed from the current week's mail destined for Switzerland.
We got other evidence to show that German insurance companies were operating at a loss in Latin America, with the help of a German government subsidy, to capture a larger share of the international reinsurance business. At the same time, to show how informative inspection reports could be to an outsider, another of our men got from the files of American reinsurance firms similar data on important European plants, such as the N.V. Philips lamp and radio-tube factories at Eindhoven, Holland. Months later, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare thanked us profusely for copies of this report, even though it was dated 1939. They told us it had been used in planning the RAF raid on Eindhoven in December 1942, and in assessing the bomb damage after the raid.

Still there were objections. Maritime Commission representatives argued that existing regulations required them to place insurance on all cargoes. If we put any brakes on the insurance companies, they might decline to accept the risks, and ship sailings would be delayed. Besides, enemy agents could get information on ship sailings and cargoes by going down to the docks and watching the ships load and depart.

The FBI resented the implication that enemy agents had the run of the waterfront. Nearly everyone in the end agreed there was no sense in wrapping up marine and industrial information and handing it to the Germans. But the Maritime Commission was still worried about the possibility of not getting insurance placed before ships were ready to sail. Other agencies were bothered about industrial plant insurance. For months they urged us to look for a solution that would permit the insurance business to be carried on as usual. Why not set up an interdepartmental committee of qualified economists and experts to sit in consultation with members of the insurance industry? They could pass upon specific items of information, deciding in each case whether the release of the information would substantially harm the war effort or give help to the enemy.

We stuck to our guns and insisted that the simplest thing to do was to tell the insurance companies that this particular practice had to stop. Let the people in the business, who were already familiar with conditions in their industry, figure out how they could adjust themselves to the new circumstances. We felt that government, wherever possible, should operate through laws, not by setting up more and more administrative tribunals to command or forbid particular acts. We pointed out that the Lloyd's group had solved a similar problem by sending over from England a resident representative with power of attorney to make commitments on behalf of the British companies without sending information out of the United States.

Our stand for a government of laws, not men, got no support from the Solicitor General. Mr. Fahy overruled us again, and discussions continued on how to set up an interdepartmental screening committee. After several months of this, even men from the insurance business began to ask the Attorney General to send his letter so that they could get the bureaucrats out of their hair. In the end the letter was sent out, nearly a year and a half after the leakage had first been brought to the attention of an agency of the government, and over four months after we in the Economic Warfare Section had taken up the case and pointed out what uses the Germans could be making of the information.

Actually the Germans made plenty of use of it. Nearly three years later, in the summer of 1945, in the files of the Munich Reinsurance Company and the German intelligence service, we were to find bundles of photographs, blueprints, and detailed descriptions of whole industrial developments in the United States, many of them obtained through insurance channels. Together they made up the vital statistics of our war economy.

Nothing was ever done to restrict the circulation of insurance inspectors' reports within the industry, inside the United States. A few weeks after Joe Borkin made his dramatic purchases, an FBI agent appeared at Borkin's office in the Justice building and demanded to know why Joe, who is not in the insurance business, had been buying up this type of information. The FBI, with its attention focused on security of information about war plants, had seen nothing unusual until someone outside the insurance field showed an interest in information that was freely accessible to anyone in the business. Like the characters in the Chesterton story...
who failed to suspect the mailman, even the G-men had a blind spot for "security leaks" that occur in what is regarded as the normal course of business.

This reminder of how hard it can be to warn others about a new kind of danger was a disturbing thought as we prepared that February night in 1945 to take off for Europe. How were we going to fare when we ran up against real demonstrations of German economic power and ingenuity, where the opposition to change would be a lot more formidable because it would be carefully engineered? The answer was not long in coming.

We settled down out of the sky over England into a fog-covered beehive called Bushy Park, headquarters for the future military government of Germany, then known as the U.S. Group Control Council. Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham was in command and it was on our way to report to him that we got our first forewarning of opposition to come. Together with Norman Bursler and Alexander Sacks, I was walking through the hall of a temporary wooden office building when Alex pointed to the name of Colonel Graeme K. Howard over the office door of the Director of the Economics Division. Howard was the author of a book, written in 1940 before the United States entered the war, called America and a New World Order, an apologia for the Nazi economic system that might just as well have been titled You Can Do Business with Hitler. Now it looked as though we were to be working with him and with others like him in an effort to reconstitute Germany on a new pattern.

Colonel Howard was only the first of many who turned up, riding into Germany with the future military government, helping to deflect the policy back into old grooves. Colonel Howard, it is true, was straightway relieved of his duties before we left Bushy Park for the Continent; in fact, just after General Wickersham received a copy of his book from the Intelligence Division. But trick pennies are the same on both sides. The position of economic director was filled by the assignment from Washington of Brigadier General William H. Draper, Jr., on military leave from his position as Secretary-Treasurer of Dillon, Read & Company. This investment banking firm after World War I had taken the lead in floating the German bonds which put German industry in a position to fight another war.

The men with whom Colonel Howard had already staffed the Economics Division clearly wanted the occupation of Germany to be carried out along quite different lines from those decided upon by the government departments at Washington. Co-ordination between the plans of the Economics Division and the policies laid down by Washington became more and more difficult. The constant carping and the mounting criticism of the official policies became so open that General Wickersham finally found it necessary to issue a formal order to all officers under his command, requiring them to stop their criticism and to support and "advocate" the policies laid down in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive.

Our special team was assigned to work in the Finance Division with Captain Norbert A. Bogdan, a charming fellow who had been a vice president of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, a firm in whose files the Nazi banking affiliations were still warm when the United States went to war. It was a bit of a relief to learn that our connection was to be only temporary and that, because of the rather fluid state of our mission, we could soon move over to Versailles and be assigned to SHAEF. There I was asked to prepare a staff study that resulted in General Eisenhower's sending out a major policy cable, designated SCAF 239, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, stating that he considered it necessary to investigate further the flight of capital assets which German industrialists were spiriting out of the country to escape seizure. Then, even before the reply came back, SHAEF sent out another cable, this time to the War Department, announcing that in advance of approval of the whole program by the Combined Chiefs of Staff our small team of investigators was being sent into the field. SHAEF asked for additional qualified personnel to be sent over from Washington to join us.

Our next problem was to map out our moves to follow those of the armies. Since we were civilians attached to SHAEF, each of our movements into operational territory had to be cleared down the chain of command, like a pinball looking for the jack pot, through army group to army, and sometimes even to the particular corps
and division in charge of the area we wanted to cover. We studied the top-secret operational plans and their allocation of geographical objectives to different army groups. We projected our movements so that the centers of our investigations would fall one after the other along the line of advance of a particular army group. Most of our investigating in the end was carried out in General Bradley’s Twelfth and Field Marshal Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group areas.

CHAPTER 3

The Heavy Timbers

GENERAL Eisenhower’s armies between D Day in 1944 and V-E Day in 1945 slashed an incision across the body of Europe. It was radical surgery to remove what the Nazis had laid out through seven years of contriving and five years of military occupation. No one who saw any part of the operation will be likely to forget how the details of life at all levels—bodies, personal effects, bathtubs, business papers, confidential government files, family skeletons—all lay exposed in the wake of combat. I remember particularly a family at Dusseldorf, living on the third floor of a building that had been cross-sectioned by a bomb. They always looked with some show of modesty both up and down the street before stepping into their open-air bathtub.

In a surprisingly short time, old habits returned, privacy reasserted itself, papers were gathered up and tucked away, flowers and vines grew over debris. But for a while there were no secrets. In those brief weeks before the incision closed, the Allied governments overlooked rights of privacy and constitutional immunities from “searches and seizures.” Immediately behind the blade of Eisenhower’s knife came the “T” forces, with their affiliated groups of specialists, to search for anything and everything that would throw light on the underlying causes of Germany’s military outbreaks.

This determination to probe and search was typical of the “never-again” feeling that predominated. Allied policy in 1945 was full of solemn promises and “morning-after” resolutions. It would have been hard not to catch some of this spirit as we moved toward the forward areas to pick up the trail of the economic war lords.
President Roosevelt had said a few months earlier that defeat of the Nazi armies would have to be followed by complete eradication of the weapons of economic warfare. After World War I there had been the same “never-again” resolves; and we had already witnessed a complete cycle ending in failure. Before we left the United States, the Economic Warfare Section prepared a report which analyzed the errors of the occupation after the other World War, and showed the measures that Germany had used to defeat the occupation and to play the Allies one against the other. I carried a copy of this report with me all the time I was in Germany. By mid-1947, I had already checked off the first twenty pages, paragraph by paragraph, week by week, in a pattern of repetition. But in the beginning, in 1945, we were open-minded and sometimes even hopeful about our prospects.

We knew that the economic policies for dealing with Germany had been prepared at Washington with some understanding of the ways in which reforms might be defeated. It was our intention to carry these policies along in the way that miners carry canaries to detect poison gases. We knew from the beginning of the occupation that once these economic reforms fell, other reform measures would not survive for very long.

We were scarcely flying blind when we made the Ruhr our foremost objective. The struggle over the Ruhr had brought the first major breakdown of Allied policy in 1923 when Britain and the United States refused to back up the French occupation of the valley; and ten years later the financiers and industrialists of that area had boosted Hitler into the driver’s seat.

In recent years there has been so much confused thinking and pro-German propaganda about the place of the Ruhr in the European economy that we have to keep in mind that this area is important principally because it has very large deposits of good coking coal. Its growth as a steel center was a phenomenon of the 1920’s, after World War I. The Ruhr became the site of Europe’s biggest steel plants less for economic reasons than as part of a struggle for power between Germany and France. In the beginning it was French Lorraine and not the German Ruhr that was the chief center of Western European heavy industry.

From the time Germany took control of Alsace and Lorraine in the War of 1870, up until the end of World War I, the Germans organized the steel industry of the combined Ruhr-Lorraine area strictly on the basis of economic and technical efficiency. They designed the steel plants and coke works to maintain the best balance of transportation facilities, centers of production, and outlets for products.

Under this arrangement most of the blast furnaces were near the ore supplies of German-held Lorraine, and most of the coke works were near the coal supplies of the German Ruhr. This saved on transportation because in the production of pig iron three tons of Lorraine ore are required for every ton of coke. However, because iron ore is very heavy and coke is light and bulky, they built a few coke works in the Lorraine near the steel plants, and a few blast furnaces and steel works in the Ruhr near the coke plants. Thus a mixed shipment of ore and pig iron eastward from the Lorraine to the Ruhr, and a mixture of coal and coke westward from the Ruhr to Lorraine kept the railway trains and locomotives fully loaded in both directions.

After World War I this efficiency of production yielded in the face of a German play for power. The Versailles Treaty had required Germany to deliver to France seven million tons of coal a year for ten years. France depended upon a vast quantity of coal from the German Ruhr because the ore beds of Lorraine were too far from channel ports to make possible a switch to British coal. So reacquiring Lorraine meant little to France, industrially, unless access to Ruhr coal went with it.

In 1913, before the war, the Germans had shipped nearly one third of their entire Ruhr and Rhineland coal output to the iron and steel plants of Lorraine. During 1922, although the Ruhr output was approximately the same as it had been in 1913, the deliveries to France were not even 70 per cent of the 1913 shipments. And that was the peak year. In 1919, 1920, and 1921, the deliveries totaled much less than half the 1913 deliveries.

Six months after the Treaty of Versailles went into effect, the German industrialists of the Ruhr and Rhineland had completely repudiated the delivery of fuel as reparations.
A special conference was called to work out a new agreement. At the Spa Conference of July 5, 1920, the Allied negotiators faced a battery of German representatives who were destined to figure prominently in the economic debacle of the late 1920's and in the support of Hitler's rise to power. In addition to the coal magnate, Hugo Stinnes, and Carl Bosch, slated to head the huge new I.G. Farben chemical combine, these leaders included Fritz Thyssen and his Emergency Committee of five other Ruhr industrialists; Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and four other Krupp directors; Albert Vögler, director general of the Stinnes concern and member of the Reichstag; and two other noteworthy steel magnates, Florian Klöckner of the Klöckner combine and Otto Wolff, head of the Phoenix Works and the Otto Wolff complex. In retrospect, it was a Who's Who in the rise of the Nazis.

The Germans were ingenious in their explanation of why they could not ship more coal. They said they had to have some way of getting enough money out of it to hasten their economic recovery. Actually, their financial distress was not caused by a lack of material goods inside Germany, but by the monetary inflation. The inflation had been given a shot in the arm when the German government at the insistence of the Ruhr industrialists paid out hundreds of millions of marks as indemnities to the iron and steel companies for their losses in ceding the Lorraine plants to the French. But no one asked the why of the inflation. German economic distress was accepted as a fact. The Germans went on to explain that they needed more food for their undernourished miners to enable them to increase production.

The Allies gave in to the demands of the Germans. In the Protocol of Spa issued at the conclusion of the conference, the Allies agreed to pay one dollar in gold for every ton of fuel delivered by Germany. The purpose of this payment was to provide more food as an incentive for the Ruhr miners. This payment was in addition to sizable loans which the Allies were already required to make to Germany under the Versailles Treaty. The loans were to make up the difference between the German domestic price of coal and the prevailing export price at British seaports. At the time of the Spa Conference this difference amounted to nearly ten dollars per ton; and the Allies agreed to continue advancing loans at this rate in addition to the one dollar per ton to feed the miners.

Over the next six months Germany received about one hundred million dollars in combined payments and loans in return for not quite eleven million tons of coal. Thus what was nominally supposed to be reparations was in any practical sense tantamount to an ordinary sale of coal at a very good price.

The shortage of coke shipments to France was not due to short production in Germany. Germany had suffered no war damage whatsoever inside its own borders during World War I. On the other hand, much of the iron-producing territory reacquired by France had been the scene of the bitterest fighting of the war. More people know Verdun as a battlefield than as a steel center. Nevertheless, it was the breakdown of German deliveries of coke to France, not failure of the French to rebuild their factories, that stopped French iron and steel production after 1920.

The German Ruhr magnates were converting the greater part of Germany's coal production into coke for new German plants in the Ruhr. They were building an entirely new complex of iron and steel plants to replace those ceded to France after the war. The new plants in the Ruhr were to get the bulk of their ores from the high-grade deposits of Sweden, Spain, and Newfoundland. The extra costs of the long overseas haul were offset by German government subsidies and indemnities.

The purpose of this German strategy was destined to become clearer as the postwar adjustments of the 1920's unfolded. During the first years after the war, when coal was scarce in Europe, the German coal producers held the whip hand over France. Since the cost of coal accounted for three fifths of the cost of French pig iron, whoever controlled the cost of coal could control the competitive fate of French iron and steel. German coal producers, who also sat on the managing boards of the German state railways and the new steel firms, arranged exorbitantly high freight rates over the German railways from the Ruhr to the French border. At the same time, drastic cutbacks in ore importations from France produced a further temporary reversal for the French industry. The new German plants got a good head start.
In spite of the relief afforded by the Protocol of Spa, the German government and industrial leaders continued to drag their feet. On January 11, 1923, four years after the Treaty of Versailles went into effect, coal deliveries broke down. French and Belgian troops were sent into the Ruhr to compel deliveries of coal and coke at the rate required by the Treaty, which was only about 60 per cent of what Germany had been in the habit of shipping into the same area before the war. The German coal and steel industrialists countered with new threats and demands. The German miners staged a sit-down strike. To keep up production in factories outside of the occupied Ruhr area, the Germans imported British coal through the port of Hamburg. At the same time, the German government appointed a coal commissioner to conserve coal. The commissioner announced that with suitable economies the stocks of coal in unoccupied Germany would last for nearly six months. Total imports of British coal into unoccupied Germany in March 1923 alone amounted to two million tons. On August 11, 1923, the British sent a note of protest to France complaining that the Ruhr occupation was hampering European recovery.

On August 12, 1923 Gustav Stresemann became Chancellor and Foreign Minister. To settle the matter of the Ruhr occupation he held a conference with the same group of industrialists who, a few years later, were to take the lead in forming Germany’s largest iron and steel combine, the Vereinigte Stahlwerke or United Steel Works, with the help of loans from the United States. The question in the minds of the German industry men was how to establish a superior bargaining position before receding in the face of French insistence. One of the steel men, Otto Wolff, stated that Germany could indeed co-operate with French industry, but that France must first place at Germany’s disposal the money to help reconstruct her economic life.

The occupation of the Ruhr resulted in a deadlock. The German government claimed there was no money in Germany to pay the Ruhr mineowners for the coal they were expected to ship. The mineowners lamented that they would be bankrupt if they could not obtain payment for their deliveries to France.

The deadlock was broken when the United States stepped in and offered the Dawes Plan, which called for balancing the German budget and an initial loan of two hundred million dollars to stabilize the German currency. The plan was approved by the Reichstag on April 16, 1924. The delivery of “reparations” was resumed for a time, while the Germans moved on to the next stage of their resistance. At the very time that the Germans were protesting inability to meet reparations, the entire country was quietly rearming under the very noses of the occupying powers.

After several years, when coal had again become plentiful on the European market, the German groups had already developed answering moves to block any attempt of the French or the Belgians or the Luxembourgers to compete with the new German setup. During the years of coal scarcity the German steel producers took the lead in organizing an international association to guarantee the steel industry of each western European nation a fixed share in the export markets for all types of steel products.

In return, the steel makers of each country agreed to limit production to a fixed quota, with cash penalties for production or exports beyond the agreed amounts. This association, known in German as the Internationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft, in French as the Entente Internationale de l’Acier, in English as the International Steel Cartel, with its offices in a stone building two blocks off the Grand'Rue in Luxembourg, became the privately organized policing system that governed the steel trade of the world from 1926 to 1939. Within a very few years after its formation, the Germans ran the cartel and could shape its policies to meet their demands.

These were some of the main steps by which a small group of German industrialists, deriving their power from ownership of coal mines, steel works, and chemical plants in western Germany, contrived to avoid the economic consequences of Germany’s defeat in World War I. It is true that the industrialists did not take matters directly into their own hands. The steps themselves had to be taken by governments. The Treaty of Versailles was an act of the Allied governments, representing their combined judgment of how the issues of World War I ought to be decided. But what actually happened after that was dictated not so much by the diplomatic
treaties of governments as by the bargaining of powerful business groups. The German businessmen were interested first in their companies, not in national political obligations. The German steel companies whose Lorraine plants had been turned over to France, and the coal producers whose output was to be shipped to France, were not impressed by the argument that Germany as a nation somehow "owed" France as a nation some recompense for war damage. If they gave up their companies' property for a national debt, it was their balance sheets that showed the loss.

The horizontal separation of private interests from government policies went even further. The struggle of the interwar period was not simply a clash between French interests on the one side and German interests on the other. During the development of the Ruhr-Lorraine industrial complex, like-minded industrialists in France and Germany had become directors of jointly owned and jointly controlled financial, industrial, and distributing enterprises. In many cases common views on questions of economic organization, labor policy, social legislation, and attitude toward government had been far more important to the industrialists than differences of nationality or citizenship. After 1870 the interdependence of the French and German iron and steel industries led the owners to work together despite national differences, although the private activities of the French owners were, in many instances, in direct opposition to French public policy. It is curious to note that only the French appeared to have this conflict between public policy and private activities. On the German side, complete co-ordination seems to have been preserved between national and private interests; between officials of the German Republic and the leaders of German industry and finance.

During World War I the de Wendels, the influential French-German banking and industrial family which headed the French wing of the International Steel Cartel through their Comité des Forges and whose members had sat in the parliaments of both France and Germany were able to keep the French army from destroying industrial plants belonging to the German enterprises of the Röchling family. These plants were located in the Briey Basin, a Lorraine ore field then in German control.

The Röchling family, with their powerful complex of coal, iron, steel and banking enterprises in Germany, has for generations played in close harmony with the de Wendel family. For a century, the descendants of Christian Röchling have dominated the industry and commerce of the Saar Basin. It was Hermann Röchling who arranged the return of the Saar to Germany in the plebiscite of January 1935 by organizing the Deutsche Front, which delivered 90 per cent of the votes to the Nazis. Though seventy-two members of the Röchling family have survived two world wars and are still active in the business of the Saar today, two other members of the family, Hermann and his brother Robert, deserve a special place in history. During World War I, Hermann, a cavalry captain in the German army, and Robert, a major, had been put in charge of production in the Briey Basin. After the war, when the brothers Röchling moved out of the areas which had to be ceded to France under the Treaty, the two of them carried away bodily a couple of large steel plants.

Conceiving this grand larceny to be something in the nature of a war crime, the French government tried the brothers Röchling in absentia and sentenced them to forty years in prison. But the German government never would give up the Röchlings to the French. For the next twenty-two years the brothers were under this cloud as far as the French government was concerned. On the other hand, as far as the French steelmakers' association, the Comité des Forges, and in particular the de Wendels who headed the Comité, were concerned, business as usual—or in this case, business as unusual—prevailed. In the end even the French government weakened for business purposes, though the war-crime sentence remained. When it came time for France to build its impregnable Maginot Line, who should be called in to supply steel and technical assistance but the German firm of the brothers Röchling. If the French behaved in this case as did the Americans during World War II in the case of insurance coverage on war plants, they doubtless placed plenty of guards to protect the security and secrecy of the Maginot Line construction from the prying eyes of the general public while the blueprints rested safely in the hands of the only people to whom they mattered: to wit, the enemy.
Now comes the outbreak of World War II. The French army marching into the Saar during the “phony war” period in 1939, received orders not to fire on or damage the plants of the “war criminals,” the brothers Röchling. In 1940 came the blitz and the fall of France. The Vichy government passed a decree exonerating the Röchlings and canceling their forty-year prison sentences. In 1945 came the blitz in the other direction. As we were starting out to round up the key industrialists, the Röchlings fell once more into the hands of the French; but this time it was the French army, acting in its role of representative of French public policy. Again the order of the day was “the Röchlings, war criminals.” In 1947, Hermann Röchling was tried by an international court in the French zone and convicted of waging aggressive war. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Robert had died before he could get his criminal record in order; but since there are still seventy-two Röchlings to go, it is not yet possible to write the final chapter to their history.

In 1945, in contrast with the close working arrangements kept through at least two wars by the Germans and the French iron and steel groups, the French public policy seemed still to have a healthy dislike for any setup that would leave German industry dominant in western Europe. French officers like René Sergent, who became head of economic and financial affairs for the French group in the Control Council at Berlin, seemed to distrust the intentions of Germany’s industrial leadership. The Germans, according to Sergent, had established quite a record for insisting upon and carrying out measures to prevent the Allied powers from rendering Germany harmless. Of course, no one should expect a German political or business leader to want to be harmless. Most Germans who meant anything in German industry or politics after World War I considered it an act of patriotism to evade the terms of the Versailles Treaty. In fact, in the years after Versailles, the German courts would entertain prosecutions for the crime of high treason against any German citizen who concerned himself with the execution of the Treaty “in such a way that a foreign power was advised of infractions.”

Clearly, the Germans themselves would expect to be supervised and watched. It would be a point of honor, as well as self-interest, to defy detection, and to camouflage or conceal their intentions. From our discoveries during three years with the Economic Warfare Section, we had already narrowed down the list of Germans who carried the major responsibility for what had happened. The list was impressively small; for somewhere among a group of not more than a hundred men were those who had done the lion’s share of the planning and had carried out the world-wide negotiations that made the economic preparations for war a success. Still, even a list of a hundred important individuals, controlling sixty or seventy of the biggest companies, was too large for pinpoint investigation by our small crew. Were there some five or ten or twelve men among these who stood head and shoulders above the others either in knowledge or in degree of responsibility for the German efforts? Perhaps the records of the International Steel Cartel at Luxembourg would furnish clues to help us concentrate our attention first on a few individuals and a few companies in Germany. But Luxembourg was “liberated” territory. One could not simply walk in and open up filing cases and take a look.

In March 1945, Luxembourg as yet had no government of its own. The Grand Duchy was under the protection of an Allied Military Mission, headed by an American, Colonel Frank E. Frazer. To get permission even to negotiate with the Luxembourgers for a look into the records, we had to show how the inquiry would contribute toward investigations in Germany itself, which fell within the mandate of General Eisenhower’s cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, SCAF 239. It was a hen-and-egg paradox. To get what we needed from the Luxembourg records, we had to know what we were going to find out in the Ruhr. The Ruhr at the moment was bulging with Wehrmacht units.
CHAPTER 4

The Fraternity Brothers

ON April 14, 1945, the Grand Duchess Charlotte returned to resume her constitutional sway over the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. This little Graustark or Ruritania with a thousand square miles of territory and three hundred thousand inhabitants, squeezed in between Germany on one side and France and Belgium on the other, is a maze of contrasts from almost any standpoint. Its official language sounds like Flemish with a dash of French, and looks like German. People on the street thank you with a mixed French-German “merci, viel dank” or “merci viel mahl.” But most of the people who speak this mixed language are more violently anti-German than their French neighbors to the west.

In contrast with the unproductive German terrain immediately to the east, which looks exactly the same so far as soil and contours are concerned, most of Luxembourg, and especially the northern half, might be called fiercely agricultural, with very high productivity. Even though the northern half of the Grand Duchy was overrun and most of its farmhouses destroyed during the Battle of the Bulge, while the German territory to the east was practically untouched, Luxembourg’s agriculture bounced back immediately after the second liberation early in 1945. Within two years Luxembourg was 90 per cent self-sufficient in food. The Germans across the line, after two years, were still pleading for food to stave off starvation.

The Industrial Revolution had come to Luxembourg with the discovery of domestic deposits of minette ore in 1870. This was the same year in which Bismarck’s armies snatched the minette ore fields and other resources of Alsace-Lorraine from France on behalf of the growing Reich. But for many years Luxembourg’s industry kept its independence from German control. The largest steel firm, the Aciéries Réunies de Burbach-Eich-Dudelange, known as “Arbed,” even reached into German territory. Just before World War I, Arbed got control of enough coal-mining properties in Germany near Eschweiler in the Aachen Basin to assure a full supply of coking coal to the Luxembourg mills. Arbed next established the largest steel cable works in Europe, the Felten & Guillaume Carlswerk, at Cologne on the Rhine. Between the two wars, however, this independence had become obscured while Luxembourg played host to the steel cartel.

A week before the Grand Duchess returned, a small group of our men from SHAEF headquarters finally got permission to enter Luxembourg and negotiate a trip through the files of the International Steel Cartel. Though they wanted to look for the particulars of German control and to identify the Germans who had been pulling the strings since the cartel was organized in 1926, our men had to proceed carefully because nothing could be done without the voluntary permission of the cartel’s officers.

Quite by accident, our team arrived on a Saturday, and simultaneously with a visit by General Eisenhower. The officials of the steel cartel somehow gained the impression that General Eisenhower’s visit had been made especially to lend additional high-level sanction to the visit of the Department of Justice officials attached to SHAEF. Hector Dieudonné, secretary of the cartel, and the other top cartel officials, who were heading for the country over the week end, told Eric Conrot, the office manager, to “give every assistance” to the gentlemen from SHAEF. M. Conrot unexpectedly took the instructions quite literally. He opened up all the filing cabinets in the office of the cartel and invited the gentlemen from SHAEF to make themselves at home for the entire week end. They did.

It is not hard to imagine the hair-pulling among the top officials when they returned Monday morning. They found an extremely weary and sleepless investigative crew sitting among a mass of folders from which an index had been compiled of close to four thousand documents. The investigators expressed their gratitude and said they would very much like permission to make photostats of
the four thousand documents. With a great deal of grinding of teeth and scarcely restrained mutterings at M. Conrot's misunderstanding of diplomatic language, they finally gave their consent, but not without making a protest that their hospitality had in some way been abused by what amounted to "police" methods.

The four thousand documents had opened up a panorama of international ties among all the major steel firms of the world, including the details of their working relations with the Germans from the time the cartel was organized.

While the crowds were milling about in front of the Royal Palace in a tremendous demonstration over the return of the Grand Duchess, M. Aloyse Meyer, managing director of the Arbed steel combine, returned quietly to the city of Luxembourg from Germany. He had left when the Germans left, but came back with the explanation that he had been kidnaped.

M. Meyer for years had been more than the managing director of a large steel enterprise. Ever since 1928, he had been permanent chairman of the International Steel Cartel, and during the German occupation he had been appointed by his long-time German business associate, Ernst Poensgen, to be the leader of the steel industry Wirtschaftsgruppe in Luxembourq. Poensgen, principal figure in the United Steel Works of Germany, had played the leading role in establishing the International Steel Cartel in 1926. During World War II, Poensgen was appointed to head the steel industry association, one of the main divisions of the Nazi Reichsgruppe Industrie, an officially sanctioned national association of manufacturers. It was not surprising that he chose his Luxembourg associate, M. Meyer, to handle the affairs of the Wirtschaftsgruppe in occupied Luxembourg.

Upon the occupation of Luxembourg by the Germans in 1940, the Arbed firm had not been taken over directly by the Germans, but continued to function under the direction of Aloyse Meyer throughout the occupation. The other two Luxembourg steel companies, Hadir and Rodange, were taken over by the Germans when the managers refused to collaborate.

After the liberation of Luxembourg, nineteen men who were department chiefs, production men, and engineers of Arbed were dismissed for collaboration, while Meyer remained as head of the firm. The official attitude was that Meyer had become a hero by keeping his firm intact during the war and thereby preventing the removal of Luxembourg workers from the local steel plants to Germany for work in the German plants. Some officials even alleged that the Arbed management had arranged to slow down production and thereby sabotage the German war effort, but the comparative figures for Arbed and the other two Luxembourg firms did not bear this out. Actually, limits by the Germans on coal exports accounted for the same reduced production rate in all the Luxembourg mills.

What the Luxembourgers chose to do with Aloyse Meyer did not change what was on the papers in the files of the steel cartel. It was not necessary to wait for photostats of all the thousands of documents to realize that we now had an enlarged picture from which to work. Here was something that had gone beyond mere German resistance to the occupation measures of the Allied powers after World War I. It was a concrete example of how leading German manufacturers had gone about the job of recapturing control over industries and markets and making Germany the "industrial hub of Europe." This was not resistance, but a counter-attack that included enlisting the help of industrialists in other countries. Here again the step-by-step history threw some light on what had happened, but at the same time raised questions about why the others let the Germans get what they wanted.

The mid-twenties were remarkable for German industrial combination. They marked the formation of the United Steel Works in Germany, as a combination of the four biggest steel producers. Ernst Poensgen, Fritz Thyssen, Otto Wolff, and the others who drew this combine together had managed to get over a hundred million dollars from private investors in the United States. Dillon, Read & Company, the New York investment house which brought Clarence Dillon, James V. Forrestal, William H. Draper, Jr., and others into prominence, floated the United Steel Works bonds in the United States behind a glowing prospectus which declared that the United Steel Works Corporation (Vereinigte Stahlwerke) "will
be the largest industrial unit in Europe and one of the largest manufacturers of iron and steel in the world, ranking in productive capacity second only to United States Steel Corporation.” The formation of United Steel gave its management tremendous power in Germany: enough to carry through without delay the organization of the German domestic steel cartel, and to guarantee the “good behavior” of all German steel companies in their agreements with foreign firms. In 1925 the I.G. Farben chemical combine was formed by six of the biggest German chemical producers and the next year the International Steel Cartel was created through a private international treaty or working arrangement among the principal steel producers of the world.

The events were not unrelated. All of these organizations had a number of directors in common and were part of a privately managed “rationalization” scheme for controlling the basic industries of Europe and regulating the international trade in the products of the basic heavy industries. In the case of steel, the motives of the German groups were clear. Cut off by political boundaries from organizing a German-controlled steel industry based on the most efficient use of resources, the German managers who formed the new combines aimed to improve their commercial position by establishing control over the market. If they could not have economy in production, they could still run a profitable business provided they could control domestic and international marketing conditions by agreement. They could not afford to let possible competitors in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain, or the United States start a struggle for markets. These others would have advantages based on more efficient production or distribution facilities, especially while the Germans were setting up their plants designed to use ores from far away points overseas.

The loans which the bigger operators got from Britain and the United States to put them on their feet after the inflation also enabled them to pay prices far above the market values to buy out troublesome competing firms. In effect, the foreign loans and German government subsidies allowed the leading companies, such as United Steel Works, Mannesmann, Krupp, Good Hope and Röchling, to substitute private regulation and elimination of com-

petition for the technical efficiency they had lost when their plants in Alsace and Lorraine went back to French control after 1918.

After combinations like United Steel and I.G. Farben had pulled together under common control a great proportion of the existing capacity, they built still more plants and added more machinery. But the amount of goods manufactured did not grow in anything like the same proportion. At the height of the boom, in 1928, the whole German steel industry was running at only a little over two thirds of its capacity. In other fields of heavy industry, actual production was as low as 10 per cent of the installed capacity. In the construction of locomotives, a field monopolized by the Borsig and Henschel combines, output at the height of the boom was only 5 per cent of capacity. Later, in World War II, when Henschel specialized in “Tiger” tanks and 88-millimeter guns, the formerly idle capacity came into its own.

Unfortunately, the bondholders who put up the money for these increases in heavy industrial capacity never got the benefit of the supposed “strength” and “soundness” of the companies. The low output in relation to the large capacity meant a huge unpaid debt to foreign investors who had bought the bonds. The companies were technically bankrupt until saved by government subsidies; but the subsidies were arranged only after payments to foreigners had been forbidden by foreign-exchange regulations. After piling up a record like that, a private citizen might have trouble getting money even from a loan shark.

From a long-run standpoint, the records indicated that the organization of the German iron and steel industry was wasteful. A commission known as the Enquête Ausschuss had been appointed by the German government early in the 1930’s to investigate conditions that had led to the industrial depression. The commission had found that the steel industry was clumsily put together and was overexpanded in proportion to Germany’s light industry and consumer-goods production. By fixing their sights on control of domestic and international markets, instead of meeting the economic needs of German industry for iron and steel, the German steel industry had put itself into a position where control must be maintained over international markets or the industry must go
bankrupt. But German steel products could be distributed in international trade only so long as no foreign competitors undercut Germany by competitive selling.

The Nazi Economic Ministry later gave due recognition to Dr. Poensgen for his services to the German iron and steel industry through his organization of the national and international steel cartels. October 17, 1941, Poensgen's seventieth birthday, was celebrated in the Stahlhof at Düsseldorf as "Ernst Poensgen's Great Day." As the Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung reported, so many leading personalities of business and industry had seldom been seen together. The Nazi Economic Minister, Walther Funk, was personally present to award Poensgen the Eagle Shield of the Reich, which put him, as Funk said, "into a class with men like Robert Bosch, Carl Duisberg, Emil Kirdorf, Albert Pietsch and Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach." Funk paid tribute to Poensgen's contribution in organizing the cartels which he said "will have great importance in the reconstruction of Europe after this war." Concluding, Funk said: "The Führer has ordered me to present to you the Eagle Shield as a special tribute to an economic leader who has performed extraordinary services in arming Germany."

When the first international agreement was signed on September 30, 1926, between leading iron and steel producers of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Saar and Germany, all the sponsors of the cartel had joined in declaring that it was a first step in the formation of an "economic United States of Europe."

Dr. Poensgen and his helpers, however, had more immediate interests. They had contrived the original terms of the organization so as to play upon two strong motives: fear of German competition, even though the German mills would have been able to compete only through money borrowed in the United States and Britain; and the desire of the "leading" firms in each country to enlist the power of German industry as an ally in crushing their own domestic competition. Membership in the cartel was not open to individual companies, but only to the national associations to which they belonged. These associations bound themselves to limit their entire national steel production and the total volume of sales in domestic and international markets. Domestic sales were controlled by all parties agreeing not to undersell in each other's countries, so leaving the member companies only the nonmember companies within their own boundaries as competition, to be eliminated by drastic short-term price cutting or by purchase. The international markets seemed secure because, although the charter members in 1926 accounted for only 39 per cent of the world's ingot steel production, they accounted for nearly two thirds of the world's exports. All members agreed that in foreign markets they would not undersell each other but would undersell any nonmember in order to drive him out of the market.

In order to get the cartel started, the German group at first accepted a production quota for themselves which they considered very low in proportion to their actual steel capacity. The German quota for the first year was a little over 40 per cent of the total for all five groups. The cartel had been in existence only a few months, however, when Paul Reusch, chairman of the German national group, and also a director of the Good Hope steel works, said that Germany would try to get an increase in its quota and that the original low quota had been a concession to get the agreement established.

Under the cartel agreement, excess production and sales by any national group, beyond the established quota, was subject to a penalty at various rates up to four dollars a ton. Any fines paid by members for producing and selling too much were to be used as a fund out of which to recompense cartel members who produced and sold less than their allowable quotas. This provision seems to have lulled most of the members into a comfortable and careful state. Most of them stayed well within their quotas.

But not so the Germans. In the first year of the cartel's existence, the Germans paid fines amounting to $10,038,000, covering excess production of 3,372,000 tons. This excess tonnage alone was almost equal to the entire annual output of the Belgians. The fines paid by the Germans accounted for 95 per cent of the total penalties incurred by all the original cartel members during the first year. The advantage to the Germans showed up in later years. With their greatly expanded capacity they next threatened to disrupt the
organization unless the quota scheme was revised to give them a higher quota. Before the first year was out, the Germans, in addition to a higher quota, got an agreement that 72 per cent of their quota should be regarded as production for German domestic consumption, on which the penalty for excess production was to be only half that established in the 1926 agreement. In September 1927, the penalty on excess production for domestic consumption was again cut in half. The full penalty was to be paid only on the 28 per cent of German output which was to be regarded as production for export.

In the second year of the cartel, 1927, German steel production of 16,311,000 tons was nearly 4,000,000 greater than in 1926. France in the same year decreased production by 54,000 tons, down to a total of 8,403,000 for the year. From this point on, Dr. Poensgen's "extraordinary services in arming Germany" continued with the same kind of success. Alternating threats and concessions consistently increased the ability of the German group to control quotas and limit the production of the non-German members almost at will. Small wonder that when the International Steel Cartel was first set up, in September 1926, just three weeks after Germany had joined the League of Nations, a member of the Reichstag, Dr. Reichert, declared that, by means of this agreement, "important consequences of the Versailles Treaty can be mitigated." As we wound up our work in the files of the Steel Cartel, we could see that this arrangement had gone very far indeed in "mitigating the consequences" of the Versailles Treaty.

By 1938, about 90 per cent of all iron and steel shipped in international trade was under the control of the International Steel Cartel. The membership by that time had been expanded to include the major steel producers in Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but the Germans were still running the show. The independents, wherever they tried to do business in the rest of the world, would find themselves hemmed in by the "one for all and all for one" spirit of the cartel members, and by the "difficulties" they would encounter in the form of foreign government regulations and red tape. A little of this experience might make the independents more amenable to "reason" where the organized firms were concerned; and this would be reflected even in their behavior at home. But first, the Big Three had to catch their rabbit.

The clause in the international agreement which presented the greatest stumbling block to the American group was Article IV of the export agreement, which read as follows:

The contracting parties accept the responsibility for the engagements undertaken under the agreement both for themselves and for outsiders in their respective countries, for the present as well as for the future. They shall be debited with these outsiders' exports and shall be responsible for the payment of penalties in respect of
excesses. Both contracting parties shall establish a list of the present outsiders in their territories and shall report as soon as possible about the appearance of new outsiders on their markets.

Up to the end of March 1938, only 58 per cent of the American exports in the heavy steel group were made by members of the Steel Export Association. Since 42 per cent of the exports were made by outsiders, the members of the Steel Export Association had refused to accept responsibility for keeping all American exports within the quota allotted by the cartel to the United States. By June of 1938, however, the position of the American insiders had progressed to the point where they felt it would be possible to give partial guarantees of the good behavior of the American outsiders.

At a meeting held in Paris on June 14, 1938, an agreement was reached between the Joint Co-ordinating Committee of the International Steel Cartel and a delegation from the Steel Export Association of America, representing United States Steel, Bethlehem, and Republic. At this meeting the Big Three accepted unconditionally the terms of the 1937 agreement which had brought the British Iron and Steel Federation into the cartel. The Steel Export Association of America agreed, on behalf of United States Steel, Bethlehem, and Republic, not only that these three firms would abide by the quota agreements of the cartel, but also that they would accept responsibility (as part of their own quota) for some exports by American outsiders. The Big Three would charge against their quota any shipments by independent American firms, up to an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of the quota. If the outsiders' shipments amounted to more than 10 per cent but not over 20 per cent of the American quota, the Big Three agreed to charge half of the excess against their own quota. But the Big Three did not feel able to assume the penalties for outsiders' shipments beyond 20 per cent of the American quota. As in all things, even insiders have to accept slow but steady progress as the means of getting what they are after.

Negotiations on behalf of the American group in 1938 were conducted principally by Benjamin F. Fairless, president of United States Steel; Eugene G. Grace, president of Bethlehem Steel; and Tom Girdler, chairman of the board of Republic Steel. The American group undertook to try to bring ten additional smaller American producers into the agreement by having them join the Steel Export Association. They arranged to have two representatives of the Steel Export Association remain in Europe to continue the relations between the Steel Export Association and the International Steel Cartel. These were Messrs. J. O. Outwater, president of the Steel Export Association, and William B. Todd, who were to work together with the British group through Mr. Ian F. L. Elliott, representative of Sir Andrew Duncan's British Iron and Steel Federation. Mr. Elliott was to turn up several years later as a representative of the United States on the international control authority for the German Ruhr; but at the time his was just one name among many.

More important to us at the moment was the tie-in between Luxembourg and Germany. Despite appearances, Luxembourg, with its thirteenth-century stone parapets and parrot-cage sentry boxes, and its hero, Aloyse Meyer, could scarcely be dismissed as comic-opera material. According to the cartel agreement, the chairmanship of the managing committee was supposed to rotate annually among the participating countries. Actually, the headquarters remained permanently fixed in offices belonging to the Arbed steel combine in Luxembourg. When the first chairman of the cartel was killed in an accident in 1928, he was succeeded by Meyer, who continued as chairman of the cartel until its activities were interrupted by World War II.

For years Aloyse Meyer, as head of Arbed, had been a director of Arbed's subsidiary in Germany, the large Felten & Guillaume cable works. Working with M. Meyer, and serving as chairman of the board of directors of Felten & Guillaume, was Baron Kurt von Schröder, Hitler's banker. As far as we were concerned, the line from M. Meyer and Arbed and the International Steel Cartel to von Schröder's private bank at Cologne could have been as thin as a filament of spider's web. We were looking for the spider.
GOING into Germany from France and Luxembourg was like entering a tunnel. The friendly flag-waving of children and grown-ups that enlivened the dusty, jolting ride through towns and countryside in the “liberated” territories gave way abruptly to a black, empty feeling of being alone, moving toward one distant objective. That is how we felt as we approached the German city of Bonn the afternoon of April 16, 1945. Nearly a month before, the “T” force party at Cologne had reported bad luck at the “bank of the cartel kings,” Baron Kurt von Schröder’s bank. The building at No. 1 Laurenzplatz, near the cathedral, was a wreck. The vaults and records were under twenty feet of rubble and twisted steel. However, the steel cartel files at Luxembourg had given us the location of Baron von Schröder’s villa at Bonn, fifteen miles south of Cologne; and we decided to try there.

Nobody was living in the battle-damaged villa when we dropped in that April evening. In a damp cellar room we found a stack of papers, some baled and some loose. The pile was about four feet high and ten in diameter. On top of one bale, under a stack of letterheads, was a folder of letters addressed to Baron von Schröder, some in his capacity as a leader of the Nazi Party, and some in his capacity as a lieutenant general in the SS Black Guards. Quite a few of the letters were on elegant stationery with a letterhead that needed no address or telephone number — a chastely engraved “Reichsführer SS” was enough. The scrawled signature, “H. Himmler,” was simply an added flourish.

The files and account books, all bearing the mark of the Bankhaus J. H. Stein (founded 1790), of Cologne, appeared to be a few tons out of the many that had comprised the working files of the bank. Their position near the furnace in our host’s house did not necessarily mean that he considered them trash. We found very often in Germany that the speed of the advance had been consistently underestimated by Germans of all ranks. Nothing else would explain their common failure to carry through simple precautions like burning papers or blowing up bridges.

The letters from Heinrich Himmler to Baron Kurt von Schröder were interesting but monotonous. The man seemed always to be asking for money. Nor was he interested in small change. The amounts were nice round figures running into the hundreds of thousands and often millions of reichsmarks.

The Schröder family of Hamburg, into which Baron Kurt von Schröder was born in November 1889, had been bankers for generations. In a preceding generation, Baron Johann Heinrich von Schröder had moved to London, adopted the anglicized name, J. Henry Schroder, and developed an extensive business financing overseas trade, especially with Latin America.

Another member of the family, Baron Bruno von Schröder, Kurt’s cousin, born in Hamburg in 1867, moved to London early in life but retained his German citizenship until 1914 when he became a British subject. Baron Bruno headed the banking firms J. Henry Schroder & Company of London, and the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation of New York until his death in 1940, when he was succeeded by his son, Helmuth W. B. Schroder, the present head.

There appeared to be no community of ownership between the Stein Bank of Cologne and the Schroder Banks of London and New York, though the two groups acted as correspondent banks for one another and participated jointly in so many deals that what the Germans call an Interessen Gemeinschaft, or community of interests, existed between them. The pattern for this parallel action had been laid in 1914 when the British closed down German banks in London, but allowed the Schröder firm, headed by “British subjects,” to operate through the war.

The list of major clients of the Bankhaus J. H. Stein was a roster of west German heavy industry. The records left no doubt that the
Stein Bank had been in a good position to help the London firm to live up to its reputation as the bridge between London’s “City” and the industry of the Rhineland and Ruhr.

Among the number of threads that had made us decide to pay a call on Baron Kurt von Schröder and his bank had been an argument back in England, at Bushy Park, when we were planning our itinerary. I have already mentioned that for a time we were assigned to work in the Finance Division of General Wickersham’s headquarters with Captain Norbert A. Bogdan, vice president of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation of New York. Captain Bogdan had argued vigorously against investigation of the Stein Bank on the ground that it was “small potatoes.” We should concentrate our efforts on bigger targets, such as the Deutsche Bank and the Commerz Bank. To waste time on small-scale private banks would discredit our investigations. We had noted, however, that the day after this outburst two of the permanent members of Captain Bogdan’s staff requested military travel orders to Cologne to investigate the Stein Bank. This was an unusual application. Since Cologne had not yet fallen, it was tantamount to a request to accompany the “T” Forces immediately behind the combat units. The Intelligence Division blocked that one.

Another thread had been the business collaboration of many years’ standing between Baron Kurt von Schröder and a very good friend of Franz von Papen, Gerhardt A. Westrick. Dr. Westrick was a prominent German lawyer and a member of the law partnership of Albert & Westrick. The senior partner of that firm, Dr. Heinrich Albert, was another of von Papen’s friends. Albert had come to the United States in 1914, supposedly as a German commercial attache, and had raised something over thirty million dollars from American sources friendly to Germany to finance the espionage and sabotage activities which Franz von Papen directed in the United States during World War I. With these funds, for example, the heavy chemical industry of the United States was crippled by the simple expedient of buying up all of the chemical stoneware produced in the United States. Stoneware was at that time the only type of equipment that could resist the corrosive action of the important heavy chemicals. Many American chemical plants were eventually shut down for lack of this stoneware. For the duration of World War I, it kept piling up in warehouses leased by von Papen’s cloaks.

After World War I the law firm of Albert & Westrick was very busy with the program of American loans to build up Germany. Beginning in October 1924, when American investors advanced $100,000,000 of the original $200,000,000 international loan under the Dawes Plan, a stream of private loans to German governmental organizations, public utilities, banks and industries had poured in American money from private sources at the average rate of over a quarter of a billion dollars a year, until the American crash of 1929. Two American investment banking organizations handled the bulk of this private lending system for the rebuilding of Germany. They were Dillon, Read & Company of New York, and the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation. Legal work on the Schroder Bank loans was always handled in Germany by the firm of Albert & Westrick, and in the United States by Sullivan & Cromwell, the firm headed by John Foster Dulles.

But to return to Gerhardt Westrick: in April 1940, this fraternity brother had come to the United States ostensibly as a commercial counselor to the German Embassy, but actually on a direct assignment as personal representative of the Nazi Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop. His mission was to attempt to convince American business leaders that they would gain by a Hitler victory, and to persuade them to help in keeping the United States out of the war. Dr. Westrick rented a house in Westchester County, New York, where his visitors included many nationally prominent executives of certain American oil and other industrial corporations.

After it began to appear that Dr. Westrick’s efforts had gone beyond the normal activities of a diplomatic representative, the Department of Justice required him to register as a German propaganda agent. Then the New York Herald Tribune and other papers assigned reporters and photographers to dog his trail and highlight everything he did. On October 9, 1940, he sailed for Japan. The American press congratulated itself on having made Westrick’s propaganda mission an ignominious failure. But as we looked into the transactions of Baron von Schröder and Dr. Westrick, we wondered.
Schroder had he been home that April evening in 1945, but it was not until two months later that another of our men, Robert West, formerly of the White House detail of the Secret Service, tracked him down. Von Schroder was found in a detention camp for SS prisoners in France, masquerading in the battle fatigue dress of an SS corporal.

Some of the records began to make sense, even without Baron von Schroder. Several bundles were the detailed ledgers of deposits into the special account labeled “Sonderkonto S.” What struck us first was the all-star cast which made up this list of depositors. Of the forty or fifty names which turned up regularly in the pages, running all the way back to 1933, we recognized about twenty immediately as well-known directors of the biggest German industrial firms in the fields of coal, iron and steel, machinery, chemicals, electrical equipment, transport, and electric power. In the galaxy of corporations dealing with the Stein Bank, this list of individuals might not have seemed unusual except for two things: the regularity of the deposits in this joint account, and the close relation between decreases in the account and the Himmler letters asking for money.

This one account, we learned by putting little pieces of evidence together, covered only the running expenses of Himmler’s SS, and perhaps some of the Gestapo; but if one special account had the letter “S,” it was a fair guess that somewhere, in the Stein Bank or elsewhere, there could be other special accounts “A” or “B” or “Y” or “Z.” The arrangement was simplicity itself. At a wink or a nod from someone—in this case we later found it was Wilhelm Keppler of the Nazis’ “Hermann Göring” steel combine—the contributors would quietly make deposits into the special account at the bank. When the leader of the party formation—in this case Himmler—wanted money, he asked for it; and it was drawn against the same account. No muss, no fuss, no “Nazi” connections for the contributors.

The next day, after the discovery of von Schröder’s records, we divided our party. Besides Burster, Sacks, and myself, there were René Manès, a naval lieutenant from SHAEF and an expert accountant; Bernard Glaser from the Treasury; John Walker, special-list in German documents; and Richard Thompson, FBI liaison with Twelfth Army Group. René Manès and I left the rest of the party at von Schröder’s villa and went down to Cologne to look for records of the steel interests belonging to Otto Wolff, a leading contributor to the “S” account. Wolff himself had died in 1940 but the files of his firm were intact in three subbasements of a building not far from the wreckage of the Stein Bank. We put a guard on the records, arranged billeting for some of the party, and returned to Bonn. All told we collected several tons of documents from Bonn and Cologne, most of which we sent back to Versailles with Manès. Burster, Sacks and I packed ourselves and nearly a ton of records into an open weapons carrier and banded along eastward to Frankfurt am Main.

We hoped to find some of the living contributors to “Sonderkonto S” and dig further into the reasons why they considered it “good business” to make these donations. In particular, I wanted to interview Baron von Schnitzler again. In his villa near Frankfurt two weeks before von Schnitzler had looked every inch a baron, from his black homburg, velvet collar, and gray spats, to the young and beautiful baroness on his arm. One would never have guessed that von Schnitzler was a criminal, one of the financial mainstays of the Nazi regime, and a mastermind of the I.G. Farben foreign organization. When Frankfurt fell on the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of March, 1945, von Schnitzler was living, comfortable and unperturbed, in his villa not many miles outside the city. His manner was that of the master of the house greeting the fire department. He was affable, urbane, but kept the firemen in their place. He offered brandy, and then withdrew it in deference to the non-fraternization order. His manner managed to imply that the non-fraternization idea was an immature gesture typical of a certain kind of American.

The war had not touched Baron von Schnitzler and, to hear him tell it, he had not touched the war. It was a case of live and let live. He asked us how soon he would be able to get in touch with his friends in Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., in England, and Du Pont in the United States. He said he was relieved that the recent “unpleasantness” was over. It was very important that he
and his friends should pick up where they had left off and build for the future. Now that we had the records of his deposits into “Sonderkonto S,” I wanted to get him back for a longer talk.

When we had him brought to our field office in the Reichsbank building at Frankfurt for questioning, Baron von Schnitzler denied having anything to do with Hitler or the Nazi Party. They were beneath him. He was a businessman and his factories had produced things which the Nazis needed; but they had come to him. Certainly he had never contributed in any way to their activities. He had deliberately avoided knowing anything at all about “government” business done by the firm. That was handled by other directors.

Baron von Schnitzler was thoroughly at ease throughout the several hours of our questioning. We warned him repeatedly of the stiff penalties for making false statements. But he talked on persuasively and smoothly, in perfect English. The records of “Sonderkonto S” seemed miles and ages away as the Baron talked. Perhaps he did not know the records had been found and he was bluffing or lying. But actually in his own mind he need not have seen any inconsistency between his pose as an “unpolitical” businessman who did not want to know about “government” business—poison gas, slave labor, Auschwitz and all that—and his record of steady contributions of at least forty thousand dollars a year to “Sonderkonto S.” In his own way he was speaking of a world in which one makes the necessary contributions to “causes” without feeling personally involved at all.

That is not to say that the Baron was unaware of how his behavior might be interpreted by those of us who did not belong to his fraternity. All through our conversations, both at his villa and in the Reichsbank building, the interrogators had been anonymous. The German intelligence service had had most American government officials bracketed in preparation for the occupation; but they needed to know who was coming in order to know what records to hide first. We never addressed one another by name or gave any hint of the reason for our interest in the Baron’s business. To put him at ease I pretended at the first interview that I had never heard of the I.G. Farben firm nor of von Schnitzler. At the outset I asked him what he did for a living. When he said he was a director of I.G. Farbenindustrie, I asked him what that was. He said it was a company. What did the company do, make shoes, ships, textiles? It was a chemical firm, he stated; a very large chemical firm.

As the questions rolled along, all of a police-blotted variety implying a profound ignorance on our part, von Schnitzler sat back with a bland and contented look, arching his eyebrows and leveling a hawklike gaze along his Roman nose as though it were the barrel of a fowling piece. He lied like a trooper through it all.

Toward the end of the second interview, however, von Schnitzler tried to find out who we were; and one of our men made the mistake of calling me by name. For just one instant the Baron’s eyes registered a quick appraisal. He then carefully and deliberately recrossed his legs, shifted his gloves from one hand to the other, and asked if I was satisfied that all his replies had been truthful and complete. When I told him merely that if we wanted anything further he would hear from us, he persisted for several minutes asking in various ways if we did not want him to “clarify” any of his answers. Later we found in his files copies of published testimony of which we had presented to a Senate committee in 1944, with our names underlined in green ink.

Von Schnitzler did not appear particularly surprised when at the end of the interview he was taken to jail, charged with making false statements to military government officers, and later held for trial as an industrial war criminal. He was among those convicted in 1948 and sentenced to twelve years for profiting from the war and for being responsible for abuse of foreign workers. He and all the other industrialists tried with him were acquitted, however, of complicity in starting the war; because the court held that they had not had advance knowledge of Hitler’s specific plans for military aggression. These men had started a chain of events whose inevitable outcome was war. But in the eyes of the law, as the American judges construed it, only those who had forged the last link could be guilty of a crime.
Roman Empire had been crowned, the little inns with their carvings and paintings, and the hundreds of other weathered and mellowed reminders of Germany's old life in the times before Bismarck, Hohenzollern, and Hitler, all had suffered the tortures of the damned. But the Nazi edifice of the New Order, literally a giant filing cabinet loaded with hundreds of tons of papers and records of the Farben empire, remained whole.

In the synthetic Nazi economy, Farben's mountains of paper were fully as important as the mountains of coal in the Ruhr. The German businessmen who had handled Farben's gentlemanly agreements with the fraternity brothers in other countries were prolific writers of memoranda. They had kept voluminous diaries and notes of conferences. Patents and patent-licensing agreements, domestic and international, were the stuff their dreams were made on.

The very volume of their paper work was almost our undoing. The main Farben building consisted of six large wings, each seven stories high, arranged to form an arc of a circle and connected by five hyphens of the same height. This colossus of steel and buff-colored stone was bulging with everything from contracts with Du Pont and Imperial Chemical for the division of world markets down to the invoices of shipments of drugs or photographic film to a little wholesaler in Buenos Aires. In all the fighting for the city hardly a window had been cracked and not a riling cabinet disturbed. But as the city fell, into this refuge had swarmed over eleven thousand displaced persons and liberated slave laborers, looking for temporary shelter and warmth. Within two days the rooms, corridors and stair wells of the building had become snowbound in a blizzard of papers. Everything spilled from the files as desperate people took care of the needs of warmth, sanitation and revenge in one mad assault on the neatly ordered rows of cabinets.

Advance members of our party had reached Frankfurt on March 29, most of them answering a call from "Lucky Forward." General Patton's armored spearheads racing eastward towards Würzburg had stumbled upon the greatest collection of SS loot, art treasures, and Nazi gold reserves ever uncovered in Germany. This mass of carefully indexed material, including everything from the famous collection of paintings of the Kaiser Wilhelm Museum to sacks of gold teeth and suitcases full of gems stripped from victims of the SS murder camps, had been hidden deep in a potash mine at Merkers, east of Frankfurt. Patton roared back to General Eisenhower to send someone up to take responsibility for this hoard. Guarding it was tying up a whole regiment and knocking hell out of one of his divisions, he said. Colonel Bernard Bernstein, to whom we were attached in the Financial Branch, got the assignment and moved up to Frankfurt and Merkers with every member of the staff he could pull away from other duties. They started the Gold Rush of 1945, tracking down leads to other Nazi loot and having it shipped back for safekeeping to the commandeered Reichsbank building in Frankfurt.

This advance party began burning up the wires for reinforcements from our side when they saw what was happening to the I.G. Farben records at Frankfurt. Two of the Treasury men got a load of German PW's to sweep all of the papers into the west wing of the building where they could at least be sealed off. But the SHAPE Headquarters Commandant arrived in a few days to requisition the building as a future forward headquarters for General Eisenhower, and ordered the building cleared of all this "refuse." Army trucks began backing up to the building, hauling off truckloads of the papers and burning them. Only the most vigorous argument could produce so much as a temporary truce while we tried to round up enough men to do something with the three hundred to four hundred tons of papers stacked in the west wing.

The token force from Treasury and our one man from Justice soon got support from a technical team attached to the "T" forces, headed by a British officer, Colonel Gordon. This team was in hot pursuit of Farben's secret poison-gas experiments which were supposed to have produced not only the superpoison, Tabun, a droplet of which meant slow death, but a still more powerful poison, Sarin, a smaller droplet of which meant instant death. They found that several hundred carloads of both had been produced, put up in containers disguised as dyestuff intermediates and other harmless chemicals, and shipped in railway cars billed to Wehrmacht ammunition dumps at points all over Germany. Apparently the only thing deterring the Wehrmacht from releasing the gases was the fact that
no gas mask or decontaminating agent capable of protecting them from the stuff had yet been developed. Some of the Farben chemists were still searching frantically for the antidotes when Colonel Gordon's men picked them up. Intentional or accidental opening of the disguised containers would cause wholesale havoc; and the keys to their identification were somewhere in the Farben production records. Colonel Gordon's men worked fast and talked sharply; but even so, they were just barely equal to the task of keeping the Headquarters Commandant's men from “cleaning up” the place to meet its destiny as the most impressive-looking military headquarters in Europe.

On the evening of April 28, when I arrived with Bursler and Sacks, we found enough manpower assembled at Frankfurt to start looking for the why that lay behind the collaboration of German industrialists with the Nazis—the prior question, one step removed from the poison gas and the slave labor and the murder camps that had been the end product of the collaboration.

But first we had to move the records to a building next door to the Reichsbank. We did it in three days with two tractor-drawn vans, two hundred PW's and three hundred I.G. Farben employees. A crew of two dozen or more Farben department heads and chief clerks was kept busy identifying bundles of papers so that they could be routed to different rooms and reassembled. To prevent some of the inevitable sabotage and concealment of documents, a human chain of Farben employees was stationed on the stairways to pass bundles hand over hand while the PW's were kept moving with individual bundles. A tremendous speed-up, with a great many shouts of "schnell, schnell," was the only other precaution we could devise.

One of the minor Farben officials tried to do his bosses a service by concealing the diary of one of their best foreign negotiators, Dr. Frank-Fahle. The little official had a job on his hands. The diary consisted of about forty-two volumes of closely written notes, arranged in loose-leaf notebooks. He took advantage of the confusion of files, papers, displaced persons, war prisoners, and Farben employees to spirit away the separate volumes of the diary and put them one by one under a heap of rubble and wastepaper. Alex Sacks watched him for a few days until satisfied that the entire set had been assembled, and then picked them up all at once.

The same investigative technique, if it could be called that, led to the discovery of the “Neuordnung” or New Order documents. These were plans prepared during the war by the I.G. Farben management to explain to the German Economic Ministry their over-all recommendations for organization of the chemical industries in occupied territories wherever German arms should triumph. Since they had thought of everything and had written most of it down, we could gradually assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of the use that the Germans had been able to make of things like patents. The patent laws of other countries had provided a solid footing for what otherwise might have been tentative gentlemen's agreements.

We recalled that when the Antitrust Division and several Senate committees had begun their wartime investigations of the American patent system, there was a lot of folklore about the international arrangements among the fraternity brothers. Economists were saying that it would have been impossible for an international arrangement to keep up prices or divide markets beyond the point where someone found it more profitable to break away from the agreement. They said that as soon as some one member of the group decided to break away there was nothing to hold him. He would, as an economic man, follow the paths to greatest profits regardless of any gentlemen's agreements to the contrary.

The German gentlemen said, “Ach, so?” Investigations showed how far they could go in putting teeth into their agreements. An agreement is more than a gentlemen's agreement if the violator can be tangled up in expensive litigation, especially if the courts in his own country can be used to issue injunctions and compel performance. Between wars the art of founding international arrangements on enforceable legal contracts had developed to a fine point of perfection. The patent laws of the respective countries furnished only one out of many possible means; but patent agreements had one peculiar advantage. Most patent laws are so complicated that litigation is long and expensive. An international private treaty that draws its strength from legally enforceable patent obligations is
very well founded indeed. The tougher the litigation in the event of a breach, the less likely that any gentleman will try to back out on his obligation.

The terms of the Versailles Treaty had limited the right of German industry to certain kinds of tariff protection and to the other kinds of subsidies and exchange controls that may be used to bolster arrangements for the division of markets. We found that from the time I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. was formed in 1925 the management had proceeded along definite lines to develop fairly simple patent schemes for protecting and expanding their position in markets abroad.

Germany was already far ahead of most other countries in the development of chemical synthetic processes for making various raw materials which were plentiful as natural products in international markets. Nitrates, for example, had always been a near monopoly for the Chileans; but Germany's war effort in 1914 had been made possible by the development of the Haber-Bosch synthetic nitrate process which provided an unlimited supply of explosives. Many developments in dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals and other products had likewise helped to make up for Germany's natural deficiencies in raw materials. Coal and potash and forest products are about all that Germany can claim in the way of natural resources. This gave considerable incentive for the development of synthetics.

The practice of I.G. Farben was to capture the basic patents in each field of synthetic chemistry. They would file applications for patents not only in Germany but also in most of the civilized countries of the world. Our own patent laws were full of loopholes that helped a great deal. For one thing, despite the legal requirement that a patent specification must be so detailed as to enable a man "skilled in the art" to practice the invention, a vague description of the method of producing a chemical compound is often enough to obtain a patent. During World War I when the American Alien Property Custodian seized the ownership of German patents, he took over the patent on Salvarsan, Dr. Ehrlich's "magic bullet" for the treatment of syphilis. When American technicians went to work to follow the recipe set out in the patent specification, the material turned out to be violently poisonous. The recipe had carefully avoided mentioning how to eliminate the poisonous arsenic compounds that occurred in the preparation.

Further, these loopholes permitted an enterprising firm to file its application for a patent long before the actual "bugs" had been worked out of the production process. The Germans, between the two wars, made an especially energetic drive to exploit their initial advantage in the field of synthetic chemistry in this way. In many cases they blanketed whole new fields of industrial technology by securing basic patents covering all known or suspected processes for synthesizing important materials. In some cases they themselves had not discovered how to make these materials, but that mattered very little. If someone else did discover the "know-how," he would find himself blocked by the patents already issued to some German firm or individual on the basis of a general description of the process. Confronted with this earlier patent, the new inventor had a simple choice before him: spend anywhere up to ten years and thousands of dollars in arguing a patent interference through the Patent Office and the courts; or make a deal. Most of them chose to make a deal. But each deal included specific and legally enforceable recognition by contract on the part of the newcomer that the German patent was valid and not open to question. Then he would get a promise from the Germans that as they worked with the new process in their own factories and laboratories, they in turn would make available to him the technical know-how that they might discover. This made it a mutual enterprise beneficial to both, saved expense of litigation, and besides the two could then join forces against any other inventors who might still be outside the arrangement.

In practice, this meant that if I.G. Farben caught Du Pont on the first go-round with the Farben patents in the United States and made a deal with Du Pont, from then on it was I.G. Farben and Du Pont against, shall we say, Monsanto. And as more outsiders fell in with the scheme the team of solidly organized patentees grew and the chances of the remaining outsiders were less and less.

Now that we had the files and many of the directors of Farben we could find out how some of these feats had been accomplished, provided we could pick the right haystack and then find the needle.
point. Most of the individual acts which made up the spectacular geopolitical activities of I.G. Farben looked like ordinary business transactions. Partly their success was due to American acceptance of the “business is business” philosophy. Largely relying on this easy tolerance of social irresponsibility, the Farben organization put across its entire program, capturing markets, bottling up inventions, digging out economic and industrial secrets, and financing propaganda practically without fear of reprisals or countermeasures.

One illustration is the successful concealment of Farben’s foreign activities. From the very first, the I.G. Farben management developed a program of what they called Tarnung, meaning concealment. The three-billion-dollar corporation, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., had started as an Interessen Gemeinschaft, or community of interests—that is, a cartel—among the six largest German producers of dyestuffs: an Interessen Gemeinschaft of the Farben industry. The individual companies that went together in 1925 to make up the combine had temporarily lost many of their foreign properties through alien property seizures during World War I. That fact alone might have been reason enough for them to protect their common interest by finding ways to make their foreign properties legally immune from future wartime seizures.

Even if there had been no contemplation of future war, however, there were business reasons why a German company of the 1920’s would develop a Tarnung program. In those years there was anti-German feeling in the important world markets. It was advisable for German companies to assume the character of domestic organizations in each country. This could have been done merely by adopting an American name for sales operations in the United States, without hiding the legal ownership. But in many countries a foreign-owned corporation can avoid extra taxes if the ownership appears to be domestic from a legal, as well as from a public relations, standpoint.

Also, many countries have adopted foreign currency regulations which subject a foreign corporation to control or supervision that might not be applied to a domestic company. Under such regulations, the books of a branch office or subsidiary corporation might have to show details of the profits and losses of the parent corpora-
tion in Germany. In that case the governments having jurisdiction over the foreign branches would be able, by pooling their information, to see how well or badly the parent corporation was doing. German corporations did not want to expose their points of financial strength or weakness at a time when they were embarking on an international struggle for markets.

In the United States there were still more reasons for hiding the ownership of German companies. Most of the new German firms, especially in the heavy and synthetic industries, depended upon government subsidies to make their operations financially possible. The United States had passed, as part of its tariff laws, the “anti-dumping” act of 1921. This act provided that if any foreign government subsidized exports to the United States, so that the foreign producers were in effect offering their goods below actual cost, a special “countervailing duty” would be levied against the goods. The United States Customs would collect an added amount equal to the foreign subsidy. Camouflage of the American subsidiary would allow the German company to appear to sell goods to an independent American company at the full market price. Then the German government could take care of low profits by paying subsidies behind the scenes, overseas, where the eyes of the United States Treasury could not penetrate. Another reason for concealment of properties in the United States was the fact that many German companies were floating large loans abroad to finance plant expansions in Germany. In the event of default, the German companies did not want to appear as owners of valuable assets in the United States, where the disappointed bondholders could reach them by court action.

The Tarnung program developed by I.G. Farben proved to be remarkably weatherproof. It was Dencker who gave us the first indication that documents describing the concealment program had been kept by the management. But despite his recollection of the shape and size of the black leather folder containing the file of Tarnungs Fragen, we never caught up with it. The combined investigative powers of other agencies of the United States government were still unable, even four years after the end of World War II, to prove the German ownership of I.G. Farben’s biggest enterprise in the western hemisphere, the multimillion-dollar General Aniline & Film Corporation of Binghamton, New York. This company, originally named the American I.G. Chemical Corporation, developed a large business in dyestuffs, “Agfa” photographic equipment and supplies, and a host of other chemical products. In this case, I.G. Farben made no attempt to conceal the foreign ownership of General Aniline, but concentrated on establishing legally that the ownership and control was Swiss rather than German.

The laws of “neutral” Switzerland were a great help in many such arrangements. The shares of stock in most German and Swiss companies are in “bearer” form. Even a look at the certificates does not help to identify the owner. Only the books of the bank which holds them for the owner can show for whom the banker is acting, and from whom he receives instructions on how to vote the shares at stockholders’ meetings. But Switzerland has a “bank secrecy” law. It is a criminal offense for any Swiss banker to disclose the actual ownership of property entrusted to his management. As we found in concrete terms how effectively this arrangement had protected the German flank, it began to seem that Switzerland’s successful neutrality throughout two world wars may have hinged on things like this law far more than on the ferocity of the Swiss guards or the tenacity of Switzerland’s democracy.

From the American side, the picture was not so rosy. We found that throughout the war the American diplomatic position in Switzerland had been to a great extent represented by American bankers. Some of these seemed to have had their own reasons for approving the pattern of private international cooperation made possible by Swiss law.

The cluster of American bankers who spent the war years in Switzerland included, perhaps by coincidence, American lawyers and bankers who could be expected to know the most about the true relations between I.G. Farben and the General Aniline & Film Corporation. The J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation and its law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, had handled the banking and legal business of the General Aniline firm from the time it was first set up as the American I.G. Chemical Corporation. Throughout the war, Allen W. Dulles, a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell and until
1944 a director of the Schroder bank in New York, headed the European Mission of the Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland; and V. Lada-Mocarski, vice president of the Schroder bank, was a United States consul in Switzerland.

Even after its seizure by the Alien Property Custodian, General Aniline was administered on behalf of the Custodian by officials of American companies which, under the code of the banking fraternity, were part of the Schroder group. Some might hold that these men were a good choice for these jobs for the very reason that they had good banking connections. But the Schroder-picked officials who were in charge of the American company and the Schroder officials who were representing the United States in Switzerland never managed to get the Swiss government to produce information which Swiss bankers had at their finger tips. The fog Switzerland never

One incident, in particular, evidently caused a great stir in the Farben organization after the New Order plan had been in operation a little over a year. In January 1942 came the Department of Justice case against the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, charging conspiracies with I.G. Farben to violate the antitrust laws. The company and its officers paid fines and accepted a court decree enjoining them from continuing the marketing and patent arrangements in the future. The Standard Oil Company then bought full-page advertising space in newspapers all over the United States to publicize Standard's claim that the United States had benefited from the Farben deals because Standard had received much more technical information from I.G. Farben than they had given I.G. in return.

It was, of course, true that under the agreements much of the basic research was to be conducted in Germany. The American partner, therefore, had to depend on Germany for more technical information than they would themselves be able to give in return. When the German Economic Ministry read copies of the Standard Oil advertisements, they demanded a full report from I.G. Farben to answer the charge that Standard had had the better of the exchange. In the files at Frankfurt we turned up copies of the I.G. Farben report to the Economic Ministry. The Farben managers were not allowed to rely on the sweeping generalizations of a newspaper advertisement. Their scientists had to produce documented answers to satisfy the Economic Ministry and the General Staff. The contention of the Farben report was that the German firm had received from Standard Oil several important new links in the jigsaw puzzle of their own technology, whereas the apparently vast quantities of information they had passed over to the Americans had left large gaps to be filled by new research and development before they could be put to any use.

The second phase of the I.G. Farben New Order plans contained supervised. Special emphasis was placed on preventing patent licenses or technological information from being given to the chemical industry outside the area of German control. This provision was aimed particularly at the chemical industries of the United States, which had been heavy "importers" of German technical information.
a long-run program for assuring permanent German control of the chemical industries in foreign countries. Where necessary, they said, this could take the form of stock interests in the foreign companies. But experience in France changed these plans. The Germans found it unnecessary to acquire ownership. With some pressure based on business considerations, they found that a community of interests could be formed between French owners and Germans. This had the advantage of assuring firm co-operation instead of recalcitrance. Even more important, in the event of German military setbacks, such arrangements in all countries would provide a corps of interested business associates in the “liberated” territories who would insist upon continuing their relations in some form even if Germany were defeated.

The I.G. Farben New Order plan was initiated by the Farben management, acting on its own, to show the German High Command how the corporate expansion of I.G. Farben as a business proposition could be geared in with the interests of the German government in establishing German power all over the world. This close identity between the business interests of the company and the national interests of Germany was not accidental. It was the result of over twenty years of close working between the management of German industry and the German government. Under this working arrangement, the laws of Germany had been gradually modified to give more and more assistance to the growth of organizations like I.G. Farben. Special tax concessions favoring the growth of combines, modifications of the corporation law to give management a free hand, government subsidies for special projects, all strengthened the position of the combines in a geometric progression as their size increased. In return, the greater size and weight of the combines made them a more and more powerful instrument of German policy abroad.

None of this development would have been possible without loans from the Allied nations. These loans for reconstruction became a vehicle for arrangements that did more to promote World War II than to establish peace after World War I. The amount of the loans to German private industrial interests was not large by present standards. In the years from 1926 to 1930 they were roughly comparable to the $275,000,000 invested by the United States Government from 1933 to 1937 in the Federal Home Loan Bank system, which enabled some fourteen hundred building and loan associations to stimulate home building and repair during the depression years. But in Germany, the reconstruction loans to private business took a different course.

Of the outstanding industrial loans, over a hundred million dollars went to United Steel and its components; over sixty million dollars to the two electrical equipment combines, Siemens & Halske and A.E.G.; twenty-five million dollars to the Hugo Stinnes interests; and slightly lesser amounts to the United Rayon combine, VGF, and to the major iron, steel and coal companies, including Krupp and Good Hope.

The loans to banks and utilities followed a similar course. About half of the banker loans went to the Deutsche Bank and Commerz Bank. A third of the utilities loans went to the RWE electrical combine, the Rhenish-Westphalian Electric Company, in which Baron Kurt von Schröder served as a leading director, along with Albert Vögler of the Stinnes and Siemens concerns, Hermann J. Abs of the Deutsche Bank, and Carl Goetz of the Dresdner Bank. This public utility combine supplied two thirds of all the electric power consumed in highly industrialized west and southwest Germany. The RWE controlled a power grid that stretched from the borders of Holland to the Swiss frontier. It held participations in over one hundred and forty enterprises including power-generating and tramway companies, hard and brown coal mines, firms engaged in designing and constructing power plants, river shipping companies, and the Braunkohle-Benzin synthetic fuel company. This latter establishment, one of the forerunners of the Four-Year Plan, was a joint enterprise of the Belgian Solvay & Cie. of Brussels, along with RWE and the steel firm of Friedrich Flick, I.G. Farben, the chemical trust, and the German government holding company known as VIAG or United Industrial Enterprises. VIAG exercised the over-all control of the synthetic fuel experiments under the supervision of Hans Kehrl and Gustav Krupp. Kehrl was an SS Brigade Leader and protégé of Himmler who controlled a large group of synthetic textile factories known as the Ring. This part
of the German autarchy program was being developed with the help of foreign loans long before the Nazis came to power.

In 1934, Wilhelm Keppler, in his capacity as Hitler's economic adviser, asked Hitler to establish a Special Agency for the Development of German Natural and Synthetic Raw Materials, commonly known as the "Büro Keppler," to prepare programs for production of synthetic textiles, synthetic rubber, synthetic fuel oil, gasoline and lubricants, and synthetic edible fats and proteins. His chief collaborators on this project were Hans Kehrl, Paul Koerner, and Paul Pleiger of the Dresdner Bank. All four were part of the Advisory Committee on Questions of Raw Material, headed by Göring and Schacht, and all four in the Büro Keppler laid the groundwork for the over-all self-sufficiency or "autarchy" plan to prepare Germany for the coming war. That was the Four-Year Plan created in 1936.

Now that we had their own statement of some of the things they had intended to do with their power, we still had to find out how far the men of the "Keppler Circle" had been able to go in carrying out their intentions—especially where they needed the help of their brothers overseas.

**CHAPTER 6**

**Seek and Find**

THE gold rush was going well. Armored convoys carrying Reichsbank gold and recovered loot were streaming back from points as far as the Czecho-Slovakian border. With something tangible like looted gold to take in hand, the combat commanders were doing a job that would make the Brinks Express Company turn green. A trunkful of bullion would arrive, not in an armored car with some armed men, but escorted by half-tracks with machine guns and one or two light tanks with artillery. One Ninth Army convoy with seventy million dollars in gold from the Reichsbank branch at Magdeburg came in with air cover buzzing overhead. The half-billion dollars or so of valuables accumulating in the vault downstairs was secure from burglars. The entire block around the Reichsbank was behind barbed wire and sandbagged machine-gun nests. There were antiaircraft emplacements on the roof and a Sherman tank and crew sitting in front of our door.

A half-billion dollars in treasure was something the army could handle. The pattern for dealing with such things was as old as Hannibal. The records we had just rescued from the headquarters commandant's bonfire were something new. In them might be a clue to the origins of a war costing a hundred billion a year; yet we were in trouble with the headquarters commandant again. At Kronberg in the Taunus, a few miles outside of Frankfurt, we had found the files of the metals trust, the Metallgesellschaft, in the Schloss Friedrichshof, seat of the royal family of Hesse. The headquarters commandant wanted immediate possession of this castle at Kronberg so as to turn it into a club for SHAEP officers. If we did not remove the files immediately, they would be turned back to the
Metallgesellschaft management or dumped somewhere outside the castle grounds.

The Metallgesellschaft management would not have been able to house the records in their handsome office building next to the Opera House because Colonel Crisswall, the military governor of Frankfurt, had taken the building as headquarters for his military government. The company's employees inhabited a maze of gopher holes in the bombed-out block of buildings beyond. The company officials said that they would be delighted to get their records back and tuck them away safely in these catacombs.

In the end the Metallgesellschaft management won out. We were already spread too thin to handle another big moving job while following the leads which the Farben investigation had already uncovered. As soon as the Farben people got any hint of what we might be looking for they tried to beat us to it. There seemed no end of ways for men like von Schnitzler to get messages out of the air telling employees where to find important documents so that they could be hidden or destroyed.

Our few weapons carriers and command cars were busy all day and into the night. Our men were finding cans of microfilm buried in gardens, hidden in barns, suitcases, clothes closets, within a fifty-mile radius of Frankfurt. For one hundred reichsmarks a month a Farben official had rented the refectory of a monastery near Würzburg to store "personal effects" of bombed-out employees. The sixty-eight packing cases turned out to contain copies of over five thousand agreements between I.G. Farben and companies in France, Britain and the United States in the field of dyestuffs and heavy chemicals alone.

We needed manpower and we needed understanding from the new crop of army officers who were moving up in the wake of battle. Up to this point co-operation had been startling in comparison with what I had been led to expect. Practically everyone I had run into, from GIs to generals, understood quickly what we were after and why it was important.

A T/5 at one division headquarters was helping me to find the chief of staff. The soldier was from New York and had worked for the Hugo Stinnes firm. We had hardly started walking before he told me about the "cartel" he had worked for in New York and his opinion of cartels. There was the jeep driver from east Baltimore. Shortly after the armies reached the Rhine at Cologne, we were driving along the west bank within sight of the undamaged I.G. Farben plant at Leverkusen across the river. Without knowing anything about me or my business he began to give me a lecture about I.G. Farben and to point at the contrast between the bombed-out city of Cologne and the trio of untouched plants on the fringe: the Ford works and the United Rayon works on the west bank, and the Farben works on the east bank. There was Major General Malony, commanding the Ninety-fourth Infantry Division, who seemed to know as much about the problem as the Senate committees that had investigated patents and cartels during the war.

So it had been up and down the line, until now. It was as though being in combat had produced a sharpened awareness that was suddenly missing as the rear echelons moved up.

Now it was like the leaden skies and snow flurries outside in early May, when one might have expected a warm sun. The housekeeping detachments of the headquarters command and the spit-and-polish military police of the Provost Marshal were moving in to "police up," unfurl the red tape, require mess passes, billeting passes, trip tickets—to challenge any unusual act and, if in doubt, to stop it. We had to have more help. As things settled down it seemed we would need two men to do what one had done before: one to do the work and one to go along and explain why.

At SHAEF headquarters in the Trianon Palace Hotel at Versailles we had a meeting of United States and British intelligence officers to consider making a list of key financiers and industrialists. The idea was to list about five hundred high-powered executives and managers of the biggest industrial and financial combines, and perhaps twenty-five hundred of their principal assistants and department chiefs. This list would be furnished to the counterintelligence units of all army divisions and regiments and to all CIC detachments and military government officers in the field, with instructions to notify us when any of the listed people turned up. The instructions to accompany the list would not only provide a guide to CIC
men in the field who were screening German civilians, but would give authority to our investigators to arrest and question high-ranking businessmen whom we ourselves tracked down.

At the same time we saw that official "cables"—army lingo for telegrams—went to all forward headquarters and army groups to announce that we would be establishing new centers of investigation in the Ruhr and other localities, similar to the one we had already set up at Frankfurt. Copies of these cables served for some time as an open sesame to get where we needed to go without too much argument or explanation.

That does not mean we had no arguments. My British opposite number had something to say about what we could investigate in the Ruhr, which was being taken over as part of the British zone of occupation. Colonel John R. Kellam had been in charge of liquidating British foreign investments during the war, before Lend-Lease, to get dollars to pay for Britain's lifeline. He was dour about the way Britain's economy had been bled white while we in the United States debated through the first two years of war. He had little sympathy for what he called the "American passion for trust busting"; but he did want to go after the assets that Germans had spirited abroad. There, at least, we were on common ground. His superior, Brigadier M. J. Babington-Smith, chief of the Financial Branch of SHAEF, in private life a director of the Royal Bank of Scotland and partner in the "City's" Glyn, Mills & Company, was more squarely on all fours with my point of view, which was that set out in our written statements of policy from Washington: that we were interested in all devices by which power had become concentrated into the hands of those responsible for the rise of the Nazi Party to power. Brigadier Babington-Smith's view was also shared pretty generally by S. P. Chambers, of the British Treasury, slated to become Colonel Kellam's superior as head of the Finance Division in the British Element when SHAEF dissolved. I had talked to Mr. Chambers in London several weeks before.

It was not long before we faced a test of how far our investigations could be carried without running into jurisdictional questions with the British element. One of my colleagues from the Department of Justice, Philip W. Amram, special assistant to the Attorney General, came in from the United States on a No. 1 priority, carrying special authorizations from the Secretary of War. He was to be given every assistance in digging up evidence for a case on which he was government counsel. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey had filed a suit against the Alien Property Custodian to recover the ownership of some shares of stock and over two thousand basic patents. Standard claimed to have bought these rights in good faith, before the war, from I.G. Farben; but the Custodian had seized them as property being held under a cloaking arrangement on behalf of Farben. Jersey promptly, and with a display of righteous indignation, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to get it all back. The patents were quite valuable, covering the basic technology and new developments in all fields of mutual interest to Standard and Farben, except for the buna rubber patents, which had been the subject of a separate deal. The papers certainly appeared to be in order, and at the time Phil Amram came to Europe it looked as though Standard might win.

Co-operation from the British side was immediate and whole-hearted. During the next two days after Amram's arrival, the investigations took shape. The three Farben bigwigs, Schmitz, Ilgner, and von Knieriem, were in custody at the "Château Transit Camp" near Versailles. Major Edmond Tilley of the British Intelligence, who had done the interrogations for the poison-gas team, flew back to work on the Farben trio with Amram. They had to get the story behind a meeting held at the Hague in September 1939, between Frank A. Howard of Standard Oil and Fritz Ringer, von Knieriem's assistant. This was the meeting at which the transfer of stocks and patents from Farben to Standard had been arranged.

Major Tilley and the Standard Oil investigation which he was making for Phil Amram dropped from sight for a few days while the Major's party searched in the field for records. But I heard from him again when I joined my group at Essen on May 23. Colonel Kellam handed me a note from Major Tilley, dated from Frankfurt the week before: "Dr. Bütefisch, chief of I.G. Farben synthetic oil production, Leuna, has admitted that Dr. Hahn, his deputy, has hidden papers, including secret contracts and letters..."
from and to Ringer at the following address: Bad Sachsa, Haus der Dynamit A.G.”

Bad Sachsa showed on the map as a point in the midst of the Harz Mountains, a few miles from the Devil’s Pulpit on the Brocken, traditional site of the Witches’ Sabbath. The Hitler Youth had revived the legend and held Walpurgisnacht celebrations annually on May first. We had reports that in the same area numbers of SS troops had declined to celebrate V-E Day and were playing come-and-get-it with units of the Fifth Armored Division. As we got together our party of ten to make the circuit of the Harz, looking for records of Krupp, Mannesmann, the Stahlwerks Verband, and the Standard Oil-I.G. Farben correspondence, an officer of the Ninety-fourth said to hell with the regulations and made me put a pistol in a shoulder holster under my field jacket.

For two days we prowled among the rocks and cowpaths that served for roads in the Harz Mountain area and finally located several cabinets full of documents hidden underground in an air-raid shelter at Bad Sachsa. It turned out that the very building the American occupying troops had chosen for a headquarters was the I.G. Farben-owned “Haus der Dynamit A.G.” Colonel Cole, the commanding officer of Combat Command “B” of the Fifth Armored Division, was amused when we turned up these documents right under the window of his office and still others in the walls of his officers’ mess. There were heavy loose-leaf files of correspondence between Frank A. Howard and Fritz Ringer; and cabinets filled with minutes of meetings and interoffice correspondence about the Standard Oil negotiations. Colonel Cole kindly furnished trucks to haul these back to Frankfurt where they were compared with other papers, and the documented story pieced together.

The papers we picked up indicated that Mr. Frank A. Howard of the Standard Oil group and Dr. Ringer of I.G. Farben had met in the last week of September 1939, at The Hague. They prepared a document that became known as the “Hague Memorandum.” This document appeared on its face to be an agreement under which I.G. Farben sold to Standard Oil of New Jersey various patents and shares of stock. Actually the two men also prepared a separate agreement, kept secret, under which I.G. Farben retained the right to cancel the transfer and get its properties back as soon as it was safe to do so. Mr. Howard did not even keep a copy of this agreement. He signed the original and the carbon copy on behalf of Standard Oil and handed both copies to Dr. Ringer, who took them back to Frankfurt.

The Standard Oil case might very well have had a happy ending for the fraternity brothers if the suit had been filed in 1947. Even by 1946 it was to become very difficult for United States government representatives to get facts from German files. It was not long before we had to show cause why we should be permitted to prowl about among the business papers of reputable German concerns. By 1947 investigations which the Germans considered troublesome would appear doubly objectionable to American businessmen acting as military government officials in Bizonia. Investigations that might disclose embarrassing transactions between American and German companies were called a “waste of taxpayers’ money.” Also, troubling busy German industrialists with unfriendly questions would tend to “interfere with German recovery” and might arouse “antagonism." In the end we were caught between businessmen representing private interests and others of the same persuasion holding official positions, where they had power to change the orders under which we operated. But for a brief period in 1945 matters were not so well under control. True, we found a number of members of the international brotherhood, commissioned as colonels and brigadier generals in the army, moving about rather freely in the field on matters of their own concern; but by the same token it was also possible for representatives of the government to get around freely as we all did in the Standard Oil case.

The documents needed by the government to establish the falsity of the Standard Oil claim were finally shipped by air back to the United States, along with Dr. von Knieriem as a government witness. Dr. von Knieriem, who had supervised Ringer’s work, had annotated his own copy of the secret Hague Memorandum with comments showing its true intent. One of these phrases alone should have been enough. It was a marginal note, “Nach Kriegs Kamo- flage” (postwar camouflage).

Not only was this case unusual in that enough trained manpower
was available, for once, to track down the evidence, and that conditions permitting full investigation happened to prevail, but because the Federal Courts in dealing with the evidence used unusually strong language to describe what the fraternity brothers had done. The following examples from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals may illustrate:

The negotiators prepared the so-called Hague Memorandum which was neither an accurate summary of the past dealings of their companies, nor complete and faithful representation of the agreements made at the Hague. . . .

The real agreement which was made by Mr. Howard and Dr. Ringer and which was later ratified by their principals can be gleaned only after a scrutiny of many documents and the oral testimony of Mr. Howard. . . .

The Court found that these were sham transactions designed to create an appearance of Jersey ownership of property interests which nevertheless continued to be regarded by the parties as I.G. owned. The parties intended that after completion of the war and the resulting disappearance of the danger of United States Government controls the property would be formally returned to I.G. and the pre-war relationship resumed. . . .

On the witness stand, Howard, testifying concerning the Hague Conference, was, in the opinion of the Court, not a credible witness.

In effect the courts held that the Standard Oil Company had tried to put across a misrepresentation in order to protect an outpost for I.G. Farben. Whereas President Roosevelt had referred to the use made of the I.G. Farben trust by the Nazis, and had insisted on the “eradication of these weapons of economic warfare,” Standard Oil, in the middle of the war against the Nazi state, had invoked the aid of the Federal Courts to defeat the measures of the United States.

Frank A. Howard was not prosecuted for perjury. The District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals merely declared he was not a “credible witness.” The Supreme Court did no more than sustain the action of the lower courts in upsetting the sham transactions and letting the Alien Property Custodian keep the patents and stock. Mr. Howard retired gracefully in 1945, full of honors, as vice president of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, having retired the previous year from his other position as president of the Standard Oil Development Company.

This arrangement between Standard and Farben was only one of many conspiracies between German business leaders and their counterparts in the United States and Britain to help in keeping alive bridgeheads for future “economic warfare.” At the time we discovered them it would have been hard to forget the other side of the coin: that these same German organizations — I.G. Farben, Krupp, Flick, Mannesmann, Siemens & Halske, and a few dozen more — had shown their less gentlemanly and more brutal side in the slave camps and murder factories, and in the looting of occupied Europe, all by “legal” means under Nazi laws. Before the press carried pictures of the murder camps at Belsen and Auschwitz and the records of I.G. Farben’s poison gas experiments on slave laborers, it might have been possible to concede that some American businessmen connived at preserving these organizations for the postwar period without knowing the awful truth. We hoped that the record after 1945 would not reveal any conniving in the revival of similar types of “industrial” organizations, or any reliance on the same men to guide Germany’s economic recovery.
CHAPTER 7

The Heavies

THE House of Krupp has been a symbol of German militarism for generations. The Krupp family mansion, the Villa Hügel, on a hill overlooking the Ruhr River at Baldeney just south of Essen, was more than a symbol. It was a very big house. With the Krupps, bigness became a fine art. Set among hills, the Villa Hügel was not dwarfed by its surroundings but dominated them. At sunrise on a summer morning, when the hills by the river are still steaming as though they had their feet in hot water and a blanket around their shoulders, the villa stands up with its blackened stones and square bulk untouched by fog and mist. It looks like the Carnegie Museum at Pittsburgh. The main house has one hundred and twenty rooms, and the "little house" attached to it a mere ninety. In the dining room, twenty-five by ninety feet, the sixty-foot dining table was covered by a one-piece damask cloth. The dining room was small in comparison with the main salon, size forty by one hundred feet; but the furnishing of both left no feeling of emptiness.

The Villa Hügel, taken over by the "T" force unit of XXII Corps, was operated as a combined billet, mess and office for investigators working in the area. All investigation units were interviewed at the end of each day so as to build a pool of information on records and personalities. We were welcome to make good use of these facilities. Then, for help in following leads, or putting a guard on records we considered important, the division headquarters in the particular area detailed men for the job. It made a good headquarters for our investigations in the Ruhr, not only because it was one of the few buildings in the area untouched by bombs, but also because investigations go more easily if they fan out from a focal point from which the activities under investigation were originally directed. The memory of minor employees for apparently unimportant details, and the jottings, diaries and other notes that accumulate around a headquarters supply the clues to the character of the whole operation.

As we began to look at the Ruhr and its heavy industry from our starting point in the center, we could see some of the relation of the Krupps to the Nazi state. Prewar movies had pictured the goose-stepping Nazis as the absolute masters of Germany. Hitler had only to command and the most powerful of the pre-Nazi potentates would snap to obey—or else. Our poking about in the Villa Hügel and questioning of Alfried Krupp and his works managers erased that impression. Adolf Hitler and his Party had never been allowed quite to forget that they had depended upon the industrialists to put them in office, and that in the future they could go further with the industrialists' help than without it. In the earlier days of the Third Reich, Hitler never made a major decision without being sure in advance that he had the backing of the Krupps and the other Ruhr and Rhineland industrialists. Before he embarked on his big purge and reformation of the Nazi Party in July 1934, Hitler went first to the Villa Hügel for a long conference.

Generations of Krupps had been accustomed to sitting at the Villa Hügel and planning what the Krupp works would do. Somewhere in the recesses of this mausoleum was born the thought of the Big Bertha of World War I. Perhaps it was only natural that World War II should have had its enlarged counterpart in Great Gustav, a mammoth gun ninety feet long with a bore thirty-two inches in diameter and capable of throwing its four-ton shell thirty miles. Great Gustav was the pride of the Krupps and the despair of the Wehrmacht. Only five such guns were made, at the expense of tying up a large part of Germany's biggest gun shop for the entire war. The one Great Gustav to see action was used against Sevastopol in the Crimean campaign, but only after railway bridges had been reinforced and traffic on the entire rail system from Essen to Sevastopol disrupted to make way for the monster. The second
gun of its type got bogged down and lost somewhere on the way to the Russian front. Numbers three and four were picked up by the British. The last Great Gustav never left the Krupp gun shop. The lathe was hit by bombing raids in March 1945. Considerable tonnage of steel partially turned into projectiles lay scattered throughout the shop.

The House of Krupp was many times a source of grief to Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments, in his attempt to get the Wehrmacht the types of equipment it wanted for the war. The Armaments Ministry sometimes would have preferred to use materials and manpower for other purposes than those decided upon by the Krupps. But not all the relations between important German industrialists and the German government followed the pattern of simply assumed as a matter of right the prerogatives that put them above government, and especially government by upstarts. The industrial aristocracy of the Krupp dynasty, even though they represented far less power than did the I.G. Farben combine, had simply assumed as a matter of right the prerogatives that put them above government, and especially government by upstarts.

One began to see some basis for Adolf Hitler’s reported appetite for chewing oriental rugs. In dealing with the Krupps, the question was not what the Krupps could do for the war effort, but what the war effort could do with what the Krupps had to offer. A mere Nazi, Hitler faced a problem in trying to deal with these people who knew exactly what they wanted their factories to produce, and when and where.

Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and his son, Alfricld, were not among the earliest supporters of Hitler and the Nazis. They joined in with the rest of the Ruhr and Rhineland industrialists in response to Hitler’s appeal for funds only after a meeting of leading industrialists at Berlin on February 8, 1933. Up until that time, the Nazis and their program had appeared too radical for the conservative tastes of the Krupps. An important consideration behind the ultimate sponsorship of the Nazis by Gustav and Alfricld was their experience with a long strike in 1932, which the Nazis helped them to break. The Krupp management showed a great deal of enthusiasm for the Nazi labor policy because they felt that discipline and authority was needed in the ranks of labor. After the Berlin meet-

ing of February 8, 1933, Gustav Krupp accepted the chairmanship of the Reich Association of German Industry and undertook to reorganize German industry to “bring it into agreement with the political aims” of the Nazi Party.

The somewhat arm’s-length relations between the Krupps and the Nazis was by no means one of antagonism. The Krupp holdings fared very well throughout the Hitler period; and the family’s wishes were always highly respected. From the time the original firm was founded in 1812 until the grandson of the founder died in 1932, leaving a daughter, Bertha, as heir, the company had been a private family enterprise. In 1903 it became a corporation, Friedrich Krupp A.G. But in 1943, by decree of the Führer, the Krupps were given the privilege of reconverting the corporation into a private holding, with Bertha and Gustav’s son, Alfricld, as sole owner. Normally employing about two hundred thousand persons, the firm during the war maintained in addition to its German employees an average of over fifty thousand foreign workers and nearly twenty thousand prisoners of war, all of whom got the full benefit of the new labor policy, including the discipline and authority which had been lacking at the start of the 1932 strike. Especially satisfactory from some points of view was the “extermination through work” program for certain classes of concentration camp workers. In the rarefied and museum-like atmosphere of the Villa Hügel, Alfricld Krupp, who was under house arrest in the gatekeeper’s lodge, could make the idea sound almost digestible until you thought of what his well-rounded phrases were actually saying.

Our inquiry into the affairs of the Krupps was itself an offshoot of a larger investigation into the operations of the big Ruhr steel combines. During the few days before we were called into the hunt for evidence in the Standard Oil case, I had made a hurried trip to the Ruhr to start the investigation, heading for Düsseldorf. There the Stahlhof stood as a ten-story monument to Fritz Thyssen’s United Steel Works, in a country where a ten-story anything was rare. The Stahlhof had housed the officers not only of the steel trust, but also of the Stahlwerks Verband, the German national steel cartel, and of Stahlunion Export, United Steel’s “foreign relations” department. Stahlunion Export had controlled the steel trust’s one
hundred and seventy-five foreign branches in co-ordination with the foreign organization of the Nazi Party.

The army had picked the Stahlhof for the Ninety-fourth Division headquarters. After Frankfurt, the pattern was becoming familiar. There was a certain poetic irony in the way these fortresses of German economic warfare converted so readily to the needs of a military headquarters. A few blocks away, the tax office for the administrative district of Düsseldorf probably contained more cubic feet of usable office space, and was in fact being converted to house German administrative agencies and several American and British military government detachments. But the corridors and offices had a hospital-like plainness and uniformity, more reminiscent of a civil service building, whereas the Stahlhof pyramided upward with a sense of hierarchy and increasing magnificence. The approaches to the high-ceilinged head office in the Stahlhof, at the top of a broad, sweeping staircase, set off by tall doors of dark wood and several heavy bronze figures against a light wall, created an impression of overwhelming power. It would take a man of very strong character indeed to work in such surroundings without developing a power complex.

The military government officer of the Ninety-fourth, Colonel St. Claire, had his own staff set up in the tax office building. We took over temporary offices there, too, while we plotted an itinerary to the offices of the important steel combines and other firms on our lists. Our map then showed where we might expect to find their records and key officials.

In the next two days, May 17 and 18, we covered a lot of territory and discovered a great deal about the stamina and doggedness of the men who had run the Ruhr. Early in 1943, the Rhine crossings, first at Remagen to the south and then at Wesel to the north of the area, had produced a pincers that encircled the “Ruhr pocket” and met between Hamm and Paderborn at the headwaters of the Ruhr River. Through all these military movements, the managing directors of the big industries acted like a bunch of ants whose hill is being disturbed. Each one grabbed a large egg, consisting of the files and papers he considered most important, and took it somewhere. What with the bombings and the coming and going of German military units on all the roads, this must have been a feat of considerable ingenuity. It would be hard to count the number of times during the next two months that we were to travel several hundred miles to find tremendous stacks of recently moved papers that must have required six or eight vans.

The net result was that a great deal of the Ruhr puzzle was unscrambled and laid out for an investigation, much more completely and visually than if the records had all been left in one building to be sorted out by the investigators. It was worth driving miles to see the inner workings of Ruhr finance and industry unwound and laid out at different points on the map for inspection. By Friday evening, the eighteenth, our map looked like the end of an amateur taffy pull.

From our first two days’ work, we already had dividends to show. We had picked up two suitcases of papers belonging to Friedrich Flick, the self-made steel man who had multiplied his holdings with slave labor and the Nazi “Aryanization” laws. He would have been better off if he had stayed and burned the papers. They showed that his forty-thousand-dollar annual premiums to the Himmler fund had yielded the best from the SS labor procurement service. The SS had provided Flick with unlimited quantities of slave laborers from the concentration camps, at the very low rates charged to special “subscribers,” through a corporation known as the Deutsche Erd und Steinwerke.

We had also struck pay dirt in another quarter. In a file cabinet at the Mannesmann pipe and tube combine we had found a list of places to which records had been moved, and a secretary’s notations on where the top directors had gone, including Wilhelm Zangen, one of the charter members of the “Kepler Circle.”

At the offices of the armament firm, Rheinmetall-Borsig, most of the main records were intact all the way back to the time of the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. At that time the company had gone ahead designing and manufacturing artillery a few blocks away from the occupation headquarters. The finished ordnance had been tested at a secret firing range outside the occupied area, in the Lüneburger Heide between Ulzen and Celle, a few miles off the main road from Hannover to Hamburg. Following our growing
impression that novelty was not the chief characteristic of the men we had to deal with, we were to find the missing financial records and most of the company’s officers a few days later at the old hide-out, not far from where Heinrich Himmler himself was picked up. Himmler committed suicide at Luneburg on May 23.

As we came back to the G-5 mess on that first Friday evening, I was handed a message that had been phoned mouth-to-ear all the way down the ladder from SHAEF Forward to Frankfurt to Wiesbaden to Bad Neuenahr to Hilden to Düsseldorf. The message was terse: “Report to airstrip Y-57 at Vorst near Suchteln at 1000 hrs. Saturday, 19 May, by order of General McSherry.” Even a civilian, privileged to question why, had no way of talking all the way back to the man who knew. General Frank J. McSherry was the American deputy to General Grassett, the British head of SHAEF G-5. The only thing I could do was to keep the mysterious appointment.

It would have been hard to think of a worse time to be called in to give an account of what we were doing. From every indication, if we just had the manpower to follow a few of the most important threads, we would have a much more devastating picture than anything we had seen from our discoveries in the United States. Yet all this was mere possibility for the future. If we were to be pulled out and ordered to stop the investigations, it would not take the German industrialists long to close the curtain.

At the airstrip these doubts were erased. Major Vaughn, General McSherry’s executive officer, had come up with the crew. He said we were heading for Reims; that Senator Kilgore had arrived with five other members of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and had asked to see me. The day was suddenly much brighter. I actually enjoyed the ride as we followed the Paris beam along the Meuse, across parts of Holland and Belgium, and turned off over the French cathedral town of Laon for the run into Reims.

We found Senator Kilgore and the others with General Eisenhower in the “War Room” of the red schoolhouse. They were having their pictures taken near the table at which, twelve days before, the German High Command had surrendered. As the photographer packed his equipment Senator Kilgore got right down to business.

His subcommittee, including Senators Ball, Brewster, Ferguson, Mitchell and Tunnell, was investigating the supply situation in connection with redeployment of forces to the Far East. But President Truman had asked him to get in touch with me to find out how our investigations were coming. The Attorney General had been concerned about reports of our difficulties in keeping records from being dispersed, as at Frankfurt, and had spoken to the President about it. The President had told Senator Kilgore to have the important records flown back to the United States, if necessary, to keep them from being stripped by the Germans.

We continued the discussion at dinner and on the plane back to Paris. I pointed out that in order to find the key to what we were looking for we had to locate not only papers but also the men who made the papers significant. This job had to be done in the field, where we could interrogate anyone from the chairman of the board to the junior file clerk.

Senator Kilgore wanted to know what Washington could do to help. On Sunday, May 20, I brought General McSherry and Colonel Bernard Bernstein, deputy chief of the Financial Branch, to the Brown House at St. Cloud where the senators were staying. We discussed what we had been doing and in the end agreed on a program. Colonel Bernstein was leaving for Washington the following Tuesday. Senator Kilgore asked me to draft letters to the President and to the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, outlining the results of our conference and urging that an additional force of at least two hundred and fifty investigators, together with a supporting staff, should be thrown into the field to round out the job. On Tuesday, the Senator approved the drafts but added strengthening statements of his own before they were typed for his signature. To the President, he added: “It is my conviction that a great opportunity exists at the present time, and that our failure to take the required action would amount to a national catastrophe.”

Tuesday night Colonel Bernstein took off, armed with the three letters and a personal note from the Senator to Ed McKim, administrative assistant to the President, urging an early appointment for the Colonel. Colonel Bernstein had two interviews with President
Truman and returned two weeks later with full approval to recruit the staff we had requested.

On my way back to the ant hill in the Ruhr, I flew first to Frankfurt to see how our small contingent was getting along in pursuit of the contributors to the Himmler fund and other key figures. They were doing very well considering all the difficulties. They had pulled together much more than we had known before about I.G. Farben and two other closely interconnected groups, the management of the Metallgesellschaft and of the precious metals group known as "Degussa," short for Deutsche Gold und Silber Scheideanstalt. Also Friedrich Flick had been picked up and added to the growing reference library of Himmler fund contributors in the Frankfurt jail. The firm of Robert Bosch of Stuttgart had yielded a great deal of new light on old methods of foreign camouflage. The French pursuit of the Röchlings was reported to have been successful. The men from the electrical equipment combines, Siemens & Halske and the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft, remained to be picked up as soon as Berlin was accessible. Gerhardt Westrick was still on the loose; but he was being tracked. We still needed to question a group of top men in the Ruhr to sketch in more of our picture of the economic backbone of the Nazi State.

The Villa Hügel was hot with discussion about these men when I returned to our joint Anglo-American detachment of investigators. One evening, the British Control Commission's director of economic affairs, Sir Percy Mills, dropped in with his American opposite number, Brigadier General William H. Draper, Jr., an investment banker. At breakfast the next morning, Major Ernest Ophuls, my American executive officer who had been heading our investigation of the Krupps, commented on how strangely the policy of removing Nazis was working out. The Public Safety Branch of Military Government had screened domestic servants at the Villa Hügel the preceding day and found that the laundress was a member of the Nazi Party. Major Ophuls said that it was curious to see so much effort being devoted to purging washerwomen when men like Edouard Houdremont, Wilhelm Tengelmann, Heinrich Dinkelbach and Hugo Stinnes were still running around loose and keeping their jobs. Sir Percy wheeled on Ophuls. "What's wrong with them?"

he demanded. "They were not Nazis; they are businessmen." Ophuls began in a conversational manner to describe some of the things we had been finding out about Sir Percy's businessmen; but Sir Percy cut back sharply and indignantly. General Draper's gritty voice threw in a conversation-stopper with the tone of a brigadier general addressing a major. The Major quietly ate his oatmeal, as though it were spinach with sand in it.

Keeping in mind that Gustav Krupp and the other Rhinelander industrialists were not Nazis, but businessmen, we wanted nevertheless to fill in some details of the success they had enjoyed. Gustav Krupp on April 6, 1938, after the capitulation of Austria, had expressed "deep appreciation to our Führer" for fulfilling "centuries-old dreams." On October 13, 1938, after the occupation of the Sudetenland, he had spoken of the "world-encircling success brought about by the Führer's faith and strong will."

Without the Führer's help, after World War I, the Krupps had successfully prosecuted a claim for £6,150,000 against the Vickers armament firm in Britain for patent royalties on all the hand-grenade fuses that Vickers had turned out for the British army during that war. In settlement, Vickers had turned over an interest in a steel works in Spain, which the Krupps found very useful. The Versailles Treaty limited their steel and armament manufacturing activities inside Germany.

The Krupp records confirmed that in many cases this firm had used its patents to fulfill old dreams. At the time of World War I Krupp had owned two basic patents in the United States covering the manufacture of stainless steel. These had been seized by the Alien Property Custodian and sold to the Chemical Foundation, which then issued licenses to American companies. After the war ended, however, two Krupp patent applications, which had not been seized by the Custodian, were approved by the United States Patent Office. The patents finally issued to Krupp in 1926. Krupp promptly informed all American companies making stainless steel that their licenses from the Chemical Foundation were worthless, because they were now infringing upon the new patents. The American companies capitulated rather than face protracted litigation.

In 1928, Krupp organized the Krupp-Nirosta Corporation of
Delaware, as a patent holding and licensing company. Through its licensing system, Krupp-Nirosta was able both to restrict stainless steel production in the United States and to send reports to Essen showing the exact production in the United States of special steel for turbine blades, aircraft exhaust systems and other uses requiring rustproof or acid-resisting metal.

The president of Krupp-Nirosta was a German citizen, Emil Schill, who had moved to the United States in 1905 to represent various German industrial interests including the iron and steel business of Fritz Thyssen and the Krups. During the next thirty-odd years he gained a considerable experience in representing these German firms. In April 1939, Dr. Schill had felt depressed over conditions in the United States. "The waves of anti-Nazi feeling and movement are rising higher than ever before... You can well imagine that under such conditions life is not at all a pleasure here." In May 1940, after the Germans occupied France, Dr. Schill was happier. He wrote to Essen: "What our soldiers accomplish on land, in the air, and on the sea, is simply unbelievable. No wonder that I buy five to six papers daily."

In December 1939, Dr. Schill sent a proposal to Essen under which Nirosta would take over Krupp's business in the western hemisphere for the duration of the war. As Dr. Schill put it, "There will be many instances where customers of Krupp's special products, who are now cut off from Germany, will look for replacements in American markets." If Krupp-Nirosta took over, he wrote, "The advantage for Krupp lies perhaps less in the sharing of the profits of such deals, than in the maintenance of contact with former customers, and that you, upon the return to normal conditions, would be posted as to what and from whom the temporarily lost customers had bought in the meantime."

Krupp-Nirosta was, however, for legal purposes a non-German corporation having nothing to do with the Krups. The Krupp firm on February 1, 1937 had been unable to redeem certain bonds, part of the Young Plan loans from American investors. This default occurred because of the Nazi foreign-exchange controls. To avoid attachment of the Krupp interest in Krupp-Nirosta by the American bondholders, Krupp transferred the ownership to a Dutch banking firm, H. Albert de Bary & Company of Amsterdam, in May 1937. This camouflage was not wholly successful, because one American group of bondholders managed to find enough evidence of the switch to get a court order attaching the Krupp-Nirosta stock. Krupp, in 1939, reached a compromise with the security holders and immediately set about arranging a new camouflage that would work better during the coming war. To carry out this arrangement the Dutch bank sold its interest in Krupp-Nirosta to an independent company, Wolframerz A.G. of Glarus, Switzerland.

In a Krupp iron mine we found three large loose-leaf binders of Krupp records marked "Wolframerz A.G., Glarus." They showed that the "independent" Swiss firm had retained Dr. Martin Louis, a director of Krupp, as consultant to guide their dealings with Nirosta. The Swiss firm had continued the Krupp practice of naming Emil Schill and Hans von Briesen to serve as their proxies at stockholders' meetings in the United States. The Nirosta group had continued to send the reports on American stainless-steel production to Essen. In August 1939, Schill was in Germany and wrote to Essen from Stuttgart asking for an introduction to Wolframerz so that he could pay his respects to his parent corporation. Dr. Alfred Busemann of Krupp wrote Schill: "We would rather you did not visit Wolframerz. They are merely a holding company, and I do not want to divulge to them anything more about Nirosta which would probably be unavoidable if you visited them."

In January 1940, the Nirosta management in the United States had become worried about the sufficiency of the Swiss camouflage. They persuaded Krupp to allow a change of the Krupp-Nirosta name to "Nirosta Corporation." They also proposed that the controlling shares be transferred to American ownership, with an off-the-record agreement for repurchase by the Krups after the war. The Krupp officials rejected the scheme in July 1940 because they were sure Germany was winning the war and they felt that the Swiss camouflage was enough. In this respect they were wrong. When the United States entered the war, the Alien Property Custodian seized the shares as German-owned, a contention which the Krupp records themselves now proved.
On May 24 and 25, Colonel Kellam and his expert accountant, Leslie Gage, joined Ernst Ophuls and me in questioning directors Schürmann and Brandstatter of Krupp, Hermann Winkhaus, director of Mannesmann, and Heinrich Diakelbach, director of United Steel, to find where the financial records and the personal files of the directors of these three firms had been stored. We had been finding that the kind of records the directors chose to move was often an index of what they considered important either for their own use or to keep from us.

We found that the Mannesmann records on foreign business had been taken by the general manager, Wilhelm Zangen, to Hameln, a story-book town on the River Weser where the Pied Piper was supposed to have drowned all the rats. The Krupp had moved their securities and records of interests in other companies to the old “Hansa” mine at Oker, north of Goslar in the Harz Mountains, and their records of foreign operations to the “Echte” mine, a few miles south of Goslar. United Steel had moved the files of the German national steel cartel, renamed the “Walzstahl Verband,” to the university town of Göttingen, south of the Harz. Their financial records were further to the west at Siegen in Westphalia, and their records on foreign connections were in the “Silberwiese” mine in the Westerwald, a few miles east of the Rhine, opposite Bonn. It was these records, and the men who had gone with them, as well as the records of the Standard Oil-I.G. Farben deals, that occasioned our circuit of the Harz Mountains in the last days of May 1945.

We found Wilhelm Zangen, general manager of the Mannesmann Rohrenwerke A.G., living comfortably in Hameln, where he had moved the more important company records from Düsseldorf. We had brought along Hermann Winkhaus, the technical director, who had been sitting on what was left of the Mannesmann offices in Düsseldorf, to make sure we had no trouble locating the big boss of the corporation that controlled most of Europe’s pipe and seamless tube production. The Mannesmann firm controlled three hundred and twenty-eight mining, fabricating, and sales subsidiaries and normally employed over fifty thousand persons.

Wilhelm Zangen, the autocrat of Mannesmann from 1934 onward, had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1930. He had joined the firm to represent the Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest commercial and investment bank. The Deutsche Bank began to move into control of the firm soon after it was founded in 1890 and gradually forced out the two founders, the brothers Max and Reinhardt Mannesmann. By 1908 the Mannesmann family had no active part. The Deutsche Bank always kept the firm abreast of new developments. When United Steel went into the tube business with the help of American loans in 1926, Mannesmann acquired coal and iron mines, blast furnaces and steel mills and turned out sheet steel, valves and other products in competition with United Steel. The bank always voted between 50 and 80 per cent of the stock of the combine at the stockholders’ meetings and saw to it that officers of the bank were elected to the board of directors and that the representatives of the bank were appointed to supervisory positions in other companies controlled by Mannesmann in Germany and abroad.

The first incomplete list of officials of all the Mannesmann companies, which Zangen and his associates made up for us at Hameln, showed thirty Deutsche Bank officials distributed throughout the world-wide Mannesmann organization. The oil and pipeline companies that were Mannesmann’s biggest customers had representatives on the Mannesmann board to help stabilize the general policies; but these customer firms were themselves part of the Deutsche Bank’s domain. For example, the Deutsche Bank controlled the largest of Germany’s domestic oil companies, the Deutsche Erdöle A.G., known as DEAG, by representing the largest single block of the outstanding stock at annual meetings. The Deutsche Bank had the right to name the chairman of the board of DEAG. Policies of the oil company were agreed upon between the Deutsche Bank representatives and members of the United Steel group, holding the second largest block of shares. The deputy chairman of the board of DEAG was a member of the Poensgen family; and the director general of DEAG from 1939 onward was a former director of United Steel.

The Deutsche Bank treated the combine like a herd of cows to be milked at regular intervals and steered into the political pas-
Mannesmann fattened quickly under the new conditions created for it by Hitler's Reich. The merging of Deutsche Bank control and Nazi Party sponsorship worked smoothly when Zangen was pushed ahead to become general manager. From 1934 onward, under Zangen's management, and with his standing as one of the earliest backers of the Nazis, the combine went full steam ahead to ride the crest of the war production drive. It profited tremendously from the use of slave labor provided by the SS and acquired new properties in Germany and German-occupied countries by “Aryanization” and the other ways open to the Nazi elite. Properties in the Saar, Sudetenland, Poland, France, Holland, Hungary and Roumania were taken over and co-ordinated as parts of the growing combine.

After a few years of Nazi rule, even some of the industrialists who had been part of the original circle of men who brought Hitler to power began to worry about the way Zangen's Mannesmann and Thyssen's United Steel were edging out their old cronies from any role in the tube business. Too late, some of the other west German industrialists banded together to try to keep Mannesmann and United Steel from dividing the entire tube and pipe markets of Germany, domestic and foreign, between them. At the first sign of trouble from the others, the steam roller went to work for Mannesmann and United Steel. In 1938, the Nazi government appointed Zangen chairman of the top organization for mobilizing all the German economy, the Reichsgruppe Industrie. The next year, 1939, the Reichsgruppe Industrie moved onto a larger stage with a series of joint meetings at Düsseldorf between this German group and representatives of the Federation of British Industries, including Sir Percy Mills, to plan the future economic collaboration of Germany and Britain.

Zangen himself was very reluctant to admit to us his part in Mannesmann's successes. In his rasping voice, he denied bitterly having had any special niche in the Nazis' hall of fame; but when he could offer no other explanation in response to Ernst Ophuls's questioning he sulked or tossed back impertinent remarks. It was not until we went back to Düsseldorf, picked up Emil Gobbers, the company's chief accountant, and put him to work with records moved back from Hameln that we got a graphic description of Mannesmann's growth under the Third Reich. René Manès came up from Frankfurt with Ed Rains of the Treasury Department to go into the company's books with Gobbers. They had the Mannesmann draftsmen summarize the results on two large maps drawn in six colors, showing the company's properties by location and types as of 1936 and 1945. Superimposing the two maps was like watching a fireworks display. Each multicolored cluster of holdings seemed to burst and release a shower of new bright spots in all the occupied territories of Europe. To keep this exhibit from being swallowed by our headquarters for its artistic value, our office manager, Sergeant Ed Liddiard, requisitioned a color-printing establishment near Düsseldorf and ran off fifty copies of each map.

We wanted to hear from Zangen about Mannesmann's activities in the western hemisphere. We knew that the Deutsche Bank had given Zangen a free hand once he became general manager of Mannesmann. But Zangen said that he had delegated the management of the combine's affairs in our part of the world to Gustav Köcke. Köcke was not only an early Nazi, but an elder statesman with experience dating back to the period of World War I.

Zangen and all the others said they had no idea where Köcke was. He had retired in 1943 from his position in the management and retained only a nominal directorship, they said. But, of course, since Köcke had been the one who maintained Mannesmann's relations with the western hemisphere, Zangen and the others claimed to know very little about that phase of the business. We finally found Köcke almost by accident when we stopped at Bad Sachsa, high in the Harz Mountains, following a lead to the Standard Oil-I.G. Farben documents which Major Tilley had asked us to get. After we located those papers, the intelligence officer of Combat Command “B,” Major Martin Philipsborn, told us that there was living in a house on top of the mountain an old fellow in whom we might also be interested. It was Köcke.

On a flagpole in front of Köcke's house was a large Argentine flag. Everybody in Germany who could display a flag or a sign of any kind to indicate a non-German identity was doing so. The
country bristled with signs proclaiming Danish or Swiss or Swedish consulates, or branch offices of British and American companies; but this was the only house I came across in Germany that was wrapped up in the Argentine flag. The house belonged to one Max Pahike, a German who had acquired Argentine citizenship years before and had saved Mannesmann’s Latin American outpost, Tubos Mannesmann, Ltda., from Argentine government seizure during World War I. He succeeded in doing the same thing in World War II.

Köcke was pretty good at dodging questions. To judge by his own account, he was one of the most ignorant successful businessmen of the age. It seems he stumbled along for years managing the foreign business of Mannesmann in the western hemisphere without ever knowing anything about what was going on. He knew even less than what the files of Mannesmann Export revealed when we went through some of them at Hameln. According to him, Zangen did not become a Nazi until after he was made head of the Reichsgruppe Industrie in 1938, and was never active in the Party. Köcke became a member in 1934, but said he was never active. Köcke knew Max Pahike only as a friend and had never heard of his espionage work for Germany in South America.

Köcke did not know anything about Gerhardt Wagner either. Gerhardt Wagner had been manager of Mannesmann’s agencies in the United States. We had to piece together the story of what Gerhardt Wagner had done for Mannesmann by putting together various things that Köcke denied knowing. We located a number of documents on Gerhardt Wagner some weeks later in an office in Düsseldorf that pretended to be the Swedish consulate general, but was actually a substitute office of the Mannesmann company. Hermann Friedrich, a director of Mannesmann, also served as Swedish consul general in Düsseldorf. He had taken some of the company’s records and placed them under his diplomatic protection, insisting that we had no right to enter his premises to look for them. Among other papers in this “consulate” were some interesting reports made out by Köcke’s staff in the early part of the war. Several reports in particular were presented to the German Economics Ministry in order to get permission to spend dollars in the United States for Gerhardt Wagner’s salary. According to these reports, Wagner was performing valuable services for the Intelligence Service of the German High Command by transmitting blueprints and other details of machinery orders for war plants in the United States on which Mannesmann’s American agency submitted bids. Copies of letters from the High Command and blueprints and reports from Wagner were attached as appendices in order to convince the Economics Ministry that it was desirable to keep this channel open even at the expense of using some of the precious dollars which the German government wanted to hoard.

From Bad Sachsa we drove to Göttingen to beat the bushes and start driving quail back toward United Steel headquarters in Düsseldorf. The records of United Steel were too near the order of magnitude of the I.G. Farben files for us to take physical possession. At Göttingen, using a list we had found in a desk at the Stahlhof in Düsseldorf, I picked up Otto Feine, the head bookkeeper of the German Steel Association, and told him to take me to the Kaiser Wilhelm Park where, according to the list, Herr Feine was keeping some United Steel records. At an inn in the middle of the park we found eighty-five huge chests containing the central books of Germany’s biggest steel trust.

United Steel, unlike Mannesmann which was controlled by the Deutsche Bank alone, was a bankers’ paradise. The books of United Steel in 1944 showed assets equivalent to $1,200,000,000, considerably bigger than the postwar valuation of the Texas Company or General Electric in the United States, and about on a par with Socony-Vacuum or Du Pont. The parent concern directly controlled three hundred and sixty-eight other companies and in addition had two hundred and twenty-one affiliates and agencies inside and outside Germany. Not one bank, but all the principal German bankers had a finger in the pudding. The very existence of the United Steel combine depended, at its formation in 1926, on the willingness of British and American banks to float bonds with the American and British public to pay the cost of drawing together and expanding a combine that had little economic justification.

United Steel was formed in 1926 by a merger of four concerns: the Rhein-Elbe Union, combined by Hugo Stinnes, Senior, in 1920;
the Thyssen group; the Phoenix group, controlled by Otto Wolff, the Haniel family, and F. H. Fentener van Vlissingen; and the Rheinische Stahlwerke, controlled by I.G. Farbenindustrie. This combine of combines was Germany's second largest industrial complex. But whereas I.G. Farben, the largest, had only ten officers and directors who sat on the boards of other major industrial firms, and only one director who was from the outside—Edward Mosler of the Deutsche Bank—United Steel's board was made up of a galaxy of bankers and industrialists, about fifty in all. Second largest investment bank, director of twenty other industrial and banking firms of the first rank, including the Munich Reinsurance Company and Merck, Finck & Company, the bank which managed Hitler's private fortune.

Others were Johannes Jakob Hasslacher, until his death in 1944 a director of I.G. Farben and of the Deutsche Bank; Alfred Honigman, director of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft; Willi Huber, director of the Coal Syndicate; Alfred Hugenberg, industrialist and publisher, Hitler's first Minister of Economics and Agriculture, and one of the early leaders in the campaign to replace the Weimar Republic with a "strong" government; Johannes Kiehl, director of the Deutsche Bank and of AKU, the Dutch rayon trust; Karl Kimmich, director of Rheinmetall-Borsig, Klockner steel, A.E.G., Flick, Henkel chemicals, and the Deutsche Bank; Gustav Knepper, director of Flick and I.G. Farben subsidiaries and counsel of the RWE utilities network; Paul Marx, chairman of the board of the Commerzbank; Robert Pferdmenges, head of Pferdmenges & Company, Cologne private bank; Hermann Schmitz, chairman of the board of I.G. Farben; Oskar Sempell, director of Siemens & Halske; Carl Friedrich von Siemens, until his death in 1942 chairman of Siemens & Halske and director of Mannesmann; Hermann von Siemens, successor to Carl Friedrich and director of the Deutsche Bank; Heinrich von Stein, partner of von Schroder in the Bankhaus J.H. Stein; Otto Steinbrinck, director of the German National Railways and RWE utilities; and, until his death in 1940, Otto Wolff, head of one of Germany's largest steel exporting firms. Frederik H. Fentener van Vlissingen, president of the International Chamber of Commerce from 1933 to 1937 and chairman of AKU, or Associated Rayon, in Holland was another outstanding member of United Steel's inner circle.

Albert Vögler, predecessor of Ernst Poensgen as chairman, held wide directorships in companies including not only all the more important United Steel subsidiaries, but also such firms as Siemens & Halske, the RWE electrical utilities holding company, the DEMAG machinery and mining equipment works, and at least one of the principal subsidiaries of the Hermann Göring combine. Altogether, the thirty-five members of the supervisory board and board of directors who were active at the time the war started held over one hundred and sixty directorships with other companies. Fifteen were on the boards of jointly controlled subsidiaries of I.G. Farben; twenty were officers or directors of the Flick combine; three were on the board of the Deutsche Bank; three with the Dresdner Bank; eight were with other big banks including the Commerzbank, Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Pferdmenges & Company, and the Bankhaus J.H. Stein. Seven were with the Siemens & Halske electrical equipment combine; seven were with A.E.G., the German General Electric Company; seven were with the RWE electrical utilities; and one or more were on the boards of Krupp, Mannesmann, Klöckner, Haniel, Daimler-Benz, DEMAG, Waldhof, Schering, Salzdetfurth, Kali-Chemie, DEAG, and the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate.

In 1931, despite this blue-ribbon board of directors the combine's debts were greater than the share capital plus reserves; and the company was headed for the wringer. Friedrich Flick, who controlled the largest single block of shares in United Steel, began negotiating with some French steel producers who wanted to buy the controlling interest. The French producers proposed to reintegrate the econo-
mies of Alsace-Lorraine and the Ruhr, cutting out the expensive ore imports from overseas that contributed so heavily to United Steel's operating losses. But the German press assailed this "internationalism" as tantamount to treason; and Flick and the other directors began negotiating with the Brüning cabinet.

Chancellor Brüning's government became convinced that if United Steel went through reorganization, this would be a great blow to the coal, steel, electrical and other heavy industries of Germany. The government first began buying United Steel shares, which had been selling on the market at 25 per cent of par. This raised the open market price to a high of forty-one. Then in May 1932, the government secretly bought the controlling block of shares from Friedrich Flick at ninety, three and one half times what the market had been when the government started to "rescue" the management of United Steel. This transaction not only restored the personal fortune of Friedrich Flick, who retained his place on United Steel's board, but it also saved the fortunes of Fritz Thyssen, Otto Wolff, and others of the blue-ribbon panel that continued to govern the steel trust after government money flowed in to prevent "bankruptcy."

Flick's deal with the Brüning government left Fritz Thyssen the largest private stockholder in United Steel; and in 1933, Thyssen's first reward for his years of financial support to the Nazis was a capital reorganization which gave the government-owned stock back to United Steel and left Thyssen in control. Later on, Flick began to challenge Thyssen's position. He managed to buy interests first in the steel trust's coal mining companies. In the end he succeeded in ousting Thyssen with some help from Göring's right-hand man, Gauleiter Terboven, later commissioner for Norway.

On the outbreak of war in 1939, Thyssen, who had already lost his inside track with the Nazis, broke with Hitler and left the country. By his own account, this was an expression of his disagreement with the war policy.

The star performer who came out as head of United Steel at the end of the war was Heinrich Dinkelbach, who had spent seventeen years as understudy to Ernst Poensgen. In December 1943, Poensgen gave up the chairmanship and retired to his country place in Austria, leaving Dinkelbach to succeed him. In replying to Poensgen's valedictory message, Dinkelbach wrote:

... I have learned a great deal from you. If, among other things in your letter, you make special mention of my work in the Reichsgruppe Industrie ... then I may now tell you that many a success can be credited to me for the reason that I set you up as a model for myself. All these labors are directed towards a closer integration of the economy. Such labors cannot be performed in a spirit of personal self-seeking. There must be a grand plan. Here you were a splendid teacher for me. You never calculated meanly in Marks and Pfennigs for yourself and your company. You always saw the grand plan for the whole ... It shall be my aim to continue my work in this spirit. I hope with you that the Vereinigte Stahlwerke will maintain and strengthen the position in the economy which it has acquired under your leadership and Herr Vögler's.

On our return from the Harz Mountains we sent for Herr Dinkelbach and had him come to our offices in Düsseldorf. We wanted to discuss with him the grand plan of United Steel, and the ideas of the common good and the welfare of the community which he had learned from Dr. Poensgen, as he watched United Steel strengthen its position in the German economy. Since the corporation was always a high-cost producer and would have gone bankrupt if the government had not provided subsidies to make up for cost differences, in what sense was United Steel a strong company? How could it compete on an all-European or worldwide basis if national considerations were cast aside and government gifts withdrawn?

We found that our notions of competition were practically unintelligible to Herr Dinkelbach. What the Germans are inclined to call "competition" has little in common with our conceptions of competition in price, service, or quality. It is more like political maneuvering and lobbying. The lobbying and political maneuvering might be within a privately organized trade association or cartel, or it might be within government ministries or Nazi Party
formations. A strong position in the economy was simply a position in which the directors of the firm found it easy to make arrangements to get what they wanted.

United Steel was the giant in its field, and held its place in German industry partly by the sheer weight of its productive power and partly by the political power of its managers. Some of the other industrial combines made up in other ways what they lacked in financial or productive power. Good Hope, or Gutehoffnungshütte, was one.

The Good Hope complex is the family holding of the Haniel family. These holdings were spread over so many important lines of industry that the individual Good Hope companies, big as they were, were usually not the giants in any particular field. For over a century, coal had been the basis of the Haniel interests. The collieries were located in the Ruhr; but during the French occupation of 1923, the ownership of most of the family's property was transferred to a new holding company in Bavaria, the Gutehoffnungshütte Nürnberg A.G., otherwise known as Good Hope Nürnberg. The range of the combine's interests, beyond coal, iron and steel, included copper and cable works, and factories producing locomotives, rolling stock, automobiles, tankers, ships, diesel engines, steam turbines, farm machinery, mining equipment, compressors, stoves, castings, forgings, pumps, bridges, armaments, ammunition, and synthetic oil. Extensive engineering, steel construction, and shipping interests spread the company's activities far beyond the manufacturing enterprises.

The four main operating subsidiaries of Good Hope Nürnberg employed about 40,000 and had assets valued at $275,000,000. United Steel employed 275,000 and had assets valued at $1,200,000,000. I.G. Farben employed 500,000 and had assets of over $3,000,000,000. Judged in comparison with their potential competitors, in the usual sense of the term, the Haniel companies might appear outclassed; but with the Nazi connections of their management and the Haniel family members, the Good Hope companies had very little to worry about.

General manager of all the Haniel properties, from 1904 until his retirement in 1942 at the age of seventy-four, was Paul Reusch, lifetime friend of Hjalmar Schacht and the first man to whom Schacht turned for shelter when he was released after the Nürnberg trials. Reusch turned over the management to his successor, Hermann Kellermann, who first joined the management of the Good Hope firm in 1918. Kellermann was also chairman of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate, the RWKS. This was Germany's largest coal association, which financed the early activities of the Nazis by levying an assessment on every ton produced by all the collieries in the Ruhr.

The head of the family, Karl Haniel, died in November 1944, leaving Werner Carp, a member of the family by marriage, as the active head of the Haniel clan. Following our tour of the Harz Mountains and the interrogations of the Mannesmann and United Steel heads, we wanted to talk to the available members of the Haniel group in the Ruhr, and then to compare notes by talking to Carp, whom the CIC had detained in the American zone at Nürnberg. Before we could do this, Carp was suddenly freed from detention and turned up at his old offices in Oberhausen in the Ruhr. The first we knew of it was when we found the German social set in Dusseldorf all in a flutter over the return of Mr. Carp. One dowager told us he was such a nice man and such a good friend of Fentener van Vlissingen and Baron von Schröder, as well as other interesting and important people whom he had so often brought to their parties in Dusseldorf. On investigation it appeared that a British major had made a trip down to Bavaria to arrange for Carp's release into his custody and then had turned him loose. The British authorities promptly packed the major off for a two-year term in a British military prison.

We turned our attention to other members of the clan. Dr. Franz Haniel was by that time too old to be active. Alfred Haniel, self-styled black sheep of the family, claimed to be a vigorous anti-Nazi and said he had broken with the Haniel family in 1930. He was living comfortably on his farm outside Dusseldorf, under the protection of American troops especially assigned to protect him—no one seemed to know by whose order. He denied any connection with the Good Hope combine and said his positions were entirely with shipping and coal mining companies which did not belong to
the Good Hope complex. What we found out was that the biggest shipping company in which Alfred was interested, Franz Haniel et Cie., G.m.b.H., was owned 42 per cent by Good Hope and 58 per cent by the coal-mining firm, Rheinpreussen. The Rheinpreussen firm, in turn, was one of the two mines in which Alfred Haniel held stock and directorships. The remaining interest in Rheinpreussen was held by the rest of the Haniel family. The story was similar with the rest of the companies in which Alfred admitted having interests. His “break” with the family had consisted in retaining no identification with the top family holding company, but in helping to manage the mining and shipping properties. In this way, he could have it both ways. He was protected on one side by the good Nazi connections of the rest of the family, so far as his standing in Germany was concerned; and he was assured his position as a good anti-Nazi for external relations, because of his “separation” from the Good Hope combine.

Margaret Bourke-White was photographing the Ruhr for Life magazine and staying with us at the Villa Hugel. She visited Alfred Haniel’s farm at Hubbelrath, near the Autobahn east of Düsseldorf, one afternoon shortly after V-E Day. Among other things, she took a photograph of Mrs. Haniel and the children standing in the doorway. That evening Alfred made a special trip all the way to the Villa Hugel to ask Miss Bourke-White to destroy the negatives. He said that he had been engaged on extremely confidential matters for the United States government and that these things would be jeopardized and great diplomatic complications would result if his present status were publicized. A few days later we brought him into our offices at Düsseldorf for questioning about his diplomatic complications and special status. We noted that his passport showed a dozen trips to Switzerland during the war, the last one in September 1944. The “status” that worried him, it appeared, was his large comfortable house, and a detachment of American troops which had been assigned by orders from higher up to protect the premises. He declined to discuss his extremely confidential work for our government, however. He said his contacts in Switzerland had been with Mr. Allen W. Dulles, head of the European mission of the Office of Strategic Services, and a director of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation.

Here, at the end of May 1945, we were getting an answer to some of our questions about the “Rhineland industrialists.” From the start we had wondered what it was that distinguished this group in the Ruhr and Rhineland from producers of industrial goods in other parts of the world, who have sometimes been known to transact business for generations without finding it necessary to buy themselves a dictator.

The Brüning government had already made a number of concessions to the large combines by decrees and licensing laws that directly limited the power of “outsiders” to engage in business. Industry groups and trade associations gradually got more and more powers under the Weimar Republic, enabling them to pass upon the eligibility of newcomers for licenses to engage in business. Under the Nazis, when the Four-Year Plan was adopted to strengthen the drive for self-sufficiency, the groups and associations got additional powers to allocate and apportion scarce materials or imported materials among the members.

The demands of the “guns, not butter” formula in the over-all economy called for corporations to undertake high-cost operations which, in normal business terms, were not profitable. These operations had to be “made” profitable by whatever bookkeeping arrangements or subsidies might be necessary. One of the first was to prevent competition inside Germany from “un-co-operative” firms which had not yet seen the advantages of joining in the new economic system. A steel company experimenting with low-grade domestic iron ores, for example, had to be protected against companies using higher-grade ores from other sources.

All of these types of controls, including financial controls, controls over the flow of investment, control over the right to expand or to enter into new lines of business, and the power to order the abandonment of small factories and the concentration of production in the larger ones, had a definite effect on the shape of the national economy. Even in a short period of five years, from 1933 to 1938, the so-called capital goods industries increased their activity to 255 per cent of 1933. Certain heavy items like cement, pig iron, crude steel, finished iron and steel, motor cars, and trucks advanced to between three and four times their 1933 level of production. Chemicals and electrical industries more than doubled.
The production in light or consumer goods industries on the other hand went up only to 145 per cent of 1933. Production of vegetable oils and fats fell to 80 per cent of 1933 production, while food stuffs and textiles increased only 25 to 30 per cent above 1933.

We were finding that the very existence of the Rhineland group had depended on their determination to build and maintain a concentration of heavy industry in a place where, by economic and technological standards, it did not belong. They had built so much steel capacity that the rest of German industry could not use it. As Hitler said, “Germany must export or die.” One definition of “Rhineland industrialists,” we decided, is that they are those who combine together to carry out a program of heavy industrial expansion, regardless of economic consequences, and then try to counteract those consequences by looking for a man on horseback.

Each time we touched something new, we seemed to be opening up fresh questions faster than our small forces could find answers. With a growing sense that there were other “Rhineland industrialists” in Britain and the United States, whose concern over their German counterparts might be more than the sympathy of one businessman for another, we were beginning to feel like men working around a power house with uninsulated pliers, and thin rubber gloves.

CHAPTER 8

The Cantilevers

MOUNTAIN peaks would not attract much attention if they were not sitting on top of mountains. In our first drive to find out how Germany was controlled, we had touched some of the peaks. Krupp, United Steel, I.G. Farben and some others stood out in such bold relief that they could hardly be overlooked. But there were connecting ridges in the shadows of these peaks. The Metallgesellschaft A.G. was one.

We had our first glimpse of the files and records of the Metallgesellschaft early in April back at Kronberg in the castle of the princes of Hesse-Nassau. Though it was only a glimpse, it was illuminating. The “T” force team under Colonel Gordon found the lead to this hideaway while they were looking into German experiments with gas masks and decontamination agents to control I.G. Farben’s new war gases.

Kronberg Castle has taken its place in history as the scene of the theft of the Hessian crown jewels by an American colonel and his fiancée. I remember Kronberg Castle as a source of puzzles of the now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t variety. Coming over from Frankfurt we could see the castle at Kronberg across the flat plain of the river Main. Its tower pierced the forest halfway up the side of the Taunus range. But the nearer we approached the castle the less we could see of it. It was lost to view as the road wound around among the trees, until we came upon it suddenly from above. Once inside, we found the contents as perplexing as the approach. Filing cabinets and packing cases were stacked about among elegant surroundings. On the walls were hung, frame to frame, portraits of the members of the British royal family and paintings of the Hessian princes and
June 2 and headed for Frankfurt, hoping to find an explanation and an evaluation of the company's importance.

The main building of the Metallgesellschaft, with its large, high-ceilinged rooms and wide marble staircase, was still occupied by the military government of Frankfurt; but a courtyard in the rear covered a large underground laboratory where a staff of over one hundred German research workers could carry out their experiments with metal alloys, light metals, ores and chemicals. Neither the laboratory nor the main building had been damaged, but the brick annex and the other buildings surrounding the courtyard were a patchwork of makeshifts. The company's employees crawled and shuffled about through the wreckage as they put their affairs back in order. To reach the financial records and the files of the company's directors, we had to scramble up a ladder to the roof, and walk on improvised planks laid across the rafters under the ridgepole.

The dominant members of the board of directors had included Dr. Carl Luer, director of the Dresdner Bank and the Deutsche Bank, and chairman of the board of Adam Opel A.G., the General Motors Corporation subsidiary in Germany; Carl Bosch, until his death chairman of the board of I.G. Farben; Geheimrat Hermann Schmitz, who succeeded Carl Bosch; Hermann J. Abs, managing director of the Deutsche Bank; Karl Rasche, director of the Dresdner Bank and one of Göring's chief lieutenants; Hans Weltzien of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft; Dr. Ludwig Westrick, chairman of the board of the government-owned United Aluminum Works; Hermann Schlosser, chairman of the board of Degussa, and a director of the soap and detergents combine, Henkel & Cie., of Düsseldorf.

This meant, in brief, that three industrial firms, I.G. Farben, Henkel, and Degussa, and three of the big Berlin banks, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, as well as the Nazi ministries of the Four-Year Plan for rearmament, had supplied the over-all direction of the affairs of the Metallgesellschaft.

The company had performed a planning, shaping and guiding function in the Nazi economy, reminiscent of Herr Dinkelbach's...
noble objective of the “greater integration of the economy.” Especially in the production of nonferrous metals, wherever Metallgesellschaft did not itself have the inside track, it had close working arrangements with the companies that did. For example, we already knew that in aluminum, the greatest part of German domestic production was turned out by the government-owned United Aluminum Works, Vereinigte Aluminium Werke A.G. The second largest producer was the Aluminium Werk Bitterfeld, in which Metallgesellschaft had a 50 per cent interest. But we found out also that the company participated on a fifty-fifty basis with United Aluminum Works in the ownership of the central sales office for aluminum at Berlin. In this connection we remembered that in 1939 the United States Bureau of Mines had asked the American consul general at Frankfurt for statistics on German production of light and nonferrous metals. The consul general wrote back that German government restrictions prevented transmission of production data in these fields, but he had given to Metallgesellschaft A.G. the statistics on American production for the same year, 1939, which the Bureau of Mines had previously supplied.

Here were eyes and ears concerned with more than the day-to-day affairs of an industrial machine. Actually two of the directors, Schmitz of I.G. Farben and Rasche of the Dresdner Bank, were destined to be convicted as war criminals for their part in planning and directing the preparations for war and in profiting from German conquests. In the war preparations, the Metallgesellschaft had acted as an agent to stockpile critical materials in which Germany was deficient, particularly copper, phosphates, pyrites, rubber, tin, and aluminum alloys. For some time, it was the sole German purchasing agency for mercury.

This company was one of several German counterfoils, prepared ahead of time to forestall attempts of enemy nations to cut off supplies of strategic materials by means of blockades and “exclusive buying.” The Metallgesellschaft was particularly suited to this work, with its world-wide network of engineering and industrial machinery companies situated in all the important industrial countries. World trade in the nonferrous field has been controlled more by loose agreements and patent restrictions than by the production and sales quotas and price-fixing arrangements which are characteristic of formally organized cartels.

The firm served as a meeting ground where many interests were brought together and worked into a pattern that balanced the interests of the banking and management groups, and of the Nazi government. Investment banks which supply abstract “management,” unfettered by absolute ties to soap, collar buttons, gold teeth or steel rails, are supposed to furnish a kind of balance to an industrial economy. The role of the banker-directors, Luer, Rasche, and Weltzien, we were told, was to keep the activities of the firm directed toward the greater good of all firms in which the banks had a finger, rather than toward the particular good of Metallgesellschaft alone. Karl Rasche, in addition, could represent the needs of the Nazi ministries.

The principal stockholders in Metallgesellschaft were, in turn, companies performing a similar function in other parts of the economic system. The three dominant stockholders were Henkel, Degussa, and I.G. Farben. Degussa, the precious metals combine, was a favorite child of the Dresdner Bank. Its chief stockholders were Henkel and I.G. Farben. The outstanding member of the supervisory board was Carl Goetz, chairman of the board of the Dresdner Bank.

While Degussa’s books showed assets worth only a little over fifty million dollars, it was second only to I.G. Farben in the range, variety and importance of its products in chemicals, metals, and related fields.

Degussa had a growth unlike that of the massive giants of German heavy and synthetic industries. Instead of becoming big in some one product, it grew more like a coral reef. Starting with precious metals processing, the company began to get control of the sources for raw materials and reagents that it needed. These, in turn, yielded by-products that could be used in other kinds of industry. But to make these by-products useful, they had to be combined with certain other materials. So Degussa would acquire the sources of these materials which, in turn, produced useful by-products, and so on, ad infinitum.

Before this company had been in business many years, there was
hardly an industry in Germany that was not completely dependent on Degussa for some essential product in which Degussa held a monopoly or a near monopoly. Beginning with activated charcoal and metals refining, Degussa had ended up in such fields as gas masks and mine-safety equipment. Beginning with cyanides, it had branched off into hardening salts, grinding materials, and tempering ovens for the machine tool industry. Degussa had a practical monopoly of carbon black for rubber tires, refractory materials and temperature-measuring devices for the metals industries; platinum spinnerets and capillary tubes, as well as acetate and cellulose solvents, for the synthetic textile industry; rare earths for manufacture of optical glass; ceramic dyes and glazes for the ceramic industries; insecticides for agricultural use, and so on around the clock.

Degussa controlled so many patents in so many fields, often covering some intermediate product or process that other industries could not get along without, that it acquired an important status in all the industry-wide agreements, or cartels, in all its fields of interest. Most of these arrangements were not confined to Germany alone.

Cyanides furnished us with one example. To the average person, cyanides are familiar only as a principal ingredient in mystery stories. But industrially they are used as hardening agents and in a variety of other uses important enough to be the subject of an international arrangement known as the International Sodium Cyanide Cartel. This organization has fixed production quotas for its members on an international basis. Degussa was the leader of the continental European group. By quietly building up stockpiles of cyanides and then threatening the Anglo-American group with dumping, Degussa several times increased its quota of world exports and shielded itself into a position to settle matters outside of Germany. One by one, companies outside the arrangement were either taken into the agreement, or payments were made to them for not manufacturing cyanides. Failing that, agreements were made that certain quantities would be bought from them at a price far above production costs, if they agreed to limit production, keep prices at a certain level, or limit their activities to a specified market. So far as the United States was concerned, the leading producer, Du Pont, was not legally able to join the cartel. It was agreed in 1932 that no correspondence on cartel matters would be sent to Du Pont in the United States, and that the British chemical trust, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., would act as Du Pont's agent in these matters.

From 1931 to 1939, the Ocean Chemical Company of Ramsbottom, England, was paid about twenty-five thousand dollars a year for not producing cyanide. In 1931, Degussa began paying a Professor Hene, of Berlin, about ten thousand dollars a year for not exploiting his new process for the manufacture of cyanides. When Hene later moved to England and interested the Rand Mines in his process, Imperial Chemical Industries agreed to make a down payment of over fifty thousand dollars and annual payments of six thousand dollars to Rand Mines and Hene to refrain from manufacturing cyanides in England.

One could go on through the list of other Degussa products and find similar arrangements worked out internationally. In 1934, for example, Du Pont and Degussa made a series of patent-exchange agreements establishing exclusive sales territories for the two companies for alkaline metals, cyanides, sodium peroxide, formaldehyde, ceramic dyes and other products. In 1935, another range of agreements was made with the Commercial Solvents Corporation of New York. The Du Pont-Degussa agreements were followed closely by similar arrangements between Degussa and Imperial Chemical in England.

It was one of the anomalies of the occupation of Germany that when the production program actually called for processing some gold into gold leaf, to be used in decorating Bavarian chinaware for export, Degussa had no gold. Our “gold-rush” vaults in the Reichsbank building at Frankfurt contained several hundred million dollars in looted gold not two blocks away from Degussa’s main office, but Germany’s great gold and silver combine had none of its own. Late in 1946, a first shipment of some thirty thousand dollars’ worth of gold bars was flown in from the United States, under an arrangement financed by the Export-Import Bank, with money furnished by American taxpayers.

On June 7, 1945, we completed our first look into the affairs of the
Metallgesellschaft and Degussa, and headed back to the Ruhr. We had to look for the beginning of the chain of corporations that had served as go-betweens for the metal and chemical industries. The first link in this chain was Henkel of Düsseldorf, Germany's largest producer of detergents, glycerine and industrial fats. It was another satellite of the Dresdner Bank. Dr. Hermann Richter of the Dresdner Bank had been chairman of the board of managers since 1942.

Henkel had at least thirty-five important foreign subsidiaries in Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Holland, England, Denmark, Poland, Italy, Roumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and the United States. By agreements of long standing between Henkel and the British and Dutch interests of Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd., the British group had the right to use the Henkel trade-marks and trade names in the British Empire and in France and the French colonies.

Henkel and two of its subsidiaries, Deutsche Hydrierwerke A.G. and Böhme Fettchemie, G.m.b.H., formed a working combination in 1932 to set up a dummy holding company in the United States with a working capital of three million dollars. The Henkel group organized this company, the American Hyalsol Corporation, ostensibly as a patent-holding company to own its American patents on the new cleansing agents, which are the basis of soapless lathers and latherless soaps. Licenses under these patents were issued to American companies working in these new fields. Companies such as Procter & Gamble, Du Pont, and the Richards Chemical Company, for example, took licenses under the Henkel patents. Just in case of future trouble, the German company arranged to have an American appear as the sole owner of American Hyalsol. Actually, when the war did come, this little bit of protection did not work quite so well as they had hoped. The Alien Property Custodian in 1943 seized American Hyalsol as a German-controlled concern, regardless of appearances. But the Custodian's office, too, was only partially successful. After the war, we found that what the Custodian had seized was only the lizard's tail.

This came to light when we got hold of the Henkel & Cie. records at Düsseldorf. We found that even after Pearl Harbor, a Swiss company had been making regular payments to the German company on behalf of American Hyalsol under an arrangement worked out before the war. The Henkel management had anticipated the outbreak of war in 1939 and figured that it would last about six years, or until 1945. They had made provision to have patent royalties paid in advance by the American licensees to the Swiss company for that period. We traced one such transaction in detail.

The American company had first set up on its books a fictitious debt of two million dollars supposed to be due to the Swiss company. Then an American, supposed to be the owner of American Hyalsol, borrowed three hundred thousand dollars from Procter & Gamble as an advance against future payments of royalties which would become due over the next six years. The purpose of the loan was to enable Hyalsol to make a payment against the debt to the Swiss company. This three hundred thousand dollars was then transmitted to Switzerland, ostensibly in part payment on the fictitious debt of two million dollars. Throughout the war, therefore, the Swiss company could make the regular payments due to Henkel of Düsseldorf while the debt of American Hyalsol Company to Procter & Gamble was extinguished bit by bit as royalty payments became due from Procter & Gamble to American Hyalsol.

An arrangement of the same kind had evidently been made with other American licensees. It worked just as well as actual transfer of new funds across the battle lines. But unless, in keeping up the deception, the American cloaks falsified their tax liabilities, there was nothing illegal about the transaction, and so far as the record showed, there was no need for the American licensees to know the real purpose of the advances.

Going over the affairs of the three combines, Henkel, Degussa, and Metallgesellschaft, made it clear that the Dresdner Bank had used them to keep the bank's hand in the affairs of a great many German industries, and as nerve centers for operations abroad. In the early days of Hitler, financial experts were constantly predicting German bankruptcy. Somehow the large bankers had, as a group, pulled together an economy of heavy and synthetic industries, gaining "self-sufficiency" for Germany at great expense, yet without the predicted financial catastrophe. We decided to see how the bankers had kept them in business.
Banks of the Rhine

THE head offices of the central banks were not yet available for investigation. Most of them were in the Soviet sector of Berlin, and it would take four-power agreement to open them up. But the preliminary inspection at Frankfurt was enough to indicate a pattern. We found that the things Germans have been accustomed to call banks fall into about three general classes which are easy enough to tell apart.

First there was the Reichsbank. Like the Bank of England, it was a curious mixture of government and private affairs, taking a global hand in the national finances, carrying out large-scale maneuvers like foreign exchange control, manipulating exchange rates and tariffs, and financing government ministries, while remaining in other respects a privately run bank. Its many branches even provided banking services for depositors.

Until January 1939, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht headed the Reichsbank. At that time he and most of the other directors lost their jobs in an argument with Hitler and his ministers over financing the war program. According to Schacht, they could not go much further with the "guns, not butter" program, concentrating everything on the heavy industries, without going bankrupt. With the war ready to start, Hitler differed on this detail and replaced Schacht with Walther Funk, who immediately eliminated most of Schacht's top staff except Emil Puhl, the acting deputy. Puhl actually ran the Reichsbank from then on, because Funk knew next to nothing about banking.

Dr. Schacht had good reason to worry about the Nazi economy as a banking proposition; but, like most of the "business" we had been examining, the operating machine in Germany often bore little resemblance to the principles of "sound business management" that a person might learn in the Harvard Business School. When Dr. Schacht early in the Nazi regime took on the job of protecting the growing war economy from foreign competition, he did very little that had not already been done privately by the cartels and combines. The innovations that Schacht developed consisted largely of certain over-all controls of foreign exchange, so devised that German money could have different values for different purposes at the same time. In this way, the price of steel inside Germany could be different from the prices at which it might be sold in various foreign markets. Under the Schacht plan, none of these price ratios need have any relation to the domestic or foreign prices of dyestuffs or leather goods. With controls in force over exchange of marks into foreign currencies and vice versa, people expelled from Germany or leaving voluntarily could be stripped of most of their holdings by a very low rate of exchange into foreign money. Germans living abroad could be attracted back to Germany through the promise of extremely favorable conversion rates. Some people have said there were about forty-five distinct types of German marks used for all these purposes. Others have said that the number of types depended on how you counted.

Dr. Schacht simply rang all the changes in using finance as a way to determine what kinds of things are to be produced or sold, and by whom. In other countries, certain things were or were not considered "sound." An unwritten code determined the persons or groups who were allowed to manipulate financial conditions, or change the value of money. In the United States, for example, the Constitution gives to Congress the power to "coin money and regulate the value thereof." But orthodox financial doctrines make it practically an axiom that the power to regulate the value of money consists in saying how much gold is to equal the value of one dollar. Any attempt to change this ratio of gold to dollars, if it is not considered immoral, is at least a highly charged political act. On the other hand, expansion or contraction of the total amount of money effectively in circulation, which in turn has a great deal to do with how much of the stuff of life a dollar will buy, is considered the
proper province of private enterprise. It is as if the Constitution had said: "Congress shall have power to coin money and determine how much gold equals a dollar, but the value thereof shall be determined by private enterprise."

Dr. Schacht and the Nazis changed these axioms so far as Germany was concerned. They lumped together everything that had to do with regulating the value of money and recognized no limitation on the powers of the government to do whatever it considered necessary in managing the currency. In doing this they had the backing of the big financiers and industrialists. The carrot they offered to selected combines and enterprises took the form of tax concessions, government subsidies, legal restrictions on the right of stockholders to interfere with "management," and a variety of administrative concessions that could be granted by officials to anyone who had the proper inside track.

But the Nazi economic scheme went beyond Dr. Schacht's manipulation of the financial rules. For these purposes they needed the services of institutions like banks; but they could not be too fussy about all the rules of "sound investment." What the Nazis needed was the algebra of the bankers, to translate practically anything into business terms; but they wanted no restriction on whatever was to be translated. For example, our group of Treasury men, looking into the affairs of the Dresdner Bank, found that in 1939, Oswald Pohl, in charge of concentration camps for the SS, had wanted a large loan for his "prison industries" firm, the Deutsche Erd und Steinwerke G.m.b.H., or DEST. The Dresdner Bank had granted one loan of five million Reichsmarks to the DEST, which supplied cheap, expendable slave labor for unpopular jobs in heavy industry, with special attention to the needs of firms whose directors contributed to the Himmler fund. But Pohl needed more money. For this he consulted Emil Puhl of the Reichsbank, who also headed the Reichsbank subsidiary, the Golddiskontbank. Puhl found the objective a worthy one; but since the charters of both banks would not legally allow this type of loan, he arranged to have eight million Reichsmarks advanced by the Reich Economic Ministry out of funds deposited in the Golddiskontbank.

The gold-rush teams, tracing the Reichsbank gold, had found still further details of these "banking" services when they checked into the mixture of SS loot and Reichsbank gold, not only at the Merkers mine but in vaults of the Reichsbank branches. Commander Joel Fisher had picked up Emil Puhl's assistant, a man named Thoms, and had taken him along to identify the hiding places. Thoms admitted that he had taken care of the details of an arrangement worked out between Oswald Pohl and Emil Puhl, whereby the Reichsbank would receive and dispose of SS loot and account to the SS for the proceeds. That explained the carefully inventoried bags of gold teeth, jewelry, and other valuables shipped from Auschwitz and other murder camps and stored with the Reichsbank. Furthermore, Emil Puhl's double position as active head of the Reichsbank and as a German member of the private international bank, the Bank for International Settlements, at Basle, Switzerland, made him an ideal "fence" to dispose of some of the gold after it had been melted down into the shape of monetary gold bars.

When the German armies spread over the rest of Europe, the economic arm of the combines was not far behind. As one director of the Dresdner Bank wrote in 1943, he had heard from a client a "very flattering" ditty: "Who marches behind the leading tank? It is Dr. Rasche of the Dresdner Bank." What a few basic controls of finance and the conditions of doing business could do to the balance in Germany between heavy and light industry, they could also do to the economic pattern of a much larger geographic area. Behind the "leading tank" the same controls moved in to turn non-German territories into suppliers of raw materials and semifinished products, and into decentralized agricultural areas which would feed the economic machine centered around German heavy industry.

The job of co-ordinating many of these economic face-lifting operations fell to the men of the industrial combines, acting in their capacity as directors of the largest central banks and private banks. The central banks carried the main load, and the private banking partnerships filled in the cracks. The six centralized commercial and investment banks can be considered most easily by pairs. Two were creatures of the government, each of them combining industrial and banking activities under one management. The Labor
Front Bank, the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit, was set up by the Nazis. The other, the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, was a leftover from World War I. Two were Berlin banks of moderate size, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and the Commerz und Privat Bank, better known as the Commerzbank. The two giants of the Big Six, with head offices at Berlin and branches all over Germany, were the Dresdner Bank and the Deutsche Bank. Besides these, and working under the umbrella provided by the Big Six, were the scattering of small but sometimes very important private banking partnerships, like the Bankhaus J.H. Stein, and Pferdmenges & Company of Cologne. Others were Berlin firms such as Merck, Finck & Company, Delbrück, Schickler & Company, Hardy & Company, or the Deutsche Länderbank. Delbrück, Schickler & Company was a subsidiary of Metallgesellschaft. The Deutsche Länderbank was a subsidiary of I.G. Farben. Other private banks, carrying on largely a brokerage and investment business, could be found in other large cities like Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Munich, most of them attached to one or more of the big family trusts or combines.

The Labor Front Bank was an eye opener for any members of our party who might have entertained the illusion that Nazi rule was fastened on Germany by ideological mumbo jumbo and mass psychology. Postwar Germans of all ranks denied that Nazism had attracted them in any way. But the Labor Front and its bank had provided jobs and the necessities of life for people who had been able to get neither from the lopsided heavy-industry economy of the 1920's. Under the Nazis, all members of the Labor Front, which included practically all wage earners in Germany, had to make regular deposits in the Labor Front Bank. With these funds the Labor Front became a pseudo-commercial concern of tremendous size operating all manner of direct consumer-goods enterprises, like bakeries, food-processing plants, hotels, chain stores, and other establishments. These were set up to provide the Labor Front membership with basic necessities at prices they could pay.

This was not a charitable undertaking on the part of the Nazis. They were being careful not to kill the goose that laid their golden eggs. "Unrest" like the Krupp strike in 1932 had come from the shortage and high prices of consumer goods, which in turn had been the result of overconcentration on the development of heavy industries. Once the Nazis were in, "private enterprise" in the form of the heavy-industry combines, out of whose profits came a flood of Party funds, was left in control of German industry subject only to the channeling activities of Nazi suborganizations like the Reichsgruppe Industrie. This meant that the build-up of the heavy industries was to continue.

It became the job of the Labor Front to correct the lack of balance as far as possible, without hampering the expansion of heavy industry. As a long-term proposition, this would have been absurd. How could most of the labor force be employed constantly in the heavy industries, and yet enough food and consumer goods be secured to satisfy the whole population, including heavy-industry workers? Germany was like a man who spends all his income making payments on a house, a car, a television set, and a hobby shop, and has nothing left to buy food. For a time, while the Four-Year Plan got Germany on a war footing, the Labor Front's enterprises helped to stop the grumbling. Then, when the country was ready for war, as fast as Nazi armies occupied other countries of Europe, a well-organized consumer-goods collection scheme went into operation and stocked the Reich with an unprecedented supply of every type of consumer goods from apples to zwieback. We saw the results in cities like Arnhem, in the Netherlands. Residents told us that convoys of German trucks would go through the city, up one block, down the other, one truck collecting only sheets, one only pillow cases, one only stockings, one just the fur coats. So this organized looting would go on through city after city and country after country. The Wehrmacht did more than just sack and loot individually, as armies have always done. They were dipping systematically into a large reservoir of consumer goods as the only way to supply needs of the German population while they continued the production of heavy goods for war.

The other government-owned central bank, the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, or RKG, was a war-preparations organization of a different kind. It had been geared up long before the Nazis came in. The RKG was owned directly by the government industrial
combine, VIAG, or United Industrial Enterprises. This combine had been set up in 1923 by the German Finance Ministry to operate industrial plants that had been built with government funds during World War I. Under the Weimar Republic, VIAG was used by the German High Command to try out plans for industrial war mobilization. VIAG’s financial right arm was the bank, which extended large loans so that industrial organizations normally operating in other fields like machinery or locomotive-building could take on “educational” military orders for aircraft, tanks, and guns. For example, the largest European locomotive builders, Henschel & Sohn of Kassel, took on the job of building up the Henschel aircraft works, Henschel Flugmotorenbau G.m.b.H., with the help of a loan from the RKG. Both the Henschel firm and RKG supplied managing directors and members of the supervisory board of the aircraft subsidiary. The RKG had assets in its own right of not much more than two hundred million dollars, but in big deals it acted as a conduit for government funds. The RKG helped to finance barter and trade agreements with countries like Spain and Portugal through its barter firm, the Rowak Handelsgesellschaft. This barter agency funneled arms and equipment to Franco during the Spanish war. The RKG also made political loans to Germany’s allies and satellites. After German armies occupied eastern Europe, such loans were used to develop natural resources and to integrate the economies of the satellite states into the economy of Nazi Germany. One example was the Kontinentale Oel A.G., a holding company headed by Wilhelm Keppler, established to create a German oil monopoly in eastern and southeastern Europe, including Roumania.

The other four big commercial banks were privately owned. Their role was to correlate the activities of the big combines which were their clients, and on whose boards the banks’ officers served. The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and the Commerzbank were the fourth and third largest, respectively. The BHG had assets of about two hundred and forty million dollars, in the form of directly owned investments and business enterprises. The BHG had no branches. The Commerzbank had branches here and there throughout Germany; but neither the BHG nor the Commerzbank was important as a spreading chestnut tree. They were the “me, too” outfits of the big league.

The BHG’s management group included Hans Burckmeyer of Berlin, chairman of the board of Schering A.G., the chemical firm, and Duco A.G., recognizable by its name, but supposedly 51 per cent controlled by Schering. Others were Herbert L. W. Göring, nephew of Hermann; Hans Weltzien of Feldmühle Papier, Schering, Metallgesellschaft and the textile firm, Christian Dior; and Rudolf Eisler of Degussa. The BHG, seconded by representatives of Count von Ballestrem’s Silesian coal and steel interests, took the major role in running Schering A.G., the up-and-coming chemical combine that always has hoped to step into the shoes of I.G. Farben. Along with the Commerzbank, BHG had the major voice in the Feldmühle paper works, Europe’s largest producer of paper and newsprint. The power of these two banks to grant or withhold supplies of newsprint was not inconsiderable.

The roster of the Commerzbank included men like Friedrich Reinhardt, who until his death was president of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce and a director of Schering chemicals and A.E.G. electric. Others were Paul Marx of Berlin, director in the Feldmühle works, United Steel, Klockner, and Flick’s Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke; and Dr. Theo Goldschmidt of Essen, head of the heavy chemicals and coal tar by-products firm, Th. Goldschmidt A.G., also part owner of Feldmühle, and director of the potash firm, Kalichemie A.G.

The Commerzbank, while much larger in total assets than BHG, contented itself with supporting roles in important combines like Robert Bosch, Schering, A.E.G., United Steel, Feldmühle paper, and Salzdetfurth A.G., the potash firm which in turn controlled Mansfeld A.G., the copper trust. Perhaps the best illustration of the supporting role played by the Commerzbank was its co-operation with the other big banks in controlling Germany’s fifth largest coal combine, Hoesch A.G. of Dortmund in the Ruhr. This family holding of the Hoesch family and their relatives, the Springorums, was a focal point for agreements and understandings that shaped the rest of the business of the Ruhr. Fritz Springorum, director general of Hoesch A.G. from 1933 to 1938, was for many years chairman of
the so-called long-name association, the Association for Safeguarding the Common Interests of the Industrialists of the Rhineland and Westphalia, an organization with a long and cloudy history as an employers' union.

The other two central banks were the big guns. It would have been hard for us to overlook them. On the main business thoroughfare of every German town are the torn and twisted signs that spell out "Deutsche Bank" and "Dresdner Bank." In Germany alone, there were four hundred ninety branches of the Deutsche Bank and three hundred sixty-eight branches of the Dresdner Bank, besides their central offices at Berlin. The Deutsche Bank owned directly assets valued at three billion dollars; but this is secondary as an indicator of the spread of the Deutsche Bank over German finance and industry. More important than the amount of money were the offices and directorships held by the bank's officers and directors in other German enterprises, and the representation of stockholders at stockholders' meetings that came from having large blocks of shares on deposit from individual investors all over Germany. Some fifty-four officers and directors of the Deutsche Bank, during the war years, held a total of seven hundred seven positions as officers and directors of other corporations. Two hundred eighty-one of these were chairmanships or vice-chairmanships of boards of directors. Slightly smaller figures would apply equally well to the Dresdner Bank with its two and a quarter billion dollars of directly controlled assets.

The strength of the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks came from their union of deposit banking with management and investment functions, a practice not allowed in the United States. In Germany, with securities in all corporations payable to "bearer," most security holders deposited their shares with banks for safekeeping; and the banks voted the shares entrusted to them. We have no strict American counterparts of the German banks, whose capital came not from deposits of money by the partners but from deposits of stock from the whole country.

The banking operations of the Deutsche Bank might be compared with those of the Bank of America in the United States, with its far-flung branches and its hand in the finances of giant corporations. As an investment house, the Deutsche Bank might be compared with J. P. Morgan & Company, with its heavy financial stake in important basic industries. There was one notable difference, however. The Deutsche Bank's connection with well-known enterprises was a matter of constant notice and attention in Germany, whereas the Morgan house in the United States has for years followed a policy of public relations in reverse. At the present time in the United States there is very little linking of the Morgan name with the affairs of the much better publicized industrial firms in the Morgan portfolio. United States Steel, General Electric, American Telephone and Telegraph, International Telephone and Telegraph, Commonwealth and Southern, and many others, are familiar household words to many people who think of the House of Morgan as a feature of a bygone day. A gentlemanly old pirate, J. Pierpont Morgan, once wrestled with the Harrimans and other giants of railroading and industry, but that was half a century and more ago. Not so the Deutsche Bank in Germany. Its name was everywhere and only to a slightly lesser extent were the names of its leading lights: Hermann J. Abs, Johannes Kiehl, Wolfgang Reuter, Wilhelm Zangen, Hermann Schmitz, Jakob Hasslacher, Oswald Roessler, Karl Ernst Sippell, Hermann von Siemens, Philip Reemtsma. The companies they made their special province were equally well known: I.G. Farbenindustrie, Siemens & Halske, VGF rayon, Reemtsma cigarettes, Mannesmann steel tube, the two motor companies, Bayrische Motoren Werke and Daimler-Benz, the DEMAG machinery combine, the world's largest building contracting firm, Philip Holzmann A.G.

The Dresdner Bank as a banking house was comparable to the Chase National Bank or the National City Bank in the United States in the way its officers stayed close to governmental circles and kept an eye on international ties. As an investment house, the Dresdner Bank might be compared to the American firm of Dillon, Read & Company for its specialization in business management with the involvement of very little capital. To some extent there may be a question whether it was Dresdner Bank which supplied management to certain companies or whether it was the management of certain companies which supplied bankers to the Dresdner
The only director of I.G. Farben who came in from outside the firm, for instance, was Edward Mosler of the Deutsche Bank. On the other hand Carl Pfeiffer, an inside man of I.G. Farben, became a director of the Dresdner Bank. Similar industrial experience could be claimed by the chairman, Carl Goetz, and other directors like Friedrich Flick, Carl Lindemann, Otto Burckhardt, Wilhelm Avieny, Karl Rasche, Emil Meyer, and Helmuth Roehnert.

Looking back from the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks through their officers and directors to the industries they had managed and directed, one could see the skeleton of a whole economic system. Aside from the Reichsbank and the three government corporations, the rest of the Nazi hierarchies of trade associations, chambers of industry and commerce, and industry groups were all simply names for special kinds of organizing activities in charge of different members of the same set. The government corporations included VIAG, the hangover from World War I; the Reichswerk A.G. Hermann Göring, medium for armament supplies and reservoir for plunder in World War II; and finally the Rüstungskontor, billion-dollar supply corporation for collecting, stockpiling and allocating scarce and strategic materials. To the extent that these corporations and the Reichsbank were not run by men from the regular banks and industrial combines, they were co-ordinated by other means.

This was not simply banker-control of industry. It was a centrally controlled and planned industrial economy. Even as early as the 1920's, four fifths of German industry was grouped into combines. Under the Nazis the number of corporations, and likewise the number of different individuals planning and directing the whole economy, was simply trimmed down to a much lower figure than before.

Between 1933 and 1942, the number of small corporations capitalized at under 500,000 reichsmarks fell from 5453 to 1843 and their combined capitalization fell from 815,000,000 to 368,000,000 reichsmarks. During the same time, the medium-sized corporations with capital not over 5,000,000 reichsmarks stayed at a combined total reichsmark capitalization of 4,500,000,000 though the number of corporations fell slightly, from 3016 in 1933 to 2684 in 1942.

The number of large corporations capitalized at over 5,000,000 reichsmarks rose from 679 in 1933 to 877 in 1942, while the total number of all corporations was falling from 9148 to 5404. At the same time, the total capitalization of the large corporations rose from 15,200,000,000 in 1933 to 24,200,000,000 in 1942.

Even these figures on total numbers of corporations tell only part of the story because actual control, co-ordination of policies, and "rationalization" within industries and among related industries, were all the concern of a clique that included not more than a hundred individuals. While these men were most easily identified by naming the banks they helped to manage, it was their outstanding character as a homogeneous group that set them apart. A member of the board of the Deutsche Bank, for example, never joined the board of directors or the management of an industrial concern on a personal whim, as if he were joining a club. The bank directors had to give unanimous consent. Once he took the job, the director was personally responsible for seeing that the policies of the company meshed with the general plans of the bank.

This co-ordination of industrial economics through strategic placing of directors was bolstered further by voting control. The Deutsche and Dresdner Banks, having branches throughout Germany, drew the necessary large blocks of important stocks together at Berlin through redeposits from the various branches. As investment bankers, the big banks also had another important way of shaping the relations of different corporations to one another to suit their purposes. New issues of securities originated on behalf of one client corporation would be placed in different proportions by the banks they helped to manage, it was their outstanding character as a homogeneous group that set them apart. A member of the board of the Deutsche Bank, for example, never joined the board of directors or the management of an industrial concern on a personal whim, as if he were joining a club. The bank directors had to give unanimous consent. Once he took the job, the director was personally responsible for seeing that the policies of the company meshed with the general plans of the bank.

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many other things under control. It was once more the familiar principle of the bottleneck or tollgate.

The men who ran the heavy industrial combines like I.G. Farben, Mannesmann, United Steel, and Siemens & Halske may have had individual ambitions that sometimes clashed; but far more powerful was the internal discipline that held them together. They kept their ties to one another without the heel-clicking, cuff-shooting, colored shirts and arm-bands that the Nazis had to use to organize the rest of the population.

CHAPTER 10

The New Hague Convention

SYNTHETIC textiles held a high place in German autarchy. German production of substitutes for cotton, wool and silk fibers became a practical monopoly of four large combines: VGF, the largest rayon concern in Germany; I.G. Farben, the second largest producer, owning six artificial fiber plants; the Phrix Works, largest producer of cellulose wool, organized in 1935 as part of the synthetic materials program; and the Kunstseide Ring, a group of twelve cellulose fiber and by-products companies, also established in 1935 for the same purpose. The Phrix combine and the Kehrl-controlled Ring, as part of the Four-Year Plan, developed a great many processes for using waste products like straw and sawdust to make edible proteins, yeast, wood sugar and synthetic cattle fodder to make up for critical wartime shortages.

Hans Kehrl, in 1941, became chairman of the board of the Phrix Works and brought in Baron von Schröder, by that time also an SS Brigade leader, to maintain ties with the Ring, with VGF, and with the Dutch rayon combine, AKU. The latter connection was made easy, not only because of the corporate connections between VGF and AKU, but by von Schröder’s long and close association with the Dutch head of AKU, Fentener van Vlissingen.

Now we wanted to know more about United Rayon, VGF, and in particular about its ties with AKU in the Netherlands. The general manager of VGF, Ernst Helmut Vits, himself a “Leader of the War Economy,” was back in charge of the VGF plants at Wuppertal, fifteen miles east of Düsseldorf. Throughout the latter years of the war Vits had served as head of the Reich Association for Artificial Fibers, the second of several Reichsvereinigungen
established by Hans Kehrl to regulate and administer the strategic industries. The first was the Reich Coal Association, headed by Paul Pleiger. Vits had already admitted to us that the guiding hands on his supervisory board in VGF were those of Baron von Schröder, Hermann Abs, and Fentener van Vlissingen. But he had insisted that his company’s properties deserved special protection because they were owned by the Dutch AKU. Abs and von Schröder had helped to protect them from seizure by the Nazis; and it was up to us, he said, to see that his trusteeship of VGF for the Dutch owners was not disturbed by the new regulations of the Allied occupying forces.

We were not at all satisfied about the circumstances under which AKU had acquired its supposed ownership and control of VGF back in 1929; and we were also curious to learn how AKU had managed to maintain this control through twelve years of Nazi rule in Germany and five years of Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. Back in the United States some of us had already had an inkling of what we would be up against at The Hague in trying to satisfy such curiosity. Dutch AKU held the controlling shares in three of the largest rayon firms in the United States: American Enka, North American Rayon, and American Bemberg. The Alien Property Custodian had proposed to seize these three as firms controlled by German VGF; but the Dutch government in exile protested strongly to the State Department. The Custodian’s office finally agreed to let the firms alone until after the war when the true ownership could be established. The Dutch agreed, in turn, to make “full information” available as soon as they got access to their records in the Netherlands.

Really “full” information, we knew, would have to include inspection of the records of the Amsterdam banks which were supposed to be holding the majority shares in VGF on behalf of Dutch stockholders; and it would also have to include the right to interrogate van Vlissingen about his conduct of the affairs of VGF and AKU. Had there been no conflict between the interests of AKU, as a Dutch firm, and the activities of VGF as a major cog in the German war preparations? In order to retain control of German VGF, did AKU not have to make any concessions to German policy before the war? How had AKU been a free agent in its own foreign operations, with its biggest block of properties in hock with the Nazis? Since our interrogation of men like von Schnitzler of I.G. Farben, and our discovery of the mechanical principles of the Himmler fund in von Schröder’s bank, we were becoming skeptical of businessmen who asserted that they had been above involvement with the Nazis. Granted that AKU was a big and powerful corporation, had it been powerful enough to talk back to the Germans? Or would it have wanted to if it could? Had not some of its power in fact come from a meshing of AKU’s foreign interests with German plans?

On June 17, 1945, Desmond MacQuaide, my British executive officer, and I left the Ruhr on a brief trip to the Netherlands in search of answers to these questions. At Arnhem the British military government officer told us the AKU factories were only moderately damaged, but that the directors were away. F. H. Fentener van Vlissingen, the head of the firm, was at his home in Utrecht. We would not be able to see him, however, without first getting permission from the Netherlands Military Administration at The Hague.

Most people think of The Hague as a symbol of peace among sovereign nations, and as a source of humanizing conventions designed to take the brutality out of war and to make it more wholesome. Hollanders think of The Hague as the “seat of government” of the Netherlands, in contrast with Amsterdam, the “capital.” This distinction testifies to the “live and let live” relation that exists between the bankers of Amsterdam and whatever political regime inhabits the old buildings, straight out of a Dumas novel, that make up the center of The Hague.

At The Hague our introduction to the Netherlands Military Administration took place under the best possible auspices. At dinner in the Hotel des Indes we met Brigadier Babington-Smith, head of the SHAEF Financial Branch, who happened to be up from Frankfurt on other business. He stayed over until the next day, Monday, to go with us on our round of the Dutch officers in charge of property matters, and to underline the SHAEF interest in our inquiries.
The Dutch officers did not dispute certain facts. The combine, AKU, had been formed July 26, 1929 by an agreement between the shareholders of the Dutch firm known as Enka and the shareholders of the German VGF. Through an exchange of shares the new corporation, AKU, became the record owner of 99 per cent of the stock of VGF. Through this control of VGF, AKU also got a voting control of the VGF subsidiary known as J.P. Bemberg, A.G.

Immediately before the exchange, the Dutch company had outstanding 25,565 shares of common stock. To make the exchange, the outstanding common stock was increased by an additional 28,560 shares, all of which were turned over to the stockholders of VGF. At the time of the exchange in 1929, therefore, the German shareholders received better than a majority of the voting stock. This stock was all in the form of unregistered "bearer" shares; so that no record was kept of transfers or of ownership, except by German and Dutch banks which were holding them for their customers.

The question of voting control in 1945 was first a question of who owned the majority of these common shares, Germans or Netherlanders. If the majority were German-held, the sham "Dutch" ownership of German VGF and of the American companies meant nothing. Even if the Dutch could prove that a majority of the outstanding shares were being held by Amsterdam banks for Dutch citizens, there would still be the possibility that some of these were cloaking for Germans; but we were willing to cross that bridge later. The Dutch officials said it would not be possible to let us go to Amsterdam and talk to bankers, let alone examine their books. The Netherlands Military Administration would appoint an officer to make the necessary inquiries, and he would let us know his findings. When this officer made his "report" a few weeks later, there was no bill of particulars. The report simply asserted that the investigating officer was satisfied that between 70 per cent and 75 per cent of the outstanding shares of AKU were owned by Netherlands interests.

In 1929, there had been 54,125 common shares, of which Germans held 28,560. By 1945, the AKU had outstanding some 93,000 common shares. We had brought with us evidence of two transactions during the German occupation by which the Deutsche Bank had acquired 20,000 shares and the Kunstseide Ring 10,000. This meant that we knew of 58,560 shares which had at one time or another been in German hands; and we had no evidence, as yet, of transfers in the other direction. Even so, the investigating officer's report, still without evidence, asked us to believe that at most 30 per cent, or 27,900 of the 93,000 shares, remained in German hands at the end of the occupation.

There was a further complication. The AKU firm, in addition to the usual voting common stock and nonvoting preferred stock, had outstanding an additional class of stock in the form of 48 "priority" shares. These shares contained an "oligarchic clause," which put into the hands of their holders the sole right to name candidates for positions on the board of directors, and the right to control amendments to the corporation charter. These 48 shares had been allocated in the beginning, 22 to the VGF management, 22 to the Dutch group, and the other 4, at the request of VGF, to the British firm of Courtaulds, Ltd., which was co-owner with VGF in the firm of Glanzstoff-Courtaulds G.m.b.H. of Cologne.

From 1929 onward, the AKU board of directors consisted of Fentener van Vlissingen and two other Netherlanders, and six Germans, including, throughout the war, Baron von Schröder, Hermann Abs, Ernst H. Vits, and Johannes Kiehl of the Deutsche Bank. To counteract this appearance of de facto German control of the management of AKU, the investigation report of the Military Administration contended that while there were many ways in which the Nazi regime could have upset the control of AKU, actually there was no evidence of any case in which the Germans acted against the Dutch interests or challenged the authority of Mr. van Vlissingen. The report went on to state that Mr. van Vlissingen at all times retained physical possession and control of all 48 of the priority shares.

The Military Administration had no reply to other questions we raised on the basis of correspondence found by our party in the files of VGF at Wuppertal. Prior to 1929, North American Rayon and American Bemberg had been owned by VGF. After 1929, they were recorded as owned by AKU. But in spite of the change in record
 ownership, only routine reports went from the American subsidiaries to AKU at Arnhem. All correspondence on business matters and all detailed reports of conditions in the United States, right up to the entry of the United States into the war, went directly to VGF at Wuppertal; and operating instructions went directly from VGF to the subsidiaries in the United States. Still, the Dutch officials stoutly maintained that F. H. Fentener van Vlissingen was master of AKU’s fate and captain of its soul.

On our way back to Germany from our initial trip to The Hague, we stopped off in Utrecht to call on Mr. van Vlissingen. He was polite, even cordial in a cool way; but he regretted that under orders of the Netherlands Military Administration he could not talk to strangers about the affairs of his company except on written instructions from The Hague. He said he had, of course, been on the board of United Steel in Germany; and he had served as a director of two coal-mining subsidiaries of the Flick combine, in addition to his work with VGF. From 1933 to 1937 he had been president of the International Chamber of Commerce, the organization of which he is now treasurer, under the chairmanship of Philip D. Reed of General Electric. His international affairs kept him busy in all parts of the world. Because of his outstanding position in international business activities, Rollins College in Florida had awarded him an honorary LL.B. degree in February 1937. He did not care to discuss the fact that in July of the same year, Adolf Hitler decorated him with the starred Merit Cross; or that on July 5, 1940, after the Dutch surrender to the Germans, he became chairman of the Dutch National Committee for Economic Collaboration. When we saw him on June 18, 1945, he was already heading the commission appointed by the Netherlands Military Administration to purge collaborationists from the Dutch government and from important positions in industry.

We returned to the Ruhr as puzzled by the official Dutch definition of a “collaborationist” as we had been by the Luxembourgers’. Somehow the function of a go-between to maintain smoothly working financial and economic relations across national boundaries during a war is tacitly accepted in the business community as part of civilized warfare. During the fighting, these matters are kept rather quiet out of deference to people who are being shot or bombed and who might become confused if the subject were raised.

The peculiar power of Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and even much smaller nations as Luxembourg and Lichtenstein, rests on their ability to act as go-betweens for the bigger powers that surround them. These countries have been like our own State of Delaware, furnishing a nominal legal headquarters for large corporations whose world-wide activities are controlled from somewhere else. But Delaware, aside from furnishing a nominal haven for “Delaware corporations,” also has its Du Pont. The same is true in Europe. Sweden has its SKF bearing monopoly and Enskilda Bank; Luxembourg has its Arbed; the Netherlands have their AKU rayon and Philips electric. These firms are big fish in their own right, whatever services they may perform for “foreign” corporations. If one of these big fish sets up shop in a small place like Delaware or the Netherlands, it becomes a whale in a fish bowl. Then even a casual observer can see a difference between the “capital” and the “seat of government” of the little nation.

In spite of this lack of balance between political and economic forces, when we get into the discussion of postwar reconstruction plans, we run into a diplomatic fiction that sovereign nations are sovereign nations. The men who sit around the international conference table are representing France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg. Diplomatic protocol forbids looking behind the screen. It would be hard to imagine a newspaper dispatch from The Hague beginning, “Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the Société Générale de Belgique, AKU rayon, and Arbed steel met today to discuss the division of financial aid under the European Recovery Program.”

After our experiences in Luxembourg and the Netherlands we knew some of the ways in which the German economy of the Four-Year Plan could easily be carried along into the postwar reconstruction of Europe. Solid foundations had been laid in the countries bordering on Germany. Here were leading citizens of the “liberated” territories ready to defend the interests of “their” companies in the operation of strategic industries which the Nazis had expanded into bastions of German self-sufficiency. We had already
seen how the Ruhr became the heart of European heavy industry, through concentration of high-cost iron and steel plants. Now we were confronted with the coal-hungry synthetic industries in Germany, built for autarchy, but offering to take on the role of kingpins in the reconstruction.

CHAPTER II

Electric Eels

THERE is a sound instinct that leads most people to look skeptical when a demand for a business advantage is said to have come from the “Government of the Netherlands,” or from any of the other small ponds in which big fish swim. During the war, the counselors of some of the smaller embassies were familiar figures in the corridors of the State, Treasury and Justice Departments. Of these, few were more active than the counselors of the Dutch Embassy on behalf of a certain big fish which was always served with sauce Hollandaise. This was the electric lamp and radio tube combine, N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken, or Philips Electric Lamp Works, Incorporated, of Eindhoven, Holland—more commonly called Philips.

Presumably something had happened to the Philips properties in the Netherlands during the German occupation; and in 1945 we wanted to know what it was. But the tight blockade which the Netherlands Military Administration had put up against investigations of Dutch companies meant that we would have to use less direct ways to find out. As a producer of electric lamps Philips was only the second largest in continental Europe, with a production a little less than half that of the German firm, Osram, which dominated the European field. The Philips position in related fields such as radio sets, radio tubes, radar and X-ray equipment was similar. The German opposite numbers were different corporations, though parts of the same complex with Osram. German Osram was a jointly owned enterprise of Siemens & Halske and A.E.G., the German General Electric Company, as was Telefunken, the German radio combine.
Philips of Eindhoven had for a long time been a cogwheel between the German firms and their American partners such as General Electric. In 1935, for example, H. F. van Walsum of Philips had written to Clark Minor, head of International General Electric, in connection with an international agreement which they were then negotiating. As Mr. van Walsum put it: "We have... refrained from embodying in the present draft the provisions agreed between the German firms and their American partners such as Siemens and us on minimum selling prices and conditions. It was rather difficult to do so and at the same time keep the agreement free from conflicts with the American antitrust laws. We are, therefore, content to leave this understanding to a gentlemen's agreement between you and us, which will, we are sure, be carried out by both of us in the spirit in which it was entered into."

When Philips officials found themselves charged with violating the American antitrust laws because several such gentlemen's agreements had come to light they even asked the American courts to rule that foreign corporations like Philips, doing business abroad, might make agreements among themselves or with American corporations without fear of American laws. As they put it, "a different test must be applied when considering the legality of actions of foreign corporations whose activities are wholly abroad." This plea for special treatment under the laws was unsuccessful; but with its protected position in "neutral" territory Philips could be the center for understandings and arrangements which the parties could then carry out in other territories like the United States without any outward signs of direct collaboration. Any similarity in the courses of action of Dutch, German and American firms would be purely coincidental.

If we could not find out directly from the Philips headquarters at Eindhoven what the company's executives had done under the German occupation, we might uncover some of the story from the officials and records of Siemens and A.E.G. at Berlin. However, this would give us only part of the story, as we already knew from our brushes with refugee Philips officials in the United States during the war. They had enjoyed the protection of what amounted to diplomatic immunity in Washington; and it had proved impossible to piece together a satisfactory picture of Philips operations on both sides.

Philips executives knew before the war that if the Netherlands were invaded, they might have some trouble in keeping control of their properties on both sides of the battle lines. They got the Dutch government to pass a law permitting Philips to move its head offices to Curacao in the Netherlands West Indies, and to leave the offices at Eindhoven in the charge of trustees with limited powers to carry on the business in the event of occupation.

The new head office at Curacao controlled directly the Philips subsidiaries in the Dutch East Indies, Sweden and Switzerland. It established two provisional trusteeships over Philips companies in the British Empire and in the rest of the world outside of Axis territory. The Midland Bank of London took control over the companies in the British Empire. The Hartford Bank and Trust Company was given control over Philips companies in North and South America, Spain and Portugal. If England should be invaded, control of the British Empire properties in other parts of the world would automatically go to the Hartford trustee. Philips properties in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were placed under a trusteeship of a German holding company headed by Dr. Karl Mey, who had previously served as director of German Osram.

All these trust agreements were so drawn that the Dutch executives of Philips kept the power to control properties and affairs of the combine anywhere in the world, so long as they were outside Axis territory and free to act. The German trustee would take over wherever the Axis moved in. The trust agreements provided for re-establishment of the prewar holding company setup under its original Dutch control, as soon as the war emergency was over.

This holding company arrangement was good business so far as the Philips company was concerned. All of their properties, both in United Nations and in Axis territories avoided seizure by alien property custodians throughout the war; and none of the branches was even blacklisted by any of the belligerents. Every time an agency of the United States government began to ask questions about the setup through which relations were being continued between Philips branches in the United States and other elements of
the Philips network, especially those in Axis territories, diplomatic representations were immediately made to the State Department. This sounds at first like a small annoyance which should not have prevented government agencies from doing their jobs. But we found that every time a formal complaint is lodged with the State Department about the activities of even a minor official of some department, the offices of two cabinet members and their highest ranking subordinates are tied up for days drafting formal letters and replies to one another. The offending official soon learns that whether he is right or wrong, it is not a good idea to cause questions to be raised. In our case, we told our staff to go ahead and ask questions about Philips; but we had to pay for it by helping to draft a series of replies from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State.

In effect, the business arrangements of a company like Philips got into the diplomatic pipes. All the procedures that normally apply to serious questions of intergovernmental relations were turned on to stop even the simplest inquiries. The effect was something like what happens in slapstick comedy when the plumber and the electrician get power lines and water pipes mixed up: frost on the radio, Bing Crosby in the bathtub, and bedlam in between. A hard-working section chief tries to find out whether a Philips official from the Argentine, whose wife is a member of the Falange, and whose yacht carries a fascist motto for a name, ought to be allowed to enter the United States and have the free run of Philips plants turning out secret radio equipment for the army. Suddenly he finds the State Department behaving as though he had committed an act of military aggression against the Netherlands government in exile. After one or two such experiences, even a very good section chief might prefer frost on the radio.

To make matters more complicated, Philips executives assigned to the United States somehow persuaded some colonels and generals in Military Intelligence that it would be a good idea to give Philips permission to ship materials through the blockade into Axis territories. The idea was that company officials from our side would be able to go with the materials and meet their partners from the other side. Then they could bring back information about conditions in Axis territory. Some of us suggested that such a pipeline could easily be a two-way affair. We wondered what kind of return information was valuable enough to exchange for goods and information both. We had already showed how it was possible to get such things as blueprints of the Eindhoven plants from the files of American insurance companies which had handled the re-insurance on Eindhoven before the war. Other types of business data, accurate up to a month or two before Pearl Harbor, could be obtained from businessmen already in the United States who had been in Holland. What “up-to-date” information of a kind available to businessmen was worth the price? It seemed likely that what came back through the pipeline would be the gossipy chitchat of intelligence reports. Most of those we were already receiving from Switzerland were less informative than dispatches from the front page of the Times, though stamped “secret.” But the lure of vicarious espionage prevailed. When Corwin D. Edwards, chief of the Policy Section of the Antitrust Division, disclosed in a monograph for the Kilgore Committee early in 1944 what we had been able to piece together about the operations of the Philips companies, without having access to “secret” sources, officials from the Dutch Embassy cried that publication of these disclosures had endangered the lives of Philips officials in Axis territory.

While Philips officials played junior G-man with American officers of the chairborne division in the Pentagon, relations of a more substantial sort continued among the Philips companies in United Nations, neutral and Axis territories. In 1942, Philips executives in the United States proposed to transfer the ownership of certain patents in Spain, owned by a Spanish Philips company, to other Philips interests in United Nations territory. The German-controlled Philips company in the Netherlands protested. The Philips officials in the United States reversed their decision and even transferred to the Spanish company all Spanish patents held by the Curacao head office.

In Sweden, the Swedish Philips company and the German radio concern, Telefunken, who were partners in a number of agreements, had joined in some patent litigation against other Swedish companies in 1942. The Philips interests in the United States helped
out in this joint venture between Swedish Philips and German Telefunken by sending their power of attorney to the Philips interests in Stockholm to aid in prosecution of the suit.

In Portugal, the Portuguese subsidiary, acting under the American trusteeship, got supplies from both the United States and England. At the same time it also received patent applications from Eindhoven and filed them in Portugal to obtain patent protection in Portugal on behalf of the Netherlands company. The Portuguese branch sent to New York reports of agreements between the Netherlands company and German industrialists, and it received from New York reports of Philips activities in the United States and Latin America. The Portuguese branch received financial support from the Argentine Philips company, which was subject to the United States trusteeship; but its accounts were audited by accountants of the Netherlands office.

Philips officials in the Axis-controlled territories did not get quite the same run of the roost as did their opposite numbers in neutral and United Nations territories. One member of the Philips family, Frits Philips, stayed in Eindhoven to manage the properties in Axis territories. But the Nazis put officers from the German branches in charge of Philips properties in all Axis territories, and also replaced many of the Dutch officials at Eindhoven.

For our purposes, we were not so much concerned with who had done what in the Netherlands, as we were in reaching accurate conclusions about the working of the system in Germany, and its effects in other parts of the world. In the case of these electric companies the German group in the international ring had again been playing “king of the mountain.” But the source of their monopoly power was not so immediately apparent. In the struggle with France over control of the iron and steel industry, the Germans had perched on top of a huge coal pile placed in Germany by nature. In the struggle for dominance in chemicals and light metals, they had perched on a heap of patented technology, placed in Germany by the historical accidents of war, the shortage of natural raw materials, and the willingness of foreign competitors to trade control of technology for protection of their own domestic markets. In the field of electrical equipment, lacking undisputed control of patents and technology, they had built a “mountain” of contracts and gentlemen’s agreements. The electric lamp agreement was only one out of many arrangements in electrical equipment.

In the case of electric lamps, the world’s principal manufacturers shortly after World War I set up an organization named Phoebus in Switzerland. The different companies then transferred to this Swiss company their rights to control the particular bits of lamp technology which each of them had previously acquired or developed. By a pyramid of agreements, many of them individually worked out through protracted negotiations, the lamp companies built Phoebus into a supranational planning center that could be used to control and plan the lamp trade of the world.

Actually, the opening maneuvers for control of the world electric-lamp trade began with a series of internal arrangements in Germany at the end of World War I, before Phoebus was born. At that time the German lamp market was supplied almost entirely by three German manufacturers: Siemens & Halske, A.E.G., and a smaller company, the Auergesellschaft, subsidiary of Degussa and better known to an earlier generation of Americans as the source of the patented “Welshach” gas mantle. During World War I, all three companies lost their foreign branch factories and their rights abroad to the use of the trade-mark “Osram” for electric lamps. Custodians of enemy property in the countries with which Germany was at war took away these foreign subsidiaries and the rights to the trade-mark “Osram,” and turned them over to non-German nationals.

In 1919 the three German companies created a new company known as Osram G.m.b.H., Kommanditgesellschaft, a limited liability partnership, for the purpose of combining their forces to regain the lost foreign properties and markets. Each partner transferred to the new firm, Osram, its own lamp-manufacturing division, its lamp patents, and its technical personnel and files. The founding companies agreed to refrain individually from lamp manufacture. With their combined power they were then able to merge into the Osram firm all the remaining independent manufacturers of Germany.

Osram then started to get control of foreign lamp companies. In two notable instances, in the cases of the leading American and
British companies, Osram confined itself to reaching working agreements. It was not necessary for them to engage in a struggle for power. The A.E.G. of Germany was largely controlled by the American company, General Electric. Similar ties made cousins and nephews of all the other interested firms in Germany, Britain and the United States.

Possible “foreign” competition outside of Britain and the United States led Osram to formalize the international organization. It was in 1924, to reach agreement with large companies such as Philips of Eindhoven, that the Osram group proposed the formation in Switzerland of Phoebus, with each of the participating companies sharing in the ownership and management. The Phoebus setup enabled the British, German and American companies to bring in some twenty-seven other firms. All of them agreed to pool their interests and to establish quotas for the sale of lamps in world markets. The quotas and voting rights in the control of Phoebus were fixed by the bargaining positions of the participants at the time the organization was formed. Osram became the largest quota holder, and had the largest voting rights.

By July 1929, Osram and General Electric’s subsidiary for foreign operations, International General Electric, created a “partnership for all time.” At the time of the 1929 agreement the American ambassador to Germany reported to the State Department that Osram, by making General Electric a full partner, had succeeded in enlarging its markets and at the same time drawing General Electric into the established arrangement of the international electric-lamp business. He pointed out that General Electric, on its part, not only had made an attractive capital investment and gained greater influence in the international lamp business, but also, at one sweep, had established a close working connection with all branches of the central European electrical industry.

From 1929 onward, the relations between Osram and International General Electric developed along lines similar to the working arrangements of I.G. Farben with its foreign partners. The American firm, by adhering to quota agreements and arrangements for keeping out of marketing areas reserved by the Osram group for itself or its other partners, received in return the protection of the combined technology and patent rights of the whole group. With this power, General Electric could and did beat down any threatened competition in the American domestic market.

With the world trade in electric lamps arranged by agreement, it became possible for all the Phoebus companies to direct some of their technical research toward increasing the “efficiency” but at the same time reducing the lifetime of their lamps. The lamp bulbs which we have to replace more and more frequently in our home light sockets burn out quickly by international agreement. The two biggest worries of lamp manufacturers were the possibility of price-cutting and the danger that electric lamps might last too long. The General Electric Company persuaded the other Phoebus companies to adopt the General Electric “formula” for arriving at the “economic life of lamps.” Upon the adoption of this formula in 1924, General Electric’s European representative wrote home: “This is expected to double the business of all parties within five years, independently of all other factors tending to increase it.” Thanks to the Phoebus arrangement, an average householder like myself now replaces sixty burned-out electric lamps of all shapes and sizes in the course of a single calendar year, instead of the fifteen which would have been a good average twenty-five years ago.

As early as 1934 some members of the Phoebus group became worried because other members were manufacturing lamps designed to operate at voltages slightly higher than those of the standard home lighting circuits. These lamps would last too long when operated at normal voltages. A.F. Philips, head of the Dutch firm, wrote to Clark Minor of General Electric on January 30, 1934 that “...there seems to exist in various territories a growing tendency to supply lamps for higher voltages than in the past, which therefore leads to the conclusion that in a great many cases such lamps are being underrun.

“This, you will agree with me, is a very dangerous practice and is having a most detrimental influence on the total turnover of the Phoebus Parties. Especially with a view to the strongly decreased prices in many countries, this may have serious consequences for Phoebus and after the very strenuous efforts we made to emerge from a period of long-life lamps, it is of the greatest importance...
that we do not sink back into the same mire by paying no attention
to voltages and supplying lamps that will have a very prolonged
life."

Mr. Minor wrote back: "I quite agree with your proposal."

Whenever this point is raised publicly, which is seldom, the stock
answer of the producing companies is that they have reduced the
lifetime of the bulbs to increase their efficiency in the use of electric
current; so that less current is required to produce the same amount
of light. Savings to the consumer from short-life bulbs would
depend on using bulbs of smaller wattage, thereby cutting electric
bills. It may be that in localities where electricity is expensive
some consumers have cut down wattage enough to make up the cost
of buying more bulbs. But no financial benefit comes to the average
householder who goes on replacing sixty-watt bulbs with sixty-
watt bulbs, regardless of whether or not there has been a slight
increase in candle power. Besides, in all this close figuring, no con-
sideration is given to the trouble of frequent replacements, or to the
fact that the price of bulbs could have been reduced to present levels
without shortening their life.

A spokesman for General Electric put the case for the short-life
bulb this way: "When the life of an incandescent lamp is shortened
its light output is increased." What he did not mention was that
there are ways of increasing light output without shortening lamp
life. Technicians long since have discovered new filament materials
— patented, of course — which could make "high-efficiency" bulbs
that would last many times the present life of seven hundred and
fifty hours. The lifetime bulb, like the "everlasting safety match,"
has stayed on the shelf since the time of its discovery.

Many more illustrations of practices like these have been spread
on the record of Senate committees in the United States; and we
found nothing amazingly new in the cascade of further particulars
that turned up in Germany. What did become clearer was the range
of new possibilities that such a union of forces opened up. One of
the original motives was to establish uniform practices and uniform
conditions among all producers. If possible, the public should be
kept from noticing the difference when the product was gradually
cheapened structurally faster than it was cheapened in price. But

in any event, even if the public did notice the difference, there
should be no easy alternative like buying another brand.

So far the motive could be classed as a "business" motive, leaving
aside questions of good or bad. But once the means had been
devised to present an unbroken front in all dealings with the
"public," we had found that — in Germany at least — it was only
a step to the unbroken front of the Himmler Circle.

This was what we had to face. We knew that if anyone should
try to wade into a system of this kind and talk about it in terms
of supply and demand, competitive marketing by independent
enterprises, and other notions of a "free economy," the confusion
could be practically boundless. Yet even as we completed our find-
ings, new arrivals were pouring in from the United States to take
up jobs with the occupation forces and military government. Their
fresh faces showed mixed horror at the bomb damage and pity for
the German civil population. The phrase "just like us" could be
heard more and more often in the big army mess at the Farben
building in Frankfurt. As mid-August came on, with its shorter
days and cooler nights, echoes of "not Nazis, but businessmen" made
some of us feel suddenly chilly, and a little old, and a little tired.