NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE L, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

PART 1
ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES
APRIL 27, 28, 29, MAY 2, AND 3, 1949

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statements by—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Warren R. Austin, Chief, United States Mission to the United Nations</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. William Averell Harriman, United States Special Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Robert A. Lovett, Former Under Secretary of State</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m. in the Senate caucus room, 318 Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), George, Thomas of Utah, Tydings, Pepper, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, and Lodge.

Also present: Senators Tobey, Ferguson, Donnell, Knowland, Jenner, McGrath, and Watkins.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This is a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for the purpose of holding hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty. We are glad to have visitors, but we must enjoin upon them the duty of preserving quiet and not interrupting the committee on its deliberations.

The committee is glad to have Senators sit in these hearings. We want the widest possible information respecting the treaty to go to the people of the United States, and we will thank the press for carrying those reports to the people of the country. We would like to have the facts and the truth.

For the convenience and information of the committee and the Senate a copy of the North Atlantic Treaty will be printed in the record at this point.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**ARTICLE 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**ARTICLE 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

**ARTICLE 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**ARTICLE 6**

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

**ARTICLE 7**

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**ARTICLE 8**

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

**ARTICLE 9**

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done at Washington, the fourth day of April, 1949.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
  P. H. SPAAK
  SILVERCHUYS

For Canada:
  LESTER B. PEARSON
  H. H. WELLS

For the Kingdom of Denmark:
  GUSTAV RASMUSSEN
  HENRIK KAUFFMANN

For France:
  SCHUMAN
  H. BONNET

For Iceland:
  BJAARNI BENEDIKTHSON
  THOR THORSS

For Italy:
  SPOZEA
  ALBERTO TARCHIANI
The Chairman. The committee is honored today by having present Secretary of State Acheson, who will be the first witness to be heard. Mr. Secretary, proceed in your own way. The questions of the committee and others will be deferred until you have finished reading your statement, if that is agreeable to you.

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely agreeable, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Acheson. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4. That treaty is no new document to you. It has been developed, to an extent without parallel in my knowledge, as a cooperative enterprise between the executive and legislative branches of the Government and particularly between the Department of State and this committee. Without the vision and assistance of your chairman, of your former chairman, and the members of this committee, this treaty could never have been concluded. The text embodies many constructive suggestions from members of the committee.

The President has spoken on the treaty in recent weeks, and the Department of State has made available a considerable amount of source material regarding it. Since you already have in your possession some of what I shall say today, I shall make my statement as short as possible and will then be at your disposal for questions.

I should like very briefly to review with you the reason for this treaty, and its purposes.
It has been well said that "Everyone wants peace, but not everyone is prepared to work for it." No people in this world want peace more than the American people. They have always wanted it, they have sought it in various ways, but they have not always been ready to work for it. If we wish peace, we must be prepared to wage peace, with all our thought, energy, and courage. That is the purpose of this treaty.

**TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLICY**

When the United States was a small and weak country, isolated by many weeks from other continents, our forefathers wisely based our foreign policy upon the realities of those times, and we managed to stay apart, to a large extent from developments in other lands.

However, our responsibility for assisting in the maintenance of peace beyond our borders has been long recognized and assumed. For more than a century and a quarter this Government has contributed to the peace of the Americas by making clear that it would regard an attack on any American state as an attack on itself. We gave our unilateral declaration to this effect. As the years passed and our neighbors to the South grew in stature, they accepted a similar responsibility.

But beyond this responsibility, we did not see clearly the impact of an unstable world on our security. In 1920 many nations of the world joined in an attempt to maintain international peace and security through the League of Nations. Although the President of the United States had played a leading part in drafting the League Covenant, the United States was not prepared to enter the League, and we withdrew from the participation with other nations in their first effort to wage peace on a world-wide basis. As a consequence, we had no effective means to prevent the Second World War.

**IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON AMERICAN POLICY**

But by 1945, after the tragedy of involvement in a Second World War, we realized fully that times had changed, drastically and irrevocably. It is the responsibility of this generation to base the conduct of foreign affairs upon the realities of today. Today no place on earth is more than a few hours distant from any other place. Today neither distance nor ocean nor air affords security. Security today and henceforward can only be assured, in the President's words, by stopping war before it can start.

**THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

In 1945 a new and greater effort for the maintenance of international peace and security was undertaken in the establishment of the United Nations. In the preamble of the Charter the peoples of the United Nations expressed their determination—

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind * * *.

And for these ends—

the Charter goes on—

To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors; and
To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security; and
To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods,
that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest * * *.

These are the words of the Charter.
The first purpose of the United Nations, as stated in article 1 of the
Charter is—
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The American people overwhelmingly accepted this commitment
and the other commitments laid down in the Charter. They showed
not merely their desire for peace but their determination to work for
peace through full participation in—
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression.
The hopes of the American people for peace with freedom and justice
are based on the United Nations.

COMMITMENTS IN UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The Charter not only spells out, as did the Kellogg Pact, the essen­
tial principle of settling disputes by peaceful means instead of war;
it goes much further. The Charter commits all members of the United
Nations to certain principles in the conduct of their foreign
affairs which would, if carried out, do a number of things. First, they would
secure peace and do away with the use of force as an instrument of
national policy. Second, they would establish the right of nations to
independence and self-determination. Third, they would establish
that economic, social, and other problems can and should be worked
out by international agreement and for the benefit of the peoples of
all countries. Fourth, they would recognize and further human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Here is more than a vague expression.
These are the foundations of a world system, based on law, which
would do far more than merely prevent war.
Still, the Charter goes further. It establishes machinery and pro­
cedures for furthering these purposes. The fundamental fact of the
Charter is that these mechanisms and procedures are the institutions
and procedures of free peoples, based on solving difficulties and mak­
ing progress through investigation of facts, free discussion, and deci­
sions by adjustment among representatives of the member nations,
all of whom accept and are attempting to achieve the purposes of the
world organization.

NONACCEPTANCE BY A MINORITY OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES

Now, any organization of free individuals or free peoples, whether
it is a private one or a national one or an international one, must
proceed upon the basis that the vast bulk of those within it are firmly
attached to the basic principles of the organization and are trying to
carry them out. If this is so, adjustments are made within the area of common purposes; and, no matter how sharp disagreements may be, there are common principles to which appeal may be made and which basically govern the conscience and behavior of the members. Whenever a powerful minority repudiates the basic principles and uses the procedures to accomplish directly contrary purposes or to frustrate the organization, then it obviously will not work as intended.

Here lies the basic difficulty which the United Nations has faced—a difficulty which would produce serious problems in any international organization, however perfectly devised. This difficulty is that a powerful group, even though a minority, has not genuinely accepted the purposes and principles of the organization and has used its institutions and procedures to frustrate them. This is not a defect of machinery. It is a defect in the basic attitude of some of the members which no change of machinery or procedure can cure.

ABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS TO FUNCTION

One of the principal problems which has grown out of this situation which I have described is that a sense of insecurity and a fear of aggression have grown up in an important section of the world which is struggling to recover economically, politically, and socially from the drains of the last war. The recovery of this area is of vital concern to the whole world.

To attain a sense of security and to be free from the constant fear of armed attack is certainly one of the prime objectives of the United Nations. How, then, is this objective to be obtained when a few of the members of the United Nations frustrate the attempt to attain it through the machinery provided in the Charter? It is certainly not to be obtained by doing nothing about it. It is certainly not hostile to the United Nations or contrary to the Charter to attempt to attain this objective by means wholly consistent with the Charter.

The United Nations is not a thing in itself. It is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. The end is progressive development of a peaceful and stable world order where law rather than force and anarchy will govern the conduct of nations in their foreign relations. It was never in the minds of the framers of the Charter that the organization set up under it should be so distorted as to become an international instrument which paralyzed the pacific nations of the world, the possible victims of aggression, while leaving a would-be aggressor with completely free hands to deal with them one by one. In order that there should be no misunderstanding on this point, article 51 was inserted in the Charter.

VIOLATIONS BY RUSSIA OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES

If I may use an understatement, the sense of insecurity prevalent in western Europe is not a figment of the imagination. It has come about through the conduct of the Soviet Union. Western European countries have seen the basic purposes and principles of the Charter cynically violated by the conduct of the Soviet Union with the countries of eastern Europe. Their right to self-determination has been extinguished by force or threats of force. The human freedoms as the rest of the world understands them have been extinguished.
throughout that whole area. Economic problems have not been solved by international cooperation but have been dealt with by dictation. These same methods have been attempted in other areas—penetration by propaganda and the Communist Party, attempts to block cooperative international efforts in the economic field, wars of nerves, and in some cases thinly veiled use of force itself.

By the end of 1947 it had become abundantly clear that this Soviet pressure and penetration was being exerted progressively further to the west. In January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ernest Bevin, said that if any one power attempted to dominate Europe by whatever means, direct or indirect, it would inevitably lead to another world war unless this policy could be checked by peaceful means. He declared that if peace and security were to be preserved it could be done only—by mobilization of such a moral and material force as will create confidence and energy in the West and inspire respect elsewhere.

THE BRUSSELS TREATY

With encouragement from the United States the Brussels Treaty was signed on March 17, 1948. The Brussels Treaty system took the form, not of a network of bilateral alliances as had been originally considered, but of a collective defense arrangement within the framework of the United Nations Charter similar in many respects to the Rio Treaty. On the day the Brussels Treaty was signed, the President, in addressing both Houses of Congress, called the treaty a notable step toward peace and expressed confidence that the determination of the free peoples of Europe to protect themselves would be matched by equal determination on our part to help them do so and that the United States would extend to the free countries the support which the situation might require.

SENATE RESOLUTION 239

At that time the Congress had before it a number of proposals for strengthening the United Nations and making it a more effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. My predecessor, General Marshall, and the former Under Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Lovett, entered into consultation with the committee on how the great influence of the United States might best be brought to bear in association with other free nations in strengthening the United Nations and furthering the cause of world peace.

On May 19, 1948, this committee unanimously reported Senate Resolution No. 239. That resolution declared:

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.
(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under article 100 or by the General Assembly.

It will be noted that of the six objectives recommended, Nos. 1, 5, and 6 were designed to strengthen the United Nations on a universal basis. This requires the agreement of all the major powers. Our efforts to achieve these objectives are being steadily pursued but it has not yet been possible, and I am not able to say when it will be possible, to achieve them.

The second, third, and fourth objectives are designed to promote peace and stability by ancillary methods within the principles of the Charter. In its report on that resolution the committee declared that these relatively unexplored resources of the Charter should be further explored and developed as rapidly as possible.

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COOPERATION TOWARD IMPLEMENTING SENATE RESOLUTION 239

For more than a year the members of the committee and officers of the Department of State have been in consultation as to the nature of the problems involved, how they might best be met, and how the influence of the United States might best be brought to bear in the cause of peace. Throughout the negotiation of this treaty the United States negotiators have been guided by the wishes of the Senate as expressed in Resolution 239. It is highly gratifying that the views of the Senate, as expressed in the unanimous report of this committee on the resolution and the passage by the Senate of that resolution by a vote of 64 to 4, and in subsequent consultation on the text of the treaty, have been absolutely free of partisan spirit and have been moved solely by the interests of the United States, of the United Nations, and of world peace.

EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Following the resolution of the Senate, Mr. Lovett undertook to explore the matter with the Ambassadors of Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The objective of this Government and of the other governments participating in these discussions was to establish an arrangement which would:

First. Increase the determination of the parties to resist aggression and their confidence that they could successfully do so;

Second. Promote full economic recovery through removing the drag of a sense of insecurity;
Third. Stimulate the efforts of the parties to help themselves and each other and, through coordination, to achieve maximum effectiveness for defense; and

Fourth. Contribute to the maintenance of peace and reduce the possibility of war by making clear the determination of the parties jointly to resist armed attack from any quarter.

EXPLANATION OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

I have explained the text of the treaty article by article in my report to the President, which is before you, and I will not repeat that explanation at this point. I wish merely to stress certain essential points of the treaty.

ARTICLE I

The treaty is carefully and conscientiously designed to conform in every particular with the Charter of the United Nations and to contribute to the accomplishments of its purposes. This is made clear in article I which reiterates and reaffirms the basic principle of the Charter, namely, that the participating countries will settle all their international disputes, not only among themselves but with any nation, by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. This declaration sets the whole tone and spirit of the treaty and provides unmistakable proof that any allegations that the treaty conceals aggressive intentions are obvious perversions of the truth. Democracies, by their very nature must conduct their affairs openly. They could not, even if they wished, conspire against anyone, individually or collectively. Such allegations are belied both by the terms of the treaty and by the very nature of the free institutions upon which the signatory governments are founded.

ARTICLE II. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

Article II demonstrates the conviction of the parties that real peace is a positive and dynamic thing, that it is much more than the mere absence of war. In this article the signatory governments assert that they will strengthen their free institutions and see to it that the fundamental purposes upon which these institutions are founded are better understood everywhere. They also agree to seek to eliminate conflicts in their economic life and to promote economic cooperation among themselves. Here is the ethical essence of the treaty—the common resolve to preserve, strengthen, and make better understood the very basis of tolerance, restraint, freedom, and well-being, the really vital things with which we are concerned.

ARTICLE III. MUTUAL AID AND SELF-HELP

Article III, of which I will speak further later this morning, embodies in the treaty the concept contained in the Senate resolution of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. This means that no party can rely on others for its defense unless it does its utmost to defend itself and contribute toward the defense of the others.

The basic purpose of the treaty is, as recommended in the Senate resolution, to contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear
the determination of the parties to exercise the right of self-defense under article 51, should armed attack upon any party occur. This provision is contained in article V. If the treaty accomplishes its purpose such an armed attack will not occur. In order to accomplish that purpose, however, the parties must state clearly what they would be prepared to do if an armed attack should occur.

ARTICLE V. OBLIGATIONS IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK

Article V recognizes the basic fact that an armed attack upon any party would so threaten the national security of the other parties as to be in effect an armed attack upon all. It further provides that in the event of such an attack each of them will take, individually and in concert with the other parties, whatever action it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, including the use of armed force.

This naturally does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the other signatory nations were the victim of an armed attack. Under our Constitution, the Congress alone has the power to declare war. The obligation of this Government under article V would be to take promptly the action it deemed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. That decision would, of course, be taken in accordance with our constitutional procedures. The factors which would have to be considered would be the gravity of the attack and the nature of the action which this Government considered necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. That would be the end to be achieved. Under the treaty we would be bound to make an honest judgment as to what action was necessary to attain that end and consequently to take such action. That action might or might not include the use of armed force. If we should be confronted again with an all-out armed attack such as has twice occurred in this century and caused world wars, I do not believe that any action other than the use of armed force could be effective. The decision, however, would naturally rest where the Constitution has placed it.

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (M. A. P.)

I believe it appropriate to outline briefly the role of the proposed military assistance program in our over-all foreign policy and its relationship to the Atlantic Pact. As you know, the President will shortly recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation authorizing the transfer of military equipment and assistance to other nations. As you also know, the proposed program will request authorization and appropriation of $1,130,000,000 for Atlantic Pact countries and approximately $320,000,000 for other countries, including Greece and Turkey, making a total of $1,450,000,000 for the fiscal year 1950.

The furnishing of military assistance to the Atlantic Pact countries is designed to assist us in attaining the fundamental goal of our foreign policy: The preservation of international peace and the preservation of the security of the United States. Our aid to Greece and Turkey, the European recovery program—the greatest of all measures to date in our foreign policy—Senate Resolution 239, the Atlantic Pact
which we are now considering, and the proposed military assistance program, are all designed to this end.

PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

You may ask why it is not enough to have the Atlantic Pact alone since it accepts the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. Why does the Executive believe that it will be necessary to have a military assistance program in addition to the commitments contained in the pact?

The answer is found in the insecurity and the fears of western Europe and of many of the other freedom-loving nations of the world. Basic to the purposes of the military assistance program is the necessity of promoting economic recovery and political stability by providing a basis for confidence, a sense of security and a reasonable assurance of peace among European peoples. The military assistance program will improve the defenses and military capabilities of these nations, and thus increase their will to resist aggression and their ability to maintain internal security.

It is understandable that the free nations of western Europe cannot look forward with equanimity to invasion and occupation in the event of war, even if we guarantee subsequently to liberate them. Nor is it in our own interest to permit them to be occupied with the consequent necessity of the costly liberation of these areas. Our active foreign policy has given rise in Europe to a great momentum of recovery and a great increase in the will to resist. The hope for peace lies in maintaining this momentum. The free countries of western Europe must be encouraged to continue their efforts toward recovery. Their will to resist and their ability mutually to defend themselves must be strengthened. They must be encouraged and assisted to build up their defense forces, through self-help and mutual aid, to a point where aggression cannot take place through internal disorders growing from the seeds sown by a potential aggressor, or under the guise of border incidents. In short, they must regain, individually and collectively, their ability to maintain their independence and national security. This in itself is an additional deterrent to any would-be aggressor. Thus, even without the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty, the need for assistance for defense of these countries would be the same. With the pact, the assistance, once given, will be infinitely more effective.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND MUTUAL AID AND SELF-HELP

It is important, however, to view the objectives of the proposed military assistance program in light of the objectives of article 3, the self-help and mutual-aid article, of the North Atlantic Treaty, for the objectives of each are complementary. The objectives of both are to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist by self-help and mutual aid. That is what article 3 is going to do; that is what the proposed military assistance program is going to do. Article 3 does not bind the United States to the proposed military assistance program, nor indeed to any program. It does bind the United States to the principle of self-help and mutual aid. Within this principle each party to the pact must exercise its own honest
judgment as to what it can and should do, to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist and to help others. The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist the other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

I therefore earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military assistance program. At the same time, I urge that both the treaty and the proposed military assistance program should be considered separately and on their own merits.

For my own part I believe that both the North Atlantic Treaty and the military assistance program will contribute to world-wide security.

THE TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The treaty is wholly consistent with the Charter and designed to strengthen the system of international law of which the Charter is the basis. It will give security and confidence to the signatory nations, whose common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs draw them naturally together, and whose well-being is vital to world recovery.

The added security of these nations does not threaten or weaken any other nation or portion of the world. The principles which draw these nations into natural affinity and which they seek to defend—freedom of the individual, tolerance and restraint, and the rule of law—are the principles which unite free peoples throughout the world.

The determination to provide defense for these principles by the 12 nations joining in this treaty—added to the other steps taken by these and other nations to wage peace—must be an encouragement to all free peoples who wish peace based on these principles.

PREVENTIVE EFFECT OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The treaty is the practical expression of the determination that an aggressor cannot divide these nations and pick them off one by one. History has taught us that the absence of such determination and of its clear statement in advance is gravely dangerous. The knowledge that armed attack will be met by collective defense, prompt and effective, will surely have a steadying effect on anyone from whom that transgression might come.

The political and moral strength which this treaty adds to the accumulating economic strength of a vital portion of the world will strengthen our ability to build a world in which freedom is maintained and expanded and in which the problems remaining and growing out of the war can be solved in an atmosphere free of the fear of aggression.
In conclusion I should like to repeat to you words which the President used at the signing of the treaty:

It is a simple document, but if it had existed in 1914 and in 1939, supported by the nations which are represented here today, I believe it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars.

For us war is not inevitable. We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or the other. In our own times we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom—war or peace.

I have no doubt which they will choose. The treaty we are signing here today is evidence of the path they will follow.

If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and peace.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you are agreeable to questions at this time, are you not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement and I am at your service for questions.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I understand from your testimony and from our own knowledge of the matter that this is a defensive treaty, a defensive treaty aimed at the preservation of peace rather than at aggressive or offensive action on the part of the signatories to the treaty. Is that not true?

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely correct, Mr. Chairman. It is wholly defensive. There are no aggressive designs of any sort openly stated, covertly concealed, or in any way connected with this treaty.

COMPARISON WITH OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

The Chairman. It has been charged, and will be charged in some quarters, that this is a military alliance. I wish you would discuss and outline the military alliances in Europe and elsewhere in the last century or so and compare them with this particular treaty upon which we are embarking. The balances of power and things of that kind in the old world were commonly denominated military alliances. Would you mind doing that?

Secretary Acheson. To the best of my ability.

The system of military alliances to which you refer was usually embodied in treaties which provided that if one of the signatory parties—they were usually bilateral treaties—became involved in war——

The Chairman. It was not limited to attack on them, but extended also to an enterprise to make war on somebody else, is that true?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is true; yes, sir. The idea of arrangements to prevent aggression is somewhat modern. In the old treaties it was if you became involved in war, then the other signatory party would come to your help.

Some of the treaties provided that the other signatory party should actually engage in war with military forces; still others provided that they should be benevolent, not neutral but nonbelligerent, and help in any way.

One of the oldest treaties of alliance in existence in the world today is the British-Portuguese treaty.
DEFENSIVE NATURE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The conception of this treaty, and the conception of the Rio treaty and the conception of the Brussels Treaty, is a newer one, and one which grows out of principles and procedures of the United Nations Charter. It is an arrangement entered into within the scope of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Now I want to make clear that article 51 does not create the right of individual or collective self-defense. That is inherent in all nations. The United Nations Charter merely recognizes that right and says that nothing in the Charter shall impair it or interfere with it in any way.

These arrangements that I have referred to, the Rio Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and this treaty, are arrangements entered into as an exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. They are arrangements entered into by natural communities of nations, in one case by the community of nations in the Western Hemisphere, in another case by that community of nations which represents the Brussels powers, in the third case by the Atlantic community.

It has been pointed out many times that there is nothing contrived or created by the treaty. It is a naturally existing thing. There is a community of spirit, a community of history, and a community of interest in these Atlantic countries, and what they agree to here is that if an armed attack occurs on one of them, it is an attack upon the whole community, and the whole community would join in resisting it.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no provision in the treaty, as I understand it, of an aggressive or offensive character whatever.

Secretary ACHESON. There is none, Mr. Chairman.

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE INHERENT IN ANY STATE

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that without this treaty we would have the right to take the action that the treaty contemplates, if we so desire as a nation?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that in World War I and World War II, without any treaty, we did, because of the armed attack on other nations which we thought threatened the security of the United States, enter the war to resist the aggression by armed powers upon the peaceful nations of the earth, without any treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. We did, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is well to emphasize the fact that you brought out, that this treaty really does not create any new authority or any new powers; it simply is a recognition, under Article 51, of rights which we already possess to cooperate in behalf of peace.

Secretary ACHESON. That is very true. The rights which are exercised through action taken under this treaty are inherent rights, described as such in the United Nations Charter. They inhere in the very existence of nationhood.

The CHAIRMAN. To the nation they are the same as the inherent rights that individuals possess, applied to the nation as a whole.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.
RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TREATY

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of discussion and confusion, I would say, about the relationship of the treaty itself to the future proposals to furnish arms. I notice you say in your testimony that you think that each one of these instruments should be separately considered and treated on its own merits. Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. That, I think, is substantially what I said, sir.

The Chairman. I haven't got the point in the testimony right before me.

Secretary Acheson. It is on page 9, Mr. Chairman, of the mimeographed statement. The sentence that you refer to is right in the middle of the page, where it says:

I therefore earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military assistance program. At the same time I urge that both the treaty and the proposed military assistance program should be considered separately and on their own merits.

OBLIGATION OF VOTING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AFTER RATIFICATION OF TREATY

The Chairman. There is some argument and debate as to whether or not a vote for the treaty carries with it any obligation or duty to vote for the arms program at a later date. Is there anything in the treaty itself that binds the United States even to adopt the military program? I mean explicitly. The general phrase “mutual self-help” is that upon which I suppose they base their argument.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. That question is one which it would be pleasant if one could answer “Yes” or “No.” I think it requires a very clear understanding.

There is something in the treaty which requires each Member of the Senate, if you ratify this treaty, when he comes to vote on the military assistance program, to exercise his judgment less freely than he would have exercised it if it had not been for this treaty. No Member of the Senate, after the treaty is ratified, in exercising his judgment, can properly say to himself, “I do not believe in the principle of mutual assistance. I think that principle is silly and I will put it out of my mind.” That should not be done, because by ratifying this treaty you accept that principle, and that principle exists.

However, when the Senator approaches the vote on the military-assistance program, if his judgment is different from that which I have described as the judgment of the executive branch, if he thinks either that the United States is not able for financial, economic, or other reasons to help other countries, or if he thinks that it is not necessary to meet the situation as he sees it, there is nothing in this treaty which determines how he shall vote. The thing that exists in the treaty is that he must accept the principle of mutual assistance. He cannot repudiate that, and he must use his own best judgment within the confines of that principle to determine whether or not we can and we should, so far as the world situation is concerned, approve the military-assistance program as a means of mutual assistance.

The Chairman. Is it not true, though, that the Senator would be free, within his own conception of his duty, even though the treaty
does carry the clause of mutual assistance, to determine whether the exact measure which was proposed was within that general scope of mutual assistance that was necessary?

Secretary Acheson. Of course, Senator Connally. There is no question about that.

The Chairman. I wanted to make that clear, if I might, because some Senators seem to be bothered with that question. It seems to me that when we treat these two instruments separately that each Senator is under the duty of searching his own conscience and his own mind as to whether or not the provisions of any particular measure come within the obligations which we will assume when we ratify the treaty. There might be a wide divergence of view in some Senator's mind as to whether it was necessary to adopt any particular measure to meet the general clause of mutual assistance. There might be mutual assistance in other ways besides armed force. So that is your answer on that.

THE TREATY IS NOT AIMED AT ANY STATE

Now, Mr. Secretary, you brought out rather clearly—it won't hurt to reiterate it a little—that this treaty is not aimed at any nation particularly. It is aimed only at any nation or any country that contemplates or undertakes armed aggression against the members of the signatory powers. Is that true?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, Senator Connally. It is not aimed at any country; it is aimed solely at armed aggression.

The Chairman. In other words, unless a nation other than the signatories contemplates, meditates or makes plans looking toward, aggression or armed attack on another nation, it has no cause to fear this treaty.

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, Senator Connally, and it seems to me that any nation which claims that this treaty is directed against it should be reminded of the Biblical admonition that "The guilty flees when no man pursueth."

The Chairman. That is a very apt illustration.

What I had in mind was, when a State or Nation passes a criminal act, for instance, against burglary, nobody but those who are burglars or getting ready to be burglars need have any fear of the Burglary Act. Is that not true?

Secretary Acheson. Very true.

The Chairman. And so it is with one who might meditate and get ready and arm himself to commit a murder. If he is not going to indulge in that kind of enterprise, the law on murder would not have any effect on him, would it?

Secretary Acheson. The only effect it would have would be for his protection, perhaps, by deterring someone else. He wouldn't worry about the imposition of the penalties on himself, but he might feel that the statute added to his protection.

NO SURRENDER OF SOVEREIGNTY

The Chairman. Some people contend that this is a treaty limiting our freedom of action and sovereignty and so on. Is it not true that the very organization of the United Nations is a treaty to which we
are parties, and its obligations are binding upon us? Is that not true?

Secretary Acheson. That is so. It is a treaty ratified by the Senate of the United States.

The Chairman. And entering into a treaty like the United Nations is not a surrender of sovereignty but it is really an exercise of sovereignty.

Secretary Acheson. That is very true, Senator.

The Chairman. One other point, and then I will turn you over to some of the other committee members.

**AUTOMATIC DECLARATION OF WAR**

Is there or is there not anything in the treaty that pledges us to an automatic declaration of war in any event?

Secretary Acheson. There is nothing in the treaty which has that effect, Senator.

The Chairman. Those are matters still residing in the discretion and judgment of the Government and the Senate?

Secretary Acheson. That is true.

The Chairman. Even after the occurrence of events, we would still have that freedom, would we not?

Secretary Acheson. That is true.

**MINORITY DOMINATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION**

The Chairman. I was interested in your statement that in the United Nations or any other international organization there was the possibility that a group within that organization would have designs that could be very destructive and detrimental to the organization. There is evidence, to my mind, not necessarily to yours, that such possibilities are already in existence at the present time—that there are little groups who vote together and act together with an objective, I think, of hampering and disrupting the international organization. There is nothing of that kind in this treaty?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. What I was referring to was the difficulties which faced the United Nations.

The Chairman. That is right.

Secretary Acheson. And I was pointing out that I thought it was not, as one commonly hears it said, a defect in the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is not because we do not have a better Charter; it is not because we do not have world government that this difficulty arises. It would arise in any organization, no matter how perfectly devised. The difficulty comes in the attitude and the actions of this powerful minority group, and it happens that the same thing happens in a trade-union or a church or a club or a political body, that when some of the members of it undertake to use the principles and procedures to frustrate the functioning, then the organization just won’t work.

**THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM**

The Chairman. I noticed in the press—I have no direct diplomatic information on the subject—that at least one great country is denouncing this treaty and complaining about it because it does not
approve of it. This country is not a signatory and it was not concerned with the treaty.

Is it not true that since the war that same power has formed alliances and arrangements with a number of the Balkan countries without asking anybody's advice or anybody's agreement, and most certainly without consulting the United States of America?

Secretary Acheson. That is true, Senator Connally. And I think all of those treaties have been printed in the document which the Senate has had prepared.

The Chairman. Containing very strong obligations on the part of those nations.

UNITED NATIONS' ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY

The United Nations, as you have pointed out, has not been effective in some respects, because of frustrations and delays and obstructions of this group, so that by reason of that we feel the necessity of entering into and signing or ratifying the present treaty. Is that true?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. There is nothing in this treaty that is in anywise hostile to the purposes or plans of the United Nations? They are supplementary, are they not?

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely right, Senator. The purposes of this treaty are to accomplish the very purposes of the United Nations. This is an ancillary method, within the provisions of the Charter, for accomplishing the purposes of the Charter.

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COOPERATION PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. The treaty is really a concrete implementation of the resolution that the Senate passed, in which the State Department collaborated throughout the preparation and the consideration of the objectives set forth in this resolution, is that true?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. That resolution has been the constant guide of the negotiators of this treaty.

The Chairman. There is one other point that I would like to bring out, and that is this: Is it not true that during the preparation of the present treaty consultations were held frequently between the State Department and members of the Committee on Foreign Relations as to the exact text, the use of words here and there, and things of that kind? Is that not true?

Secretary Acheson. That is true, Senator.

The Chairman. There was no secrecy on the part of the State Department, no attempt to keep from the Committee on Foreign Relations or from the Senate, for that matter, the provisions of this treaty as they were being formulated?

Secretary Acheson. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. I want to commend that course in the future. I think we will get along much better under that procedure than by the Senate being handed a treaty or a convention with the words "Here it is; take it or leave it." If the members of the committee that are interested in these matters might be consulted—and I am not complaining—prior to the final act of adopting or ratifying or agreeing to a treaty or convention.
Secretary Acheson. I think it is a very wise course which you suggest.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

As I view the treaty, and I will ask you whether or not you agree with me, one of its chief merits is that there would be a deterrent effect on any nation that contemplated an armed attack or an aggression because of the knowledge by that nation that such an attack would arouse the opposition of the whole group and the resistance of the whole group.

Secretary Acheson. That is the first dominant and overwhelming purpose of this treaty. As the Senate Resolution pointed out, as the President stated in his inaugural and other addresses, the only really effective way to deal with the threat of war is to prevent wars from happening. Anything that you do after the war has happened is an aid to national survival, but the disaster has occurred, therefore everything that can be done to prevent a war from happening is to the greatest possible benefit not only of the United States but of all the rest of the world, including the nation that might be foolish enough to think of aggression, because in these days both the aggressor and the nations against whom the aggression takes place suffer terribly in the course of a modern war.

The Chairman. Is it not also true that it would have a deterrent effect on the practice that is growing up of one nation reaching out and grabbing little nations one at a time, and incorporating each into its system, when it knows in advance that to do that would arouse the hostility and resistance of all the nations that are parties to this treaty?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. That is a very great part of the effectiveness of this treaty.

The Chairman. A great and powerful nation without that situation in mind could just reach out and grab some little wobbly and weak nation and incorporate it, and then go on to the next one and the next one and the next one, until it had picked the roost clean.

Secretary Acheson. That is true, sir.

ACTION IN CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK

The Chairman. One other point. Article 5 of the treaty provides that an armed attack against any one of the nations shall be considered an armed attack upon all of them. It further provides that in the event of such an armed attack, each of them will take individually and in concert with the other parties whatever action it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, including the use of armed force. With regard to the language "including the use of armed force," is it not true that that does not require the use of armed force, but armed force is merely one of the means, among other means, which it may adopt to perform its duty of helping maintain the integrity of the Atlantic area?

Secretary Acheson. That is true, Senator, and of course, whatever means would be employed would be appropriate to the gravity of the attack.
The Chairman. Exactly. But, after all, it is up to each country to determine for itself, is it not, what action it deems necessary to restore the security of the Atlantic Pact area?

Secretary Acheson. There is no question about that, Senator. That is true.

The Chairman. I wanted to get that clear, if I could, because there was some disagreement over it.

REFERENCE TO UNITED NATIONS

Secretary Acheson. Of course, one of the first things which would occur would be reference to the United Nations.

The Chairman. Would you develop that a little?

Secretary Acheson. I beg your pardon?

The Chairman. I say, go ahead and develop that, if you care to.

Secretary Acheson. Nearly all of the signatories of this treaty are members of the United Nations, and if a situation was developing which looked as though an armed attack might be threatened, one of the first things that you will do will be to invoke the Security Council, invoke all the provisions of the Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes. But when the armed attack occurs, and no effective action having been taken by the United Nations, then this treaty provides for action to resist the armed attack.

RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Chairman. From page 9 of your statement I would like to quote just a moment:

Article 3 does not bind the United States to the proposed military assistance program nor indeed to any program. It does bind the United States to the principle of self-help and mutual aid.

Now, again:

Within this principle each party to the pact must exercise its own honest judgment as to what it can and should do to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist and to help others. The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist the other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment.

That is very true, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman (reading):

It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO UNITED NATIONS

The Chairman. You referred to this being in aid of or supplementary to the United Nations. Is there anything in this treaty which is in conflict with any of our obligations under the United Nations?
Secretary Acheson. There is not only nothing which is in conflict, but there is express provision in the treaty that the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations prevail. Article 7 provides:

'This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibilities of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.'

PURPOSE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Chairman. I have gotten the idea somewhere from these discussions that even the proposed arms agreement coming along a little later does not necessarily envisage the increase in the armed forces of the signatories to the pact, but rather the furnishing of supplies and equipment to bring up to date their armed forces.

Secretary Acheson. That is the basis on which the proposal will be made to the Congress, Senator. You are quite correct.

The Chairman. I am glad you bring that out, because some Senators seem to be confused about the arms program. They are worried that it means that we are going to vastly increase the armed forces of European nations and give them large amounts of supplies and so forth that would involve us still more deeply in some scheme of military alliance.

Senator Vandenberg?

LIMITATIONS OF THE TREATY

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Secretary, first of all I want to be sure that the record discloses what I conceive to be the very close limitations within which the treaty moves into action. I am not clear about your answer to one question that the chairman asked you. He asked you what happens when an armed aggressor contemplates or undertakes an attack, and I understood you to say that the treaty came into effect under those circumstances. It is not my understanding that it would come into effect on the basis of a contemplation. The armed attack has to occur. Am I wrong on that?

Secretary Acheson. You are right, Senator. If I gave the other impression, it was inadvertence on my part.

Senator Vandenberg. And that is not the only limitation. The area of action is completely described within article 51, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. And under article 51 even the cooperative effort which is made under the North Atlantic Treaty ceases the first moment that the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security, is that not true?

Secretary Acheson. That is true, both under article 51 and under the express provisions of this treaty.

Senator Vandenberg. I think it would be well, Mr. Chairman, to print article 51 in the record at this point, because it is the key to the whole situation.

The Chairman. Without objection, article 51 will be printed in the record at this point.
(Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations is as follows:)

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take it at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Senator VANDENBERG. So we confront, then, this series of limitations. In the first place, no nation is the target of this treaty unless it nominates itself as an armed aggressor by its own armed aggression. Is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator VANDENBERG. Secondly, it is effective only so long as the Security Council fails to take measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Secretary ACHESON. That is made repeatedly clear in the treaty itself, Senator.

Senator VANDENBERG. Therefore, if the general membership of the United Nations is faithful to its obligation to the Treaty of the United Nations, this treaty never becomes operative in action at all.

Secretary ACHESON. That is entirely true.

OBLIGATION TO VOTE FOR ARMS PROGRAM

Senator VANDENBERG. Now, this is a rather ticklish question which I dislike to bring up again, because I know it is a difficult one to answer. Nevertheless it involves the viewpoints of a number of my colleagues. On the nature and extent of the obligation that a Senator assumes, if any, when he votes for the pact, you have narrowed that obligation as nearly as possible to the vanishing point as you could, but you have left this sentence:

It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making honest judgment regarding mutual aid.

Let me ask you this question, and I am not intending thereby to indicate my own point of view but I would like to know what your answer is. Suppose a Senator who votes for this pact says, in his own honest judgment, that he prefers to let the general obligation involved in the pledge of "one for all and all for one" to stand as his commitment to do everything required of him when the crisis arrives. Is he entitled to say that?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, of course he can say it, Senator.

Senator VANDENBERG. Has he violated your rule if he says that?

Secretary ACHESON. In my judgment I think he would have violated my rule, if we add something further to your question, and that is, that in his judgment the United States not only can help other countries but the strengthening of the other countries is called for in view of the world situation.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think that is pretty clear. I am not sure I subscribe to it, but certainly there should be no doubt on the subject. I must say that I think a Senator could logically say that he accepts this obligation when it arises under article 51 without accepting an
obligation to prepare in advance to implement article 51. However, you have made your answer, and that stands.

SCOPE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Now, I have a question on the subsequent military pact, which under your last answer does become pretty definitely integrated into the initial decision that we have to make regarding the pact itself. I wonder if you can be any more specific than you have been in respect to this contemplated mutual aid program. I agree that the two things have got to be settled separately and yet a divorce in the first instance is pretty near impossible when a Senator is undertaking to arrive at a judgment.

You have suggested that you will ask for the authorization and appropriation of $1,130,000,000 for Atlantic Pact countries. I assume that is for the first year.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; that is for the fiscal year 1950.

Senator Vandenberg. Can you say what may be contemplated beyond 1950?

Secretary Acheson. No; I cannot say that, Senator, because I think it is almost impossible to say that at the present time. The program for the year 1950 has been worked out in advance of the setting up of the machinery provided for in this treaty. If the treaty is ratified, you will then have a council, a defense committee with various subcommittees, probably, with military people on them. When that gets into full operation, and there is a completion of the exchanges of views between the countries, they will know more clearly what the future plans are so far as the military establishment of each one of the countries is concerned.

The program for the year 1950 has been worked out in consultation with all of these countries, and as Senator Connally intimated a moment ago, it is based upon the maintenance of the military establishments of the European countries as they exist in their proposed 1950 budgets. It is not proposed to increase the establishments beyond what is already provided in their budgets.

This assistance has to do with the provision of more effective and better rounded equipment for those forces. The European nations will do the great bulk of this equipping themselves. They will enter into—in fact they already have devised the basis of—agreements by which they will help one another get equipment.

So far as the pact countries are concerned, United States assistance will be somewhere between one-sixth and one-seventh of the total effort which will go into military efforts in Europe. We will provide, as is stated in the statement, approximately $1,130,000,000 for the pact countries.

NATURE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Wiley. Money or equipment?

Secretary Acheson. That is the authorized funds, and the funds which we hope will be appropriated. Some of that, Senator, will be furnished in the form of already existing military equipment, equipment which is in existence. Some of it will have to be manufactured for that purpose. About $150,000,000 of it will be in the form of raw
materials which the European nations will have to import in order to help their own manufacturing of military equipment. That gives you the general picture.

Now, the equipment which we will be furnishing will be very largely in the nature of what you might call capital goods. It will be equipment which is not used up in 1 year in peacetime. It will last much longer than that, so that it will not be necessary to replace that equipment every year. There are certain more or less limiting factors here. If the size of the forces is limited by the primary necessity for recovery, as is the case in Europe, then any annual increment in existence is limited, so that there are limiting factors, both the fact that the equipment is in the nature of capital goods and is not readily expendable except in time of war, and the fact that the size of the forces is very closely related to the needs of recovery.

PROSPECTS OF DECREASING MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Senator Vandenberg. Of course, in contemplating future budgets on this score, the greater the success of the program in increasing pacific and reliable security, the less will be the need, and the need may entirely disappear.

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely correct, Senator. Of course, the outstanding purpose of both the treaty and of the military assistance program is the prevention of war. These two are complementary. If they prevent war from starting, and if that creates a stable situation in which you can look forward to the fact that war is not going to start, then the whole outlook is changed and greatly eased.

NO AUTOMATIC DECLARATION OF WAR

Senator Vandenberg. I was requested to ask you one question earlier, which I will ask now so that the record may be clear. Is there anything in the treaty which will lead automatically to a declaration of war on our part?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. The answer, of course, is unequivocally "No."

Secretary Acheson. Unequivocally "No."

ACTION IN THE EVENT OF COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF POWER IN PACT COUNTRIES

Senator Vandenberg. What happens, Mr. Secretary, if one of the pact countries should be taken over politically by their Communist Parties?

Secretary Acheson. Is that question based on the assumption that this is not by external aggression?

Senator Vandenberg. Oh, yes.

Secretary Acheson. Purely internal action?

Senator Vandenberg. Right.

Secretary Acheson. Then the country will obviously have a Communist government, and I should suppose that the country would want to repudiate this association in that case. It is pure speculation on my part, but that has been the general attitude of countries which go that route. And it would undoubtedly take unilateral action to declare that any obligations from it to anyone else were at an end.
Senator VandenBerg. How about the reverse? Suppose this new government clearly fails to qualify under the credentials that are required for membership in this fraternity? Would it not almost perforce have to leave the fraternity because there is no possibility of congenial action?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is very likely to be the case.

PROCEDURE FOR ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

Senator VandenBerg. I want to ask specifically about article 10, Mr. Secretary.

The Chairman. Of the treaty?

Senator VandenBerg. Of the treaty. This is the article which permits by unanimous agreement other European states in a position to further the principles of this treaty, and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, to accede to this treaty. How would the judgment of the United States be expressed upon a question of that character?

Secretary Acheson. I take it that your question involves the point as to whether this would be done by the Executive alone, or whether there would be the advice and consent of the Senate to it.

Senator VandenBerg. That is my point.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I am authorized by the President of the United States to say that in his judgment the accession of new members to this treaty creates in regard to each new member coming in in effect a new treaty between the United States and that nation, and that therefore the President would consider it necessary to ask for the advice and consent of the Senate before himself agreeing to the admission of a new member.

Senator VandenBerg. I do not know how you could make a more totally persuasive or righteous answer.

I will pass for the time being.

The Chairman. I do not want to elaborate on that, but is it not true that with the nations that are now parties to the treaty, any addition of another member would be, in effect, a new treaty?

Secretary Acheson. That is the President's judgment, sir, which I have just expressed.

The Chairman. And therefore, being a new treaty, it would have to be ratified by the Senate.

OBLIGATION OF SENATORS TOWARD MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

I do not want to argue with you, Mr. Secretary, but I think you went, according to my view, a little far in your statement about the obligation of a Senator, if he votes for the treaty, to vote on the arms provision.

I do not think there is any compulsion or obligation on a Senator when he votes on any question except his own conscientious conviction and his sense of his obligation under the Constitution. When this treaty is ratified, it is the obligation of the United States, as a Government to aid the other signatories, but that does not mean that every Member of the Senate shall take the views of the executive department as to what this aid shall be.
I do not want to labor the point, but I wanted the record to show that I do not quite go with you that far. I think, after all, it is a matter of judgment and conscientious conviction of each particular Senator casting his vote.

Secretary Acheson. Of course, Senator Connally, that is right. It is not my function or place to be stating what should move Senators in their votes. I was trying to respond to questions in a responsive way, and to give what I thought was the intellectual relation between this treaty and some other proposal. Obviously I think I have made it very clear that there is no obligation on anybody to vote for the forthcoming proposal on the arms program because he votes for this treaty. He may believe this program is too small or too badly devised or too large, or have all sorts of reasons. All I was trying to point out is that the treaty brings upon the United States the obligation to help, and those who are officers of the United States will want to conduct themselves in such a way as to carry out the obligation of the United States.

The Chairman. As I pointed out a little while ago, I quite agree that the Government still has the obligation to render such aid, but after all, the judgment of the Senator as to whether such vote would comply with that obligation or not is up to him.

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely up to him.

The Chairman. Let me announce to the Senators that you need not worry about a quorum call. I had an agreement entered in the Senate yesterday that the Committee on Foreign Relations would be excused from attendance on the session indefinitely, and at the end of each quorum roll call there would be a statement to that effect, so that if you are not recorded you have a complete alibi in the fact that the Senate has excused you.

Senator Thomas?

Senator Thomas of Utah. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, if our names will be counted toward making a quorum over there?

The Chairman. I do not suppose they will, because we are not personally present, but it explains our absence so if they can not get a quorum without us they are in a bad way.

THE TREATY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator Thomas of Utah. Mr. Secretary, my question is wholly in the realm of the development of international law. I think myself—I have got to say this at the start so that you will see what I am talking about—that this is the first time in the history of international law, and if the pact becomes effective it will be positive international law about as strong as anything we have, will it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Thomas of Utah. This is the first time in the history of international law that community responsibility in regard to an aggressor, and in regard to war, is made quite as definite as it is made in this treaty. Is that not true?

Secretary Acheson. Well, I should think that the Rio Treaty is just about as definite as this, and the Brussels Treaty is also.

Senator Thomas of Utah. Nearly as definite. It is reciprocal and, of course, in the evolution you have theories that are closely connected with this. For instance, article X of the League Covenant
attempted to guarantee the sovereign integrity of the various members, and that implied some obligation on the rest of them, but the statement that an attack on one is an attack on all, does that not put all in the position of war if one is attacked?

**RIO AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY PROVISIONS RELATING TO ATTACKS**

Secretary Acheson. As we pointed out in other discussions before the committee, that particular phrase that you refer to is in the Rio Treaty.

Senator Thomas of Utah. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. Article 3 of the Rio Treaty provides—

The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered an attack against all the American States.

And consequently—

Each one of said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Senator Thomas of Utah. If that right is binding under our Rio Treaty, and I myself believe it is, this is merely an extension of the idea, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. That is so, Senator. Would you like me to go on with your question?

Senator Thomas of Utah. I would like to have it developed.

Secretary Acheson. The provision of article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty states, first of all, that an attack upon one is an attack upon all. That is to make clear that there is collective interest and collective self-defense involved. The article then goes on to spell out what happens when that occurs, and there it says that each one of the contracting parties will forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

**PROCEDURE IN EVENT OF AN ATTACK**

Therefore, when the attack occurs, which is an attack upon all of them by definition, each party considers what the objective under the treaty is. That objective is to restore, if it has been violated, and to maintain after it has been restored, the security of the North Atlantic area, and it pledges itself to take any sort of action, including armed force, if that is necessary in its judgment—to take whatever action its judgment says is necessary to bring about that result.

That might be a declaration of war and the use of all the resources of the country. It might be something much less, depending on what happens as a result of the attack. If the attack is something which has not been deliberately planned but has flared up in some way, it might be dealt with by means not involving the use of armed force. It might be dealt with by reason, and that sort of thing.

If, however, it were a deliberate plan, a highly mobilized attack upon the whole area, then I assume that the only thing that could possibly have any effect in restoring and maintaining the security would be every possible physical effort on the part of the country. So you are not automatically at war. You take whatever action you think is necessary in the circumstances.
Senator Thomas of Utah. And all of the various means, from consultation up, might be taken?
Secretary Acheson. They might all be taken.

SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR

Senator Thomas of Utah. But from the standpoint of creating a substitute for war, haven't you at least done this by these two pacts, and especially by the last one; made war between any of the members that are parties to the pact almost an impossibility?
Secretary Acheson. I think so. As Senator Vandenberg, I think, said earlier, if all of the members of the United Nations—certainly all of the members of this pact—live up to their duties under this pact and under the United Nations, war is totally impossible, because you declare that you will settle every dispute by peaceful means. You declare again under the United Nations Charter that you will not use force, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, and therefore war is impossible unless some nation violates its undertakings under the Charter or under this pact.

EVENTS IN CASE OF A VIOLATION OF CHARTER OBLIGATION

Senator Thomas of Utah. If a nation does violate its obligation, what happens to that nation?
Secretary Acheson. Well, if it violates it in the connection we are discussing here, it violates it by making war on somebody else, and it has precipitated the situation which all of these treaties, the United Nations and everything else, are designed to prevent; therefore it has to be met by collective resistance.

Senator Thomas of Utah. Collective resistance; or the preponderant force of the united group in the community could be used against such a nation, could it not?
Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Thomas of Utah. And would it not be used in a moral way and every other way if the pact works as you think it is going to work?
Secretary Acheson. That is true, Senator Thomas; yes, sir.

Senator Thomas of Utah. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Let me ask one question right on that.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK

This clause about an armed attack on any one nation being regarded as an armed attack on all leaves each nation free, however, not to consider any armed resistance if it should see fit; is that not true?
Secretary Acheson. That is what I was spelling out for Senator Thomas.

The Chairman. The measures they take, if any, would be wholly within the judgment of each particular country.

Senator Smith?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I have a few questions I would like to ask the Secretary, based partly on my own thinking and partly on questions that have been asked of me.
TRADITIONAL UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE TREATY

The first one has to do with the implications of this treaty in connection with our traditional foreign policy. Would you or would you not consider this an extension, for example, of our original foreign policy of noninterference in the affairs of the world and the Monroe Doctrine, and so forth? In other words, is it really an extension of exactly the same principle on exactly the same basis that we laid down when we made the unilateral declaration of the Monroe Doctrine that now we have extended in the Rio Pact into a collective responsibility of the same principle for this hemisphere? Now in this treaty we have extended our vision because of world conditions, World War II and threats to peace, to include these Atlantic Pact countries. The same principle is involved that we had in mind when we did set the Monroe Doctrine!

Secretary Acheson. I think you are entirely right, Senator Smith. This is the recognition and enunciation of something which has happened twice before in our history. It lays down principles on which we have acted in this hemisphere since the statement of President Monroe which developed into a similar treaty within the hemisphere, and as this committee itself said in resolution 239 and in its report, if we had stated, and everyone had understood, before World War I and before World War II, that what did happen would happen, then those wars might not and probably would not have occurred.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I am glad to have you state that, because I agree entirely with the position that you have stated. It seems to me it is a perfectly logical development of our whole foreign relationship since the beginning of our history, and of course the change of world conditions. Conditions have changed, but we are still sticking to the things we believe in fundamentally, and we are prepared if necessary to join with others in defending them.

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Senator Vandenberg pointed out, I think very properly, that article 51 is the key article here so far as the right of individual or collective self-defense is concerned. But I have been asked this question: Whether, assuming that is true so far as article 51 is concerned, and passing over for the moment article 52, a question mark cannot be raised when we read article 53 of the United Nations Charter. That reads:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council—

and then it excepts, of course, Germany as the enemy in the last World War.

My assumption is that the way we get around that, and I want to ask you if I am correct, we know perfectly well from the present composition of the Security Council we probably would run up against a stone wall, and therefore we have to fall back on the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, because we feel the futility of the application of article 53 if we want
to have this anchor to windward in case that comes, in the event of an armed aggression.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I do not think that article 53 has any application whatever to this problem. There is no question of “getting around” anything in the Charter. We have no desire to get around anything whatever. Article 53 deals with a regional arrangement which has been set up, for whatever purpose it may be, and article 53 says that that regional arrangement shall not, itself, undertake positive coercive enforcement action against any country unless the Security Council asks it to do so and authorizes it to do so. Article 53 has nothing whatever to do with the right of self-defense, individual or collective. Therefore article 53 is not involved in our discussions in any way whatever. Under the North Atlantic Treaty nobody proposes to take enforcement action, aggressive action, preliminary action, any sort of action at all, except defensive, after an attack has occurred. Article 53 isn’t talking about that at all.

Now I think it is important, and one hesitates to discuss this before Senators Connally and Vandenberg, who were at San Francisco and know far more about this than I do, to recall that in the drafting of the Charter article 51, which as originally proposed and discussed was under the heading of “Regional arrangements” and with these other articles, was purposely separated from them, so that the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense should not be associated with any other idea whatever; it is a complete, absolute right which is not associated with regional arrangements or actions of the Security Council, unless the Security Council steps in and stops their development. Therefore we are not concerned with article 53 at all.

Have I made that clear?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I think you are right, but the question has been so pressed on me and others have raised the question as to what this language means here that I wanted very much to get your statement, and I think the separation of those in different chapters is significant, as you have suggested, of the two articles, 51 and 53.

Senator Vandenberg. Before you leave that, Senator, I would like to testify that I cordially agree with the Secretary’s analysis. Article 53 deals with affirmative action by the Security Council; article 51 deals with a situation where the Security Council does not act, and the need for article 51 grew out of the fact that article 53 did not meet the conditions to which article 51 addresses itself.

The Chairman. Is it not true that article 53 simply authorized the Security Council to use this regional arrangement to carry out instructions set forth in article 53?

Secretary Acheson. That is right, sir.

ARTICLE 54 OF THE CHARTER AND THE TREATY

Senator Smith of New Jersey. The next question, which I also admit I personally do not have any difficulty with but I would like to have the Secretary answer for the record, is with regard to article 54, and I will read it:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
There again, if I may express my own interpretation, you apply the same interpretation that you just applied to article 53, that these two articles have nothing to do with the individual or collective self-defense provision provided for in article 51.

Secretary Acheson. I think that is right.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And therefore, under article 51, if we are seeking to protect ourselves under the self-defense principle, we will not be compelled to keep the Security Council necessarily informed of all the activities we are taking in that connection.

Secretary Acheson. We would, under the provisions of this treaty and under article 51, immediately inform the Security Council of any armed attack and of the measures which we were taking to resist it. That is an obligation both of the Charter and of this treaty.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. That would be at the moment the armed attack occurs?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And the fact that we are just looking ahead to protect ourselves against any possible danger does not necessarily mean that we give that full information to the Security Council?

Secretary Acheson. We would file this treaty under article 102 of the Charter. It would be filed with the United Nations in accordance with that obligation.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I thank you very much for that, because I have been asked that question many times, and I wanted to get your statement for the record on it.

INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND THE TREATY

I would like to refer to page 7 of your testimony, where you refer to article II, because a question comes into my mind in connection with what you say about article II. You say,

In this article the signatory governments assert that they will strengthen their free institutions and see to it that the fundamental purposes upon which these institutions are founded are better understood everywhere.

I have been one of those very much interested in our whole program of the Voice of America and the interpretation to the world of our purposes in world affairs. This seems to me to imply, in article II, that it is contemplated that from here on out possibly these Atlantic Treaty countries may jointly present to the world their purposes and intentions in entering into this treaty, and their general plans for strengthening their free institutions, and let the world know how the fundamental purposes upon which these institutions are founded and see that they are better understood.

Am I possibly anticipating future action, or is it understood that we should create a "Voice of United Treaty Countries" to explain that position?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. It is not contemplated that there will be joint action. Article II does not impose any obligations upon the contracting parties. Article II states the fundamental things which are being defended. We are defending those things which are most precious to us. Those are free institutions, and we want everyone to understand what those are. Article II states the basic principles
of free government and the determination of each one of the parties to have those understood by everybody. Once you understand what those free institutions are, you know there is nothing aggressive in the Treaty, that there cannot be; but there are no plans and there is no obligation here for joint action under article II.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. But we are probably hoping, or I would be hoping at least, that the parties to this treaty would all attempt, so far as they can, to reiterate the point that you have just made. That is what we are trying to do in our presentation to the world of where we stand. I am saying this because I feel that a great deal will be accomplished by the proper carrying on of a publicity program and an expression of where we stand, so as not to permit these charges of imperialistic designs and aggression to take hold. I think we have a responsibility to make that clear as a part of the whole present world picture.

Secretary Acheson. The Department of State, as you know, reiterates its belief in the importance of the Voice of America and other information activities which we take outside of our borders to make ourselves understood, and we will continue to urge on the Congress that we be enabled to do that as effectively as possible.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And while you might wish that other countries will do the same thing as a group, there is no contemplation of joint action?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Vandenberg. May I interrupt you just a moment.

I think it is rather important to stress that point, Mr. Secretary. This is not a rival organization to the United Nations in any aspect of its contemplated activities, and to go into a collateral informational program at the same time that the United Nations is operating one or the State Department is operating one would be sheer duplication, and nothing of the sort is contemplated.

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely correct.

PRIORITY OF ECA OVER MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Now, Mr. Secretary, am I correct in my feeling that we look upon the ECA program, the program for the rehabilitation of these countries of western Europe, as a No. 1 undertaking of our own, and under no conditions are we going to sacrifice that program for any other program? We are going to see that through. In other words, it has priority in our thinking as a means for bringing about world peace and as a means for resisting those forces that seem to tend to destruction and chaos and so forth, as against the forces of unity that we are trying to set up.

Secretary Acheson. That is fundamental, Senator Smith.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Then we would not, in the case of this program and especially the military implementation end of it, contemplate cutting down on the ECA program at all, but we would consider that that was an A-1 proposition to be considered as the first objective in our own foreign policy?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. That has complete priority.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much. That is all I have in mind at the moment.
The Chairman. Senator Pepper?

Senator Pepper. Mr. Secretary, in article 106, chapter XVII of the United Nations Charter—

The Chairman. It is the purpose of the Chair, if it is agreed to by the committee, that we will recess at about 1 o'clock, and come back at 2:30. I am not saying that to influence the Senator. I just want everybody to know what we have in mind.

CHAPTER XVII OF THE CHARTER AND THE TREATY

Senator Pepper. I started to say that article 106, chapter XVII of the United Nations Charter, under the heading "Transitional security arrangements," does apparently make provision for association among the four signatory powers of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and France with respect to maintaining international peace and security on behalf of ourselves and the United Nations. I think the answer is clear, but I wanted to make it clear in the record, to the effect that those four signatory powers and France were authorized in that article, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration, to consult with one another, and, as occasion requires, with other members of the United Nations, with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

In your opinion, that did not preclude other associations and consultations among member powers when in accord with article 51 of the Charter?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct, Senator Pepper.

RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO CHARTER

Senator Pepper. Now then, the question has been raised with respect to the relationship of the association formed under the treaty with the United Nations organization, and naturally the question would arise as to the relationship of the United Nations Charter to the North Atlantic treaty. It is provided, is it not, in article 103 of the United Nations Charter, that—

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other International agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Secretary Acheson. That is the provision of the Charter, and that is reiterated in the treaty.

Senator Pepper. So that not only is it not intended that there should be anything in the North Atlantic treaty in conflict with what is in the United Nations Charter; if anything were in the North Atlantic Treaty in conflict with the Charter, then that would not be valid with respect to the Charter.

Secretary Acheson. That is, as I say, stated in the Charter and in the treaty.

Senator Vandenberg. Before the Senator leaves that point, may I ask a question on the same point?

Senator Pepper. Yes, indeed.
Senator VANDENBERG. There are many questions raised regarding the French and British treaties with Russia in that connection. What is the situation in that respect? I am sure you are familiar with those treaties.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

In the North Atlantic treaty there is article VIII, which states that each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties, or any third state, is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement—

Senator PEPPER. Will the Secretary allow me to interrupt? I have just been notified that there are some amendments coming up on the floor in which I am interested, and if the Senator will allow me, since the Secretary is coming back, I will desist for the time being.

Secretary ACHESON. By entering into this treaty, the French Government with respect to its engagements, and the British Government with respect to its engagements, certify that there is nothing in those treaties which is in conflict with this treaty.

Senator VANDENBERG. In other words, the answer to these inquiries about the conflict between the existing French and British treaties with the Soviet Union is that there is nothing in conflict between those treaties and this pact, is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The answer is that the British and the French Governments have stated that, and that is conclusive so far as we are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not their signing this treaty have the effect of really modifying or abrogating any treaty in conflict with this treaty, even though they might have difficulties with the contracting power in adjusting themselves to that decision? It is a subsequent treaty, and if there is any conflict this treaty would supersede the other.

Secretary ACHESON. I am not prepared to say that that would follow, Senator. I think that it is left by the parties declaring that there is nothing in those treaties that conflicts.

Senator VANDENBERG. But in this instance there is no question whatever that both parties, both Britain and France, have declared that there is nothing in conflict.

Secretary ACHESON. There is no question as to that, Senator Vandenberg.

The CHAIRMAN. They are bound by that statement.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, if it is agreeable, when Senator Pepper comes back we will let him resume.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe I can finish in a very few minutes. The CHAIRMAN. I am not rushing you. Take all the time you want.

FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am interested in two phases of this treaty other than those which you have already covered, and to which you have given a number of answers in which I was interested. One of them is the financial obligation that we are assuming to sustain
the ability of other nations to resist over a 20-year period, which is
the life of this treaty; and the other one is a question that has been
asked of me a number of times as to the interpretation by some other
nations of our action in assisting or in mutual assistance in arming
these nations.

IS THE TREATY PROVOCATIVE?

I do not necessarily hold this view, but I think the question is going
to have to be answered, and I think I can sum it up in this way.
Some other nation or powerful group of nations not party to this
treaty may well say that by our very action in passing a mutual
assistance pact, and then implementing it immediately and over a
period of years, with increasing armaments which surround that na­
tion or group of nations with a ring of steel, it can be interpreted by
that nation as an aggressive act on our part, or a preparation for
aggression. May I hasten to say that I do not necessarily hold that
view myself. I do not mean that. But those questions have been asked.

Now, what may the answer be to that?

Secretary Aucheson. Let's take up the charges one by one. There is
no action here which is assisting the rearmament of nations which
surround that nation which you are presumably talking about. The
one nation which has attacked this treaty has been the Soviet
Union. There is no ring of steel surrounding the Soviet Union. Only one
of the signatories of this pact even borders on the Soviet Union, and that
is one of the smallest members, and I am sure that no matter how hys­
terical anyone's fears might be, they could not suppose that Norway
was contemplating any aggressive action.

The second answer would be that, following World War II, the
United States and those nations associated with it in the West had
one of the greatest aggregations of military power ever gotten to­
gether. We undertook to demobilize all of that. So, far from being
any aggressive action on our part, we went almost to the extreme
other end of possible action. We demobilized our great ground forces,
we demobilized our great Air Force, a large part of our Navy is put
up, our military forces now are very small.

The nations of western Europe also have very small military forces.
The action which is contemplated and outlined in what I have told
you about the President's proposed recommendation on a military
assistance plan could not by any stretch of imagination be regarded
as aggressive. There is nothing to aggress with under that program.

What would be done is to take the existing small forces and make
their equipment more modern and better rounded, so that to the best
of their ability they can defend themselves if they are attacked. The
idea that, with everything that is going to be done, they could pos­
sibly take aggressive action, is really unthinkable.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is important to call attention to
the fact that we have demobilized and our forces really are not be­
ing brought back up to what one might call a war strength. But that
position is going to be taken by some people, without any doubt. It
already has been stated by some people, that our assistance in arma­
ment to these countries in western Europe is in and of itself a basis
for suspicion by those who either do not understand the circumstances
or blind themselves to the circumstances.
PURPOSE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Now may I ask you, because I feel that the matter of the implementation of this pact is part and parcel of the whole consideration, is it contemplated by the parties to this pact that the western European nations will eventually be placed in a position so they can themselves successfully resist armed aggression from whatever source it may come, or will we limit it to the nature of a holding force, or a police set-up? In other words, I am concerned with the extent to which we may be expected to participate in building armaments, largely as a load upon our own people or from that standpoint, and of course perhaps equally as important in the success of mutual cooperation under this pact.

Maybe I can make it a little clearer. I can envision certain assistance, physical assistance, by way of arms and supplies sent to bolster the forces of western Europe which would be not enough to give them the strength they would have to have to resist aggression. I can also envision certain volumes of supplies which might be deemed by a lot of people to be enough, but would be beyond our capacity to supply. One might be waste of materials, if we sent too little or if we aided too little or if the mutual cooperation was too little. It might be a waste of effort. Another might be a burden that we just could not stand.

I wonder if there is any defined area of assistance now, and in the program over the next 20 years, because this is a 20-year program; that is, that we can picture at the moment.

SIZE OF MILITARY BUDGETS

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind if I intervened just a moment?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that while under the budget and this proposed bill we give them $1,130,000,000 for the next current year, their own budgets providing for arms and so on are something like six or seven times as much as that $1,130,000,000?

Secretary ACHESON. Somewhere in that neighborhood, Senator.

LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

I think, in answering Senator Hickenlooper's question, we might start with the question that was asked of me by Senator Smith, because that begins to give the contours to this problem.

The first primary necessity is the economic recovery of western Europe. That means that there are very definite limitations on the size of the military forces which western Europe can maintain, because if you withdrew greatly increased numbers of men from production and put them into military service, you would impair recovery and you would impair the very ability of these nations to resist and to remain as free nations. Therefore recovery comes first.

That means that under the military assistance program we have started with the forces as they exist in the 1950 budgets of these countries, and we are trying to give better armaments to those countries.

As Senator Connally pointed out, the great bulk of this effort is being undertaken by the European countries themselves.
WILL ERP FINANCE THE REARMAMENT OF EUROPE?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, and may I suggest, at that very point, the possible inseparable relationship between ECA and the proposed assistance. As I understand it, we propose to give $1,000,000,000 a year, or to contribute mutual assistance this near year, at least, in the amount of $1,000,000,000, which, as you say, is one-sixth or one-seventh of what these pact countries are putting in. I cannot avoid recalling that the European recovery program is about five and a half billion dollars. So, is it possible that the argument might be made that exactly what we are putting into European recovery is the total amount that these pact countries are putting into military development in one way or another? I suggest that because that question is going to come up.

Secretary ACHESON. I think the answer to that is, whereas the amounts may in general be somewhat in the same area, you are talking about different countries and you are talking about something wholly different.

What the ECA plan and program does is to assist the western European countries, 16 altogether as against 12 here, with their problems of foreign exchange; that is, with getting the things outside of their area which they have to pay for in foreign money. Their military budgets are budgets which are made up of maintaining and equipping establishments of their own. They are paid for with their own funds within their own countries.

So far as the connection between ECA and this military assistance program is concerned, there is one important connection which has various aspects, and that is that the recovery program comes first. Nothing which is proposed under the military assistance program will interfere with the recovery program.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The military assistance program can't survive unless the recovery program survives.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator.

Therefore, when, in planning the military assistance program, it became clear that in order to manufacture certain equipment the European countries would have to import certain raw materials, the question arose, How were they going to do that? Was that going to come out of the ECA program? The answer is "No." $150,000,000 for that purpose is included in the military assistance program, so that the ECA program goes on undisturbed.

Also, plans for production have been drawn so that they do not withdraw people who are manufacturing goods for domestic consumption or for export. Such increased manufacture as they are undertaking here is done with the slack of certain manufacturing facilities which will not interfere with production for civilian use at home or for export.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, as I understand it, the budgets for these pact countries are already drawn, and they contemplate, let us say, 5 or 6 billion dollars for their own contribution, so that those budgets must come out of their economic calculations in these countries.

Secretary ACHESON. They are the continuation of budgets which they have had for many years.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Without doubt, but I frankly have difficulty, while I may some place back in my own mind think I understand the situation, in explaining some of these things to people that ask me questions.

Secretary ACHESON. It is undoubtedly a difficult thing to explain, Senator, but we will continue to try. I think the point we are making here is that, of course, the maintenance of a military establishment does take something out of the economy of a country. There is no question about that. It does. But nobody would propose that a country should be without any kind of military establishment because it has economic problems. If you propose that, you obviously would get nowhere. The country would be without protection; economic recovery could not go forward because of the terrible state of uncertainty within it, and you would defeat yourself.

The real problem, I thought, that you were proposing, was, are we indirectly paying for all of the military budgets of all of these countries. I think that answer is “No,” we are not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have stated the question, yes.

Secretary ACHESON. I think we are not.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to ECA and these arms, these expenditures by these countries will be made in their own funds and not out of dollars.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be expenditures of their local currencies, and will not be a load on the dollar provisions of the ECA.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have always been unable to reconcile the reasoning for that argument which has been used many times, I know. It does not seem to me to make much difference what pocket you carry your money in or how you change it. There is a certain amount of financial stability behind an economy or that goes into an economy, and if we relieve the pressure with dollars, it releases that portion of the local economy to be devoted to something else. I do not claim to be a financial expert, and I may be wrong in that, but I have never had the other theory satisfactorily explained to me.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY

I want to make clear to you, Mr. Secretary, that I believe this program is a very essential program, but getting back to the question of the implementation of this pact, you propose $1,130,000,000 for this next fiscal year. Now, as I said before, I think, to either you or some members of the committee, when we go into this we commit ourselves to mutual cooperation with these countries for 20 years. That is a substantial period of time. And I feel that it is highly essential, in the interest of our whole calculation, that we get some reasonably substantial view of the over-all obligation that we will be expected to assume over this period. There should be some perspective that we can have, and I feel that it is not a good thing to go at this piecemeal.

I know the argument that successive Congresses can look at the picture and they can exercise their own judgment, but too often when we get committed on a matter of this kind we resign the right to exercise our own judgment because of the so-called moral commitments and legal commitments which we assume in the first contract. So
I am concerned with whether it will be $1,000,000,000 in 1952,
$2,000,000,000 in 1953, and those matters.
I do not know that you are prepared to answer those questions this
morning, and perhaps they should be presented in some different way
than the answer to my questions might suggest, but it is a matter
that greatly troubles me, because I think I am obligated to take a
look at this thing over the next 20 years if we are going to sign a
contract that lasts that long.
Secretary Acheson. Senator, I started on an attempt to throw some
light on this question when somehow or other we got entangled with
the foreign-exchange problem.

LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

What I think I want to throw out is some things I said earlier, and
I think you were not in the room at the time, that there are certain
clearly self-liquidating factors to the military assistance program.
The first one comes out of the fact that recovery is a prior necessity,
therefore the size of the European forces must be such that they do
not interfere with recovery. And it looks as though it will continue
to be quite small for some time. Therefore, the size of the forces will
not, as many people erroneously assume, mushroom into vast numbers
of troops. That is one limiting factor.
The second limiting factor is that as recovery takes place, the
European countries can take over more and more of this increment
which we are helping them with, so that they will increasingly be in
a position where they can carry their own expenditures. That is an­
other limiting factor.
The third limiting factor is that the help which we are giving them,
as I pointed out a moment ago, is in terms of durable equipment. It is
not shoes and uniforms and ammunition which disappears; it is equip­
ment which is durable in peacetime and will last for many years.
Therefore you do not have to replace that equipment annually, and
the only necessity for adding to it comes when you have any increment
in the forces. That increment, as we pointed out a moment ago, cannot
take place until recovery is more nearly achieved, and when it does
take place the Europeans are in better shape to provide all the equip­
ment themselves. So it is not, in my judgment, a program where I
look forward to years of the same or of increasing help. I look for a
comparatively short time of help and then it is no longer necessary.

RECOVERY OF MATERIALS FURNISHED UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST COUP

Senator Hickenlooper. With reference to a question that was asked
you a while ago by some member of the committee—and incidentally
I did hear you generally refer to that subject awhile ago because I was
here when we started the meeting—some member of the committee
asked you a moment ago what the situation would be in the event of an
internal coup or taking over by forces that were not sympathetic or
cooperative to the general pact consideration.
Have you given consideration to the possibility that capital goods
which we might mutually cooperate to provide to such a country that
later got out of this pact, or repudiated, or disassociated itself with the pact, could be returned to us under safeguard for the return of capital assistance that we have put up?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator, that has had a lot of consideration. I think it would be less than candid on my part to leave you with the impression that if there were a coup, and if one of these countries had such a change in government, that we would have any large chance of getting back any large amount of what we had transferred.

Senator Hickenlooper. I thoroughly agree with that.

Secretary Acheson. In my judgment the possibility of such a coup is remote. It is made more remote by the program, because as you give a sense of will to resist and the possibilities that that will be successful, you get further and further away from the sort of disintegration which leads to an increase in Communist strength.

**TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE FURNISHED UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Senator Hickenlooper. That would lead to another group of questions, or an area of questions, that have been asked me by members of the Senate and which may be more properly answerable by the military people than by the State Department. I do not know. But those questions would go to the type and kind and purposes of capital equipment. In other words, we could put permanent long-range capital equipment of great value into certain countries which might be later subject to seizure by internal revolution, or something of that sort, which would not necessarily call up the obligations under the pact; that is, the mutual obligations for resistance to aggression. But that may be a military matter rather than a diplomatic matter.

Secretary Acheson. I think that either in these hearings or in the hearings on the military-assistance program the military authorities will completely satisfy you on that. That is one of the criteria that they have been considering in the screening work which has been done.

Senator Hickenlooper. For instance, we hear the statement that it is a military-assistance question of whether or not we are going to send and permanently stable B-36's in Europe.

Secretary Acheson. I think they can remove any worries from your mind on that.

Senator Hickenlooper. I may not be necessarily personally worried, but I think in many of these questions the areas should be explored, and there should be some answers to them.

Secretary Acheson. I highly agree.

Senator Hickenlooper. On some of them I certainly cannot give the answers unless I have the benefit of better knowledge than mine.

Secretary Acheson. I think you can and should be fully informed on it.

**FUTURE COMMITMENTS UNDER MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you think that we will have the opportunity, or that there will be available any more reliable or understandable detailed pictures of what we may reasonably expect over the next few years by way of our share of the mutual contribution and by way of some concrete evidence of the contribution of other nations to
this pact, before these hearings are over? In other words, at this moment I am not at all content with the very nebulous program of the next few years. I don’t know what we are going to do. And I certainly hope that before we come to final action we can have a little more concrete understanding of what we are expected to do in the foreseeable future, and what other nations are expected to contribute to this well-knit unity of purpose for resistance to aggression. In other words, perhaps some of those things might be discussed in executive session or some other place, but certainly I do not have the answers yet, and I do hope to get myself much more satisfied on those obligations.

Secretary Acheson. I think that can be done, Senator.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think at this time, Mr. Chairman, I have nothing else.

The Chairman. All right. We will recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m. at the expiration of the recess.)

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Senator Wiley, we will be glad to have you proceed.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I have only a few questions I want to direct to the Secretary. I feel that the questioning up to the present time has elicited a lot of the information that the public should have, and most of us had before. I just want to ask a few simple questions.

INABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS TO ACT

This North Atlantic Pact, Mr. Secretary, is the result, is it not, of, first, because under the United Nations, which is a good mechanism in itself, there has been the inability to get the results due in large measure to the fact that Russia constantly exercised its veto.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. In other words, there has been that lack of international cooperation which we hoped and prayed would come into being after the United Nations was born in San Francisco.

If the United Nations had functioned, if the nations had played ball together, there would not have been that fear that brought about what we think is another mechanism that will have beneficial results; is that right?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. If everybody in good faith had lived up to their obligations under the Charter, then there would have been no fear of aggression, because the clear obligation is that you shall not use force or the threat of force in settling any international question.

Senator Wiley. But it is because of that very condition the European nations and the rest of the world, sensing a threat to the independence of the nations, that we are now trying this new mechanism, the North Atlantic Pact?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. Again you face the question that if there is this unity, and if this great Nation becomes a part of this unified action, it is the hope that it will operate to repress or stop any aggression. That is the theory of it; is it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator Wiley.

Senator Wiley. Whether or not military assistance will become necessary will depend upon whether or not there are any beneficial results following the mere execution and the ratifying of the pact. In other words, if the pact itself would open the eyes of the would-be aggressors there would not be any need to carry out any military assistance; is that true?

Secretary Acheson. If you mean that the mere ratification of the pact would do away with any fear of aggression, that would be true; but that is not the case, Senator.

Senator Wiley. The fact is, as you so dynamically outlined, that we got into two previous wars because, first, the Kaiser was informed and thought that we would not get into the First World War, and it is generally said that if he and his armed crew had thought that America would get in, he would have hesitated a long time.

And in this Second World War it has been said that if Hitler and the Japs had thought that we could do what we did do in the short time that we did do it, they would have hesitated.

In other words, Hitler did not think that it was possible. Now we are saying in this pact, “Do not tread on me,” or “Do not tread on my co-pact-makers.” That is the substance of it.

Would that not have the same effect that we think it might have had in the previous cases, had we at that time informed the world that if certain things happen, like aggression or an attack, we would stop the aggressor?

Secretary Acheson. We hope and believe, Senator, that the unity of all the signatories of the pact on the theory that an attack against one is an attack against all, will have a profound effect in discouraging any attack whatever.

NEED FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PACT

Senator Wiley. I get then, from the general concept of the so-called military assistance program that has been evolved, and which you pictured for us today, that there is still the fear that, unless there is some unified action on the part of nations involved as co-pact-makers in the matter of getting better prepared, the situation will not be bettered much by merely signing the pact.

Secretary Acheson. I say that these two things are complementary; they are both directed to bringing about the same purpose. If we ratify the pact, what we in effect say to the 12 nations signing it is that we will join together, if one of them is attacked, in resisting this attack and restoring peace.

In the present situation some of the signatories of the pact have very inadequate armament, very inadequate equipment for the troops that they have. These nations are anxious to join with us. They say the signing of this pact means that we are all together. They say as we look at the actual situation, if there were a really serious, all-out
attack, we know that in the long run, probably, the great strength of
the United States would end in the defeat of the aggressor.

But in the meantime, they say, "we would be overrun. Most of us," they say, "would be dead; our countries would be destroyed; our civil-
ization would be pretty well destroyed." The final outcome would
be that the United States would be liberating a corpse.

"Now," they say, "we want a chance to fight with you; we want a
chance to protect ourselves; we want to join in this effort. If you will
help us in bringing the equipment of our admittedly small forces to a
more competent level, then the will of those forces to fight will be
great; the will of the countries to resist will be great; and any would-
be aggressor will know that he will be faced with immediate resis-
tance, not only ultimate defeat, but immediate resistance, so that he
cannot accomplish his results by some kind of a coup or some kind of a
push which is all over before he starts."

He has got to move into this with full-scale mobilization and a full-
scale, aggressive, warlike purpose. They say we want to be able to
help in meeting that and help in protecting ourselves. If we do not
respond to that desire we do not get the full impact of the pact, which
is that all of these countries will join in resistance with determination
and with effectiveness.

Senator Wiley. Then we reach the conclusion, which I think is
apparent to every reasonable person, that the condition as it exists in
the world today, after 2 or 3 years since the so-called war ceased,
we find ourselves in the position where we, with our co-pact-makers, feel
that two thinks are necessary: First, an announcement to the world
that we will stand in unity against any aggressor; and, second, that
we will back up that announcement by getting ready as far as we can
foresee to meet any aggressor.

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. That is right, Senator Wiley.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN AND FRANCO-RUSSIAN TREATY AND THE PACT

Senator Wiley. And perhaps you can throw some light on the sub-
ject if you will turn to article 8 of the pact, which reads:

Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force
between it and any other of the parties or any third state is in conflict with the
provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international
engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

As I say, it has developed that both France and England entered
into certain treaties with Russia. I think they preceded the Second
World War; and some, I think, were entered into during the war.

You are in a position to explain those treaties. In case there is a
breach of the peace or an aggression on the part of Russia against
any of the co-pact-makers, those so-called agreements or treaties be-
tween Russia and France or England would not have any application,
would they? I think that is important for the public to know, because
there has been considerable talk on that subject.

Secretary Acheson. Senator, I think we touched on that this morn-
ing. I pointed out that the article which you have just read from the
treaty is a declaration by the signatory that it has no treaty which is
inconsistent with this treaty. That is an unequivocal statement by
the British Government and by the French Government that no treaty
to which they are a party is inconsistent with the North Atlantic Treaty.

In fact we have printed in this very book, from which I think you were perhaps reading, Senate Document No. 48, among all the source material you have the British-Russian treaty printed there so that all can read it and all can see that this declaration which Britain made is correct.

But it is not for me, as an official of the American government, to undertake to state on behalf of the British Government what their obligations are. They have done that themselves. We see the treaty and we can know that their statement is true. But I am not an official who is called upon to interpret British treaties.

Senator Wiley. I have the benefit of the record, and your assurance that it is at least your conclusion that the statement of the two governments is in accord with the facts and the truth?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator; it is inconceivable that these two governments would make a statement that is not in accord with the facts. As I say, we can all read these treaties, and there is the language before us.

Senator Wiley. That is all I have.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, may I supplement what I said this morning with the other matters?

The Chairman. All right.

Secretary Acheson. May I just add one thing to the answer to Senator Wiley? I should add that, in addition to this assurance in the treaty itself, the Soviet Government addressed a note to the British Government at the time it addressed one to us at the end of March, in which it raised this very question, and the British Government, in its answer to the Soviet Government—which is published and has been printed in all our newspapers—points out exactly again what I have said: That this treaty in nowise is inconsistent with the Charter.

Senator Wiley. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL AID BEFORE AN ATTACK OCCURS

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, article 3 of the pact, in referring to the self-help or mutual aid, uses this language:

that the parties, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

I interpret that provision as clearly adopting a policy that you mentioned this morning, of the preaggression development of the mutual strength of these countries rather than the attempt to develop their strength in the event of aggression.

Is that a proper interpretation of what you stated this morning?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator Hickenlooper. And that is right. In other words, you do not wait until the attack takes places to start getting ready to meet the aggression.

Senator Hickenlooper. And that is an obligation raised in this pact on the part of the participating countries to increase their strength prior to any aggressive acts on the part of another nation.
I have noticed a number of times in your statement reference to the term "the will to resist," which, of course, I think is an essential thing in any self-defense agreement or any self-defense activity. But I seriously wonder, in view of the rapid fall of France at the outset of World War II, Dunkirk, all of the rest of the historical failures at the outset of that war on the western front, if there is any sound or reliable basis upon which to believe that the will to resist now in these countries, after the devastation of war, is any greater than it was, let us say, in 1939 when at least the resistance itself collapsed with great speed.

To qualify that a little further, I would say that it might well be argued that the will to resist might even be greatly weakened because of the devastation of war and all the things subsequent to the war that we think are necessary for the rehabilitation of those countries. I am wondering if we can anticipate that the will to resist will be any greater now than it was in 1939.

Secretary Acheson. In our judgment, Senator, there is a strong and growing will to resist in western Europe. If you wish to compare a condition of will now with a condition of will at some other time, I think that we will get into a slightly confusing area. Let us talk about the will to resist now.

The fact that countries meet disasters I do not think is an indication of a lack of will to resist. We certainly met our disasters early in the war, and some of those were pretty complete, as the disaster in the Philippines. That indicated no lack of will to resist. In fact, there was a tremendous will to resist in the United States, and that brought us through to victory.

You mentioned Dunkirk. Dunkirk is no example of a lack of will to resist. It is one of the really glorious episodes of history; and nothing has been more outstanding than the will of the British people.

Senator Hicklenlooper. I do not mean to detract from the heroism of Dunkirk.

Secretary Acheson. If you point to the fact that France was disorganized, and its armies becoming disorganized, that is quite true. I think we could point out something else, which is true, and that is that those experiences have left a very strong effect upon the countries. In my judgment, the effect is to make even more vigorous the will to resist.

One has to talk with Norwegians, for instance, only a short time to discover that they are not prepared to repeat the experiences of 1940. They are not prepared to rely on neutrality; they are not prepared to believe that they alone can escape if some major aggression is planned, and they have a complete will to resist.

I believe that that exists in western Europe, and I believe it is increased as we give these people a feeling that what forces they have are going to be so equipped that they have a real fighting chance. And then I think you get the fighting spirit.

THE WILL TO RESIST AND THE ABILITY TO RESIST

Senator Hicklenlooper. I recall that prior to 1939 there was a substantial degree of armament in western Europe. Many years had gone by since the close of World War I. Yet, with a substantial
amount of armament and with France especially being reputed to have, at least at the start of the war, a highly trained and a very effective land army, we saw the resistance collapse almost overnight, even with equipment and with a reputedly fine military organization.

Again let me assure you so that you may not misunderstand me: I am not intending to argue against the merits and philosophy of this program, but I feel that it is only fair that we test the facts rather than embark on wishful thinking so far as results in the time of need are concerned.

I am not certain yet whether the will to resist can be separated from the ability to resist. The will to resist may exist in certain quarters. But a year and a half ago I was in one of the countries, one of the small countries of Europe, and it was repeatedly stated to me thus: "We have learned to live with invasion and capture, and we believe that when the third one comes we will know much better how to survive on our own under the invasion than we did in the last two, when we were unschooled in the methods to be used." This rather shook my faith in the will to resist in that particular small country.

I just do not know. I hope that the will is strengthened, and I hope that the ability to implement that will can be strengthened; but I do not think we have any particular assurance based on past events.

NO PLANS TO SEND AMERICAN TROOPS TO EUROPE

I believe you said earlier in your testimony today that it was contemplated that a great portion of the armament, or the developed armament, of western Europe, in the nations of this pact, would be carried under their own weight. I presume that that refers also to the manpower in their armies. I am interested in getting the answers as to whether or not we are expected to supply substantial numbers—by that, I do not mean a thousand or two, or 500, or anything of that kind, but very substantial numbers—of troops and troop organizations, of American troops, to implement the land power of western Europe prior to aggression.

Is that contemplated under article 3, where we agree to maintain and develop the collective capacity to resist? In other words, are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries' capacity to resist?

Secretary Acheson. The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute "No."

Senator Hickeloope. That is sufficient. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Smith. In connection with article 3, I would like to ask one question.

The Chairman. Do you yield, Senator?

Senator Hickeloope. I yield the floor.

The Chairman. Go ahead, Senator Smith.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION UNDER ARTICLE III

Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, as Senator Hickenlooper has read the text of article 3, I will not read it again. But where you speak of
individual and collective capacity and joint action, you contemplate, I assume—

Secretary Acheson. Would you direct my attention again to what you are reading, Senator?

Senator Smith. Article 3 of the treaty. I will read the whole article so as to make it clear in the record.

Secretary Acheson. I have it before me. I just did not know what you were speaking of.

Senator Smith. It says:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Am I to understand from that that we are contemplating some sort of lend-lease program in this military-assistance program that goes along with this, and, if so, is it just a unilateral lend-lease from the United States, or do we expect joint lend-lease by the whole group, you might say, a multilateral lend-lease program? If some other nation is able to do the lending or leasing of a particular article as well or better than we do, that would be contemplated?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator, I think, as I tried to sketch out this morning, under the proposed military-assistance program, we will ask the Congress to make available funds out of which certain transfers can be made from the United States to these pact countries, of weapons.

It is also contemplated, and well worked out already, that the European countries themselves will not only do their utmost in their specific plans to supply themselves, but they will supply one another; and the exact amounts of that are also worked out, and they are very substantial.

Senator Smith. It would be proper to say it is a sort of multilateral lend-lease program?

Secretary Acheson. I do not want to talk about lend-lease. That is not something that adds to the clarity of the thought.

Senator Smith. I agree with you, we do not know whether it will be lend-lease or what it will be. But under that general idea—

Secretary Acheson. We propose transfers from our own side to the Europeans, and the Europeans will make transfers between one another.

Senator Smith. Thank you very much. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

ASSURANCE THAT SENATE WILL BE CONSULTED ON ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Secretary, if the chairman will permit, I would like to ask one supplemental question before the next Senator takes over, regarding your answer to my question this morning on article 10. You recall that you quoted the President as saying that, if he were confronted with the problem of deciding whether or not to accede to the addition of other members to the pact, he would consider that this involved the equivalent of writing a new treaty; and, so far as he is concerned, he would seek the advice and consent of the Senate.
Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. That protects us up to 1952—I do not mean to put a limitation at that point—

The Chairman. Certainly beyond 1948.

Senator Vandenberg. But, after all, this treaty runs for 20 years. What protects us if, as, and when this President concludes to retire, voluntarily or otherwise?

Secretary Acheson. I think there is precedent, Senator.

The Chairman. Would this not be a precedent? Would not the statement of the President—in the event it transpired within that period—and the custom and the practice, would that not make a precedent that the others would respect?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; this mere statement would be a precedent. But I was going to say that there is a precedent for the fact that a statement made by a sitting President in regard to Presidential interpretation of the treaty, and what should be done under it, is accepted by his successors as a statement coming from the Presidential office.

Senator Vandenberg. You yourself evidently considered it to be a somewhat important point, I judge, from the degree of attention which you gave to arming yourself with a thoroughly adequate answer.

If the Senate should conclude that this is of very fundamental importance, and interpret a reservation which dealt solely with our understanding of what the language means—and obviously it deals solely with our own domestic procedure—it could in no sense be hostile to the treaty itself or to any acceptance of it by us; could it?

Secretary Acheson. I should not think so, Senator, that being purely an internal, American arrangement; the Senate might consider it unnecessary to attach this to an international document. But that is up to the Senate.

Senator Vandenberg. Thank you.

The Chairman. Along the line of the interrogation, the Presidential action in saying that this is a matter for Congress and the Executive would certainly have some influence at least, I hope, on a successor?

Secretary Acheson. I should think it would make it clear that the basis of the thing is what the President said; that it is in effect a new treaty with a new stay.

The Chairman. Exactly. It either has to be a new treaty or a modification of an existing treaty, and the consent of the Congress is required in any event. I think the President was exactly right in that attitude, because if he could make a treaty without referring it to the Senate at all he would abrogate, almost, the advice-and-consent clause of the Constitution.

Secretary Acheson. I think the statement that was made on behalf of the President really puts the question to rest. I do not think that any future President, in the light of that statement, would undertake to vote for the admission of a new member, and any new member would be very ill-advised to let the matter rest at that point.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley, did you finish?

Senator Wiley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Green is next.
Senator Green. Mr. Chairman, the questions I had in mind to ask have all been answered in the interval by the preliminary statement of the Secretary—upon which I would like to congratulate him for its clarity and comprehensiveness—or by the answers to the questions of other members of the committee.

Since those questions have been asked by some of them several times over, I do not feel I will do the same. I have no questions to ask at present.

The Chairman. Congratulations to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Senator Lodge is next.

Senator Lodge. Mr. Secretary, I think you have answered a number of rather difficult questions, and I have a few more difficult ones to put to you, not so much on my own account but on account of the important functions that this committee has to perform; to make a record in which an answer is found to every question which can reasonably be asked. In that spirit I shall interrogate you.

**IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL AID AND SELF-HELP**

Referring to the requirement in the treaty that there be continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, is it not true that, if there were not continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, our obligation to assist would, by virtue of that fact, be suspended?

Secretary Acheson. You mean if the other countries do not do everything that they can for themselves?

Senator Lodge. Yes.

Secretary Acheson. Yes. We should not be assisting countries that are not doing the best they can themselves; that is quite correct.

Senator Lodge. By the same token, if they are doing the best they can by themselves, then there certainly is an obligation on us, is there not, to do something?

Secretary Acheson. Yes. We have accepted the principle that if they do all they can, and in our judgment they need help, then we give them the help.

Senator Lodge. And that it is a good proposition from our standpoint.

Secretary Acheson. A very good proposition, yes, sir.

**COMPARISON WITH THE SITUATION IN 1939**

Senator Lodge. In connection with the point that has been made regarding the comparison between 1939 and 1949, is it not true that there are a number of very significant differences in Europe as between 1949 and 1939, to wit, that there is now an agreed-to plan between the western union powers which is much more definite and much more closely adhered to than any plan which existed in 1939? Is that not the fact?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, Senator Lodge.

Senator Lodge. Is it not the fact that, whether or not we do ratify this treaty, there is a very reasonable expectation in Europe, based on two previous experiences, that in case of trouble the United States would interest itself, and that that belief is held with far less doubt and uncertainty than ever existed in 1939?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; that is true.
Senator Lodge. And that those factors, therefore, make it very much more likely that the will to resist would certainly be as great, if not greater.

Secretary Acheson. There is another factor, Senator Lodge, which I know has not escaped you, but I think it is important perhaps to have on the record, as a difference between the period before 1939 and the present time.

I think all the European countries have had experience with the conception that it is possible to appease a potential aggressor. The view was widely held at one time that if one just acted softly, and gave in, that the aggressor's interest would die down and there would be no aggression. I think that view is no longer held anywhere in Europe.

Senator Lodge. In other words they have learned from experience.

Secretary Acheson. They have learned from experience. They have also learned, as I said a moment ago in answer to a question by Senator Hickenlooper, that you cannot escape by hiding and looking the other way. If there is a full-scale aggression no one is left out of it.

Senator Lodge. Is it not true that the French, whose army, as has just been said, was so disorganized in 1939, formed an army with our help which, in 1944 and 1945, acquitted itself extremely well?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator Lodge. So that we do not need to conjecture as to the capacity of France to regenerate itself from a military standpoint. We already have some performance we can point to, is that right?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; no one is a greater authority on that subject than you are yourself.

DANGER OF AMERICAN EQUIPMENT FALLING INTO AGGRESSOR'S HANDS

Senator Lodge. I do not know about that. The statement is made, here and there, that to extend military assistance and equipment is a short-sighted thing to do because in case there is another crisis that equipment will fall into enemy hands. Therefore we would be much wiser to keep it over here. What would you say would be the answer to that contention?

Secretary Acheson. I should say there were several answers to that, Senator Lodge. In the first place, in the last war we sent a great deal of equipment to many of our associates in the war. It is true that some of that equipment was captured and fell into the hands of the enemy. But by far the great bulk was used most effectively in winning the victory.

In the second place, I think the dividends which come to the United States from making this equipment available are very great indeed. We get many times the return in security from this equipment, more than the cost of the equipment to us. We get better rounded forces on the continent, we get a greater will to resist, we get all this equipment manned by people who are determined to use it. We get very great returns in security for the whole area in return for our assistance.

Senator Lodge. In other words, most of the equipment which we sent to the Russians and the British and the French in 1944 and 1945 did not fall into the hands of the enemy but was used to inflict punishment on the enemy?

Secretary Acheson. That is right.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I interrupt?
Senator LODGE. Yes.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think the situation is comparable at all. It certainly is not comparable to the question I asked a moment ago, and someone else asked, as to an internal coup in the country permitting the capture of this equipment. Manifestly when the enemy is shooting at one he is going to do everything he can to protect the equipment. It was not a military act of seizure that I was concerned about at all.

Senator LODGE. I do not understand you, Senator. I thought you were talking about the danger of enemy action.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not at all.
Secretary ACHESON. Even at that, Senator Hickenlooper, there is a certain amount of comparison. I suppose people could have justifiably wondered, in 1940 and 1941, whether equipment which was being sent to the British at the time of their darkest days, might not fall into the hands of the enemy. It did not, it was well worth while taking whatever risk there was, as the British might have been overwhelmed, by giving them the essential aid which took them through those very dark days. I think in that degree there is a certain amount of comparison.

EFFECT OF COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF POWER IN A TREATY COUNTRY

Senator LODGE. In pursuance of Senator Hickenlooper's suggestion that there might be Communists that would take over one of these foreign governments, did you not say to Senator Vandenberg, under the terms of this treaty, such Communist control of the government would no longer receive any benefits from this country?
Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, yes.
Senator LODGE. I do not believe you made it quite clear in your response to Senator Vandenberg that that would be true not only because the Nation itself would not care to be under this pact, but also because we would take the initiative in seeing to it that they did not get the benefits under this pact?
Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, Senator Lodge.
Senator LODGE. And that the language of the pact—this is a question that has been raised on the floor of the Senate already—makes it clear that it is to be attributed to the nations that believe in the liberty of the individual, and in democratic ideals, and if they stopped practicing those ideals then they would not come under the pact any more. Is that true?
Secretary ACHESON. A new situation is created by that, yes.

POSSIBILITY OF FINANCING THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OUT OF MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS

Senator LODGE. Another question that is frequently asked is: Will whatever military assistance we extend under the terms of this general concept—I mean the treaty and the Military Assistance Act—be at the expense of our own Military Establishment? That is a question that has been brought up quite a lot. I would like to get your comment on that.
Secretary Acheson. Of course, Senator, that is a question which is out of my field. I would have no authority to speak on behalf of the President. My judgment and expectation is that it would not be had at the expense of our own military preparations.

IMPACT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OF UNITED STATES BUDGET

Senator Lodge. Would it be outside your field to comment on the fear that is frequently expressed that there must be a limit somewhere to these expenses that we are making for foreign assistance, and that this may be just that straw that breaks the camel's back?

Secretary Acheson. I should think it is not that straw. I agree that we cannot go on indefinitely adding expenses on account of foreign operations. But I believe what we are doing here is taking the essential step which makes all the vast amounts we have invested really productive and will really bring about the results we are seeking.

Senator Lodge. You do not consider that this step will impose a burden on the American economy so serious that it would require fundamental changes in our economic relationships?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Lodge. Or that it would precipitate a crisis in Government finances, or budgetary matters?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Lodge. After all, the nations of Europe have as great an interest, have they not, in the health of the American economy as we have ourselves?

Secretary Acheson. Nearly as great. We all have a vital interest in it.

Senator Lodge. I do not know how many realize it. I hope that is being preached to them. Of course if any of these questions—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, would you mind an interruption?

Senator Lodge. Not a bit, Senator.

EXPENDITURES NOW WILL SAVE GREATER ONES LATER

The CHAIRMAN. Along the line of the question of Senator Lodge about present expenditures, is it not true that proper expenditures now would save future expenditures of a much larger amount?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is quite true, Senator Connally. If all of these expenditures have their result of really removing, we hope at some fairly near future date, this overhanging threat of aggression, as Senator Vandenberg pointed out this morning, it will have a tremendous effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

IMPROVEMENT IN EUROPEAN MORALE

Senator Lodge. Has there been any perceptible improvement in morale in western Europe since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed? Do you get any news from abroad to that effect?

Secretary Acheson. Yes. We have a great deal of information on that, and I think that Ambassador Harriman, who has come back from Europe for the purpose of testifying before this committee, can give you chapter and verse on that, Senator.
GOOD WILL BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

Senator Lodge. I understand that there is still considerable good will for the democracies behind the iron curtain. What would the effect of this pact be on people in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and eastern Europe in general? Do you know what reception it has had there?

Secretary Acheson. We have had very little information about that, Senator. I should hazard a guess that it is encouraging to those forces within the countries who are hoping some day to regain the type of freedom which they have lost.

PROSPECTS OF OTHER PACTS

Senator Lodge. There are people who write to me, and I am sure to other Senators—and maybe to you—who say that this is going to be followed by a Mediterranean pact, and then by a Pacific pact, and so forth. Is there a likelihood that there will be further regional arrangements, and that the United States will participate in them?

Secretary Acheson. There are no further arrangements under contemplation at the present time, Senator.

RELATIONSHIP TO OEEC

Senator Lodge. Is it planned to have the OEEC fill any function, insofar as the administration of this military aid is concerned, the organization for European recovery, or will there be some machinery set up based on that?

Secretary Acheson. My impression is that their chief function will be that they will continue as they have in the past, to bring about a recovery of their various countries. The actual manufacturing of particular types of weapons in whatever country, will probably not be handled by OEEC but by arrangements under the Brussels Treaty or this treaty.

Senator Lodge. There probably would be, would there not, some international group—in fact the treaty calls for the setting up of an international group—to administer the military aid, does it not?

ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN EUROPE AND THE TREATY

Secretary Acheson. Yes; that is true, Senator.

Senator Lodge. Has enough progress been made in western Europe in the last year to justify any statement of hope as to the degree to which the countries of western Europe will cooperate together in a military way?

Secretary Acheson. I think there has been very considerable progress, and I think that this treaty will increase the rate of progress and bring much closer cooperation in many fields.

POSSIBILITY OF COUNTER-MEASURES BY U. S. S. R.

Senator Lodge. Now the question has been raised by a number of very prominent men of the press, over the radio, and television, as to counter-measures which the Soviet Union will take as a result of the ratification of the Atlantic Pact. Is there something that you can say to that on the record?
Secretary Acheson. I should not want to speculate about that matter. We already know, of course, that the Soviet Union has greatly intensified its propaganda against this treaty; we know that they have addressed notes to us and many of the other signatories protesting about it. I should imagine that that type of action will continue.

Senator Lodge. But it certainly is true, is it not, that the force which is building in western Europe, even in its maximum level of strength, would not possess any offensive capabilities at all?

Secretary Acheson. That is entirely right.

Senator Lodge. So a nation which is making realistic judgments as distinguished from propaganda, or as distinguished from looking for pretexts, certainly would not change its policy because of the development of an armed force that has no offensive capabilities, would it?

Secretary Acheson. One would think not.

AGREEMENT ON GERMANY AND THE TREATY

Senator Lodge. If an agreement could be reached between Russia and the western powers with respect to Berlin and the German problems generally, would it still be necessary to go ahead with the North Atlantic Treaty?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; in my judgment it would.

Senator Lodge. In other words that is just a part of the problem?

Secretary Acheson. That is a part of the much larger problem of Europe, and I should like to add there what I know you appreciate very fully, Senator Lodge, that the tendency of some people in the United States to believe that our policy should go up and down, depending on whether the Russians raise or lower the international temperature, is really to take the initiative in the formulation of our policy away from the American Government and put it in the hands of somebody else.

I think that is a most unwise way of proceeding, and that we should go ahead calmly and not be influenced by these various peace offensives or wars of nerves or wars of propaganda, or whatever is directed against us.

Senator Lodge. We hear people say that the United States ought to declare, if you step over this line, we will do so and so. As I understand your point, it is that the minute you say that you give the other man the control of what we do.

Secretary Acheson. That is right.

COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE TREATY

Senator Lodge. Does the United States, by the acceptance of this pact, in any way indicate approval or support of the colonial policies of other pact members?

Secretary Acheson. Not in the slightest.

Senator Lodge. There is just no doubt about that at all, is there?

AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Have you discovered any basic differences between the opinions of our own military leaders and those of European countries with respect to the fundamental nature of this military-assistance program, and the over-all strategy that governs it?
Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I think it has been worked out in complete harmony.
Senator Lodge. They really are in agreement on it?
Secretary Acheson. They really are.

AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE SINCE WORLD WAR II

Senator Lodge. Can you state, or would you rather not for reasons of security, the amount of money which has been expended on military assistance to these nations since the war?
Secretary Acheson. I do not have that information available at this moment. I think it can be obtained and given to you, Senator.
Senator Lodge. That is a question that is asked quite often.
Secretary Acheson. I think that can be readily made available to you.

(The committee has been informed that the Department of State is preparing this information for submission in connection with the proposed military assistance legislation.)

CUT IN MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS TO OFFSET MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Lodge. The argument is made that since the pact will increase our security, and it will cost a billion dollars, therefore we ought to cut a billion dollars from domestic military purposes in order to offset the gain in security we get from the pact. Will you comment on that contention?
Secretary Acheson. I think that that is not a sound argument. In the first place, as I think you very well know, we use the word security in two different ways. We gain greatly in security by both the military assistance program and the pact in the general prevention of war. That is perhaps the most important aspect. We also gain, in the unhappy event that that war is not prevented, in security, by having more effective associates in resisting aggression than we otherwise would. That does not mean that by merely transferring some money from our military budget and the budgets of other countries that we get the same amount of protection only in a different place.
In the first place, the element of time comes into it. It will take a year or a year and a half or 2 years for the full effect of the military-assistance program to go into operation. We should not weaken our own preparation.
Secondly, we wish to make our own participation as effective and vigorous as possible. We wish to make the European assistance as effective and vigorous as possible. Both programs are much smaller than they would be if there were a threat of war, an immediate threat of war.
We would have greatly to expand that program, both abroad and here. Therefore we are doing, I believe, about as little as we safely can in time of peace to prepare ourselves for this emergency, and we should not weaken what we are doing, because we are helping to add to the effectiveness of allies in time of crisis.
Senator Lodge. We ourselves, are we not, are starting from scratch in a sense, and have just begun to build up?
Secretary Acheson. Yes. We have a great deal to make up.
Senator Lodge. If we were to reduce our own strength because of this billion dollar's worth of equipment in Europe, would we not be giving up actual armed forces in being, in exchange for paper plans over there, which could not possibly be realized for several years?

Secretary Acheson. To some extent that is true, although it could be said that some of our expenditures are also for production which has not yet taken place.

REVIVAL OF ARMS INDUSTRY

Senator Lodge. Is it contemplated that arms industries will be revived in Europe, and, if so, should limitations be placed upon such expansion in the light of our own interests? What is the view on that? Is it a view that we encourage them to expand their armament industry or do we encourage them to expand it up to a certain point or what?

Secretary Acheson. As I said this morning, absolute priority goes to recovery. Therefore, production of arms has to be held to almost a minimum point so that you will not withdraw any people or any factories from civilian production for consumption and for export. Therefore, what they are doing is operating the factories, whether they are Government-owned or otherwise, which are making armaments, at a point which will be somewhat increased under this program but within the slack which exists under the recovery program.

You will not be deflecting people or machines which are now working on civilian orders to military orders, but you will be making the production of those factories which are working on military orders closer to 100 percent. You will take up all the slack that there is. Therefore, there is a very severe limitation.

Senator Lodge. So the economic policy acts as a limiting factor?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

REVIVAL OF RUHR ARMS INDUSTRY

Senator Lodge. Is it planned to bring back the Ruhr as a source of arms production?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; it is not. We are very clear that the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany must be complete and absolute.

DIVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Lodge. What can you tell us about how the arms aid is going to be divided up as between the different countries of Europe? First of all, will we make that allocation ourselves, or will that be made in response to some joint recommendation? That is the first question.

Secretary Acheson. It is made as the result of receiving a plan which has been worked out in Europe. That plan shows certain deficiencies in the total fulfillment of the plan. The plan involves manufacture sometimes in one country for use in another country, sometimes by manufacture in the country for use within its own areas.

All of that leads to certain deficiencies in equipment, that is, material which they cannot under this program make themselves. Those requests have been very carefully screened in the National Military Establishment. It was gone over after consultations with our military
authorities and those in Europe, as to how these could be used, where they would be most effectively used, et cetera.

The total result is reached after that screening. I think it would be unwise, certainly at this time, to try to say how much of what we propose to do goes to a particular European country.

Senator Lodge. Will it be possible for the United States to make sure that, for instance, arms allocated to the Netherlands will not be used in Indochina?

Secretary Acheson. Absolutely. There is no question about that.

Senator Lodge. We will retain that control?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir. Absolutely no doubt about that.

Senator Lodge. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, very much.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. In view of the congratulations of the last Democrat, I hesitate to ask the Secretary any questions on the proposal at this time. There are just a few that I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary.

EFFECT OF A COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF POWER IN A TREATY COUNTRY

I was not clear this morning as to what you think might happen if, as a result of an election, Communist government took control of one of the members. Is there any mechanism by which a member of which we do not approve can be excluded? I was not clear. I know it was discussed, but I am a little in doubt as to what your feelings are.

Secretary Acheson. There have been no provisions in the treaty looking to that end, Senator. I think if the event occurred to which you refer, that in the first place the country which became Communist would not be able to carry out its obligations under the treaty, would not want to, we could not have this sort of cooperation that the treaty envisages, and in one way or another, ways would be found to solve that problem.

Senator Fulbright. Of course that has happened in the United Nations. That is approximately what has happened. We might have to resort to some similar action in this case.

Secretary Acheson. Yes.

DEFINITION OF AN "ARMED ATTACK"

Senator Fulbright. Under article 5 a question was prepared by the staff:

Would an internal revolution, perhaps aided and abetted by an outside state, in which armed force was being used in an attempt to drive the recognized government from power be deemed an "armed attack" within the meaning of article 5?

That is a little different from the last question, in that I assume an ordinary election which the Communists won. This is in the nature of a coup. Would that come within the definition of an armed attack?

Secretary Acheson. It is quite hard for me to hear you Senator, and I am not sure that I got the question. Did you say if there were a revolution supported by outside armed force, would we regard that as an armed attack?

Senator Fulbright. That is right. It is one of those border-line cases.

Secretary Acheson. I think it would be an armed attack.
Senator Fulbright. It would be?
Secretary Acheson. It would seem to me that it would, yes.
Senator Fulbright. Would you say that each country, or this country, would decide for itself whether or not that is an armed attack within the meaning of article 5, or would that be a function of the Council?
Secretary Acheson. No. Each country would have to decide for itself.
Senator Fulbright. Is the Council given any executive powers to make such a decision?
Secretary Acheson. No, it is not.

VOTING IN THE COUNCIL

Senator Fulbright. There is one other question in regard to the Council. Is it intended that those decisions be unanimous or by majority? That is a question that has plagued us.
Secretary Acheson. There are no voting procedures laid down. The Council is a place where questions are discussed and recommendations are made to the member governments. Those recommendations might be unanimous, they might be split recommendations, and you might get one group of Council members recommending something, and another group recommending something slightly different.

There are no voting procedures, there is no desire to prevent any member of the Council from making any recommendation.
Senator Fulbright. As a practical matter, that being so, if the members choose, they can require unanimity, which they would like to do, in case they ever want to set up some voting procedure among themselves, by agreement within the Council.
Secretary Acheson. I suppose they could.
Senator Fulbright. There being nothing to the contrary, nobody objecting; in other words, it is a practical resort for unanimity.
Secretary Acheson. Their principal function is recommendatory and there is no purpose in trying to get a voting procedure, because what you want to do is to get the views of the Council. That is the purpose. If you set up a procedure whereby you may not get any views you have defeated your own purpose.
Senator Fulbright. The point I have is if they themselves choose to set up some machinery there is nothing to prevent it. There is no prohibition.
Secretary Acheson. No, sir; there is nothing to prevent them.

AREA COVERED BY TREATY

Senator Fulbright. There has been a good deal of speculation as to article 6 as to the extent of the area covered. I think it might be a good thing to clarify a little bit further, because I do not think that you treated that article in detail. I did not hear it this morning. There are four questions there.
Is it intended that the treaty should cover only those areas specifically referred to in article 6, or does the use of the word “include” imply that it might also cover certain other areas?
Secretary Acheson. It covers the area specified in article 6.
Senator Fulbright. Only?
Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. With the exception of Algeria and the North Atlantic area, does article 5 of the treaty cover any of the outlying territory of member states?
Secretary Acheson. It does not cover any areas outside the area described.
Senator Fulbright. Even though the area belongs to a member?
Secretary Acheson. That is correct. It does not cover that.
Senator Fulbright. Why is Algeria singled out in the text of article 6?
Secretary Acheson. Because Algeria, under the French Constitution, is a part of metropolitan France. Only those parts of Algeria which are parts of metropolitan France, under French law, are included.
Senator Fulbright. Where does the Panama Canal fall in that connection?
Secretary Acheson. The Panama Canal falls outside of the area. In the pamphlet which you have, Senator, published by the Senate, the Senate committee print, there is a map which is drawn.
Senator Fulbright. I saw the map. What I was asking is for the record, because it is easier to use for debate than is the map in any case.
Secretary Acheson. That is right, Senator. It falls outside the area.
Senator Fulbright. Does the North Atlantic area include any part of the Mediterranean Sea?
Secretary Acheson. Yes.

RELATIONSHIP OF BRUSSELS PACT TO TREATY

Senator Fulbright. How will the Brussels Pact defense organization be drawn into the broader framework of the Atlantic Pact in our concept of military assistance? Is there any idea of merging those two?
Secretary Acheson. I should think that the relations between the organization set up under the Brussels Pact and that set up under the North Atlantic Treaty, would be very close indeed. It would seem to me unwise to merge them. All of that, of course, is in the future.

There is a working party already set up to work out the arrangements under this article which provides for the council, the military committee, et cetera, and they will work and come forth with recommendations if, as, and when the treaty is ratified.
Senator Fulbright. All of the members of the Brussels Pact countries are, of course, members of this organization?
Secretary Acheson. Yes; they are.
Senator Fulbright. Do you wish to comment on the military matters, that is, can you give the committee for the record your idea as to how this military aid will be organized? Will a single military force be organized in Europe, or will there be 12 different ones?
Secretary Acheson. I would not be competent to testify on that subject.
MEMBERSHIP IN NORTH ATLANTIC PACT COMMUNITY

Senator FULBRIGHT. What was the reason why Portugal was included and Spain was excluded?

Secretary ACHESON. The countries which were included, aside from those who originally met to negotiate the treaty, were included by the unanimous decision of the negotiators. Portugal was unanimously included. There was no agreement that Spain should be included, therefore Spain was not included.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it probable that Spain will be invited to participate at a later date?

Secretary ACHESON. I could not possibly speculate about that, Senator. As you see, it has to be by unanimous agreement.

POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF GERMANY

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would the inclusion of western Germany in the pact improve the strategic position of the North Atlantic powers?

Secretary ACHESON. Would it do what?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would it improve the strategic position of the North Atlantic powers?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not think I am an expert on military strategy, but I should think that we must say quite clearly at the present time that a discussion of including western Germany in the pact is not possible. The pact deals with armament questions, with self-help, mutual aid, and things of that sort, and at the present stage of affairs in Germany we could not contemplate a military program in Germany.

At the present time, of course, under the treaty, an attack on the occupation forces in Germany would be an armed attack under the treaty, so in effect Germany is protected as long as the occupation forces are there.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We will just assume the western government is set up, and if it becomes a self-governing area there is no reason why it could not be made a member. There is no prohibition there either. That is just left for the future for determination.

Secretary ACHESON. There are reasons that I have pointed out, in policy, which would create difficulties. You would have a conflict in policy between disarmament agreements which were entered into between the occupying powers and the self-help and mutual-aid preparations to resist aggression which are called for in the treaty. Therefore I think the question does not arise.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I realize that, but all the members who are concerned from that point of view, except one, is a member of this pact. It could, by agreement, be brought in also later on, if the members chose?

Secretary ACHESON. You could do anything by unanimous agreement; yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, if you are asked "Are they excluded?" and they cannot be, that is not necessarily so, at all, by this pact. They could be brought in later on but they are not now included.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think that this pact will influence in any way the political and economic integration of the western European countries?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think it will have a very helpful influence upon it.

Senator Fulbright. That is all.

Senator Lodge. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one more question.

The Chairman. Very well.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST COMPLYING WITH PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY

Senator Lodge. I would like to direct your attention, Mr. Secretary, to the preamble and article 2, and I shall read two excerpts from those two portions of the treaty.

In the preamble “they”—that is the parties—are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

The other excerpt is article 2:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

My question is, in the light of those two phrases: “Is it not true that a Communist government would not come within the purview of those two phrases that I have quoted?”

Secretary Acheson. I think you are quite right.

Senator Lodge. Are those not two very pertinent provisions?

Secretary Acheson. They are very pertinent, and they bear upon the question that you have in mind.

Senator Lodge. And they would justify us, would they not, in saying to a nation that was taken over by the Communists, “You no longer come within the purview of the pact.”

Secretary Acheson. In my judgment they would.

Senator Lodge. Thank you.

INVITATION TO SENATORS DONNELL AND WATKINS

The Chairman. The committee has invited Senators Donnell and Watkins to appear at this session. These Senators indicated a desire to sit with the committee and to interrogate witnesses. The committee agreed to that, under the accepted practices and courtesies of the Senate, so that at this point we will give Senator Donnell, the senior of the two Senators, the right to interrogate Secretary Acheson.

Senator Donnell. I want to thank the chairman for his courtesy, and to make inquiry at this time, if I may, before proceeding.

As the chairman knows, neither Senator Watkins nor I were present this morning at the hearing, and consequently did not have the benefit of the testimony of the Secretary of State this morning. In view of that, I inquire whether or not it is the pleasure of the committee, in order to prevent any possible duplication, that we should defer our
examination of the Secretary until his return, if he is to return, or whether the committee would prefer that we proceed this afternoon.

I am sure, speaking for myself, that I would be glad to go ahead, although I realize that there is a possibility of unnecessary duplication in view of the fact that I do not know what his testimony was this morning.

The Chairman. I will say to the Senator that it is not the fault of the committee that the Senators were not here. As soon as I was advised as to what the attitude of the committee was this morning I notified the chief of the staff here to notify both Senator Donnell and Senator Watkins that we were going to meet at 10:30 and we would be pleased to have them.

I had assumed also that the public announcement I had made on the floor of the Senate several days ago to that effect, in which we invited all Senators to be present, if they desired, had come to the notice of Senators Donnell and Watkins prior to the meeting of the committee this morning.

I am not complaining that you were not here: I am simply trying to show that it is through no action of the committee that you were not here.

Senator Donnell. May I say to the chairman that I am sure there is no desire to enter into a controversy on the matter, but the fact is that on the 23d day of March there was delivered to the chairman, by myself, a letter, jointly from Senator Watkins and myself, requesting not merely the privilege of attendance, and not merely the privilege of interrogation to such extent as someone else might deem proper, but all the privileges of members of the committee, except the right to vote, in connection with these hearings.

Our request was based primarily on the fact that we felt that the committee had already, as to 12 out of the 13 members, expressed themselves as being in harmony with certainly the theory of the treaty, and subsequently, I may add, that the other member, Senator Lodge, had expressed himself to a similar effect by a newspaper article.

I may say that we received no response whatsoever to our letter, and this morning the communication to which the chairman refers was merely a statement—I have a copy substantially of it in my pocket—to the effect that we were invited to come to this meeting, with no statement as to whether we were entitled to interrogate, no statement as to whether our letter was being acceded to, no other statement at all, except that we were invited to come, as other Senators.

I think that was stated by Dr. Wilcox. The exact language is available if the chairman needs it.

As to the invitation on the floor of the Senate, I think the chairman will find on an examination of the record that there was no invitation, as far as I find at any rate, in the announcement by the chairman yesterday. It was no invitation. It was simply a request for an excuse by the committee for attendance, and previous announcement was to the effect that the hearing would start today.

I say, however, there is no desire on my part to enter into controversy. Our request, however, has never been complied with, or acknowledged, until 10 minutes before the hearing this afternoon, at which time I received a letter from the chairman, who told me some 40 or 45 minutes before, I should say, substantially, that he was going to send me such a letter.
The Senator knew, and the Senator from Utah also knew, that we were going to meet today for these hearings. That was told on the floor of the Senate. We thought that the interest of the two Senators would be such that they would appear.

The Senator from Texas, who is the chairman of this committee, could not reply to the Senator's long and involved letter without knowing what the views of the committee members were. As soon as I found out what the attitude of the committee was I called you this morning. Until that time no definite conclusion had been reached.

Now, the Senator's letter, and his statement here now, refers to all of the privileges, all of the privileges except voting. The precedent, so far as I know, in the Senate, has been that frequently noncommittee members of the Senate attending a hearing are invited to ask questions, and to sit. But other than that I do not know what these privileges are that the Senator refers to.

Certainly he cannot have the privilege of voting, and he did not ask for that. But the primary responsibility on this committee is for the members of this committee to investigate these facts.

Now, the Senator referred to the fact that he understands that the members of the committee are for the pact. I do not know. I have taken no vote. But certainly everybody knows that the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Utah are not for the treaty, and that they are here not to—if I may say it—elucidate such information as we had this morning, but they are here to impede and obstruct and delay and hinder and filibuster, if I might say, against the treaty.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman, it is somewhat difficult, in view of the statement by the chairman—

The Chairman. I do not say that in any hostile spirit.

Senator Donnell. I know that. I observe it is very friendly and nonhostile. May I say that when such terms as impede, obstruct, delay, hinder, and filibuster are used against a fellow Senator, I cannot help resenting any such language; and I do resent it.

There is no such attitude on the part of either Senator Watkins or myself. We have just as much right to our opinion as any member of this committee has, and we are not here in a desire to impede, obstruct, delay, hinder, or filibuster.

I may say we have devoted considerable time to this matter, and we should like to examine the witnesses and do so intelligently. I am quite willing to proceed with examination of Secretary Acheson this afternoon, if it is the pleasure of the committee. On the other hand, as I started out by making the inquiry, in view of the fact we did not hear the testimony this morning, I asked whether or not you desire us to proceed.

The Chairman. I did not intend to offend the Senator by those terms. The future conduct of the Senators in their questioning will reveal whether or not I am correct in my original view.

I withdraw the language, however, and apologize. I want to be courteous, I want to be fair. But this Senate, and this committee, have some considerations in this matter as well as the two Senators from Missouri.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Watkins, I am sorry to say, is not from Missouri. We would like to have three Senators.

The Chairman. I assume the Senate would like to have everybody on this committee, for that matter.
Senator Donnell. Is it all right for us to proceed with this matter?

The Chairman. It is perfectly agreeable to me. I do not know what the engagements of the Secretary are.

Secretary Acheson. I am at your disposal.

The Chairman. Tomorrow we have booked former Senator Austin, who will be here. I suppose we can work that out. For the time being we will go on with the interrogation. If it is necessary to suspend it, we will postpone the remainder of it.

Senator Watkins. Mr. Chairman, since my name has been mentioned, and since certain statements have been made concerning my views, my commitments—

The Chairman. Certainly you can make a brief statement. I would appreciate the courtesy of making a brief statement.

Senator Watkins. In the first place I have made no commitment for or against this treaty. I have asked some questions which I think ought to be answered. Maybe some of them have been answered.

The Chairman. Would the Senator mind saying now whether he is for it or against it?

Senator Watkins. I cannot say. I have not completed my investigation of it.

The Chairman. You have not finished? That is fine.

Senator Watkins. If the chairman would please, I was trained as a lawyer and as a judge. When I do not understand a matter I try to get all the information on both sides. I think my conduct has been absolutely fair in the matter.

The statements in the Record, in the Congressional Record, contain exactly what I have said, and I defy you or anyone else to go into those statements and find that I have been reflecting upon any Member of this body, or have taken a definite position one way or the other.

The record is there, and I rely entirely upon it. I would like to say something about this—

The Chairman. I want to be courteous to the Senator, and respectful to him, and he has a right to his views.

Senator Watkins. I have received your letter. I think I received mine at 2:20 this afternoon, although my letter was addressed to you about a month ago.

The Chairman. That is true. I explained to you why I did it. I am not the whole committee. This committee is the only authority that has any power to control the proceedings here on who shall appear or not appear and what they shall ask or not ask. I did not assume to decide that question for myself.

The Senator knows we have been under tremendous pressure here. We have just had the ECA for a month or more.

Senator Watkins. I realize all that. I thought probably the decision had been made. This afternoon when I was on the Senate floor and picked up my home-town paper in the Senate reading room I found that apparently on last Saturday the Associated Press reporter had interviewed the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which it was announced that Senators Donnell and Watkins would be permitted to appear here and ask questions.

That is in substance what it was. I got it today. It is dated April 23. It was apparently known in Salt Lake City on last Saturday.
The Chairman. All that shows is that the Salt Lake paper is better advised as to what is going on in Washington than the Senator from Utah.

Senator Watkins. That is true. I thought perhaps I would have to go home to get the information. I can get it right here, close by. But apparently I have to read my home-town papers in order to get the answers.

The Chairman. I commend that practice.

Senator Watkins. I have an invitation that has been extended to me now. I call the attention of the committee to the statement in this letter:

This is to advise you—

and this is the last paragraph—

that the committee meets again at 2:30 p. m. in the caucus room, in the Senate Office Building, to hear Secretary of State Acheson, and the committee invites you and Senator Donnell to appear. Each of you will be permitted to ask Secretary Acheson appropriate questions respecting his testimony and the Atlantic treaty.

That is very good, and all right as far as it goes. The request was not only to ask Secretary Acheson questions, but the other witnesses who were to appear here. I am wondering now, maybe this was not intentional, but it seems to limit us to the examination only of Secretary Acheson. If that is the fact, that I am limited, and by this appearance you have complied with our request, I would most respectfully decline to participate unless I am permitted to ask the other witnesses questions.

Senator Lodge. I hope these two Senators have the chance to interrogate other witnesses, too.

The Chairman. Certainly. That letter referred to this afternoon's meeting. I said we would meet this afternoon at 2:30 and that you could come and interrogate Secretary Acheson.

Senator Watkins. I am asking the question now to clear it up. If that is all that you want, very fine, and I appreciate the courtesy.

The Chairman. That is all I meant for the moment. I do not know what the committee will do hereafter. It depends on how the hearings progress. When anybody appears, if they want to ask questions they can indicate so and the committee will decide whether they will hear them.

Senator Watkins. I also want to say, not having received any reply, and not having been advised, I did not make any special preparation. I had other obligations. I knew that I could read in the record what was said. There was no necessity for me to come here to listen. I was not prepared to come here to interrogate, so I did not prepare, and I have not heard what Secretary Acheson said. I have not heard the questions that have already been asked.

The Chairman. You could have heard if you had come this morning.

Senator Watkins. I understand that.

The Chairman. You were notified before the committee met this morning that they were going to meet at 10:30, and you did not come.

Senator Watkins. I did not come, of course. I had other obligations.

The Chairman. Exactly.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Watkins. And I had not been given permission to ask questions. I would like to say, with this, that I would like to ask some questions after examining the record. I would like to read the transcript tomorrow, when it is ready, and I take it for granted that in a matter of this importance, with the Secretary here in the city, it will be possible to get him back, and we will not be unduly trespassing on his time if we ask him to return for further questions.

I will not ask him anything this afternoon.

The Chairman. Very well.

Senator Donnell, do you have any questions?

Senator Donnell. Yes, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. I would like to say that my opinion of the wisdom of the distinguished Senator from Missouri and the distinguished Senator from Utah is such that I fully expect after their exploration of the subject that they will become ardent devotees of the North Atlantic Pact.

Senator Watkins. That is possible.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding with the examination, I desire just to reiterate this one statement: I trust the Secretary and the committee will pardon me if I should repeat some of the matters that have come up this morning. I have no knowledge of what has come up, and necessarily it is entirely possible that some of the questions I shall ask will be repetitious to that extent. I may say also that it is entirely possible that approaching this matter from the standpoint of questioning the validity of the treaty—the advisability, I should say, of the treaty—that I may ask some questions that the chairman of this committee, or possibly some others, may not agree with, and may not think will elicit information of value. Yet I assure the chairman that I will endeavor only to ask questions that I think are of importance in the proceedings.

EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS ON ATLANTIC TREATY

Mr. Secretary, I direct your attention to that part of your letter of April 7, 1949, to the President, which appears in Executive L, Senate, Eighty-first Congress, first session, in which letter you state that in July 1948 the President authorized Mr. Lovett to begin exploratory conversations with the Ambassadors of Canada and the parties to the Brussels Treaty. I pause until you have observed that position of your letter. It is at page 5 of the Executive L print, up near the top.

I assume, Mr. Secretary, that these exploratory conversations that Mr. Lovett entered into, pursuant to the authority of the President, were the first of the acts participated in by the United States and other countries which ultimately culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty. Am I correct in that assumption?

Secretary Acheson. These I believe were the first discussion with those countries about a possible treaty.

Senator Donnell. Those countries were Canada, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. I believe you stated the Brussels countries correctly; yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. You say in this letter, Mr. Secretary, that the President, and I quote, "on the basis of these expressions of the wishes
of the legislative branch," authorized Mr. Lovett to begin these exploratory conversations to which I referred. Will you state, please, Mr. Secretary, what are those expressions of the wishes of the legislative branch to which you refer in that observation?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is set forth in the letter, Senator Donnell.

SENATE RESOLUTION 239 AND H. R. 6802

Senator Donnell. And it is the preceding page, and consists of two items, does it not, Mr. Secretary; namely, Senate Resolution 239, which was adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, and the preamble of H. R. 6802, which was unanimously reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on June 9. Am I correct in that?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. The action in the House of Representatives did not culminate in any actual action by the House itself. Am I correct in that; am I not?

Secretary Acheson. The letter points out that that was the vote of the committee but it was not taken up before the end of the session, so far as any final action by either body of the Congress, to Senate Resolution 239, which was adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948; am I correct in that?

Senator Donnell. Yes. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, if you know, the reason why there was an effort made to secure the passage of that resolution as Senate Resolution 239 was advisable?

Secretary Acheson. I am afraid I don't understand that question.

REASONS FOR PASSAGE OF SENATE RESOLUTION 239

Senator Donnell. Here is the question I am asking you: Senate Resolution 239 was passed by the Senate on June 11, 1948. I want to ask you, if you know, what was the reason why there was an effort made to secure the passage of that resolution?

Secretary Acheson. I was not in public office at that time. I just know what the record indicates, and what is contained in my letter.

Senator Donnell. The record indicates the reason why it was necessary or advisable to have a resolution such as 239, which is known as the Vandenberg resolution.

Secretary Acheson. I think if you will turn to my letter, Senator, we point out—

on the day the Brussels Treaty was signed—


Secretary Acheson. Yes.

the President addressed the Congress in joint session, and the conclusion of that treaty as a noticeable step toward peace. You—

that is the President—

expressed confidence that the American people would extend the free countries the support which the situation might require and that their determination to defend themselves would be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to do so. Shortly thereafter, my predecessor, General Marshall, and Mr. Robert Lovett undertook a series of consultations with the leaders and
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the problems facing the free world and how they might best be met by bringing American influence to bear in the cause of peace, in association with other free nations, and within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

I think that states why the consultations took place and the purposes of them.

USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO AND THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Did the fact that Russia had made frequent use of the veto in the United Nations have anything to do with the institution of the consultations between your Department and the Foreign Relations Committee leading to the adoption of Senate Resolution 239?

Secretary ACHESON. I pointed out this morning, Senator, at some length that the hopes that the world had had that the members of the United Nations would adhere, continue to adhere to the principles of the United Nations, and that they would use the procedures of the United Nations to carry out those principles, had been disappointed; and that a large group of the Soviet Union, and some of its satellite states had, in effect, not adhered to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and had used the procedures of the United Nations to frustrate the achievement of the purposes and principles. As a result of that, and as a result of other Soviet action in eastern Europe, a deep-seated sense of insecurity arose in Europe, and it was to meet that sense of insecurity which was having an unfortunate effect upon recovery that the Brussels Treaty was undertaken, that the consultations were undertaken between the State Department and the members of the Foreign Relations Committee; and, as you read the report of the Foreign Relations Committee, you will see that they were influenced by that in drafting the resolution, and the Senate was influenced by that in adopting it, by a vote of 64 to 4.

BRUSSELS PACT

Senator DONNELL. And the President's observation with respect to the Brussels Treaty occurs, does it not, in his address to the Congress on March 17, 1948, three sentences of which read as follows:

This development—

that is, I think, referring to the Brussels agreement—

deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free nations of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to do so.

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I referred to in my letter.

PREPARATION OF SENATE RESOLUTION 239

Senator DONNELL. That is what I thought doubtless you had referred to. Now coming on down to the days immediately preceding the presentation on May 19, 1948, of the Vandenberg resolution to the Senate, do you know, even though you were not in the department at that time, who it was that worked with the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee from the State Department on the preparation of Senate Resolution 239?

Secretary Acheson. I do not.

Senator Donnell. It was a fact, however, as the records disclose, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that representatives of the State Department did cooperate in the preparation of Senate Resolution 239, which was presented to the Senate by Senator Vandenberg?

Secretary Acheson. I have no idea whether they participated in the preparation of the resolution or not.

Senator Donnell. Was Mr. Lovett in the Department at that time?

Secretary Acheson. He was the Under Secretary of State.

Senator Donnell. Did you read the Congressional Record of June 11, 1948, and note particularly the various expressions of opinion by Senator Vandenberg as to what S. Res. 239 did and what it did not do?

Secretary Acheson. I am sure that I have read at one time or another the debates and the report, everything in connection with the resolution. I do not recall now.

PREPARATORY CONVERSATIONS ON ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Donnell. Going forward: After the passage of the resolution, Senate Resolution 239, on June 11, 1948, you have mentioned, as I have indicated, in your letter of April 7, 1949, to the President, that in July—the next month—after the action of the Senate, on the basis of the expressions of the wishes of this branch, the President authorized Mr. Lovett to begin exploratory conversations with the Ambassadors of Canada and the parties to the Brussels Treaty. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, if a little bit later in your letter of April 7, 1949, you say:

These conversations resulted in September in agreement by the representatives participating in them that an arrangement established by treaty, for the collective defense of the North Atlantic area, was desirable and necessary.

Am I correct in that?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. In November 1948, which was 2 months after the September agreement to which you refer, is it a fact that the western European alliance was itself working on a draft of a proposed treaty?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know. I have no information.

Senator Donnell. You have no knowledge to that effect? Do you recall seeing in the press, as of that approximate date, Mr. Secretary, a statement from the Washington Post, an Associated Press London dispatch, November 20, 1948, that:

The western European alliance is plugging away on a rough draft of the North Atlantic defense pact—
as shown in the Washington Post of November 21, 1948.

Did you see that statement?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. You do not know whether that is a fact or not?

Secretary Acheson. I assume that these parties were working on a draft of the treaty.

Senator Donnell. Had the State Department of our own country started work at that time also on a draft of the treaty?
Secretary Acheson. I assume so. An outline of what was to be discussed was prepared; yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. An outline, prior to December 1948, is that correct?

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Then you say in your letter to the President:

Following approval by the governments concerned—

of the recommendations of their representatives—

negotiation of the treaty was begun in December and finished on March 15, 1949.

Is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. So that the actual negotiation, after these preliminary conversations, after the agreement had been reached on the general nature of the treaty, after the approval by the governments of the prior recommendations, the negotiation of the treaty began in December 1948 and was finished on March 15, 1949?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

FIRST DRAFT OF THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Are you able to say whether or not at the beginning of what you term "negotiation of the treaty" that there was any instrument in existence which had previously been drawn by the State Department of our country, or whether the only instrument was something that had been drawn in Europe by representatives of the western European alliance?

Secretary Acheson. I am informed by my colleagues, who were in the Department at that time—although I was not—that the first draft of any sort emerged from the conversations and was a product of group discussion.

Senator DONNELL. I am not quite certain whether you mean at the beginning of the negotiations—I am using the term negotiations as used in your letter of April 7, 1949, to the President—whether there had been anything drawn by the United States or whether anything that had been drawn was drawn by foreign countries.

Secretary Acheson. The answer is neither. My colleagues inform me that the first draft was the product of group discussion between the United States and these other countries. This came out in a group discussion.

Senator DONNELL. And that was in the month of December 1948?

Secretary Acheson. Yes.

PRESIDENT’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Senator DONNELL. The President’s inaugural address delivered on January 20 contained these three sentences, did it not, Mr. Secretary:

If we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur. I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan. In addition, we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security.
Do you recall that language in the President's address of January 20?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I do.

Senator Donnell. You took your oath of office on the day after the inauguration of the President, did you not?

Secretary Acheson. January 21.

CHANGES IN THE DRAFT TREATY

Senator Donnell. January 21, 1949. Do you recall whether or not the treaty was, at the time you took your office, in substantially the same form as it was when it was signed on April 4, or was it in quite different form?

Secretary Acheson. There were very important changes.

CONFERENCE WITH NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

Senator Donnell. I will ask you to state whether or not on or about February 11, 1949, you had a conference with Mr. Lange, the Foreign Minister of Norway.

Secretary Acheson. I suppose that is the day. Yes; I presume that you have the date correct, Senator. The Foreign Minister of Norway, as you know, came over here for the purpose of discussing the treaty with us.

Senator Donnell. I ask you to state, Mr. Secretary, whether or not there was given out a statement with your knowledge to the Associated Press, almost immediately following the conference between you and Mr. Lange, in which these two paragraphs—which are very short—appeared:

The United States, subject to Senate approval of the treaty, will make the strongest possible commitment to give prompt and effective aid if any one of the countries in the alliance is attacked; but only Congress can declare war.

Military action, therefore, cannot be committed in advance, but in joining the alliance the American Government would subscribe to the principle that an attack on one member nation was an attack on all, and this would be interpreted as a moral commitment to fight.

Was there a statement given out to that general effect with your knowledge?

Secretary Acheson. Not at all.

Senator Donnell. There was not?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. Did you know of any such statement having appeared in the press?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

SENATE DEBATE OF FEBRUARY 14, 1949

Senator Donnell. Did you read the Congressional Record of February 14, 1949?

Secretary Acheson. I am sure I did not.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall that that was the date on which that observation was called to the attention of the Senate, and that Senators Vandenberg and Connally made various statements which were immediately commented upon by the press of European nations,
country after country, within the next 24 or 48 hours? Do you recall that?

Secretary Acheson. I remember the incident to which you refer.

Senator Donnell. Would you state, Mr. Secretary, whether or not on the afternoon of February 14, following the debate in the Senate of that day, you had a call from Messrs. Connally and Vandenberg at your office? Do you recall that?

Secretary Acheson. I have had several calls.

Senator Donnell. They came to see you that afternoon, did they not?

Secretary Acheson. I will ask them. I do not know whether they came on that afternoon or some other afternoon.

Senator Donnell. You knew of the foreign comments that were made, did you not, immediately after the debate of February 14?

Secretary Acheson. I knew of many of them, Senator. There were quite a few comments.

Senator Donnell. Did you know that this question was asked, and answer returned by Mr. Vandenberg, in the debate of February 14:

But the Senator would not favor, would he, a North Atlantic Pact containing within it a moral commitment on the part of the United States to fight?

Mr. Vandenberg. Not without its own independent decision to that end.

Did you know, Mr. Secretary, that in the same debate the following ensued in which Mr. Connally made various statements:

Mr. Connally. I do not, of course, approve of any language which may be adopted which would be construed as automatically involving the United States in war.

Mr. Donnell. Or as a moral commitment to fight?

Mr. Connally. Of course. In the case of governments I do not know the difference between moral commitments and legal commitments. I certainly would not desire the adoption of any language which would morally commit us to fight. I think our morality is worth something in the world, and we would not want to play with a moral commitment, even though we might not be legally bound.

But there are many people, and we have found them in Government and elsewhere, who would favor automatically going to war, which would mean letting European nations declare war and letting us fight.

Mr. Donnell. Which would, of course, be entirely contrary to the Constitution of the United States, would it not?

Mr. Connally. Certainly. Congress alone has the power to declare war. Of course, individual Senators declare war sometimes.

Mr. Donnell. But those are only local wars.

Mr. Connally. Seriously, I would not vote for any language of that kind. I have so told the Secretary of State, and I think he knows that I feel as does the Senator from Michigan, that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations would not approve or adopt any form of language in an international agreement which would commit us to go to war when some other country in Europe might be attacked.

We are not responsible for the disagreements which may arise in the countries of Europe. Any European nation might attack another nation, not merely the one country about which we hear so much talk.

I would not attempt to assess all the different ramifications involved but when and if the situation shall arise, the Government of the United States can legally, morally, and constitutionally determine what our course shall be under the given circumstances; that is reserved to the United States.

If we think the controversy or situation is of such a nature that we should go to war, we can do so. If we think it is not of such a nature, we shall not go to war.

That is my horseback attitude in regard to the question at the moment.
Do you recall having had that language, or substantially the information that the two Senators had so expressed themselves, called to your attention?

Secretary Acheson. I recall the incident, and I recall reading about it. I do not recall the quotation to the extent that you read it.

Senator Donnell. Did you read the New York Times statement of February 15, an article by Mr. James Reston? I pause to ask, Do you know Mr. James Reston of the New York Times?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Has Mr. Reston frequently conferred with the State Department, and did he prior to the general knowledge of the contents of this pact coming to public attention?

Secretary Acheson. Mr. Reston has always attended the press conferences of the Secretary of State. I do not know that he has any other conferences.

REPERCUSSIONS OF SENATE DEBATE

Senator Donnell. Did you observe this statement on February 15, by Mr. Reston:

After the debate, Senators Connally and Vandenberg went to the State Department to see Secretary of State Acheson.

The Secretary of State intends to have other talks with Senators Connally and Vandenberg later this week, after which he will present his case to the full Foreign Relations Committee.

Meanwhile, the State Department will be watching for reaction to the day's debate, not only at home but abroad.

Do you remember seeing that article?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall an editorial in the New York Times of the next day on the Atlantic Pact Debate, in the course of which this language appears:

This was especially evident from the statements of Republican Senator Donnell, who, in the manner of Senator Lodge's round robin of 1919, attempted to serve notice that the United States will accept neither legal nor moral obligations to defend the peace by opposing aggression, if necessary by force of arms, and that the Senate will repudiate any treaty even implying such commitments.

In this stand during the debate on the floor of the Senate he found the support of Senator Connally, the new Democratic chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Even Senator Vandenberg saw himself compelled to advocate such a watering-down of the Atlantic Pact as to make it little more than a formal recognition of the community of interest in the event of an armed attack upon the Atlantic community, leaving every member free to do as he pleases.

In contrast to this position is the stand of President Truman, who proposes the Atlantic Pact in order to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter as the best method of avoiding such attack and thereby safeguarding our own security, et cetera.

Do you recall having seen that editorial in the New York Times?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Donnell. Did you read the press accounts, or many of them, Mr. Secretary, in the foreign countries, or from the foreign countries, with respect to this debate of February 14, in which these two gentlemen, the two Senators, had made these various observations?

Secretary Acheson. Very few.
Senator Donnell. You were aware, were you not, Mr. Secretary, that there was very grave apprehension in Europe, by reason of the statements made by the two distinguished Senators. You knew that, did you not?

Secretary Acheson. I knew that the incident attracted a great deal of attention throughout Europe.

FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE SENATE DEBATE

Senator Donnell. Did you notice this language by Mr. David Lawrence appearing on February 16:

The negotiations over the North Atlantic Pact, for example, have aroused a significant comment in the Manchester Guardian, one of the leading liberal newspapers of Great Britain. It says, in an editorial entitled "The Wrong Way": "The United States can hardly be proud of some recent passages in its diplomacy. Negotiations on the North Atlantic Pact have obviously been bungled. The apparent retreat behind the shelter of the Senate's authority should have been avoidable and much misunderstanding and heart-searching in Europe could have been prevented. The United States should not have forced the pace if it were not able to deliver the goods. Now a more sober and less spectacular approach to problems of mutual aid must be attempted." * * * Other British newspapers put headlines on the comments of Senators Vandenberg and Connally and said America is "welshing" on its obligations to Europe in connection with the military alliance.

You saw that, did you not, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Acheson. No; I did not.

Senator Donnell. You read these newspapers, of course, Mr. Secretary, I know, to the full extent that your time permits. That is correct, is it not? Current press observations on matters involving the State Department?

Secretary Acheson. I am quite lazy about that, Senator. There is prepared for me a résumé of most of the press.

Senator Donnell. May I ask, without inquiring further in any detail, whether or not you saw this Associated Press dispatch, or learned of it:

London, February 16—

which was the day after the debate—

America's rejection of any "automatic war" clause in the Atlantic Pact hit the public of western Europe like a dash of ice water today. "Senate Bans War Pledge" and "No Automatic War Tie, Say Senators," morning paper headlines announced.

Did you hear or see anything like that?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. It is a fact, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that you did learn there was great apprehension in Europe that after all this treaty that you had been working on from December 1948 up until February 14 probably would not give anything to Europe that it expected. That is correct, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. No: I should not think so. I knew there was a great deal of interest in the debate which took place in the Senate, and some confusion about it.

Senator Donnell. Do you regard Mr. Reston as a gentleman of wide information on matters pertaining to diplomatic affairs?

Secretary Acheson. I have the highest regard for him.
Senator Donnell. Do you concur with his language in the New York Times of February 20:

Since last Monday's debate in the Senate considerable energy has been expended on finding words that will scare the Russians, reassure the western Europeans and satisfy the Senate.

Do you recall seeing that, and do you agree with it?

Secretary Acheson. No; I do not recall seeing it.

Senator Donnell. Do you agree with that, that that is what was going on in the State Department, shortly after the debate of February 14?

Secretary Acheson. I do not think it was intended to be a description of my mental process.

European Reaction to Senate Debate

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, you do realize, do you not, that following these announcements by the two gentlemen in the debate, that there was a strong position in Europe, a strong feeling in Europe, I should say, that after all the pact was not going to give any assurance. Therefore the State Department, on the one hand, was confronted by the problem of satisfying Europe, that the United States will go to war in the event of armed attack on any signatory, and on the other hand, of reassuring people in this country who feared that there was an obligation to go to war.

Was that the dilemma that was presented to your Department?

Secretary Acheson. No; I should not say that was a dilemma.

Senator Donnell. You would not say that?

Secretary Acheson. No.

Effect of a Communist Coup in a Treaty Country

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, I would like to pass for a moment to article 5 and ask something of your opinion as to the meaning of article 5 as it now stands. Before doing so, might I refer to a comment which you made here this afternoon in regard to the question as to whether, if a nation becomes a Communist nation, it can be expelled or ousted from the pact.

Is there any other language in the entire treaty to which you can point, or which has ever occurred to you as tending to indicate that such a nation could be put out, other than that that Senator Lodge called to your attention this afternoon while you were on the stand?

Secretary Acheson. I think that the language which is applicable is that contained in the preamble, probably in article 1, article 2, and kept running through the treaty, Senator Donnell. You will find all through here provisions which would seem quite incompatible with participation by a nation which was Communist and which was following the Communist line.

Senator Donnell. Would you point to the next one of those provisions, which runs through, to which you refer?

Secretary Acheson. For instance, the undertaking to settle all their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the charter, which is in article 1.

Senator Donnell. That is in article 1?
Secretary Acheson. In article 2 it is referred to. In article 3 it talks about "more effectively to achieve the objectives of the treaties by means of continuous self-help and mutual aid."

I have not seen very much mutual aid between Communist and non-Communist countries. Consultation, whenever in the opinion of one of them the territorial integrity, political independence, or security is involved.

Article 5 would be a difficult one for a Communist country.

Senator Donnell. Any other provisions that you can think of as bearing on that question?

Secretary Acheson. I do not know whether these Communist countries could say that none of the international engagements which they now have in force would conflict with this treaty.

I think that about covers them.

PROVISIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TREATY

Senator Donnell. There is nothing, I take it, Mr. Secretary, which in express terms provides any method by which any country can be ousted from the participation in the pact. I am correct in that, am I not?

Secretary Acheson. I pointed that out earlier this afternoon.

Senator Donnell. And there is no provision in the pact by which a country may voluntarily withdraw, is there?

Secretary Acheson. There is no express provision.

Senator Donnell. There is no implied provision either, is there?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. Neither expressed nor implied, by which a country may withdraw. And certainly, unless these items that you have referred to, and Senator Lodge has referred to, have application, there is nothing which either expressly or impliedly says that if a country goes Communist that it can be ousted or can withdraw. I am correct in that, am I not?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, you, of course, are an eminent member of the bar; you were the private secretary or law clerk of Mr. Justice Brandeis; that is correct, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. I was his law clerk.

Senator Donnell. And practiced law?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. If you were writing a contract for a client, and wanted to make it clear that one of them could get out of the contract, or either of them could, or could be put out, you would say that in so many words, would you not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. It is not said in so many words in this pact, is it?

Secretary Acheson. That is true.

MEANING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Donnell. May I ask you, going down to article 5 of this treaty, with which, of course, you are thoroughly familiar, whether you agree with this observation of the New York Times editorial—
I may say it is the first editorial—of March 22, 1949, which is not very long. This excerpt says:

The North Atlantic Pact contains promises not even dreamed of by Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson, indeed, in his war speech of April 2, 1917, looked forward to "a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." But Mr. Wilson in time of peace would not have dared ask the Senate to commit itself, as Mr. Truman and his advisers are now doing, to go to war if any 1 or more nations is attacked. We should not quibble on this point. The defense pact means that or it means nothing.

Do you agree with that statement in the New York Times?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir. I think if you would ask me questions, not as to whether I agree with what other people said, but my own view—

Senator Donnell. I want to know if your view of that statement is correct, namely, that the defense pact means that the United States will go to war if any 1 or more of the 11 nations is attacked, or it means nothing. Do you agree with that?

Secretary Acheson. That is not what I testified here today.

Senator Donnell. And you testified here earlier this morning on that point?

Secretary Acheson. Yes. I covered it quite fully in my statement.

Senator Donnell. Let me quote this dispatch which appeared in the Washington Post March 23:

United Press, Copenhagen, Denmark. Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen—he is the gentleman who signed the treaty on behalf of Denmark, is he not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. I resume, from the Washington Post, to the United Press:

Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen told Parliament today that under the proposed North Atlantic treaty, the United States would go to war if any one of the signatory nations is attacked. "To the Danish Government," he said, "there is no doubt that the United States will consider herself pledged to assist an attacked nation with all her force. If armed force is necessary to reestablish security, it is evident that the member countries possessing such force are obliged to use it. That means that if an armed attack occurred on one of the member countries, it could have only one answer—the United States would go to war."

Do you agree with that statement of Mr. Rasmussen?

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 5

Secretary Acheson. I said this morning, Senator, that under article 5, if there is an armed attack, then all the signatories of this treaty state that they will regard an armed attack on one as an attack on all, and forthwith they will, jointly and severally, take the action which each one of them deems necessary to restore peace and security in the North Atlantic area.

Now if there is an all-out armed attack, where the only action which this country believes can possibly restore peace and security in the North Atlantic area is the use of armed force, then this Nation is obligated to do that, but it has the decision in its own hands.

The objective which it is pledged to follow is to take whatever action it deems necessary to restore peace and security. Now if we in our
honest judgment believe that action less than the use of armed force will restore peace and security, then we may do that. If in our honest judgment we believe that force is the only thing which can restore peace, then our obligation is to do that.

Senator DONNELL. If I may give you an illustration, Mr. Secretary: If Norway were to be attacked, 6 months after this treaty were ratified, by a force of 500,000 Russians, this pact would constitute, in your opinion, would it not, an absolute engagement on the part of this country to go to war?

Secretary ACHESON. My judgment would be that the only way to restore peace and security would be by the use of armed force. You might differ with me on that.

Senator DONNELL. If I may give you an illustration, Mr. Secretary: If Norway were to be attacked, 6 months after this treaty were ratified, by a force of 500,000 Russians, this pact would constitute, in your opinion, does it not?

Secretary ACHESON. If those in charge of the constitutional procedures of the United States Government to go to war, does it not?

Senator DONNELL. It imposes an obligation that if those in charge of the constitutional procedures of the United States believe, as I would believe in such a circumstance, that force would be the only answer to that, then that is the obligation. If those in charge of our constitutional procedures do not believe that, then they use their best judgment.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 5

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Secretary, this article 5 contains an agreement that—

An armed attack against any one or more of the signatories of Europe or North America—

I take it that means the extended continent of Europe and North America as defined in article 6—

any armed attack shall be considered an attack against them all.

There is an absolute obligation, is there not, a little further in article 5, that—

each of the signatories will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

That is the obligation, is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the obligation of article 5, yes.

Senator DONNELL. I take it, Mr. Secretary, that you do not at all construe that language, "such action as it deems necessary," to give any country the right to use a dishonest determination, or an unreasonable interpretation of that language?

Secretary ACHESON. No honorable country would do that.

Senator DONNELL. What you mean there, as I understand you very frankly stated in the white paper and also in your radio speech on this subject, you said:

Article 5 of the pact comprises a solemn obligation that each party will exercise honest and genuine judgment in determining what is necessary for the determination of peace when another party has been attacked.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.
Senator Donnell. So that article 5, under the suppositious case that I presented to you, with 500,000 troops marching into Norway, we will say, from Russia, would unquestionably, in your opinion, impose an obligation on the part of this country forthwith to assist Norway by taking the action of going to war. That is correct, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. That is the obligation which in my judgement would follow from the facts that you have stated. It is up to those who control the constitutional procedure to reach their own judgement. If they agreed with me, then they would feel that they were bound to do that. If they did not agree with me, they would not feel so bound.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TREATY

Senator Donnell. There is no condition in this treaty which says anything more than this, is there, Mr. Secretary: this treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their constitutional processes? There is nothing in the treaty which says that this obligation, individually to take such action, to assist the parties by taking such action as it deems necessary, is conditioned on the judgment of Congress. There is nothing in this treaty to that effect, is there?

Secretary Acheson. The words which you just read, so far as the declaration of war is concerned, obviously mean that Congress is the body in charge of that constitutional procedure.

Senator Donnell. Obviously, of course, we would agree, would we not, Mr. Secretary, that Congress is the only body that can declare war? That is correct, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. If the United States were to be attacked at the port of New York by 500,000 troops or by atom bombs or whatever it might be, you would have no doubt of the right of the President, before the Congress took any action at all, to defend this country against that attack?

Secretary Acheson. I would have no doubt.

Senator Donnell. In this article 5, each of the parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all. That is correct; is it not?

Secretary Acheson. That is true.

Senator Donnell. So that if the President would have the right to defend this country against an attack on New York, without action by Congress, this would obligate him, would it not, and our country, immediately to take action even though Congress did not go through with the formal declaration of war?

Secretary Acheson. Article 5, Senator, does not enlarge, nor does it decrease, nor does it change in any way, the relative constitutional position of the President and the Congress.

Senator Donnell. In other words, the President would have the entire right to send troops to safeguard this country against an attack on New York without any action by Congress; that is correct, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. He would have whatever right the Constitution gives him.
Senator Donnell. He does have that right, does he not, in your opinion as a lawyer?

Secretary Acheson. I do not want to go into a discussion as to the relative position of the Commander in Chief.

Senator Donnell. If you do not want to go into that subject we will not trespass on your desire.

COMMENTS ON THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Turning again to what other persons as to this document have construed to mean, do you agree with Mr. Bevin’s observation as reported in the New York Times of March 20, 1949, as follows:

In London, British Foreign Secretary Bevin told the House of Commons: “This is the first time that the United States has ever felt able to contemplate entering into commitments in peacetime for joint defense of Europe, and it is a most famous historical undertaking.”

Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I think that is correct.

Senator Donnell. Do you agree with this statement in the New York Times of March 20:

In Paris, Foreign Minister Schuman said: “Today we obtain what we sought between two wars. * * * The United States * * * offers us both immediate military aid in the organization of our defense and a guarantee of assistance in case of conflict.”

Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary Acheson. Within the terms of article 5. We have been all over article 5.

Senator Donnell. We have gone over that?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I do not want to use the loose word “guarantee.” I have explained exactly what is involved in article 5.

Senator Donnell. I take it this morning with your testimony you went into that question, did you not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes; I have just been into it also with you.

Senator Donnell. And you did it this morning, too?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Did you do it any further this morning than you did this afternoon? Did you bring out any other points?

Secretary Acheson. I do not recall. I had quite a long statement on that, and I think I was asked some questions on it.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE TREATY

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, I would like to read this observation, if I may, from Senator Vandenberg in his speech to the mayors, delivered in March of this year, reading as follows: “The Neutrality Act of 1939 told Hitler that the United States would keep out of any such conflict, would keep our vessels out of belligerent ports, would refuse credits to warring nations. The North Atlantic Pact, wholly to the contrary, will tell any aggressor in 1949 that from the very moment that he launches his conquest in this area he will face whatever united opposition, including that of the United States, is necessary to beat him to his knees. I assert that this is the greatest war deterrent ever devised. No itching conqueror would care to face such odds.”
Do you care to state whether you agree with the statement so made by Senator Vandenberg?

Secretary Acheson. I think that is correct. And that is carried out in the Senate Resolution 239.

The whole purpose, as you know, Senator Donnell, as expressed in Senate Resolution 239, was to make clear in advance what the attitude of the United States would be.

Senator Donnell. And you regard the treaty, as I gather, from your letter to the President, as having been carried out pursuant to the wishes as shown in Senate Resolution 239?

Secretary Acheson. That has been our constant guide.

PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 5

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you this question: Both in your radio speech—in your committee paper and again in your letter to the President, of April 7, you indicate this view: That this provision, "as it deems necessary" is one which means, in substance, the exercise of honest and genuine judgment. That is correct, is it not?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Not some arbitrary or fictitious judgment.

Secretary Acheson. That is right.

Senator Donnell. I ask you to state, please, who is it, in the case of an attack being made against one or more of the signatories, the President or the Congress, that in your judgment has the right to exercise that honest judgment to which you refer in these various documents?

Secretary Acheson. Both the Congress and the President have their constitutional responsibilities, and each one in carrying out its responsibility would exercise that judgment.

Senator Donnell. Would you care to indicate in the suppositions case which I have given you, of the 500,000 troops being marched in by Russia into Norway, whether or not the President would have the constitutional right to put this country into a state of war without the actual formal declaration of war by Congress?

Secretary Acheson. I would prefer not to go into cases of that sort. I should think if you take one which is fairly clear—I am not the Attorney General and I do not express legal views on this matter—but if you will take the case of an attack upon our own forces, suppose they were attacked, then obviously it is the responsibility of the Commander in Chief at once to take steps for the safety of the forces. And obviously that would be his initial responsibility, and the Congress would then come in later to see whether further steps were necessary to protect the forces.

Senator Donnell. And of course, as article 5 indicates, and you have indicated yourself, the parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them, shall be considered an attack against them all; is that correct?

Secretary Acheson. That is correct.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Secretary, referring to article 3 of the treaty, under which it is provided—

that in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the treaty the parties, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack—

effective to do what? What does the word "effective" mean?

Secretary ACHESON. That expression, as you know, Senator Donnell, has a history. It first appears in Senate Resolution 239. It is in paragraph 3. And there the view of the Senate was that it should advise the President to follow several courses.

Paragraph 3 was:

Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

That language was adopted in the treaty from the Senate resolution.

Senator DONNELL. Might I interrupt to ask you please, if you know whether or not that language was placed in Senate Resolution 239 by representatives of the State Department?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no knowledge of that.

Senator DONNELL. Pardon me for the interruption. Go ahead, please.

Secretary ACHESON. In its report the Senate committee says:

United States association with arrangements for collective defense must supplement rather than replace the efforts of the other participants on their own behalf. Such arrangements must be based upon continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. This means, in practice, that the participants must be prepared fully to carry out their obligations under the charter, resolutely to defend their liberties against attack from any source, and efficiently to develop their maximum defense potential by coordination of their military forces and resources.

Effective, I suppose, means competent, not ineffectual efforts, but effective efforts.

Senator DONNELL. Does it contain within it the idea of sufficiency? That is to say, by means of continuous and sufficient self-help as to accomplish the maintenance and development of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack?

Secretary ACHESON. No. It cannot mean that, because probably the provision of "sufficient forces" at the present time is impossible for everybody. Otherwise if you were trying to get sufficient forces you would have to maintain military establishments which would be quite impossible both for Europe and for us.

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator DONNELL. May I ask you whether or not, on April 5, 1949, there was made a reply by the Government of the United States to a certain memorandum from the Brussels Treaty powers, which memorandum inquires whether the United States will provide military assistance in the form of military equipment and financial aid to the Brussels Treaty powers?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; there was.
Senator DONNELL. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, whether the following few sentences, two, I think it is, constitute paragraph 2 of that reply:

The executive branch of the United States Government is prepared to recommend to the United States Congress that the United States provide military assistance to countries signatory to the Brussels treaty, in order to assist them to meet the material requirements of their defense program. Such assistance will be extended in recognition of the principle of self-help and mutual aid contained in the Atlantic Pact under which pact members will extend to each other such reciprocal assistance as each country can reasonably be expected to contribute, consistent with its geographical resources and in the form in which each can most effectively furnish such assistance.

Is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. That was in your answer?

Secretary ACHESON. That was contained in our reply.

Senator Donnell, may I insert something at this point?

Senator DONNELL. Certainly.

COMMITMENT TO SEND MILITARY AID UNDER THE TREATY

Secretary ACHESON. There was a suggestion, in one of the long quotations that you read to me before, that there may have been some commitment or other on the part of the executive branch of the government to these other governments in regard to military assistance. Now, there is absolutely no commitment of any sort except the commitment which you have read, and that is that the executive branch would recommend to the Congress a military assistance program of the kind you have described. That is being done.

There was no commitment by me or anybody on behalf of the executive branch that anything would be done beyond recommending to the Congress recommending this program.

Senator DONNELL. I do not want to repeat this if you prefer not to answer. I am not certain whether you indicated a desire not to answer this. You have only to indicate your desire one way or the other and I will be guided accordingly.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK

In the suppositions case of the 500,000 troops from Russia converging 6 weeks after this treaty shall have been ratified, on to Norway. are you willing to say whether or not, in your opinion, the President would have the constitutional power to send a large number of American troops instantly to repel that advance, without any action by Congress whatsoever?

If you prefer not to answer that question, that is all right.

Secretary ACHESON. I am quite clear that I prefer not to answer it, and I want to make it perfectly clear why I do not. It is not for the purpose of engaging in any fencing match with you. We are here dealing with one of the questions of the highest prerogatives in Government, the constitutional powers of the President and the constitutional powers of the Congress of the United States.

It is not my function, not being the chief legal officer of the Government, to make any statement whatever which might either prejudice powers of the President or undertake to prejudice powers of the Congress.
Senator DONNELL. Very well. I shall not pursue that inquiry further. This matter I should like to ask about as a matter of information. It may have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of it. I would like to know why it is that this document is called the "North Atlantic Treaty." What is the reason for that?

Secretary ACHESON. It has to do with the defense of the North Atlantic area. Obviously that does not mean that you are defending water. This is not a treaty that has to do with water and not with land. It has to do with that area of the world which is concerned in the North Atlantic, and that means those countries which border on it or border on countries which border on it.

And it has to do with that area of western Europe which, with the United States and Canada, constitutes the whole North Atlantic defense area.

TREATY NOT A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT

Senator DONNELL. Was the thought in the minds of those who prepared the pact—originally, I should say, in their work upon it—that the justification under the United Nations Charter for such a pact would at least in part lie in that portion of the United Nations Charter which refers to regional arrangements?

Secretary ACHESON. No. It lies in article 51.

Senator ACHESON. And not 52?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. So the appellation of "North Atlantic Treaty" did not in any sense indicate a desire on the part of those who framed the pact to bring the pact under the aegis, so to speak, of the regional arrangement contemplated by the United Nations Charter?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct. We were concerned with an area. This was not a universal commitment, widespread commitment all around the world. It had to do with a particular area, and an area of great importance to the United States.

Senator DONNELL. And as previously indicated, the governments which entered into these negotiations which culminated in the treaty, originally included only those either fronting on the North Atlantic—on the Atlantic Ocean, or close at hand, as, for illustration, Belgium, Luxembourg, et al., and did not include a country as far removed from the Atlantic as Italy. Am I correct in that?

Secretary ACHESON. The point is not whether it is removed from the Atlantic. That is what I was trying to get at a moment ago. You are not defending some water here. You are talking about a defense area. And Italy is very closely connected with the defense of that western European area, which in turn is what we call the North Atlantic area.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, did the committee desire to continue at this time in view of the vote call that has come in?

The CHAIRMAN. We do not pay any attention to votes, but I will consult the committee. What is your desire, to recess or go on?

Senator DONNELL. I will be very brief. It will take me only a few more minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Let us go on.

Senator DONNELL. Had you finished your answer to that?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.
COMPATIBILITY OF ATLANTIC TREATY WITH ANGLO-RUSSIAN AND FRANCO-RUSSIAN TREATIES

Senator DONELLI. You referred to the provision in the treaty which is a warning, I think, or at least a statement, by the parties that—

Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any of the parties and a third state is in conflict with this treaty and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements which conflict with the treaty.

You commented on that earlier this afternoon.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator DONELLI. I want to ask you whether or not you yourself have examined the treaties placed before the Senate some weeks ago by either Senator Watkins or Senator O'Mahoney, or both of them, between France on the one hand and Russia on the other, and between Great Britain on the one hand and Russian on the other, which contain certain obligations of the contracting parties, whether you examined them yourself with a view to determining whether France and Great Britain, in a representation that there is no international engagement now in force and in conflict with this treaty, correctly construe the obligations under this treaty.

Secretary ACHESON. I have examined them very closely. I want to make one thing absolutely clear to you, and that is that the declaration in this treaty, by each of the signatories, that they have no treaty which is in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty, is their responsibility, and they stand upon that, and we stand upon that.

I do not want to take the position for a moment that the Secretary of State of the United States, on behalf of other countries, undertakes to go into their treaties or express any views about them. We are not called upon by the treaty to do that. The nations make that declaration themselves. We have the plain language of the treaties before us. And that is where the matter rests.

Now, any person reading it I think can come to his own conclusion, and I think it is perfectly clear what that conclusion is. But I am not going to, as an officer of the United States, say in respect of any of these countries what their treaties mean or whether their declarations are anything other than what they should be, a statement of complete and absolute truth.

TERMINATION OF THE TREATY

Senator DONELLI. Is there any provision in the treaty by which the treaty may be terminated in less than 20 years?

Secretary ACHESON. It may be terminated by unanimous consent at any time. But there is a provision for review at the end of 10 years.

Senator DONELLI. That provision for review does not, however, contain any provision for the termination of the treaty at the end of 10 years.

Secretary ACHESON. It can be done by unanimous consent.

Senator DONELLI. Certainly. Anything, as you said earlier this afternoon, can be done by unanimous consent.

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.
Senator DONNELL. I am not asking whether there is anything in the treaty which provides in any way for the termination of the treaty earlier than at the expiration of 20 years.

Secretary ACHESON. Not except as I have said.

Senator DONNELL. That is not an exemption. There is no provision for it, is there, for a termination earlier than 20 years?

Secretary ACHESON. There are no words in the treaty which provide for its termination earlier than 20 years, as I stated to you. There is a provision that it should be reviewed at the end of 10 years, and it of course follows, as you yourself have said, that if that review leads to the unanimous conclusion that it should be terminated, modified or changed, that may be done.

Senator DONNELL. That may be done in 6 months from now equally.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. That does not depend on a provision in the treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right.

Senator DONNELL. Did not the United States take the view in its negotiations that the treaty should run for 10 years and not 20?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not aware of that. I do not think that is true at all.

Senator DONNELL. That was reported in the press. Perhaps it may be incorrect.

Secretary ACHESON. That is unfounded.

Senator DONNELL. It was reported in the press that the European nations desired a 50-year period and this country desired 10, and ultimately 20 years was agreed upon.

Secretary ACHESON. The latter statement is true. The European nations did desire 50 years. The earlier statement is not correct, that we took the position of 10 years.

Senator DONNELL. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection from the committee we will recess at this time until 10:30 tomorrow morning. Senator Austin will be the witness tomorrow. We will be glad to hear him.

(Thereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m. Thursday, April 28, 1949.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, on April 27, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), George, Thomas of Utah, Tydings, Pepper, McMahon, Vandenberg, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, and Lodge.

Also present: Senators Tobey, Donnell, Flanders, Watkins, Gillette.

The CHAIRMAN: The committee will come to order.

This is a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. We are holding hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We are honored this morning to have former Senator Warren Austin, now Chief Representative of the United States at the United Nations, and a member of the Security Council, representing the United States. Is that correct the way I have stated it?

Ambassador Austin: Yes; it is correct.

The CHAIRMAN: Senator Austin, we are very pleased to have you here, and we are prepared to hear any statement you desire to make with reference to the North Atlantic Pact and related matters.

STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN R. AUSTIN, CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador Austin: Mr. Chairman, will you let me say something personal before I start talking about the North Atlantic treaty?

This is a very emotional experience for me, to be invited by this very great committee, on which I was serving when I resigned from the Senate about 3 years ago. I have not been back here since, and now to be asked to come and talk with you about so important and grave a matter as the North Atlantic treaty is a great honor and a great pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN: It is mutual. We esteem it an honor to have you here and a pleasure to have you here. We remember quite vividly your valuable services on this committee and your outstanding services in the Senate of the United States. We are glad to have your advice and counsel in view of your broad activities in connection with the United Nations and foreign relations generally.

Ambassador Austin: Thank you, sir.

Now may I read a prepared statement?
The Chairman. You may; and at the end of the prepared statement you will have to submit to questions, as you know.

Ambassador Austin. I am a little bit intrigued by the novel situation of being on this end of the questions. However, I will try to respond to them with the utmost frankness and without any reservations whatever.

EFFECT OF THE TREATY ON THE UNITED NATIONS

From the point of view of the United States Mission to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty, by its express terms and by its probable effect would, if properly executed, promote United Nations effort to maintain peace generally, increase its ability to remove causes of war, bring the world nearer to its goal of substituting pacific settlements for the ancient practice of fighting out controversies among nations, and aid in the promotion of social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. This is one of its objects.

It would be a shield under the protection of which such purposes and policies of the United Nations could be more rapidly achieved in the North Atlantic area than if the fear of aggression should continue to deplete the energies and confidence of peoples. This is the other object.

These objectives are complementary.

HOPES FOR UNITED NATIONS SUCCESS

Here in this committee, which only 4 years ago considered carefully the United Nations Charter, I hardly need recall the hopes we held then that there would continue to be a large measure of cooperation among the great powers. We did not expect the drastic deterioration in relations between east and west which has occurred. We certainly did not conceive that the Soviet Union would so brazenly violate the solemn Charter pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. None of us imagined the adoption of a deliberate and calculated policy of obstruction that has prevented the conclusion of peace treaties and impaired the work of the United Nations.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

It was hard to believe what we were seeing. While most of the world was seeking to build a system of collective security in the United Nations, the Soviet Union sought security through the discredited policy of territorial aggrandizement. This feudalistic concept of security threw its black mantle over country after country in eastern Europe. Only decisive action by the United Nations, supported effectively by the United States, prevented Iran, Greece, and Korea from being drawn into the shadows.

COUNTERMEASURES BY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES

As a result of the growing opposition of the non-Communist world, the balance is swinging toward the forces favoring peaceful progress. This committee can be gratified at the part it has played in influencing
that trend. Impetus was given it, I believe, when we decided to help Greece and Turkey. It attained historic proportions when we joined in the European recovery program. It is now being advanced by our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. Our devoted support of the United Nations has immeasurably strengthened that trend.

INCREASING UNITY OF NON-SOVIET WORLD

The increasing unity of the non-Soviet world is being demonstrated in the United Nations. Two years ago there was a widespread tendency to regard major differences simply as a conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the voting was mixed and marked by a large number of abstentions. The actions and attitudes of the Soviet Union, inside and outside the United Nations, have altered that situation. Today, most major issues are recognized as a conflict between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Abstentions are fewer; the majorities are larger, and the minority is usually the six voices and votes controlled by the Soviet Union. These majorities run between 40 and 50; 43 to 6, with four abstentions, is an example which we frequently have. We are now witnessing in the United Nations the unity that is progressively making aggression and obstruction less attractive and less feasible; that is, the unity of those countries outside of the Soviet group. They are growing more and more to act like one world. I don't mean to say that they always vote in a bloc. There is a variation which is represented by perhaps the factor of five or six votes among these countries that are outside the iron curtain.

It is difficult for the meaning of facts like these to penetrate the isolation which the ruling class of the Soviet Union has created for itself behind the walls of the Kremlin. But slowly it penetrates even there. The Soviet rulers have seen that we cannot be driven out of Berlin, and they are learning that the European recovery program cannot be defeated; that free nations will no longer permit themselves to be submerged one by one; that the Charter of the United Nations means what it says, and that the overwhelming majority of the nations are determined to uphold and defend it. While this process continues, we hopefully keep open the door to cooperation. Time after time we reiterate the invitation to this group to join with us. You realize that in some of our organs they will not even sit at the table with us.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE TREATY

Now, I would like to speak of economic recovery and the treaty. I have divided this paper up into chapters, because it is more convenient for me to think this matter out that way from the point of view of the United States Mission to the United Nations. And that is the characteristic of this testimony. I am trying to present the view of our mission to the United Nations.

The claim has been made that economic recovery should be our primary objective in the North Atlantic area and that the treaty may endanger that objective. The premise is correct, but the conclusion is not. Economic recovery is the surest defense against the spread of totalitarian tyranny, but that recovery requires security and confidence.
The treaty would not have come into existence if there had not been a real need for it. The last two World Wars raged across the lands of the European signatories of this treaty. We share with them the desire to remove the miscalculations which could invite a similar tragedy.

This community—that is to say the North Atlantic community—with its bridgeheads on both sides of the Atlantic, is engaged in a great cooperative effort to attain economic recovery and the blessings of political stability and social progress. The United States is assisting on a very large scale because we know that a healthy Europe is a strong force for peace, a vital element in a strong United Nations and a friendly partner with the United States in its efforts to establish greater security for all.

SECURITY AND RECOVERY

The nations of the North Atlantic area have learned that they must stand together and make plain in advance that they will do so. I believe that they knew it as far back as February 1946, just after the Organization had been set up in London, for I find in one of the speeches of the Honorable James Byrnes, who was then Secretary of State, remarks which plainly showed that. I would read parts of it if you ask me to, but otherwise I will not take your time. In that speech, Secretary Byrnes forecast this situation, and he makes perfectly plain that, if we are going to have greater security for all, we must ourselves be strong and we must be ready to contribute our part with the neighbors in the North Atlantic area to prevent or to suppress these attacks from outside upon this area.

The preservation of the freedom and independence of any one of them is of vital concern to all of them. An armed attack upon one is considered an armed attack on all. The treaty is intended to remove the feeling of insecurity which hinders economic recovery in Europe by establishing a needed preponderance of moral and material power for peace. I say “preponderance”; I would like to emphasize it.

SOVIET ATTACK ON THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Now I would like to talk with you just a moment about the Soviet attack on the North Atlantic Treaty in the General Assembly. It does throw light upon what the treaty means to them.

As we expected, the Soviet Union has attacked the North Atlantic Treaty in the General Assembly. The nature of that attack exposed the awareness of the Soviet group to the intimate relationship between the treaty and the United Nations.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO AND THE TREATY

Every member of the Soviet group spoke against the treaty in attempting to defeat a resolution aimed at correcting abuse of the special privilege of the so-called veto in the Security Council. The Soviet Union, which has used the veto 30 times—some of those times in cases to which the founders of the United Nations did not intend the veto to apply, for they said so in establishing the Charter—realized that the treaty might endanger objectives which it can use the
veto to protect. Consequently, it introduced discussion of the North Atlantic Treaty as germane to the then pending question, which was the problem of voting in the Security Council. No member state other than the Soviet bloc criticized the treaty, but every one of these six argued that the treaty violated the Charter.

The Soviet delegate claimed it violated the Charter because it organized a bloc outside the United Nations. He said this bloc was being organized "because the approval of such actions is impossible in the Security Council, where the concurrence of all the great powers is required to adopt decisions on all important questions involved in the maintenance of peace." Thus he revealed the bearing that this treaty had in his estimation on the privilege he has exercised 30 times; that of the veto.

If, indeed, the North Atlantic grouping should render possible the security of members which is now impossible because of the veto, then the treaty ought to be put into effect promptly.

INCLUSION OF PORTUGAL AND ITALY

Mr. Gromyko claimed further that the treaty violates the Charter because it contains among its signatories two states not members of the United Nations—Italy and Portugal. References to article 51, he said, were—and I am quoting his words—"groundless" because "only an armed attack against a member of the Organization gives the right to take action in self-defense."

Our answer is this: By international law, every state has the inherent right of self-defense. The Charter does not exclude nonmember states from the inherent right referred to in article 51.

The application of article 51 to existing arrangements such as the Arab League and the Act of Chapultepec was precisely noted. At the May 23, 1945, meeting of committee III/4 the delegate of Egypt observed that "the principle involved in the new text should certainly extend to the League of Arab States." The text of the league agreement, signed at Cairo March 22, 1945, was before the committee, having been made an official committee III/4 document as of May 4, 1945. Two of the signatories of the pact of the Arab League, Transjordan and Yemen, were not represented at the San Francisco Conference. To be sure, years afterward Yemen was admitted to the United Nations, but Transjordan, though having applied, has not yet been admitted to the United Nations.

I refer this committee to a document already in its files. This document is so important that I shall refer to it again later. It is entitled "Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations." This document is so important that it seems to me to be worthy of being printed as a Senate document. It has been a very useful document in making a careful study of the origin of article 51.

And now I say that on the basis of reason, on the basis of current interpretation by the founders, and on the basis of experience, it is clear that Mr. Gromyko's claim that the North Atlantic Treaty violates the Charter because of the memberships of Italy and Portugal is without any foundation whatever. In a word, the Charter recognizes the inherent right, growing out of international law, not out of the Charter, of Italy and Portugal to join with member states for col-
lective self-defense. This document to which I refer elaborates this reasoning. I shall not take your time to read all of that.

And now I come to another chapter: Article 51 and Regional Arrangements.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE TREATY

Mr. Gromyko has made another charge.

The North Atlantic Pact—

he said—

cannot under any circumstances be called a regional arrangement because it comprises states located in two different continents—America and Europe. Thus these states are united not according to the regional principle.

What we say about it in the United States mission to the United Nations is this:

This claim that the treaty is in conflict with the Charter because it does not create an arrangement according to the regional principle is without probity. First, it does create an arrangement according to the regional principle. History shows that the Atlantic Ocean is a bridge linking America and Europe. Second, even if the treaty did not do so, it creates a group for collective defense under article 51 of the Charter.

It is not necessary to define the organization of the North Atlantic community as exclusively a regional arrangement, or as exclusively a group for collective self-defense, since activities under both article 51 and chapter VIII are comprehended in the treaty. It is our opinion that the provisions of the Charter relating to each such activity—that is, when applied and if applied, if undertaken—will apply to that activity. But you do not have to departmentalize the treaty. It is significant that no definition of regional arrangements, or regional organization, was contained in the Charter, or the Senate Resolution 239, or the North Atlantic Treaty. Each of these contemplates both regional action and collective self-defense.

HISTORY OF ARTICLE 51 OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Light is thrown on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations by reviewing the origin and then current interpretation of article 51. At the San Francisco meeting, representatives of states of the Western Hemisphere, who had participated in establishing the Act of Chapultepec, actively opposed being subordinated completely to the United Nations. They had developed a system of hemispheric self-defense based on the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. The question arose as to how the legitimate operation of such a regional system was to be fitted into a general global system.

It was obvious that autonomy of the Western Hemisphere system would be in conflict with the primacy of the universal system which the Charter sought to establish and which all American States recognized. It was necessary to reconcile the operation of both systems. This was done by inserting article 51, which was not in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, providing that nothing in the present Charter—what sweeping terms: nothing in the present Charter!—shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

This very comprehensive language overrides any other part of the Charter that might stand in the way of this special right of self-defense until the Security Council has acted effectively. In any case whatever, it is my opinion that article 51 is not concerned with "enforcement action"; it is concerned with self-defense.

COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Chapter VIII, which prohibits taking enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, does not apply to collective action for self-defense under article 51. The objection that the North Atlantic Treaty does not create a regional arrangement contemplated by articles 52 and 53 does not hit the treaty. It does not apply to the treaty. This arises from the fact that the authority recognized in article 51 is not limited to regional arrangements. This point was clearly established in the hearings conducted by this committee when it was considering ratification of the Charter. I am sure all who were sitting then will remember. There is an important exposition of the meaning of article 51 on page 304 of the published testimony. This exposition resulted from an exchange between Mr. Pasvolsky of the State Department and Senator Vandenberg. Senator Vandenberg's views with respect to article 51 are of utmost significance because he was a member of the subcommittee dealing with this question and the principal negotiator in the formulation of the text of article 51.

FORESHADOWING OF ATLANTIC PACT DURING THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER

In that exchange it is established that the phrase "collective self-defense" contained in article 51 not only relates to regional but also to any group action that may be taken for purposes of collective self-defense. This view is corroborated in other statements made before this committee at that time. I would cite to you particularly the statement made by Mr. Stettinus, which you will find at page 210, and that by Mr. Dulles, at page 650. To the same effect are statements by representatives of France, Australia, Egypt, and the United Kingdom in 1945. See the document in this committee's files to which I have already referred, entitled "Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations."

There is one brief passage here from Paul Boncour which I want to read. I hope you will pardon me for doing this. I know you can read just as well as I can, but it fits the occasion very well, as I see it. After he had paid Senator Vandenberg a great compliment he went on to give the characterization of what article 51 would do for the future, showing that article 51 contemplated entrance into such a treaty as the North Atlantic Treaty. I would not speak of this if I had not met and encountered the claim that the Charter of the United Nations did not contemplate this treaty. I say it did.

Senator PEPPER. When and where was that speech made, Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Austin. In Committee III on June 13, 1945.

Senator Pepper. That was at San Francisco?

Ambassador Austin. During the writing of article 51. They had just completed it and he burst into song. I am not reading the whole of it. He said:

I would more particularly like to express my gratitude to Senator Vandenberg and the delegation of the United States who have helped so much in the drafting of the text now submitted and in securing its acceptance. The text makes a clear distinction between the prevention and repression of aggression.

After skipping a lot of it I come to this. He had, in between, described the devastation that France had suffered in the war. He said:

This is why we have sought and will continue to seek—

that has reference to the future—

through pacts of mutual assistance and regional arrangements, fully in conformity, of course, with the governing principles of the Charter, the means of taking action on the very day, the very hour, or minute, when brutal aggression is committed, aggression that can be made all the more deadly by the speed of technical devices.

Nobody can meet that. That, in my opinion, is the end of the claim that this pact, this treaty, was not contemplated by the Charter or by article 51.

There are other references in there by other distinguished statesmen from around the world to the same effect.

Senator Vandenberg. And may I interrupt you, Senator? They are uniformly all in the same tenor, without a single dissenting voice.

Ambassador Austin. Thank you, sir. I believe that is correct.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE TREATY

The principal emphasis in the treaty is upon its character as a group of nations who are binding themselves together to take collective action in self-defense. Article 51 contains ample authority for the right of any group of nations, regional or otherwise, members of the United Nations or otherwise, to bind themselves to take collective action for self-defense against an armed attack. In certain of its aspects, the treaty is also a regional arrangement. Don't think that I am arguing that this treaty undertakes to set out in full the kind of regional arrangement that is described in chapter VIII. I am not. The point I am making is that if in the operation of this treaty the signatories go into the exercise of duties that fall within that chapter, then that chapter applies. But in the main what I am saying is that this is not that kind of an organization. This is an organization for collective self-defense against an armed attack. That is another limitation. And I say, in certain of its aspects the treaty is also a regional arrangement, and insofar as it partakes of those characteristics, chapter VIII of the Charter provides full authority for its provisions. Thus, those aspects of the treaty which are not authorized by chapter VIII are covered by article 51, and vice versa.

Now I come to another topic, Regional Versus Universal Arrangements. We have been asked the question, "Why don't you shoot for something larger?"
The question may be asked: Is the conclusion of collective security pacts on a regional basis the best solution? Would it not be better to devise a universal pact to which all states might adhere? In the abstract such a universal pact might appear desirable. However, any binding collective defense pact to be effective depends on the individual and collective and effective self-help and mutual aid as envisaged under article 3 of the treaty. On its part the United States at the moment is making prodigious efforts through the European recovery program to enable the participating countries of Europe to stand on their own feet economically and so be both psychologically and economically able to resist internal and external pressures. Under the treaty it is contemplated that this self-help and mutual aid will be continued and augmented, in particular through the development of a coordinated defense program as envisaged in articles 3 and 9 of the treaty. The United States contribution to this over-all program requires a substantial outlay by the American people, a contribution which, it is hoped, will lead to a more stable world.

I do not mean by this to dismiss out of hand the idea of a generalized article 51 treaty. We should welcome all contributions of intelligent men of good will who are constantly searching for ways and means by which the great purposes of the United Nations may be advanced. But I doubt—and here is the milk in the coconut—that many member nations would be prepared to undertake substantial commitments going far beyond those contained in the Charter of the United Nations with respect to all other nations who were prepared to reciprocate.

Furthermore, assuming that a formula could be found which most of the United Nations could accept, would we not run a very serious risk of splitting the United Nations, and driving out of it nations who might consider the new arrangement directed against themselves? I feel myself that the course we have chosen is the more practical of the two alternatives. We should continue to examine, of course, sympathetically, all suggestions for strengthening the United Nations and the cause of peace.

Now I come to the New Power for Peace.

I have been asked whether the North Atlantic Treaty is not the resumption of the practice of setting up a power equilibrium; whether it would take the place of the United Nations; or whether it would reduce the opportunities of the United Nations for development through service. My answer is “No.”

The ancient theory of balance of power lost its potential utility through the voluntary association of states, on the basis of sovereign equality and universality. The old veteran, balance of power, was given a blue discharge when the United Nations was formed. The undertaking of the peoples of the United Nations to combine their efforts through the international organization to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures, introduced formally the element of preponderance of power for peace. And out went old man balance of power.
Effective collective measures are intended to be dealt with through the Security Council, through regional arrangements, and through groups for collective self-defense. Members of the United Nations have joined to put an end to war. They have bound themselves not to use force except in the defense of law as embodied in the purposes and principles of the Charter. Treaties, combining within the framework of the Charter nations that sincerely adhere to and practice the great principles of the United Nations, increase that unaggressive and decisive preponderance of power introduced by the Charter. Among such treaties, we recognize the Brussels Pact, the Inter-American Agreement, and the Atlantic Treaty as activities giving power, both moral and material, to those principles. The Charter is a check and a guide for the organizations resulting from such treaties. The treaties are a stimulant to the influence and activities of the United Nations.

In this swiftly shrinking world, peace will be secured and maintained only if we pursue the goal of collective security that is set up in the Charter. I support the North Atlantic Treaty because I believe it is a practical, although geographically limited, method of supporting that universal objective.

Like all treaties, the words of the North Atlantic Treaty will take on meaning in the light of the policies and actions that the signatories follow in implementing it. That is why I opened my statement by emphasizing that the Treaty must be properly executed. I believe it will be so executed. The President and the Secretary of State have expressed the determination that the Treaty shall support and not be a substitute for the United Nations. My old friends, I want to say to you that I have already defended the Treaty against the attacks of the Soviet group, some of which I have mentioned here. I am determined, as are the President and the Secretary of State, that the North Atlantic Treaty shall not take the place of or weaken the United Nations, but that it will increase the opportunities of the United Nations to develop through service.

If the North Atlantic Treaty is operated according to the letter and spirit both of the Charter and of the Treaty, it can lift the cause of peace above any level yet attained.

The CHAIRMAN. You are open to questions?

Ambassador Austin. Yes.

INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Austin, the matter of article 51 and the inherent right of nations to self-defense arises, does it not, independently of the Charter or any other arrangements that we might have? If it is inherent it is a natural right that each nation would have to resist aggression or attack.

Ambassador Austin. The chairman is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The purpose, or one of the purposes, of this Treaty is to not only recognize that principle in each individual state, but to recognize the power of the individual states to join a collective arrangement for the same purpose of defense inherently in each one, but joined together in an arrangement set forth in this Treaty.

Ambassador Austin. That is right, Senator.
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. With regard to the regional character, and the Soviet complaint that this was not confined to a particular region, is it not true that those forming the arrangement would probably have the right to define what the region is, and does not this treaty define particularly the region to which it is applicable?

Ambassador Austin. Yes. The region is described here.

The Chairman. It is described accurately and definitely; is it not?

Ambassador Austin. Yes; I consider it so. But I do not think that that is exclusive. I do not want my answer to be regarded that way. I think there is a possibility of that region being amplified upon unanimous agreement of the signatories, and that in making that agreement each signatory will, of course, have the right, and probably the duty, to give its consent or dissent according to its constitutional processes, so that if the question arose here in the United States whether a certain country should be added to those that are now signatories, I believe that that question would have to come to Congress.

There are two ways of looking at it. One would be whether this amounted to a protocol or additional provision of the treaty, or whether this amounted to authorizing legislation that would enable the Chief Executive to give the consent of the United States to that addition. In that case, of course, the extent of the area would be changed.

The Chairman. In that event would it not be open to very serious question that we could not change it without congressional approval, senatorial approval, because of the fact that it would in essence be a new arrangement?

Ambassador Austin. That is what prompted me to say what I did about it, yes. It is a serious question.

BASIS FOR A REGION

The Chairman. In the case of Portugal and Italy, you say the Soviets made some complaint about them. As a matter of fact, those nations are intimately associated by sea routes and their geographical position with the general plan of the treaty to make this area defensive; is that correct?

Ambassador Austin. That is true, but I think there are other factors in the consideration of what constitutes a region.

The Chairman. I am glad to hear it. You might point them out, if you will.

Ambassador Austin. I think the customary life of the countries, their contact with each other in business, culture, and interchange of travel, those things which identify an area by the customs of the people, enter into this question of what is a region, and in such cases as ours here the ocean is no longer a barrier. And we find ourselves very close together on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean and on both sides of the Mediterranean.

PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The Chairman. It is clear, is it not, in the charter and particularly in the articles dealing with regional arrangements that they must be within the general purposes of the United Nations and that
there is no conflict between permitting a regional arrangement of this character and the United Nations.

Ambassador Austin. My answer is, "Yes." I think also, if you will permit me to add—I don’t know whether I am heading right by offering additional statements—

The Chairman. That is what you are here for, not to hear me ask questions but for you to answer them.

Ambassador Austin. You are very gracious. I have never been on this end of the questions before. I want to be perfectly respectful to the committee and not get outside of my position as a witness.

What I had in mind, prompted by your question, was that not only is that true by virtue of the terms of the Charter, but it is true by virtue of the terms of the treaty—the same thing.

The Chairman. I wanted to make that clear in answer to the charge that the regional arrangements that we are entering into would be in conflict with the United Nations Charter. As I understand, Mr. Gromyko urged that in his comment before the General Assembly.

Ambassador Austin. That is true. Every one of those six countries in that group made that claim.

The Chairman. They have a unity of purpose and a unity of speech, have they not, pretty much? Never mind answering that.

**OVERRIDING AUTHORITY OF UN**

Article 51 of the Charter says—

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

That recognizes the overriding authority of the United Nations; does it not?

Ambassador Austin. It certainly does.

**INCLUSION IN THE TREATY OF NON-UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS**

The Chairman. Article 51 is restricted to an armed attack against a member of the United Nations. Has there been any comment or objection that this treaty spreads that and permits the participation by other nations not members of the United Nations?

Ambassador Austin. That is right. It was raised as an objection. It was asserted that the treaty was in conflict with the Charter because of that characteristic, that the treaty has in it two states that are not within those words.

The Chairman. You answered that, of course, successfully?

Ambassador Austin. I answered that in my formal statement, and I pointed out that the answer to this is perfect, because you had exactly that situation in fact before you—and I mean you—and you and Senator Vandenberg were there on that work. You had exactly that situation.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg was a member of the subcommittee. I was on another committee. We had frequent meetings of the delegation.

Ambassador Austin. You had two states that were not present at San Francisco, were not participating in the organization of the
United Nations. It wasn't then known whether they would ever be members, yet they were recognized as coming within the scope of article 51.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a representative at Chapultepec; were you not, Senator Austin?

Ambassador Austin. Yes, sir.

DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER

The CHAIRMAN. In the meeting at the expiration of Chapultepec there was placed in the Dumbarton Oaks draft of the proposed United Nations a reference here, "Section (a), Purpose and Relationship," entitled "Arrangements for International Economic and Social Cooperation." But as I understand it, and I will not read it all, while Dumbarton Oaks recognized regional arrangements and so forth, it did not go into detail specifically regarding armed aggression and the inherent right of self-defense. Is that true?

Ambassador Austin. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. So it was developed and amplified at San Francisco in the treaty which established the United Nations and made applicable to situations like the present.

Ambassador Austin. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the activity of Senator Vandenberg, who was on the subcommittee, had a great deal to do with it.

Ambassador Austin. May I call your attention to page 13 of that document to which I called your attention twice before?

Senator George. Is that a United Nations publication?

Ambassador Austin. No; it is not. It is a paper that is furnished by the Department of State, Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations, and a copy of it, I understand, is on file with you. I have had the good fortune to have had access to this, and at page 13 it states, regarding these defensive situations that were actually in existence and under contemplation when article 51 was devised:

Senator Thomas of Utah. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that it be put in the record at this place. The statement surely has a place for the consideration of the Senate, and if it can be put in the record we will have it in the Senate document.

Ambassador Austin. That will save me reading it.

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Chairman, I think that is an appropriate request. By way of explanation, the memorandum to which our able visitor refers was prepared for me at my request by the Department in the first instance. I doubt whether it has been given general circulation. I certainly think it should be, and I suggest, with the Senator from Utah, that it be inserted in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted in the record.
of the whole Charter establishing a United Nations security system. Article 51, which preserves to member states the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, is of primary importance, in view of its language and of its negotiating history at San Francisco.

The argument developed in the course of the present paper runs as follows: Article 51 of the Charter, in providing: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations," is not a grant of authority to member states enabling them to take measures of defense if attacked. The article states simply that, after the Charter has come into force, just as before, member states retain the right which all states have traditionally enjoyed under international law to defend themselves in the event of armed attack. Article 51 thus does not purport to limit the right of self-defense to member states only, and creates no obstacle to collective defense efforts by member states jointly with nonmembers in the event of armed attack.

It will perhaps be appropriate to begin with a consideration of the rules of international law.

I. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 51 refers, by its language, only to states which are members of the United Nations. However, it is clear that the right of individual and collective self-defense preserved to member states by article 51 was not created by the Charter. The right existed in international law before the Charter, available to all states. Article 51 made clear that it continued, under the Charter, to be available to member states, subject to certain limitations. Naturally this right of self-defense remains available to nonmembers.

An eminent authority on international law and the United Nations has said concerning the right of self-defense:

"International law recognizes the right of a state to resort to force in self-defense. Where the use of force has this justification, the incidental or consequent infringement of the rights of another state is excused, although the other state may be legally privileged to resist. A forcible act of self-defense may amount to or may result in war, but it may frequently be a single incident of short duration, especially when the two states involved are of unequal strength. Self-defense has also been a commonly invoked political justification on moral grounds for resort to war.

"When, in 1926, states renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed that they would not seek to settle their disputes by other than peaceful means, the right of self-defense was expressly reserved. Thus the United States note of June 23, 1928, declared that the proposed treaty did not in any way restrict or impair the right of self-defense. "That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." Such a statement suggests that the right of self-defense by its very nature must escape legal regulation. In one sense this is true. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, in the course of discussions with the British Government concerning the celebrated affair of the Caroline, stated in 1842 that action in self-defense was justified only when the necessity for action is 'instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.' This definition is obviously drawn from consideration of the right of self-defense in domestic law; the cases are rare. Indeed, in which it would exactly fit an international situation. It is an accurate definition for international law, however, in the sense that the exceptional right of self-defense can be exercised only if the end cannot be otherwise obtained. In 1926, when League of Nations experts were studying the problems which would result from the application of sanctions under article 16 of the covenant, a Belgian jurist noted that 'Legitimate defense implies the adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by the imminence of the danger.' When an individual is set upon by an armed thug who threatens his life, instantaneous action is clearly requisite, and it can be said that there is 'no moment for deliberation.' When a state anticipates a threatened injury from another state or from a lawless band, there is usually opportunity for deliberation in a chancery or war office, and an officer on the spot does not act until he has received instructions from a higher command. Telegraphic or radio communication between the officer and his
superiors can be taken as a counterpart of the impulses in the nervous system of the individual whose brain instructs his arm to strike." (Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948), 163-64.)

II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER

A. Chronology

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals contained no provision comparable to article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It was a matter of common knowledge, however, at the San Francisco Conference that representatives of the Big Five Powers (China, France, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the United States) were engaged in intensive private negotiations during the early stages of the Conference to find a formula on the subject of regional arrangements and self-defense. The first public intimation as to the nature of this formula came in an official press statement by Mr. Stettinius, Secretary of State, on May 15, 1945. (The text of this statement is set forth below in II.) In that statement, a new section was suggested, the language of which was almost identical with article 51.

Subsequently, on May 21, 1945, Senator Vandenberg, United States delegate on committee III/4 (regional arrangements), submitted this proposed text to subcommittee III/4/A, on behalf of the Big Five Powers. It was suggested that this text become a new paragraph 12 to chapter VIII, section B (determination of threats to the peace or acts of aggression and action with respect thereto), of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Subcommittee III/4/A unanimously approved the proposed text but favored its becoming a new section D to chapter VIII. The subcommittee concluded, however, that the location of the text should be decided by the coordination committee of the Conference.

On May 23, 1945, the full committee III/4 unanimously approved the text of the proposed new section and also decided to refer to the coordination committee the question of the location of the text.

This decision of committee III/4 was subsequently approved by Commission III (Security Council) at its second meeting on June 13, 1945. At its thirty-fifth meeting on June 20, 1945, the coordination committee made several minor drafting changes in the text and decided, upon the advice of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, that the text should be located, as article 51, at the end of chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression) of the final text of the Charter. This article, as so revised and located, was approved by the ninth plenary session of the Conference on June 25, 1945.

B. Interpretive statements

During the course of the formulation of this article at the Conference, various delegations made significant interpretive statements which are included in the public records. These are set forth below in the chronological order in which made.

1. United States statements.—As indicated above, the first public release of the text of which finally became article 51 was that made by Secretary of State Stettinius on May 15, 1945. This statement is set forth in full, as follows:

"[For the press, May 15, 1945, No. 25]

"Statement by Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State:

"As a result of discussions with a number of interested delegations, proposals will be made to clarify in the Charter the relationship of regional agencies and collective arrangements to the world organization. These proposals will—

"1. Recognize the paramount authority of the world organization in all enforcement action.

"2. Recognize that the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, remains unimpaired in case the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Any measures of self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

"3. Make more clear that regional agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means.

"[
"The first point is already dealt with by the provision of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (ch. VIII, sec. c, par. 2), which provides that no enforcement action will be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. It is not proposed to change this language.

"The second point will be dealt with by an addition to chapter VIII of a new section substantially as follows:"

"Nothing in this chapter impairs the Inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, in the event that the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

"The third point would be dealt with by inclusion of a specific reference to regional agencies or arrangements in chapter VIII, section A, paragraph 3, describing the methods whereby parties to a dispute should, first of all, seek a peaceful solution by means of their own channels."

"The United States delegation believes that proposals as above outlined if adopted by the Conference would, with the other relevant provisions of the projected Charter, make possible a useful and effective integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security."

"This applies with particular significance to the long established inter-American system."

"At Mexico City last March preliminary discussions took place regarding this problem, and the Act of Chapultepec envisaged the conclusion of an inter-American treaty which would be integrated into and be consistent with the world organization. After the conclusion of the Conference at San Francisco, it is the intention of the United States Government to invite the other American Republics to undertake in the near future the negotiation of a treaty which, as provided for in the Act of Chapultepec itself, would be consistent with the Charter of the world organization and would support and strengthen that organization, while at the same time advancing the development of the historic system of inter-American cooperation. This would be another important step in carrying forward the good neighbor policy."

In addition, Senator Vandenberg made the following statement relative to article 51 at the second meeting of commission III on June 13, 1945:

"Third, we have here recognized the inherent right of self-defense, whether individual or collective, which permits any sovereign state among us or any qualified regional group of states to ward off attack by providing adequate action by the parent body. And we specifically recognize the continuous validity of mutual protection pacts to prevent a resurgence of Axis aggression, pending the time when all the states concerned may be satisfied to rest this exclusive responsibility with the new organization."

The statements of Senator Vandenberg with respect to article 51 are of utmost significance, as it was a matter of public knowledge that he was the principal negotiator in the formulation of this text. Public tribute was paid Senator Vandenberg for his "wisdom, infinite patience, and unexcelled skill" in this matter by Dr. Wellington Koo (China), rapporteur of committee III/4, as well as by Dr. Lleras Camargo (Colombia), chairman of that committee.

Subsequently at the hearings held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of the Charter, Senator Vandenberg brought out the fact that article 51 was designed to safeguard the interests of the Inter-American system. Senator Connally also stated the view in this connection, that the Monroe Doctrine survived in its entirety and that the purpose of the Charter was to strengthen the doctrine rather than to weaken it.

2. Latin-American statements.—At the May 23, 1945, meeting of committee III/4, which approved the text which later became article 51, Dr. Lleras Camargo, speaking as delegate of Colombia, made the following statement:

"The origin of the term 'collective self-defense' is identified with the necessity of preserving regional systems like the Inter-American one. The Charter, in general terms, is a constitution, and it legitimizes the right of collective self-defense to be carried out in accord with the regional pacts so long as they are not opposed to the purposes and principles of the organization as expressed in the Charter. If a group of countries with regional ties declare their solidarity for their mutual defense, as in the case of American states, they will undertake
such defense jointly if and when one of them is attacked. And the right of defense is not limited to the country which is the direct victim of aggression but extends to those countries which have established solidarity, through regional arrangements, with the country directly attacked. This is the typical case of the American system. The Franco-American Charter of Chapultepec provides for the collective defense of the hemisphere and establishes that if an American nation is attacked all the rest consider themselves attacked. Consequently, such action as they may take to repel aggression, authorized by the article which was discussed in subcommittee yesterday, is authorized for all of them. Such action would be in accord with the Charter, by the approval of the article, and a regional arrangement may take action, provided it does not have improper purposes as, for example, joint aggression against another state. From this, it may be deduced that the approval of this article implies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in contradiction of the Charter.

The committee records show that the delegates of Mexico, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Honduras, and Cuba associated themselves with this statement.

3. French statements—At this same meeting of committee III/4, the delegate of France expressed his desire to give utterance to the voice of Europe amidst the general concert of the Latin-American Nations. In his opinion, the formula approved by the committee extended in general to cases of mutual assistance against aggression.

The French view of article 51 was elaborated by M. Paul-Boncour at the meeting of commission III on June 13, 1945, as follows:

"Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my dear colleagues, in the name of the French delegation, I want to pay tribute to the work that has been done and to express our public and grateful adherence to the text now submitted for your consideration. I would like to thank the president of the committee, Senor Llanas Camargo, and my old Geneva companion, Dr. Wellington Koo, for their help. I would also like to express my gratitude to all the nations of America who wanted this amendment in order to safeguard their fecund Pan American Union, which for years has prevented or avoided war in your continent.

"I would more particularly like to express my gratitude to Senator Vandenberg and the delegation of the United States who have helped so much in the drafting of the text now submitted and in securing its acceptance. This text makes clear distinction between the prevention and repression of aggression.

"As far as prevention of aggression is concerned, it vests in the Security Council the task of making the necessary provision and taking whatever measures are necessary. It renders obligatory the authorization of the Council for the measures which the states concerned would take, with an exception in the case of the application of treaties for the prevention of fresh aggressions by our present enemies. And this exception will endure until the signatories think that the Security Council is in a position to take over the task.

"But as far as repression of aggression is concerned—and that is a form of legitimate individual or collective defense—the text indicates the right of the signatories of regional understandings or treaties of mutual assistance to act immediately without awaiting the execution of the measures taken by the Security Council. They will naturally have to report to the Security Council what they have done.

"Gentlemen, let me say what a great relief this amendment has brought to the French delegation, and, with them to all the French people. And for this reason, I expressed a moment ago my gratitude to all those who have helped in this work.

"After all, you see, I belong to a country which has been three times invaded in less than a century. The last war has left it, like so many other invaded countries of Europe, devastated, shaken, destroyed. Their distress rises as an appeal to the nations untouched by war to persevere in the common task.

"My country has complete confidence in the system of collective security, in the Security Council, in the charter which we are making. The report which you just heard yesterday—I would like to introduce it again for that—testifies to the faith I have personally in this system of collective security and in its efficacy. But whatever precautions may be taken in the various committees, in order to assure swift and effective action by the Security Council, it is impossible to prevent delays resulting from its meetings, its discussion, from the transport from countries often distant of material and men assigned to those who are attacked. And this, coupled with the lightning rapidity which aggression in modern war is capable of, may defeat—still more in any future war if that unhappily should occur—may subject a country to the risk of death.
"Let us not forget that in 1914, had it not been for the prompt arrival of the valiant British Army, our left wing would have been turned at Charleroi and the war finished on August 24. We do not forget how German ranks poured through as soon as the lines of Belgium and the Meuse were forced, nor the bewildered crowds fleeing from an invaded capital, nor all the atrocious disorder which remains an unforgettable memory for those who have witnessed it.

"This is why we have sought and will continue to seek through pacts of mutual assistance and regional agreements, fully in conformity, of course, with the governing principles of the Charter—the means of taking action on the very day, the very hour or minute when brutal aggression is committed—aggression which can be made all the more deadly by the speed of technical devices.

"Admittedly, we know that in the end the strength of the United Nations will prevail. This must inspire us with a deep confidence that the piling up of material and men will unfaillingly beat down the lone aggressor which has dared to provoke the war. But, in the meantime, we don't want to leave any more parts of our territory in the hands of an aggressor whose brutal attack has succeeded in paralyzing momentarily our means of defense. We want to seek in those regional agreements which the amendment leaves open to us, provided they conform to the principles of the Charter, in treaties of mutual assistance which must likewise be in conformity—the means of acting forthwith without having to await the execution of the measures taken by the Security Council to protect us from the experience which has made us shed our blood three times in less than a century.

"This is why I thank the fourth committee for having assured us these means, and I hope that the third Commission will give its approval to these conclusions."

4. Egyptian statement.—At the May 23, 1945, meeting of committee III/4, the delegate of Egypt observed that "the principle involved in the new text should certainly extend to the League of Arab States." (The text of the pact of the League of Arab States, signed in Cairo, March 22, 1945, was before committee III/4 at that time, having been made an official committee III/4 document issued as of May 4, 1945.)

5. Australian statement.—At the same meeting of committee III/4, the Australian delegate stated the view that the term "individual or collective security" was "sufficiently wide to cover that part of the Australian amendment referring to the right of the parties, in certain circumstances, to adopt necessary measures to maintain international peace and security in accordance with any arrangements consistent with the Charter."

The Australian amendment on this subject read as follows:

"At the end of section (C) [ch. VIII, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals], a new section to be added, as follows:

"'Section (D): Other arrangements for maintaining international peace and security. If the Security Council does not itself take measures, and does not authorize action to be taken under a regional arrangement or agency, for maintaining or restoring international peace, nothing in this Charter shall be deemed to abrogate the right of the parties to any arrangement which is consistent with this Charter to adopt such measures as they deem just and necessary for maintaining or restoring international peace and security in accordance with that arrangement.'"

6. British commentary.—The records of the San Francisco Conference do not reveal the British view of article 51. The following significant statement appears, however, in the official British commentary on the Charter of the United Nations, presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British Parliament:

"38. A most important addition is the recognition of the explicit right of self-defense, both individual and collective, but in such a manner that the final authority and responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security is not impaired (art. 51). It was considered at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference that the right of self-defense was inherent in the proposals and did not need explicit mention in the Charter. But self-defense may be undertaken by more than one state at a time, and the existence of regional organizations made this right of special importance to some states, while special treaties of defense made its explicit recognition important to others. Accordingly the right is given to individual states or to combinations of states to act until the Security Council itself has taken the necessary measures. It will be for the Security Council to decide whether these measures have been taken and whether they are adequate for the purpose. In the event of the Security Council failing to take any action, or if such action as it does take is clearly inadequate, the
right of self-defense could be invoked by any member or group of members as Justifying any action they thought fit to take."

7. Views of the Advisory Committee of Jurists and of the Coordinating Committee of the San Francisco Conference.—In addition to these statements of individual governments represented at the San Francisco Conference, note should be taken of the views of the Advisory Committee of Jurists and of the Coordinating Committee.

As indicated above in section I, the Coordinating Committee at its thirty-fifth meeting on June 20, 1945, decided to put the text of present article 51 at the end of chapter VII of the Charter, which relates to the functions of the Security Council. Committee III/4 had suggested that this article might be located as a separate section after the chapter on regional arrangements but left final decision to the Coordinating Committee.

The Coordinating Committee was advised, however, by the Advisory Committee of Jurists that "the article should not be placed after chapter VIII, as a separate section as Committee III/4 had proposed, because it might have the effect there of limiting the right of self-defense only to regional arrangements, thus depriving a state which was not a party to such arrangements of that right. Such a conclusion was clearly not to be permitted."

The Coordinating Committee concurred in this conclusion of the Advisory Committee of Jurists and expressly rejected the contention of one member of the Coordinating Committee that this article belonged in the chapter on regional arrangements because it was only "a particular exception to the action of the [Security] Council in connection with the system of regional arrangements."

It was the consensus of this Committee that the article belonged to the chapter on the Security Council, as a general exception to the statement of the powers of the Security Council.

III. DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

The following defensive arrangements or pacts were in existence at the time of the San Francisco Conference, and were clearly intended to be safeguarded by article 51:

1. The Inter-American system of collective security, as embodied in the Act of Chapultepec of 1945;
2. The Pact of the League of Arab States of March 22, 1945;
3. The Treaty of Alliance between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of May 20, 1942;

Of particular interest in connection with the question of participation of states not members of the United Nations in mutual assistance pacts is the Pan-Arab Pact. The states parties to the above defensive arrangements specified above all were represented at the San Francisco Conference and hence eligible to become members of the United Nations immediately. In the case of the Arab League, however, two of the signatories of the pact of March 22, 1945, Transjordan and Yemen, were not represented at the San Francisco Conference. Yemen was subsequently admitted to the United Nations in 1947, but the application of Transjordan has not yet been approved by the Security Council.

This would indicate that the delegates at the San Francisco Conference did not regard the term "collective self-defense" in article 51 to apply exclusively to states members of the United Nations.

IV. CHARTER PROVISIONS RELATING TO NONMEMBER STATES

An examination of the various provisions of the Charter relating to nonmember states shows that it was not intended to isolate the organization or the member states from states not members of the United Nations.

A significant provision is contained in article 2, paragraph 6, which reads: "The organization shall ensure that states not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and security."

The report of the chairman of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference states that this principle was contained in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and was unanimously adopted by the San Francisco Conference. The delegates had in mind the fact that two exmembers of the League of Nations,
Germany and Japan, had been the aggressors responsible for World War II. It was therefore felt that unless the organization undertook this responsibility with respect to states not members of the organization, the whole scheme of the Charter would be seriously jeopardized.

It is important, moreover, to read article 2 (6) in connection with article 39 of the Charter, which provides:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

It should be noted that the Security Council has already been called upon to take action in several situations involving nonmember states. In 1946, for example, Albania and Bulgaria were charged with aiding the Greek guerrillas against the Greek Government. In 1947 the British Government charged Albania with causing illegal damage to British warships in the Corfu Straits. In addition, the Security Council has had to intervene actively in the Palestine situation, after the termination of the British mandate on May 15, 1948, and the proclamation of the State of Israel.

While the legislative history of article 2, paragraph 6, shows that the delegates at San Francisco were primarily concerned with the need to prevent future aggression by nonmember states, it seems evident that the organization would be equally concerned in event of aggression against a nonmember state. This is the clear import of paragraph 1 of article 1, which states as a purpose of the United Nations to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace * * *". Attention is also called to article 2 paragraph 4, of the Charter, which requires members of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. It therefore seems evident that the United Nations is concerned with aggression against any state, whether a member or nonmember state, and regardless of whether the aggressor was a nonmember state or a member state.

It is nevertheless clear that article 2 (6) does not impair the traditional right of self-defense of nonmember states under international law. Any such state has the right to defend itself against an armed attack.

Other provisions of the Charter also recognize the need to permit nonmember states to participate to some extent in the United Nations system for maintaining peace and security. Thus article 32 specifically provides that any state which is not a member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to this dispute. In both the Greek and the Corfu Channel cases noted above, the nonmember states involved were invited to participate without vote in the proceeding of the Security Council.

In addition, article 35 (2) provides:

"2. A state which is not a member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations to pacific settlement provided in the present Charter."

Moreover, article 93 (2) provides:

"A state which is not a member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

(Pursuant to this provision and to a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946, Switzerland became a party to the Court’s Statute.) In this connection, article 35 (2) of the Court’s Statute provides that the Court may, under conditions to be laid down by the Security Council, also be open to states not parties to the statute.

Finally, of interest in connection with the status of nonmember states under the Charter is article 103, which reads:

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

The legislative history of this article shows that the delegates at San Francisco were particularly concerned about treaty obligations which member states had incurred, or might incur in the future, vis-à-vis nonmember states. The committee...
The committee has considered that in the event of an actual conflict between such obligations and the obligations of members under the Charter, particularly in matters affecting peace and security, the latter may have to prevail. The committee is fully aware that as a matter of international law it is not ordinarily possible to provide in any convention for rules binding upon third parties. On the other hand, it is of the highest importance for the organization that the performance of the members' obligations under the Charter in specific cases should not be hindered by obligations which they may have assumed to non-member states. The committee has had these considerations in view when drafting the text. The suggested text is accordingly not limited to preexisting obligations between members. It seems clear from the language of article 108 and from its legislative history that the Charter did not intend to prohibit members of the United Nations from entering into treaties with nonmembers. The sole requirement is that obligations incurred under such treaties be consistent with obligations of members under the Charter.

The obligations assumed by the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, are consistent with the obligations of the United Nations Charter. Article 1 of this treaty parallels paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 2 of the Charter in expressing general principles of international law. Article 7 of the treaty specifically provides that nothing in the treaty is inconsistent with the obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The United Nations general responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security includes the responsibility to check aggression against any state, whether a member or nonmember.

2. The United Nations Charter does not prohibit any state, member or nonmember, from taking necessary measures of self-defense in the event of an armed attack, subject to the right of the Security Council to review this action.

3. The United Nations Charter does not prohibit member states from entering into mutual-defense treaties with nonmember states, but requires only that such treaty obligations be consistent with the obligations of the Charter.

4. Such treaties, consistent with the obligations undertaken in the Charter of the United Nations, can lend positive support to the substantive law of the Charter as expressed in the purposes and principles of the United Nations, particularly under circumstances where Soviet abuse of the veto has obstructed the full development and effective functioning of United Nations organs in the security field.

JUSTIFICATION OF ITALY'S AND PORTUGAL'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ATLANTIC PACT

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Senator, I want to refer to one matter that you have touched upon, and that is the cases of Portugal and Italy not being members of the United Nations. Regardless of whether they are members of the United Nations or not, does not the doctrine of the inherent right of self-defense apply to them independently of the treaty?

Ambassador Austin. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And is that not a sufficient warrant for them to be included in this particular treaty?

Ambassador Austin. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. You need not be so terse unless you want to. We will be glad to have your comments and your views, because you have had large experience in international affairs, both on this committee and in the United Nations. We welcome any suggestions or amplification of your testimony, Senator Austin. I know you were never
a prolix debater in the Senate. You were a very able debater and an eloquent debater, but you were not so prolix. That seems to be a development of the last two or three Congresses.

Ambassador Austin. Could I make a request?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Ambassador Austin. I think it is so valuable as a matter of history and as a means of answering some of the claims that are made now that I would like to have printed in the record Secretary Byrnes' address of February 28, 1946. To show why, I will just read you a paragraph or two of this. Do you mind?

The Chairman. Oh, no; go ahead.

SECRETARY BYRNES' SPEECH OF FEBRUARY 28, 1946

Ambassador Austin (reading):

We have joined with our allies in the United Nations to put an end to war. We have covenanted not to use force except in the defense of law as embodied in the purposes and principles of the Charter. We intend to live up to that covenant. But as a great power and as a permanent member of the Security Council, we have a responsibility to use our influence to see that other powers live up to that covenant, and that responsibility we also intend to meet. Unless the great powers are prepared to act in the defense of law, the United Nations cannot prevent war. We must make it clear in advance—

this is familiar language—

that we intend to act to prevent aggression, making it clear at the same time that we will not use force for any other purpose. The great powers are given special responsibilities because they have the strength to maintain peace if they have the will to maintain peace. Their strength in relation to one another is such that no one of them can safely break the peace if the others stand united in the defense of the Charter.

The present power relationships of the great states preclude the domination of the world by any one of them. Those power relationships cannot be substantially altered by the unilateral action of any one great state without profoundly disturbing the whole structure of the United Nations.

Therefore, if we are going to do our part to maintain peace in the world, we must maintain our power to do so, and we must make it clear that we will stand united with other great states in defense of the Charter. If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to insure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world.

There is much more in that.

The Chairman. Where was that address made?

Ambassador Austin. This address was made at the Overseas Press Club in New York City on February 28, 1946.

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be put in the record as the Senator requests.

(The address of the Honorable James F. Byrnes, so identified, will be inserted in the record at this point.)

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE JAMES F. BYRNES, SECRETARY OF STATE.

We are beginning to realize that the war is over. It is good to have sons, husbands, and fathers home again. It is good to open a newspaper without fear of finding in the casualty lists the name of one near and dear to us.

But this is not wholly a time of celebration and rejoicing. As families in their homes on the farms and in the cities settle back from the dinner table to hear the boys tell of Normandy and Iwo Jima, there is an unspoken question in every

1Delivered to the Overseas Press Club in New York, N. Y., on February 28 and released to the press on the same date. This address was broadcast over the network of the National Broadcasting System.
mind. The question is what we can do to make certain that there will never be another war.

During the war our goal was clear. Our goal was victory. The problems of industrial and military mobilization, it is true, were problems of the first magnitude. Production bottlenecks often seemed unbreakable, transportation difficulties and manpower shortages insurmountable. On the fighting front of the combined land, sea, and air operations were heartbreakingly in complexity.

These were hard tasks. Yet we were able to apply a yardstick to each proposal by asking a simple question: "Will it help to win the war?" The common goal of victory served to unite us and to give purpose and direction to our efforts.

Now that we have come into calmer waters, our relief and gratitude are mixed with uncertainty. Our goal now is permanent peace, and surely we seek it even more anxiously that we sought victory.

The difficulty is that the path to permanent peace is not so easy to see and to follow as was the path to victory.

When an issue is presented, we ask, "Will it help to win the peace?" When the answer is slow to come or does not come at all, we grow uneasy and apprehensive.

While we may be in doubt about many things, there are certain basic propositions on which we are clear. One is that a just and lasting peace is not the inevitable result of victory. Rather, victory has given us the opportunity to build such a peace. And our lives depend upon whether we make the most of this opportunity.

Another thing of which we are certain is that we Americans alone cannot determine whether the world will live in peace or perish in war. Peace depends quite as much upon others as it does upon us. No nation is the complete master of its fate. We are all bound together for better or for worse.

Because we know this, we have planned our hopes to the banner of the United Nations. And we are not content simply to take our place in that Organization. We realize that, although the dreams of the world are lodged in it, the United Nations will fail unless its members give it life by their confidence and by their determination to make it work in concrete cases and in everyday affairs.

And so I wish to talk to you about the first meetings of the United Nations. What has been said in these meetings has been said as plainly and bluntly as anything I have heard said by responsible statesmen in any private conference.

These first meetings were intended only to establish the various organs of the United Nations. But so pressing were some of the problems presented to the Security Council that they had to be dealt with before there was a chance for the Council to adopt even provisional rules of procedure.

All was not calm and peaceful at the meetings in London. There was effort to use the United Nations to advance selfish national aims. But the clash of national interests and purposes which were reflected in the debates in London was very much like the clash of local and special interests which are reflected in our national and State legislatures.

We may appreciate some of these clashes of interest. But when they exist, it is better that they should be publicly revealed. If these conflicts of interest did not appear in the forums of the United Nations, these forums would be detached from reality and in the long run turn out to be purposeless and futile.

A most significant precedent was established when the Security Council finished its discussions of the complaint of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments requesting the withdrawal of French and British troops from their territories.

The Council did not take formal action because of a difference among the permanent members as to the form of the resolution. But no one questioned the general proposition that no state has the right to maintain its troops on the territory of another independent state without its consent, nor the application of this proposition to the pending case.

The particular form of resolution to this general effect which was presented by the United States representative, Mr. Stettinius, was supported by most of the members of the Council. It failed of acceptance, however, because the Soviet Union vetoed it on the ground that it was not definite enough.

But the British and French Governments immediately announced that, notwithstanding the technical veto of the Soviet Union, they would act in accordance with the American resolution as it clearly represented the views of the Council.

This indicates that the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the
Council does not in fact relieve any state, large or small, of its moral obligation
to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
The United Nations go off to a good start. However, that does not mean it is
an assured success. It simply means that the Charter will work if the peoples
of the United Nations are determined to make it work. At times our Congress may
make serious errors of omission and commission. Such errors are not the fault
of the Congress as an institution. They are the fault of its members or of their
constituents who fail to measure up to their responsibilities.
So it is with the United Nations. It will succeed only as we, the peoples of
the United Nations measure up to our responsibilities.
I should be lacking in candor if I said to you that world conditions today are
sound or reassuring. All around us there is suspicion and distrust, which in turn
breeds suspicion and distrust.
Some suspicions are unfounded and unreasonable. Of some others that cannot
be said. That requires frank discussion between great powers of the things
that give rise to suspicion. At the Moscow conference there was such frank
discussion. It was helpful. But the basis of some suspicion persists and prompts
me to make some comments as to our position.
We have joined with our allies in the United Nations to put an end to war. We
have covenanted not to use force except in the defense of law as embodied in the
purposes and principles of the Charter. We intend to live up to that covenant.
But as a great power and as a permanent member of the Security Council we have
a responsibility to use our influence to see that other powers live up to their
covenant. And that responsibility we also intend to meet.
Unless the great powers are prepared to act in the defense of law, the United
Nations cannot prevent war. We must make it clear in advance that we do
intend to act to prevent aggression, making it clear at the same time that we
will not use force for any other purpose.
The great powers are given special responsibilities because they have the
strength to maintain peace. If they have the will to maintain peace. Their
strength in relation to one another is such that no one of them can safely break
the peace if the others stand united in defense of the Charter.
The present power relationships of the great states preclude the domination of
the world by any one of them. Those power relationships cannot be substantially
altered by the unilateral action of any one great state without profoundly disturbing
the whole structure of the United Nations.
Therefore, if we are going to do our part to maintain peace in the world we
must maintain our power to do so; and we must make it clear that we will stand
united with other great states in defense of the Charter.
If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order
to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world.
Much as we desire general disarmament and much as we are prepared to participate in a general reduction of armaments, we cannot be faithful to our obligations to ourselves and to the world if we alone disarm.
While it is not in accord with our traditions to maintain a large professional
standing army, we must be able and ready to provide armed contingents that may be
required on short notice. We must also have a trained citizenry able and ready to supplement those armed contingents without unnecessarily prolonged training.
That is why in the interest of peace, we cannot allow our Military Establish­
ment to be reduced below the point required to maintain a position commensurate
with our responsibilities; and that is why we must have some form of universal
military training.
Our power thus maintained cannot and will not be used for aggressive purposes.
Our tradition as a peace-loving, law-abiding, democratic people should be an
assurance that our force will not be used except in the defense of law. Our armed
forces, except as they may be called into action by the Security Council, cannot
be employed in war without the consent of the Congress. We need not fear
their misuse unless we distrust the representatives of the people.
I am convinced that there is no reason for war between any of the great powers.
Their present power relationships and interests are such that none need or should
feel insecure in relation to the others, as long as each faithfully observes the
purposes and principles of the Charter.
It is not enough for nations to declare they do not want to make war. Hitler
said that. In a sense he meant it. He wanted the world to accept the domination
of a totalitarian government under his direction. He wanted that without war
if possible. He was determined to get it with war if necessary.
To banish war, nations must refrain from doing the things that lead to war.
It has never been the policy of the United States in its internal affairs or in its foreign relations to regard the status quo as sacrosanct. The essence of our democracy is our belief in life and growth and in the right of the people to shape and mold their own destiny.

It is not in our tradition to defend the dead hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege. We did not fight against the Nazis and Fascists who turned back the clock of civilization in order that we might stop the clock of progress.

Our diplomacy must not be negative and inert. It must be capable of adjustment and development in response to constantly changing circumstances. It must be marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, practical and forward-looking suggestions.

Though the status quo is not sacred and unchangeable, we cannot overlook a unilateral gnawing away at the status quo. The Charter forbids aggression, and we cannot allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion or pressure or by subterfuges such as political infiltration.

When adjustments between states, large or small, are called for, we will frankly and fairly consider those adjustments on their merits and in the light of the common interests of all states, large and small, to maintain peace and security in a world based on the unity of all great powers and the dominance of none. But is the unanimously-vital important adjustments which will require our consideration. Some of these situations are delicate to deal with. I am convinced, however, that satisfactory solutions can be found if there is a stop to this maneuvering for strategic advantage all over the world and to the use of one adjustment as an entering wedge for further and undisclosed penetrations of power.

We must face the fact that to preserve the United Nations we cannot be indifferent—veto or no veto—to serious controversies between any of the great powers, because such controversies could affect the whole power relationship between all of the great powers.

The United States wishes to maintain friendly relations with all nations and exclusive arrangements with no nation. Naturally there are some problems which concern some nations much more than other nations. That is true in regard to many problems related to inter-American affairs. That is true in regard to the control of Germany and Japan.

In our relations with the other great powers there are many problems which concern two or three of us much more than the others of us. I see no objection to conferences between the big three or the big four or the big five.

Even conferences between ourselves and the Soviet Union alone, conferences between ourselves and Britain alone, or conferences between ourselves and France or China alone, can all help to further general accord among the great powers and peace with the smaller powers.

But in such conferences, so far as the United States is concerned, we will gang unswervingly against no state. We will do nothing to break the world into exclusive blocs or spheres of influence. In this atomic age we will not seek to divide a world which is one and indivisible.

We have openly, gladly, and wholeheartedly welcomed our Soviet ally as a great power, second to none in the family of the United Nations. We have approved many adjustments in her favor, and in the process, resolved many serious doubts in her favor.

Only an inexcusable tragedy of errors could cause serious conflict between us in the future. Despite the differences in our way of life, our people admire and respect our allies and wish to continue to be friends and partners in a world of expanding freedom and rising standards of living.

But in the interest of world peace and in the interest of our common and traditional friendship we must make plain that the United States intends to defend the Charter.

Great powers as well as small powers have agreed under the United Nations Charter not to use force or the threat of force except in defense of law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.

We will not and we cannot stand aloof if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

We have no right to hold our troops in the territories of other sovereign states without their approval and consent freely given.

We must not unduly prolong the making of peace and continue to impose our troops upon small and impoverished states.
No power has a right to help itself to alleged enemy properties in liberated or ex-satellite countries before a reparation settlement has been agreed upon by the Allies. We have not and will not agree to any one power deciding for itself what it will take from these countries. We must not conduct a war of nerves to achieve strategic ends. We do not want to stumble and stagger into situations where no power intends war but no power will be able to avert war. We must not regard the drawing of attention to situations which might endanger the peace, as an affront to the nation or nations responsible for those situations.

It is quite possible that any nation may in good faith embark on a course of conduct without fully appreciating the effects of its conduct. We must all be willing to review our actions to preserve our common interests in the peace, which are so much more important to all of us than the differences which might divide us.

We must get back to conditions of peace. We must liquidate the terrible legacy which the war has left us. We must return our armies to their homelands. We must eliminate the breeding grounds of suspicion and fear. We must not deceive ourselves or mislead our allies. To avoid trouble we must not allow situations to develop into incidents from which there is no retreat.

We must live by the Charter. That is the only road to peace. To live by the Charter requires good will and understanding on the part of all of us. We who had patience and gave confidence to one another in the most trying days of the war must have patience and give confidence to one another now.

No nation has a monopoly of virtue or of wisdom, and no nation has a right to act as if it had. Friendly nations should act as friendly nations. Loose talk of the inevitability of war casts doubts on our own loyalty to the Charter and jeopardizes our most cherished freedoms, both at home and abroad.

There are ideological differences in the world. There always have been. But in this world there is room for many people with varying views and many governments with varying systems. None of us can foresee the far-distant future and the ultimate shape of things to come. But we are bound together as part of a common civilization.

As we view the wreckage of the war, we must realize that the urgent tasks of reconstruction, the challenging tasks of creating higher standards of living for our people, should absorb all our constructive energies.

Great states and small states must work together to build a friendlier and happier world. If we fail to work together there can be no peace, no comfort, and little hope for any of us.

COOPERATION AMONG THE GREAT POWERS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that at San Francisco, where we adopted the United Nations Charter, it was upon the assumption, perhaps without sufficient support as events have shown, that the great powers would cooperate and go along in a general plan to support the principles of the United Nations Charter?

Ambassador Austin. Yes; of course.

The CHAIRMAN. They all professed at San Francisco the desire to do that, did they not, or their representatives did?

Ambassador Austin. They did.

The CHAIRMAN. And the conception that there would be any little group led by any one power opposed really to the purposes of the Charter through delay and frustration and veto and things of that kind was never seriously questioned, is that right?

Ambassador Austin. That I believe to be true.

The CHAIRMAN. The idea that you touched on, that there is complaint, that they think that instead of confining it to article 51 it would be better to devise a universal pact to which all states might adhere, that is what the United Nations is intended to do, is it not?
Ambassador Austin. Yes; yes, indeed.

The Chairman. And it is only because of the failure of the United Nations in some respects that it is necessary to do these things, is that true?

Ambassador Austin. Yes. May I make an observation?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed. I told you a while ago to observe whenever you feel like it.

Ambassador Austin. It is not necessary to have unanimity of all the members of the United Nations all the time on every question to maintain peace.

The Chairman. I agree with you.

Ambassador Austin. All we have to have is that reasonable cooperative spirit that enables us to go forward as we do in ordinary transactions among human beings. And when we have a case up for pacific settlement, a dispute between two countries, we need to handle it in the interest of peace and not in the interest of some national idea. If we could only have that cooperative spirit which we do have in the great majority of the members, if it could extend to the five permanent members, we could make more progress than we are making now, and I don't want you to believe that we are not making good progress now. We are moving in the right direction, and have been throughout the history of the United Nations. We are moving toward pacific settlement of disputes and against the use of war for the determination of controversies among nations. We have made progress in every case where there has been a scare and a threat of possible international disturbance.

That is all.

The Chairman. The United Nations has, by reason of affording a forum for all of the members of that organization, been able to crystallize public opinion on many of these questions that have had a great deal to do with supporting the United Nations.

Ambassador Austin. That is true.

NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chairman. You state here that the President and Secretary of State have expressed their determination that the treaty should support and not be a substitute for the United Nations. That is true also of the mission and of all connected with the United Nations representing the Government of the United States, is it not?

Ambassador Austin. It is true.

The Chairman. It is certainly true of the Senate of the United States, insofar as I am informed and advised, and I believe that the Government and responsible Government officials have the same impression, that we are not trying to chisel off or destroy or impair the United Nations, but that this treaty shall in a way be supplementary thereto, and in conformance with the cardinal principles of the United Nations.

Ambassador Austin. Mr. Chairman, may I observe that your witness is representing the Senate of the United States in the United States mission. You rarely stop to think of that, that the appointive power is not in the President alone. It is in the President and in the Senate. And what is more, he is under a participation act adopted by Congress. There is a very close responsibility of the representative of the United
States in the United Nations to the Congress and to the Senate. I would like to have you remember that.

The Chairman. I thank you, Senator. The committee and the Congress are very proud that there is such an eminent former Member of the Senate as yourself who represents us in the United Nations, and we know what you are keenly alive to the obligations both to the President and to the Senate and to the country that you possess.

Senator Vandenberg, take the witness.

Senator Vandenberg. Senator Austin, I want to congratulate you upon your very able analysis of article 51. I so completely agree with every word you have said that there is no necessity for me to pursue the subject in cross-examination. I simply want to raise one question with you for your comment.

THE TREATY NOT A MILITARY ALLIANCE

The critical habit is growing in the country of labeling the North Atlantic Treaty as a "military alliance," with all the connotations which historically condemn either the morals or the utility of military alliances. I ask you whether this North Atlantic Pact is not in essence the precise opposite of the term "military alliance" in its traditional sense.

Ambassador Austin. Oh, absolutely. I agree completely with that characterization.

LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY

Senator Vandenberg. Is it not true that the North Atlantic Pact operates in its ultimate action only under two conditions: (1) That an armed aggressor has identified himself as an international criminal; (2) the pact operates only so long as the Security council has failed to take the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security? Therefore, so long as the United Nations is able, under its procedures, to function, the North Atlantic Pact does not function in action, and it only functions within the completely limited area of action which I have described.

Ambassador Austin. Exactly.

Senator Vandenberg. That is all.

The Chairman. May I intervene right there? Of course, until the Security Council acts the North Atlantic Charter is not confined to having to wait. It may come into operation immediately upon armed attack. When the Security Council takes the matter up and acts, then the North Atlantic Pact would not be operative insofar as any aggressive action was concerned. Is that true or not?

Ambassador Austin. That is true.

The Chairman. It is an emergency provision, recognizing the inherent right of self-defense of these nations, subject to the overriding authority of the Security Council, and until the Security Council acts the authority of the treaty powers is not impaired. Is that correct?

Ambassador Austin. That is correct.

The Chairman. Senator George!
Senator George. Senator Austin, I wish to compliment you on your very cogent and able statement of this matter. Like all such statements, your implications, of course, go beyond your mere language, but on the point that you have just been queried about by Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally, the treaty, the pact, remains and continues, it is in existence, it is the particular measure that is taken to repel an armed attack which ceases when the United Nations takes over; is that not right?

Ambassador Austin. Yes, sir.

Senator George. So the obligation, of course, of the member states in the pact who are also members of the United Nations is to make a report of their acts and doings, but nothing ceases, nothing ends, except the particular measures that have been taken to put down the aggressor—all the measures taken for that purpose—

Ambassador Austin. Yes.

Senator George. By the very language of article 5 of this treaty.

Ambassador Austin. That is right.

Senator George. I read it:

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

I want to make that clear.

Ambassador Austin. Thank you very much. I haven't heard it stated exactly like that before, and with your customary clarity and wonderful incisive speech you have made that point very clear.

INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

Senator George. I gather, Senator Austin, and indeed I think the conclusion is inescapable, that you justify this treaty not alone because of article 51 or any other provision in the United Nations Charter, but out of the precedent inherent right under international law of any state jointly in association with another state to take appropriate action to defend itself.

Ambassador Austin. Yes, sir. I have a little bit of a distinction there. In my mind article 51 does not grant a power. It merely prohibits anything contained in the Charter cutting across an existing power. This existing power is not dependent on the Charter, it is dependent upon international law and the customs of people, and that is the inherent right of self-defense.

Senator George. Which precedes the Charter and which the Charter expressly recognizes.

Ambassador Austin. Yes.

ASSOCIATION OF MEMBER AND NONMEMBER OF UN IN REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Senator George. I think that ought to be kept clearly in mind, because then the argument that any state which is associated in the North Atlantic Pact which is not a member of the United Nations cannot be so associated ceases to have any force and effect whatever, does it not?
Ambassador Austin. It ceases to have any effect.

Senator George. Because a member of the United Nations may associate himself with a nonmember so long as it is acting within the purview of the United Nations Charter and for the purposes of accomplishing the main objectives of that Charter.

Ambassador Austin. That is certainly so, and it cannot be said that it is conflict with the Charter.

Senator George. It cannot be so said. In other words, a regional arrangement is not to be interpreted in a narrow or geographical sense at all. You have already recited here, in your main statement, what you thought should be and might properly be considered. You did not expressly say so, but I take it that from what you did say it necessarily follows that if there be a common purpose and a kindred objective existing between a member of the United Nations and even a nonmember in this vital area of self-defense, maintenance of peace and security, they may properly become members of the same group.

Ambassador Austin. I think you have formulated a rule beautifully. That is the doctrine, I think.

Senator George. I agree with you. And I again want to thank you for your valuable contribution to our studies here.

Ambassador Austin. Thank you, Senator.

Senator George. Perhaps others may ask you, and I would not myself go into it, about any specific provision in the North Atlantic Treaty. I simply want to content myself with thanking you for your great contribution to our work here on this committee.

Ambassador Austin. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. Senator Austin, on the point that Senator George placed so well before you and before the committee about these nations that are not members of the United Nations, ought any members of the United Nations to object to a nation not technically a member of the United Nations joining with other members of the United Nations in carrying out the purposes and objectives of the United Nations?

Ambassador Austin. I believe not, and in this case it seems especially unjust that one of these countries, namely Italy, which is not a member of the United Nations, is in that status because her application for membership has been vetoed by the Soviet Union, notwithstanding that they had announced that she was qualified to become a member of the United Nations.

The Chairman. I thank you very much, Senator Austin. I want to compliment you upon your very comprehensive and very clear exposition of the matters relating to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Senator Smith of New Jersey will have the floor.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, before I begin my questions to our distinguished former colleague, I would merely like to say for the record, if I may, that as one member of the Foreign Relations Committee I am happy to see this morning with us Senator Donnell and Senator Watkins and other members of our body who are not members of the Foreign Relations Committee, because this is a matter of such profound importance that it is my conviction, and I express the hope, that all our colleagues may come to these hearings in order to get the kind of excellent presentation we have had this morning.
I also express the hope that any of our colleagues who may see fit to ask questions may be given the full privilege to do so in order that we can bring out every possible issue that is involved in this tremendously important matter.

I want to say, Senator Austin, that from a personal standpoint it is a great pleasure for me to see you here with us. As you know, our friendship has been such that it is a great pleasure for me to see you here.

**DISTINCTION BETWEEN COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

I want to thank you for one emphasis which you have made here this morning which has cleared up in my own mind some difficulties I had but more particularly has cleared up difficulties that many of my correspondents had. They do not realize the distinction, as you have so ably brought out, between chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, which is entitled “Regional Arrangements,” and article 51 of chapter VII, which is really a totally different subject. I think you have brought that out so clearly that we do not need to develop it any further.

Ambassador Austin. If you do not mind my making this observation, there is one curious event that makes that very clear, and that was the removal of that article from its original position under chapter VIII. They did not want to have any question about it, so they lifted it right out of chapter VIII and put it up there really alone on the end of chapter VII, relating to enforcement. It is a very interesting event.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I think that is very important, and we find it now in chapter VII, at the end, as you have suggested, of a chapter the title of which is “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” That is what 51 deals with.

Ambassador Austin. That is it.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And it does not deal primarily with the regional arrangements.

**COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS MORE IMPORTANT THAN REGIONAL LOCATION**

That leads me to ask this question, which is presented by your own statement this morning, where you discuss universal arrangements and point out that any binding collective defense pact, to be effective, depends on the individual and collective capacity of the parties to resist armed attack. This involves continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid as envisaged under article 3 of the treaty, implying that that language which I have just read is the only limitation to any possible other nation, with the consent of the members of this treaty, joining in this Atlantic Pact. In other words, it is not the question of whether they actually happen to be in the Atlantic area, but if they have similar objectives and are related to the objectives of the nations in the Atlantic area, they might properly be considered eligible, although the exact regional definition might not reach them.
Is that a fair conclusion, with the possibility that this might grow into a larger group of nations than we have contemplated in the immediate Treaty?

Ambassador Austin. I think that is a likely position for a signatory state to take. Of course the question of projecting what is going to be done and what probably will happen is a little difficult where you are dealing with states. I have discovered that in the experience of the past 3 years.

**ADDITIONAL MEMBERS FOR TREATY**

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And, of course, the treaty provides that other States are admitted only on the invitation of all the signatories, so you would have a problem there. There are other states whose names have been mentioned. The question has been brought to my attention, "Are you going to make this eligible for so and so and so and so?" You probably know some of those to whom I have referred.

Ambassador Austin. I would have to mention names, but I do not think we need to go into that discussion.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. No.

**REGIONAL ASPECTS OF ATLANTIC TREATY**

You said one thing on page 5 of your statement which was not entirely clear to me, on the assumption that we clearly divide chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter from article 51. You say:

In certain of its aspects, the treaty is also a regional arrangement; and insofar as it partakes of those characteristics, chapter VIII of the Charter provides full authority for its provisions.

That is the end of the quotation from your statement.

That seems to suggest that you visualize certain regional characteristics where the parties as a regional group might be called upon to act under chapter VIII. I am not quite clear what you mean by that.

Ambassador Austin. Well, I think I would be very intemperate if I undertook to forecast the specific acts that can be done under this treaty that would require application of the checks that are contained in chapter VIII. But it must be obvious to anyone reading this treaty that they could get into that field under article 4:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

You see, that deals with threats. Article 51 does not deal with threats. Therefore, I can imagine cases where even there they would be obliged to conform to what the Charter of the United Nations requires to be done in such an event, don't you see? It all depends on what happens. As I have said repeatedly in my position here, what this treaty is depends on how the signatories carry it out. And we will deal with practical things and not theories. We will not have to pass on lots of these problems that I see expressed in various forms. We may never meet them.

So from the point of view of wise consideration of a treaty like this, I do not think that it would be right for me to speculate about
what acts are likely to occur under this treaty that would be in the realm of those things which are suitable for regional determination.

There is one thing very clear, and it is a recommendation for the treaty, and that is the firm adherence to the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations; so great adherence as to repeat some of them, like the reference in article 2:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

That is almost taken right out of the Charter. And the fact that 12 great nations get together in a treaty like this and reaffirm those fundamental principles helps to carry out one of the objects that we have, and that is to gain universal peace, universal cooperation.

Excuse me; I got away from your question.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. You see no implication in the fact that we are preparing to enter into this North Atlantic Treaty that it is an evidence of our lack of confidence in the United Nations?

Ambassador Austin. Far from it; oh, no. It is simply another way to strengthen and carry on the United Nations.

OBLIGATION OF NON-UN MEMBERS OF ATLANTIC PACT TO ACCEPT CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF UN CHARTER

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Senator, I would like to bring to your attention certain questions that have come to me in my correspondence, certain questions that have come to our staff. We have compiled certain of these issues, and there are a few of them here that it seems to me have a special bearing on your intimate knowledge of the way the United Nations Charter was set up and the way it is functioning and the relation of that to certain articles in this treaty.

I want to, in the first place, in taking up article 1, ask you some questions, and I am going to read article 1 first so we have in the record what we are talking about:

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In reading that I emphasize the word “parties,” meaning the parties to this North Atlantic Treaty.

Does that language mean that such nonmembers of the United Nations—the two countries we have brought into this, Italy and Portugal—will now be bound by the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes?

Ambassador Austin. Yes.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. You think by their entering into this they are just as much bound as though they entered the United Nations themselves?

Ambassador Austin. What they have done by this treaty is not to make an operative clause here. I do not regard this as an operative
clause. I regard this as a declaration. In other words, Italy and Portugal, who are not members of the United Nations, say by this treaty that this is sound principle. That is what they are saying. And they are saying that, so far as they are concerned, they will undertake to do as the Charter of the United Nations requires in respect of any disputes.

USE OF UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY BY ATLANTIC PACT MEMBERS TO SETTLE DISPUTES

Senator Smith of New Jersey. That leads to the next question: Does this article mean that the pact members are to settle their disputes through the machinery of the United Nations or other existing agencies? Otherwise, why does the treaty omit detailed provisions outlining the methods to be followed? Would that be true of Italy and Portugal as well as of the members of the United Nations?

Ambassador Austin. Your question opens the door to a whole lot. There are many features of the Charter of the United Nations that this really refers to by indirection, like those obligations on the parties to any dispute to try to settle it themselves by various means, don't you know. Article 33 is a characteristic one. But that is not the only one. And now then, in order to facilitate the work of such litigants, you might say, such opponents in a dispute, we have worked out in practice certain methods and procedures. In one case, for example, the President of the Security Council had been vainly trying to get his Security Council into agreement on a settlement between certain countries; and then he finally launched out on an informal basis to act as a mediator or peacemaker. All right. Then what happened? From that experience the interim committee went into its study and procedures to the point of making a finding and recommendation that we establish, by rule, this practice of having the parties, after they have made their claim and created the issue, join with the President of the Security Council or a peacemaker that he appoints, for the purpose of carrying out such a provision as this which you have in article 1 of the treaty and such a provision as this which you find in article 33. Permit me to read this. It is not long:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Do you see?

Now I think I had better stop, because I could go on with a long story relating to this.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I realize that, but what I am trying to bring out is from your answer to my former question, that such a provision as that would apply to Italy and Portugal, who are in the Atlantic Pact, if they have a problem that is presented.

Ambassador Austin. It is my belief that it does.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. That is a very interesting development of this whole thing, and very important, and I am very much pleased with your answer, because it seems to me that was the conclusion that we have to draw.

Ambassador Austin. I intended to make that clear in my little statement. I doubt that I did, now.
Senator Smith. I thank you very much. It has been a question I have been asked a number of times, and I think it is a very important reply you are making.

I will skip article 2 and go to article 3. Article 3 reads:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

The questions that are presented under this article, which I want to present to you as an authority on the way the UN operates, are these: Would the signatory parties be bound by this article not only to maintain the present strength of their military establishment for the duration of the treaty, which incidentally is 20 years, but also to develop and expand those establishments? Does this mean, for example, that in 1950, 1951, and 1952, our Military Establishment would have to be progressively enlarged and improved? I am not quite clear where we go on the military implementation here.

Ambassador Austin. You are asking me a question that I have not considered, and perhaps I am making a hasty answer.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. If you would rather not answer it, do not hesitate to say so.

Ambassador Austin. No; I am going to give you my opinion. I think you have to make reasonable interpretations of such a statement as you have there. As I see it that is expressed in general terms, not specific—maintain and develop their individual and collective capacities. You would get into a terrible tangle, I think, if you undertook to say how much gain you shall make the first year, how much development you shall make the second year, and all that. You leap from one extreme interpretation to another, and get yourself into a cul-de-sac.

Now, what I interpret that to mean, looking at it reasonably and construing it liberally, is that in order to implement mutual aid and self-help, each one of the signatories to this treaty will perform its part. I do not think there was any intent to measure it with such degree of care as to say it shall be maintained at the level that exists now, or that it be developed above that level.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Let us put the matter this way.

Ambassador Austin. I believe it means that it must be by self-help and mutual aid kept qualified to make the contribution that article 5 requires.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 3 AND POSSIBLE DISARMAMENT BY UNITED NATIONS

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Let me put it the other way, then: Would not the obligation involved in article 3 possibly prohibit us for at least 10 years, when we renew our consideration of this treaty, from accepting plans that might be formulated by the United Nations, either for the establishment of a ceiling on armaments, or disarmament, or whatever it may be; either a ceiling or a reduction or whatever it might be? Is there any interference there?
Ambassador Austin. That answer is perfectly clear. Article 7 says:

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Doesn't that answer your question?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I think it does, but I wanted to get it on the record and from a person of your distinction and authority, that you do not feel that our entering into this thing, and our discussing in article 3 here the developing of our individual right to resist armed attack, in any way prevents our joining in a program for limitation of armaments, or what we all hope for in the time to come, when we can disarm entirely and let the police force of the world be in the hands of the United Nations.

Ambassador Austin. I recommend, if you do not mind my saying it, that you study that article 3 with reference to the fact that this treaty is going to set up a group to do something that heretofore has been done only by the individual members themselves. And when they talk about developing the individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, they refer principally to that.

Senator Vandenberg. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Yes.

Senator Vandenberg. Is not the final answer, Mr. Ambassador, that the interpretation of this article is entirely contingent upon events; that as events improve the peace prospective under the United Nations, this obligation recedes?

Ambassador Austin. Yes. And it recedes just as much as it can progress, depending upon events.

Ambassador Austin. Yes. The word “effective” is the word that makes that perfectly clear.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I am very glad you have gotten that into the record, because lots of people are fearing that we are setting up something here (a) that will contemplate our continuing to increase the armed forces of this group year by year; and (b), that we will be in some way stopped from joining in a plan for disarmament when that plan comes properly through the United Nations. You made it clear, as my own judgment is, that neither one of those conclusions should be drawn.

Ambassador Austin. I think that is an interpretation that strains the language of the pact and the purpose of it far beyond what you call reasonable and fair interpretation.

SUPREMACY OF CHARTER OVER TREATY

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Let me turn to article 7, if I may. I will read the article again:

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The question is this: In the event of a conflict in jurisdiction between the treaty and this Charter, which would prevail? Suppose a pact member is attacked by a nonpact member and the Security Council assumes jurisdiction. To what extent would action under the treaty still be possible?

Ambassador Austin. Perhaps you have two questions there. I would like to separate them, if you don't mind.

The supremacy of the Charter is strictly maintained in the treaty itself. If there is a conflict of law, the law of the Charter prevails.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I am glad you have made that statement, because I have been attacked by some of my correspondents in New Jersey on the ground that in supporting this treaty I am undermining the Charter and putting something superior to the Charter in effect so far as the United States is concerned. You have negatived that definitely. The Charter is the supreme law as between these two should there be a conflict.

The Chairman. Is that not clear in article 71?

That recognizes its overriding authority.

Ambassador Austin. There is another article here, Senator Smith.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL ASSUMES JURISDICTION OVER A DISPUTE

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Then the other question I put, the question of a pact member being attacked by a nonpact member, and the Security Council assuming jurisdiction.

Ambassador Austin. I do not quite understand your question. Probably I had better understand it before I try to respond.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Let us suppose a pact member is attacked by a nonpact member and the Security Council assumes jurisdiction. To what extent will action under the treaty still be possible?

Ambassador Austin. To no extent, if the Security Council takes the measures necessary to maintain security and peace. There is the big "if." Now, it is said that the Security Council will decide the matter; that the Security Council, being supreme over the subject, having the primary responsibility, will decide that question of whether they have taken the measures necessary.

Does that answer your question?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I think that takes care of that particular question.

But until they do, the treaty is still in effect so far as self-defense.

Ambassador Austin. The treaty is still in effect, but the activity, as Senator George said—he brought that out very clearly—will cease. The word "measure" is involved.

The Chairman. When and if they take action. Until they do, the treaty remains effective, the measure remains effective.

Ambassador Austin. That is right.

Before you pass from that take this into account, that Article 8 says:

Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with the treaty.
That has to be read, I think, in connection with the other provisions of the treaty, on your last question.

POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN AMENDMENTS TO UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE TREATY

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I am glad you brought in article 8, because I was going to ask you a question in connection with that, whether under the second clause of that article the United States obligates itself not to become a party for 10 or 20 years to any proposed amendment for strengthening the United Nations if that amendment would in any way limit the right of self-defense under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Ambassador Austin. I have no difficulty in answering that, because throughout this treaty that is before us the obligation of the United States under the Charter of the United Nations is maintained unbroken, and its right under the Charter of the United Nations is sustained. There is nothing in this that abridges the power of the United Nations.

Does that answer it?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Not quite, because this question I gave you contemplated the possibility of amendments, we will say. Suppose we get together to amend the United Nations. Does this article 8 in any way prevent our entering into amendments to the United Nations which might conceivably be looked upon as in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty?

Ambassador Austin. Oh, no; I think not.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. That is a question that has been presented.

Ambassador Austin. How could you get in conflict with this treaty, anyway?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Only if it in any way limited the right of collective self-defense. I imagine we would not agree with that anyway, so there would not be any question.

Ambassador Austin. The Charter says that nothing inconsistent with this shall prevail. The Charter does not create that right; that right exists under international law, as you know. You are perfectly familiar with that.

I think I have answered it.

COMPETITION BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL UNDER THE TREATY

Senator Smith of New Jersey. We provide in article 9 for a Council. Now, as I understand that Council, it consists of representatives of each of the treaty countries who meet together and confer. They have no authority to bind their respective governments, but they do consider with regard to matters to implement the treaty.

The question that has been presented to me is this: Will the Council compete in any way with the Security Council? Are we going to have any danger of any conflicts with these various councils operating under these other treaties—the Security Council, the Council under the Brussels pact, and so on?
Ambassador Austin. I do not see any danger. With the supremacy of the Security Council declared in the treaty itself, I do not see how anyone can raise a question that the Council under this treaty is supreme over the Security Council. That I just cannot see.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I think you are right about that, because in reading this it seems to me the Council is not given any authority except to get together and consider matters. The individual members are not given any final voice for the countries they represent.

Ambassador Austin. You will notice that this article 9 envisages the purpose of the treaty, collective self-defense, and specifically includes in its reference articles 3 and 5. How that could ever get in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations I cannot see, because the activity under this treaty would cease, that is, the measures taken for self-defense would cease, if and when the Security Council took the necessary measures to maintain security and peace.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And the Council probably never would begin to function until the Security Council had endeavored to take care of any threat to the peace. It would only function in case of an aggression, which is provided definitely at the point of aggression.

I agree with you entirely, but as I say to you, it has been presented to us, and I am glad to have your reply to the question.

I have one or two more, and then I am through.

This question I think you have already answered, but because it has been asked I am going to repeat it. Many people still pin their hopes for world peace on the United Nations. Why is it not possible to leave the question of security in the North Atlantic area up to the United Nations generally, instead of emphasizing the regional approach as contemplated in the pact? I think you have answered that in your statement, and I think Secretary Acheson did yesterday, too, so I won't press that question. It is clear to me.

THE ARMSTRONG PROPOSAL

There is one more here that I do want to ask you, and that is with regard to the so-called Armstrong proposal. I do not know whether you are familiar with that or not. I will read it to you in the question: It has been proposed that members of the United Nations who are determined to avoid the excessive use of the veto should form a coalition for peace within the United Nations and open to all members. Would such a pact open to all states serve the cause of world peace and security better than a pact of this nature, this North Atlantic Treaty?

Ambassador Austin. I have covered that pretty fully in my opening statement. I would have covered it precisely if I had said "including that proposition" by name. My idea is that we should not close our minds. We are in a new field. We are engaged with a new power for peace. We have had only 4 years' experience with it. I think we have done well. But we haven't done as well as we are going to do. And I welcome proposals of all kinds for strengthening this power, except those that are proposals to destroy it under the pretext of strengthening it.
Senator Smith of New Jersey. Then you would agree with me that some of the talk that is going around, that the United Nations is a failure, that we had better start from scratch, that we had better set up a world federation, we had better do this, we had better do that, is unfortunate discussion—let's put it that way—and you thoroughly believe the United Nations has made substantial progress with all the difficulties it has had and is on the road to accomplishing the objectives we seek?

Ambassador Austin. Much of the dissatisfaction with the United Nations and the desire to substitute something else for it results from inadequate understanding. We try very hard to distribute information on the progress the United Nations is making, but it is a difficult thing to do. Success usually is achieved quietly, while failures attract widespread publicity. It is the people who don't appreciate what we have who are more readily swept off their feet by promises of something else.

The birth and organization of the greatest combination of nations that history has ever seen, in the interest of the greatest cause—the abolition of the scourge of war—should command the attention of every citizen.

The indifference of people is difficult to cure, but of one thing I am certain: There are an enormous number of young people all over the United States, in fact all over the world, who are taking an interest in the United Nations, who are finding out all about it, and who are qualifying themselves to take up the torch and carry it on. Their interest, their enthusiasm, and their determination to make it work, offset the unjustified skepticism with which some of our generation view the work of the United Nations. These young people will become more qualified than my generation was, and is, to make a success, a wonderful success of the United Nations.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Thank you, Senator Austin. I appreciate your fine testimony today, and especially your answers to these questions which will enable me, from an authoritative source, to give some answers. I can say that I agree with all of your replies. They have been my own conclusion, but I do not feel qualified as the expert you are, and I wanted to get into our record your answers to those points which have been raised, and especially the very last thing you have said, because I have had pressed on me by delegations from my State that I should support a movement in the light of the atomic bomb to scrap all armament in the world except such police force as we give to some central authority, and everybody will be happy continuously thereafter.

I gather from your replies that you feel just the way I do. Nobody yet has devised a plan by which any such scheme could be put into effect. We have got to work with the materials we have. We are making progress because of the great work done in San Francisco by our distinguished colleagues here and others, and we do see the way ahead through this Atlantic Treaty as a supplementary step to bringing about the things we are praying for.

Ambassador Austin. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Austin, I just want to say, in connection with what you observed about the United Nations, that while the United Nations has not achieved all the things that we either expected or hoped for, I think it has made substantial progress and has achieved many worth while and useful things, and I think that the hope of the world is through the development and strengthening of the United Nations, rather than to junk it and run off after some other scheme that probably won't work half so well.

One of my chief observations about the use of the United Nations is that under it no member can pursue schemes and plans of conquest or an armed attack or subjugation without the whole world knowing it, because the Security Council and the United Nations can immediately air the whole thing before the whole world, and I feel that already what the United Nations has done in one or two instances has prevented that very thing from happening since the Charter was adopted.

I want to pay my respects to the United Nations. I regret the obstructions and the delays and the handicaps under which it has suffered, but that is no new experience. All of these things have to undergo that period of trial and error, and I want to congratulate you and the others associated with the United Nations on the things that have been accomplished rather than to criticize you for the things you have not accomplished.

Ambassador Austin. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say that you have every reason to be gratified for the development that has been accomplished in the United Nations through your own distinguished service—

The Chairman. I thank you.

Ambassador Austin. From the beginning to this moment.

The Chairman. I thank you, Senator.

Ambassador Austin. And I expect to see it increase.

The Chairman. We congratulate you, and we thank you for your appearance.

The committee has here today Senator Watkins, of Utah, who has been invited by the committee to come before the committee. He desires to interrogate some of the witnesses, so, with your consent, we will turn over the questioning to Senator Watkins.

Senator Watkins. I thank the Chairman, but Senator Donnell is my senior.

The Chairman. The reason I called on you was because Senator Donnell was here yesterday. It is agreeable to me that either one of you go on.

Senator Donnell. We would like for both of us to go on.

The Chairman. We cannot hear but one of you at a time.

Senator Donnell. We are not asking that. As the chairman well knows, both of us desire to have the privilege.

The Chairman. Whichever one of you wants to go on, go ahead.

Senator Watkins. Mr. Austin, I, too, want to compliment you on a very able presentation of at least a part of the case for the treaty. I cannot say I agree with it all. Many of the matters that you mentioned I am not sure about. I will admit my mind is somewhat in a
state of confusion from what I see happening and what you have said. I probably am one of those who doesn't know exactly what the United Nations has done. I have been trying to read the newspapers faithfully—

Ambassador Austin. Do you expect to get it all in the newspapers?

Senator Watkins. I have had an experience recently that indicates that you don't get it all in the newspapers.

What I want to call to your attention are some of the statements that you have made and that have not been covered by the other examination. I do not want to go into the whole thing. Some of these questions may seem to be not so important, but I am calling them up because no one else probably has said very much about them.

**PROGRESS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NEED FOR THE TREATY**

One of the first ones is, I was very much impressed with what you said, that we are now witnessing in the United Nations the unity that is progressively making aggression and obstruction less attractive and less feasible. As I remember, you probably interpolated some other statement there about the number that would vote now and, outside of the few that voted with the Soviet Union, the voting was almost unanimous on the part of these other nations.

Now, this is the thing that bothers me. If the United Nations is making progress, and the group within it, except for the Soviet Union and its satellites, are working together more than they have ever done, and seem now to be working as a unit, why is it necessary now to formalize this unity when, as a matter of fact, they are already acting together without any formal agreement?

Ambassador Austin. Well, you have drawn a conclusion that was not justified by what I said, and you have omitted a very important fact.

Senator Watkins. I will be glad to get whatever it is. I do not want to misrepresent it.

**THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO AND THE NEED FOR THE TREATY**

Ambassador Austin. We have what is called the unanimity rule, under article 27 of the Charter, by which the five permanent members have to be included in the majority of seven in the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security and peace. And the point is that the Soviet Union, one of those five permanent members, has used the veto, as we call it, or has made it impossible for us to have unanimity, thirty different times.

Senator Watkins. I am aware of that, and that was not what I was calling attention to.

Ambassador Austin. There is the question of why it is necessary to have the North Atlantic Treaty. Don't you see it?

Senator Watkins. What I am calling to your attention is the fact that you say these other nations, these western democracies, outside of Russia and her satellites, have been working together and are voting together in the Assembly, I take it. I know that in the Council only five nations are represented, and I understand that. But these other groups have been working together and voting together, and the point is, why can't they continue to work together without making
some sort of a formal agreement to continue to work together, if the entire movement, as I get it from what you have said, has been toward a united working by these groups or these nations? Why couldn't that go on without formalizing it, putting it in the form of an alliance or a treaty? That is the thing that bothers me.

Ambassador Austin. Why do you ask that question? Of course they can go on and continue to do it.

Senator Watkins. Why is it necessary to put it in the form of a treaty if they can act?

Ambassador Austin. You are mixing all these things up.

Senator Watkins. I told you I was mixed up and wanted you to straighten me out.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Ambassador Austin. The majority votes I mentioned do not represent Security Council votes, but General Assembly votes. The General Assembly does not have charge of the subject of security and peace. Look at the Charter and you will see that the Security Council deals with that subject, primarily, and it is because the peace of the North Atlantic area is under the threat of aggression, the use of force, for territorial aggrandizement and overwhelming of the sovereignty of countries in the North Atlantic area; it is because the assault upon any one of them is an assault upon all of us, that we combine together here and say, "Now you remember, you make an attack, an armed attack, on one of us, and it will be deemed an armed attack on all of us."

Now, haven't you in mind the possibility that that will strengthen the United Nations? That will be a shield over the development economically and socially of the North Atlantic area.

Senator Watkins. What I can't understand, Mr. Austin, is this: We have been acting now for a number of years, since the close of hostilities, together, and we have undertaken a program to put them on their feet economically without having any binding pact of any kind other than the United Nations, so I am wondering, if the union of thought and feeling and action is growing among this group that we are talking about now—I am not talking about the Security Council—and if that is all growing and getting stronger each day, why do we need to formalize it with a pact in order to get us to act together? We have been doing pretty well to the present time, haven't we? I don't mean in the Security Council; I mean among the nations that are going to be participants in this pact, the North Atlantic Pact.

SECURITY AND RECOVERY

Ambassador Austin. You seem to assume that these 12 countries are what I was talking about when I talked about the gain in unanimity of 43 countries, sometimes 45, sometimes 49. That wasn't what I was talking about. Now stick to one subject at a time. Take this proposition of economic recovery of Europe. The point about it is that there is a fear gripping the souls of those people of Europe that has a tendency to palsy their effort. How much initiative are you going to get out of a poor devil who sincerely believes that he is exposed to having an invading army come in and destroy the product
of his labors and of his initiative? If you don’t understand that the recovery of Europe is actually dependent on protection from that fear, then you don’t understand this whole problem. Certainly you don’t realize the importance of this Atlantic Treaty.

That is what this treaty is for. It is to give notice to those poor fellows who are under that fear that they have friends who are strong enough to protect them against that kind of an attack, and it is for the purpose of giving notice to those who threaten them; who have already, by either the threat or the use of force, taken over countries right next door to them. It is for that purpose that this treaty is put together. It is not for the other purpose in particular, although it does help it. That is what we say about this treaty, that it is a shield under the protection of which the economic recovery not only of Europe, but of all the world, can be sought.

NECESSITY FOR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Watkins. As I get it, going back to what you said when you said we ought to stick to one subject, and that is what I want to stick to, why can’t we go on as we are, with these nations acting as they are under the economic recovery program and the other things that the United States has done to indicate its support of these nations who have been living in fear? If we are growing more united all the time, why can’t we do it without actually entering into some agreement and committing ourselves for some 20 years? That is the question that is bothering me. I don’t think I am dodging it at all.

Ambassador Austin. What you are doing is making an argument. You are not asking me a question. I could answer the question “Why?” very easily, but the real question—

Senator Watkins. Give me the reasons why we can’t go on. That is what I would like to know.

Ambassador Austin. Oh, well, I will repeat it for you as many times as you like.

The reason that we need a treaty of self-defense is that we need to stabilize the situation. We need to give those people courage. We need to increase their energy and their spirit in order to make use of this financial aid that we are giving, and other aid, too. That is why.

Senator Watkins. I may say that I voted for the European recovery program, for the Greek-Turkish loan twice, and for the European recovery program twice, to do exactly what you say now ought to be done with the pact. I thought, and I think we were told, that those steps would do the very thing that you now say the pact is necessary to do. I thought that was going to give them the spirit and the hope and the faith to go on and take care of themselves. I think I can find plenty of speeches in the Congressional Record from my colleagues and many others in public life who took that point of view, and I have been wondering why these measures that we have been doing—you state we are becoming more united, and I think that is a fact. I think it is a fact that these western nations are becoming more united. Why do we need now to take this other step?

Ambassador Austin. Have I answered your question twice?

Senator Watkins. Maybe you have. If that is your best answer, all right; I will let it go at that.

Ambassador Austin. That is my best answer.
EFFECT OF LIMITATIONS ON ITALY UNDER THE TREATY OF PEACE

Senator Watkins. Now I would like to come over to this question of Italy. As I understood you to say, and I agree with you, every nation has the inherent right of self-defense. And the justification, probably, or one of the justifications, for this pact would be in getting together in order to make stronger this right of self-defense, this inherent right of collective self-defense.

Now, with respect to Italy, how can Italy, under the treaty that Italy entered into with the United States and Russia and the other nations at the end of the war, increase its armament or increase its powers of self-defense and still keep the terms of that treaty?

Ambassador Austin. I don't know. Do you?

Senator Watkins. I am asking for information.

Ambassador Austin. Oh, no; that isn't it. If I understand questions, and I have sat in your seat, sir, 16 years, this is not solicitation of information from a witness. This is clearly using a witness to make an argument. Now, I would like to have, Mr. Chairman, questions that I can answer instead of being confronted here with arguments.

The Chairman. I will say to you, Senator, that you are acquainted with Senatorial procedures in committees and things of that kind. If you do not care to answer any question, you may say so.

Ambassador Austin. Oh, no; I will try my best. I have already.

The Chairman. You may decline whenever you like. It seems to me that the Senator from Utah in his questions has completely ignored those 30 vetoes in the Security Council which go to the very vitals of the organization of the United Nations. He suggests, "Why don't we just go on as we are going?" Of course, if we are just going on as we are going, we do not need to do anything. But I do not want to go on as we are going. I do not want to go on with one nation and its half a dozen satellites absolutely dominating action by its vetoes 30 times in the Security Council.

Senator Watkins. May I call the attention of the witness to the fact that the treaty with Italy apparently limits the armament of Italy. I personally voted against the ratification of that treaty because I thought it infringed on the inherent right of self-defense of the Italian people, and I made a talk against the ratification on that ground, and I said that some day we would be sorry for it.

Now I am wondering, in keeping with the commitment, if we ratify this North Atlantic Pact and Italy becomes a party. It gives me some concern as to how we can justify ourselves in now adding to the armament that Italy was permitted to have under the treaty, and it is very limited. That is a legal question, and I know the distinguished member of our delegation to the United Nations is a lawyer, and a distinguished international lawyer, and I thought maybe he could give me some light on that question. I am not just doing it to argue with Senator Austin. I would really like to know how we can justify increasing the armament or putting up armament for Italy if we admit that we have such a treaty and in that treaty there are limitations to hold it down to certain obsolete equipment and a very small army and no navy and no air force, except some old bombers and a few observation planes and something of that sort.
Ambassador Austin. You have not asked me whether we do justify it, nor have you asked me whether we have got to justify it. You have made an assumption, sir, that I have not testified to.

Are you a lawyer?

Senator Watkins. I do not care to get into any argument with you, Mr. Austin.

The Chairman. I will volunteer the information that the Senator from Utah is a lawyer and he has been on the bench from his State.

Senator Watkins. And I have asked many a lawyer the same question to explain his opinion and his judgment, and now you come here as an opinion witness, as I have understood, and I would like you to give me the benefit of your opinion.

Ambassador Austin. If you will ask me a question, sir, you will get a response. It may not be an answer that you like.

Senator Watkins. I quite often do not get the answers I want, but nevertheless I ask them.

Ambassador Austin. Let me have one that is a question and not a speech.

Senator Watkins. I submit I have asked a question; and, if you don’t want to give me your opinion as to how we can justify that action, I will let it go at that.

Ambassador Austin. Who says we have to justify it?

Senator Watkins. Maybe we haven’t. Maybe we can go ahead and violate treaties. Do you think it would be a violation of the treaty to increase the armament of Italy?

Ambassador Austin. What treaty are you talking about?

Senator Watkins. I thought I had made it clear: The treaty of peace between Italy and the other members of the United Nations, made at the conclusion of World War II, and it was ratified, as I remember, 2 years ago this spring.

Ambassador Austin. Now, sir, I do not know what the provision in that treaty is with respect to the limitation of armament. But, if there is a limitation of armament in that treaty, it does not constitute a barrier to carrying out the provision in this treaty here with relation to self-help and mutual aid. Is that an answer?

Senator Watkins. That is your answer?

Ambassador Austin. I thought you would not like it.

Senator Watkins. It does not give me very much information, I will admit, but if that is your answer we will let it go at that.

(The Department of State supplied further information on this point for the record as follows:)

It is understood by all parties to the treaty that the participation of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact had no effect on the military provisions, or any other provisions, of the Italian Peace Treaty. Any contribution which Italy makes to the collective capacity for defense of the North Atlantic area must be within the limits fixed by the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.

Senator Watkins. I have no further questions.

Ambassador Austin. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to finish, if I can, before lunch. Would you mind having Senator Donnell ask me his questions before lunch? The reason is that I have to be in New York this afternoon, if possible.

The Chairman. We will accommodate you, Senator.

Senator Donnell?
Senator DONNELL. I want to say that I am very happy to see my friend, the distinguished Ambassador and former Senator, whom I have known for some years and regard most highly, here with us today.

Ambassador ASTIN. Thank you very much. You go just as far as you like, too.

Senator DONNELL. I will try to go only within the limits. I think Senator Watkins, to my judgment, has observed the limits, too. I shall endeavor to present my questions to you as briefly and succinctly as I can.

THE TREATY IN RELATION TO REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Mr. Ambassador, on page 3 of your testimony, near the bottom, occurs a quotation which I ask you now, is this an exact quotation from Mr. Gromyko?

The North Atlantic Pact cannot under any circumstances be called a regional arrangement because it comprises states located in two different continents—America and Europe. Thus these states are united not according to the regional principle.

Ambassador ASTIN. I believe it is. I intended it to be.

Senator DONNELL. I assumed it was intended to be a correct statement of what Mr. Gromyko said.

Then I want to ask the meaning of this next sentence, your own sentence:

This claim that the treaty is in conflict with the Charter, because it does not create an arrangement according to the regional principle, is without probity.

Would you be kind enough to tell us, am I correct in understanding, if I may put it in that form, that that is an incorrect statement, and not founded on truth?

Ambassador ASTIN. Oh, no.

Senator DONNELL. What is it that you mean?

Ambassador ASTIN. I use "probity" in the common, ordinary acceptance of that word by lawyers, as something that proves something.

Senator DONNELL. I beg your pardon. All right, sir.

Do you, Mr. Ambassador, understand, or assert, that the North Atlantic Treaty is, to use the language of Mr. Gromyko, a regional arrangement?

Ambassador ASTIN. Not in the full sense of the Charter of the United Nations. You see, you can regard it as regional in some of its functions. It is evidently not designed under chapter VIII, but designed as it is, under article 51, it is described in the record this way. This is the hearings on July 9 to 13, 1945, in this same committee. Mr. Pasvolsky said:

Now, Mr. Chairman, in conjunction with the provisions of this chapter, I would like to say a word about article 51 of the preceding chapter. That is the self-defense article which states that nothing in this Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken all measures necessary.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think you left out three very important words: "individual or collective" self-defense.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I am just coming to that.

Senator VANDENBERG. All right.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I wanted to say that the right of self-defense is defined as individual or collective.

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. That word "collective" relates in part to the regional arrangements I have just described, but it relates also to any group action that may be taken for purposes of self-defense.

That same thought, you will find, I am confident, at the pages that I have stated in my written statement there, expressed by Mr. Stettinius and by John Foster Dulles.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to ask you this question: You next say in your statement, and perhaps I should read this sentence:

This claim that the treaty is in conflict with the Charter because it does not create an arrangement according to the regional principle is without probity:

First—and I am quoting from you now—it does create an arrangement according to the regional principle. History shows that the Atlantic Ocean is a bridge linking America and Europe. Second, even if the treaty did not do so, it creates a group for collective defense under article 51 of the Charter.

Then, on the next page, is this further sentence to which I direct your attention. You say:

It is not necessary to define the organization of the North Atlantic community as exclusively a regional arrangement, or as exclusively a group for collective self-defense, since activities under both article 51 and chapter VIII are comprehended in the treaty.

I take it that that is your opinion?

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is my opinion.

Senator DONNELL. And chapter VIII is the one which contains article 52?

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. And chapter VIII is entitled "Regional Arrangements" and contains, as I have indicated, article 52, and also articles 53 and 54. That is correct; is it not?

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is right.

KEEPING THE SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMED OF ACTIVITIES UNDER THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Now, Mr. Ambassador, article 54, I observe—and this is the question I want to ask you—reads:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Does it not?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. I understand your statement—and am I correct in this?—to say that activities under chapter VIII, that is to say article 52 and these other two articles, 53 and 54, are comprehended in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is my opinion.

Senator DONNELL. The Security Council includes within its membership, as among its permanent members, Russia; does it not?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Oh, yes.

Senator DONNELL. So that in the provisions of article 54, am I correct in understanding that the Security Council as an entirety, including every member, both Russia and the others, shall at all times
be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security?

Ambassador Austin. First you have to have a premise for it; that is, an activity. Understand, I make this distinction clear in my statement, I think. I do not regard this treaty as making a regional arrangement, fully panoplied regional arrangement. I have said so time and time again, and I do not think it does, but it comprehends some activities that may get in there, and when you try those activities then you come under the restrictions in chapter VIII. Thus, the parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened. I don't know that it will ever happen, but if it should happen and this group of 12 countries here, under the North Atlantic Treaty, undertook to do any business in that field, don't you see, they would have to tell about it.

But the implied question—I don't think I have the full question—that they would have to report everything I would have to answer "no"; they wouldn't have to.

GEOGRAPHIC BASIS OF NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

Senator Donnell. Simply in view of your statement in what you have given us today that the treaty “does not create an arrangement according to the regional principle”——

Ambassador Austin. That is on geography; that meets the geographical question.

Senator Donnell. I understood you to say, however, earlier this morning, that geography is not the only thing to be considered in determining whether a region exists; that cultural and other such things may be taken into consideration in determining that.

Ambassador Austin. Let's stick to the question. Here is the situation. In the text you will see that I am answering Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Gromyko says it cannot under any circumstances be called a regional arrangement because it comprises states located in two different continents—America and Europe. And he says, “Thus” (because of that) “these states are united not according to the regional principle.”

My answer is limited to that. I am saying that the Atlantic unites them, and history shows that the Atlantic is a bridge linking America and Europe and the including of them is therefore within that regional principle. It relates to that, that answer does.

REGIONALISM AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Senator Donnell. Now, Senator, it is true, however, is it not, according to your statement which you have given the committee this morning, and I quote, that “Activities under both article 51 and chapter VIII are comprehended in this treaty”? That is correct; is it not?

Ambassador Austin. They may be.

Senator Donnell. You say they are.

Ambassador Austin. My position is that the treaty is broad enough so that certain activities would come in there. Now, when they come in—I know what you are driving at. I am very familiar with what you are driving at. Let's get right down to it.
Senator DONNELL. That is just what I would like to do, and have you give me your view.

Ambassador AUSTIN. The question is, What information are you bound to give up under article 54?

Senator DONNELL. If I may just state the question I have in mind succinctly, I would like to have your answer. My statement is based on the fact that you have said first, and I quote exactly, that the treaty does create an arrangement according to the regional principle, and second that you state that activities under both article 51 and chapter VIII are comprehended in the Treaty.

Now I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, what type of activities which will be carried out under the Atlantic Treaty, and comprehended in the treaty, will have to be reported by the participants in the treaty to the Security Council, of which Russia is a permanent member? That is my question.

Ambassador AUSTIN. In the first place, take the prior object of the treaty, self-defense. It is self-defense; is it not? It is security. We aim for security and protection against armed aggression. Isn't that the No. 1 thing?

Senator DONNELL. I would assume so.

REPORTING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Ambassador AUSTIN. All right. If that is it, then what do we report? We are not in that objective of the treaty which functions under chapter VIII at all; are we? We are in article 51, and under that article, even, we have to do some reporting. And we say that under article 51 we have to report to the Security Council after this attack has commenced what we are doing about it, and I am for a very liberal interpretation about reporting, don't you see? And my theory about this is that there isn't anything in this treaty that calls for an unreasonable interpretation. There isn't anything in the North Atlantic Treaty that calls for a change-over from the practice that has been found necessary on this subject of self-defense and security. And this does not mean and the Charter does not mean that we have got to violate security by turning over to the enemy secret information. Such an interpretation would be absolutely absurd. We are governed by this theory of self-help and mutual aid.

Now, then, can this reasonably be interpreted that we turn over to the Security Council at any time, under any pretext, information that would convert and reverse this into self-injury and mutual damage? No. That would be a very unreasonable interpretation. Even the most liberal interpretation of what you ought to do as a regional group here for self-defense will not admit of that, because that would destroy the whole theory of self-defense. I would give it a very liberal interpretation, because I am under the firm conviction that this treaty, if carried out according to its spirit and letter and according to the Charter of the United Nations, will have to be operated through the United Nations. The moment that it steps out into this field, the nonsecurity field, which it might occupy as I have said here, then its functions would fall under chapter VIII, and it has to do business through the United Nations. But what it has to turn over for the information is qualified by what is reasonable.
Senator DONNELL. Now, Senator, I appreciate your answer, and I understand it to mean, and perhaps I am making it too simple, that you say that it would obviously not devolve upon the participants to the treaty to turn over to our enemy matters which are essential to our own defense under the treaty.

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is right.

Senator DONNELL. I wanted to ask you affirmatively, however, inasmuch as you say in your statement that activities under chapter VIII, which includes article 52, are comprehended in the treaty, what type of activities you think, under article 54 of the United Nations Charter, are required to be communicated to the Security Council, of which one of the permanent members is Russia?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I think no man can predict what will happen under this treaty, and I can't. I see clearly from my point of view as a representative of the United States in the United Nations, and therefore representing one of the important signatories to this treaty here, that there could arise a situation under which article 4 would come into operation and the parties would have to consult.

Senator DONNELL. Might it not arise also under article 2, in which there is a requirement of the endeavor to eliminate conflict in international economic policies?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I doubt it. I doubt it. I think that comes under another part of the Charter of the United Nations. I don't think it falls into chapter VIII. You see, I believe that this part of it, Senator Donnell, is strengthening the United Nations Charter, consciously strengthening that part of the Charter that deals with the removal of causes of war, poverty, ill health, economic warfare, ignorance, bad housing, crowded conditions, and all those things. I believe article 2 is an affirmation by this group that it is for those things affirmatively, and that the only way in the world for them to be effective in carrying out that affirmation is to do it through the United Nations.

Ambassador AUSTIN. No; oh, no. I am afraid I have not been clear.

Senator DONNELL. Would you tell us just what your view is with regard to that?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I will give you my opinion, based on my personal knowledge of the origin of 51, of its current interpretation—meaning there at San Francisco—its use, its application covering four different things, namely the inter-American system of collective security, as embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, 1945; the pact of the League of Arab States of March 22, 1945; the treaty of alliance between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of May 26, 1942; and the treaty of alliance and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and France of December 10, 1944. From all these things it is clear to my mind that the foundation of this treaty, the very essence of this movement among the 12 states here, having bridgeheads on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, is article 51, and no other article.
Senator DONNELL. Do you mind, Mr. Ambassador, if I ask you at that point, then, what is it that you mean by saying that the treaty does create an arrangement according to the regional principle, and I am quoting exactly from your statement this morning?

Ambassador AUSTIN. That means that it answers the charge that because some of these members in this group are on one side of the Atlantic and some on the other, and in different continents, therefore it is in violation of the Charter. I say that that is a fallacy of logic, and a fallacy of fact.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Ambassador, I am mindful of the time.

Ambassador AUSTIN. You go just as far as you like.

Senator DONNELL. I do not want to interfere with your arrangements or those of the committee.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I would go without my lunch to talk with you any time.

By the way, I want you to know that I have followed your argument and been very interested in it, and I know what a wonderful logician you are.

Senator DONNELL. That is very kind of you, Mr. Ambassador. I greatly appreciate the compliment, coming from you, whom I know so well.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I tell you what; I think you ought to change your position, that's all.

Senator DONNELL. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I don’t want to fall into any error of making an argument, and I shall not do so if I can prevent it.

Senator Pepper, of this Foreign Relations Committee, made a statement in the course of the debate that I would like to present to you and ask you what your opinion is of his statement.

Ambassador AUSTIN. Please don’t do that.

Senator DONNELL. Would you mind if I do that?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Oh, don’t do that. I don’t like to express an opinion about a Senator’s statement.

Senator DONNELL. May I state the point that is involved?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes; that is all right.

**INTENT BEHIND ARTICLE 51 AT SAN FRANCISCO**

Senator DONNELL. The point, as I understand it, that Senator Pepper made, and I will make it now to present to you as a point, apart from himself, was that it was never intended that article 51 should justify states in getting together and forming a military alliance, entering into a general agreement about concerted action in the common interest or against the common enemy, and to standardize the military equipment and provide for joint supply of their armed forces; that in the second place article 51, and I am speaking now of the United Nations Charter, was intended to give authority for something like a spontaneous and instantaneous resistance to an armed attack on the part of an individual state or collective states, et cetera, and the language to which I call your attention in respect to this question in the Charter is that—

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. * * *
To boil that question down a little bit, if I may, the point I am presenting to you is, Do you think there is any merit in the view that article 51 of the United Nations Charter was not intended to cover a general future arrangement or agreement, no matter what you may call it, between parties, but was designed to cover the situation solely "if an armed attack occurs"; a temporary situation as distinguished from a more or less permanent arrangement? Do I make my point clear?

Ambassador Austin. Oh, yes; that is a very fine question.

Senator Donnell. I cannot claim credit for it.

Ambassador Austin. At first I thought your question was aimed at the future element in it, but it is not. Your question, as I understand it, is aimed at the element of the permanency of the organization.

Senator Donnell. That is correct. I think we understand one another. It is aimed at the question as to whether article 51, in referring to a situation "if an armed attack occurs," since "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs," means that there is a limitation to a situation where an armed attack occurs, and then you can all get together to defend, or, on the contrary, does article 51 authorize you to make a future arrangement in contemplation of all future possible attacks?

Ambassador Austin. Now I know I understood you. Your question seems to me to be this: Does that article do this, or is there something else that does it, and my answer is that that article just says "Nothing in this Charter shall interfere with it." Don't you see?

Senator Donnell. Yes.

INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

Ambassador Austin. As I said before, article 51 doesn't grant any powers. Article 51 brushes aside anything in conflict herewith. That is what it does. It is a tremendous big thing. But the real foundation of this agreement and other like it is the inherent right of self-defense. Do you see?

Now, that exists without this treaty. It exists without this Charter. Every State has that right of self-defense, and it is seen fit to join up with a friend that is willing to join and it make them both stronger and their interests are mutual, then it can go ahead and do that, and that is what these men did. And since some of them were members of the United Nations, they had to put into it article 51. Don't you see?

Then there was an interpretation made of article 51 in another way, don't you see? The Latins, of course, who were very greatly interested in it, came along and said, "Not only does it do that; not only does it permit this organization by states on the basis of their international rights," but one of the most brilliant of these men, Lleras Camargo, said this, if you will permit me to read it.

Senator Donnell. I would like to have you do it if the committee is agreeable.
Ambassador Austin. This statement was made on May 23, 1945, in that committee meeting, committee III/4, which approved the text of article 51. This purports to be a quote from Lleras Camargo, of Colombia:

The Latin-American countries understood, as Senator Vandenberg had said, that the origin of the term "collective self-defense" is identified with the necessity of preserving regional systems like the Inter-American one. The Charter, in general terms, is a constitution, and it legitimates the right of collective self-defense to be carried out in accord with the regional pacts so long as they are not opposed to the purposes and principles of the organization as expressed in the Charter. If a group of countries with regional ties declare their solidarity for their mutual defense, as in the case of American states, they will undertake such defense jointly if and when one of them is attacked. And the right of defense is not limited to the country which is the direct victim of aggression but extends to those countries which have established solidarity, through regional arrangements, with the country directly attacked. This is the typical case of the American system.

The Act of Chapultepec provides for the collective defense of the hemisphere and establishes that if an American nation is attacked all the rest consider themselves attacked. Consequently such action as they may take to repel aggression, authorized by the article which was discussed in subcommittee yesterday, is authorized for all of them. Such action would be in accord with the Charter, by the approval of the article and a regional arrangement may take action, provided it does not have improper purposes, as, for example, joint aggression against another state.

From this, it may be deduced that the approval of this Article implies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in contravention of the Charter.

Senator Donnell. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

There is just one final point, very briefly, that, with the permission of the committee, I should like to ask the Ambassador, if he will be so kind as to likewise be patient with me if I ask him.

It relates to this: Senator Vandenberg, with his eloquence and clarity of thought, presented to you this morning the point that this treaty is not only not a military alliance but that it is the opposite of it.

Ambassador Austin. Yes.

Senator Donnell. I am not entirely able to follow the reasoning that the Senator had in that respect.

Senator Vandenberg. You mean there wasn't that much clarity?

Senator Donnell. It was because of my own density, I have no doubt, sir. But in the course of his presentation I understood him to use the words, in substance, or the expression, in substance, that these measures that had been taken by the participants in this treaty in the event of an armed attack will continue only so long as the Security Council has failed to take action, and I think I recall the word "emergency" having crept in also into the course of the statement.

INABILITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT

Now, the point to which I ask you to direct your attention, and on which I ask your opinion, is this: Assuming that there should be an attack made upon Norway by Russia, and that the parties to this pact take prompt action forthwith, as it says in article 5, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, notwithstanding, Mr. Ambassador, the provision in article 5 that those measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security, how long do you think it would be before the Security Council, which contains among its permanent members Russia, would take the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security?

Perhaps I faultily stated the question.

Ambassador Austin. No; you have a good question. I understand it. It is all right. It is a compact question.

Well, you are asking an opinion, and I am going to give you one.

Senator Donnell. I would like to have it.

Ambassador Austin. I don't know as it is worth a cent, but I think it will be forever and ever, see? I think that they will veto, of course. That is a perfectly natural thing.

Senator Donnell. That is a very frank and clear statement, and I thoroughly agree with you, and I don't think that this situation of a temporary emergency that would be dissipated by some action of the Security Council next week will be taken. I want to thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator Vandenberg. May I just intervene, inasmuch as my quotation is involved? I agree with the answer too, and I think one of the supreme virtues of this arrangement is that you can act in self-defense inside the Charter and outside the veto. That is what I like about it.

The Chairman. Well, the veto does not apply to an inherent right that exists by reason of international law and custom over and above the provisions of the Charter and above the provisions of the pending treaty. Is that true?

Ambassador Austin. That is true.

**COMPARISON OF TREATY TO MILITARY ALLIANCE**

Senator Donnell. Might I have leave, in view of the interpolation by my good friend Senator Vandenberg, to state on the point of whether or not this is the opposite of a military alliance—that I am not clear on the point that an instrument which contains within it a contract to use effective self-help and mutual aid in maintaining and developing individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, which contains within it also an agreement that an armed attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against them all, and which contains the further agreement that each of them agrees that forthwith, upon such an attack being made, each party, individually and in concert with the others, will take such action as it deems necessary, and so forth, as set forth in article 5—I just can't see where Senator Vandenberg makes the point that that is not a military alliance. I just wanted to make that statement on that, so I might not in any sense be thought to have been convinced by the very eloquent and clear and expressive statement made by Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. I would just like to add this postscript, that I suspect this question will be debated at some length on the floor of the Senate, when I personally will be quite happy and prepared to meet it.

I simply add this postscript at the moment, that in my opinion the traditional interpretation of the phrase "military alliance" carries within it an offensive rather than an essentially defensive overriding objective, and that it is a partnership for power rather than a partnership for peace—in the traditional sense, I am saying. I do not think
that any of those characteristics is involved here, and that is the great distinction that I draw.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. To answer the Senator from Missouri, the reading also of Mr. Acheson’s statement yesterday, I believe it was, when that particular question was directed to him, to distinguish between this sort of an arrangement and the traditional military alliance as practiced in former years, is recommended.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I shall certainly read that with care, and I am very happy to have the suggestion.

BALANCE OF POWER AND PREPONDERANCE OF POWER

May I just conclude by mentioning to Mr. Ambassador the fact that I have noted with interest particularly the fact that he points out in page 6 of his statement, “The ancient theory of balance of power lost its potential utility,” and then points out that the undertaking of the peoples of the United Nations, et cetera, to combine their efforts introduced formally the element of preponderance of power for peace. That is in there.

But the point I am making is that the distinguished Ambassador, for whose judgment and character I have the greatest of admiration, points out that now the traditional idea of balance of power has been superseded by the preponderance of power idea; in other words this treaty, as I understand it, is to create not merely a balance of power, but a preponderance of power.

Ambassador Austin. That is right. I meant exactly that.

Now, some people have talked with me about this, and you can imagine I have not taken that position without very great care.

Senator DONNELL. I know you haven’t. I am very sure of it.

Ambassador Austin. And I have talked with very learned men and got their views. I have had lots of help on that.

Some people interpret balance of power as the same thing as preponderance of power, but it is not. The traditional meaning of balance of power was equilibrium. The balance was kept level by means of two or more states, don’t you see, usually more. But the strange thing is that in all the history of balance of power they never did have a balance. There always was a preponderance in some state, and in my years, the years I remember, it has been the United Kingdom, because of their control of the seas.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, may I thank not only the distinguished Ambassador for his very great patience and courtesy, but also the committee for permitting me to infringe upon their patience.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope the Senator is satisfied with the action of the committee.

Senator DONNELL. I appreciate the action of the committee very much indeed, and I shall desire to avail myself, if I may, of future incursions of like character.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you. Senator Austin, for your very fine statement. We appreciate your presence.

The committee will be in recess until 2:30 o’clock, when we will reconvene to hear Secretary of Defense Johnson.

(Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee recessed until 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)
The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., upon the expiration of the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee has the pleasure of having before it today Secretary of Defense Johnson who will testify on the North Atlantic treaty and related matters.

STATEMENT OF HON. LOUIS JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Johnson. Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am appearing here today at the invitation of your committee to add the views of the National Military Establishment to what Secretary Acheson has told you about the North Atlantic Treaty.

As you know, I have been in office only about 1 month and there have been many serious problems to face. I have had an opportunity, however, to study this momentous document. I say it is momentous with feeling, because it is a long stride in the peacetime path of American history. It is a bold and important step for us all, for in it we join our great power with that of our neighbors in a common effort for safety and self-preservation—for peace before victory, and without war.

INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE DEPARTMENT

The Secretary of State has outlined to you the progress the Government is making in what he calls "waging the peace." He has demonstrated that the North Atlantic Treaty and the military assistance program are components of our progressive foreign policy. The initiative and responsibility for both have clearly and properly been with the Secretary of State. This great structure of freedom has been built through months of careful and precise work by Secretary Acheson and his foreign colleagues. He and his staff took over this heavy burden where General Marshall and Mr. Lovett left off and were aided by the cooperation of this committee. I think that all who have worked on this treaty are deserving of the highest gratitude of this country.

ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PREPAREDNESS

There has been very close cooperation on these matters between the Department of State and the Military Establishment, for all of us are seeking the greatest security for our country. In striving for this objective, however, we must carefully balance the military requirements of coping with the dangers we now face with the maintenance of a sound and prosperous American economy. At the same time we must give first priority to restoration of economic stability in Europe while assisting her to regain greater military security. All of these calculations involve risks, but our willingness to face them may well measure our ability to prevent war. We must face them squarely and courageously.

It is absolutely clear to me, as it was between 1937 and 1940 when I was last in the Military Establishment, that we must be prepared to
counter foreseeable threats. This requires preparedness not only in terms of guns, ships, and airplanes, but in terms of readily convertible resources of manpower and industry. It is equally obvious that we need friends and partners. Through this treaty we band together with many of our friends and by the military assistance program we put the means in their hands to defend themselves, thereby increasing our own security.

Ambassador Austin has explained to you the importance of this treaty to the United Nations, how it is consistent with the UN Charter and serves as a strong brace in support of the peaceful objectives of the Charter. It is and has long been my belief that we must continue earnestly and faithfully our efforts to make the United Nations succeed. What he has said confirms my belief that the ability of the western nations to work for peace through the United Nations will be strengthened.

THE TREATY—NOT A MILITARY ALLIANCE

I expect that sometime during the congressional consideration of these matters that someone will say that I have been inconsistent in my attitude toward treaties of this character. They will probably refer to a speech I made a year ago to the Daughters of the American Revolution. At that time I stated, and I quote:

Military alliances are not in the tradition of the United States.

As Secretary Acheson has carefully pointed out, this treaty is an association of nations that have come together under the Charter of the United Nations to exercise their inherent right of self-defense through a collective security arrangement authorized by the Charter of the United Nations.

This treaty, like the Rio Treaty, is thus a vital measure for self-defense. Neither of them, in my opinion, is a foreign military alliance in the customary sense, and therefore my remarks in the speech I referred to do not thus apply. These treaties are logical extensions of the time-honored Monroe Doctrine, and entirely consistent with our policy of seeking international security through the United Nations.

When I made that speech, I was referring to the Brussels Pact, the signatories of which had held their first meeting only 3 days before. At that time I considered it to be a purely western European military alliance. But, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I was then a private citizen, and properly did not have access to information regarding implementation of that pact which has since been made available to the entire world.

The North Atlantic Treaty is of much wider scope and involves a broad area in which the very preservation of the United States is at stake. It is a partnership with our friends for the common defense.

In that speech I also said, and I quote:

We cannot give to any foreign nation or group of nations the power to say when the United States should go to war.

I can assure you that I continue to believe this. It seems clear to me from a reading of article 5 that in this treaty we do not give to any foreign nation or group of nations the power to say when the United States should go to war. We obligate ourselves to take what-
ever action we deem necessary "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Now, as Secretary of Defense, I want to tell you how important this treaty is from the point of view of the Military Establishment. I understand that you have invited General Bradley to testify before your committee next week. He will give you more detailed information about the meaning of the treaty to our armed forces.

STRENGTHENING OF UNITED STATES SECURITY THROUGH TREATY

From the military viewpoint, the basic objectives of the collective defense system contemplated by the treaty are to deter war and to attain maximum military effectiveness in war, if war cannot be prevented. The North Atlantic Treaty will form a basis for improving United States security by improving the military potential of all the member nations. This potential will be improved in terms of collective action as well as individual armed strength.

I am sure that its value as a war deterrent and, in the last resort, in war itself must be obvious to you all. Nevertheless, it is our firm belief in the Military Establishment that the ratification of the treaty cannot, in itself and without further action, safely be relied upon to accomplish the objectives of the treaty. Unless its terms are vigorously implemented, its force for peace will be vitiated and, if there should be war, we should have to pay an inordinate price for our failure to implement it.

NEED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

We must keep constantly in mind the three fundamentals of preparedness—manpower, materials, and suitable positions from which to employ them in the event of attack. The treaty goes far toward making available for the common defense the manpower and strategic positions. The main lack in this great partnership will be materials—the materials required for defense. Some of the required materials may become available over the next few years as byproducts of economic recovery and we must assure uninterrupted effort toward attainment of the goals set by the Marshall plan.

If we are to strengthen the line of defense in Europe and elsewhere, we must go further and supply our friends with some of their deficiencies in arms and equipment and help them to help themselves. We have invested a great deal in rebuilding the western community and now we should join these friendly neighbors in building a bulwark against aggression.

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

There has been some talk lately of the possibility that by joining the treaty we can reduce the investment in our Military Establishment. It is confidently hoped that over the next few years we will enhance our security by joining this partnership for peace. However, I am sure it is clear to you that until the world situation clarifies we cannot afford to relax the strengthening of our military forces. We may, over the long term after the strength of our partnership is built up, be able to reduce our annual expenditures for the armed forces. How-
ever, until the danger that confronts us subsides and an efficiently operating, coordinated defense system is established under this treaty, we of America cannot afford to reduce our investment in preparedness.

In passing, I want to tell you that Mr. Forrestal planned to appear before your committee to lend his strong support to favorable action on this treaty. You will recall from his annual report that he considered greater solidarity with our neighbors in the Atlantic area and military aid to western Europe as matters of highest priority to the Military Establishment. With that thought I concur.

And there, for a moment, Mr. Chairman, may I digress to say that it is with the greatest pleasure I say to you that at Mr. Forrestal's invitation I visited him for about 35 minutes in his room at the hospital the first of this week, and I found him like his own self, in good health. The doctors expect him to leave in 2 or 3 weeks. He will take some rest; he will be a completely restored and able man. I am glad to tell you that.

BENEFITS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THE TREATY

To resume: On the assumption that the pact becomes, as intended, a force to discourage war and a basis for improving the military potential of its member nations in the event of war, I believe that we shall get, in return for joining the pact, a greatly improved prospect for the maintenance of the security of the United States and the world. We will get it, in my opinion, through an improved sense of security and stability abroad under which the moral, economic and military strength of our friends can be rebuilt.

We will feel a greater assurance that friendly governments will not fall to fifth columns. We will see a growing nucleus of defensive military force on which to base our own strategy in the event of war. Furthermore, it is to be expected that our actual strategic position will be improved, in that we shall be much better able to make effective use of our armed strength, if the necessity arises, as a result of the mutual aid we will get from our partners under article 3 of the treaty.

The Military Establishment certainly does not want war. We are striving for peace and security with honor. The North Atlantic Treaty, in our opinion, is an instrument for such peace and security. We believe, in the National Military Establishment, that ratification of the treaty is essential to the future security of the United States as well as to the peace and freedom of very important areas of the world.

THE MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I will ask you a few questions, and then turn you over to the questions of the committee.

It is contemplated, is it not, at a later date, after the ratification of the treaty, that such plans as may be in the making for military aid to Europe, will be laid before the Congress in the form of a bill or some other appropriate action?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir; and much intensive work by our most competent men is being done, so that when the hour arrives, under the State Department's leadership we shall submit the data to this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I understood from your main statement that General Bradley, as our Chief of Staff and our chief military officer, would give us a good many more details than you have been able to give us; is that correct?

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir. On those details, sir, you are entitled to the highest and best authority, the most qualified men we have. I therefore, as has been my custom, put it up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Bradley will be here at such time as you indicate.

TREATY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DO NOT LESSEN NEED FOR MAINTAINING UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH

The CHAIRMAN. I want to stress one point that you made, and that is that the ratification of this treaty and the adoption of a military plan for western Europe does not in any wise lessen the necessity for us to maintain our own military strength here in the United States.

Secretary JOHNSON. Until such time as, in the western union, or in the area of this pact, there is there constituted such military strength as can be substantially relied upon, there can be no lessening of our own burden of keeping up sufficient military strength in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I was speaking of the present. Those are desirable ends that you mention, but for the present, in our present situation, Congress is going to be faced with the problem of the size of our military budget and all those things.

The point that I want to bring out is that regardless of this treaty we still will have the obligation to the people of the United States to provide for their proper defense.

Secretary JOHNSON. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Through the Army, the Air Force, and all the other auxiliary branches. Is that not true?

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume from your statement that it is our ultimate hope that by doing what this treaty provides, and following it with military assistance to western Europe, we may decrease that necessity in the course of years, as it goes along.

Secretary JOHNSON. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chiefs of Staff, I assume, are working on this military program now, are they? Or have they finished it?

Secretary JOHNSON. They have not finished it. Among other pressing things they are working on this, and the joint staff, working under the Joint Chiefs, is giving elaborate attention to this.

COMPARISON OF TREATY TO OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to your speech where you quoted on the subject of military alliance, is there not a wide divergence from this treaty and what was traditionally known as military alliances?

Secretary JOHNSON. In the first draft that I intended to give you, the reference to my speech was left out—the speech is very vivid in my mind—so that it might not later be misconstrued. It seemed to me advisable not to explain it away but just to say what was in the
speech and what it meant, and that it is not inconsistent with what I am saying here today.

The Chairman. My conception of the military alliances in the traditional history of the United States and other countries is an alliance not limited to self-defense. It is an alliance not along that line at all, but those alliances of which we speak were joint alliances, both for defensive and aggressive action.

If one of the parties should in any event go to war, then the others were forced to go to war; is that not true?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. That is what I was then talking about, as distinguished from what we have here today, which I now support.

The Chairman. To my mind and memory, the World War I was a classic illustration of that. They had the Triple Entente, and on the other side they had another group, the Central Powers, and when the Central Powers declared war, or went into war, they demanded that Italy should join them because Italy was a party to their military alliance. But Italy did not join them. She did not agree to go along. That is a classic example of where they, when they declared war, expected Italy to join them, not because Italy was in danger, not because she was attacked, but because they were in a state of war and Italy was a member of the alliance—it was thought she should automatically come into the war.

Secretary Johnson. Thank you, sir, for the additional explanation, which shows that what I said then is not in conflict with what I said today.

The Chairman. Not at all. As a matter of fact, this treaty is not a general military alliance in any sense. It is limited to defense against armed attack.

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. It is the very opposite of the military alliance.

Senator Tydings. Defensive entirely.

The Chairman. Defensive entirely. It is an alliance of peace, if you want to call it an alliance.

Secretary Johnson. I like your language.

The Chairman. It is an alliance against armed attack, it is an alliance against war, and does not partake of the essentials of the primary obligations of a military alliance as we know military alliances at all; is that true?

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

benefits to the united states from the treaty

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Chairman, I think I will defer to the other members of the committee who are more competent to discuss this particular phase of the matter. I want only to call the Secretary's attention to a sentence on page 5 of his statement, in which he says, with my complete concurrence:

I believe that we shall get, in return for joining the pact, a greatly improved prospect for the maintenance of the security of the United States and the world.
If I correctly judge the temper of the Secretary's able statement he would not object to the addition of one more phrase to that sentence, so it will read as follows:

I believe that we shall get, in return for joining the pact, a greatly improved prospect for the maintenance of the security of the United States and the world, without the necessity of actually using this armed force.

Secretary Johnson. I agree to that, sir. That is implied. You put it expressly, and I thank you for it.

Senator Vandenberg. I pass.

The Chairman. Senator Tydings, chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate.

Senator Tydings. I would like to say at this time that my army, navy and air force, consisting of the Republican and Democratic members of the Armed Services Committee, feel that they are being bypassed when the security of the United States, with which they are particularly charged, is being considered by the Foreign Relations Committee exclusively. I would like the record to show that, because they have served notice on me in no uncertain terms that I am lying down on the job.

Senator McMahon. A protest will be filed.

COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO SELF-DEFENSE

Senator Tydings. We would like to first have you look at page 1, Secretary Johnson. You say if "we join our great power with that of our neighbors in a common effort for safety and self-preservation"—that is what this North Atlantic Security Pact will actually do, will it not?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. So that we are no longer going to proceed on the concept that we are planning for our defense without regard to other nations. Heretofore I take it that we have planned for our defense without regard to any alliance or agreement in writing, or any formal statement or program that connected our defense with that of any other nation.

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir.

Senator Tydings. So this will be somewhat of a departure.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. We will no longer rely entirely upon ourselves in certain categories, but we have given our word and other nations have given their words to us, that it will be a joint effort to keep the peace of the world, and for the mutual defense, including our own, of the parties that are signatory to the pact.

Secretary Johnson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Tydings. This has been called, over and over again, an agreement for defense, is that not correct?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. Now, on page 2, you used this language:

In striving for this objective, however, we must carefully balance the military requirements of coping with the dangers we now face with the maintenance of a sound and prosperous American economy.

I take it, too, from what your statement expressly sets forth, we have to likewise balance our own military requirements and our military actions with the military requirements and military actions of the
other nations that are parties to the North Atlantic Security Pact.

Secretary Johnson. If approved by Congress, that will be done.

Senator Tydings. But that would be the concept in the approach?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

INDUSTRIAL POTENTIALS AND PREPAREDNESS

Senator Tydings. Later on, on the same page, you say:

This requires preparedness not only in terms of guns, ships, and airplanes, but in terms of readily convertible resources of manpower and industry.

Would you give me a little more of an explanation of what you conveyed by that thought?

Secretary Johnson. I mean to convey that if this is authorized, that it is not alone the number of guns, ships, and airplanes, but particularly as to industry. The maintenance of what they want to do in their country will vary in the different countries according to the industrial resources and ability of that particular country; and that factors such as that will be taken into consideration in working out our assistance when authorized by Congress.

STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator Tydings. At the top of page 3, starting at the bottom of page 2, you say:

Through this treaty we band together with many of our friends and by the military assistance program we put the means in their hands to defend themselves, thereby increasing our own security.

So that the purpose of this program is basically to increase our own security first, and to do that we find it necessary to increase the security of those who are associated with us.

Secretary Johnson. Beautifully expressed.

Senator Tydings. Do you agree?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. But the core of it is our own national security?

Secretary Johnson. All the way through.

Senator Tydings. And our thoughts and our motivation, as from the hub of a wheel, all radiate from that point in encompassing the whole North Atlantic Security Pact picture.

Secretary Johnson. If we did not believe that in the National Military Establishment we would not be supporting this to the limit of our ability today.

Senator Tydings. The point that I want to get at, and you have answered it specifically, but I would like it repeated for the sake of emphasis: The core of this whole program is the security of the United States of America, from where we sit.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Tydings. Of course, you have said here that when General Bradley comes before us representing the professional side of the Military Establishment—that is, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force—he will give us more details about this program.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Tydings. I assume that when General Bradley comes, either in executive session or in open session, that he will give us the benefit of what other countries propose to do in concert, and what we propose to do in concert in the event of certain happenings, for our own security and for the security of all the other nations involved.

Secretary Johnson. Subject to not having before him the exact language of what you may or may not do in your authorization, he will give you, to the best of his ability, the beliefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But, Senator, if you want him to go as far as you have now said, may I suggest you think about it most carefully. It should not be on the record, and it should be in executive session.

Senator McMahoney. What difference does that make?

Secretary Johnson. Insofar as it would be a disclosure to other people of what is proposed to be the set-up in the several countries, we would not have served ourselves well to have let it be cabled abroad.

Senator Tydings. I am going to assume—and I am not going to even ask you the question, but so that I can proceed from now on—if this pact is adopted, and if the arms implementation part of it is carried out, that the arms implementation part of it will only be carried out as a part of what might be called an over-all master plan primarily and exclusively devoted to the defense of the North Atlantic area and the keeping of the peace of the world.

Secretary Johnson. That is correct, sir.

Senator Tydings. So not going into the details of that, quite obviously if there is a plan it has only one purpose, and that is defense, and not aggression.

Secretary Johnson. That is right.

Senator Tydings. And if it is for that purpose it ought not to be put on the record to advise those who are evil-minded of what we intend to do to protect democracy and ourselves from future aggression.

IMPROVING UNITED STATES SECURITY AND MILITARY POTENTIAL

You say on the same page:

The North Atlantic Treaty will form a basis for improving United States security by improving the military potential of all member nations.

That is a repetition of the thought I expressed a while ago, to wit, that the core of this is the defense of the United States of America, and by improving the military potential of those friendly nations that are associated with us in this endeavor we increase the security of ourselves.

Secretary Johnson. I agree with you, sir.

Senator Tydings. The potential will be improved, you say, "in terms of collective action as well as individual armed strength." That answers the question I hypothetically put a while ago.

Secretary Johnson. I think it does, sir.
DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

Senator Tydings (reading):

I am sure that its value—
you say—
as a war deterrent, and in the last resort in war itself, must be obvious to all.

It is quite plain from that statement that you are using this machinery first in a tremendous effort to prevent war by making the peaceful, nonaggressive, democratic, liberty-loving countries so strong that no nation or group of nations will feel they can successfully attack that sort of a compact group.

Secretary Johnson. That is right.

Senator Tydings. But that if war comes, and you have to prove that you are stronger than the others, the very fact that you are combined together will in time prove that you were right in assuming these nations would be foolish if they would attack us.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

BENEFITS FROM COLLECTIVE ACTION

Senator Tydings. I think this sentence, too, bears to that end. You say:

Unless its terms are vigorously implemented, its force for peace will be vitiated and, if there should be war, we should have to pay an inordinate price for our failure to implement it.

We all comprehend that. Would you care to enlarge on it?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir. But I stand upon that as a fundamental, one of the fundamental bases underlying this whole program.

Senator Tydings. In other words, we will be weaker being selfish and thinking only of ourselves, without regard to the other friendly nations that are like minded, than we will be if we muster all our strength in one common pool and exert it for the defense of all.

Secretary Johnson. Quite right, Senator Tydings. We cannot leave the world alone any more. The world is not going to leave us alone. And in the known problems we face, knowing that some part of the world might not leave us alone, we ought to have friends where we may, and to the extent within our own economy that we can, they ought to be substantial friends.

We hope, through this program, that those who are our friends may be substantial friends.

Senator Tydings. What I am reemphasizing all the time is the defensive character of your testimony here before this committee.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE TREATY

You say on page 4:

We must keep constantly in mind the three fundamentals of preparedness: manpower, materials, and suitable positions from which to employ them in the event of attack.

Obviously it must be your opinion that if we have this alliance we will have more manpower than we would have without it to resist aggression.
Secretary Johnson. Senator, my approach to this whole statement is that a strong America is the one hope of a peaceful world. I realize in the business to which I now am assigned that a strong America is an expensive thing. I want to strengthen others who think as we do, and who are not aggressors, so that those others may join with us, and that while we help them a little bit now, without reducing the sufficiency of our own Military Establishment, we want to enable them to build up, in their own national interests, their own military establishment and that this will enable me to come back to the Congress 3 or 4 years from now and say:

We can now reduce the Military Establishment of the United States with safety, because their effective strength has been added to ours.

That is what I mean by these references to economy.

Senator Tydings. When you name manpower, materials, and suitable positions, what you really say is to put together such a preponderance of industrial plant, economic potential, financial stability, inventive genius, military equipment, military experience and imagination, and know-how, to such an extent that if there is any reason left it is almost certain to keep the peace.

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir. The whole purport of this is defensive—defensive toward retarding those who would cause trouble—and to make peace in the world. To that end the language in this statement, after it was prepared, was turned over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sir. A few words were changed so there would be no confusion later in the military approach to this picture, and the statement as given to you—except the insert that I made about my own speech, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EFFECT ON OUR SECURITY

Senator Tydings. To those of us who are going to vote on this committee, in our Government, in accepting it or rejecting it, or in the military in approving it or opposing it, there is the choice of whether we will be more secure without it, standing on our own feet, and acting alone, or whether we will be more secure with all that we have plus all the other might of one kind or another which other countries like-minded with us could contribute to the common purpose.

Secretary Johnson. That is a fair statement.

Senator Tydings. So that we must make a choice either to stand alone or to stand with more than ourselves for the same objective.

Secretary Johnson. hoping to build them more to the point that we can reduce our own.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

Senator Tydings. And always with the clear understanding that there is not one line of aggression in this whole transaction that anyone can honestly point to.

Secretary Johnson. No; and in no statement that comes out from my knowledge from the Military Establishment will there be anything that looks like aggression. It is all going to be defensive, and peace through strength.
Senator Tydings. In the first place, there is no one strong enough to aggress the possible aggressors, possibly alone, except ourselves. Goodness knows we cannot do it without a declaration of war. We are pretty safe from any implication of aggression in the very nature of things.

On that same page you say, too:

We must go further and supply our friends with some of their deficiencies in arms and equipment and help them to help themselves.

That further bears out the concept that the stronger we make our friends, the stronger we make ourselves.

Secretary Johnson. That is quite right, sir.

ENHANCEMENT OF OUR SECURITY

Senator Tydings. On that same page you again say—and you are speaking for the Military Establishment—

We will enhance our security by joining this partnership of peace.

By “our security” you mean in effect, I take it, that we will have the best prospect of peace by joining this compact?

Secretary Johnson. In my opinion, and since this is a statement that I had submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sir, than whom I have no better source.

Senator Tydings. In other words, the military motivation for support of this pact is predicated entirely on the fact that it is the best opportunity to prevent hostilities.

Secretary Johnson. The best offered us; yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. It is the last best hope of mankind that we can evolve at this time for the preservation of peace in this country and peace in Europe, and perhaps in the world.

Secretary Johnson. I agree with that general statement. But if something should happen to this, I am still going to be fighting for something else.

Senator Tydings. That is right. But this is the best thing that we have been able to devise to keep the peace.

Secretary Johnson. That is correct.

NO RELAXATION IN STRENGTHENING OUR OWN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Senator Tydings. You furthermore say:

We cannot afford to relax the strengthening of our military forces.

With that I agree. We are dealing primarily in that statement with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and our own country. Now let us be candid about it, to the extent that we take our good weapons, whether they be bombing planes or artillery or tanks or battleships, or whatever they may be, and transfer them to other countries, we do weaken our own military potential if we were standing alone.

Secretary Johnson. That is true, Senator Tydings.

Senator Tydings. I am not talking about the compensation for the moment. I am just asking if we do not weaken ourselves in the event we were standing alone.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. But what—

Senator Tydings. Go ahead.
Secretary Johnson. That is almost a question like, "Have you stopped beating your wife?"

Senator Tydings. No; it is not.

Secretary Johnson. The things that we shall furnish them are largely those that are in reserves or surplus. But before answering your question, I must say that in the doing of this I shall be governed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we are not going to do anything that weakens the immediate sufficiency of our own defense.

Senator Tydings. Let us take a concrete case.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND THE STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

If you take a hundred B-29's, or B-17's, or whatever you want to take, good, healthy bombers that might be in storage, and distribute them to some countries of Europe, have you not weakened your own military potential to the extent of 100 bombers that you might need if you got into a war?

Secretary Johnson. Your military potential? Yes, sir. But we are not going to give them equipment, unless we have left what the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to say is sufficient unto the needs of the hour.

Senator Tydings. I agree with that, but just the same, if you had that 100, plus what the Joint Chiefs of Staff say is the irreducible minimum, you would be that much better off, would you not?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. That is my point. So you do, to that extent, weaken your own ability to resist.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. Now, the compensation is——

Secretary Johnson. Yes; that is what we want to come to. You state it.

Senator Tydings. I want to take it through its evolutions. The compensation is that whatever you have lost here, by taking things which, in many cases you probably would not need or use anyhow and giving them to people where they are immediately available in the event of hostilities, you have increased your security more than if you had kept them in your own arsenal.

Secretary Johnson. That is true, Senator Tydings, when you reach the point—and they are developing their own strengths over there—that it is of substance and can contribute to the common defense.

Senator Tydings. That is right. I am assuming that their economic recovery, as well as their military recovery, continues.

Secretary Johnson. On that assumption you are right.

Senator Tydings. My point is that whatever you lose of potentials in this country by the transfer of military equipment to the other countries, you should be more than compensated for by the effect of that material where it can be employed to the greatest advantage.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir; that is the theory.

Senator Tydings. In other words, to take an imaginary case, if we were to transfer a thousand tanks to Europe, and if there were an aggression on one of the countries of the Atlantic pact, and these thousand tanks were on the spot where they could be immediately used, it would have more effect than if we had those thousand tanks down at Fort Knox, Ky.; is that right?
Secretary Johnson. That is right.
Senator Tydings. While that is a crude illustration, you can multiply it and see how, with other categories, it would make a tremendous difference and give us plenty of time.

You also say, on page 4:

MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS AND THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

However, until the danger that confronts us subsides and an efficiently operating, coordinated defense system is established under this treaty, we of America cannot afford to reduce our investment in preparedness.

What do you mean by "our investment"?

Secretary Johnson. I mean what you of the Hill—as we call it in the Pentagon—give us annually to keep up the Military Establishment.

Senator Tydings. Even, to be perfectly honest about it, even after we have this pact in being, and after the other countries have made a substantial recovery, and we have allocated tasks, somewhat, let us say, to carry out the general purposes of keeping ourselves strong, we still want to have an adequate investment in this country for defense, do we not, just in case something should not turn out quite as we hoped and believed that it was going to turn out.

Secretary Johnson. I would believe that the over-all minimum requirements for our own safety would be reduced by the strength that we would have through these friends who were themselves fortified.

Senator Tydings. That is right. But your statement likewise implies the converse, that we cannot go below a certain point with safety.

Secretary Johnson. That is right.

Senator Tydings. Notwithstanding the help we are sending abroad.

Secretary Johnson. America must always be able to be strong enough that no aggressor is going to dare attack us.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY AND UNITED STATES SECURITY

Senator Tydings. Speaking of Secretary Forrestal's testimony and your own, and speaking of the annual reports of the National Military Establishment, you say:

You will recall from his—

that is, Mr. Forrestal's—

annual report that he considered greater solidarity with our neighbors in the Atlantic area and military aid to western Europe as matters of the highest priority to the Military Establishment.

That again emphasizes that this pact is again, at base, nothing more or less in its motivation, from where we sit, than a defensive mechanism that we have employed for our own and the world's security.

Secretary Johnson. I think it does, sir, and that was Mr. Forrestal's approach, if you take the written word.

Senator Tydings. That is right. There are other repetitions of this main idea. I am not reading them all; I do not want to read them all; I do not believe it is necessary.

Finally you say, on page 5:

We will see a growing nucleus of defensive military force on which to base our own strategy in the event of war.

That again emphasizes it.
Again you say:

Furthermore, it is to be expected that our actual strategic position will be improved, in that we shall be much better able to make effective use of our armed strength, if the necessity arises as a result of the “mutual aid” we will get from our partners under article 8 of the treaty.

Again, the whole core of this thing is the security and the defense of the United States, with the decision made that we have more security, more prospect of world peace, in this pact than we have without it.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. And that is the opinion of the highest military level in our Military Establishment.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir; and General Bradley will be here prepared to support that position.

COST OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Tydings. In the transfer—coming down to the weapons themselves—in the transfer of the supplies and weapons from our own arsenal, so to speak—those we now have, in storehouses—to the countries in Europe, do you know whether or not it is planned, in keeping the books, to charge them off at their cost value or at a percentage of their cost value?

Secretary Johnson. They will come from several categories. Some of it will be new procurement. That will be cost.

Senator Tydings. I am not talking about—

Secretary Johnson. Some of it will be from reserves. Some will be from the third category, surplus.

ORIGINAL COST AND REHABILITATION COST OF SURPLUS ITEMS

Senator Tydings. Those that you have in reserve or in surplus, what percentage of the original cost will be entered in making up this figure of $1,100,000,000-odd?

Secretary Johnson. I think we can answer that generally.

Senator Tydings. If you can answer me specifically, I would appreciate that.

Secretary Johnson. For the items that are in the category of surplus we should, out of your appropriations in the National Military Establishment, be reimbursed the cost of rehabilitating that surplus material only.

Senator Tydings. That will be about 15 percent, will it not?

Secretary Johnson. It will vary.

Senator Tydings. I saw a figure this morning that I think said it would cost about 15 percent to rehabilitate.

Secretary Johnson. You may have gotten that from one of our generals as an over-all approach as to what it might average out. We will be able to give you a little more specific data. About 10 or 15 percent.

Then, on the items that are reserve items, those are the ones that we have to replace. Those will give you an exact definition. I think it will be at replacement cost, sir.
Senator TYDINGS. Here is what I would like to know: Let us take bombing planes that we might have in storage. They have been used, but they are in good condition; they are usable; they may need some minor repairs. When we take those bombing planes and send them abroad as a part of the arms implementation plan of the North Atlantic Security Pact, how much of it are we going to charge to these countries? Are we going to say that they are worth 10 percent of what they cost or 50 percent? How do we arrive at this figure of $1,100,000?

Secretary JOHNSON. I think we are going to have to give you, eventually, a break-down to arrive at that, Senator. I am afraid if you try to take an isolated instance that it will require a detailed description.

Senator TYDINGS. I would like to say this, because obviously this is not a fair question: There is nobody who can testify and give offhand answers to that.

Secretary JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator TYDINGS. And I do not think it is fair for me to press you on that. But I would say this: I would like to have—and I know the committee would like to have, as soon as you can give it to us, either tentatively or in final form—the number of weapons by categories that are to be transferred in toto; the original cost of those weapons; the date they were purchased; whether they have been used in whole or in part or not; and what the charge will be to the countries to which they are to go—I mean the bookkeeping charge—what percentage of the cost, at the time of delivery, will be charged against country X.

Secretary JOHNSON. We will work that out for you, Senator.

Senator TYDINGS. So that I will have the original cost of the article and the final assumed present cost of the article at the time of transfer.

Secretary JOHNSON. Its classification by us and its condition.

(The committee has been informed that the Department of State is preparing this information for submission in connection with the proposed military assistance legislation.)

Senator TYDINGS. I would likewise like to know whether these articles are surplus and whether they are from our reserve, and what it is proposed to do, by way of replenishing the reserve. For example, you may take a certain weapon—without naming it—and get a certain amount of credit for it. But I would assume you would not replace the money credit that you got for that arm by the same article. You might want to get an improved article.

I am not going into too much detail on that.

Secretary JOHNSON. We aren't going to give them any junk equipment, sir. We are going to give them the best. But do not press the other question.

Senator TYDINGS. I would like to say that I do not think you should be bound—and I hope you will give me an answer that you will not be bound—to use the money to purchase the identical equipment as that you have sent abroad wherever you have tapped your reserves.

Secretary JOHNSON. No, sir.

Senator TYDINGS. You might be able to buy a later model, if you can get a later model.
Secretary Johnson. You have given me a thought. We do not want to come back to you to get another appropriation and add it on to the armed forces appropriation.

Senator Tydings. We will give you authority so as not to catch you outside the door.

Secretary Johnson. I like your method of bookkeeping, sir, and we will give you that.

Senator Tydings. I think we have got to have that. In other words, it has been said here that this program for the security of the North Atlantic countries is going to cost about $1,100,000,000 in round numbers.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. And it is likewise said that so much of it would be in cash, so to speak, to buy new equipment with, and so much of it will be used for old equipment, the equivalent value for old equipment. What I want to know is what part of it is going to be used to buy entirely new equipment that has to be made, and how much you are going to charge for the old equipment as a bookkeeping transaction that you are going to turn over to them.

Secretary Johnson. We will bring you that.

Senator Tydings. And what part of that is surplus, and what part of it is reserve.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir; we will bring you that. It is quite an order.

Senator Tydings. I think we ought to have it.

Secretary Johnson. I do, too, and we will get it for you.

[The committee has been informed that the Department of State is preparing this information for submission in connection with the proposed military-assistance legislation.]

Senator Tydings. I have some other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I would rather ask them in executive session. I do not think I can go any further.

Increasing the Security of the United States

The Chairman. Very well. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a very brief question, and then turn you over to Senator Smith. Senator Tydings referred to the main purpose of this treaty being the preservation of the United States and its safety and security, and so forth and so on.

Is it not true, though, that any attack, any war on a free government, any unprovoked attack, either on its territory or on its people, is, in a sense, a weakening of the security of the United States itself?

If any aggressor, if any military aggressor is allowed to pick off one at a time, smaller and weaker nations, does not that increase the danger to our security and the danger to the security of every other nation which expects and desires to maintain its integrity and its independence?

Secretary Johnson. You are quite right, Mr. Chairman, and history has many instances. The oldest and most classic, I guess, is when, despite the pleading in the market place to take care of themselves, Athens sat by while Philip of Macedonia picked them off one by one until nobody was left in the city itself, and then it perished.
AGGRESSION ANYWHERE AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES SECURITY

The Chairman. Were we not provoked in World War I by that very thing, that the aggressors in World War I threatened the security of the United States ultimately, and did we not enter that struggle to preserve our freedom from aggression and from invasion of our territory?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. That is right.

The Chairman. Is it not true that in World War II, while we were attacked unjustifiably by Japan, that our measures for aid prior to our declaration of war were motivated by the fact that here was an aggressor attacking Poland, attacking Norway, overrunning Czechoslovakia, and doing all of those things that we considered an attack on democracy and freedom everywhere? Speeches in Congress, prior to the outbreak of our part of the war, illustrate the danger that we felt in case of victory by the aggressors in Europe, that they would ultimately invade or attack the nations of western Europe.

Secretary Johnson. The action of the Congress and of the executive department both support the statement that you now make.

The Chairman. So that one of the important things about this treaty is that we do not propose to let aggressors feel that they have any security in a similar course of conduct in the future, and that if they make an unprovoked armed attack upon a weaker nation, that they may expect the resistance, the armed resistance, if necessary, of all of the nations that are signatories to this pact.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Smith?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, there are one or two questions that have been brought to my attention frequently in discussions of this matter. The first one in a sense has already been brought out in the questions Senator Tydings has asked you.

EFFECT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ON MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS

That question simply stated is this: It is probably conceded by entering into this North Atlantic Treaty that our security position is improved.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Taking the over-all picture?

Secretary Johnson. We think it will be.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And it will probably have an over-all strategic program to take care of the eventuality of an attack?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. That being true, people very naturally ask the question, If our estimates of cost for our military establishment were made prior to this treaty being entered into, why should it not be possible now, within the over-all coverage of those figures, to take care of this need of implementing the European set-up because of that additional security that we have got?

I think you answered it in a way already, but I want to get that clear again.

Secretary Johnson. My first job as Secretary of Defense is to see that these United States are ready at 4 o'clock in the morning if somebody wants to be an aggressor as far as we are concerned.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Whether or not we have aid abroad?
SECRETARY JOHNSON. Your appropriating money, or doing things under this treaty, is a matter that we hope in time will build strength abroad that will be helpful to us, so that when the Joint Chiefs are gauging our readiness at 4 o'clock in the morning they can take that into calculation.

I say to you that for the next 2 or 3 years after you do this there still can be no diminution in our own military strength here because, until that is organized and built up abroad, to which you now contribute, we still must make the gage our own interest here. Is that answering what you have in mind?

Senator Smith of New Jersey. That gives us your position on the matter very clearly. Whether it satisfies those who feel there might be some area in which we might be able to take care of this may be another question. I realize we have that in the field of controversy, perhaps.

CONTRIBUTION OF COSIGNATORIES

Are we satisfied—if you do not want to answer this now we will save it for the executive session—that the other members of this pact are going to be able to help themselves in this joint effort or is it going to be looked upon as something in which we are practically doing the whole thing?

Are they going to be able to make a real substantial contribution?

SECRETARY JOHNSON. Some of them; yes. And our allocation of arms and other assistance that goes under this program, if authorized by you, will be that which fits into their shortages and contributes to their building up those things that will make them strong in the way we see it.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And we are contemplating now building up their present program for their military set-up, or their divisions, or what not, without going into the longer range of implementing those in years to come and making them even stronger and stronger?

SECRETARY JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. You are not at the present moment looking ahead to any increase say in 1950, 1951, or 1952, although we do admit that what we are doing today probably would not be adequate, if there should be an attack, to defend those countries. One of the opinions that people have about this is that this is a billion-dollar cost this year, but in the years to come it may go up to 5 billion dollars, 10 billion dollars, or what have you.

SECRETARY JOHNSON. With cooperation on their part, that amount should not grow. They should begin to come down, and even our appropriations at home should come down—our appropriation at home for our own military establishment—as their organized strength goes up.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. But their organized strength conceivably might need more help from us.

SECRETARY JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I assume that is a possibility. We ought to face that.
Secretary Johnson. I do face that, and therefore say that 2 or 3 years, or 4 years from now.

**ALLOCATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE**

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Another question that has been asked me is the question of how the over-all plan for dividing this military aid is set up. Is that going to be a joint staff that determines that, that country X needs this—I am not asking you for divisions now—that country Y needs that, and so forth?

Secretary Johnson. That is right.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And it will be allocated accordingly under a joint set-up?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir; that is right.

**REVIVAL OF ARMS INDUSTRY**

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Another question asked me is this one: Is it contemplated that arms industries will be revived in Europe, and have we any fear—if that should be a result of this program—to the extent it might be a danger to the future peace of the world?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. There will be some manufacturing of arms, of course?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. But their own economy will be the limitation thereon.

**PRIORITY OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY**

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And that economy of theirs is one that we are deeply interested in because we do give priority, do you agree with this, to the ECA program?

Secretary Johnson. That is right.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. The economic recovery is the basic thing we are relying on for the rehabilitation of those countries for the preservation of peace.

Secretary Johnson. And this will further the ECA program in that it will give confidence to the people who must build the new factories, new stores, establish the new businesses, we hope.

**FINANCING THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OUT OF THE MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS**

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I will say, in the questions I have asked you, the first one is the one that troubles more people that come to me, because they get this argument. The figure of $15,000,000,000-plus, is an enormous figure. The details of that cannot be known to the ordinary person, the so-called layman. People feel within that over-all global figure, possibly some savings here, there, or the other place, might conceivably take care of this much smaller program that we are contemplating for the European aid.

Do you think that can be done? That there cannot be squeezings and reallocations and dealing with that in a way to give this implementation to the European countries without calling on our taxpayers to put up some more money?
Secretary Johnson. I think not, sir.
Senator Smith of New Jersey. That is all.

LIMITATION ON ARMING OUR ALLIES

Senator McMahon. Mr. Secretary, on the top of page 3, beginning at the bottom sentence of page 2, you say:

Through this treaty we band together with many of our friends and by the military assistance program we put the means in their hands to defend themselves, thereby increasing our own security.

I do not suppose that you intend us to conclude that by saying that that we anticipate putting all of the means into the hands of—

Secretary Johnson. No, Senator McMahon; not at all. Where there are shortages we can contribute to build their over-all power. We are going to try to do that intelligently on the Chiefs of Staff level.

Senator McMahon. And any deduction that they furnish the men and we are going to furnish the war material would not be in accordance with the facts?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Secretary, this pact follows pretty well the form of the Rio Pact, as I understand it.

Secretary Johnson. I believe that is right.

NEED FOR IMPLEMENTING TREATY BUT NOT RIO PACT

Senator McMahon. With that in mind I wish to refer to the language on page 3, in which you say, speaking about this pact:

I am sure that its value as a war deterrent and, in the last resort, in war itself, must be obvious to you all. Nevertheless, it is our firm belief in the Military Establishment that the ratification of the treaty cannot, in itself and without further action, safely be relied upon to accomplish the objectives of the treaty.

Now, in the Rio Pact we do just that. There has been no military implementation of that pact. That was the more or less natural development of the Monroe Doctrine. We have said in the pact, that if anybody attacked any signatory member that we would go to their defense.

How do you differentiate between the two defensive pacts?

Secretary Johnson. They are very different situations. There are, of their own kind, economies in operation in the governments in the Rio Pact. We are dealing here with people without equipment, without houses, without plants, without food. We are trying to build back some sort of economy for them, and they are faced, on their border, with an organized possible aggression.

No such menace confronts so closely the people in the Rio Pact.

Senator McMahon. So you differentiate on the basis of the geography of the situation in good part.

Secretary Johnson. Location and economic condition.

Senator McMahon. The closeness of the possible aggressor?

Secretary Johnson. The location and condition of the country.

Senator McMahon. Perhaps this question might be better put to you or to your representatives, those representing the security establishment, when we consider specifically the implementation of the treaty. Yet it might be well to have it in the record at this point.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Do you consider that the aid that we contemplate giving, as represented by an expenditure of $1,100,000,000, is going to be much more than a psychological lift for the people of western Europe?

Secretary Johnson. I think it might be justified in a great many people's minds as a psychological lift. To me it is not. It is beginning to make those people keep the frontier against possible aggression over there, instead of it being here on the Atlantic seaboard.

Senator McMahon. While I am definitely committed to the pact, and shall support it with whatever resource at my command, I am in no way committed to the implementation of it through military aid. I will say, however, that the only argument that today has made very much sense to me is the morale factor. That $1,100,000,000 of aid is the kind of aid that scarcely impresses me a bit. However, that is something that we will go into more definitely when we do discuss the details of that proposition.

Thank you very much.

Senator Tydings. (presiding). The next Senator: Senator Hickenlooper?

ADEQUACY OF MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, you have answered a great many questions that are of interest to me, and those that you have not answered I think you have agreed to furnish the information later on in a break-down of the material. I am interested in getting your view from the military point of view, as to whether or not you believe the $15,000,000,000 plus recommended for appropriation to the National Military Establishment for our own defenses is adequate?

Secretary Johnson. You have opened up an entirely new field, and I am probably going to get into dutch with the Armed Services Committee. I hope Senator Tydings will not leave—

Senator Tydings. No; I will not.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, let me assure you that I do not want to press you on any matters that you believe are secret for the interests of the defense of the United States. That is not what I am getting at.

Secretary Johnson. Not at all. My first endeavor is, first, peace. My second is to get the Military Establishment streamlined and efficient, to cut out the duplication, to bring down the costs and get it more nearly within the economy, so it is less a burden to the American people.

We have been giving a lot of attention to that, day and night. I do not want to be committed to the $15,000,000,000 figure.

Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask you another question, then?

Secretary Johnson. I find that there are authorizations for expenditures for guided missiles, for planes and submarines, that are not going to cost very much between now and July 1. A few million or a few thousand, maybe. But the project which is authorized, and upon which we are embarking in the next year and the year following and the year after, runs into tremendous sums. Therefore I cannot answer your question that I am satisfied with the $15,000,000,000.
Despite the savings we can make—and they will be great—there are these other things to which we are already committed and contracts entered into and authorizations, to run into great items of money. That is why we are fighting so hard on the things that are non-essential and do not meet with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being within that formula.

**EFFECT OF NONVERIFICATION ON DEFENSE EXPENDITURES**

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me put it another way. If the implementation of the Atlantic Pact should be turned down in toto, and no appropriation for implementing the military forces abroad were provided for, would you then ask for another $1,300,000,000 or $1,400,000,000 on top of the $15,000,000,000 that we have now authorized for the internal defense of this country?

Secretary JOHNSON. I would, sir, if after a thorough study, consideration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that conclusion were arrived at.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Budget Bureau, quite thoroughly canvassed the minimum necessities for national defense in arriving at the figures of fifteen billion some million dollars.

Secretary JOHNSON. That is right, sir. But you were talking about my reducing it in the future, and I did not want an answer here saying, yes, we might reduce it in the future some amount when there are these commitments that I had to get in the record so there will be no confusion later.

**MINIMUM AMOUNT NECESSARY FOR UNITED STATES SECURITY**

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not like to prolong this questioning. Of course, the thing that I am concerned with is were we wrong when we said that $15,000,000,000 was the minimum that we could get along with, with safety and security, for the United States, under the circumstances? Were we wrong then or are we wrong now when we say we may need another billion, three hundred million dollars for foreign contributions to increase our safety and security?

Secretary JOHNSON. No, sir; I see your thinking.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am wondering can we reduce our $15,000,000,000 internally.

Secretary JOHNSON. No; you cannot reduce the $15,000,000,000, in my opinion, until you have strengthened that abroad, until it is organized and capable of contributing substantially to this picture.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But before the Atlantic Pact came up for implementation we considered that $15,000,000,000, that is roughly that, was what we should spend to secure our own military forces against potential—

Secretary JOHNSON. We have not changed that; we do not change it, but we think the spending of whatever amount you authorize in this field for which we come here today, is that which will enable us in the long run to cut down our own expenditures here by having a line over there instead of the line at the Atlantic seaboard.
NECESSITY FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By the same token, is it necessary for us to go into Japan or Australia and appropriate another billion dollars or two to secure our peace from that part of the world?

In other words, we are now securing it in Europe. Is it going to be necessary for us to secure it in Asia and other places in the world? I am merely trying to get a limitation.

Secretary JOHNSON. Senator, I hope you will ask that of the State Department. I just do not want to be asked about this Chinese picture and Japan, and so forth. That is not my field. I am not prepared to testify on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about the security element.

Secretary JOHNSON. Nobody suggested to me that we ask for money in these other fields. If there is any discussion of any like arrangements in other parts of the world we have not heard of them. I have not heard of them in the Military Establishment at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am trying to get a little better understanding of the philosophy of these defense expenditures, on the theory that there ought to be a considered minimum which is reasonable for our national security needs, in keeping with the present economic situation which faces us, and just where that limitation is.

POSSIBLE FUTURE REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Secretary JOHNSON. Senator, here you start at this fund—if that should later be authorized—for the improvement of forces over there that we hope will build up in those several countries a military establishment with the countries tied to us in this pact or treaty, who would be of such substance and value that then we could reduce our own military appropriation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is at some time in the future?

Secretary JOHNSON. At some time in the future. In the meantime, through this year and next year, we hope, through their cooperation with you, that they will be building toward that end, but until you do reach that point of sufficiency of their establishments, collectively, to be of aid to us, there can be no reduction in our own National Military Establishment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is this a reasonable conclusion of this program, as you might view it from the military standpoint: that we arrived at a figure of $15,000,000,000 plus, as the necessary figure if we had to stand alone against the world, or if we were responsible solely for our own defense, but that here we have a chance to buy a bargain at the expenditure of a little more money, that is a bargain in security, a bargain in the security of further frontiers than we did have, or something of that kind?

Secretary JOHNSON. Senator, until they have built their own establishment so it is substantially of aid, we do not reduce our establishment. But at the same time, if you do not spend this $1,100,000,000 over and above ECA, to bring peace to the world, and your failure to do it will not bring peace to the world, then you have made a mistake. But that is a matter of your judgment.

The two things are separate. Our own Military Establishment must be on the basis—and I believe will be on the basis—of the sufficiency of defense for the safety of America.
Now you are doing something here, if you do it, that besides the strength of America, like the ECA, contributes to deterring an aggressor from starting something because you are building up next to him those who can deter him, and thus make for peace.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to be firm in my conclusion, if I feel I must at any time defend any action in this thing, that what we may be doing is spending an extra amount of time and money and sacrifice in strengthening the frontiers out farther away from our own country, rather than to have to sit back and merely defend ourselves against aggression which may come over here.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, but looking at that, Senator, you will not overlook that this trend to build toward a sufficiency abroad, every bit they do brings to America a greater degree of security.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say that the implementation of this treaty, whatever we do by way of implementation is necessarily on top of and in addition to what we have heretofore concluded to be our minimum responsibility toward the Military Establishment?

Secretary JOHNSON. You and I are talking the same language now, sir. I do. It cannot come out of the Military Establishment without crippling it to the point that you imperil the safety of America.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that you do believe there is an irreducible minimum that we must maintain here in any event.

Secretary JOHNSON. There is an irreducible point of safety. We have not, in this authorization you have given us, perfectionist defense. It has cut down to the point where we are satisfied it is a sufficiency of defense, but not the ideal defense.

You cannot cut it any more and you cannot take the money out without risking the security of this Nation of ours.

ADDED SECURITY TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But you believe, as I understand it, that the implementation of this pact will add greatly to our area of security, that is, not only our own as a Nation, but to the security of the world?

Secretary JOHNSON. I believe it will tend to add to our military security. I think it certainly will add, as Senator McMahon put it, to the psychology of the situation favorable to us, and that it establishes a trend which over 3 or 4 years will bring a real addition to our strength, and at a lesser cost to us on those items than if we took the same money and put it in our own Military Establishment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, you stated a moment ago that the pact and the implementation are really two different actions.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes.

RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I agree with that although I feel that they are interlocked, so that there is no complete severance of the two. But the fact is, the Pact itself is an expression of unity of purpose of nations that have generally common ideas.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir; and therefore an aid to peace in itself, and a deterrent to aggressors.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that in expressing that unity we get closer together and our common purpose is well understood, and an aggressor would hesitate to attack us.

Secretary JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is knowing that if he attacked one he would attack all.

Now, the implementation of this pact, on the other hand, is a physical demonstration of our determination to stand together. Is that a fair statement? That is, when we implement the pact.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes; I agree with that. But I go a little further: that it gives an uplift to those people to be a nation, responsible, strong again.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope that that connotation was in my assumption.

Secretary JOHNSON. If so, then I agree with you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In implementing the pact we give not only concrete evidence but every other evidence that we mean what we say.

Secretary JOHNSON. Senator Hickenlooper, we are speaking the same language again.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By the implementation of the pact, in addition to the psychological uplift that it will give various countries who contribute—and ourselves, too, I hope—we propose to furnish, at least in the first fiscal year, about $1,100,000,000 to the signing countries in one way or another.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that $1,100,000,000 is military equipment, is it not?

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of one kind or another. Strategically under the head of military equipment.

Secretary JOHNSON. It has one item in it that I am not familiar with, which is an emergency fund of cash to reach over and supplement within the field you are talking of.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the implementation is designed to develop and strengthen the military establishments of these countries with a view to their ability to resist aggression if it occurs.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, I am fully aware that—I should not say I am aware; I can only say that I earnestly hope that implementation will add to the confidence of those countries and their unity and their will to resist, as was said here yesterday.

But what would you say is the ultimate use of this military equipment if an aggressor is not deterred, if he is not frightened off, and if he goes ahead with his aggression? I mean, is it not military action? Do we not say, then, we will fight if an aggressor commits aggression against one of the pact countries? Do we not say we will fight, and we are furnishing the implementation material for the purpose, not alone for psychology but for the purpose of fighting an aggressor in case he commits an act of aggression?

That is the purpose of strengthening these countries by implementing the pact, is it not?
Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, Mr. Secretary—and I do not want you to understand that I am trying to take issue with you on the philosophy of this pact. I am pretty much for it.
Secretary JOHNSON. I do not.

COMPARISON WITH MILITARY ALLIANCES OF PAST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The question of the amount of implementation may be up to some dispute, perhaps; but then I may say respectfully and perfectly cordially that I am in thorough disagreement with your statement that this is not a military alliance, because it would seem to me by whatever name you call it, its end result is fighting.

We have determined the time when we will use our complete strength, military and otherwise, as a last resort measure to throw off aggression. The only reason I bring that up is not to dispute the matter, but I do not want to be under any delusions in my own mind, and certainly I do not want to misrepresent it to those who are bound to ask me questions about it.

It seems to me that it could be said, at least to that extent, that, of course, it is a military alliance, a military alliance as a last resort with peace as its objective; an alliance in which we expect to exhaust every reasonable and possible means to maintain peace. But the end point of the implementation is to get ourselves and our allies in a sufficient position so we can and will fight under those eventual last-ditch conditions.

It would seem to me, therefore, that it is, of course, among other things, definitely a military pact?

Secretary JOHNSON. Military pact?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, sir. Military alliance, I should say.

Excuse me.

Secretary JOHNSON. No, you talked yourself out of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to see you talk yourself out of that one.

Secretary JOHNSON. You talked yourself over into my corner on it. You and I are not differing, unless we did differ about cutting down the amount we put in our own National Military Establishment, I gather from what you say.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not differing. I am merely exploring.

PARTNERSHIP FOR SECURITY—NOT AN ALLIANCE

Secretary JOHNSON. All right. Then I want to add another word or two about that speech of mine. Since I made that a year ago, there have been some other significant developments in the world. There have been the growth of the Cominform; satellite treaties; the Berlin crisis; and still more recently, the Communist successes in China. Those are a few of them. There are a lot more.

Looking at the world situation today instead of the time I made that speech, we are more justified now in taking this step in joining in what, instead of calling an alliance, I am going to call now a broad partnership for security. And in a partnership, there is some-
thing that does not exist in your phrase you want to use of "alliance," because alliance is the power to drag us in; and I negated that very carefully three or four times in my statement.

But in the same DAR speech I clarified my attitude toward further aggression in Europe by another quote I want to give you. I quote:

The United States should say that it, like other nations, has joined in the pledge against aggression. It has kept that pledge and expects others to do likewise. In the event that an aggressor attacks the western European group of free democracy, the United States will carry out her pledge and will, in conformity with its obligations to the United Nations, give this group all the assistance in its power.

I say, sir, that that language qualified the use of the words "military alliance." That is from my speech, Senator Vandenberg. This treaty we are proposing here now reaffirms the pledge that this Congress and this country have taken several times against aggression.

I believe it proclaims from the mountaintops our belief in international law as a basis for security and peace. I think this treaty, as you have it here, Mr. Chairman, is entirely consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. It is not a military alliance, the thing I was doubting in this speech, sir, to which I myself made reference.

I think by doing the thing here, we join the other peace-loving nations of the world to build toward peace-keeping in the world.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I want to assure you, so that there will be no misunderstanding, that I never would have quarreled with you at all about what you said in that speech.

Secretary JOHNSON. I do not want you to interpret it differently from what I have been interpreting it.

PRESENT SITUATION DIFFERENT FROM THAT EXISTING AT TIME OF PAST ALLIANCES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree it has not been the policy of the United States in the past to get into military alliances abroad. There is no question about that. We are facing a different situation, and I think it has been well pointed out that we are probably facing a great reversal in the American foreign policy.

So I have no criticism of you for making that speech. As far as I am concerned, it is all right with me. I think you stated the facts.

But I do not believe that I can completely say that this is not a military alliance that we are getting into with nations when we agree to join with them, not when they get into war, but we agree to join with them in the preparation and the building of their strength against the time when they may have to use it in war and we will join with them at that time.

Secretary JOHNSON. You and I are thinking alike. We are getting down to where we are disagreeing on Tweedledee and Tweedledum, and I am going to agree with you on the result and not argue with you further about the word.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Maybe we can just leave it with that and each go his own way and sing his own song. I do not know. But we hear a great deal about this being solely and completely a peace measure, and I think it is utterly completely devoted to the earnest hope
for peace and every effort for peace, but I do not think in all fairness that we ought to stick our heads in the sand and refuse to recognize that it is a military alliance with these countries if, as, and when that becomes the last-ditch method of resisting active aggression which the peace overtures and the peace unity and all of our objectives fail to attain.

Secretary Johnson. You and I agree. We are both for any intelligent thing that tends within our economy, to bring peace to us and the world.

NATURE OF A MILITARY ALLIANCE

Senator Hickenlooper. As far as I am personally concerned, I think we would be shortsighted indeed if we merely adopted the pious declaration of united intention and neglected to see to the strength to make it stick. Perhaps I am prejudiced, but by the same token I do not like to hear the denial—and I do not necessarily say that you did make a denial—but I do not like to hear the denial by many, many people that this is in no way a military alliance; because it has ultimate military objectives, and we agree to band together as allies, both before the necessity for military action, and also if all peace unity should fail and an aggressor still decides he will have to aggress, then the ultimate time when we fight is the military use of this strength we are building up.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. My point is this: As I understand military alliances, historically speaking, they provided for automatically going to war in the event of certain contingencies. Now, of course, we will not automatically go to war. That is a difference perhaps, but that might be your position. I am just speaking historically, now.

Alliances in the past have meant that if these countries got together, they agreed automatically, and we certainly are not agreeing automatically, to go to war under this situation.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think there have been alliances. An alliance means people will stand shoulder to shoulder and gang up against the other fellow. Now, then, you go a step further. After you get your alliance and the terms under which the alliance is brought into effect is a different thing.

I think that prior to World War II, Britain had an understanding—I shall not quibble over the term—Britain had an understanding with Poland that if Poland were attacked, she would come to Poland's rescue.

I consider that to be an alliance. I do not believe that Poland could start an aggression against some other country, and with that understanding automatically drag Britain in. I think there are all manners of terms and conditions under which allies can call upon their allies for aid. It depends on the contract they sign.

I feel that we are allying ourselves with these pact countries and that we are allying ourselves for a definite purpose, which primarily is peace, and which we hope to achieve. But we are allying ourselves also for armed unity with them to resist aggression.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Would you make the same answer if there was no military implementation, just the treaty itself, without passing the Military Assistance Act?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that without any doubt the pact itself is an alliance.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. It seems to me that the military alliance is limited in case of our entering into this pact in the future and only comes up in case we enter into it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is an alliance to this extent. I think the Secretary of State pointed out yesterday, that when we vote for the pact, I think that we are voting to assume the obligations of doing whatever we can in conjunction with our allies to resist aggression; and that, undoubtedly, in the ultimate would mean military force, military might, if the aggressor had the military force to make a sufficient attack in connection with the aggression.

I do not go on the theory that an alliance necessarily means that an ally can go out and do an affirmative and an offensive thing to somebody else and automatically, in all cases, come in and call his ally to get him out of the hole.

Secretary JOHNSON. Would you join me at dinner sometime? I would like to discuss that word “alliance” with you, and the history of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I would join you any time.

NATURE OF OLD-FASHIONED ALLIANCES

Senator Vandenberg. I simply want to join myself with the observation of Senator Smith, and suggest to my able friend that this denunciation of the term “military alliance”—and I certainly joined in that denunciation and so continue to do—has been in precisely the sense that the Secretary himself used the term.

In each instance we both have referred to the old historic tradition, connotation, of the term “military alliance,” which historically has usually involved highly offensive features which are not remotely involved in the present situation, which is, I agree with the Senator, an alliance, if you wish to use that word, of a type which is easily distinguished from the historic tradition that I am talking about.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is no dispute whatsoever about that. There have been many alliances in the past and probably the customary alliance in the past has been, one might also say, an alliance of aggression, that would permit aggression by one of the Allies.

Of course, there is nothing like that in this pact. I do not approach it from that standpoint. But, by the same token, I want the same right to quibble about the word “alliance” as—I should not say quibble—but to dispute the specific definition of the term “alliance,” and reserve my own interpretation of what alliance is.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Secretary just one question which occurs to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that agreeable to you, Senator?

Senator Lodge. I would like to get at him some time.

CHOICE BETWEEN CUTTING MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS OR CUTTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Just one question I want to ask the Secretary. If you, Mr. Secretary, as head of the Military Establishment, had to choose for fiscal 1950 between these alternatives, $15,000,-
000,000 for us and nothing for Europe, in the event the Appropriations Committee said we could not go any further; or $14,000,000,000 for us and $1,000,000,000 for this European implementation, which from the standpoint of purely national security would be the choice we would have to make.

Secretary Johnson. We would take the $15,000,000,000 for our own defense.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. And leave the European implementation out?

Secretary Johnson. We cannot cut, in our opinion—we have canvassed it thoroughly—this $15,000,000,000 for our own defense.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Lodge.

Senator Lodge. Mr. Chairman—

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Thank you, Senator Lodge, I apologize for interrupting.

COMPARISON OF TREATY TO MILITARY ALLIANCES

Senator Lodge. Not at all; not at all. If, by the word "military alliance" we mean an aggressive combination of nations who are going out on the rampage to attack and oppress people, this is not a military alliance, is it?

Secretary Johnson. We agree.

Senator Lodge. If by "military alliance" you mean a group of nations who were gathered together in a spirit of cynicism and opportunism, without regard to any common idealistic values, this is not a military alliance; is it?

Secretary Johnson. I agree.

Senator Lodge. When you read these two provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty, and I quote:

They (the parties) are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

And the following:

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions • • •.

Do you not come to the conclusion that this North Atlantic Treaty is not purely a cynical device, that it is animated by a certain community of ideals?

Secretary Johnson. I do.

Senator Lodge. Is it not also true that there is no time limit set in this North Atlantic Treaty by which a certain state of military readiness must be obtained?

Secretary Johnson. That is true.

Senator Lodge. Is it not also true that there is nothing in this North Atlantic Treaty which either expressly or impliedly commits the United States to any particular strategic plan or to fight in any particular place or in any particular way?
BUDGET MESSAGE FIGURES FOR MILITARY AID

Secretary Johnson. That is true.

Senator Lodge. You stand, I presume, do you not, on the budget message of the President insofar as the figures on national defense are concerned?

Secretary Johnson. I do, sir.

Senator Lodge. Is there anything in that budget message which relates to military aid to foreign countries?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir. Wait a minute; there is one item. Your question does not contemplate it, but we want to keep this record straight. There is this one item.

Senator Lodge. What is it? The $400,000,000?

Secretary Johnson. That is it.

Senator Lodge. So this amount of $1,100,000,000 is over what there is in the President's budget. Is that not right?

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir. We are talking about the Turkish-Greek item.

Senator Lodge. The what?

Secretary Johnson. Greek-Turkish.

Senator Lodge. Is it not consistent to be in support of the budget message and at the same time welcome a new opportunity that comes along, wherein, by making some outlay now, we develop a great source of military strength for the future?

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir.

Senator Lodge. Certainly there is no inconsistency there, is there?

Secretary Johnson. None at all.

Senator Lodge. Now, you, in addition to being Secretary of Defense--

Secretary Johnson. You recall in that budget message there was a reference, or the President referred, in discussing these items, in language I will not attempt to quote, to the need of further aid along this line that we now come to here.

Senator Lodge. So the idea was foreshadowed.

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lodge. In addition to being Secretary of Defense, you are also an American citizen and taxpayer, and in that respect are concerned with the total American economy, the way we all are?

Secretary Johnson. That is right, sir.

IMPACT ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY

Senator Lodge. Do you consider that this added expense imposes a burden on the American economy; that it is the straw that breaks the camel's back and plunges us into a condition in which we have to go to rationing, allocation, and a change in our economic set-up?

Secretary Johnson. I do not.

Senator Lodge. I presume you believe that that point can be reached some time?

Secretary Johnson. I do. And that is why I want to try to use this in helping these people abroad to build up, so that we might cut down within the National Military Establishment.

Senator Lodge. Certainly it is true, is it not, that at the root of our military strength lies the American productive economy?
Secretary JOHNSON. You are right.

Senator Lodge. And that lies not only at the root of our own Military Establishment, but it has a very intimate relationship with the military establishments of friendly nations?

Secretary JOHNSON. You are quite right, Senator Lodge.

Senator Lodge. They will be almost as badly affected as we will if we had killed the goose that laid the golden eggs.

Secretary JOHNSON. Quite right again.

Senator Lodge. There are a number of questions which I think should be answered in order to make this record complete. I think one of the jobs this committee has to do is to develop a record in which the student of this problem will find an answer to any question he may ask. It may not be an answer he agrees with, but there ought to be some sort of an answer.

I have been asked these questions by Senators and friends of mine in the press and others, and I will try not to ask any questions which involve any matter of security. But if I by inadvertence do so, please do not hesitate to say no.

ALLOCATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

I am right, am I not, that it is not possible at the present time, at least, to make any statement as to the partition of these sums between foreign countries? Is that not correct?

Secretary JOHNSON. That is correct. We are not physically ready to do it, and I would just like to discuss with you frankly at some stage when we are ready the advisability of making it a public matter.

Senator Lodge. Would that not involve clearance with the foreign countries, in addition to consultation with our own interests?

Secretary JOHNSON. It would, indeed.

Senator Lodge. That is a matter of international comity.

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir. They have given us in confidence what they want and what they have. We have got to pay the game fairly and honestly with them.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Lodge. Senator Tydings has asked for a great many figures, which I think are essential to furnish at the proper time; but there are a few questions which I would like to ask in addition. Senators have asked me repeatedly what commitment this imposes insofar as future expenditures are concerned.

Secretary JOHNSON. None.

Senator Lodge. That is a good, clear answer. So we have a request of $1,400,000,000 whatever it is, for this immediate year.

Senator VANDENBERG. $1,100,000,000 for this immediate year.

Secretary Johnson. Even if we knew what it would be, we would not ask you for a commitment that we could give for future years that might interfere with the efficiency of the operation of this, if you authorize the $1,100,000.

Senator Lodge. Say that again?

Secretary JOHNSON. If you fixed out a program for 3 or 4 years you were going to do in this, you take away from the National Military Establishment and the executive department the power to try to use
this $1,100,000,000 so it makes them assist within their own economies in building up that which we try to aid.

Senator Lodge. So this is not at all comparable to the 4-year program of ECA or to any of these concepts which do tie us down to some degree over a period of years? This is not in that category at all?

Secretary Johnson. As long as they have to cooperate to the limit of their ability on an intelligent use of that which is allocated to them, and we have to justify that to you when we come back asking for more funds, they are going to cooperate a lot better than if you had said so many dollars this year, so many dollars next year, to these countries.

We cannot control it, cannot influence it, and what we seek is strength.

Senator Lodge. That is right, and maximum self-help on the part of these other countries.

Secretary Johnson. That is the phrase I was reaching for and could not find.

Senator Lodge. Continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid; that is the phrasing in the treaty, and you lay a lot of importance on that?

Secretary Johnson. I do, sir.

DURABILITY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATERIAL

Senator Lodge. Is it not true, though—I think you can probably answer this question—that, broadly speaking, most of the articles which we would send over under the terms of this pact would be in a sense capital goods, goods that would not be readily expendable such as if we said a gun or a tank or a rifle? Those are items that last for quite a long while. Would not many of the articles be within that category?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lodge. So it is not comparable to lend-lease or to a wartime situation where whatever you send is being used up almost as fast as you send it?

Secretary Johnson. It is not that type, sir.

CONTEMPLATED EXPORT OF FACTORIES AND MACHINE TOOLS

Senator Lodge. The question has been asked me whether it is planned to export factories or machine tools, the wherewith to make these weapons. Is that included in this figure?

Secretary Johnson. The General says not entire factories, that is true, not complete facilities for factories, and so forth. But, Senator, there might be an instance where within a plant that they have and a facility they have, we might send some machine tools and jigs and dies.

Senator Lodge. Of an ordnance character?

Secretary Johnson. That is right, to fill out what they have; but not an approach where we set up a whole plant or a factory. No, that is out.

RATIO OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO EUROPEAN SELF-HELP

Senator Lodge. In general, would this not be true, that five to six times as much is being spent by the nations of Europe to build themselves up militarily as we would be spending?
Secretary Johnson. We hope the ratio—I know what it is—
Senator Lodge. Mr. Acheson—
Secretary Johnson. He said it; it is about 1 in 7.
Senator Lodge. He said that.
Secretary Johnson. I just did not want to put that in here. That
is State Department business.
Senator Lodge. So that with our desire to help some particular
European factory, that would much more likely come under ECA as
part of an economic consideration?
Secretary Johnson. That ties in. That is what I meant when the
first question was asked me, maybe by Senator Vandenberg; the dol-
lars that we put in there, if we make them tie them into their economy
and build-up, since they are going to get these 6 additional dollars,
go a lot further than the dollar here if you added it to our military
appropriation bill.

UNITED STATES MILITARY MATÉRIEL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Lodge. The statement has been made here by one Senator
that if we turn over a piece of equipment to a foreign country that
we have definitely incurred a loss. That has been rankling in me ever
since it was made. I would like to put a hypothetical case to you.
Secretary Johnson. If anybody said that to me today, I did not
hear it.
Senator Lodge. Yes; it was said here today.
Secretary Johnson. He got the right answer to that one.
Senator Lodge. Let me take the case of the tank with which we
began World War II, the tank that had the 75-millimeter gun mounted
on the side so that it could only traverse a little way—I think it was
the General Grant tank, if my memory is not wrong.
Let us assume that that is a piece of equipment which could be quite
effectively used in certain types of employment in certain countries,
but that if we were to keep those tanks here and undertake to man
them and train people in their use, have them learn an obsolete firing
system and an obsolete motor maintenance and obsolete tactics on a
weapon that had very few offensive capabilities, we would actually
be doing ourselves a bad turn.
So you would have a piece of equipment which not only is ben-
eficial or could be beneficial, to the foreign countries, but the retention
of which might be a positive disadvantage to us. Is that not con-
ceivable?
Secretary Johnson. You are quite right. I am sorry I did not
make that point.
Senator Lodge. It seems to me you are better off giving it to some-
body who can use it.
Secretary Johnson. I agree with you.
Senator Lodge. So it is not a case of subtracting something from
what you have got. You are getting rid of something that really is
not doing you any good. It is doing you harm.
Senator Hickenlooper. If I may interrupt, I understood the Secre-
tary to say what we expected to furnish over there was late equip-
ment and not obsolete equipment.
Senator Lodge. But the point is, Senator, the thing that is obsolete
for us is not necessarily obsolete for another country, because the
employment which the other country wants to make of it is entirely different. That to me is perfectly clear. There are an awful lot of things that you can use if you are engaged in suppressing fifth-column activity, or if you are engaged in a purely defensive role, that you can get very little good out of it if you are trying to go in on an offensive mission.

There is, of course, no doubt, is there, of our ability to control the use to which equipment is put?

Secretary Johnson. None at all.

Senator Lodge. And if we wanted to see to it, for instance, that our equipment was not utilized to promote something like this Indonesian venture, we would have the power to see to it?

Secretary Johnson. We of the Military Establishment will have the power to do it this year, and we will have to report to you so you have the power and control of approval of how we have done it.

EFFECT OF ITALIAN PEACE TREATY LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY

Senator Lodge. Now, the question has been asked as to whether the limitation that is in the Italian peace treaty on the size of the Italian defense establishment is any argument against this North Atlantic Pact, in view of the fact that Italy is adhering to the pact.

I wonder if you care to comment on that?

Secretary Johnson. That is right. I think you have got to leave that to General Bradley, in looking at the strategic picture, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and maybe the State Department may want to express an opinion. You are getting into pretty deep military waters there.

Senator Lodge. It is perfectly agreeable to me. Yesterday Senator Hickenlooper asked a very interesting question which has been in the minds of a great many people, and which he phrased very clearly. It was something like this:

WILL TO RESIST IN 1939 AND 1949

If the will to win of the nations of western Europe was as poor as it was in 1939, when they had much larger armies than they have in 1949, what makes you think that their will to win is going to be better in 1949?

I would like to ask if you have any comment you would care to make on that question?

Secretary Johnson. No, I cannot answer that. I think that it is a question of measured risk. It is a considered risk, and that very element has been discussed in the National Military Establishment. It is not one that you can give any fixed answer about.

I do know that what you have heretofore done in the Congress, in certain parts of the world has been almost completely successful in what you have sought. I can think of a country that maybe it is not right to name it here, in which, with the assistance you have given it, there is today no communism, and there is the will to resist and they will resist.

I believe that would not have been possible except for the American aid you have given them. I believe it inadvisable to name the country.
LES LSONS DRAWN FROM 1939

Senator Lodge. Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. Is it not true that in western Europe the nations that have been through the fires of 1939 have had an experience which has probably taught them something that will be of use to them in the future?

Secretary Johnson. If I were in the State Department, probably I would not say this; but as an individual, not as Secretary of Defense, I think that some of the peoples who now want to be our friends have seen those who went into the orbit of another country cut up, independence lost, and a slave state created. This means that the probability is that these Western countries who have now come with us are really going to stick it out and profit by what they have seen.

I do believe that the fires from 1939 on have taught them something, and that their morale and their military establishments will not reflect the heedless days of 1939. This is an individual statement. I do not speak for the Administration thereon.

Senator Lodge. Is it not true that the French army, for instance, which was very much disorganized in 1939 eventually rebuilt itself with our assistance into an army which rendered a good account of itself in 1944 and 1945?

Secretary Johnson. That is absolutely true.

Senator Lodge. And is it not true also that the Italian partisan formations which fought in cooperation with us in Italy in 1944 and 1945 were of great utility to us?

Secretary Johnson. There is no doubt, Senator, what you do here, here, even if there should be aggression somewhere else, is going to leave us with friends indeed if those friends are not going to be overrun.

Senator Lodge. Are you not favorably impressed with the headway that has been made in Europe in the development of an European command and agreed to strategic plan?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lodge. You do not, however, do you, expect much quick progress in the way of standardization of weapons in the next year?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir.

Senator Lodge. But you do hope to make some headway along that line?

Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lodge. That concludes my questioning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make one suggestion, and that is that the State Department prepare a memorandum for inclusion in the record on these so-called evil military alliances that we have been discussing here today, so that it will be clear for all to see what the difference is between this pact and these military alliances of the past.

I do not say that they ought to give the direct texts of all these military alliances, but a brief sketch that would show the difference between an automatic go-to-war offensive, cynical, opportunists, old-fashioned power politics, European military alliance, and the type of partnership for peace that we contemplate here.

(The document will be found in the appendix.)

Senator Lodge. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Johnson. Thank you for your help, sir.

The Chairman. We have Senator Donnell with us, and the Senator is permitted to ask questions of the Secretary.
I will say to Senator Donnell these other Senators are just going
to run over and vote and come back. So we need not interrupt him
at all.

COMMON DEFENSE

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, this afternoon in large part the
discussion has been in regard to matters relating to equipment. Now,
I want to discuss, or have you answer, if you will, some questions along
another line. I am particularly interested in the first sentence on
page 4 of your statement which reads as follows:

We must keep constantly in mind the three fundamentals of preparedness:
manpower, materials, and suitable positions from which to employ them in the
event of attack.

Then you proceed to the next sentence:

The treaty goes far toward making available for the common defense the
manpower and strategic positions.

Now, it is particularly, Mr. Secretary, along the line of manpower
that I want to ask you some questions. In the first place, I would
like to ask you if you heard or saw the Army Day speech of General
Bradley on April 6 of this year?

Secretary Johnson. Only what was printed in the newspapers.

Senator Donnell. There are three sentences here I would call to
your attention, if I may, before questioning you. He said this:

At present, the balance of military power is centered in the United States.

Secretary Johnson. I did not get your first sentence.

Senator Donnell. I was quoting, Mr. Secretary, from the address
of General Bradley as I have it of April 6. That is, the quotation has
been given to me as follows:

At present, the balance of military power is centered in the United States,
3,000 miles from the heart of Europe. It must be perfectly apparent to the people
of the United States that we cannot count on friends in western Europe if our
strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the
enemy, with a promise of later liberation.

Yet, that is the only strategy that can prevail if the military balance of power
in Europe is to be carried on the wings of our bombers and deposited in reserves
this side of the ocean.

Do you know what he was referring to by the term “reserves this
side of the ocean”?

Secretary Johnson. As I read that sentence, which I now have be-
fore me, it means the industrial set-up and equipment and the fighting
manpower of America.

Senator Donnell. It includes both the industrial set-up and the
fighting manpower of America?

Secretary Johnson. In my opinion that is what he meant. He will
be here, and you can ask him about that if you want.

Senator Donnell. If the chairman will permit me, I intend to do
that. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, whether in your opinion—

Secretary Johnson. I do not know where you are headed in your
questions, and I do not mean to interfere with you; but you must not
overlook the next paragraph:

Unless plans for common defense of the existing free world provide for the
security of western Europe, these people cannot be expected to stake their lives
in the common cause. As long as the helplessness of western Europe would invite
military aggression, its increasing prosperity shall grow more tempting to the
armies from the East.
Not until we share our strength on a common defensive front can we hope to
replace this temptation with a real deterrent to war.

PROVISION OF MASS MANPOWER FOR EUROPE

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you whether or not the
plan has been considered of so providing manpower for Europe as to
place adequate divisions along the Rhine for the purpose of slowing
down and absorbing the shock in the event of a Russian attack? Has
that plan been considered, if you are able to tell?
Secretary Johnson. That question I cannot answer.
Senator Donnell. You mean you would prefer not to answer?
Secretary Johnson. That question I am saying I will not answer.
Senator Donnell. Very well. I am not pressing it at all, but I ask
whether or not it had been considered, and I understand you to decline
to answer that?
Secretary Johnson. I do.
Senator Donnell. Very well. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us,
or do you feel that you are at liberty to do so in view of considerations
of national security, whether you think the signatories to the pact,
other than the United States of America, could hold Europe against
Russia if only the manpower of the signatories is used and without
any manpower of our country?
Secretary Johnson. I do not think the best interests of our own
security are served by answering that question, Senator.

RUSSIAN MANPOWER

Senator Donnell. Very well. May I ask you in regard to the man­
power of Russia, in World War II, am I correct in understanding that
Stalin equipped and fought some 11,000,000 soldiers during World
War II?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, I have just asked about this figure.
Senator Donnell. Very well.
Secretary Johnson. I would like later to correct this if I am wrong.
I think the figure is in excess of 11,000,000; but your question is not
quite a fair question.
Senator Donnell. I mean to make it fair.
Secretary Johnson. It is not fair.
Senator Donnell. In what respect?
Secretary Johnson. He did that, whatever the figure is, with the
help and industrial might of these United States and not as your
question implies.
Senator Donnell. I had no implication one way or the other on that,
Mr. Secretary, and did not intend it.
Secretary Johnson. I did not want anybody else hearing or reading
that to draw any such implications.
Senator Donnell. I certainly welcome any corrections from the
standpoint of fairness or otherwise.
Secretary Johnson. We will get along all right.
Senator Donnell. In other words, it is a fact, is it not, Mr. Secre­
tary, that Stalin used 502 divisions against Germany on the eastern
front?
Secretary Johnson. I do not know how many divisions he used; but General Bradley can, without flicking an eyelid, give you the exact figures on that.

**American Military Manpower**

Senator Donnell. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, whether the total number of divisions which the United States of America exported in World War II was 89, which it sent out from the United States? I am not talking solely about Europe.

Secretary Johnson. Eighty-nine is our total number of divisions, if my offhand recollection is correct, Mr. Chairman. The question was exported. I do not know quite what exported means. We did not send out of the country 89.

Senator Donnell. I have just stated by the term "exported" I meant sent from the United States of America.

Secretary Johnson. Then your question is wrong. If you have no objection, General Bradley will give you that information.

Senator Donnell. Very well. Am I correct in this, Mr. Secretary, that of the divisions of United States soldiers in World War II, only 63 were used in Europe? Is that correct, if you know?

Secretary Johnson. You had better wait and ask those questions of General Bradley, because where I do not know, I should not answer. I think I know the answer to that one, but it may be wrong. Why do you not, in fairness to me, ask the most competent military authority who is coming to answer such questions?

Senator Donnell. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am perfectly willing to ask him; but I thought if you knew, you would have no objection to telling us. If you do not know, of course I cannot press it.

Secretary Johnson. I think I know, but I would rather give you that answer after I look at the tables which we have, or after a man who lived with it then, as I did not, tells you from his own knowledge. You are entitled to exactness.

**Necessity of American Troops Abroad**

Senator Donnell. Are you willing to tell us whether or not it is advisable, considering the matter of national defense and national security—I shall not press this question if you do not desire to answer it—but are you willing to tell us whether or not, in order to hold Europe for a few weeks, say 4 weeks, as against Russian attack, considering the number of troops Russia could put into the field, it would be absolutely necessary that United States troops be sent to Europe in order to accomplish that result?

Secretary Johnson. I do not think it serves the best interests of any of those governments or ourselves to answer that.

Senator Donnell. Very well. Therefore, then you are not willing to state because you deem it inadvisable from a standpoint of national security, whether you believe it would be necessary for troops to be conscripted in the United States under the terms of the Atlantic Pact? I do not mean under the terms of it, but in pursuance of the purposes of the Atlantic Pact?

Secretary Johnson. You give it another twist. On the first question, I think neither General Bradley nor myself will answer. Now you
are bringing in the question of conscription. That has not been involved in your question before, and it is not in any answer I have made or will make.

**CONSCRIPTION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Senator Donnell. I am asking you now whether you are willing to state if conscription would be necessary in order to hold Europe against Russian attack for a period of 4 weeks.

Secretary Johnson. I think not.

Senator Donnell. You do not think conscription would be necessary, or you mean you are not answering?

Secretary Johnson. I think we are going to give you a competent authority to answer that, and I think fairness would require that your question be asked of him.

**COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ALLIES**

Senator Donnell. Very well, I shall not push that further. May I ask you this question, Mr. Secretary, if you are informed upon this? This has to do with the combat effectiveness of our allies in World War II, just how much actual strength there is among the signatories of this pact as it existed in World War II.

Now, Belgium is one of the signers of this pact, is it not?

Secretary Johnson. I can tell you now, I do not know the answer to that. If you want that, you had better tell us, and we will dig it up from the files. I do not think General Bradley can answer that offhand.

Senator Donnell. You do not think he could answer what?

Whether Belgium was a signer of the pact?

Secretary Johnson. No, the number of divisions of each of these—

Senator Donnell. That is not what I was going to ask. I have not got to that yet. Belgium is one of the signers of this pact. That is true, is it not?

Secretary Johnson. That is right.

Senator Donnell. Do you know whether Belgium fought in the last two World Wars at all, whether she placed any troops into the field?

Secretary Johnson. I happened to be over in that part of the world in the First World War. Very definitely I do know that they did, and I know from what newspapers, history, and records show that they did in the second.

**TROOPS SUPPLIED BY BELGIUM IN WORLD WAR II**

Senator Donnell. Do you know approximately how many troops in each of those two wars that Belgium placed in the field?

Secretary Johnson. I have a general estimate, sir.

Senator Donnell. Are you willing to tell us, sir?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir; because if you want that, just tell us and we will get it for you.

Senator Donnell. Very well. I shall not pursue this down the line. But I should like to ask you if you will furnish us, or have General Bradley prepared to furnish when he comes here, the information as to the number of troops that each one of the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty provided in World War II.
Secretary Johnson. No. 29

Senator Donnell. Yes, sir. I do not think it is necessary to ask about No. 1. I think World War II would be sufficient.

**Peak strength World War II (Atlantic Pact countries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada (1945)</td>
<td>474,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>757,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (May 1940)</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>556,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (June 1940)</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>1,116,000</td>
<td>6,058,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (July 1945)</td>
<td>3,122,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>861,000</td>
<td>4,005,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>857,000</td>
<td>2,024,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (August 1945)</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (1945)</td>
<td>3,250,191</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>255,988</td>
<td>3,756,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes nursing services.
2 Ex-enemy.
3 No organized forces.

**END USE CONTROLS**

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to direct your attention to another question, that is, the possibility of the use of equipment which this country might furnish under the North Atlantic Treaty, the possibility of the use of that equipment by those who are the other signers of the treaty for purposes which we might not favor.

There are two of the signatories, are there not, who are at present at war with their own colonies, namely, France and the Netherlands?

Senator Donnell. Are they at war with their own colonies, any of their colonies, at this time?

Secretary Johnson. I do not know.

Senator Donnell. You know of the Netherlands being at war in Indonesia, do you not?

Secretary Johnson. I know that they were.

Senator Donnell. Very well.

Secretary Johnson. I saw in the paper that France was having some troubles, I believe, with Morocco or someone. But you are asking me about something knowledge of which I do not possess as an expert, and where I do not know, I am not going to answer.

Senator Donnell. I would not want you to; I certainly would not. I wanted to ask your opinion, however, of this question, regardless of whether or not you are familiar with the actual facts as to there particular countries.

If equipment should be sent by our country under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty to a country which is itself engaged in war against its own colony or colonies, would not one of two situations be possible? First, that such country might use some or all of that material in the fighting against its colony; or, if by reason of precaution in our agreement with it as to the furnishing of that equipment, it could use the equipment which it received for the purpose of releasing other equipment to be used in the war against its own colonies?

Secretary Johnson. As to the other equipment, there would not be too much we could do about it. As to that which we furnished, we can control it within the area of this treaty.
Senator DONNELL. And just how would you control that? What type of policing would you have in order to be sure that each country would use that equipment solely for purposes that the United States thinks proper?

Secretary JOHNSON. Their very dependency upon us for future aid in that field would enable us to control it within that area. If you have to worry on that score, we can give proper assurances, Mr. Chairman, that that will not happen. American equipment that goes in will be used within the terms and purports of the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. When it is given to them or furnished to them, would not it be understood in the agreements that it is to be used under this treaty?

Secretary JOHNSON. We can control that. He wants to know how we can control it. How we control it will be determined later. That it will be controlled we tell you now.

The CHAIRMAN. But when we supply them with this material, will it not be understood that it is to be used under this treaty?

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And not for general warfare, general expedition.

Secretary JOHNSON. That is right, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, a message from the minority leader—I suppose he is trying to get all of us members of the minority party there. I will waive any further examination of the Secretary.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary JOHNSON. If there is other stuff like that that you want which we can under security furnish, give us a list of that. It is not fair to General Bradley to ask him how many troops Belgium fought in the area in 1925. You ought to give him a little tip-off.

The CHAIRMAN. We are obliged to you, Mr. Secretary.

The committee stands adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow morning in this room.

(Thereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the committee recessed until Friday morning, at 10:30 a.m., April 29, 1949.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

FRIDAY, APRIL 29, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on April 28, 1949, at 10:30 a.m. in room 318 Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), George, Thomas of Utah, Tydings, Green, Vandenberg, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, and Hicklenlooper.

Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

This is the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, holding hearings on what is popularly known as the North Atlantic Pact. We have the pleasure and honor today of having before us Mr. Harriman, who is the Chief of the European Branch of the ECA. His office is in Paris and he is well equipped to testify regarding European matters, both with regard to ECA and the pending treaty.

We are very glad indeed to have you, Mr. Ambassador, and we will be glad to have a formal statement if you have one prepared, and after you have had the pleasure of reading that you will be subjected to questioning by members of the committee if they so desired. Is that agreeable to you?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, UNITED STATES SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN EUROPE, ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Ambassador Harriman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to express to you what I feel to be the meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty to our European partners, namely the governments and people of the participating countries, and how it relates to the European recovery program. Testimony has already been given on other aspects of the treaty, including its relation to the United Nations. I speak from my own experience during the past year as United States Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration and from those of our missions in the different countries. I also speak from my earlier experience during the past 8 years much of which I have spent in different parts of Europe.
Early in February, I testified before this committee at the hearings on the Economic Cooperation Act and gave certain information and figures on the strides that have been made toward economic recovery in western Europe. I explained, however, that progress could not be measured alone in terms of food, industry and trade. I stated (and I quote from my testimony):

No one who has had occasion, as I have had, to see Europe in the summer of 1947 and to see it again today, can fail to be struck by the deeper progress in the things of the human spirit. Hope, and the will to resist tyranny, were ebbing in Europe in 1947. They are flowing again today. It is this—the will to live as freemen and to go forward toward a future which, while it cannot be precisely foreseen, can yet be believed in—that is, to my mind, the most heartening and significant development in Europe since the Marshall proposal and the measures to give it effect. It is this which has made possible the increased efforts of the ordinary men and women visible throughout Europe today. It is this which has made it possible for the governments of the participating countries to face up to the rigorous measures which are needed. And it is this which has arrested the spread of reactionary Communist aggression. Without this revival, the Communists might well have succeeded in their design to get control of Italy, which was frustrated in the elections of April 1948; nor could the Communists have been kept out of the Government of France.

FEAR IN EUROPE

Progress until recently has thus been based on hope, but there still have been disrupting influences. In February, in my testimony, I stated:

It is my conviction that the USSR regards the fear of war as an instrument to be used in the course of its scheme of moral and psychological disruption. The fear of war tends to kill hope for the future, and with it initiative, enterprise and investment, all essential to the recovery of Europe.

GROWING CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE

In the intervening months, I have traveled in many of the participating countries during the period when the North Atlantic Treaty has been under consideration. I can testify that a new factor has developed, a growth of confidence, based on the belief that through the North Atlantic Pact security from external aggression can be attained. Fear is a contagious and frustrating emotion. But confidence, too, is contagious, and is a constructive and creative human emotion. Confidence is essential for the eventual success of the recovery program and the maintenance of determination to resist internal and external aggression.

EUROPEAN DISCUSSION OF ATLANTIC PACT

We are dealing with some 200,000,000 people facing varying problems, but all with a tradition of liberty and freedom. Discussions in these different countries leading up to the decision to sign the Atlantic Pact were sober and searching. This decision was based on the acceptance of the principle that neither appeasement nor neutrality could be relied upon, that it was only through unity of purpose and action of freemen that there could be hope for future peace and security. This was a momentous decision. The decision was based
on the two principal articles of the pact, namely, article 5 and article 3, first—

that an armed attack against one • • • shall be considered an attack against • • • all—

and secondly—

• • • means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid • • •
to resist armed attack.

In the European mind, these two concepts have been, I feel, inseparable. The first is that unity of purpose among the free nations would be a powerful deterrent to any aggressor, and the second that through self-help and mutual aid, effective military establishments can be developed as an assurance of defense.

IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN ATLANTIC PACT

The participation of the United States in the pact is of course the factor which is basic to the development of confidence. The Brussels Pact, entered into a year ago between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, was a search for common security measures. Yet the Europeans know that without the United States, no association among the free peoples of western Europe would be effective. The strength of the United States gives strength and meaning to the pact. The proposal for military aid from the United States gives vitality and meaning to the concept of effective self-help and mutual aid to resist armed attack. The Europeans have confidence in us, have confidence that in any war we would eventually be victorious. But they recognize only too well that as things stand today, they would be overrun, and when their countries were again liberated, the life of their people would be irreparably destroyed. Thus article 5 of the pact cannot stand by itself in the development of the confidence essential in making this association effective in serving the needs of the people of Europe and of the people of the United States. For the pact to have real meaning, I am convinced there must be a willingness to implement promptly article 3. European nations are prepared, I believe, to contribute their share in self-help and mutual aid. They cannot, however, develop an effective military establishment alone. They need military equipment and raw materials from us to supplement what they can do for themselves. Assistance from us is vital to the growth of mutual confidence. It will be concrete evidence that we have real concern for their problems of self-defense.

BENEFITS TO UNITED STATES FROM TREATY

From our standpoint, I feel that our security can be immeasurably increased as time goes on and as the military forces of the western European countries are strengthened. I think we should look at the productive capacity of the signatories of the Atlantic Pact. For example, between us we have four times the coal and four times the steel production of the Soviet Union and its satellites, and a labor force substantially greater. The productivity of our mutual labor force is vastly greater than that of the backward countries of the East, on a man-by-man basis. The western European participants alone have greater industrial productive capacity than the countries behind
the iron curtain. It does not seem unreasonable to me to have confidence that in time an effective defensive force can be developed which would provide a real sense of security. It is well always to bear in mind that no one has any thought of an armament program for aggression. The only thought in anyone's mind is the thought of defense. A defensive force is relatively small and cannot be a threat of aggression.

In looking at the world today, I feel we need strong and vigorous partners, of like mind and intent. The North Atlantic Treaty gives us this association with like-minded people. They are vigorous people but they need help in rebuilding their strength. Of prime importance is the European recovery program. All agree that nothing should be permitted to interfere with that. But alongside of it, I earnestly believe we should help our associates, and it is very much in our own interest to help our associates, in their own efforts to build up means to defend themselves.

If the United States consistently pursues the policies which have been adopted in supporting the European recovery program, if we will now enter the Atlantic Pact and honestly implement article 3, we can look forward to the time when we ourselves can feel confident in our search for peace and security.

The North Atlantic Pact is one of the great concepts of history. If we join it with enthusiasm and implement it with American determination, we will contribute to the confidence and will of freemen the world over.

GROWING CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE

In western Europe today, there is a growing wave of confidence, confidence instilled by the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty, that freemen will stand together in common defense of their liberty and freedom. Should we turn aside at this moment, I doubt whether we can ever again recapture that spirit.

To succeed in what I earnestly believe is our winning struggle in Europe for freedom and peace, America must be resolute and steadfast.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, you have in your capacity as representative of the ECA in Europe, had opportunity, of course, to contact a great many countries and to visit in those countries; is that true?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have said there is a marked improvement industrially and commercially and so on among these countries; is that true?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir.

IMPROVEMENT IN EUROPEAN MORALE

The CHAIRMAN. Now, my question is, To what extent has that improvement lifted their morale? Have the operations of the ECA given strength to the revival of the spirit?

Ambassador Harriman. As I said briefly in my testimony, I feel that the spirit of Europe is completely different from what it was in the summer of 1947, when the Marshall proposal was put forward. The recovery program has changed the whole feeling of the people of Europe, hope has been inspired, with the results that have been ob-
tained, of course, they see concrete evidence in the ability to get enough food to live and in other ways that progress is being made, and with progress, of course, comes greater hope for the future. That is true in all of the countries. Of course, the conditions of the different countries are different. I am making a general statement. And there have been concrete results from that in the determination to resist internal and external aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it has stiffened their spirit of resistance, you would say?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. It has given them hope and very much stiffened their will to resist internal and external aggression.

MUTUAL AID AND SELF-HELP

The CHAIRMAN. You have observed, Mr. Ambassador, a clause in the treaty putting the obligation upon all of the signatories of mutual self-help and assistance, and so forth, and so on, and also the obligation of these various countries to improve their condition and help themselves along the lines of the treaty. You have observed that, have you not?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, the only countries where there has been any evidence of it so far of course, has been the Brussels Pact countries, where they have had these matters under consideration for the past year. The consideration of the treaty is so new that there has been no specific plan, but from my discussions I can assure you that each one of them has its own determination to do what it can, and is discussing what it can do to contribute to its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty.

IMPORTANCE OF SELF-HELP

The CHAIRMAN. You have somewhat anticipated my other question, but it is all right. In your contacts with these various governments and their representatives, do you or do you not find the determination to carry out the injunctions of the treaty to exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish these things, and not rely solely upon the United States?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Yes, sir. They agree with us that the European recovery program must have a higher priority, but all of them are trying to find ways and means by which they can expand production of equipment and supplies which are needed for military establishments, not only by themselves but of their partners in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does the treaty provide for American assistance and aid? It seems to me that the European nations must be impressed with the fact that we are not expected, at least, to carry all of the load on this program, and that they should exert themselves to the utmost. What we shall do will be more or less supplementary to their own efforts. Is that understood?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, all of the discussions I have had with any European nations have related to aid from America in the matter of equipment which they are not now able to produce themselves. And they are discussing what they can do to expand their production in this field. In other words, they take article 3 seriously from the standpoint of their obligations under it.
The Chairman. That is what I was getting at. I wanted to know if they have been seriously impressed with the obligations that this treaty puts on them to exert themselves to the utmost to meet the requirements of the program.

Ambassador Harriman. Mr. Chairman, their desire to be in a stronger position is such that I have found no evidence that they were not keen to do what they can for themselves. They recognize that whatever comes from us will be a plus that can not be the basis of their rearmament program.

COOPERATION AMONG BRUSSELS PACT NATIONS

The Chairman. The Brussels Pact countries have, have they not, made substantial progress since the formation of their agreements?

Ambassador Harriman. The Military Establishment can tell you more than I can about it, sir, but they have established committees of mutual defense and are working on a program of mutual assistance. That is the only area of Europe where that sort of thing on a mutual assistance basis has been started. The spirit of that organization is such as to indicate the general spirit of Europe.

The Chairman. Have they or have they not set up a staff arrangement looking toward the unification or rather the association of their military establishments?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir; military staffs, supply staffs, and other joint committees on different aspects of the military and supply program.

The Chairman. Is it your belief or within your knowledge that these staff arrangements can be very easily fitted into this program under the treaty without duplication?

Ambassador Harriman. Mr. Chairman, I am not able to answer you that, except to say that what has been done so far naturally is a contribution to what comes next. What the relation of the Brussels Pact present arrangements would be to the arrangements contemplated under the North Atlantic treaty I cannot say.

CONTRIBUTION OF BRUSSELS PACT COUNTRIES IN ATLANTIC TREATY

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, some of these countries are equipped to make substantial contributions to the armaments phase of this treaty, and others are not. In the case of Belgium, it is quite a manufacturing point for arms and equipment of a military character, is it not?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And naturally it would be expected, probably, to aid in supplying these materials to other nations without having to export them from the United States, is that true?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. Belgium, of course, is relatively an important nation for her size.

The Chairman. And it has made probably greater progress toward recovery than any of the other nations associated with us in the treaty, has she not?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, she has. Life is more normal in Belgium than in many of the other countries.
The Chairman. My point was that the attitude of these European nations is one not of reliance entirely upon the United States, but that they understand that there must be a very active and vigorous cooperation. They are to assume obligations to do their utmost before the United States shall be expected to take over the program. Is that more or less true?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. It is almost the reverse. They are so keen to get themselves in a stronger position that it does not occur to them that they can rely upon the United States. They know they have got to do the main job themselves, and they want to do it, but they do need assistance from us, particularly in types of military equipment which they cannot produce themselves at the present time.

THE WILL TO RESIST

The Chairman. A good deal has been said here in these hearings about their spirit of resistance and what would cause them to feel a stronger spirit of resistance. Would you or would you not say that their experience in the last war, the desolation and the ravagement that took place, and the cruelties to themselves, would have a tendency to stiffen their resistance now to a repetition of such outrages in the future?

Ambassador Harriman. Each country, of course, differs, but as a general statement the will to resist has grown very markedly among all the participating countries. It is resolute in many of them, and it is growing in others.

As I have said in my testimony, each one is under varying types of pressures and influences, but as a general statement the will to resist is resolute and sound, and growing in larger groups of the populations. Certainly it is in the majority of the populations in all of the countries.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Chairman. This treaty, according to our concept, is entirely a defensive treaty?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. It has no purposes of aggression or offensive action against any country or group of countries in the world, is that not true?

Ambassador Harriman. There is no thought among the participating countries in Europe of any aggression. Their one desire is to create a situation where they can live in peace and sleep at night without the thought of war coming to them.

The Chairman. Is that feeling more or less general among these nations that we are associating ourselves with?

Ambassador Harriman. Among all of the nations with which we are associating ourselves, the overwhelming majority of the people of all nations associated with us.

The Chairman. There is no thought connected with the treaty of an imperialistic attitude toward the rest of the world?

Ambassador Harriman. That does not exist in Europe today.
ANTI-UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA

The Chairman. But there is a great deal of propaganda and agitation and falsehoods generated by some countries in Europe against the United States, claiming that we are a great imperialist and we are trying to build up an imperialistic attitude, and that through this treaty we are trying to strengthen that attitude.

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. The Communist press, which is small in most countries and fairly large in one or two, when I go to the different capitals, say, or some of them say, “The American Colonial Commissioner has come to give orders to the Government.”

The Chairman. You are sort of a proconsul?

Ambassador Harriman. Something like that. We are the imperialist in terms of the Communist attack.

The Chairman. Do our associates in this treaty realize that that is propaganda and that it is not true, do you think, or do they not?

Ambassador Harriman. In most countries it is laughed off. There are one or two countries where there is a large Communist infiltration where those who only read the Communist press I suppose have some impression made on them, but the majority of all the people of even those countries pretty clearly understands what the American motivations are. I will put it that they clearly understand the motivations of the United States, and that is why they want an association with us. They would not associate themselves with us if they believed we had imperialistic intentions. After all, this pact must be ratified by the different legislative branches of the different governments, and they represent the majority of the people.

PRIORITY OF ERP

The Chairman. Your understanding is that in all of this plan, the treaty and so on, the ECA is to have priority—that the rebuilding of the European system under the provisions of the ECA Act shall have every consideration and priority?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. In my conversations over there it was welcomed that we took such a strong position. When this subject came up of mutual aid, they wanted to be sure that we understood how vital it was for them to reestablish a sound economy.

The Chairman. A sound economy, if we can reestablish it, of course, will be a basis not only for actual temporary recovery, but for continuous strength in these countries which would aid the purpose of the treaty. Is that not true?

Ambassador Harriman. Expanding strength.

The Chairman. Yes; expanding strength.

Ambassador Harriman. Expanding strength and greater ability to maintain forces that will be adequately equipped.

COORDINATION OF ECA WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Chairman. Do you not believe that the operations under the ECA and the action that may be taken under the treaty can be so coordinated and related to each other as not to bring about conflicts of purpose or conflicts of action, so that we can accomplish the objectives of both plans?
Ambassador Harriman. If the treaty is ratified and the military assistant program adopted, it is the intention to have ECA in Europe work closely with the different countries to make sure that their expanded military production in no way interferes with the objectives of the ECA.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Vandenberg?

EMPHASIS ON MUTUAL AID AND SELF-HELP

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Chairman, I only want to ask the distinguished Ambassador one thing. In his testimony he seems to put paramount emphasis on article 3 of the treaty over the paramount importance of self-help and mutual aid. It seems to me that this is in line with the growing tendency to measure the importance of the North Atlantic Pact by the military aid factor.

Without in any way to discount the argument that can be made regarding the importance of our physical contribution, surely the fundamental importance of this great enterprise is not measured by whether or not we contribute a comparatively trivial $1,130,000,000 of assistance, or whether it is $1,000,000,000 or whether it is $800,000,000. Surely there is a fundamental impulse in this enterprise which far transcends any contribution of that sort, is there not?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. If I gave any impression in my testimony of overemphasis on article 3 as against article 5, I appreciate the opportunity to correct it.

I feel, during these discussions, that there is a new feeling developing in Europe, that there will be through the North Atlantic Treaty a new great association among like-minded peoples in the general region that will lead to more intimate relationships in all sorts of ways, and that concept of an association of like-minded people is lifting people’s imaginations.

When I emphasized article 3 I correctly stated what I believe is the opinion when they made the decision to put aside reliance on appeasement and neutrality, and those are tempting ideas; they have been tempting in the past. There have been people in this country and people in Europe that have tried to think that that is the way, to put their heads in the sand. They have made the decision that there is a conflict between freedom and dictatorship, and that all free men must stand together on the side for freedom; and that is the decision which these people have made under different conditions in different countries.

RELATIONSHIP OF ARTICLE V TO ARTICLE III

I tried to indicate, Senator, that, having made that decision, to rely upon this association and to join with it, the natural thing when there is the threat of aggression so close by, is to turn and see what they could do in the way of developing means by which they could protect their people against a possibility of aggressive attack, and it was only because I wanted to try to report to you what I believe to be the feeling in all of these countries, that article 5 is the one they decided upon first, and then article 3 comes along in what they consider the natural sequence. The self-help is one they are ready to get behind. The hope and growing confidence in mutual aid—I should say hope from
the article, but confidence when they see it implemented, is of such vital importance, and, as I said in my testimony, the flow of some equipment will be concrete evidence that we have an interest in their problem, namely, self-defense; and unless we give that in evidence, that we are interested in their self-defense, it will take away from this spirit which has been generated by the debate over joining the Atlantic Pact.

Senator Vandenberg. I am not quarreling with that analysis; and I want to again make it quite plain so there will be no misunderstanding that I am in no sense hostile to the obligation which we confront to seriously consider article 3 and its implications in connection with our action. I simply find myself repelling the idea that the reason the North Atlantic Pact was signed by our associates in this great adventure was article 3.

Ambassador Harriman. That is obviously not a fact. But I tried to indicate that article 5 and article 3 were considered together, but the debate and the soul searching were over article 5, and article 3 came along as an implementation of this determination of free men to stand together.

Senator Vandenberg. I think we must act under article 3, and I don't want to labor the point, but I should hate to have the importance of the North Atlantic Pact yardsticked by a relatively insignificant sum in respect to the total armament problem of Europe like a billion dollars, and it seems to me that we are tending dangerously toward that sort of concept.

No promises of military aid to signatories

Do you know of any promises that were made to any signatory states in contemplation of the implementation of article 3?

Ambassador Harriman. I know of no promises.

Senator Vandenberg. On the contrary, is it not a fact that there were no promises of any nature under this article?

Ambassador Harriman. There were no promises with which I am familiar, and I do not believe that there are any promises to implement article 3.

Senator Vandenberg. I would like to state for the record in that connection that I personally interviewed two foreign ministers on this particular point, and they both frankly asserted their hopes in respect to article 3, but categorically denied that they had been given any promises of any nature whatever.

I think that is all I have.

Effect of nationalism on unity

The Chairman. Senator George, may I interrupt just a minute? I wanted to ask one question, Mr. Ambassador, on the nationalism question.

Of course every country has, or most of them at least have, a feeling of nationalism, just as we have to a certain extent. Do you or do you not believe that that spirit of nationalism in these various countries will hinder or detract from the united action of the countries in carrying out the objectives of this treaty and in acting in a united fashion against aggression against any one of the nations involved?
Ambassador Harriman. Mr. Chairman, there is a new sense of unity which has developed in Europe as a result of the recovery program. One is for life. The North Atlantic Pact is for security, the deepest of all emotions in men, and that is giving a greater sense of unity of purpose in Europe in the last few weeks since it has been publicly debated and considered.

There is, in my judgment, a determination to work together for the purposes of the pact. It is natural—it is true in our country—that when one part or one country thinks it is entitled to a little more than another there will be discussions about the program, but there is about them a growing sense of unity of objective and purpose, and I am not concerned that that will interfere with the values that we seek in the pact.

The Chairman. You think, then, that they are realizing that under this treaty there is the necessity of cooperative action if the objectives of the treaty are to be attained in resisting an armed attack upon any one of them? Do you think they realize that and are prepared to meet it?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. I think they interpret the pact as we do.

Senator Vandenberg. May I just ask one further question?

Mr. Ambassador, I interrogated you about article 3 in a fashion which might have been construed as critical. Now I want to ask you a question which certainly could not be construed in that fashion.

GROWING CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE

As I take it from your testimony, it is your considered conclusion, after first-hand continuous contact with western Europe in the last year or two, that there is now a momentum of confidence?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes.

Senator Vandenberg. And that in the presence of such momentum, which in the language of the street is winning the "cold war," this is the time, of all times, when we should evidence our maximum spirit of cooperation and support?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. The growth of mutual confidence will be tremendously forwarded by concrete evidence.

The Chairman. All right; Senator George?

INTRA-EUROPEAN TRADE

Senator George. Mr. Ambassador, to what extent are the European countries trading among themselves? I do not mean to go into detailed figures.

Ambassador Harriman. When I went over to Paris a year ago and studied figures, European trade was on the decline because of the difficulties of exchange problems, unbalance of production, and so forth, and the credits that had been given by certain countries to others had come up to the maximum of their means. It has substantially expanded in this past year, and will expand during the next 12 months.
ABOLISHMENT OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE BARRIERS

Senator George. Specifically, what barriers have been removed by any one of the states that is in this pact as against any others?

Ambassador Harriman. There have been further discussions in the economic union which has been agreed to between the Benelux countries; there has been a customs union agreed to in principle and it is being implemented between Italy and France. There are discussions of similar nature in the Scandinavian countries. Unfortunately it is a fact that there is a good deal of bilateralism which is essential at the present time to get trade moving, but there is every intention, and we are stimulating it as much as we can, to develop into a general acceleration of European trade. The territories are not a block today; it is the restrictions that have been forced to be placed by the different countries on the importation of goods that used to move in inter-European trade which are considered in a luxury or semiluxury class, and as trade expands those will break down.

Senator George. Actually, has there been removal of any important restriction between these countries?

Ambassador Harriman. In the areas that I have mentioned; yes. Generally, unfortunately, conditions of the balance of production have not been such that there could be a widespread freeing of trade except by bilateral agreements.

Senator George. Are you prepared to give to this committee any illustration or instance or example of the actual removal of barriers between these countries, or are you merely expressing a hope?

Ambassador Harriman. I have mentioned that in the Benelux discussion and the discussions between France and Italy there have been specific barriers removed as a result of arrangements made, and through the bilateral agreements they have agreed, unfortunately on a bilateral basis rather than a multilateral basis, to remove barriers in certain specified commodities.

WILL TO RESIST DIRECTED AT ONE POSSIBLE AGGRESSOR

Senator George. When you speak of a growing spirit of unity in these European states, do you not mean that there is a growth in the spirit to resist a single outside aggressor, primarily?

Ambassador Harriman. Of course, in the European mind that is the immediate concern. But this pact is interpreted to include all aggressors. Germany has been an aggressor in the past, and I have found less concern about our policies with regard to Germany since the Atlantic Pact has been under consideration and signed by us all.

Senator George. But the question I am putting is this, that when we have done with all the fine phrases about European unity, is it not in fact a unity against a single visualized aggressor, primarily?

Ambassador Harriman. Well, there have been two things that have brought the spirit of unity together. One was economic necessity, the economic disintegration of Europe as a result of the war, and the recognition daily and weekly that it was only by the continuation of the cooperative methods which have been started and are expanding that they can hope to develop a reasonable life for the people of western Europe. There isn't anyone that I know that feels that there is any hope for a decent life in Europe for the future without growing
economic cooperation. From the standpoint of security there is only one threat that is in the minds of the people of Europe today, but there is a lingering fear about what will happen in Germany.

**CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMANY**

Senator George. I am going to ask you about that. Is there any change in attitude toward Germany on the part of the other members in this Atlantic Pact with respect to strength and power?

Ambassador Harriman. Well, the only change that has specifically occurred was the acceptance of western Germany as a part of the recovery program and as a part of the OEEC, which is the cooperative body of the participating nations. They recognize that Germany is an important economic element in Europe, and that to attain recovery of Europe and prosperity in Europe, western Germany must become a contributing unit, both in production for the European countries and consumption of products that other European countries have in the past and can in the future trade with them. There is no discussion of any other nature in Europe at the present time. There is a hope that a democratic western Germany can be developed which will avoid a threat from Germany for the future. There is a hope that that can be done, but there is no assurance as yet. There is no feeling of assurance about it as yet.

**EUROPEAN ATTITUDE TOWARD STRENGTHENING GERMANY**

Senator George. I think there could be no disagreement about the development of Germany so far as economic recovery, but now I am going back to this question of the growth of unity in Europe, a real growth of will to resist. Is there any feeling in Europe that so long as Germany is impotent and weak there can be any real security in western Europe?

Ambassador Harriman. There have been no discussions about western Germany from the military standpoint. There have, as I say, on the economic side, been questions with regard to Germany. There have been no discussions of the kind you speak of, sir.

Senator George. Well, what is the feeling? If you can tell us, and other witnesses can, about the spirit of unity that is existing in Europe, the disposition to resist that is growing in Europe, can you tell us what the attitude of the other states is toward some strengthening of Germany in this picture?

Ambassador Harriman. Until such time as there is concrete evidence that there is a real democratic Germany developing, there is today, and will continue to be, fear that Germany might join up with the east in some form to make her dangerous, and therefore there is still a desire to protect against a military threat from Germany. What that will be in the future I would not want to predict, sir.

Senator George. I was asking you what the feeling was in the European states.

Ambassador Harriman. I have tried to give it as I find it today. Until such time as there is real evidence that there is a real democracy in Germany, there will continue in my opinion to be fear that Germany might, unless carefully watched, become a threat, particularly from the standpoint of joining up with the east.
Senator George. Is not the whole problem of security in western Europe bound up with the future of the movement in Germany, some strengthening of Germany, at least?

Ambassador Harriman. I want to say that there are hopes about Germany. There are hopes that Germany will become a real member of the western community of nations. I am only speaking about the fact that until there is concrete evidence that that has become a reality, there will be no acceptance of it.

Senator George. There is no desire anywhere, so far as I know, to rebuild Germany's great military power, but when you tell me about unity in Europe I am obliged to ask what the attitude of the other European states is toward a strengthened Germany in this picture. Is she to be kept torn as she is now, and impotent? Is western Europe to have any substantial hope of security?

Ambassador Harriman. Well, Senator, one has to appreciate what these neighbors have gone through twice, and particularly this last time. There is an acceptance of the fact that economically Germany must be healthy.

Senator George. How are you going to get Germany economically healthy unless she also has some sense of security? If you are leaving her out of this picture, where does she look for any security which will rebuild her economic strength?

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, I am attempting to report as accurately as I can what I find the feeling in Europe to be, as a reporter, and the progress, certainly, is very definite. Western Germany sits very definitely as a member of the economic councils of Europe today, and that is a substantial advance. As I say, what the future will hold I cannot predict. I can only say what has happened, which is an advance, but I cannot predict the future.

THE TREATY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator George. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I gathered from your statement that if our contribution to mutual aid and the building up of a purely defensive system was withheld, that pact would have no particular significance. Is that right?

Ambassador Harriman. Well, sir, I think that is going too far.

Senator George. I wanted to find out. I gathered from your statement that you were putting a tremendous emphasis upon the military assistance.

Ambassador Harriman. I believe this to be a fact, that if we do not interpret article 3, self-help and mutual aid, as they do, which means prompt acceptance, all doing what we can, it will cause a wonder as to what our motivations are, and a beginning of wonder as to confidence in our real desire to have a mutuality of interest. And therefore there will be a serious set-back, and I do not want to minimize the set-back there will be, if there is not some concrete evidence that we interpret article 3, self-help and mutual aid, in the sense Europe does.

Senator George. Suppose the member states should be of the opinion that our contribution was too little. Then what?

Ambassador Harriman. I do not think that, Senator, is involved in the discussions at the moment. The important thing to the people—
I am talking about the public—will be in seeing something concrete moving, that the American people have a desire to help them defend their soil.

NEED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

As I said in my testimony, it is the pact itself which I believe is a great deterrent, but they have set aside reliance on neutrality. They are in whatever difficulty comes along, and therefore I think it is not unreasonable to understand that they want to get in position where they don't rely only on the deterrent, but are in position to defend themselves. And the movement of some military equipment from us is an indication that we have a real interest in helping them reach the day when they can defend themselves.

It is very important, Senator, from a psychological standpoint. I do not want to minimize it.

Senator George. I grant the importance of it, but it comes down practically to this, that so far as European recovery is concerned—because there cannot be any final recovery unless there is a sense of security—it all depends upon the continuation of aid and assistance from us, or primarily depends upon aid and assistance from us.

Ambassador Harriman. The European countries have not the ability to carry out a recovery program without the assistance that has come from the United States.

Senator George. I believe I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

FEAR IN EUROPE

Senator Wiley. Mr. Ambassador, as I analyze the situation, there are three great fears in Europe that are apparent to observers over there; first, the fear of Russia; second, the fear of a resurrected Germany with its warlike intent; and, third, the fear of economic disintegration. Does that agree with your thought?

Ambassador Harriman. I think the only fear that is uppermost in people's minds today is the fear of Russia and her intentions. Germany is only a possibility of future developments. It is not a fear today. And so far as economic collapse is concerned, the recovery program has developed a sense of confidence that they can economically reestablish their lives, so that fear no longer exists as it existed 18 months ago.

NEED FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE

Senator Wiley. But they are not willing to go on from here without our assistance, are they? They have not gotten that far yet, have they?

Ambassador Harriman. No. There is a belief among the people of the different countries that we intend to carry through for the 4-year period, on, of course, a diminishing basis.

ECA CONTACTS WITH EUROPEAN PEOPLES

Senator Wiley. What I got from your testimony was an interpretation of the psychological situation that was facing those people. I am interested in knowing how close you have personal contact with
the common people, or whether this was just your conclusion from contact with the so-called leading minds of Europe.

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, I have in Paris men from labor from the United States, on my staff, who are in touch with the labor unions, and in each mission there is a labor division with men from organized labor in the United States who are in touch with the local unions and with the local labor opinion. All of the members of my staff, and particularly in the country missions, have, of course, wide contacts. We have agriculturalists, we have business people, and they circulate around in a cross section of opinion. I do not mean to say that I would consider that in any sense a poll, but we do get opinions from all sources and they are reported to me both in messages and in written word, and also in my contacts with them.

Senator Vandenberg. You do not have Dr. Gallup on your staff, do you?

Ambassador Harriman. No, sir; we do not have Dr. Gallup on our staff.

CONDITIONS EAST OF THE IRON CURTAIN

Senator Wiley. Now that you have given us the source and basis for your conclusions with relation to the situation west of the iron curtain, have you any opinion to give us as to what the feeling of the German people themselves is? Have you any information to give us as to whether or not there is any information that east of the iron curtain conditions are probably pretty messy?

Ambassador Harriman. Well, it is not my direct responsibility, but naturally because of my previous experience I try to follow as best I can whatever information I can get. It is my own judgment, and all information is so limited that it can't be the type of opinion which I have expressed of the attitudes and conditions in western Europe, but the reports I get lead me to believe that with the economic progress that has been made in western Europe, and the policies of the Soviet Union to exploit their neighbors rather than to help them, they are having considerable difficulties. I think the instance about Yugoslavia is an example.

Senator Wiley. Are you talking simply about the satellite nations? Can you tell us anything of within Russia?

Ambassador Harriman. I cannot speak for Russia. I think one should get those who have followed more closely than I the recent developments in Russia. It seems obvious that our policies in Europe and the developments in western Europe are such that it has affected policies of the Soviet Union in a direction which is to our interest.

TREND TOWARD POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

Senator Wiley. I understood from your testimony that since you last testified here you have felt that there has been what you might call an optimistic trend in the European people.

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. That conditions are better economically and politically. Now I want to revert to that one question of Senator George. In your opinion, is there any hope that this cauldron that we have, known as Europe, or that the people there, are thinking in terms of any kind of political unity?
Ambassador Harriman. There are definite signs. We have seen the establishment of the Council of Europe. We have seen people joining in meetings and discussions of what is called the European unity movement. After all, this is the first time in history where a movement of this kind has ever started on a peaceful basis. There have been attempts to get unity through conquest, but this is the first time in history where there are earnest attempts being made to get unity in Europe through peaceful means. There are difficulties in the way of it, but certain progress has been made.

Senator Wiley. Do you think our aid has contributed to it or lessened the pressures that might have made that movement greater?

Ambassador Harriman. I think if it had not been for our aid it would have fallen apart. Some countries would have been a little better off than others. They would have gradually disintegrated, the weaker going first and the stronger trying to survive. I am talking about the Continent, of course.

Under the leadership of the European recovery program, the development of unity has been stimulated. In other words, United States policies have themselves stimulated this development of the desire for unity.

Senator Wiley. Do you want to comment on the position or situation of such nations as Sweden, which would not come into this pact?

Ambassador Harriman. Sweden, of course, has had a traditional and a successful neutrality policy over a number of generations. She and Switzerland are in the same position in that respect. And they have made up their minds that they want to stick to that neutrality. That is about all I can say.

LESSENING INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISTS IN EUROPE

Senator Wiley. Do you want to comment as to what is the situation in Italy and France with relation to whether the influence of the Communists is lessening or getting greater?

Ambassador Harriman. In both countries it is substantially lessening. The two countries, of course, are different, but it is true of both of them that the political strikes which have been called for political purposes by the Communist-dominated unions have not been successful in either country. Because of the disagreement about the use of strikes for political purposes there is developing in both countries non-Communist trade unions which are joining together to develop federations of non-Communist unions.

Senator Wiley. Is the new agrarian policy that we read about in Italy, the dividing up of large tracts of land, becoming a fact, do you think?

Ambassador Harriman. I believe so. It is a policy which the Government has adopted and I believe it will be carried out.

Senator Wiley. How do you like the new title that the Communists have given you?

Ambassador Harriman. Which one of them?

Senator Wiley. The one of which you spoke. I would have said "the Cecil Rhodes."

Ambassador Harriman. They call me so many things that I don't know which one you speak of.
Senator WILEY. You mentioned it.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. The overwhelming majority of people in all the countries laugh at it.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

NECESSITY FOR THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator GREEN. Mr. Ambassador, in the testimony so far there has been discussion both of the Atlantic Pact, which is our immediate subject of discussion, and military aid, which may follow and which, it has been stated, is supplementary to the pact. There are some critics, and I am glad to say they are few in number, that believe you can have the Atlantic Pact and be successful with it without the subsequent military aid. That has been discussed and I think has been answered well and adequately.

However, I do not think there has been sufficiently discussed another form of criticism which states that we might give the military aid without the Atlantic Pact, that the Atlantic Pact assumes certain mutual obligations which are unnecessary for us to assume, and we can give them military aid without it.

I would like to ask your opinion of what you think would be the effect on these other nations if we gave military aid without ratifying the Atlantic Pact.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I am quite ready to say, Senator, that in my opinion, if we should pursue that policy, there would be a recession of confidence which would be of such a nature that there will be a regrowth of the idea that appeasement and neutrality were the only hope for these countries, and there would be a set-back in public confidence and discussions which would be extremely damaging to the recovery program and completely destroy this sense of confidence.

Senator GREEN. In other words, the Atlantic Pact would give them a sense of confidence that could not be supplied in any other way?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. It is really a great feeling, as I have found it, that there is something new in the world in this association among like-minded people. I think Senator Vandenberg used the expression the other day, "one for all and all for one." There is a spiritual emotion about that which is hard to emphasize.

Senator GREEN. That motto of the Three Musketeers is hardly applicable, because this is for defense rather than offense.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Perhaps that is not the right word, but it indicates the feeling that freemen are standing shoulder to shoulder.

Senator GREEN. I had assumed that in answer to my question you would say there would be a tremendous loss to give them that practical aid without the assurances which were included in the Atlantic Pact also.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator GREEN. There are very few such critics, but I think we ought to have some answer in the record such as you have given us now.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?
Senator Smith of New Jersey. I have just one or two questions. I would like to ask you if you can confirm the impression I got when I was in Europe in the summer of '47, while the Marshall plan negotiations were on foot but when nothing had been completed, that the rank and file of people that I met had sort of the feeling of fatalism. They had had two invasions—I am speaking now of the western European countries—and they felt that now it was going to be a question simply of the two great powers, the United States and Russia, and they were sort of pawns in the game, and that sort of thing. I got that feeling in talking with some people, you might say of the lower ranks themselves, and also in talking with some of our own officials in our embassies. I understand from your testimony that there is a complete change so far as that is concerned. The man in the street does not have that fatalistic feeling that, after all, there is nothing to life; "We might as well make up our minds to go along.”

Is there a spirit of get up and go among the people as a whole that is going to put some real life into this so-called mutual aid business that we have been discussing this morning?

First, am I right in the observation I made in 1947; and secondly, in the change of feeling today?

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, you are absolutely right about it. At least that was my impression. I was there in the summer of 1947 and talked to a good many people. In 1947 there was complete lack of hope, as you say—fatalism. Whatever hope there was was was based on reaching for the concept that this was a conflict looming up between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that they wanted to put their heads in the sand and believe that somehow the storm would blow over the top of them and not across them.

**MORALE IN EUROPE TODAY**

Now, with the idea proposed by Secretary Marshall and the implementation which has been developed under the leadership of this committee, there started to grow very rapidly, even in the autumn of 1947, a feeling of hope, a feeling that a real life could be developed. We saw that in France. There was a general strike in the early winter and at the end of 1947, which was defeated, and the growth of the free trade-union movement in France, the will to resist internal aggression and external aggression, has developed month by month until I feel that with the discussions of the Atlantic Pact in all countries there has been a growth of confidence and a growth of the basic feeling which is so important in the concept of the Atlantic Pact, that free men must stand together, and this issue is theirs.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. You feel that we are awakening that sense and that morale by the ECA program and its success, and I want to congratulate you, as I have congratulated Mr. Hoffman and Mr. David Bruce, on the great job you have done. You have the feeling that there is a change-over from the obvious feeling that I have had, especially in France and Italy?

Ambassador Harriman. I must make clear that in those two countries—in the other countries I think it is fairly safe to say that the battle is won against the Communist internal aggression—but in Italy and France I think it is being won, and that we are resolute through
the policies and determination that it will be won. But you have seen in the press that the Communist leaders have said the Red armies should be welcomed in their countries to protect them against American aggression, and so forth, and the Communist Parties do have a considerable following, they do have in those two countries a substantial press, and they do affect a minority of public opinion. But the majority of public opinion is similar in its views to those of the other countries.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Do you think the situation is better in Italy than it was just after the election?

Ambassador Harriman. Oh, progressively better; and progressively better in France, too.

FINANCIAL BURDEN ON UNITED STATES

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I think you are aware that I have been a stanch supporter of the ECA program and I am a stanch supporter of the North Atlantic treaty, and I expect to support the military implementation. But I am troubled, as is everyone else in the Senate, with this problem. Here we have, in our ECA program, from the dollars-and-cents standpoint and the effect it has on the American economy, $5,000,000,000 plus of the ECA program which we have authorized.

Ambassador Harriman. That is for 15 months, of course.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Oh, yes. The military program is $15,000,000,000 plus, making an over-all total of something like $21,000,000,000, and then this military implementation program calls for another $1,130,000,000 more.

POSSIBILITY OF FINANCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FROM DEFENSE AND ECA APPROPRIATIONS

The question constantly comes to me in talking with people, with all those enormous requests for appropriations and authorizations, isn't it possible, by change of conditions or whatever it may be, or by sharpening our pencil, to take care of this military implementation, which after all is a token of good will rather than an over-all defense program? I do not think anyone would claim that a billion dollars is a final over-all defense program for Europe. It is an indication of our willingness to participate and be behind it.

Could we not deal with that, in your judgment, from our over-all appropriations when they are made in the ECA program and the military program for this country?

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, it is my strong opinion and earnest hope that the Congress will support the three programs of which you speak. I believe our success in winning the struggle which we have increasing right to believe will be successful, that the situation will see peace in Europe, is based on four pillars. One is our own military strength; one, of course, is the European recovery program; the third is the Atlantic Pact; and the fourth is the military assistance program. And if you weaken today you weaken the whole program, and I believe this is not the time, when we have every evidence that we are attaining success, to turn aside and wonder about whether we can save a little here or there. I think it is too dangerous. The implications are too serious to turn aside at this time and weaken our determi-
nation. The program will not be as effective, and it will have an effect behind the iron curtain in adding encouragement that they could sit us out and we will gradually become weaker and weaker in our determination to carry through.

I think if there ever was a time when we should go along courageously and with determination it is today, when we are winning, and I do earnestly hope that members of the Congress will support the recommendations of the Administration in these fields.

**PRIORITY OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS**

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Now, as you are aware, there have been some suggestions from well known and expert economists that there are certain threats of danger to our own economy at home. I am wondering whether you share my view, which is very much the same as you have suggested now, that, with respect to whatever figures we may ultimately arrive at as covering this foreign program of which we are speaking, it has the priority over everything that we are doing in America today. If there have to be economies, we will have to, for the present, postpone some of the so-called desirable but postponable items in the home program. If that is embarrassing to you I want you to say so, and do not answer it. I realize that I am criticizing the apparent over-all demands of the administration today that we go not only into this program but into this enormous welfare program. I seems to me there is a definite threat to our economy and I am greatly troubled by it, and many of my correspondents and constituents are troubled by it. They are wondering where it is going to stop.

I would say that on some things that are preferred things to do, they are “must” things, and so far as our security is concerned, that must come ahead of everything else. And if that is true, don’t we have to face courageously the advisability of postponing some of these other things that may be desirable but can be postponed.

Ambassador Harriman. It is not embarrassing. I am glad to answer it in this way:

I have been away from this country for 12 months. My trips back here have been related to my work in Europe. I have not analyzed the situation and cannot express any opinion on the subject, because I just do not know.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. No; I do not believe I have any questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, we have with us two Senators who are not members of the committee but who are here by our invitation. They will ask you some questions.

Senator Donnell?

**GROWTH OF EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Senator Donnell. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement this morning, if you will be kind enough to turn to page 2 of it, I note your observation near the middle of the page that you can testify that:

A new factor has developed, a growth of confidence based on the belief that through the North Atlantic Pact security from external aggression can be attained.

I am quoting correctly from your statement, am I not?
Senator DONNELL. And on page 3 of your statement you observe:

The participation of the United States in the pact is, of course, the factor which is developing confidence——

and then again you state:

The proposal for military aid from the United States gives vitality and meaning to the concept of effective self-help and mutual aid to resist armed attack. Then finally on that page you make this observation:

For the pact to have real meaning, I am convinced that there must be a willingness to implement promptly article 8.

Mr. Ambassador, I take it that you heard also the observations, did you not, of Senator Vandenberg, that a momentum of confidence has been attained over in Europe of recent date, or words to that effect?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I note, in view of all these statements about this momentum and this growth of confidence, and the fact that the proposal for military aid from the United States gives vitality and meaning to the concept of effective self-help and mutual aid, in connection with your observation that for the pact to have real meaning you are convinced there must be a willingness to implement promptly article 3; I say I observe with some great interest your further observation on page 4:

A defensive force is relatively small, and cannot be a threat.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, the question that I want to ask you in connection with these various statements is: On the one hand, emphasizing the great confidence that is coming and has arrived by reason of the United States being in, and this reference to implementation, et cetera, and on the other hand your assurance that a defensive force is relatively small. do you not think that this momentum of confidence will rapidly evaporate if Europe should get the idea that we are not going to send sufficient strength of some type or types to hold Europe against an attack by Russia?

What is your answer to that question, please?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Everyone in Europe knows it would take some time before they can afford, from their own means, to maintain a military establishment adequate to defense, but a gradual development will increase confidence rather than detract from it, as you indicate. I believe that as the military establishments will grow moderately there will be increasing confidence.

SCOPe OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator DONNELL. Do you not think, Mr. Ambassador, that as the President of the United States puts it, it is his judgment—I am quoting now from his inaugural address——

If we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur——

is not that the view of the President of the United States?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. You are quoting the President. Of course it is his view.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Ambassador, is it not your judgment that the thought which inspires confidence in Europe, all this momentum to which reference has been made, is primarily that with the United States and its power and its military help and its dollars and its men, Russia would be met immediately by an overwhelming force, to use the quotation from the President's address? Would the people of Europe rapidly lose that confidence if the United States did not promptly begin to send and continue to send sufficient force to guarantee that, if Russia did attack, Europe would be held for a reasonable period against such attack?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I do not fully understand your question, but I can say this; that there is a belief in Europe, in my judgment, that the North Atlantic Pact, with participation of the United States, and the knowledge that we have a substantial rearmament program, will be a strong deterrent to war, but if you are living very close to a threat of attack there is a desire to build up some means of meeting that attack. That is all I can say about it.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Do you not think, Mr. Ambassador, that the great impetus for confidence is the thought that, through the aid of the United States, the military aid of the United States, Russia will not be able to overrun Europe as Germany overrun parts of Europe, but that on the contrary Russia would be held back through this great overwhelming force to which the President alludes in his inaugural address?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I have said, sir, that there is a belief that I believe exists that participation of the United States in the North Atlantic Pact will be a great deterrent against any agressor, but I also say that the spirit and the desire is there to develop continental forces which will be able to be strong enough, on a defensive basis, to protect their soil.

EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON UNITED STATES MILITARY AID

Senator DONNELL. By your observation in your statement that "For the pact to have real meaning, I am convinced there must be a willingness to implement promptly article 3," do you refer there at least in large part to an implementation by the United States of America?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. No. I have testified that there is a spirit of desire in the suggestions I have had of the development of self-help and mutual aid. That mutual aid has already found evidence within Europe itself, as among the countries. The Brussels Pact countries are a specific example of what is already happening, but naturally the United States is the strongest of all the participants in the North Atlantic Pact, and to have the fullest mutual confidence I believe that the same interpretation of article 3 that they place on it should be placed on it by us; that they should have some evidence that we place the same interpretation on it as they do.

Senator DONNELL. And, if the United States was going to announce that it was not going forward with military implementation of Europe, this confidence in Europe would rapidly subside?
Ambassador Harriman. I have testified it would be checked. We would never catch the same spirit again that exists there today of mutual confidence.

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE THROUGH NONIMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III

Senator Donnell. And do you not think, Mr. Ambassador, that if the United States were today to say, "We will not pass a military-implementation bill providing appropriations for that purpose" that immediately the confidence, this momentum of confidence, would begin to evaporate and would very rapidly evaporate?

Ambassador Harriman. No; that is too strong.

Senator Donnell. How strong do you think it should be?

Ambassador Harriman. I do not think I can put the percentage calculation on that. The spirit of man is something you cannot put on a mathematical basis.

Senator Donnell. You still, however, I take it, adhere to the statement in your prepared statement that—

The proposal for military aid from the United States gives vitality and meaning to the concept of effective self-help and mutual aid to resist armed attack.

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir.

NEED FOR AN OVERWHELMING FORCE IN EUROPE

Senator Donnell. I want to call your attention to an observation which was made by Senator Vandenberg, the Senator from Michigan, who is on this committee, and which was presented also the other day to Secretary Acheson, and I will ask you to answer a question after I have read these few observations from him. This was in an address made on March 22 of this year in Washington to the conference of mayors. He said:

The Neutrality Act of 1939 told Hitler that the United States would keep out of any such conflict, would keep our vessels out of belligerent ports, would refuse credits to warring nations. The North Atlantic Pact, wholly to the contrary, will tell any aggressor in 1949 that—and I call your attention to this language—

from the very moment he launches his conquest in this area, he will face whatever united opposition, including that of the United States, is necessary to beat him to his knees.

I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, whether you understand that from the very moment he launches his conquest in this area, reference is made to the importance of having immediately available forces in Europe to stand against the overrunning of the country which would leave only the alternative of ultimate defeat or ultimate necessity for reliberation of the country.

Ambassador Harriman. Senator. I am testifying from my knowledge of Europe. The question that you ask I believe should be addressed to the Secretary of State.

The Chairman. It has been already. He has stated that he agrees with this observation.

Ambassador Harriman. The Secretary of State will interpret the political aspects of the treaty. He has already, as I understand it, to the satisfaction, I hope, of this committee.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Ambassador, in your study in Europe, have you considered whether or not it would be necessary for American troops to be stationed in Europe in order to prevent Russia from overrunning Europe, should an attack be made by Russia?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. All I know is that I do not know any country that wants to have an armed occupation of United States troops.

Senator DONNELL. I did not ask you that question, as to their desire for an armed occupation. I ask you the question whether or not you are of the opinion, or whether you have formed an opinion, as to whether Europe could be preserved from a Russian onslaught, "a conquest launched," to use the language of Mr. Vandenberg, "in this area"? Do you think that such an attack so launched could be successfully either repelled or withheld without addition to the European military forces being placed in Europe?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I am testifying, or trying to testify, about the things that I know about. I am not a military expert. I have testified that the European partners in this number some 200,000,000 people, and I have indicated their productive ability. That is as far as I can go in testifying on my own. I have spoken of the size of the populations and I have indicated that their industrial production is in excess of the industrial production of the Soviet Union and her satellites. I cannot testify beyond that point.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Ambassador, you referred to not being an expert, or words to that effect, along military lines. May I ask you whether or not you have had military experience?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I have not been in the Army. I have not served in the Army. During the war, I was involved as a civilian in many aspects of supply problems, military supply problems of our allies, stationed in Europe.

Senator DONNELL. You were stationed in Europe during World War II, or a large part of it?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. From the winter of 1941 until the end of the war.

Senator DONNELL. From 1941 until the end of the war in 1945, approximately 4 years?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Yes, sir; just 4 years.

Senator DONNELL. And you do not care to express any opinion on the question as to whether or not, in the event of a launching of an attack against Europe by Russia, it would or would not be necessary that American troops be there on the spot in order to convey to the enemy this united opposition to which Senator Vandenberg refers, "including that of the United States, which is necessary to beat him" (that is, the enemy) "to his knees"? You do not care to express an opinion on that?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I have made a statement, if I can find it, in my testimony, in which I speak about the population and the productive ability of our partners in Europe, and I have said, "It does not seem unreasonable to me to have confidence that in time an effective defense force can be developed to provide a real sense of security."

I do not care to say anything more than that. I am expressing my own opinion and nobody else's when I say that.

And in another place I said something to the effect that I thought it would contribute to our own security. In other words, this is a
two-way street, Senator. In my judgment the whole program is a two-way street. It adds to our security as well as theirs.

Senator DONNELL. And we add to theirs very greatly; do we not?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. We certainly do at the present time.

Senator DONNELL. The question was asked you as to whether or not any promises were made to European nations, and you have stated none to your knowledge, and you do not believe there were any with respect to military implementation.

DEVELOPMENTS IN NORWAY

Do you know whether or not Mr. Halvard Lange, the Foreign Minister of Norway, came to this country in February of this year?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I understand that he did.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know whether or not Norway was waver­ing in the balance as to whether she would or would not go into the North Atlantic Treaty, or whether she would go into some pact of Scandinavian countries?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I was in Norway a few weeks ago, and before Prime Minister Lange came to the United States to sign the treaty I had some talks with him when I was in Oslo. As I have testified, there was a sober debate and consideration of whether it was wise in all of the countries to join the pact. That was a sober consider­ation in Norway, particularly sober in Norway, whether they would trust appeasement and neutrality, or whether they would stand shoulder to shoulder with the free people of Europe.

They made their decision as a matter of basic national policy, con­sidering all of the factors, and they made their decision supported by the legislative branch in an overwhelming vote. As a matter of fact, that vote took place the day before I got to Oslo. I think practically all of them except the Communists, and there were very few of them, voted for the pact. I got the impression there was great unanimity in Norway to make this basic decision of which I speak.

Senator DONNELL. I return to the question which I asked you, which was whether or not you knew if Norway was wavering in the balance as to whether she would or would not enter the North Atlantic Pact, or whether she would go into a combination of Scandinavian countries, and that Mr. Lange came to this country during the pendency of that wavering situation. Do you know whether or not that is correct?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Well, Senator, I do not recognize that your words are a correct description of the type of sober considera­tion which was given in Norway by the Government and by the people to the question of whether they should trust appeasement or neutrality as against joining the free countries of the North Atlantic and the United States in the North Atlantic Pact. I do not call that wavering, sir. I call that sober, earnest consideration, and I think it is an implication, a wrong implication, if I may say so; I think it is not a correct description of the type of spirit that exists in Norway. They are fine people. They fought with us during the war. Their seamen were as gallant during the war as any seamen, and they took their losses and they took them bravely.

Senator DONNELL. May I say that I have no criticism whatsoever of Norway. I make none. I have implied none. I have asked, during the process which I shall now call sober, earnest consideration, instead
of wavering, whether you know whether Mr. Lange came to this country and whether the decision of his country was made after his return from that visit.

Ambassador Harriman. Historically, that is known to be a fact. He was over here some time in the early winter, and I was there some time in March, the latter part of March, and the legislative branch of the Norwegian Government the day before I was there gave Mr. Lange the authority to come to the United States a second time and sign the pact. That is an historic fact.

Danish Position on North Atlantic Treaty

Senator Donnell. Were you in Denmark along about that time also?

Ambassador Harriman. I went to Denmark afterwards.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall the dates you were in Denmark?

Ambassador Harriman. It was a date in the end of March.

Senator Donnell. Were you in Copenhagen on the 22nd of March, which was the date on which Foreign Minister Rasmusson made a statement to Parliament with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty?

Ambassador Harriman. No. Mr. Rasmusson was in Washington the day I was in Copenhagen. I did not see him on that date. I know him, but I did not see him on my visit.

Senator Donnell. Did you see, in the press of that country, or any other country, a dispatch or information substantially to this effect, and I quote now from the United Press statement in the Washington Post of March 23, from Copenhagen:

Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmusson told Parliament today that under the proposed North Atlantic Treaty the United States "would go to war" if any one of the signatory nations is attacked. "To the Danish Government," he said, "there is no doubt that the United States will consider herself pledged to assist an attacked nation with all her force. If armed force is necessary to reestablish security, it is evident that the member countries possessing such force are obliged to use it." That means that, if an armed attack occurred on one of the member countries, it could have only one answer. The United States would go to war.

Did you see substantially that in the press in Denmark?

Ambassador Harriman. I did not.

Senator Donnell. Did you hear substantially that information while you were there?

Ambassador Harriman. No; I did not.

Fundamentals of Preparedness

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Ambassador, there are three fundamentals of preparedness, are there not, and I am not using my own language; I am quoting from the Secretary of Defense, who testified yesterday: manpower, materials, and suitable positions from which to employ them in the event of attack.

You would agree with that from your observation; would you not?

Ambassador Harriman. I do not care to comment on it. I have no reason not to believe it is so. I do not know what this is leading to. I have no reason to take any issue with that statement.

Senator Donnell. Regardless of what it is leading to, that is a correct statement?
Ambassador Harriman. I have no comment to make. I have no reason to believe it is not true. I do not know whether it covers all the points. I have not given it consideration.

**MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY**

Senator Donnell. Very well. You have given consideration, I take it, to whether or not military implementation by the United States is important to maintain that confidence; is it not?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. I have said it would indicate concrete evidence that we take seriously the treaty.

Senator Donnell. Have you given consideration to whether or not the observation of Senator Lodge of this committee would be helpful in maintaining confidence in Europe, which observation was made as follows yesterday. Senator Hickenlooper interrupts Senator Lodge, and perhaps I had better read the statement by Senator Lodge.

Senator Lodge. So it is not the case of subtracting something from what you have got. You are getting rid of something that really is not doing you any good. It is doing you harm.

Then, following that, this is what Senator Hickenlooper says:

Senator Hickenlooper. If I may interrupt, I understand the Secretary to say that what we expected to furnish over there was late equipment and not obsolete equipment.

Senator Lodge. But the point is, Senator, the thing that is obsolete for us is not necessarily obsolete for another country, because the employment which the other country wants to make of it is entirely different. That, to me, is perfectly clear. There are an awful lot of things that you can use if you are engaged in suppressing fifth-column activities or if you are engaged in a purely defensive role that you can get very little good of if you are trying to go into an offensive mission.

Do you think that that view, suggested by Senator Lodge, would tend to increase the confidence that the people of Europe would have in the operation of this pact, from your observation of their temper since you have been over there?

Ambassador Harriman. No. 1, the military equipment which will be sent, if it is authorized by the Congress, will be military equipment which these countries ask for, and the needs of the different countries are different. Our needs are different. And it may well be that there are certain types of equipment which one nation may need which are not adaptable to our needs and may be in surplus, or may be in surplus but which may be of great value to that country.

Beyond that, I would not care to comment, except to say that the shipment of equipment they ask for and want certainly will add to confidence and not detract from it, as you appear to suggest, sir.

Senator Donnell. I have asked you the question as to whether or not the observation of Senator Lodge with regard to the use of types of equipment that we cannot use would tend to increase the confidence or otherwise affect it.

Ambassador Harriman. Everybody knows what I have stated: That some countries need certain types of equipment. As a matter of fact, some of the western European partners are sending equipment which they have in surplus, which they either cannot use or because they may have need for something new. That is well known. I do not think anybody would pay much attention to a statement of that kind.
You see, most people in Europe have fought, you know. They know what military equipment is.

Senator DONNELL. In fact, Europe has been engaged in war for many centuries, has it not, off and on, with great frequency?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. And that is one of the points that was made as long as approximately 160 years ago by Washington in his Farewell Address. You recall that comment, do you not?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I do.

**MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE**

Senator DONNELL. I note, Mr. Ambassador, and it is certainly creditable to you, that you have studied the question of whether or not it is advisable and important to send military equipment over to Europe to implement this treaty. You agree to that?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I certainly do.

Senator DONNELL. And your statement here this morning says, among other things—

The decision—

that is the decision to sign the Atlantic Pact—

was based on two principal articles in the pact, namely, article 5 and article 3; first, that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all, and secondly, means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid to resist armed attack.

Then you proceed:

In the European mind, these two concepts have been, I feel, inseparable.

Is that correct?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. That is correct.

**POSSIBLE NEED FOR UNITED STATES TROOPS**

Senator DONNELL. May I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, inasmuch as you have given sober and careful and earnest consideration yourself to the question of the importance of sending over military equipment, how does it happen that you have not given such serious, sober, and careful consideration to the question as to whether manpower must also be sent over by this country to guarantee that if Russia should make an attack, she would be immediately confronted, to paraphrase somewhat the language but certainly not the meaning of Senator Vandenberg, by opposition that would beat her to her knees? Why haven't you studied that question?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Because I have never heard anyone in Europe suggest it.

Senator DONNELL. You have not heard anybody in Europe suggest that, and that is the reason you have not studied it?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. It is not in the European mind at the present time, as I see it. I have said they do not like armies of occupation.

Senator DONNELL. Are you prepared to state whether or not the armies of the United States have been quite acceptable in Germany, at any rate? Have they not been received in a very friendly manner?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I think you would ask that question of our military people who are responsible for the occupation. No people
like to have armies of occupation. I think American troops have behaved well, by and large, and insofar as any army of occupation can have any reasonable good will, I think our American troops wherever they go have it. No army of occupation is welcomed.

Senator DONNELL. I may say, Mr. Ambassador, that I have not suggested even remotely that this country should send over an army of occupation to occupy France or any of these other countries. The question to which you have addressed your thought is whether or not, in order to guarantee that if Russia should start in with a great number of troops from the east side it would be necessary, in order to hold that country for several weeks, to send over American troops or to have them already stationed there with the full concurrence of the parties to the pact, in order to guarantee that Russia could be successfully withheld.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. You should ask that question of our Military Establishment. So far as I am concerned, I have never heard anyone discuss that matter in the discussions I have had regarding the Atlantic Pact and the implementation of article 3.

Senator DONNELL. Have you investigated, Mr. Ambassador, the question of what is the armed strength of the various other signatories?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I have some very general information about it, but not in detail at all.

Senator DONNELL. You would prefer not to give an offhand statement, I take it, on that?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins?

Mr. Ambassador, this is Senator Watkins, of Utah.

ECONOMIC COLLABORATION AMONG ATLANTIC PACT NATIONS

Senator WATKINS. I would like to have Mr. Ambassador make some comments on article 2 of the North Atlantic Pact, inasmuch as he has been connected with our economic establishment in this country and abroad for some time.

Article 2 provides—

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being, and particularly the last sentence—

They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

What particular economic policies do you think the negotiators had in mind when they put this in the treaty?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I think that question should be addressed to the Secretary of State, sir. So far as Europe is concerned, the participating nations of the North Atlantic Pact are also participants in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and they are sitting around the table every day to find ways and means, by cooperative action, to help each other in the economic field. There is evidence that our European partners in the Atlantic Pact are already at work in the economic cooperative field.
CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES

Senator Watkins. This states—

Will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies.

What economic policies do they have that are now in conflict which they can eliminate or probably have agreed to eliminate by this very paragraph?

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, I was not involved in the negotiations for the treaty. I believe your question as to what was meant, and the interpretation of that article, should be addressed to the Secretary of State.

Senator Watkins. I was addressing it to you. I realize probably he would be the one to get at what they had in mind at the moment, but since you have endorsed the pact and said it is a good pact for us, I thought probably you would have some judgment on what could be eliminated and what should be sought to be eliminated by reason of this agreement.

Ambassador Harriman. I cannot speak of my own knowledge as to what the discussions were that led up to that language and the interpretation which the United States Government places on that, and therefore I think it would be confusing if I, as an individual, attempted to speak of matters of which I have not intimate knowledge.

Senator Watkins. I am not asking you to interpret the treaty now, as to what the intention was when they negotiated it, but what in your judgment are the economic policies which we could eliminate as between the signatories to the treaty, including ourselves. I mean by that the United States. I am speaking of conflicts.

Ambassador Harriman. I do not know what that word “conflicts” relates to, specifically, and I would rather not confuse the testimony by giving a personal opinion.

Senator Watkins. Would it include tariffs?

Ambassador Harriman. I would not think tariffs were a conflict. Of course, tariffs do interfere with the freest flow of multilateral trade, but each country is entitled to decide itself as to whether its well-being is served by a tariff on this or that commodity, and what is involved in it. We also have other agreements, as you well know, under our tariff-treaty policies, which relate to international agreements on that subject.

Senator Watkins. Have you observed in your meeting with the foreign countries that are now part of the ECA program any conflict which you think might possibly come within the scope of that paragraph?

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, I think that it is more appropriate, if I may say so, to ask the question of interpreting this article of the Secretary of State, and individual testimony on this question I do not think contributes to an understanding of the committee on what this article is intended to cover.

Senator Watkins. I do not know myself what it is intended to cover.

MEANING OF ARTICLE 2

Ambassador Harriman. In general it indicates economic cooperation, which, from my observation, countries are today engaged in. They are not engaged in conflict, but are trying to find ways and means by which they can help each other economically.
Senator Watkins. Would you be willing to approve this paragraph without any more knowledge than you say you have of it, or what it means?

Ambassador Harriman. If I were a member of the committee considering it, I naturally would want to understand from the Secretary of State all aspects of what it was intended to cover. I am not overly concerned about it, frankly, personally.

Senator Watkins. I am not overly concerned about it, but I would like to know what possibilities there are in that paragraph. I thought possibly, inasmuch as you had given us your judgment and your opinion that this pact ought to be approved, that you probably had studied it, and know what it means and what it is intended to cover in making up that judgment of yours, and you would be willing to give us whatever light you have on that subject, because after all, the Senators individually have to make up their minds on the information they can get. About the only source of our information is what we read in the newspapers and what we get from the witnesses in the hearings.

Ambassador Harriman. It seems to me the article is clear. But you want to get an interpretation of it and what was in the minds of the negotiators, and it is in that field that I cannot contribute to you.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Senator Watkins. My last question did not go to the interpretation of it. I wondered if you had observed any conflicts over there which ought to be eliminated between nations.

Ambassador Harriman. I am testifying, Senator, to the fact that the Organization for European Economic Recovery, of which the European associates in the North Atlantic Treaty are members, are daily at work, and I am constantly in touch with them, and the members of my staff, on the work that they are doing in attempting to encourage and develop the closest type of economic cooperation among the members. I can simply testify to the fact that our European partners are already at work on increasing economic cooperation to the fullest extent which they feel is possible.

TRADE TREATIES WITH IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES

Senator Watkins. May I direct your attention to trade treaties that are now in existence between Great Britain and Russia, Great Britain and Poland, and France and Russia, and possibly Poland, whereby Great Britain ships large quantities of steel, steel rails and locomotives, and copper products, motors, aluminum, and other articles, that are war-potential articles, to both Russia and Poland. Would that be considered, in your judgment, in the nature of a conflict with the general policy of ECA as declared by the Congress, that that policy should be to strengthen our friends over there and not go to our enemies?

Ambassador Harriman. These treaties that you speak of are barter deals between different countries in western Europe with the different countries in eastern Europe. The governments of those countries have complete control of their foreign trade, and they deal on a barter basis. That is their way of doing business.
Under the ECA there is a section, 117 (b), which provides that the things we send them should not be used to make products which we do not ship from this country for security reasons, and they are adhering to that. From all information I have they are adhering to that provision of the act.

Senator Watkins. Would you consider aluminum as one of those materials that ought not to be sent? If we ship it to England, for instance, it ought not to be reshipped by England.

Ambassador Harriman. I have no evidence that England is shipping aluminum which is financed by ECA.

Senator Watkins. Would it make any difference if the aluminum were shipped from some that England manufactured herself out of materials or from financial aid from the United States under the ECA program?

Ambassador Harriman. The act provides that materials which we send them, raw materials we send them, should not be used in the manufacture of things which are excluded from export by the United States for security reasons, and I am stating that so far I am informed, and it is my belief, they are rigidly adhering to that. The question of what products it goes into, there are things which are excluded from shipment by the United States for security reasons. There are also things that are excluded from shipment by the United States for short-supply reasons, as you well know, under the authority granted to the Secretary of Commerce.

Senator Watkins. Aluminum is one of those articles, is it not, one of those short-supply items?

Ambassador Harriman. The ECA Act only relates to those things which are excluded from shipment by the United States for security reasons.

LIMITATIONS ON EAST-WEST TRADE

Senator Watkins. Do you believe that it is in keeping and in harmony with our help to Europe, and also in harmony with the spirit of this present pact that is now presented to us, for England to be shipping materials that can be used in building up the war potential of Russia and her satellites?

Ambassador Harriman. It is a question of interpreting what is war potential.

Senator Watkins. I am submitting to you the exact items, steel rails and locomotives.

Ambassador Harriman. The exact items will have to be discussed in detail, and I am not prepared to testify on that question today. I do say that the British, as well as other participating countries, are not shipping the things which they believe are against the security interests of this country. Of course the question of what is war potential has been discussed many times by different committees here and different people have expressed different views about that. What is or is not dangerous at the present time—we have our policies, and the other countries, generally speaking, have similar and parallel policies, and generally speaking they are substantially in conformance with our own.

Senator Watkins. I take it for granted you are acquainted with the trade treaties I have called to your attention between the countries named?
Ambassador Harriman. There are people in Government who study those things, and I am saying that these countries have established restrictions on exports which are similar and parallel to the countries you speak of, to our own. We are not always in full agreement on all items, but generally speaking in their policies they recognize fully they are in the same boat as we are. They recognize fully what is involved in the problem that is concerning you and concerning all of us. They, generally speaking, have the same point of view we have, and are implementing that concern in restricting exports.

Senator Watkins. The reason I called it to your attention, we have had in the Congressional Record copies of the trade treaties in which are named some of the articles I have already called to your attention. I thought probably you had made a study of that in the course of the conduct of your official duties, and probably would give us some light on whether or not that actually is dangerous to our country in the way of helping to build up possible enemies.

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, I am not prepared to discuss individual items except in executive session. I can only say that from my observation, these countries recognize the same interests that we have in our security, and are taking measures to carry out parallel restrictions of things that we do not export for security reasons.

ARTICLE 2 AND THE ITO CHARTER

Senator Watkins. In your judgment would there be any binding effect of this article 2 on the United States to ratify the international trade agreement that has been negotiated recently—anything in this paragraph?

Ambassador Harriman. I would not think they had any overlapping relationship at all.

Senator Watkins. You are acquainted with that proposed International Trade Organization treaty, are you not?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes.

Senator Watkins. I have not studied it, and I was wondering if there was anything in this article 2 which would lay down a policy which would, in effect, normally or otherwise, bind us to ratify that pact as possibly something in the nature of moving in the direction of the elimination of economic conflicts.

Ambassador Harriman. I would naturally prefer you to ask that question of the Secretary of State. I am not conscious of any overlapping.

Senator Watkins. In other words, your answer is that you do not know anything that would be in conflict?

Ambassador Harriman. I do not know of anything. I have never assumed there would be.

EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDING OF ARTICLE 8

Senator Watkins. I think you have spoken at some length on article 3, but unfortunately I was required to answer a quorum call. I do not have permission to be away from the session, so I had to answer the roll, and I didn't get all the answers, but I would like to ask one or two questions about article 3.

The first is, What in your judgment, as you have mingled with the officials and people of Europe, is their interpretation of what the
United States is required to do under article 3? You have been giving the sentiment of those peoples. How do they view that? What do they think our obligations are?

Ambassador Harriman. Each country is free to interpret that article in whatever way it believes it is the intent.

Senator Watkins. What do you find to be their sentiment? That is what I am trying to get at.

Ambassador Harriman. They take that provision of self-help and mutual aid seriously, and are prepared to do what they can.

Senator Watkins. Do they think that that absolutely binds us, binds the United States and the Congress, to go ahead and vote money and goods?

Ambassador Harriman. I have stated before that I think it is perfectly clear to them that there is no agreement on our part to do anything to implement that article, and it is for the Congress of the United States, if it approves the treaty, to interpret that article. Mr. Acheson has testified at length in that respect. I listened to his testimony, and I cannot contribute anything more to what he said. I can only say, as I have said, that there have been no promises given.

Senator Watkins. I am not asking you that. I am asking, How do the people of Europe feel about it? What is their view about it? Do they think whether we ratify this treaty we are bound to do something in the way of giving them help?

Ambassador Harriman. I have stated that I have not found anyone, none of the Government people that I have seen, or any under them, who has any impression that any promises have been made under that article. They have hopes, yes.

Senator Watkins. I direct your attention to article 3. I am somewhat confused now. I thought that you had made a direct commitment in your statement that articles 3 and 5 went together.

Ambassador Harriman. And I have testified that if we do not implement it properly, it will cause some loss of the growing confidence.

Senator Watkins. Do I understand you correctly now, that the European people, including the officials, feel that it is entirely up to us to say whether or not we are bound to do anything under that article?

Ambassador Harriman. No. I can only say that they interpret it seriously, want to implement it, and have hopes that we will feel the same way they do; but there have been no promises made.

Senator Watkins. What is the public sentiment on the point of the implementation of it?

Ambassador Harriman. I have testified to that, that they have hopes; and if no action is taken it will tend to reduce this growing confidence to which I have testified.

Senator Watkins. Do you mean the only thing they get out of it is that there is a hope? They do not feel there is any binding effect on us to really do something?

Ambassador Harriman. That is why I said is was so important psychologically to see the flow of some equipment promptly, in order to prove that we had a real interest in helping them defend their soil.
Senator Watkins. Now, as an American citizen of the United States, what do we think it means with respect to what they are required to do under that same obligation, that same article? Do we feel, or is it your belief, that they are not required to do anything, that they are not actually bound, that we just have a hope that they will do something?

Ambassador Harriman. Well, the interpretation of that will become solid when each country takes positive steps in regard to it.

Senator Watkins. I am aware of that. I am trying to get at something else.

Ambassador Harriman. The interpretation that each country has of that article is determined by what it does. We are free to interpret it as the Secretary of State testified.

INTERPRETATION OF COMMITMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 3

Senator Watkins. You do not have any well-defined idea as to what they think over there or what we should think about the binding effect of that particular section?

Ambassador Harriman. I have testified to the fact that I have not found any Government official under the belief that there were any promises made. I am testifying also to the fact that they have high hopes and they welcome recommendations of the administration for the implementation of that article through the military assistance program which will be before the Congress shortly, and they have high hopes that Congress will take favorable action on that program.

Senator Watkins. I understand they have hopes, but I am wondering what they think we have agreed to do. I hope I have not failed to make it clear that that is the answer that I would like to get, as to just how they feel about it; what their interpretation of that is. The reason I am asking you this, Mr. Harriman, is that I really want to get their feeling on it. I don't know; and you have been there.

Ambassador Harriman. I am not trying to evade, but I am trying to be as definite as I can. I think they fully understand that that article provides that each country must interpret that in its own way, and analyze its obligations under that article in its own way. Further understanding of what it means will come after the action in each of the countries, including the United States. And I am adding to that the fact that they have hopes that we will take an interest in their own self-defense. They have a conviction that they can as a group, not individually, but collectively, develop a military establishment in Europe which would not only add to their security but make a contribution to the security of the United States. And they believe in that article 3.

It is important to them as a two-way street. They have capabilities, a readiness to fight and capabilities of developing military establishments which will not only contribute to their security but also to ours. This word is “mutual” and they do not look upon it as a one-way street. But they do understand that they cannot effectively develop their forces without some help at this time, and certainly particular types of equipment.
I testified that there would be great disappointment and a certain lack of confidence or diminution of confidence if we did not promptly implement article 3 by the shipping of some equipment.

Senator Watkins. You recognize the fact that that article is rather vague and rather indefinite, do you not?

Ambassador Harriman. It is a general statement of purpose.

ADVISABILITY OF CLARIFYING ARTICLE 3

Senator Watkins. Do you think it would be wise, in view of the fact that you say each country will have the right, after the pact is signed and ratified, to interpret it in its own way, that we ought to have a reservation clearing up just what we think about it, so they will know just what we understand it to mean?

Ambassador Harriman. So far as I am concerned, speaking as an individual, I think the article is satisfactory as it stands. The interpretation of that will be by the concrete steps that are taken. There is a desire for mutuality of interest, and I am not concerned over the interpretation the participating countries of Europe will place on that provision. I think they are earnest about it. Their capabilities are limited today, but they are talking about what they can do for the common cause, all of them.

Senator Watkins. You realize that if we do not have some meeting of the minds on the question of what we are to do that they, if they have a different view, may be terribly disappointed in us and it may bring us more ill will if we do not meet their interpretation of the treaty?

Ambassador Harriman. I do not think you could write it more specifically because conditions change from year to year. The situation in different countries changes from year to year, the needs change from year to year. I don't see how one could write into a treaty what any country, including the United States, would do next year or the year after or the year after. I wouldn't have thought we would want to bind ourselves to that. We are dealing with countries in this treaty that in my judgment, from close observation, are like-minded, and I have confidence that they will in their way do their share.

Senator Watkins. But I have seen members of a family, certainly a father and son, to be like-minded, yet they have had a disagreement over the meaning of agreements even in a relationship as close as that. I just wondered whether you felt the situation was such that we ought to be made aware of it so we could know what they expect of us, so we could be governed accordingly. In other words, the American people ought to know pretty much what they are being let in for in this agreement, what it is going to bind future Congresses to do, to make appropriations to go on to carry out this so-called mutual aid. If you can give us any light on this view over there, we have had certain dispatches from over there giving quotations from speeches made by some of their premiers and other government officials, but if you have first-hand information, that is what I would like to get.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Will the Senator yield for a question? Did the Senator hear Secretary Acheson's testimony when these hearings opened up?

Senator Watkins. I was not here that morning.
Senator Smith of New Jersey. Might I not ask Mr. Harriman, then, whether my understanding is correct, that Secretary Acheson made it very clear to us that there had been discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to what might be needed for a proper implementation of this defense program. In arriving at this figure of $1,130,000,000 they thought in terms of what would be needed in order to bring the existing divisions, this year's military program of these various countries, up to adequate strength, or something along that line. I got the impression, at least, that there was an understanding up to that point, and that he would be prepared to present the program to this committee or the Armed Services Committee specifically for the plan of this military pact.

Am I wrong about that?

Ambassador Harriman. That is right as to this year.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. Everybody admits that the future will depend on what happens, what develops, what the effect of this is this year. So far as this year is concerned I understand there was a pretty clear understanding of what this mutual aid meant.

EUROPEAN REACTION TO ARTICLE 3

Ambassador Harriman. The Senator has asked me what the reaction in Europe is. One is the government, and the other is the people. I think that if there was some evidence that would satisfy the people that we had an interest and interpreted this article as having an interest in helping them to help themselves, that would be adequate. Now, as to this program, I rest on Secretary Acheson's testimony in regard to the manner in which this particular proposal, which will be submitted to the Congress, was developed.

I would like to add that with the spirit which exists in Europe today, if we meet it with a recognition that we can help them contribute to their own security and our own, by shipping arms, I think it will cement the relationship of the growing confidence, the mutual confidence, and I do not think that it is a serious matter for the future, assuming that the Congress of the United States continues to carry out the article in the spirit in which it is begun. There may be a time when it isn't necessary at all. But they all recognize that that is a free decision. When you have a partnership relationship it is a partnership relationship, and everybody does what he thinks can be done.

I am not afraid, Senator. There will be discussions, yes, of course, but I am not afraid of its leading to any major difficulties in the future.

Senator Smith of New Jersey. I just wanted to ask Senator Watkins whether that helped to clarify his thinking on this very relevant question, this very important question. It seems to me in presenting to us Secretary Acheson's statement it has been clear that these other countries, or at least their representatives, have in mind a fairly definite program.

Senator Watkins. One reason I am asking this question is because as I glanced over the statement here—I did not hear it all; he was practically finished when I came in this morning—Mr. Harriman was giving practically unlimited endorsement to this program, and while that is very helpful to have his opinion, and I have great respect for
it, still at the same time, under our Constitution the Senate has to advise the executive department with respect to these treaties, and I take the position that we should have as nearly as possible the same factual information as the Executive has in order to make up our minds. We should not rely entirely on the judgment and opinions of responsible officials any more than they should rely on our judgment.

The American people, I think, under the Constitution, require more of us than to merely get the opinions of these generals and Cabinet members and the President of the United States. If we are going to get advice that is worth anything for the protection of America, we must have the facts as well as the other agency of Government, and that is the view I take in the matter of these investigations, and I would like to get as much information as I possibly can from the witnesses on the facts which enable them to make a judgment in favor of the pact or against it, whichever way it happens to be. So you see what I have in mind.

DIFFICULTY IN MAKING TREATIES TOO DETAILED

The Chairman. May I interrupt just a minute right there, and you can answer this, too. I will ask you, Mr. Ambassador, if it is not impossible to put in a treaty all of the details as to what each government shall furnish and not furnish and what actions they shall take. These countries that signed this treaty are obligated to do the things that the treaty incorporates, just as we are obligated. We have got the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other visitors working on these plans, and if one of these countries should not do all that it can do, it certainly could be called to their attention through the appropriate agencies, and they could be stimulated into living up to the obligations of this Charter. It seems to me absolutely physically impossible to put in a treaty every detail affecting the various countries and what they shall do.

For instance, one country can better do one thing than another country, and adversely that country might be able and qualified to do certain things that the other country could not do. Are those general observations not true, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Harriman. Absolutely, Senator.

May I say something to try to clarify to Senator Watkins my position with regard to this. I have come here this morning to testify as a reporter of what I see in the European scene. I opened my remarks with the statement that I welcomed the opportunity to express to you what I feel to be the meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty to our European partners, and how it relates to the recovery program.

LIMITS OF TESTIMONY

Now we are discussing his morning the Atlantic Pact, and I was addressing myself to the reaction in Europe to article 5 and article 3. We are not discussing this morning the recommendation of the administration, or the executive branch, I should say, on the military assistance program. When that comes before us, or this committee or whatever committee is appropriate, then the executive branch will submit the details of that program, and if I am here in the country
I will be very glad to contribute whatever I can to an analysis of that program.

Obviously it is the duty of the committee before which it comes to analyze the reasons and to review the facts which are presented at that time, but we are not here this morning, as I understand it, Mr. Chairman, to review the details of a program which has not yet been submitted. I am only testifying as to the reaction in Europe, the meaning of the pact to the Europeans, and I am discussing, or trying to discuss, article 3 and article 5, which are considered in Europe the two principal—I suppose by all of us the two principal—articles of the pact.

Senator Watkins. I submit my questions do not think have gone to asking any details. I have been trying to get the facts upon which I have formed a judgment. I may say this: That I think, as I read your testimony, that you have not only come here as a reporter to report what you saw and give a factual statement, but you have come here as a pleader and as a person who, by reason of his official position and experience, is enabled to form an opinion that is worth something to the Senate, and you have expressed that opinion and have done it very well.

I think you are more or less in the nature of an expert witness as well as someone who is just trying to give us the facts. That is what I wanted to get, if it is possible, and not all the details. I realize it is impossible to sit down and write all the details in a treaty, although the general principles are usually laid down, and if there are some firm commitments with respect to financial assistance and all that sort of thing they are more or less outlined so you can identify them and so there can’t be any misunderstanding between the parties as to what they are to be.

Having made that explanation and that statement, I think you have said all you want to say about it, probably, and I do not want to prolong the investigation on that point, but to me it is a very important point in this treaty to know just what we are getting into and what we are letting ourselves in for, and it will help me to make up my mind finally on this treaty, whether we ought to have a reservation on this particular section to make it pretty clear to the people of the world just what we are agreeing to.

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, I feel this question so deeply that I come to this committee and express the earnest hope that the pact will be ratified and that at a later time, when you consider all of the aspects of the proposal which will be submitted by the executive branch for the military assistance program, you will take similar action on that. I believe we are winning the struggle for a peaceful outlook in Europe, and I believe this is the time to carry through on the program which is showing evidences of real success. And the spirit of the people in Europe is most important of all.

**MORALE IN EUROPE BEFORE ATLANTIC TREATY**

Senator Watkins. I would like to ask you something more about that. As I understand it, when you went there a year ago—I think you went there at the beginning, did you not, of the Marshall program?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir, I went over in May of last year.

Senator Watkins. And you found that they were not too hopeful at that time?
Ambassador Harriman. No; my testimony about that relates to the trip I made to Europe in the summer of 1947. There already had been, between the summer of 1947 and the spring of 1948, as a result of the Marshall plan proposal and the implementation of that by the Congress, a tremendous improvement in the morale of the people. I testified to that at some length in answer to other questions.

Senator Watkins. What did you find when you went there at the beginning? I want to find out what it was as compared to what it was before we ever announced the Atlantic Pact.

Ambassador Harriman. I have said that the momentum which we attained up to, I said in my testimony, February, which clearly stated what had been achieved today, was based on hope. As Senator Smith said, when he was in Europe in 1947 his observations were the same as mine, it was pretty close to despair, and we saw month by month the improvement of conditions, the hope carried through to this point, that since the discussions of the Atlantic Pact—and I have made some trips during the period when the pact was under consideration—there was a new factor, namely, confidence was developing. I testified to the fact that I thought confidence was essential to recovery in Europe and to the development of the will to resist internal and external aggression, and therefore I expressed the view that the implementation of the pact, under article 3, was important to the European program, and attainment of our major objectives, which is the development of conditions which can lead to an assurance of peace in Europe.

RECOVERY IN EUROPE

Senator Watkins. As I understand it from your testimony, the Marshall program, the European recovery program, has succeeded and has succeeded very well.

Ambassador Harriman. It is making progress and is ahead of what I had hoped it would be when we undertook the task.

Senator Watkins. Did you not tell the House committee or one of the committees before whom you testified, as I remember the quotation from your testimony it was that it had succeeded very well in accomplishing the purpose the Congress had intended?

Ambassador Harriman. Yes, sir. I think we must bear in mind it is a 4-year program, and I testified to the fact that I thought it was ahead of what I thought it would be in the first year. More progress had been made toward the ultimate goal than I believed would be the case in 1 year.

Senator Watkins. Do you remember at that time, when that program was up for discussion, it was said that if we did that it would help prevent a third world war, and it would also make it unnecessary for us to render any military assistance?

Ambassador Harriman. I never testified to that effect.

Senator Watkins. I didn't say you; it was testified to that effect at that time.

Ambassador Harriman. I don't know who testified to that effect. I felt and hoped for a number of years that we would develop the policies which are now before the Congress, and I have said so many times, that I believed that if these policies would be developed, and the committee has heard me testify over the years since I came back
from my post in Russia, that policies along the lines we now have before us would, in my judgment, assure us of a peaceful situation in Europe.

MORALE IN EUROPE BEFORE THE ATLANTIC PACT

Senator Watkins. What was the sentiment of the people in Europe immediately before the announcement of a possible Atlantic Pact? How did they feel then about their situation under the recovery program?

Ambassador Harriman. It is awfully hard to define it. I have used the word “hope.” Hope was expanding, and the discussions and conclusion of the Atlantic Pact have developed this wave of confidence. I cannot find words to describe it any more definitely than that.

Now, the question of the Atlantic Pact and the military assistance is not new to them, because the resolution which was developed by this committee and passed by the Senate gave an indication of the trend of opinion in the Senate. It is on that resolution that the Atlantic Pact has been developed, in addition to which the House discussed, in connection with ECA last spring, whether there should not be in ECA a provision to permit the transfer of military equipment, so this subject and the fact that we are considering it—when I say “we,” the American people and the Congress—is not new to the people in Europe. They were fully alive to the fact that this subject was in public and general discussion among the people and in the Congress last year.

Now, that has contributed to the hope, and to find that the Atlantic Pact is actually signed and before the Senate for ratification, and the expectation that it will be ratified, and with that the consideration and implementation of article 3, all has led to a wave of confidence as I have described.

The Chairman. May I interrupt a minute?

How long will you take to conclude?

Senator Watkins. I can tell better if I can tell how long the answers will be. I have only a few questions, but I seem to have to ask them a good many times to try to get what I want to get.

Ambassador Harriman. I am sorry, sir.

Senator Watkins. I have no means of anticipating the length of the answers.

The Chairman. Nor the length of the questions.

Senator Watkins. My questions have not been so long, I think the record will show.

RECOVERY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

What I wanted to find out, if possible, was just how the people felt, whether they had confidence in going on under the European recovery program without any military alliance or pact.

Ambassador Harriman. I don’t think we have a completed program in Europe to attain our objectives in Europe unless we go forward.

Senator Watkins. How do they feel?

Ambassador Harriman. I will put that as my opinion of their belief. What I say, I believe is their opinion.

Senator Watkins. You put that as their opinion?
Would they give up hope now, for instance, and not do anything more to help themselves, and just give in to appeasement if the Senate should not vote anything, or Congress should not vote anything to implement the pact?

Ambassador Harriman. No. I think they will go ahead, but I think it will raise doubts. I think you will have a serious set-back if we don't go ahead with the pact.

Senator Watkins. I meant the implementation. I said, suppose we ratify the pact but we do not vote any military relief.

Ambassador Harriman. I testified, Senator, at length this morning that I believed we would never recapture the present wave of enthusiasm and spirit of mutual cooperation which exists and which is growing today in Europe.

Senator Watkins. What would happen if we did not ratify the pact and would just go on with our European recovery program?

Ambassador Harriman. I think there would be a reorientation. Those people in each country that have some confidence in appeasement and neutrality would see that there would be a rediscussion of all of that, and a restrengthening of those that believe in appeasement and neutrality would result.

NEED FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE

Senator Watkins. Is it a fact that they feel that they cannot, for any foreseeable time now, stand on their own feet without our assistance?

Ambassador Harriman. I do not know what "foreseeable" is. I believe they feel that with our assistance they can strengthen their military establishment to the point where they can live in a sense of security and go to bed at night feeling that they can get up in the morning without some bad news.

Senator Watkins. I get from one of the statements you made here in your general statement that without the United States their case is practically hopeless. I wondered how long that would be that way, how long we would have to be their mainstay.

Ambassador Harriman. The European recovery program was undertaken as a 4-year program and accepted as a 4-year program by the European nations, and they have worked to carry out what they have to do to make it a success. I cannot discuss the military aspects of it, as that is not before us at the present time.

Senator Watkins. You can discuss how they feel.

Ambassador Harriman. They have great confidence in their ability, talking about the Europeans. The Europeans feel that they will fight, and they have fought well in the past, and will do so again to protect their soil, but at the present time it will take them so long to reestablish their military establishments that they want our help to expedite the day.

RECOVERY AND THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Watkins. Do you think they would give up completely if we did not ratify this pact but went on with our economic assistance?

Ambassador Harriman. Without any economic assistance? They wouldn't give up; they would battle it through. But it is my judg-
ment economic conditions would deteriorate again and there would be the same difficulties, or similar difficulties, that existed in 1947, and what we put into it would be lost.

Senator Watkins. In other words, after having had the European recovery program in operation a year, it is your considered judgment that these people feel over there that without the pact they are practically lost, and their condition will disintegrate again back to 1947?

Ambassador Harriman. Senator, they look upon this as a 4-year program. No one over there felt the job could be done—no informed person; I don’t know what the individual people felt—that it could be done in a year.

Senator Watkins. I said, let us carry out the European recovery program to the full 4 years. If we do not take in the pact, or if we do not ratify the pact, then do they take the position that without the pact they will not be able to get on their feet and they will disintegrate again back to 1947 conditions?

Ambassador Harriman. No. I thought you meant if we stopped the European recovery program.

If you carry along the European recovery program without the confidence that comes from the pact itself, it will be more difficult to achieve the objective. The economic situation, in my judgment, will not be as sound at the end of 4 years as it would be with the pact. But certainly progress will have been made, but it won’t be the full realization of what I believe is in our national interest to development of, as I said, strong partners in the struggle for freedom and peace in which we are engaged.

**POSSIBILITY OF WAR**

Senator Watkins. Mr. Ambassador, in your opinion are we moving away from imminent war or are we moving nearer to it?

Ambassador Harriman. I have testified before this committee that I did not believe that war was inevitable, and I felt if the programs that we had before us could be developed, war could be avoided, and I am more encouraged in that conviction now than I ever have been. I am extremely optimistic, personally, that our policies as they have been developed are bearing fruit.

Senator Watkins. I do not think I got quite what I asked for. I wanted to know whether in your opinion we were moving toward war or away from it.

Ambassador Harriman. I thought I testified to that effect. We are moving away from it.

Senator Watkins. What I would like to get your opinion on is this: Whether or not the present situation is such that if we do not adopt this pact we are likely to face war, and that that prospect is imminent.

Ambassador Harriman. I do not think that anyone can answer that categorical question.

Senator Watkins. All I want is your opinion.

Ambassador Harriman. My opinion is that we further the interests of peace by carrying through this program, and we will develop strong partners which we need, in my judgment, as we look around the world, to help us further the interests of peace all over the world.

That is all I can say, Senator.

Senator Watkins. I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until Monday at 10:30.

We thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. You have made a very clear and very comprehensive statement in view of the questions that have been asked you, all of which were not, in my opinion, pertinent to the issue before the committee.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I am grateful for the opportunity you have given me to appear before you.

(Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene on Monday, May 2, 1949, at 10:30 a.m.)
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on April 29, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, at 10:30 a. m., Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally, George, Thomas of Utah, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Hickenlooper, and Lodge.

Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins.

The chairman. The committee will please come to order.

This is the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, holding hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We are fortunate this morning in having present Mr. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State, whom we wish to interrogate. Mr. Lovett is familiar, I assume—I assume it is a sound assumption—with the North Atlantic Pact, and is reputed to have been one of the early people who had contact with its formation, and so forth. We will be very glad to hear you on the matter, Mr. Lovett, and we shall try to accommodate ourselves as much as possible to your convenience.

Mr. Lovett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a short prepared statement here, copies of which are on the way up to the committee now, and if it meets with the wishes of the committee I will read from this as an initial statement.

The chairman. That is very good, and we will interrogate you afterward.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. LOVETT, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Lovett. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have the opportunity to appear before this committee in support of the North Atlantic Pact with which I was directly associated in its origin and early development.

I shall not take the time of the committee by discussing the importance of this treaty in relation to our foreign policy or the interpretation of the actual text. These and many other points dealing with the treaty have been authoritatively and fully covered in the statements and testimony of the Secretary of State and other witnesses who have appeared before you. I shall likewise try to keep my preliminary statement brief and will then be at the disposal of the committee for any questions concerning the particular aspects of the treaty with which I was intimately and directly associated.
It is important, I believe, that there should be a full understanding as to how this treaty was conceived, the need which gave birth to its concept, and the manner in which the executive branch of the United States Government came to the decision that United States association in a measure of collective defense of this nature was necessary in the interests of its own security and that of world peace.

INSECURITY IN WESTERN EUROPE

Even while the European recovery program was still in a state of formulation, it became obvious that the problem of security in western Europe could not be ignored in connection with the general problem of European recovery. The policies and practices pursued by the Soviet Government and the Communist Parties subservient to it since the end of hostilities had created a sense of insecurity in the free countries of western Europe who had joined together to promote, with American assistance, the reconstruction and recovery of their community.

COMMUNIST ACTIONS AGAINST ERP

This general sense of insecurity had been intensified by the savage reaction of the Soviet Government to the program of cooperative undertaking between the United States and the nations of western Europe then known as the Marshall plan for the reconstruction and revival of the European community. The organization by the Soviet Government of the Cominform and the announced purpose of the Soviet Government of its intention to use every method at its disposal to sabotage and defeat the return of health and stability to the European community and the subsequent implementation of that intention had raised immediately and directly the problem of security for the nations of western Europe. They knew from experience and from the open announcement of the Soviet Government that they could expect neither help nor mercy from the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties which operate under the direction of the Kremlin.

NEED TO ASSIST RECOVERY BY INCREASING SECURITY

It became obvious to the European countries and to the executive branch of this Government that recovery would not be fully achieved unless some method could be devised to enhance the sense of security of the participating nations and restore, insofar as possible, confidence that the fruits of the constructive enterprise in which we were jointly engaged would not be destroyed by external aggression. With the encouragement of this Government, five European governments joined together in the Brussels Pact as a first step in dealing with this problem of security for the European community.

It was, however, obvious to them, as it was to us, that these European countries—no matter how far they progressed along the program which they had set for themselves of coordinating and integrating their defense capabilities—were not able by their efforts alone to deal with the situation. The problem then arose in our minds as to whether or not it was in the interest of the United States to associate ourselves with certain European nations in order to create those conditions of security and confidence essential for recovery and to
make a contribution for the preservation of peace in an area so vital to the national security of the United States.

The support given to the European recovery program, which during this period was before the Congress of the United States, had already made it plain that a primary objective of the foreign policy of this country was the survival, revival, and recovery of the free community of western European nations. It seemed hardly logical to us to make the effort required under this program and to ignore the possibility that if this great enterprise was not given the protection that it needed, its whole aim could be defeated. Then all the consequences which the European recovery program was designed to avert might be upon us.

EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The President of the United States, in his address to the joint session of the two Houses of Congress on March 17, 1948, made clear our interest and intentions in regard to this problem of security. However, the executive branch did not wish to take even the first step in so important a matter without obtaining the views of this committee. Accordingly, under the instructions of the President, Secretary Marshall and I began a series of consultations with the Committee on Foreign Relations. I shall not go into any detail as to the nature of these consultations, since they were done with this committee and they are familiar to many of its members.

I would like to say here that while the State Department placed at the disposal of the members of this committee the information which we had concerning the situation abroad, and discussed with them our opinion as to where the interests of the United States lay, the Senate Resolution 239, which was reported out unanimously by this committee and subsequently adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, was not drafted in the Department of State. It was—as this committee knows—the product of this committee after many consultations with us. The contents of this resolution, with which you are all familiar, became our guide in the discussions and subsequent negotiations which led to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact.

EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS WITH BRUSSELS PACT COUNTRIES

From July to September 1948, as Under Secretary of State, I conducted a series of conversations with the representatives of the Governments of Canada and the five countries forming the Brussels Pact—Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. These conversations were in the true sense of the word exploratory, and were specifically without commitment on the participants. We did not attempt to draw up any text or draft of a treaty. We wished to ascertain whether or not all the countries then involved were in sufficient accord as to the problems we were dealing with and the measures suitable to deal with them before we would embark on any more formal course. We wished above all to be certain that the European nations understood clearly the point of view of the United States Government and the sense of the Senate as set forth in Resolution 239.

I do not wish to burden the committee with any details concerning these conversations in my statement, but I hope in my testimony I will
be able to clear up any questions on this point that the committee may have.

In September these exploratory talks came to an end and the results were reported back to the governments for their consideration. They were not resumed until December.

BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TREATY

Through diplomatic channels, at the end of October, the governments which had participated in the exploratory talks in the summer had made known their views that a treaty of this nature was considered most necessary by all of them, and in December the discussions in Washington were resumed for the purpose of drafting the type of instrument that would give expression to the common purpose we had in mind. An outline of the subject matter which such a treaty should contain had been agreed upon in the exploratory talks during the summer and subsequently approved by the respective governments. This outline was developed into a series of preliminary draft articles during negotiations which started in December. No draft of the treaty as a whole was introduced by any government at any time. The drafting was a collective effort. The drafting had not been completed when I left Government service on January 20.

INTERESTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE TREATY

It was during the last week of December and early January that certain other governments whose participation in the treaty would be welcomed if they so desired, were informed of the general nature of the treaty in contemplation. I would like to say here that this information was conveyed to these governments at their request and no government at this, or as far as I know any other, time was ever subjected to any pressure in regard to joining the North Atlantic Pact. The participants did not wish even to place any government in the awkward position of receiving an invitation unless it had previously indicated its desire to be invited. We had very firmly in mind that this association of nations for collective self-defense must be entirely voluntary on the part of any of its members or it would fail of its purpose.

SUBMISSION OF PRELIMINARY DRAFT TO PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS

A preliminary draft of certain articles of the treaty was completed late in December and on the 24th of that month was submitted to the participating governments for their consideration. I think it is important to emphasize that although the representatives who had met in Washington had worked out this preliminary draft, it was clearly understood that it was without commitment on the part of the governments they represented; it was, in effect, a working paper which all realized would be subject to probable change before it became anything approaching a final text. We made abundantly clear our intention to regard this draft as a working paper and as a basis for consultation with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. This was clearly understood by all participants.
Shortly after this, as you know, I relinquished my duties as Under Secretary of State, and Secretary Acheson took over the conduct of these negotiations. He has appeared before this committee and has testified concerning this period.

ADVANTAGES OF THE TREATY

It is, I hope, superfluous to tell the committee how warmly I welcomed the signature of the North Atlantic Pact on April 4 in Washington. We would not have embarked on this venture had not the President, General Marshall, and those of us in the State Department associated with him, as well as the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, felt strongly that an association of this nature was essential to the national security of the United States and for the furtherance of peace and security, which has been and remains the great goal of our foreign policy.

Nothing that has occurred since I left office has changed my own strong convictions upon this point. On the contrary, I believe that the signature of this treaty has in itself enhanced the chances of successfully achieving these goals.

There has, in fact, already been concrete evidence of this. Within a few days of the signature of the treaty, comprehensive agreements on Germany, agreements I may say which we had been trying unsuccessfully for more than a year to reach, were concluded with the United Kingdom and France. Without the new sense of confidence provided by association contemplated by the treaty I doubt whether it would have been possible to reach such satisfactory agreements.

Recent events have only deepened my conviction that this treaty reflects the basic interests of the United States. I feel confident that fluctuations in our relations with any foreign power will not succeed in diverting our attention from these basic interests.

I firmly believe that this treaty gives accurate expression to the determination of the American people to play their full part in the maintenance of peace and security. I earnestly hope, and I am confident, that the Senate will make that determination unmistakably clear in its action upon the treaty.

The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Lovett?
Mr. Lovett. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD ECA

The Chairman. Mr. Lovett, you made reference to the ECA having been under consideration during a certain period. With regard to the Soviet Government's attitude respecting the ECA, I want to ask you some questions about my own views. Am I correct in the assumption that one of the chief motives of the opposition of the Soviet Union to the ECA is their fear that the operation of the ECA will strengthen the weaker countries, the smaller countries, like Denmark, Holland, and others of western Europe, and thereby damage the opportunities of the Soviet Union to infiltrate and aggress against them, and probably incorporate them into the system that we know as the satellites? Am I correct in that view?

Mr. Lovett. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is generally correct, sir. They have found that communism spreads in a period of great distress
and turmoil, and these countries had not had an opportunity to regain strength since the war and were a fertile field for agitation.

The CHAIRMAN. And economic hardship and disturbance would aggravate that situation, would it not?

Mr. Lovett. Very definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. And incline those who were in want and those who were dissatisfied and those who have no hope for the future, and have despair, to grasp any new proposal that might be made to them?

Mr. Lovett. I think that is correct, sir.

**MOTIVES BEHIND THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION**

The CHAIRMAN. What other motive could a government have to depress its neighbors and to bring about or to encourage economic disturbance, except that that I have indicated? Why should one country that itself is prosperous and getting along successfully be jealous of another country because it was rehabilitating itself and coming back into a normal state of economic and political life?

Mr. Lovett. Well, Mr. Chairman, I find it quite impossible to follow the devious mental processes of the Politburo, but it is clear that they have in the past profited by unrest and disorder, and in fact have very frequently had a hand in generating it through fifth-column activities, so I think it is fair to assume that their ambitions for expansion may have been an element in their desire to move toward the West.

The CHAIRMAN. Have not those conditions that you mentioned a moment ago preceded practically every movement that the Soviets have made toward taking over these various countries?

Mr. Lovett. That has been generally so, sir.

**DRAFTING OF SENATE RESOLUTION 239**

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of the resolution which the Senate passed, and you said that it was not drafted by the State Department. As a matter of fact it is true, however, that the State Department did draft an outline or rough plan, and that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations worked it all over and changed it and adopted our own draft?

Mr. Lovett. My best recollection, Mr. Chairman, is that the State Department had two or three drafts presenting their views on certain of the matters which were subsequently covered in 239, and the staff of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee went over them carefully, and then they were transmitted to the committee and there were frequent conversations. What came out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had very little resemblance to what initially went in in treatment. The basic points, however, were covered.

The CHAIRMAN. As I recall it, the Senate resolution finally adopted was much shorter and terser than even the drafts which the State Department had theretofore submitted.

Mr. Lovett. Oh, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. And we thought we had made a great improvement over the tentative drafts that had been submitted.
You spoke of the negotiations and conversations with the other nations who subsequently signed the North Atlantic Pact. As I get the effect of your testimony, it was that no pressure was exerted by the State Department or by our Government to push them into the treaty, is that correct?

Mr. Lovett. It was even stronger than that, Mr. Chairman. All participants were careful not to give information about the treaty except on the request of the countries, so that it was not merely a question of pressure, which was not exercised in any case, but we did not want to embarrass them, as I pointed out in the statement, even by discussing it, unless they asked for such discussion.

The Chairman. However, is it not logical to assume that with a number of the nations expressing their desire to adhere, that that no doubt influenced some other countries to come along and join up?

Mr. Lovett. I think that is a reasonable assumption. Certainly there was enough coverage of the discussions in the press to indicate that some important events were taking place. No doubt those were among the elements which influenced other countries to inquire as to the purpose of this and the status at that time.

The Chairman. And each time a nation would express a desire to adhere, it would give strength to the North Atlantic Pact, and that fact would have an influence upon others who were wavering to join up, is that not true?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir; that is true.

The Chairman. That is true in ordinary life and negotiations of a group character.

All right, Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. Well, Mr. Secretary, first of all I want to welcome you back even temporarily into this forum where you rendered such distinguished service to the country.

Mr. Lovett. Thank you.

Senator Vandenberg. The Senate Resolution 239 is really the root source of the thing which is now under consideration, is it not?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir.

INABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO INSURE SECURITY

Senator Vandenberg. I think it is of considerable importance to spend a moment on that resolution, because heretofore in these hearings we have not seriously explored it.

Was not the chief inspiration of that resolution the fact that the operations of the Security Council of the United Nations were demonstrating so many road blocks that we found it necessary to give our attention primarily to the possibility of exploring every possible method to make the Charter work. Was that not the primary inspiration of this entire enterprise?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct, sir.

SENATE RESOLUTION 239 AND STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Vandenberg. Indeed, out of the six points in Senate Resolution 239, is not the very first point and key point the one which calls for voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involv-
ing pacific settlements of international disputes and situations and from the admission of new members? In other words, is that not the take-off point from which this consideration started?

Mr. Lovett. That was the take-off point.

Senator Vandenberg. Furthermore, out of the six objectives certified in Senate Resolution 239, three of the six deal specifically with this effort to find a way to make the Charter of the United Nations practicable as a factor in preserving international peace and security. Is that not true?

Mr. Lovett. That is true, Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. I would like to identify the other two. I have read the first objective in the resolution. The fifth objective reads as follows:

Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member-nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

The sixth point reads as follows:

If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Now, the point I want to reiterate, and I want to see if you agree with me, is that this clearly shows that the entire impulse of this enterprise was to find a way, if possible, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to more nearly approach those protections for international peace and security which were being interrupted by the unanticipated obstructions of the Soviet Union and its satellites in making the Charter work. Is that not true?

Mr. Lovett. That is true, Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. Having, then, in three of the six paragraphs of Senate Resolution 239, dealt directly with this question of the veto, was it not, in your opinion, a perfectly logical evolution that the Department and the committee should turn, then, to chapter VIII, dealing with regional arrangements, and still more particularly to article 51, to identify a very specific opportunity to achieve the results I have indicated, even though they found it impossible to remove the veto from questions involving pacific settlements and even though we found it impossible to progress dependably toward disarmament?

I will state the question again more briefly: Was it not the fact that we found ourselves driven to an exploration of chapter VIII of the Charter, and article 51 in particular, in order to achieve these peace objectives, even though we continued to find it impossible to liberalize the Charter itself?

Mr. Lovett. That is quite correct, sir.

AUTHORITY IN CHARTER FOR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Vandenberg. So when we turned to chapter VIII and article 51, we found, did we not, that here was the authority under which congenial nations could proceed in individual and collective self-defense, whenever the Security Council, for whatever reason, was failing in its obligation to defend adequately the objective of international peace and security?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Vandenberg. And we found, did we not, and by "we" I mean the State Department and the Foreign Relations Committee, that already a very significant precedent was available in the Rio pact, under which what seemed to be a highly hopeful formula had been developed which would permit member nations of the United Nations to individually and collectively defend themselves not only at the instant moment of a sudden armed attack, but also through that continuing period until and unless the Security Council made adequate arrangements to protect and restore international peace and security.

Mr. Lovett. I believe the Rio pact, Senator, was the signpost for both the Brussels pact and our own efforts.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TREATY

Senator Vandenberg. So that in this evolution we finally arrive at the North Atlantic Pact, which does specifically provide, and wholly within the jurisdiction of the United Nations, the means by which the congenial peace-loving nations of the North Atlantic community can defend themselves, within the Charter, not only at a moment of initial armed aggression but also until such time as the Security Council has taken adequate action to function as was anticipated when the Charter was written?

Mr. Lovett. That was our definite purpose.

Senator Vandenberg. So that we are at this point operating strictly within the jurisdiction of the Charter, but outside the reach of the veto, until such moment as the Security Council exercises the responsibilities which are presumed to attach to it under the obligations of the Charter?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct, Senator Vandenberg.

EMPHASIS ON SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID

Senator Vandenberg. Now, Mr. Secretary, in the course of all of those preliminary conversations which you had with the first group of allied nations which have joined in this adventure, to what extent did the conversations turn on article 3 and the supplemental military implementation of the pact?

Mr. Lovett. I will just check article 3, Senator Vandenberg. During the conversations and exploratory discussions which were held here it was tiresomely repeated by the United States Government representatives that we were talking about a collective self-defense system here, on the definite understanding that anything which might be done in the way of a pact must necessarily stem from absolute assurance that every member of this would do his utmost not only in his own defense, but in the defense of his associates in this pact. The matter of military supplies was not discussed during my time in the exploratory talks. In fact, there was no figure or estimate. It was, however, clearly recognized by all that there would be, under the mutual-aid aspect of this, a necessity at some time for help from one country to another, those countries not being specified. During those discussions it was clearly understood by all that there was no commitment on the part of this country or any other participant in the talks to do a specific thing in the way of supply.
The whole purpose, and certainly the majority of the time, was spent on devising a method whereby we could deter the aggressor, stop a war before it starts, if possible, and in any event make the position of these countries of common heritage and common ideals so clear that if anyone did attack them, he would do so at his peril and after adequate advance warning. It was our hope that we could profit from the past and stop aggression in an area which has so vitally affected the national security of this country as well as the peace of the world.

**OBLIGATION ON UNITED STATES TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 3**

**Senator Vandenberg.** Now in that phase of those discussions, even though you did not teach any inquiry into specific implementation, the situation as I understand you comes down to about this, that clearly there is some sort of an obligation involved in our signature in this treaty. The situation certainly does not remain as totally unobligated as it would be if there were no treaty. But you are undertaking at all times to leave the Government of the United States in complete and unquestioned control of its own decisions in this aspect, without any sort of mortgage or commitment in respect to its right to make those decisions?

**Mr. Lovett.** That is absolutely correct, Senator. Not only that, but there were other participants who were equally insistent on such right.

**NO COMMITMENTS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE**

**Senator Vandenberg.** And so long as you were in charge of these negotiations, there was no commitment made of any nature, directly or indirectly, in connection either with the military implementation of the pact or in respect to the type of action which the United States would take if, as, and when it confronted armed aggression and had to decide for itself what its contribution should be to defeat it?

**Mr. Lovett.** None whatsoever.

**Senator Vandenberg.** That is all.

**The Chairman.** Senator George?

**Senator George.** I believe I have no questions, except just to thank Mr. Lovett for coming back down here and assisting us again.

**Mr. Lovett.** Thank you, Senator.

**FORESHADOWED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY**

**Senator George.** I think, Mr. Lovett, you might say that even when we were considering the resolution to which you have referred there was at least a consciousness that ultimately there would be an obligation to extend mutual aid and assistance?

**Mr. Lovett.** Well, Senator, you will remember in our repeated conferences on this with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the question of the constitutional processes was reiterated. My recollection is mentioned two or three times in the language of 239. That was expanded and explained to the participants repeatedly, and it was pointed out that the manner of action, the form of action which this country would take, would necessarily be within the power of the Congress, and not an automatic affair controlled by this treaty itself. On the other hand, if the treaty is to be effective, it must clearly indicate in advance what the obligation of this Government is, and as I recall
it, that is covered in article 5. I am not speaking of the governmental obligation; that is, to take such action as this Government may deem necessary, or any other government dealing with its own affairs may deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. So that the obligation was always an obligation of some sort dealing with this pact. It was always in contemplation and was, of course, discussed, hence the introduction into 239 of the repeated warning to the negotiators and to the executive branch to take such obligation within the constitutional processes of the country.

Senator George. That is in accordance with my recollection of our early discussions and subsequent discussions, so far as that goes.

DETERMINING UNITED STATES OBLIGATION UNDER THE TREATY

I think it would be very difficult, Mr. Lovett, and perhaps you would agree, to formulate final action before events were beginning to shape themselves also.

Mr. Lovett. I think it would be impossible, Senator George. I do not think it would be possible.

Senator George. You do not think it would be possible?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir.

Senator George. That is what I meant to say, that until events began to shape themselves, even aggressive moves, it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to make final determinations as to what our obligation would mean under the treaty.

Mr. Lovett. The order of magnitude of the event would certainly be a vital element. If armies marched in and overran a country, that would appear to be at one scale of magnitude. If, on the other hand, there was a border incident with some border guards shooting at each other, that would be toward the low end of the scale. Between that you would have the wide range in which some judgment must enter.

Senator George. Yes, sir. That is all.

CHANGES IN THE DRAFT MADE BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The Chairman. May I go back just a moment, while it is on the point that has just been covered? In article 5, after outlining certain other things, we find the language:

by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary • • •.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, in its discussions with the State Department and the drafters of this treaty, is responsible for the insertion of that language. The committee insisted that the language “such action as it deems necessary” should be included in that particular article, and that was for the purpose— you were not here at the time, as I remember—of reserving to the United States, and for that matter to the other signatories of the treaty, the provision that the action which it would take would be the action which the Government taking it deemed necessary, and so on and so on.

Mr. Lovett. That is entirely consistent, Mr. Chairman, with the basic principles set out as guideposts in Senate Resolution 239, and the position taken in the negotiations with the participating countries.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. I wanted to let the country know that the Committee on Foreign Relations was insistent upon the insertion of that language so as to preserve the understandings that we had in the exploratory and other conversations.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I think you might well add that the phrase “including the use of armed force” was moved from its original context at the instance of the Foreign Relations Committee in order to make sure that the use of armed force was not automatic, one of the things which had to be embraced within the preventive measures which might be undertaken in this collective security.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is correct, and I recall very vividly the discussion in the committee with respect to that point. It was contended by some that the language “including the use of armed force” would require the use of armed force, but we made it very clear, and the State Department representative agreed with it, that among the actions which it could take if it deems necessary was armed force. But that was reserved to the decision of the United States and other signatories to the treaty. There was nothing automatic about it. It was simply a recitation of things that it could do. Already the general proposition of aiding all it could had been named, so the language, “including the use of armed force” was simply a particular statement that it was within the measures which the United States could take or could not take, and therefore any idea that it was automatic was negated and it was made clear that there was no obligation to do that but only on the idea that among the things we could do would be the use of armed force.

Senator Lodge?

FLUCTUATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Senator Lodge. I am much obliged to Mr. Lovett for giving us this very helpful statement. I notice the last sentence in the next to the last paragraph of Mr. Lovett’s statement, when he says, “I feel confident that the fluctuations in our relations with any foreign power will not succeed in diverting our attention from these basic interests.”

I think it is true that in the last year or two there have been a number of international actions which have been provocative and which have aroused anger and irritation in this country, but as I read that sentence of yours, you feel that the foreign policy on which we are engaged should be continued whether or not we are irritated or angered by the actions of some other country.

Mr. Lovett. Senator, I was trying to point directly to the danger of being lulled to either laziness or to sleep by a temporary incident or a temporary set of circumstances. I think a fair example can be found if you recall the swings from anger to disgust to hope that we went through in the 2 years that I was down here, notably with respect to endeavors to reach agreements with the Soviets. And I was trying to point out in the record that I feel we must deal with this on the basis of the long-range policy of this country and not be diverted by some temporary or transient element in the negotiations between any countries.

Senator Lodge. So that even if international communism should stop punching us on the nose and should start using honeyed words,
we should continue along this moderate, firm line that has been outlined?

Mr. Lovett. Most definitely, sir; because what we want to do is to insure, if possible, the continuation of some peace which we hope to attain some day.

Senator Lodge. I think there is no question, is there, that the tactics of international communism in punching us on the nose have had a good deal to do with some of the legislation we have enacted?

Mr. Lovett. I have no doubt of that.

Senator Lodge. And I just express the hope that we do not need that in order to keep us on the beam.

STATE DEPARTMENT-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Now I would like to bring up one more point, and then I will be through. When you were Under Secretary of State, you seemed to me to be making a very comprehensive and wholehearted effort to keep in touch with the United States Senate, in the only way that was open to you to do it, which was through the Foreign Relations Committee. First of all, am I right in that belief?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, Senator Lodge, you are certainly right. It would have been quite impossible for the Department of State, in my time there, or I think at any time, to have dealt with the multitude of confusing problems without somebody to go to and discuss the various alternatives with complete frankness and complete security. I emphasize the latter, and I am glad to say that we never, so far as I know, were let down in those efforts on our part to obtain guidance and help. By that I do not mean that we were not given restraints, from time to time, or questioned very pointedly, which served the purpose of clarification, but when a line was agreed on and it had the imprimatur of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we could go back to work and know that we were going to be backed up, and that is of tremendous importance in negotiation, as you know.

Senator Lodge. In preparing yourself for these negotiations, did you have occasion to look into past history and see to what extent there has been cooperation with the Senate in past days on other treaties?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, I have.

Senator Lodge. Did you ever find a case in which there had been closer or more comprehensive cooperation than took place in connection with this one?

Mr. Lovett. I do not know of any, Senator Lodge. I think this is an extraordinary collective effort between the legislative and the executive branches.

Senator Lodge. So if we can't make a go of it after all the effort that has been made this time, the outlook for future cooperation is not very good, is it?

Mr. Lovett. Not very, sir.

Senator Lodge. Thank you; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESOLUTIONS ON THE UNITED NATIONS AND STATE DEPARTMENT COOPERATION ON SENATE RESOLUTION 288

The Chairman. Reverting just a moment to these drafts of this resolution, as I recall it we had a great number of resolutions by various Senators affecting the foreign policy, and as I recall it now, we
referred all of those things down to the State Department, and that was more or less the basis for the original two or three drafts which you suggested a moment ago were finally brought back to the committee, and we then reworked them and agreed upon the final draft of the resolution.

Mr. Lovett. That is correct, Senator Connally. There were a very large number—the precise figure escapes me at the moment—of suggestions as to what to do about the problem which Senator Vandenberg has earlier outlined. There was a large number. We were asked our opinion about it, notably in order to bring in the experts on the United Nations organization, and there were several suggestions made in alternative forms by the Department to the committee, but Resolution 239 came out of a series of consultations and not from the State Department. It is, as was said earlier, substantially more pointed, it is substantially shorter, and it deals with a more limited area than was in some of the original suggestions arising out of the large number of bills which had been submitted to your committee.

The Chairman. As I recall it, five or six of those resolutions or bills contained suggestions about the amendment of the Charter and dealing with the United Nations, and almost every Senator that had an idea about how he thought the foreign policy of the United States should be conducted had introduced a resolution, so the committee referred them down to the State Department and you boiled them over and reduced them to three or four drafts. Those drafts were then submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and then we boiled them down, and after the final boiling process there was evolved the Senate resolution which was adopted by the Senate. Is that not correct?

Mr. Lovett. That is generally correct, Mr. Chairman. I think it was pointed out, sir, that of the six objectives mentioned here there were three which were designed to strengthen the United Nations on a universal basis, and one of the problems which was posed to the Department of State was, of course, the fact that any major operation on the United Nations Charter would require the agreement of all the major powers.

The Chairman. Exactly.

Mr. Lovett. And we had had the lengthy and somewhat saddening experience of the effect of the veto in the Security Council.

The Chairman. Very well. Senator Thomas?

Senator Thomas of Utah. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Green?

Senator Green. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator McMahon?

Senator McMahon. Mr. Lovett, I am delighted to see you and to see you looking so much better than when I saw you last.

Mr. Lovett. Thank you, sir.

FLUCTUATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AMERICAN POLICY

Senator McMahon. I do think it is worth emphasizing the context of the last paragraph about which Senator Lodge spoke to you: namely, that any temporary day-to-day fluctuations shall not be considered by this Government or by the American people as any basic
change in policy unless and until there are certain developments in very important matters having to do with the relations between our two countries. Are you not in agreement on that?

Mr. Lovett. That is absolutely correct, Senator.

Senator McMahon. And I think perhaps the precaution you voice there is well worth while.

I presume, Mr. Lovett—and I think you have said so, but I think it is worth emphasizing—that the improvement that we have today in our foreign relations, in your opinion, in some part at least is due to the fact that we have taken the steps that we have already taken with regard to the formulation of this treaty?

Mr. Lovett. I think so, sir; very definitely.

Senator McMahon. And the American people ought to know that it is only because we have processed along a definitely marked and intelligent line of conduct that we have gotten as far as we have.

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir.

Senator McMahon. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, I beg your pardon. I did not know you were back there.

Senator Hickenlooper. I came in while Senator Lodge was asking his questions.

COTERMINATION OF ERP WITH THE TREATY

Mr. Lovett, I think perhaps you have been questioned about most of the phases of this treaty that I might examine into, and if you have been asked this question please do not burden the record by answering it again. But with reference to the treaty itself, and your interest in its development and its connotations, do you envision any commitment in the treaty that might bind us to a continuation of the ECA program or something of its kind in the economic field for a long continued period, or during the life of the treaty?

Mr. Lovett. No, Senator Hickenlooper; I do not see that in any language in the treaty, or in its intent.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think that is all. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fulbright?

INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Chairman, I might digress a moment with regard to some of these other resolutions. Mr. Lovett, do you feel, with the economic program we will assume satisfactorily taken care of by ECA and the security by the pact—assuming it is adopted—that any political change or any change in the political structure of Europe will contribute anything to the stability of that area?

Mr. Lovett. Senator Fulbright, if I understand your question correctly, I think it is virtually impossible to separate the economic, political, and military influences in western Europe. Therefore, I will try to be responsive. I think anything which politically in Europe can improve the sense of unity and cohesion and determination among those people is definitely an asset both economically and militarily.

Senator Fulbright. Is it your impression that our Government recommends or urges that they bring about greater political unity among those countries?
Mr. Lovett. Senator, I can only answer in the light of the past. I have not, of course, been in touch with the Department since I got out. But it was, and I believe still is, our purpose to do what we properly can to influence the western European countries to a better-integrated unity of system, and I think, as I recall it, the steps are being taken now through an organization, I think, called the Council of Europe, or some such name, looking toward a degree of unification which would have been thought quite impossible just a few years ago.

Senator Fulbright. Do we have any participation in the so-called Council of Europe?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir; we do not. It is, of course, restricted to the sovereign governments of western Europe.

Senator Fulbright. In a sense, we are almost part of the sovereign government of Germany; are we not?

Mr. Lovett. Germany, so far as I know, is not presently participating in that group.

POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

Senator Fulbright. I do not recall any official expression or statement by our Government that we did look with favor upon the unification of Europe. Do you recall any such expression at any time in recent years?

Mr. Lovett. I do not, Senator Fulbright, recall any public statement offhand. I do recall repeated conversations at the Government Foreign Office-State Department level with respect to the possibility of that, and I believe in the initial ERP discussions there were statements which favored a closer economic integration of those countries. In connection with the customs union in particular, it is my recollection that Mr. Clayton had a number of conversations with the heads of governments abroad pointing out that that economic association would necessarily have to involve, to be fully effective, a closer political tie-in.

Senator Fulbright. You are familiar with the fact that the Senate recently eliminated the word “federation” which had been put in by the House, indicating that we do not approve of that idea; that we think the sovereign quality of all these states should be maintained in their present pristine purity. Isn’t that the indication of that move?

Mr. Lovett. Senator, I am just reminded by one of the officials of the Department that there was a public press release put out last summer.

Senator Fulbright. I am very familiar with it, which did not include “political.” It has always been the idea that it was purely economic, and Mr. Hoffman in his testimony here clearly said he had nothing to do with the politics and thought it would be a mistake if there were any political implications in the ECA. That press release likewise was limited to the economic, which has been the policy all along.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTEGRATION

Mr. Lovett. On that point, I do have a fairly accurate recollection. In the European recovery program, the present ECA, the handling of the aid program was specifically limited to economic considerations.

Senator Fulbright. That’s right.
Mr. Lovett. And the Administrator, as I recall it, both by the legislative history and the act itself, was restricted to the economic field.

Senator Fulbright. And this program is to be restricted to the military. There is nothing political in this pact; is there?

Mr. Lovett. This is restricted in its language to the security of the North Atlantic area and the effort to preserve peace in that area. But, as I tried to point out earlier, the effects of this will, I believe, be economic, political, and security.

Senator Fulbright. I thought I understood you to say it should be; but, whether it will or not, there is nothing in the language of the act in either of the two programs mentioned which would indicate that this Government wishes to bring about political unity in Europe.

Mr. Lovett. I believe, Senator Fulbright, that that would be undesirable in this particular case, because, while I am trying to guess what its effect would be, I think that the pact itself must stick to those things which deal with its own field.

Advisability of Encouraging the Federation of Europe

Senator Fulbright. That being so, and since the economic and the military—and I don't quarrel with that; it might very well be the proper way—are bound; if I understand you correctly, you feel political unification of some sort will be brought about, would there be anything wrong with our Government at least giving its blessing and approving of it? I am unable to understand why we have never been willing to say, "Yes, we think it is a good thing and it would add to the effectiveness of these two programs."

Mr. Lovett. Senator, I am afraid I cannot answer that question. I don't know. I think it is something that perhaps the Secretary of State and the Department could be of some assistance on. I do not know of any specific public recommendation.

Senator Fulbright. I did not mean that. Do you see any reason why it should not be done? I think it is agreed that it has not been done. Do you see any reason why it should not be done? In other words, would it not add something to it to express officially what you say has been done unofficially right along?

Mr. Lovett. Well, Senator, I am always troubled by words like "federation" and things of that sort. I am not sure—

Senator Fulbright. You used the words "greater unity."

Mr. Lovett. I suggested that it was in the interest of the countries immediately involved and of this country, in my personal opinion, to have as great a degree of unity as possible among the western European countries.

Senator Fulbright. And you mean political unity?

Mr. Lovett. I mean unity in all of its aspects, which are both economic, political, and military. Therefore, I believe that the Council which I mentioned earlier is a heartening step in a direction which seems to me to be appropriate, but I think the Department of State would have to give you an opinion as to whether it is in the interests of this country or the other countries to make that a matter of public pronouncement.

Senator Fulbright. If that Council of States were given some political power, do you think that would be a good thing for the future security of Europe?
Mr. Lovett. My personal opinion would be that it would.

Senator Fulbright. That is what I mean, and leaving out the word "federation," you mean giving them some governmental authority to make decisions. Isn't that what we really mean, in the final step?

Mr. Lovett. Yes. I think the moves which Mr. Churchill has made and which the Brussels Pact signatories have initiated are definitely a heartening thing.

ADVANTAGES FROM POLITICAL UNIFICATION

Senator Fulbright. I agree with that. I have only been a little chagrined that our Government would take no interest in that field when it has taken such a tremendous interest in the economic field, but somehow that is a part of the picture that is taboo so far as the Government is concerned, and that to me is the real core of the problem. It would make possible the much more effective use of ECA and the resources of the pact, because in the pact the part that bothers me most about the pact is that we finally end up with only, we will say, 12 little armies, if you would like to look at it that way, or 12 defense establishments that have no real coordination under a joint chief of staff. If we are going to pursue the pact, it seems to me it should be a unified security organization only because it would otherwise not be effective. I cannot believe that it would be any more effective than what we had prior to the war, when you had each country with its own little relatively small military organization, all of which fell very easily. As a purely practical matter, that is the principal part that disturbs me: that it won’t be effective. I think you are entirely correct in the emphasis upon the Council, because that is the element that gives the other elements, economic and military, its binding and permanent coordination, because these people are likely to coordinate or cooperate only so long as conditions are difficult. As soon as they get fairly easy, then they are not as cooperative.

Would you not say that had been your experience in the past?

Mr. Lovett. It can be definitely, I think, encouraged from without, but I know of no substitute for the internal desire for it among these countries.

Senator Fulbright. I takes both. They have evidenced a great deal of desire, haven’t they, all along?

Mr. Lovett. I think so. It is hard to measure it, but in my time there was evidence of it.

But, Senator Fulbright, for the benefit of the record, if it is agreeable to the committee, sir, I will ask to put in that statement issued by the State Department.

Senator Fulbright. It was put in the record before, but it is all right with me to put it in at this time.

The Chairman. I think, in fairness to Mr. Lovett, it ought to be put in.

Senator Fulbright. I discussed it with Secretary Acheson in the ECA discussions. The only difference about it was that to me the language does not mean political unification, but economic, which is the same as the ECA.

The Chairman. Without objection, the statement will be inserted at this point.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

Digitized by Google
As stated in the preamble of the Economic Cooperation Act, this Government strongly favors the progressively closer integration of the free nations of western Europe. We believe that the world of today requires the taking of steps which before the war would have seemed beyond the range of practical politics. We favor the taking by the Europeans themselves of any steps which promote the idea of European unity or which promote the study of practical measures and the taking of such measures.

Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Lovett, along the lines you were interrogated by the Senator from Arkansas, this treaty deals only with defensive arrangements?

Mr. Lovett. It is a defensive arrangement, Mr. Chairman, aimed at the preservation of peace in the North Atlantic community. It deals only with that.

DANGER OF ENCOURAGING THE FEDERATION OF EUROPE

The Chairman. To link in with that any suggestion of political action, would that not leave us open to the charges of the Soviet and others that the whole plan is based on the imperialistic attitude of the United States, bringing within the scope of its power the nations of Europe?

Mr. Lovett. I think that it might very well do that, but I believe that one of the controlling factors, of course, is that in such a pact, with such tremendous impact on the world as a whole, it is necessary to confine the agreement down to the point where there can be no misunderstanding as to what each person understands it to mean. The moment you get into the political aspects of these various countries you are treading on the doubtful ground of the sovereignty and the parliamentary systems which differ between these countries. So that, in my opinion, it would be wise to deal with the pact as it is.

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, this so-called Council of Europe is working along the lines for greater unity.

Mr. Lovett. At the present time.

The Chairman. Would it not be wise to leave that, which is a European organization, to advance these things, rather than for us to undertake to dictate or suggest what course they shall pursue?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I understood from Senator Fulbright that only the question as to whether or not we, so to speak, gave it our blessing, and attached importance to their activities, was involved, and my answer to that was that while I didn't recall accurately whether there had been a public statement representing the views of this Government, but speaking purely as an individual, I thought that it was a desirable thing for those countries directly involved to get together in such degree of unity as they found possible.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

ENCOURAGING FEDERATION OF EUROPE OUTSIDE THE TREATY

Senator Fulbright. Before you leave that I want to clarify one point. I did not say that it ought to go in this pact. I only was developing the point that not in any pact or in any way had we done it,
but your answer that it would be imperialistic, and we would be subject to the charge, I cannot follow that. It seems to me the least imperialistic attitude for this country would be to encourage a strong Europe. The policy of Russia in eastern Europe is to prevent any unification. When those countries proposed that they have a Balkan League, Mr. Tito was one of the proponents of that view, and they immediately said they should not do anything. They would not permit it. Now, if one is strictly accurate here, the imperialistic approach for this country would be to discourage unity in western Europe, because then we would be able to dominate them one at a time. If we contribute to building a strong western Europe, a politically integrated Europe, that would be the opposite of imperialism, is my view, because we would be constructing a possible competitor, for example, in the economic field and in the military field, because they have possibilities of being very strong. I do not understand at all, or I can't believe, that you believe it is imperialistic to promote a political unification of those countries.

But you agreed with the chairman when he said that, that that would subject us to an accusation of imperialism if we encourage the political unification of Europe, which seems to me exactly the opposite.

Mr. Lovett. I think the chairman's inquiry of me related to whether or not the inclusion of some political advice in this North Atlantic Pact would or could be construed by the Soviet as a part of their propaganda line.

Senator Fulbright. I did not mean in this pact. I mean as a governmental policy at any time or in any way that is understandable by the people. You do not think that would be imperialistic, do you?

Mr. Lovett. I think the Government has already, if my faint recollection is correct, indicated that we feel it is desirable and in the best interests of the countries directly involved in western Europe, as well as in the over-all search for peace and security, that there should be as high an order of unity as is possible for them to accept at this time. Therefore I believe this country has looked with favor on the efforts being made over there among the Brussels Pact signatories to improve their political associations.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Senator Fulbright. The Council of Europe, of course, is purely an idea. It has not had a meeting yet. We do not know what will come out of that. It would be a good vehicle, I think, with proper encouragement, that it be given political power, but they have had one or two meetings preparatory to establishing the Council. It has not really functioned, and if I interpret the reports correctly they had not agreed to give it any real power to make a decision on anything. It is another consultative assembly, so to speak, or organization, and I think that would be the proper place that we cooperate, we will say, or help them evolve some kind of organization that has political power.

Mr. Lovett. Senator, I am not informed on the Council of Europe and its activities at present. My information, of course, comes only from the press. But going back to your initial question as to a public statement which might give support to some move toward unity on
the part of the European countries, there is in the March 17, 1948, address by the President to the Congress this expression:

Its significance—

referring to the Brussels Pact—

goes far beyond the actual terms of the agreement itself. It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for the protection and preservation of its civilization. This development deserves our full support.

THE TREATY—NOT A COMPLETE ANSWER TO OUR DIFFICULTIES

Senator McMahon. Mr. Lovett, since the end of hostilities we as a nation have supported UNRRA, the United Nations, Bretton Woods, the British loan, the ECA, and now a proposed military pact. I have supported as a Member of the Senate every one of these proposals and every one of these policies. I think it is important that the American people not get the idea that this pact, if it is entered into, is the answer to all of our difficulties. I think perhaps one of the human mistakes that was made along the line was to regard each one of these proposals as the complete answer to all of our difficulties. I take it that you do not believe that even though we are successful in working out the ECA program and even if it meets our fondest expectations, and even if this pact is ratified and put into full validity that we will have then reached the apogee of perfection in the situation between the Soviet Government and ourselves.

Mr. Lovett. Senator McMahon, I am fairly confident that this is not the end of our activities as we try to find a solution for a peaceful existence. It is a most important one, I am sure, but I agree with you, sir, that we cannot say that this, if enacted, thereupon makes it unnecessary to do anything else. To the contrary, I feel that this is one, and perhaps one of the most important, steps that this country could take or has taken. But it will inevitably, in view of the dynamic quality of relationships between countries, require us to meet whatever circumstances come up a month, a year, or 10 years from now.

DANGER OF AN ARMAMENT RACE

Senator McMahon. Perhaps my knowledge of history is deficient, and perhaps you will correct it, but I seem to have no recollection of any occasion in all history where an armament race ever resulted in anything except conflict. As I recall history, wherever you have had two nations of approximately equal size where you have engaged in an armaments race there has inevitably followed conflict. That is why I have personally been of the opinion that we must, in some fashion or other, end this arms race, in order to assure ourselves of permanent peace. I also appreciate that one of the ways of ending it is to have the proper kind of strength when you go into a discussion of disarmament.

I merely emphasize that fact for this record because for my part I want the people to know that I do not regard this pact as any 100-per-cent guaranty of peace, and I do not think it ought to be sold to the American people on that basis.

The Chairman. If it will be a 50 percent guarantee it will be something.
Senator McMahon. Don't misunderstand. I think I have made it clear that it is a necessary step, but we will get much more support for future moves in our foreign policy if we do not add an extravagant sales price or an extravagant value to this particular step.

The Chairman. Mr. Lovett, we have today with us, through the courtesy of the committee, Senator Donnell and Senator Watkins of Utah, and it is our intention to permit them to interrogate you if that is agreeable with you.

Mr. Lovett. Certainly, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

ENHANCEMENT OF OUR SECURITY

Senator Donnell. Mr. Lovett, in your statement I observe, on page 8, that you have expressed a belief that the signature of the treaty has in itself enhanced the chances of successfully achieving the goals mentioned in your statement of our foreign policy. Is that correct?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, Senator. You refer to the paragraph starting, "Nothing that has occurred since I left office. * * * *?

Senator Donnell. Yes, as read in conjunction with the immediately preceding paragraph, where you defined what is at least one of the great goals of our foreign policy.

Mr. Lovett. Yes, that is correct, Senator Donnell.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Lovett, I assume from this belief on your part, namely that the very signature of the treaty has enhanced the chances of successfully achieving these goals, that there isn't any very great doubt in the minds of the European nations, so far as you have observed, that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate is favorable to this treaty.

Mr. Lovett. I am unable to answer that, Senator Donnell. I do not know what the attitude of the foreign governments is. I would have no means of knowing. I would assume that they would be hopeful that this country would approve the treaty.

SENATE RESOLUTION 239

Senator Donnell. Mr. Lovett, you referred in quite considerable detail, and I am very glad you did because it was a matter that we had interrogated Secretary Acheson about also, to the history of Senate Resolution 239. You recall reading the Congressional Record of June 11, 1948, which was the date on which the debate on and the action on that resolution occurred in the Senate, do you not?

Mr. Lovett. I did not read the Congressional Record, sir, but I do remember its adoption.

Senator Donnell. Did you know at the time that Senator Vandenberg, who presented the resolution, made numerous statements as to what in his opinion the resolution did and what it did not do, and the fact that the Senate was to be completely free later on to decide whether it would go further on?

Mr. Lovett. I read the accounts of it in the papers.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES OF THE SENATE IN THE RATIFICATION OF TREATIES

Senator DONNELL. In connection with this treaty, I observe here on the wall a large map, showing in very heavy black, states signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949. That signature to the treaty, I take it, you would agree imposes no duty whatsoever upon the Senate if in its judgment it deems proper not to ratify the treaty, does it?

Mr. LOVETT. You mean the signature to the pact itself? Why no, Senator Donnell. It is clearly understood that this treaty cannot be binding on this country until the Senate acts.

Senator DONNELL. So it is entirely possible, is it not, Mr. Lovett, that it is a little bit premature for the great confidence that you speak of, the new sense of confidence, to have arisen in Europe until the Senate has determined, after hearing the testimony and hearing the arguments, whether it will or will not approve the ratification of the treaty?

Mr. LOVETT. Senator Donnell, I don't think you can keep people from having hope, and I think the people of Europe have hope, based on our past performances in ECA and in the general effort to find peace, that the Congress, represented by the Senate in this case, will find it wise and appropriate for this country to sign the pact.

Senator DONNELL. At any rate, I take it as you have indicated so fairly and correctly, that the Senate is no more obligated today to approve this treaty than it was before the signature of the pact. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. LOVETT. I am not able to answer that, Senator Donnell.

Senator DONNELL. You know as a matter of law that the Senate has the right either to approve or not to approve this treaty?

Mr. LOVETT. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. And it has precisely the same right today that it had prior to the signature of the treaty?

Mr. LOVETT. I do not think the right is in question.

Senator DONNELL. I say it has precisely the same right it had before the signature to the treaty.

Mr. LOVETT. Certainly. The right has not changed.

GENESIS OF SENATE RESOLUTION 239

Senator DONNELL. Now, Mr. Lovett, you have told us of the progress made on Senate Resolution 239. Would you tell us, please, who it was, if you know, who first conceived the idea that a resolution to that general effect would be desirable? Was it the State Department or was it the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. LOVETT. I haven't any idea, Senator Donnell. I just don't know. My recollection is that the suggestion derived from the committee activities. Certainly, so far as I know, there was no such communication from the Department of such an idea.

Senator DONNELL. You have no recollection, however, as to who it was, whether someone on this committee or someone in the State Department, who first conceived the idea of a resolution to that general effect?
Mr. Lovett. No, I haven't, Senator Donnell; but my guess would be that it came out of the committee's activities with respect to the United Nations bills.

Senator Vandenberg. Will the Senator yield? I think I can clear that up for him.

Senator Donnell. I would like it if the Senator would.

Senator Vandenberg. I have no doubt that the original impetus came from the committee in its efforts to see, as to all of these various resolutions which had been presented by many different Senators dealing with many phases of these related problems, whether it was possible to lay down a general philosophy which would cover them all.

Senator Donnell. Might I ask the Senator, if he will permit me, whether or not this thought which he says he has no doubt originated, as I understand it, in the committee, was by someone on the committee communicated to the State Department? Was that the initiation of the State Department's connection with the matter?

Senator Vandenberg. I suppose so, in connection with the continuous conversations we were having with the Department regarding this flood of resolutions with which we were confronted.

Senator Donnell. I do not want to ask the Senator more questions unless he is perfectly willing to answer them. I appreciate he is not the witness this morning.

What I wanted to ask him is, if he recalls with certainty whether or not it was a member of the committee who first communicated the thought of such a resolution to the State Department, or whether it was someone with the State Department who communicated that thought to the Foreign Relations Committee?

Senator Vandenberg. I just do not think you can categorically identify the initial impulse, because we were dealing jointly with the problem of trying to find out what we ought to do with this flood of resolutions which was before us from various Members of the Senate.

Senator Donnell. Thank you, Senator.

REASONS FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Now, Mr. Lovett, am I correct in the understanding of the early portion of your statement that the birth of the concept, to quote the language in your statement, of this treaty arose from conduct by the Soviet Government? Is that correct?

Mr. Lovett. That is not entirely correct, sir, because it presumes that the conduct of the Soviet Government was the proximate cause of this entire enterprise, whereas it was one of a number of factors included among which were, of course, this problem of the United Nations veto, the obstructionism which they had shown, and their openly declared antagonism to the recovery of western Europe.

Senator Donnell. Yes. And as you have indicated in your statement, and I read from it:

The policies and practices pursued by the Soviet Government and the Communist Parties subservient to it since the end of hostilities had created a sense of insecurity in the free countries of western Europe who had joined together to promote with American assistance the reconstruction and recovery of their community.

That is correct, is it not?
Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. And I ask you if you continued in the next paragraph:

This general sense of insecurity had been intensified by the savage reaction of the Soviet Government to the program of cooperative undertaking between the United States and the nations of western Europe then known as the Marshall plan—

and so forth? That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. So the activities of the Russians, and particularly with respect to the veto power in the Security Council of the United Nations, had at least a very large part in the birth of the concept mentioned in your statement, namely the concept of this treaty?

Mr. Lovett. It was certainly one of the factors, but included, of course, were the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London in December 1947 and our long experience of obstructionism toward the efforts of the United Nations to perform the functions with which it was charged.

SIGNING OF BRUSSELS PACT

Senator Donnell. On the 17th of March 1948 you have told us that there occurred the signature of the Brussels Pact. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct, sir.

Senator Donnell. Was that pact, as you recall it, a defensive pact, solely?

Mr. Lovett. As I recall it, it was a defensive pact which had certain aspects of association both economically and politically.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S SPEECH OF MARCH 17, 1948

Senator Donnell. And you quoted in part this morning from President Truman's speech to the joint session of the Congress on March 17. At that point, if you do not mind, and for the purpose of a little further questioning, I should like to have the record show these three sentences from his speech:

This development—

the President was referring to the Brussels Treaty—

deserves our full support.

I pause, Mr. Lovett, to ask whether or not the speech by the President was delivered on the identical day on which the treaty was signed.

Mr. Lovett. It was, sir.

Senator Donnell. So that the President knew of the fact that the treaty was to be signed, and his address was prepared in advance of the expectation that it would be signed. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. Lovett. I do not know when it was prepared, Senator Donnell, but of course he knew that it would be signed on a given date, as it had been carried by the press.
Senator Donnell. And his language in his speech continues, after the sentence which I read, namely—

This development deserves our full support—

with this:

I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to do so.

You recall substantially that language in his address?

Mr. Lovett. Oh, yes; I recall that very well.

Senator Donnell. That address was delivered on March 17, was it not, 1948?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir, it was.

Senator Donnell. And the action by which the Senate approved Senate Resolution 239 was not until nearly 2 months later?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

SUBSEQUENT ADOPTION OF SENATE RESOLUTION 239

Senator Donnell. So that notwithstanding this advice from the Senate, which was embraced in Senate Resolution 239, and I use the term “advice” because of the fact that the President, in his letter of March 17, 1949, to Senator Watkins, uses that term and puts it in quotation marks, the advice given by Senate Resolution 239 was not given until almost 2 months after the President had himself expressed certainty that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves would be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to do so. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. Lovett. The times are correct.

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Lovett, you referred to the frequent use of the expression Senate Resolution 239 “constitutional processes,” and I have observed that fact, too, and the fact that assurance is given more than once in that document of the fact that the constitutional processes were to be preserved. I am correct in that; am I not?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO DECLARE WAR

Senator Donnell. Mr. Lovett, in whom, under the Constitution of the United States, is the power to declare war vested?

Mr. Lovett. The Congress.

Senator Donnell. And the Congress consists of two Houses, and not only the Senate? Of course we realize, by the term “Congress” in that expression is meant the two Houses; is it not?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. May I ask you this hypothetical question which was suggested to one or two of the witnesses previously: Suppose, for instance, that Norway, 6 weeks after the ratification of this treaty, if it be ratified, should be attacked some day by 500,000 Russians. May I ask you, please, Mr. Lovett, whether or not it would be necessary as you construe the law, for Congress to be consulted before the President of the United States, acting under the North Atlantic Treaty, could send troops and take efforts to repulse Russia along that front?

Mr. Lovett. Yes; I think that is clear.
Senator DONNELL. You think what is clear?
Mr. LOVETT. That the President would, before declaring war, have to leave the matter to the Congress.
Senator DONNELL. Before declaring war he would have to leave the matter to the Congress?
Mr. LOVETT. That is correct.
Senator DONNELL. Do you think he would have no power to send troops?
Mr. LOVETT. I think it would depend on the circumstances as to whether our own troops were involved.
Senator DONNELL. Suppose, for instance, that none of our own troops was involved whatsoever in Norway at that time, but that Norway should be attacked by 500,000 Russians. Do you not think that the agreement on the North Atlantic Pact by which it is expressly stated in Article 5—

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all—

would give the President the same power with respect to that attack on Norway that he would have if an attack were made on the United States of America along its own coast line?

Mr. LOVETT. No, sir; I do not. I think the power of the President is clearly fixed by the Constitution and I see nothing in this treaty which in any way runs counter to it.

Senator DONNELL. And what is that power of the President which you see so clearly placed and fixed by the Constitution?

Mr. LOVETT. The power of the President, and the limitations on that power, would require a declaration of war to be made by the Congress.

Senator DONNELL. So that if Congress were not in session at the time it would have to wait until the declaration of war, and any action by the President—am I correct in that?—toward sending troops would have to wait until the Congress convened? Is that correct?

Mr. LOVETT. Senator, I am sure the members of this committee here are more familiar with the procedures followed by Congress while they are not in session. I suppose a special session would be called, an emergency session. I believe that has occurred in the past, and I would assume that that would be the procedure followed in the future.

Senator DONNELL. Do you think, Mr. Lovett, that if New York City were attacked when Congress was not in session that the President would or would not have power to send troops and take all necessary military action to protect our shores and our country before Congress came back?

PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITY AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Mr. LOVETT. I don't know the legalistic answer to that, Senator Donnell. I am not a lawyer. But I think the realistic answer to it would be an immediate response, since it is clear that our own troops in the area, Navy yards, and so forth, would be at once attacked, and I should think that his powers as Commander in Chief, and his responsibility for the protection and well-being of those troops, would give him some special latitude, but I want to emphasize, sir, that I am not a lawyer and not competent to pass on that type of question.

Senator DONNELL. Suppose, Mr. Lovett, that instead of the attack occurring on the American shores at New York, where there is a
navy yard near at hand, that the attack should occur upon some other portion of the American shore, at any point where there are no troops whatsoever. Suppose that any act, atom bombs, or immediate landing of troops, or whatever illustration you might think of, of the actual physical attack on our country, were to occur at a point where there were no American troops. Do you think the President would be powerless to act under those circumstances until after Congress had come back together?

Mr. Lovett. I say again, Senator Donnell, I do not know the legal responsibility of the President as Commander in Chief in those circumstances which you put in this hypothetical case, but I would assume that the President, as Commander in Chief, would react immediately.

Senator Donnell. In other words, the presence of troops of the United States at that particular point where the attack occurred would not be the decisive element in determining whether he had power to act to save our country or not?

Mr. Lovett. I do not know what the legal answer to that is, but I think from a practical point of view, if any portion of this country were attacked the President, as Commander in Chief, might have some special authority with which I am not fully familiar.

Senator Donnell. I thought you said a moment ago, when I asked you one of my earlier questions, that the power of the President is clearly set forth in the Constitution, and its limitations also.

Mr. Lovett. I was speaking specifically of the limitations and specifically in answer to your question as to the declaration of war.

Senator Donnell. What are the limitations that you refer to that are clearly set forth in the Constitution with respect to the President of the United States?

Mr. Lovett. That the Congress of the United States has the authority, and is the sole body that has the authority, to declare war.

ARTICLE 5 AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

Senator Donnell. Then if the President in your opinion would not have power to send troops over to Norway, or to take immediate action before Congress came together, much of this talk about the great advantage of this treaty from the standpoint of the promises, so that we could act instantly, as Mr. Vandenberg has indicated, and as article 5 refers to by the word "forthwith," and much of the force of that argument, is lost immediately if the President does not have power to act instantaneously, is that not correct?

Mr. Lovett. No, Senator Donnell; I do not think that is correct. With great respect, sir, I think that the reaction of this country to an obvious act of aggression such as you gave in your suppositional case would require great promptness in action.

Senator Donnell. It might require much greater promptness than the assembling of Congress from the four corners of the United States might permit? In other words, it would require action prior to the return of Congress?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir: I don't think that I would go that far.

Senator Donnell. You would think the President would have to wait until Congress got back before he could send any troops or take-
action toward repelling Russia under the circumstances I have cited in Norway?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir. I think he would have to leave it to the Congress to declare war, but certainly the Military Establishment could be pulling itself together and getting material and personnel collected in the event that the Congress did declare war. That would be a tremendous saving in time.

Senator Donnell. But the President, you do not think, could send troops over to Norway, or send bombers, or take any overt action with respect to repelling Russia, until Congress had declared war?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir. Again, let me caution you; I am not a lawyer. My answers are simply based on the reasonable understanding of the authority of Congress with respect to the declaration of war.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 5

Senator Donnell. Now, referring again to article 5 of the proposed treaty—

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; * * *

I understood you to say a few minutes ago that if an attack should occur on the shores of America at a point where no troops are present whatsoever, the President, in your judgment, would immediately, as you put it, react, which I understand you to mean that he would not only be startled, but that he would take action. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Lovett. I said that my best judgment would be that the President, as Commander in Chief, would have certain express powers there in his capacity as Commander in Chief.

Senator Donnell. Then the agreement that—

the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all—

is to be read, is it not, in connection with the fact that the President would, as you have indicated, have some powers in the event an attack were made against our own country?

Mr. Lovett. I am not sure I understand your question.

Senator Donnell. Perhaps I had better state this. Let me ask you another question or two along this line. You ceased to be Under Secretary on January 20, did you not, of this year?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. Up to that point had there been incorporated in the draft of the treaty any language to the effect that—

the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all?

Mr. Lovett. That was in some of the drafts.

Senator Donnell. You understood the legal meaning of the language, or else you would not have concurred in its incorporation in the draft?

Mr. Lovett. We not only understood it but we spent long hours explaining that any treaty which might subsequently be developed as a result of these exploratory talks would not be binding until such time as it had been through the constitutional processes of this country, and at no point was there any question but what the Constitution fixes the respective powers of the President and of the Congress, and
the treaty in no way changes, so far as I know, the respective powers of the President or the Congress.

Senator Donnell. Do you say, Mr. Lovett, that at the time you ceased to be Under Secretary, then, that it was understood in the State Department that this provision that I have read to you from article 5 did not impose any obligation on this country to forthwith go to war or to send troops or to take any action, even though the statement in this article is that every one of these signatories agrees that an armed attack against any one of them is to be deemed an armed attack against itself?

Mr. Lovett. Senator Donnell, I think it is perfectly clear that in the discussions the manner of the armed attack was probably the item on which more time was spent than any other. It was always understood, and there has never been the slightest doubt, that the reaction of any participant, not just the United States, must take place under its constitutional procedures, whatever that might be. And so far as I know, there has never been any question.

COMPARISON OF RIO TREATY WITH NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY


Mr. Lovett. I was familiar with it; yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. You recall that in article 3 of the Rio Pact there is this provision, do you not?

The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Do you think that this proposed treaty is based, as I have rather understood Senator Vandenberg to indicate, at least in part on the Rio Pact, this pact that I have just read from?

Mr. Lovett. This pact is based in part on the Rio Pact. It differs from the Rio Pact in several particulars.

Senator Donnell. And may I call your attention to the fact, and ask if I am correct in this statement, that among the things in which it differs from the Rio Pact is that the Rio Pact contains article 20, which reads as follows:

Decisions which require the application of measures specified in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

Do you recall that that provision is in the Rio Pact?

Mr. Lovett. I recall such a provision.

Senator Donnell. And there is no such provision in the Atlantic Treaty? That is correct?

Mr. Lovett. There is no similar provision.

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Lovett, you say that the negotiations for the North Atlantic Pact were based on Senate Resolution 239, and that that was the guidepost of your negotiations; is that correct?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.
Senator DONNELL. May I ask you this question. In the negotiations was there any consideration given to the fact that among the elements that would make this treaty succeed would be the fact that there should be such an overwhelming force developed by the parties to the treaty as would act as a deterrent against any foreign nation attacking any of these participants? Do you remember that?

Mr. Lovett. It was clearly in contemplation that the unified purpose of the participants in this group would enable us to show a degree of determination which we hoped would stop an aggressor before war began, and not compel us to become involved at some later date after war was under way.

Senator DONNELL. And that thought was expressed, was it not, by the President of the United States in his inaugural address of January 20, 1949, in which, among other things, he said this:

If we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur. I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic Security Pact. In addition, we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security.

Do you recall that part of his address?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir; I do.

DISCUSSION OF NECESSITY OF SENDING UNITED STATES MANPOWER TO EUROPE

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Lovett, it is, therefore, of very great importance, is it not, if the theory of the President is to be followed, that we shall have collected together here overwhelming force, to adopt his language, to be furnished by this country to the countries signatory over to Europe adequate supplies which, when added to their own supplies, shall provide that overwhelming force. That is right, is it not?

Mr. Lovett. I am not able to give you the complete definition of the degree of force that the language "overwhelming" contemplates, but I have no doubt in my own mind that if this country ever undertakes to fight a war and attempt to restore the peace and security of the North Atlantic area that we will bring overwhelming force to bear.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know whether or not it was considered by the negotiators, and particularly the United States, as to whether, in order to stop Russia in her tracks if she should come across the borders of the other European countries, it would be necessary or advisable that there be United States troops on hand in addition to the troops of the European countries?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir. I have no such recollection.

Senator DONNELL. You have no such recollection?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. You do not know whether that was ever discussed?

Mr. Lovett. I have an accurate recollection of the negotiations in which I participated, but I do not recall that question being raised by anyone. No suggestion was made to us that we should have United States troops spotted around Europe.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Lovett, you spoke of not being a lawyer. Did your Department have counsel on the preparation of this treaty from Mr. Bohlen and others?

Mr. Lovett. It had counsel from both the geographical desk officers and from the legal adviser’s office and from the counsel, but Mr. Bohlen also is not a lawyer, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Bohlen is not a lawyer, sir?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. He is described in the booklet that I have here, which is a series of addresses made over the Columbia Network, as “counselor of the Department of State.”

Mr. Lovett. He is the counselor of the Department of State, but that is not in itself necessarily legal.

Senator DONNELL. What is Mr. Bohlen’s profession or business?

Mr. Lovett. He is a Foreign Service officer.

Senator DONNELL. And if you do not mind telling us, what is your profession or business, Mr. Lovett?

Mr. Lovett. I am a private banker, sir.

Senator DONNELL. In New York City?

Mr. Lovett. In New York City.

Senator DONNELL. What is the organization with which you are connected?

Mr. Lovett. I am a general partner of Brown Brothers & Harriman, a private commercial bank.

Senator DONNELL. I was wondering whether or not the Harriman that is mentioned is in any way related to Mr. Harriman—

Mr. Lovett. There are two. W. A. Harriman was formerly a general partner, and is now a limited partner, having resigned from general partnership; and his brother, E. Roland Harriman, is at the present time a general partner.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. W. A. Harriman is Mr. W. Averell Harriman, who is the Ambassador who testified here a few days ago?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

INABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO FUNCTION

Senator DONNELL. I would like to just briefly—and I shall not trespass much longer on your time, Mr. Lovett, or that of the committee, read these three sentences from Mr. Bohlen’s address over the Columbia network on March 23 of this year. He says:

I shall not recite the dreary record of Soviet frustration and obstruction in the United States, the abuse of the veto, the defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly. I mention them merely to show that the fault lies not with the United Nations, nor in the mechanism set up under the Charter, but in the policies and attitude which the government of one of the great powers has pursued in relation to the organization. As a result, the United Nations has not been permitted to establish throughout the world the condition of security for which it was designed.

Do you concur in the observations so made by Mr. Bohlen?

Mr. Lovett. Yes; I do.

Senator DONNELL. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt here to say that while Mr. Lovett is not himself a lawyer, and has not practiced, I suppose, I want to say that his father was one of the most distinguished lawyers in the United States. He attained distinction first down in Texas, where he resided.
He then moved to New York and was the attorney for the elder Mr. Harriman, and was also the general counsel and chairman of the board, as I recall it now, of the Union Pacific Railroad. Is that correct?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. He was one of the most remarkable men that our State has ever produced, and was distinguished not alone in his own State but throughout the United States, and was a member at one time of the largest law firm in Texas, at Houston.

Thank you, Senator, for permission to interrupt.

Senator Watkins. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lovett, I say at the outset I regret that I couldn't be here when you gave your main statement. I was required on another committee in order to make a quorum, and they would not let me leave. I did want to hear your principal statement. I have tried to glance at it and get some information out of the examination which would indicate just what you said in your main statement. I may possibly cover some of the same ground you have covered before, but it is not with any intention to be repetitious, but to clear up some matters that bother me, and I would like some light on them.

GENESIS OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Going back to the negotiations for the North Atlantic Pact, how long were you connected with those negotiations, Mr. Lovett?

Mr. Lovett. They started in July of 1948, sir, and continued through September, were adjourned in September and picked up again in December of 1948, and I was connected with them actively from July to September and again from December until the termination of my office in January.

Senator Watkins. How long did you serve in the State Department?

Mr. Lovett. I served from the 1st of July 1947 until January 20, 1949.

Senator Watkins. That was your first service with the State Department?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir. I had previously been about 5 years Assistant Secretary of War for Air, in the War Department.

Senator Watkins. I have been trying to find out just who would be able to give us the information on the genesis of this North Atlantic Pact, and the reason I say that is because it has been suggested to me by a very expert newspaperman that he observed at the time of Breton Woods that this pact had its genesis, that it was already then in contemplation by some of our planners in the State Department, and I would like to find out if I can from somebody in the State Department if that is true.

Mr. Lovett. I cannot, of course, answer for what might have been in the mind of someone long before my period of service in the State Department, but I can give you positive assurance as to how this particular pact arose, and that was covered at some length earlier this morning in the testimony, Senator Watkins. You will find it in full there.

Senator Watkins. If you will note, what I said was that this newspaperman indicated that he saw it. He was covering that particular conference, and he said he saw its beginnings then. Of course that would be—
Mr. Lovett. I would doubt that very much, sir, as the genesis arose through a series of circumstances in the United Nations, and circumstances associated with the United Nations Organization, and that was only evident in 1947 and 1948, whereas the Bretton Woods business was many years before that.

**INCLUSION OF ARTICLE 51 IN THE CHARTER**

Senator Watkins. Then I read also, and it also whetted my curiosity to this point, a statement attributed to Mr. John Foster Dulles, who stated, or at least my recollection of the press story sometime back was, that he and the Senator from Michigan provided, or helped draft, to get into the United Nations Charter, article 51, a provision for regional arrangements of this kind, so that in the event we had difficulty with the United Nations procedure or the Security Council we would always be provided with something of this type to take its place.

Mr. Lovett. Senator Watkins, I read some of the transcript last night, and I think you will find that Senator Austin dealt with that at some length. Certainly there are on the Foreign Relations Committee at least two Senators who were actively associated in the meetings in San Francisco.

Senator Watkins. Maybe sometime they will be testifying and we can ask them about it and find out just how this thing did get into the United Nations Charter, and just where it began.

Senator Vandenberg. I am sure the Senator doesn't mean, when he says "how it got in," and does not infer, any sinister implication or something terrifically criminal about it.

Senator Watkins. I do not. It may have been a very wise thing, the way the United Nations thing was set up, that we should have some safety escalator, and, as somebody said the other day, provide a backstop in the event the United Nations did not function.

The Chairman. There was no porch climbing in this matter. The San Francisco Conference understood it perfectly when they adopted it, and the Senate understood it perfectly when they adopted the Charter.

Senator Watkins. I am glad to know that, because I have some serious questions as to why they did what they did at that time, and thought probably we would have a way out even for them. If they did not have full information they probably would not have adopted it as it was adopted.

Senator Vandenberg. If the Senator will yield, just on the point, this is no time to argue it and I do not want to interrupt the examination, but for the Senator’s basic information I would like to make this fundamental statement, that in my opinion the South American countries would never have signed the United Nations Charter without article 51, and its original inspiration was from the pan-American countries.

Senator Watkins. What inspired chapter VIII, which follows?

The Chairman. May I interrupt right there to supplement what Senator Vandenberg said? The Dumbarton Oaks preliminary draft of the United Nations contained a clause on regional arrangements which was developed and perfected by article 51 at San Francisco.
Senator Vandenberg. There was nothing in Dumbarton Oaks comparable to article 51.

Senator Watkins. I am talking about Bretton Woods.

The Chairman. I said Dumbarton Oaks. I said, in Dumbarton Oaks there was a section (c), "Regional Arrangements," but it did not go to the extent of article 51, and when the San Francisco meeting took up the Dumbarton Oaks arrangement then it was developed and perfected by article 51, so that it did not originate over at Bretton Woods. It originated elsewhere.

Senator Watkins. I merely asked the question. Some newspaperman said it was apparent.

I want to take up some of the provisions of the treaty that you helped negotiate, to see what your understanding is of the meaning of those particular provisions. You have already testified some about article 5, and I want to ask you some more questions about that, and also article 3. I am referring now to the North Atlantic Pact.

**INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 2**

Article 2, so we will have it in the record at this moment, and I will direct discussion to it, I read:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

I refer first to the language:

by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

Do you know just what conditions they had in mind, chiefly, that they might undertake to promote?

Mr. Lovett. The conditions of stability and well-being, of course, relate to the stability of the country both economically and politically, and the permanence of the establishments which related to the individual freedom and other implements of justice that are covered in the language prior to it.

Senator Watkins. Do you think they had any specific project of any kind in mind in providing that language?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir.

**ELIMINATION OF CONFLICT IN ECONOMIC POLICIES**

Senator Watkins. Then let us come to the last sentence:

They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

What specific thing did they have in mind there? Was that discussed in any way?

Mr. Lovett. That whole sentence there, as I recall it, Senator Watkins, arose out of the efforts to make it abundantly clear that these countries who participated in the treaty would do their utmost, through the principle of cooperation economically, to improve themselves, so that they would be in a position for self-help and mutual
aid. In other words, our economic program abroad as represented by the ECA was here again referred to, and they certified there was a continuing purpose of cooperation amongst them.

Senator Watkins. I understand the affirmative side of it, but they specifically mention that they will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. They must have had a recognition of some conflicts which they were going to seek to eliminate.

Mr. Lovett. There were at that time, and there have been throughout, a number of instances of difficulties arising between the countries as a result either of their customs union activities or of their financial policies. You remember specifically when France readjusted her currency the British felt very definitely it might have an unsettling effect on other currencies.

Senator Watkins. They were to eliminate these conflicts over their currencies?

Mr. Lovett. No; any element of their economic life. They were to try through peaceful means, which are mentioned notably in the United Nations Charter, to dispose of those difficulties.

Senator Watkins. You will note that this not only applies to the European nations, but also applies to the United States.

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Watkins. In other words, we are bound to seek to eliminate conflicts in economic policies. Do you have any in mind, or did they have any in mind at that time, that affected the United States?

Mr. Lovett. No; we had no specific items in mind. It was a statement of general principles, not a statement of a specific purpose at the moment.

ARTICLE 2—A STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES ONLY

Senator Watkins. The thing that bothers me about a reference of this kind in a contract, if it does not have any meaning at all, that is, any specific meaning, is, why it was put in there. Usually in a contract you try to cover, and I am sure in your business experience you have had a great deal to do with contracts, the elements or any conflicts on which there may have been disagreement, and put it in express language so that the relationships will be better and that there will be unity of action on that particular matter.

Mr. Lovett. This particular section deals, of course, with the explanation of the purposes, the goals, among others, that they are aiming at.

Senator Watkins. This is outside of the preamble, as I get it.

UNITED STATES TRADE POLICIES AND ARTICLE 2

Mr. Lovett. It is outside of the preamble, but it does not relate, of course, to any one particular conflict or any one item, but outlines a course of action.

Senator Watkins. Does it bind us in any way to a continuation of the principle of reciprocal trade treaties?

Mr. Lovett. I do not see that it binds us to anything other than what it says.

Senator Watkins. Was it discussed at that time that it would bind us to continue that policy?
Mr. Lovett. No. It was not discussed.

Senator Watkins. There was no discussion of tariffs as being some of the conflicts that might need to be eliminated?

Mr. Lovett. None whatsoever.

Senator Watkins. Even between the European nations?

Mr. Lovett. Not during my time. There was no specification at all.

Senator Watkins. I would ask specifically if there was any discussion on this particular paragraph among the negotiators as to any tariffs or customs between the various European signatories or proposed signatories to the treaty.

Mr. Lovett. No. It was only an expression of a course of action,

Senator Watkins.

Senator Watkins. I understand that, but what I am trying to get at is, what did they have in mind, specifically, if there were any specific ideas, when they drafted and put this into this agreement?

Mr. Lovett. They had in mind, as I tried to indicate earlier, the definite purpose to eliminate, insofar as possible, anything which would retard the unified growth of the economy of this group. And it was an expression, if you choose, of a general philosophy. It was felt that it would be extremely desirable as an indication of the good intentions of the participants in this pact.

Senator Watkins. I understand that, and I think they probably have tried to do that sincerely in this pact, but as one who has to make up his mind in giving advice to the executive department as to whether or not it ought to be ratified, I wanted to know just what this section contemplated. You do not think it contemplated the elimination of any tariffs, it does not contemplate binding us to a continuous policy of reciprocal trade agreements. Do you think it in any way hints at——

Mr. Lovett. Not at all, sir.

Senator Watkins. I had not finished. Do you think it in any way hints at or binds us to adopt the International Trade Organization Treaty which is now prepared and which will soon be submitted, as I understand, to the Senate for ratification?

Mr. Lovett. Not at all.

Senator Watkins. It does not indicate that in any way, and you would not construe this to bind the United States as a matter of policy to go on eliminating its tariffs or to adopt permanently, or for the life of the treaty, a reciprocal trade program?

Mr. Lovett. No.

Senator Watkins. Or to even ratify the international trade agreement?

Mr. Lovett. I would not.

Senator Watkins. None of those matters I have mentioned was contemplated or even discussed in connection with this particular section?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Watkins. And you were present at most of these discussions when the negotiations were taking place?

Mr. Lovett. I was.

Senator Watkins. And the legal counsel for the State Department was present and advised in all these matters?

Mr. Lovett. They were in all of the working parties.
Senator Watkins. Who was the legal aide that took part in these negotiations for the State Department? I think we ought to have him here to give his opinion.

Mr. Lovett. Mr. Gross; Ernest Gross.

Senator Watkins. What position did he occupy at the time?

Mr. Lovett. He was the legal adviser. He was at that time of which we are speaking the legal adviser of the Department of State. He is now an assistant Secretary of State.

Senator Watkins. You do not have a solicitor for the Department of State, do you?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir.

Senator Watkins. They used to have a solicitor for the State Department. I was acquainted with a number of men who occupied that position with great distinction.

Now let's go over to article 3:

**IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

In the negotiations was there a discussion of the ways in which self-help and mutual aid might be accomplished?

Mr. Lovett. Yes, there was.

Senator Watkins. And did the idea of mutual aid go to the extent of including military measures, the furnishing of arms and armament by the United States to the other signatories, the proposed signatories to the treaty?

Mr. Lovett. There was never any specific covering of that.

Senator Watkins. Let's leave out the word "specific."

The Chairman. Let him answer it in his own way.

Senator Watkins. All right; I apologize. I do not want to interrupt you.

Mr. Lovett. It is all right, Senator. There was never any discussion direct or implied, or obligation, on the part of this country, to do any particular thing with respect to military supplies and military assistance. The language was perfectly well understood by the negotiators, and I think has been covered in the testimony of the Secretary of State here, that the self-help and mutual aid language related to a measure of earnest determination to put themselves and their neighbors in the best possible position to resist aggression if it occurred, and it was understood that the mutual aid meant that there would be no purely selfish attempt by one country to take care of itself, and then its neighbors go by default.

It was always in contemplation that good faith would require each of them to help within the measure which he deemed necessary and possible in the building up of the participant strength.

**DISCUSSIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 3 BY MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Senator Watkins. Since we have gone into this question of what happened and how this treaty was negotiated, I think it would be fair and probably perfectly proper and material to the discussion to in-
quire along the lines that I am now inquiring. Was there not a discussion of the practical situation of the signatories or the proposed signatories at the time as to what this would need in the way of help, arms, economic help and all other help? Was that not discussed in these negotiations?

Mr. Lovett. You will recall the Brussels Pact signatories were at that time meeting abroad, and at those meetings there were representatives of the National Military Establishment of this country present. We therefore, in the Military Establishment end, were receiving information dealing with the studies that were then undertaken, and which are now of course public knowledge through the combined commanders in chief organization of the Brussels Pact signatories. Those studies were being made then.

Up to the time I left, Senator Watkins, there had been no report issued or received by us which gave an estimate either in amounts or in dollars. As of January 20th there was no such figure. Those figures were being collected at the time that I was here, and I believe that they came out some month or so later, probably some time in February.

Senator Watkins. Without meaning any offense, I think the answer is not responsive to what I asked. I asked, was there any discussion among the negotiators of the various items I have called to your attention? You told me about what was done somewhere else.

Mr. Lovett. I have tried to say previously that there was discussion of the principle of self-help and mutual aid; that the precise detail of the competence of each country and its requirements was not developed at the time I left, so it was understood that as and when the figures were ultimately provided there would, of course, be a more precise study made. That has been done, and I think it has been reported to this committee by the Secretary of State.

Senator Watkins. Was there general discussion? You have used the word "precise." I would not restrict you to that. I think probably it would not be far enough developed at that time to make it precise, but was there a general discussion of what their needs would be and how that could be accomplished under the principle of mutual aid?

Mr. Lovett. There were frequent general discussions as to the ability of the various countries to contribute to their own self-defense, and to the aid of their neighbors.

Senator Watkins. Did they not indicate the needs they would have?

Mr. Lovett. No, they did not.

Senator Watkins. In the way of armament?

Military Assistance Program Discussions Separate from North Atlantic Treaty Negotiations

Mr. Lovett. No, they did not; only in the most general terms, that they would need armament. I was going to say, Senator Watkins, that it was stated by the negotiators for the United States at the outset that we would have to have a very precise understanding of the competence and the potential of each participant before we could get anywhere in that area of discussion, which was properly one for the military authorities, and it was also abundantly clear throughout that anything which any country might do, this country included among the others, would be supplementary and not a replacement for the efforts of the individual country in its own self-defense, hence the
importance of the words "self-help and mutual aid," which we had learned the value of through the ECA procedures.

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, then, in these negotiations there was a general discussion of the necessity for this type of an agreement, taking and keeping in mind the threats that had been made or the lack of cooperation of one of the great powers in the United Nations, that need of the various nations taking part in the discussion for some help to defend themselves against whatever aggressor might appear on the scene and what the United States could do, if anything, to help them. Wasn't there all that discussed in this?

Mr. Lovett. Not in any precise detail.

Senator Watkins. Let's leave out the word "precise." I recognize that.

Mr. Lovett. As I said earlier, the general principle of self-help and mutual aid was, of course, discussed at considerable length, but there was no commitment made by any participant in the discussions as to what he might do or what he might expect anybody else to do. Up to the time I left it was not even possible to get into that phase of it.

Senator Watkins. But it was intended that the United States would help, and was committing itself, or would commit itself, if it ratified this particular treaty with this clause in it, economically and with armament?

Mr. Lovett. It was not directed to the United States at all, Senator Watkins. Each participant took a similar obligation of self-help and mutual aid, and the concept of the treaty was that it should be a two-way thing, and not a one-way thing.

CONSIDERATION OF CAPACITY OF EUROPE TO DEFEND ITSELF

Senator Watkins. Was it not understood, and did they not take into consideration the situation that existed? In other words, didn't they face the facts of life that we were then putting up billions to put them on their feet, that they didn't have the means themselves to rearm themselves or to go ahead and establish their economy as they ought to be to be strong? Wasn't that all taken into consideration and discussed?

Mr. Lovett. Everything was discussed that related to their economic position and their military competence, but there was no commitment made.

Senator Watkins. I realize that. Discussion is what I want.

The Chairman. Just a minute. Let him answer your question.

Mr. Lovett. There was no commitment made as a result of any of the discussions, and the discussions were in general terms based upon the principle of self-help and mutual aid.

NO COMMITMENT TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Watkins. Would you say now that as a result of those discussions or in the discussions there was nothing that took place, or intimated, that in any way bound the United States, or looked to the United States, to furnish substantial military rearmament for the European nations who were to be part of this treaty?
Mr. Lovett. I say again, Senator Watkins, what I said earlier this morning, that there was no commitment taken on the part of this Government or any other participant as to what they might do in amount, type, time, or form, of assistance.

Senator Watkins. But is there not a commitment in this very paragraph, and so understood by those negotiators, that the United States would do something? At least it was committed to something.

Mr. Lovett. All participants.

Senator Watkins. All right; let's put them all in. That takes in the United States as well. I am talking about the United States. We have to act for the United States, not for the rest of them.

Mr. Lovett. Certainly, but I want to make sure that there is no misconception that it was some sort of a unilateral obligation.

Senator Watkins. I do not think so. They have to help too, but didn't they face the facts of life that they could not help and were not in a position to help?

Mr. Lovett. I do not agree with that particular conclusion that they were not in position to help.

Senator Watkins. I have been told that. I have been voting on the theory that we had to tax the American people to send billions of supplies over there because they could not help themselves without it.

Mr. Lovett. The help we give them is just a small portion of their total help, of what they are doing. In this particular case, the military supplies program, which the Secretary of State has previously testified on, I believe it was brought out in testimony that the amount of mutual aid that we have been considering is one-sixth or one-seventh of the total that the participants require.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 3

Senator Watkins. You understood that we were binding ourselves to do something, at least, to take some affirmative action to help?

Mr. Lovett. Of course, Senator.

Senator Watkins. And they were, of course, likewise binding themselves the same way?

Mr. Lovett. Exactly.

Senator Watkins. And what the possibilities of that help would be were discussed among the negotiators?

Mr. Lovett. Yes.

Senator Watkins. That is what I wanted to find out. I can't imagine men sitting down and facing the situation we face today without actually going into some of the details—

The Chairman. Go ahead and ask your question, Senator. It is not necessary to make a speech. Just ask the questions.

Senator Watkins. I will appreciate it very much if the Senator will permit me to ask my questions in my own way.

The Chairman. I want you to ask questions, but I do not care for you to make a speech not in response to some suggestion of the witness. I want to be courteous, but we have other considerations here.

Senator Watkins. I understand so, and I think I have not unduly trespassed. I am not here just as a visitor, and entirely by the courtesy of the committee. I am a Member of the United States Senate charged
with the same responsibility that the Senator from Texas or any other Senator is charged with, to do my part in giving the advice to the Executive on this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am suggesting is that the Senator is free to ask any question that he wants to, but after the witness has answered the question fully, then the Senator from Utah has proceeded to say what he couldn't imagine, and so on and so forth, that did not call for an answer at all, but was a mere general observation.

Senator Watkins. I probably have been following the example I have been set for so many days in these hearings. I have heard so many members do it that I have probably just lapsed.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. We want to be courteous and to give you every consideration, but we want you to also give us some consideration.

Senator Watkins. I have tried to give that consideration, and I think the record will show that I have used but very little of the time, and that at the tail end of the proceedings.

OBLIGATION TO TAKE SOME ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 3

Now, as to article 5, I do not want to cover all the same ground that was covered before, but as I get it from your interpretation, you think what that means, or what you have told the committee it means, is that we are not bound in any respect to do anything under that treaty, but the matter is entirely left to the Congress, and it will have to consider it when a question would arise. Is that a true interpretation of what you have said?

Mr. Lovett. Senator Watkins, I said something which places the emphasis elsewhere. We are bound by the treaty.

Senator Watkins. Just what do you think we are bound to do? That is what I want to know.

Mr. Lovett. I was just going to say, sir, that I think we are bound by the treaty, under article 5 and elsewhere, as a government, first under article 3 and then under article 5, to take such steps as the representatives of the people of this country deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. That seems to me to be a perfectly clear, unequivocal obligation.

Senator Watkins. As I understand you, then, we are bound to take some steps in order to protect and to secure the North Atlantic area.

Mr. Lovett. We are bound to take such action as we deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 5

Senator Watkins. I ask you what interpretation you give to the meaning of the first part of that section, down to the first semicolon:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all;

Mr. Lovett. That is perfectly clear to me, sir. It would be hard to make it clearer.

Senator Watkins. Do you follow me, and am I correct in my statement, and I will ask you that as a question, that an attack upon London, an attack upon Paris, an attack upon Copenhagen, or any of those
Mr. Lovett. It does not say that, Senator.

Senator Watkins. It says, if you attack any one of these signatories it will be an attack upon them all, and that would mean an attack upon us.

Mr. Lovett. It does not say it will be the same thing. It says it will be considered as an attack against them all, and then, in those circumstances, if the hypothetical case you put occurs, we have the obligation which I referred to previously, and that is to assist the parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as this Government deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Senator Watkins. Does it not, in effect, bind us to consider an attack upon London, for instance, the same as an attack on our own country, and aren't we bound to do and to take such steps as we would take if one of our own cities were attacked by another?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir; it does not. I think the language is clear on that point, because it draws the sharp rule here that if an attack occurs, we consider that as an attack on us, but the measures that we take in response to that are within the determination of this Government.

Senator Watkins. I understand that, and I will agree with you. The measures we would take would be within the power of this Government. That is true, and we will probably have to take them by Congress. But does it not bind us, and does it not bind Congress in advance, to take exactly the same steps that it would take if its own territory were attacked? Would that not be the interpretation of that clause, that we shall regard an attack upon any one of these nations the same as if our own Nation were attacked, and we would proceed in the same way to react, to do the things we would do if our own Nation were attacked?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir; that is not my understanding.

Senator Watkins. That is not your understanding?

Mr. Lovett. No, sir.

Senator Watkins. You do not claim to be a lawyer, but you think that is not the understanding that these other powers had?

Mr. Lovett. I am confident in my own mind that that is not the understanding in general terms, because we have here set up the rule which leaves to the Congress the determination as to whether or not the facts are such as to require, for example, a declaration of war.

Senator Watkins. You understand, of course, that it is possible to have a state of war actually exist without a declaration of war, do you not?

Mr. Lovett. I understand that that is possible.

Senator Watkins. In fact we did have.

Mr. Lovett. This does not contemplate it.

Senator Watkins. We did have that at least during the time when the Japs struck at Pearl Harbor until the declaration by Congress which recognized, not declared a state of war but recognized a state of war to already exist. We had that situation, did we not?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.
Senator Watkins. And under the circumstances here, if New York City or Washington were attacked by a foreign power, we would still have a state of war without the Congress enacting a declaration of war.

Mr. Lovett. I do not know that you would have a state of war, but you would certainly have a prompt reaction on the part of the Commander in Chief and the military services if this country itself were attacked. The question you are posing is, what happens if some other country is attacked which is a participant in this enterprise.

Senator Watkins. I am getting an interpretation now that is different than I understood a good many others have placed on this, and a large number of people that have communicated with me have insisted that if one of these other countries were attacked we are more or less bound to react the same way as if our own country were attacked.

EUROPEAN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 5

I think, and preliminary to this question I want to ask, that that is the very view that the European people themselves are taking of this situation and of this particular section. They feel satisfied now with this section. They were very much disturbed at one time at what took place in the United States Senate when it was generally expressed there on February 14 of this year that there was no moral commitment to go to war or to fight, and they were very much disturbed over that, and so expressed themselves. Later on that alarm practically disappeared, and it is now thought by a great many of our own citizens here that it disappeared for the reason that they were assured, and that they now understand this to mean that when they are attacked the United States Government is bound to respond and to do the things that it would do the same as if one of its own cities were attacked or its own territory were attacked.

I can see that construction of this particular clause would give them great assurance, because they all know, from their own experience and their own minds, what the reaction of the United States would be in a specific matter. Legally Congress might say "No" and they might not fight, but if anybody would agree to do for them the same as they would do for themselves if they were attacked, they would feel much assured about it.

Mr. Lovett. I am not aware, of course, what interpretation the foreign countries put on it. I can only give you my own impression from my conversations.

Senator Donnell. Would the Senator permit just a brief interruption?

Senator Watkins. I yield for a moment.

Senator Donnell. May I ask Mr. Lovett whether he saw this observation which is stated to be made in a dispatch of the United Press from Copenhagen, quoting an address by Gustav Rasmussen, who signed the pact, you will recall, for Denmark:

If armed force is necessary to reestablish security, it is evident that the member countries possessing such force are obliged to use it. That means that if an armed attack occurred on one of the member countries, it could have only one answer. The United States would go to war.

Did you see that, and you agree with that?
Mr. Lovett. No, I did not see it; and no, I do not agree with it except with the reservations which I have previously made indicating that it would require the judgment of the Congress.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ATTACK ON UNITED STATES AND AN ATTACK ON A CONSIGNATORY

Senator Watkins. Let me ask you if you would agree with this situation, that by reason of the statement made in that first part of article 5 up to the end of the first semicolon, we have created, by this agreement, a situation which binds the United States in the future to take the same action with respect to the foreign countries that have been attacked as it would take on its own.

Mr. Lovett. I have tried to answer that earlier, Senator. I do not think that article 5, and I stress this as being my personal opinion on a subject which is properly the field of the Secretary of State to answer and which he has previously covered, and I do not think that the language in article 5, gives any assurance that the line of action we take must be identical if an act of aggression occurs in some other country with the line of action we will take if the act of aggression occurs against one of our own cities. I see no assurance in this pact that such a conclusion is warranted.

Senator Watkins. I would understand that probably it would not be identically the same action or the same precise action, but it would mean fight, would it not?

Mr. Lovett. That would depend on the circumstances.

Senator Watkins. And would not Congress be bound to declare war just the same as it would if New York City and Washington were attacked?

Mr. Lovett. Senator, I can only refer again to the Secretary of State's full answer on that point, where it was pointed out that there is a direct obligation on this country to consider what measures are necessary to restore and maintain peace in the North Atlantic area. The method of restoration, the time of it, and its extent, are within the control of this Government, and I do not know how I can make that point any clearer as representing my own opinion.

Senator Watkins. The time and the way and the method, all that sort of thing, I think you are right on that, but haven't we agreed specifically to take some action?

Mr. Lovett. We have agreed to take some action, and that "some action" is specifically defined as action which we deem necessary.

Senator Watkins. And to take it forthwith.

Mr. Lovett. That is right.

MORAL COMMITMENT TO DECLARE WAR IN CASE OF ATTACK ON A CONSIGNATORY

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, have we not, in effect, by making the statement we do that the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, created a situation in advance which will make it, as a matter of practical operation, impossible for any future American Congress not to declare war and to go to the rescue of these nations, having once adopted that principle?
Mr. Lovett. No, Senator Watkins, I cannot agree that that is a reasonable interpretation, or was the intent. I am not sure whether you were here when we covered this point earlier, but I tried to explain my own understanding of the difference which the order of magnitude of the offense itself would have in the conclusions of the Congress. It would be one thing, certainly, if formalized armies invaded and occupied another country. The Congress would have to determine whether or not that, in their judgment and in good faith, a declaration of war was necessary to restore and maintain. I think the language is, the security of the North Atlantic area a declaration of war. On the other hand, if a couple of border guards started firing at each other, the lesser order of magnitude might not require a declaration of war, but some other steps.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE TREATY

Senator Watkins. With respect to the statements that have been made in behalf of this pact that it would be a great deterrent for war because it would say in advance that at the moment an attack was made on any one of the signatories it would meet an overwhelming force, will that statement not be robbed of its effect if the Congress, as it has the utmost freedom when that should occur to decide whether or not it was bound to take any armed action whatsoever, should decide not so to do?

Mr. Lovett. I can only answer that in the affirmative, by an affirmative statement. Senator Watkins, that I believe the importance of that pact is difficult to overestimate, largely because it puts a group of countries with a common point of view toward human life and justice and freedom on the record in advance that they will oppose with determination and with unified resources any act of aggression.

Senator Watkins. Are we committed to oppose in advance?

Mr. Lovett. What we are committed to has been pointed out in article 5, which I have tried repeatedly to interpret, and I think it would be hard to find a method of making it clearer, that the ultimate decision on a declaration of war, if that is what is deemed necessary must rest with the Congress of this country as far as this country is concerned; and incidentally, Senator Watkins, of course, with the appropriate bodies in the other participants, who likewise have constitutional procedures to go through.

Senator Watkins. Do you think the statement in this agreement we have signed, which you say is not binding upon any future Congress to act with force to regard, that they would have the freedom of choice to decide whether we will or will not act with force, will be of any practical help to stop future aggression?

Mr. Lovett. I think the pact, as I understand it, will be of the greatest help.

Senator Watkins. And that Russia, or any other nation which might possibly be an aggressor, in view of the interpretation which you have given here this afternoon, would be worried at all about an agreement of that kind?

Mr. Lovett. I think any potential aggressor who reads this pact, and if he is well advised he will, cannot escape the clear understanding that an act of aggression will be reacted to promptly by this group within their judgment as to what is necessary to restore and maintain
the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. He is on notice in advance that he has opened the door to an endless amount of trouble.

Senator Watkins. And then we are committed to restore and secure that peace?

OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN NORTH ATLANTIC

Mr. Lovett. In such form as we feel necessary.

Senator Watkins. I am not talking about the form; I am talking about the substance. Are we agreed in substance that we are committed to secure and protect the security of the North Atlantic area?

Mr. Lovett. The language seems to me to be completely clear.

Senator Watkins. I am trying to get your opinion.

The Chairman. The treaty is what we are talking about.

Senator Watkins. And it is what we interpret that treaty to mean that counts, and as the Senator well knows, we take the interpretation, the understanding, of those who were present at the negotiations to help us find out what the language means.

Mr. Lovett. My answer to the question, if you want my personal view, is that the language of article 5 means, yes, we do have an obligation, otherwise the treaty would have little or no value.

Senator Watkins. I am agreed with you on that 100 percent, that it does have an obligation, a very binding one, and considered just the same as if we were attacked ourselves.

GERMANY AND THE TREATY

Now I want to go to another question. I do not want to prolong this. What was said about Germany during the negotiations in connection with its future and what part it would play in the defense of the Atlantic area?

Mr. Lovett. My best recollection is that Germany was discussed at some length but we found that its circumstances at the present time make it impossible to be considered as a participant, notably western Germany.

Senator Watkins. What about the future?

Mr. Lovett. And the future is left, I think, covered by article 10 of the treaty, which would presumably cover any future adherent, and I believe there has been testimony given before this committee that in the case of any future adherent it would be regarded as a new element in the treaty and therefore would be either discussed with the committee or referred to the Congress. My recollection of the precise language is not accurate on that point. But Germany would be treated, I should imagine, as any other applicant for membership.

Senator Watkins. I notice you used the word "imagine." It went just a little further than imagination, did it not, when you discussed the future of Germany with relation to the defense of the North Atlantic area?

Mr. Lovett. I am not sure that I understand you, Senator.

Senator Watkins. You said "I imagine," I wanted to know, to get right down to your memory on the matter, if there was not some concrete discussion of what part Germany would take in the defense
Mr. Lovett. My personal opinion is that it would, on the same principle that the Algeria departments are a part of metropolitan France.

Senator Watkins. But you think that Hawaii is now in a state where it is not entitled to the same protection it would have if the government were changed to that of a State?

Mr. Lovett. I am not speaking of the protection involved.

Senator Watkins. There is no protection under this treaty, is there?

Mr. Lovett. I am speaking on questions which relate to whether or not it was or was not in the pact. The answer to that question is that it is not in the pact, because it falls without its limits.

Senator Watkins. An attack, then, upon Hawaii would not call into operation the terms of this pact?

Mr. Lovett. That is my understanding.

Senator Watkins. But an attack on the Aleutian Islands would?

Mr. Lovett. On our portion.

Senator Watkins. An attack on Japan, of course, and on our forces in Japan, would not call into operation this pact either, would it?

Mr. Lovett. That is correct.

Senator Watkins. I think that is all.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30, at which time General Bradley will be the witness before the committee.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., a recess was taken to the following day, Tuesday, May 3, 1949, at 10:30 a.m.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on May 2, 1949, in room 318 Senate Office Building, at 10:30 a. m., Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Connally, George, Thomas of Utah, Green, McMahon, Vandenberg, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Lodge.

Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This is the Committee on Foreign Relations holding hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We are very glad indeed to have with us this morning a distinguished soldier and distinguished American: General Bradley, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, whom we shall be pleased to hear at this time on the treaty and its importance.

Let me announce first: At 12:30 the first ratification of this treaty will be deposited with the United States. It is a ratification of Canada; the treaty was ratified unanimously by the Canadian Parliament.

All right, General Bradley.

STATEMENT OF GEN. OMA R N. BRADLEY, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General Bradley. It is an unusual but welcome occasion when a soldier is called to speak of peace instead of war. In the North Atlantic Treaty, I believe we have found a new strength for common defense without abandoning our determination for permanent peace.

Your committee has heard far more expert testimony than mine on this treaty, and what it means to the United States, and what it can mean to a friendly world. At this point in your hearings, gentlemen, my part is relatively simple. I can tell you what this pact, as a deterrent to war, means to the military security of our country today, and what it may mean if our plans for peace are subverted, and war is thrust upon us.

Twelve nations have signed this treaty with the common determination, according to article 3, to—

separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

285
In addition, they have in common with us, according to their treaty signatures, a desire for—
the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREATY

There is a military significance in these simple declarations. There is no better basis for common defense plans than mutual confidence, similar aims and objectives, and a common worthy purpose. And in the event of war, there is no greater strength than mutually avowed ideals and purposes.

According to this treaty, 12 nations in the world have joined a common pact for security and peace. It would be our good fortune, from a security standpoint, if we were to become a member. Within the framework of these subscribed intentions, we, with our friends, can progress collectively toward added strength and security.

In considering this treaty and its important corollary, the military assistance program for our friends, we ought to ask ourselves: Are we following a national pattern fully supported by the American people? Our avowed purpose has been to rebuild western Europe in order that it may be self-sufficient and secure.

Economically, through the European recovery program we are attaining this purpose.

Politically, through the North Atlantic treaty we would be strengthening their will and their institutions for self-help. As a soldier, I feel that the natural and essential sequel is to strengthen them security-wise with a military assistance program.

ADVANTAGES TO UNITED STATES FROM THE TREATY

However, it is unrealistic to assume that any one of these member nations has cast its lot without consideration of concrete gain. Certainly we of the United States, and especially we members of the National Military Establishment, expect increased military potential from the treaty, and any subsequent mutual aid endeavor. Here are some of the things we expect to gain by joining this pact of collective security:

First, 11 friendly nations assure us that they will stand with us. Second, 11 friendly nations signify that, to the limit of their abilities to resist, no aggressor could count them among his satellites.

And again from a purely military standpoint, the combined population of these 12 nations is more than 300 millions of people—an important military-political factor to the group of nations, and especially to our Nation, in the event we are ever called upon to defend ourselves in another total war.

Fourth, the industrial potential of our 11 friends is not small. Their combined steel production in 1948 is estimated at 37,000,000 tons, while we produced 89,000,000 tons in the United States. Their natural resources, and their ability to manufacture the weapons of war as well as the basic life-giving commodities of peace are important contributions to the security of the western world. And like the popula-
tion question, the transfer of the industrial potential of any one of these nations, from our combination to any aggressor, would be a double liability.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSE FRONTIER IN EUROPE**

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are responsible for our strategic planning, I point to a fifth, and very important contribution that these nations make toward our security. Geographically, many of these member nations are already in positions where any aggression into western Europe would be a conquest of their homelands. I assure you that our frontiers of collective defense lie in common with theirs in the heart of Europe.

In World War II we had the costly experience of making, on the Normandy beaches, the greatest amphibious assault in history to gain a toehold in Europe from which we could launch the final attack for victory. That beachhead cost the United States 21,000 casualties in the first 10 days. I was a commander in that sea-to-land assault and I hope that the occasion shall never arise when I might again be called upon to participate in such a hazardous and costly operation.

I have outlined briefly the five important contributions that the other signatory powers are making to the United States and to each other. There is no price tag on these pledged commodities in security, for they are never for sale.

Any plotting aggressor realizes—just as friendly Europeans realize—that in the final analysis, western Europe can be saved only by the western Europeans. Americans realize that neither American dollars nor American arms can—in themselves—give Europe security. But if we Americans, together with the western Europeans, believe that economic assistance can bring economic stability, we should also believe that military assistance can bring military stability to us all.

**GREATER SECURITY FOR NORTH ATLANTIC AREA**

The North Atlantic Treaty would supplement ERP by furnishing improved military security already begun with growing economic recovery. Military assistance is not specifically required by this treaty. However, this pact, and some military assistance, would provide both an assurance of collective aid, and would provide additional means to resist. Given the sorely needed materials, and given the proper training, European divisions, established on their own home territory in western Europe, will be in a firm position of readiness. I have no doubt that given the assurance of aid, and the means to resist, that they will contest resolutely any threat of aggression.

Finally, after studied appraisal of the future security provisions for our country, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in unanimous agreement that our strategy, in case we are attacked, must rely on sufficient integrated forces of land, sea, and air power to carry the war back to the aggressor, ultimately subjugating the sources of his military and industrial power. Plans for the common defense of the existing free world must provide for the security of western Europe without abandoning these countries to the terrors of another enemy occupation. Only upon that premise can nations closest to the frontiers be expected to stake their fortunes with ours in the common defense.
In conclusion, let me state that I believe our national objective is permanent peace and security. Both peace and security are necessary to maintain our way of life, and to sustain our standard of living.

At no time in our history has it become so important that we be utterly sincere, and profound in our integrity. If we are convinced that the European recovery program promotes peace through economic stability, and that the North Atlantic Treaty establishes strength for democracy through political stability, then we should adopt the treaty wholeheartedly.

The Chairman. Thank you, General. We want to ask you some questions along that line.

AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONTEMPLATED

In the current issue of the United States News appears a report that the United States can ship abroad up to $5,122,000,000 in ground-force arms not needed for our M-day forces of 18 divisions. I do not know whether that is true or not. I want to interrogate you. To what extent will military aid over and above the authorization requested come from our surplus military supplies?

General Bradley. It is hard to say that any piece of military equipment is surplus to your eventual needs. Except, however, that certain articles are surplus in that, until production catches up, you can not arm more than a certain number of divisions. So that the equipment we have in certain categories over and above that required for that particular balanced equipment, would probably be available through production after the war, and would not seriously affect your own equipment standpoint.

To make myself clear: Supposing you had balanced equipment for, say, 40 divisions, and you had certain items of equipment above that particular need, in say a dozen articles, you could not mobilize but the 40 divisions until production of all of those catches up, so that the 12 items, over and above the requirement of 40 could be provided to somebody else without seriously affecting your own mobilization.

CONTEMPLATED MILITARY STAFF ORGANIZATION

The Chairman. It is to be assumed, I suppose, that when and if the treaty is ratified, there will be some kind of a military contact between the governments on the line of staff consultations and things of that kind, is it not, General?

General Bradley. I believe that is reasonable to assume. However, this primarily, and to start with, certainly, is a political union.

The Chairman. That is very true.

General Bradley. As to what staff organization or military organization will be formed within that pact, I do not believe it has been determined.

The Chairman. The details have not been determined. But is it not a fair assumption that if and when we ratify the treaty, and especially if we later do supply them with equipment or arms, that there would have to be some coordination and contacts between the different governments and the United States?

General Bradley. I think that naturally follows; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That, of course, as far as we are concerned, would be under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would it not?

General BRADLEY. I think it would be primarily under the governments themselves to determine that. Undoubtedly when it comes to the organization of a military staff set-up for all the nations, if such were determined to be necessary by the nations, undoubtedly they would ask for military advice on it. But as I see it, whatever organization is finally formed, would be that decided upon by the governments themselves and not by the military.

The CHAIRMAN. I grant you that, of course, it being a political matter. But assuming after that has been attained is it not entirely likely there would be a military committee or military staff or some organization so that there would not be one country going one way and the other the other?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I think such an organization would be best qualified to determine what each nation should furnish toward a collective security organization. Some countries can furnish one thing, and others another. In order to determine what each of the members could best furnish toward the collective security, I think that that would have to be done by some kind of a military staff.

MUTUAL AID IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of furnishing arms and equipment, is it not true that some governments probably are already supplied in certain lines, and another one is not, so that those matters would have to be taken into consideration and some systematic plan adopted?

General BRADLEY. That is correct. And different nations might have surplus in some items that we could furnish to someone else—I mean countries other than ourselves might be able to furnish to some other country some things. As I see it, it would have to be a collective use of the things available.

NATURE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The CHAIRMAN. It is contemplated, is it not, that a foreign military assistance program would be in the form of either financial aid, equipment and materials, and services? What would “and services” mean? Advisers? Military advisers?

General BRADLEY. I think that would cover it. Military advisers and possibly an exchange of facilities on schools, and maybe an exchange of tactical doctrines in the way of textbooks, or anything of that kind that would contribute to the common security.

The CHAIRMAN. What we would supply, and the kinds of materials that we would supply, would be determined, of course, largely by our own military authorities in consultation with other nations, would it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I will turn the examination over to you, Senator Vandenberg. I will ask you some questions later, General. I do not want to cover the whole field now.

Senator Vandenberg. I want to make only one or two inquiries, Mr. Chairman.
NEED FOR A MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

I think you have made a fine statement, General Bradley. I think you have tuned it to the real objectives of the North Atlantic Pact, which is peace. While you emphasize the importance of some degree of subsequent military implementation, as I read your statement the great importance of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an element in our national security, from your point of view, is the over-all, overriding unity of total cooperation to meet any ultimate contingency, rather than the specific importance of this immediate military implementation. Is that not true?

General Bradley. That is correct. As I see it, we are interested in our friends in the western European countries, and particularly the ones who have joined this pact. We are interested in their regaining some of the strength they had before the last World War.

They need to do that; they need economic recovery; they need some assurance that they will not be picked off one by one. In other words, they need something to lift their morale. And they possibly need to regain their ability to defend themselves.

I would think that if left alone, without any of these things, they might eventually regain that position. It might be a long time. As I see it, this country has adopted a policy of trying to speed up their reaching that point where they have a will and a means to resist. We started in a year ago by helping them on economic recovery and speeding that up. We now are talking about a political pact in which we pool our resources to a certain extent, those of us who have common ideals and purposes, and it seems that the third thing, military assistance, follows. If you do not furnish it I think eventually they would arrive at a point where they could defend themselves, but it seems it falls in the same category as your economic recovery.

You did not try to do everything for them; you tried to assist them. And the same thing on the military assistance program. You are merely trying to speed up the time when they will reach that condition where they can defend themselves individually and collectively.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE TREATY

Senator Vandenberg. Putting my question a little differently: Is it not a fact that your plans in connection with the pact and its implementation do not contemplate the creation of sufficient forces in being to win another world war? You are simply proposing to create an organized and friendly nucleus through which you can more effectively anticipate a satisfactory ultimate net result.

General Bradley. That is correct. And by acting collectively you will probably avoid a war.

Senator Vandenberg. Precisely.

General Bradley. I am one of those who believe that had we had such an agreement before the last world war it probably would never have happened, because I do not believe any country would ever have tackled such a combination of friendly countries, that is, friendly to each other. But where they were allowed to pick off one at a time they finally went so far that they found themselves at war, and as I understand it, to their own chagrin at that time, because they did not
think it would bring war, as they had gotten away with one or two others.

As I see it, the principal purpose of this is to serve notice on anyone that they cannot do that again, and therefore I think it would prevent a war, so that you would never have to go to that point.

Senator Vandenberg. In other words, the potentials in this program are far more important than the immediate physical aspects?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. Potential of countries thinking alike and acting in concert in case of an emergency.

CONTRIBUTION OF MASS MANPOWER

Senator Vandenberg. I only want to ask you this further question, if you can appropriately answer it: In connection with any discussions of implementation of this treaty, is there any thought that we must contribute mass manpower under any circumstances connected with the implementation of the treaty?

General Bradley. I do not see how it is implied in the pact itself. In case of war you probably would act in concert with them, and that would, of course, depend upon the circumstances, and eventually would be at the will of the people, expressed through their Congress, after due consideration.

Senator Vandenberg. I am speaking about the self-help and mutual aid in this peace effort, and I am asking you whether our contemplated contribution does not exclude mass manpower at the beginning, before there is any fracas?

General Bradley. I do not see that it excludes or includes. I do not see how it is involved at all.

Senator Vandenberg. Is it involved in your plans on the subject?

General Bradley. No, sir. In my opinion it is not involved.

Senator Vandenberg. That is what I was trying to get at. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. Not involved except in event, of course, of global conflict growing out of some aggressive movement, and in that event you would be controlled by the circumstances as they arise. That is true, I suppose.

General Bradley. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator George. No further questions.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley?

PEACEFUL PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

Senator Wiley. General, just a question or two. As a man of large experience, and not simply a commander of men, but in world affairs, you have naturally arrived at certain conclusions as to what the world is like today. I understood for your answers to the Senators from Michigan that it is your opinion, your mature judgment, that this is in the best interests of the American people, our joining up in this past. Is that right?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. I believe it increases our own national security.

Senator Wiley. And knowing Europe as you do, and knowing those people over there, acquainted also, I take it, with the factors
involved behind the iron curtain, you feel that joining up in this pact makes for peace, rather than for war?
General Bradley. I do.
Senator Wiley. I think that is all.
The Chairman. Senator Thomas?
Senator Thomas of Utah. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator Hickenlooper. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Senator McMahon?
Senator McMahon. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Lodge?
Senator Lodge. General, I have a few questions that I would like to get answers to, not so much on my account as I think one of the important tasks confronting this committee is to make a record in which answers can be found to questions which may be asked.

IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL AID AND SELF-HELP

Now, on your first page you quote article 3, in which the stipulation is made that there shall be continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. I presume that means, does it not, that if the other nations in this pact do not exercise continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, we are not obliged to help them?
General Bradley. I would interpret it that way. As I have stated before, we cannot, in ourselves, save western Europe. It must be mostly done by themselves, or by self-help. We merely speed that up by giving them help now, so that the eventual goal, through their own worth, their own self-help, will be attained the quicker.
Senator Lodge. So there is no question of all those nations just laying back and saying "Uncle Sam will take care of us, and we do not have to do anything," is there?
General Bradley. I suspect if you find out that that is what they are doing, that there might be a change in policy.
Senator Lodge. I imagine so.

COMPARISON WITH OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

On page 2 you speak of the mutually avowed ideals and purposes which animate the nations that joined in this pact. Does not that give it a certain moral force and enthusiasm that is lacking in the type of old-fashioned military alliance in which people banded themselves together without regard to common ideals simply for opportunistic conquest?
General Bradley. I believe that you had asked the State Department for a definition of military alliance. I do not know that the definition means too much until you get down into the meaning of it.
As I see it, the purpose and meaning of this is entirely different from the normal military alliances as we have known them in years past. Here we are binding ourselves together with some other nations who have free institutions and ideals like our own. Some of the military alliances in the past were a sort of combination of people who did not have such common ideals. You might say a combination of strange bedfellows, but for different purposes. Some of them were for purposes of offense, some for defense, that is true.
It seems to me like this one is entirely a different one, where we are joining together nations of like thinking and like ideals, with the purpose of trying to prevent aggression and the starting of a war. There is certainly no offensive implications in this pact whatsoever, because none of these nations could start any offensive war without our assistance, and certainly we would never start one.

So that as I see it, there is no danger in the world in this pact of its being interpreted by anyone, really, as a gesture for offensive aggressive action.

MILITARY CONTRIBUTION OF COSIGNATORIES

Senator Lodge. On page 3 you say:

First, 11 friendly nations assure us that they will stand with us.

That statement means, does it not, that those nations have got a contribution to make in a military sense, which can be definitely helpful?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. And when considered collectively it is quite impressive.

Senator Lodge. The very pertinent question has been raised here in the past week that because western Europe became very disorganized and collapsed in 1939, when their armed forces were much greater than they are in 1949, that therefore there is reason to doubt whether their strength can be worth while in the future.

That point has been raised, and I think it is a legitimate point worthy of consideration, but is it not true that the French Army, for example, which was disorganized in 1939, was subsequently reconstituted with American help, and rendered a very good account of itself in 1944 and 1945?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator Lodge. Is it not true that the Italian partisans were helpful?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator Lodge. Then I notice in the next sentence:

Second, 11 friendly nations signify that, to the limit of their abilities to resist, no aggressor could count them among his satellites.

Is not the significance of that statement that even if these nations could not make a contribution the very fact that they are being denied to somebody else is in itself an advantage to us?

General Bradley. That is what I intended to convey by that sentence. You expressed it very well, sir.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE COSIGNATORIES

Senator Lodge. You also point out that these countries have industrial potential. In the event that the worst should happen, and that they should be hostile, that potential would be of great value for service of supply activities, would it not?

General Bradley. It would be of great assistance to us and at the same time, as a second point here, it denies it to any other group as a satellite potential.

Senator Lodge. On page 4 you refer to the fact that you commanded the sea-to-land assault on the Normandy beaches. I gather from that that you draw the conclusion that it is better from every standpoint,
American and European, if western Europe is not swamped and invaded, and then with a costly liberation to follow, that it is far preferable for western Europe to preserve its integrity and identify at the outset?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. So that we would never have to go back in the manner that we did before.

**EFFECT OF A COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF POWER IN A COSIGNATORY**

Senator Lodge. You are satisfied, are you, General, that the provisions of the treaty protect the United States in the event that one of these nations should fall into the hands of the Communists? I will rephrase that question:

We would not be obliged under the terms of this treaty, would we, to go on furnishing military aid to a country which had fallen under the control of the Communists, would we?

General Bradley. I should think that that would be a proper question to ask the State Department. However, in my personal opinion we would not be expected to, under those circumstances, because you would have a change of government which would probably repudiate the previous signing of the pact by that nation.

Senator Lodge. You do not think, do you, that the Communist reaction to this treaty would be so violent as to make military aid to Europe unjustifiable?

General Bradley. No, sir.

**FUTURE COMMITMENTS ON MILITARY AID**

Senator Lodge. Does this treaty impose a commitment for future years, insofar as money is concerned? Does it commit us to spend a certain amount of money beyond this $1,100,000,000 which is set up for the next year?

General Bradley. My understanding is that the pact in itself does not imply any expenditure; that that is a third point: the European recovery program being one, the pact the second one, and that a third one which must be considered separately. However, whatever you would decide on that third step, whether it is a billion dollars or whatever it is for any one year, I do not see that that commits you to any particular program.

I should think that any assistance to be furnished in the following years would depend upon the progress the nations have made for themselves. At some time they will reach the point where they do not need any, and if on the other hand they did not do anything to help their own recovery you probably would decide not to continue it anyhow.

So as I see it, whatever you decide on that third step, if you do decide to give any military assistance, it does not commit you to any future year whatsoever.

Senator Lodge. Is it true, if you did set up a program of definite dollar amounts for 3 or 4 years, that there would be a tendency in human nature to assume that they were surely going to get that amount and they would relax their own efforts accordingly?
General Bradley. Yes. You might have a long-range plan yourself, but I do not think you should make any promises beyond any one particular year.

Senator Lodge. There is also no commitment, expressed or implied, as to the precise way in which military operations would be conducted if they ever were to be conducted; is there?

General Bradley. There is nothing stated in this as to that; no, sir.

Senator Lodge. And there is nothing stated as to the particular place in which any activities would be undertaken, is there?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator Lodge. There is complete freedom to do whatever seems best at the time, is there not?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator Lodge. Thank you very much, General.

The Chairman. Senator McMahon?

COMMON DEFENSE LINE IN EUROPE

Senator McMahon. General, on page 4, if you do not mind referring to it, you state at the top of the page:

Geographically, many of these member nations are already in positions where any aggression into western Europe would be a conquest of their homelands. I assure you that our frontiers of collective defense lie in common with theirs in the heart of Europe.

When I read that sentence I was reminded of the statement by President Roosevelt in 1939 that our frontier was on the Rhine, and there was a great uproar about it. I take it from this sentence that you agree that that certainly is true today, even though it were not true then.

General Bradley. You notice that I used the words "collective defense," assuming that we are talking about the defense of the 12 nations joining this pact.

Senator McMahon. We are one of the 12 nations?

General Bradley. We are one of the 12. So if we go into this collective-security arrangement, then our common defense line lies, for the 12 nations, in the center of Europe.

Senator McMahon. We found out since 1939 that what the late President said at that time was true. I take it it is far more true today, with the increase in destructiveness of weapons and the increased speed with which they can be delivered, and every development since then reiterates and fortifies the statement that our defense line is in Europe, because that simply takes cognizance of the fact that if war breaks out anywhere in the world today, unfortunately we are going to be involved in it. That is what you are really saying, is it not?

General Bradley. That is right. And going back a little bit, within the last 2 or 3 years, without this pact, had war broken out we would have found ourselves fighting in the center of Europe because we have troops there at the present time on occupation duties.

Senator McMahon. Now, General, I presume that when the military implementation bill is presented that you will naturally appear as a witness to testify on that specific proposal. Many questions occur to me of a military nature having to do with that implementation bill which I do not think it is necessary to ask now.
I merely state that to explain why I do not ask some questions that go that far, but I will ask you this: Even without military aid, the pact does have considerable power, do you not think so?

General Bradley. Yes, sir; I do. I think it is desirable whether or not you want to go on with the military aid.

Senator McMahon. In other words, the might of this country, backed by $16,000,000,000 worth of appropriations for our rearmament, is certainly not to be taken lightly when it is married to a pledge to use it, and use it effectively if aggression takes place. Do you not agree with that, sir?

General Bradley. I agree.

Senator McMahon. We guarantee, in the Rio Treaty, the territorial integrity of the whole South American Continent, and they in turn guarantee ours. We have no arms program for the implementation of that pact. It rests upon our assurance that we will resist any aggression, under the Monroe Doctrine.

If you regard this pact as the extension of the Monroe Doctrine theory, to the line around these 11 countries of western Europe, it might be that our power and our might might be sufficient to deter an aggressor without putting a ground army in western Europe. Is that so?

General Bradley. I think very definitely so. As I understand it, a lot of the people in Germany stated at the outset of the last world war that if the United States got into the war Germany was sure to lose it. They did not know when they started it for certain that we would get in it.

As I stated before, I believe that had we had a pact such as this, where there would have been no doubt in their minds that we would get in it if they started it, it might never have started.

Senator McMahon. And that is so whether or not we have a gun or a man or an airplane on the continent of Europe.

General Bradley. Yes, sir; because of our potential of putting it there later if it is so decided.

Senator McMahon. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General, it is stated, of course, here in the treaty, that each one of these nations shall exert itself by means of continuously effective self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

It is proposed, or has been suggested, that we should appropriate $1,130,000,000 the first year if we undertake the arms program. Can you not verify the statement that that $1,130,000,000 that we contemplate appropriating is matched by the budget requirements in the other 11 nations by something like 6 to 7 billion dollars for their own defense?

General Bradley. I understand that that is correct, that this aid would be on the ratio of about 1 to 6, or 1 to 7, of the total that would be available for the nations; the nations themselves furnishing the rest of it.
The CHAIRMAN. The reason I ask you that, it was brought out in the testimony that there might be some slackening on their part, on their reliance on us to do it all. That would be an earnest that they do not expect to do that, if they lived up to their budget provisions; would it not?

General Bradley. That is correct. They are supposed to furnish about 6 or 7 times as much as we are talking about furnishing them from here.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be under article 3, to meet their obligations under article 3; is that correct?

General Bradley. I am afraid I am not familiar enough with that.

COMPARISON TO TRADITIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCES

The CHAIRMAN. Article 3 is the self-help and mutual-aid provision. Some mention was made about military alliance. You mentioned that. The traditional military alliance as we knew it in the European countries, was not confined to self-defense or to preservation of peace at all; was it?

General Bradley. No, sir; it was not. Quite often it was formed for purposes of aggression, really.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, in a sense, instead of being formed for the sake of peace, it was sometimes formed for the sake of war; was it not?

General Bradley. That is correct. It was sometimes formed for that purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. And in those alliances, if one of the nations became involved in a war, the others automatically were supposed to join in that war; were they not?

General Bradley. They were, and regardless of why they got in the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. Without going into the reasons or the justification for the war, if one of their associates became involved in the war, they were supposed to rush to its aid and enter the war.

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember, no doubt, in World War I, Italy was in a treaty with the Central Powers. She did not stick to the treaty. She found an excuse to get out of it. But there was a bitter complaint of her associates in that Central Powers agreement that she did not rush into the war on their side without any justification on her own part at all. Is that not true?

General Bradley. Yes, sir; that is true. And as I understand it, Italy pulled out because she did not agree with the causes for which the Central Powers were fighting.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all I have.

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the general a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

NATURE OF OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

Senator Vandenberg. It is rather in the form of a statement. I am one of those who have constantly been saying, General, that this proposed North Atlantic Pact is not in manner, form, spirit, or char-
acter anything like what we traditionally know in history as a military alliance. Sometimes it is difficult to identify the difference in the mere text, as you yourself have indicated. Sometimes it is necessary to go behind the text to identify the reality. But just at this point, Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to call attention, for the purpose of the record, to one sentence in the Holy Alliance which was signed November 30, 1815, and which is probably the greatest of all the so-called military alliances in history.

The sentence reads as follows:

The three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions, and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance.

That is what I have had in mind as a typical example of the true character of the old traditional, historical military alliance. And certainly we cannot apply the term “military alliance” to the North Atlantic Pact in any such manner as I have indicated by this quotation. Is that not true?

General Bradley. I agree.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator Hickenlooper. I had not intended to pursue this subject, but I think it has been again reemphasized. General, do you recall an agreement between France and Britain prior to World War I with regard to coming to each other’s assistance if some other country, specifically connoted as Germany, attacked France?

General Bradley. I remember that agreement. I do not remember the details of it.

SIMILARITIES WITH OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not have the text of it here, but as I recall it, the phraseology of that treaty was that they would come to each other’s mutual assistance in the event of attack or aggression by some outside power. I believe that was generally considered to be a military alliance.

It seems to me that there was also an agreement, at least between especially France and Russia, that if the Central Powers committed an aggression that they would come to each other’s mutual assistance. I believe that was considered to be a military alliance as between those countries.

It also seems to me that prior to World War II there was an agreement or an understanding between Great Britain and Poland that the violation of their territory or their sovereignty by way of military advancement by any country would call for certain definite and immediate assistance on the part of Britain.

I am thoroughly convinced that this pact is a peace pact. I do not believe it has any aggressive intentions; in fact, I am certain that it does not. If it is aggressive, it is aggressive for peace. But I am not certain that it is not, in the long run, an alliance for military purposes subject to certain contingencies.

If these countries are attacked it is a military alliance, in my judgment, among other things, and while it certainly connotes peace, it is pointed toward peace, and I think peace underlies every motiva-
tion of this pact, yet I see the same high declarations of resisting invasion and resisting aggression in many other treaties that have been formed in, let us say, the last 20, 30, or 40 years.

I cannot follow the philosophy that just because some treaties a great many years ago probably secretly protected another country, if that country decided to go out and take some more territory, we could necessarily say that a military alliance is an aggressive alliance.

I think a military alliance is just as righteous, if it is a peace alliance, or it is just as much of an alliance if it is a peace alliance or if it is an aggressive alliance, and I think there are various kinds of military alliances.

So that as I view this pact, it is, in some of its particulars, and under some eventualities, a military alliance.

The purpose of the alliance may be different from some ancient alliances, but I think the purpose of this alliance follows quite well the verbiage and the declarations of some more recent alliances that we have seen in history. To that extent I have expressed the opinion that this is actually a military alliance in its last effect.

General Bradley. I wonder if it makes much difference what you call it.

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not know if I asked you a question, but if you have a comment, I would like to hear it.

General Bradley. I do not know whether it makes much difference what we call it, so long as we know the definite purpose of it.

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think it makes much difference what we call it, but what it does do is fix the time when we will fight, and that is the end result of this thing. We hope that we never will fight. We hope that it will insure peace, but it does fix a contingency under which we are determined to fight in a military way in conjunction with these other 11 nations, and I think it is very important that we clearly understand that.

DIFFERENCE IN PURPOSE FROM OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

The Chairman. Is it not true, General, that the purpose and the objectives are the things that determine the character of the pact, or the treaty, or whatever it is? If it is for peace, that is one thing; if it is for aggression or conquest or war, it is another thing.

General Bradley. I should think that the purposes of the pact will certainly determine the policies which are followed by the members of that pact through the years. And if the pact is formed for the maintenance of peace, as we know this one is, I do not see how it can ever result, or even be construed as, an alliance or anything else, whatever you want to call it, for starting a war or for aggressive action.

Senator Hickenlooper. May I just pursue that one question?

ACTION IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK

Senator Lodge. I would like to comment on something Senator Hickenlooper said. I would like to have you elucidate it. I think as you phrased it, it gives an impression that I do not think you mean to convey.

You said that this treaty——

The Chairman. Whom are you interrogating?
Senator Lodge. I am going to comment on Senator Hickenlooper's statement and then ask General Bradley to comment on it.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Lodge. As I understood Senator Hickenlooper, he stated that this treaty—and I wrote it down as he said it—"fixed the time when we will fight." It does not do that; does it, General?

General Bradley. Except that at the time that any one nation is attacked. I assume that is what he meant.

Senator Hickenlooper. Substitute the word "conditions" for the word "time"; the conditions under which we will fight.

Senator Lodge. It does not commit us to any particular time to fight, or to fight in any particular place, or in any particular way, does it?

General Bradley. No, but I believe it does imply that if any one of these nations is attacked by aggressive action on the part of someone else, we will all pool our resources to stop that aggression.

Senator Lodge. We will react, we will take such measure as we deem necessary, I think is the language, including the use of armed force.

General Bradley. At that time.

Senator Lodge. Yes. It does not compel us to use armed force; does it?

General Bradley. No. Because I think you would decide on the circumstances under which the aggressive act had taken place. You would decide at that time.

Senator Lodge. Does it either fix the time, the way, the place, or the conditions under which we will fight?

General Bradley. Not specifically. But I think it is implied that if the nation that was attacked was not at fault, I think the pact implies that they would render military assistance. If it was her own fault I do not think that is implied, necessarily, because as you say, it would then depend upon the conditions.

Senator Lodge. "Going to their assistance," that is the phrase you used. That is not the same thing as fighting; is it?

General Bradley. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator Lodge. Thank you.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Go ahead, Senator Hickenlooper.

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE WILL ACT

Senator Hickenlooper. Again let me reiterate that I am firmly convinced that this is the strongest and perhaps the most concerted peace effort that has ever been made in the world, as a world-wide effort. But on this question of the fighting end of this treaty, I take it, General, that there are many ways of fighting: Blowing up bridges, without necessarily being armed, sabotage of various kinds, infiltration, and then you can fight with guns and with other weapons. But this does, in my judgment—and I wonder if you will agree with me—this does set up conditions which we cannot necessarily anticipate in particular at this moment, but it does set up conditions under which we will bring to bear whatever strength—which means fighting, by whatever means we deem proper—in unity with these other countries, to repel aggression against any of these countries, and in my judgment that fixes the conditions under which we will fight.
Now, "fight" is a pretty broad word, and I do not use it in the sense that we will begin to shoot rifles immediately, but we will begin to fight with all that we have in conjunction with the cooperative efforts of these other nations to repel aggression.

That is why I phrase my statement that it furnishes perhaps the word "time." The word "time" might have been ill-advised, so I will substitute the word "conditions" under which we will fight.

Senator Lodge. Do you include the word "blockade" under the word "fight"?


Senator Lodge. Psychological propaganda!

Senator Hickel-Looper. All manner of power which we could bring to bear in conjunction with our pact. I do not limit fighting necessarily to shooting guns.

Senator Lodge. When you said "fight," I thought you meant "shoot."

Senator Hickel-Looper. You can fight with your fists. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. General Bradley, we have present today two Senators, by the courtesy of the committee: Senator Donnell of Missouri and Senator Watkins of Utah. The committee allows them to interrogate the witnesses. I recognize Senator Donnell.

PROCEDURE IN CASE OF AN ATTACK

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman, and General Bradley, pursuing for a moment the point under discussion by Senator Hickel-Looper and Senator Lodge, I understood, in substance, that you concede that the North Atlantic Treaty does mean that if we come to a point where there is aggression against one of the signatories to the pact, and that signatory is not at fault, it is an aggression by some outside aggressor, we will pool our resources to repel that aggression. That is your view; is it not?

General Bradley. That is correct. And the decision, of course, at that time would be made by the Congress itself in declaring war.

Senator Donnell. May I ask you, General, to take the case that has been mentioned before, both to Secretary Acheson and Mr. Lovett, in which we got different responses from those gentlemen. Suppose that a force of 500,000 Russians were to enter Norway in an attack upon Norway. Do you think that the President of the United States, as the Commander in Chief, would have power to send forces immediately to repel that attack without congressional action?

General Bradley. I think that would be a question for decision by the President and the State Department, and not by the military, and I am afraid I could not answer that question.
Senator DONNELL. General, along some other lines: Senator Connally made mention at the outset this morning of some article in the United States News. I do not know what that article was, and have not seen it—consciously, at any rate.

ORIGINAL COST OF CONTEMPLATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATERIAL.

I notice in the edition of May 6, 1949, of the United States News and World Report, this statement:

Military alliance—

this is in what is known as the Newsgram—

The military alliance of the United States and western Europe will be made effective.

I am not asking for your conclusion as to whether this is or is not an alliance. I am reading this in conjunction with the next part:

Lend-lease is likely to be approved. Europe, in the first year, is to get $4,520,000,000 of United States arms written down to $452,000,000 to calm taxpayers. Replacement cost of arms to be given might be around $5,000,000,000. Armament for United States will be approved at around $15,000,000,000.

Can you tell us, General, whether or not there is contemplated that in the sending of equipment to Europe in pursuance to the Atlantic Treaty obligation, there is to be a charge made against Europe in determining how much is being sent to Europe?

General BRADLEY. A charge to Europe?

Senator DONNELL. A bookkeeping charge.

May I explain what I mean? We have heard here about the appropriation of one billion, or so many million dollars, that is going to be asked for the first year. Is that money going to be used in part to acquire from the United States Government, arms at a written-down figure, and then those arms be transported on over to Europe?

General BRADLEY. I think I know what you have reference to. I might say to start with that there is no definite list as yet; we do not have a final list of what would be of the most use to them, collectively—included in any such list there would undoubtedly be certain items of equipment which we do not need immediately upon mobilization.

REHABILITATION COST

It is planned, I believe, that those articles would be furnished to them out of our surplus, and that the only money necessary to be appropriated for that transfer would be that required to rehabilitate the equipment and to transport it, to put it into their hands.

Senator DONNELL. So that the appropriation then to be made, would not be made to repay the Government for what is being sent over, but merely to rehabilitate, in the instances you have described, that which we already have?

General BRADLEY. Rehabilitate and transport it.

Senator DONNELL. So that in an appropriation, we will say, of $1,000,000,000, to be used in rehabilitation, there may be actually sent equipment which has been rehabilitated by the use of the $1,000,000,000, equipment which itself is worth many billion dollars. That is correct, is it not?
General Bradley. I would say the original cost of it might have been a great deal more. The present worth of it might not be anything in our own hands, but might be worth a great deal in somebody else's hands.

Senator Donnell. I understand that. But the point I am getting at is that the mere figure in the appropriations bill does not at all, necessarily, indicate the original cost of the equipment which will be rehabilitated and sent over to Europe. I am correct in that, am I not?

General Bradley. That is correct, because certain items will be given to them, and the only money necessary in the way of appropriation is that necessary to rehabilitate that equipment and get it transported to the nation concerned.

Senator Donnell. Do you have any idea, General, roughly speaking, as to what the original cost of the equipment was which will require a billion dollars to rehabilitate it?

General Bradley. No, sir. Because all of that billion dollars is not rehabilitation and transportation. Some of it would have to be new equipment. So that I have no idea what the original cost of that particular part would be. When the program is finally decided upon it could be figured out then, of course.

Senator Donnell. I understood from Secretary Johnson, when he was on the stand a few days ago, that the experts are vigorously at work, and actively at work now, on preparing these figures and this detail information. Am I correct in that?

General Bradley. That is correct. They are working on such a list.

Senator Donnell. Do you know, General, approximately when that list will be completed, if you feel at liberty to tell us?

General Bradley. No, sir; I do not know just how soon it will be.

RATIO OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE BUDGETS

Senator Donnell. I understood you to say that the other countries to this Atlantic Treaty are expected to furnish about 6 to 7 times as much as the United States does. Did I correctly understand you?

General Bradley. In money value; yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Would you tell us if there is anything in writing, General, to the effect that they are expected to furnish 6 to 7 times as much as we do?

General Bradley. Not that I know of. That was a State Department figure. Whether or not they have it in writing I do not know.

Senator Donnell. When was that State Department figure given out? Or has it ever been given out publicly?

General Bradley. I do not know whether it has been given out publicly or not. I have been given to understand that that is about the ratio, of 6 to 1.

Senator Donnell. General, I do not want to impose on any confidence, and I assure you of that. If there is anything I ask you that you feel you cannot answer because of confidence, I want you to express your desire not to answer it.

The Chairman. That covers security also.

Senator Donnell. Yes. Anything that he considers is contrary to the interests of national security.
General, would you mind telling us who told you that it is contemplated that the other countries are expected to furnish about 6 to 1 compared to what we are to furnish?

General Bradley. It came to me through one of my staff members who had been working with the State Department on it. What member of the State Department told him I do not know.

Senator Donnell. Do you mind telling us which member of your staff told you?

The Chairman. May I interrupt? I think Secretary Acheson testified about that before this committee.

Senator Donnell. If he did, it will do no harm to have this further testimony.

The Chairman. You asked what the source was.

Senator McMahon. That is the amount of their published military budgets, Senator. They aggregate about 6 or 7 billion dollars. That is where that figure comes from.

SOURCE OF RATIO FIGURE

Senator Donnell. What I am getting at is the source of General Bradley's information, that it is expected that the other countries will furnish about 6 to 1, as compared with what we furnish. Would you mind telling us which member of your staff so informed you?

General Bradley. General Grunthier, who is sitting right here, said that he heard Secretary Acheson make the statement in a speech.

Senator Donnell. Do you know where the speech was made, and when it was made, and to whom?

General Bradley. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that that particular statement referring to Secretary Acheson be stricken from the record? I understand that that statement was made when he was talking off the record, sir. The member of my staff who informed me of that was General Lemnitzer, sir.

The Chairman. We will strike it if you like. But his testimony here before this committee was not off the record.

General Bradley. No, sir. I understood that he made it here when I first said that. In conferring with General Grunthier, at the time he heard it, was when he was talking off the record some time ago.

The Chairman. Very well.

Senator McMahon. That is published in the whole world, General. For instance, the Belgian budget is known to the whole world, and you can take the amount of that. Everybody has that.

General Bradley. I believe there are two or three of these which have not. I do not think the statement hurts, because it does not concern two or three which have not been announced. If you want it on the record that is all right. It came to me from two sources.

Senator Donnell. Those two sources are whom?

General Bradley. General Grunthier and General Lemnitzer.

Senator Donnell. General Persons is sitting behind you now?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

Senator Donnell. In your prepared statement, which you gave us this morning, I notice that at page 1 you refer to the Atlantic Treaty as "a deterrent to war." That is correct, is it not?
General Bradley. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnell. And you regard it as a deterrent to war?
General Bradley. I do.
Senator Donnell. That is the primary reason that you are favorable to it?
General Bradley. That is correct.
Senator Donnell. In that connection, General, I want to recall to your mind this language by the President of the United States in his inaugural address, January 20 of this year:

If we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur. I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan.

Then I would like also, before asking this question, to recall to your recollection these contents as I have them set forth in a question to Secretary Johnson, at page 373 of the record, with respect to your own Army Day address of April 6. This is what you are quoted as saying:

At present the balance of military power is centered in the United States, 3,000 miles from the heart of Europe. It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation. Yet that is the only strategy that can prevail if the military balance of power in Europe is to be counted on the wings of our bombers and deposited in reserves this side of the ocean.

Now, General, am I correct in understanding that you are indicating here, in this Army Day speech, and in your opinion that the President, when he talks in advance that any armed attack would be met with overwhelming force, am I correct in understanding that you have in mind that in order that this treaty may act as the utmost "deterrent to war," to quote your testimony this morning, that Russia should know as soon as possible that she is going to be met with such force as will prevent her from taking possession of Europe?

Is that the best possible deterrent to war, if she cannot take Europe?

WHAT CONSTITUTES A DETERRENT

General Bradley. The question of whether or not she can take Europe was not implied in that particular statement. The statement was that the great reserve—and by that I mean manpower and primarily, however, industrial potential—lies in the United States. No country is any stronger than its industrial capacity. At the present time we have that great potential which is a deterrent to any country if they know we are going to get into it. Particularly if we are going to have friends in it.

What I was referring to these as reserves was not only manpower but industrial capacity and potential.

Senator Donnell. The expression "reserves this side of the ocean" does include, however, not only the industrial potential, but manpower, as you have just mentioned.

General Bradley. Everything which is a potential for making war.

Senator Donnell. General, if Russia should think that she could take possession of Europe and leave the future to this process of later liberation mentioned by yourself, she would not be so much deterred as if she knew—that is, deterred from war—as if she knew
in advance that there would be such an overwhelming force pitted against her at the outset that she could not take possession of Europe.

That is correct, is it not?

General Bradley. I would not say that the nations of this pact have the capacity today to either stop or not stop the taking of Europe by any aggressor. What you are hoping for is eventually to have those countries in such a condition that such a thing could not happen, that there would be no question about it.

Senator Donnell. The particular point, however, that I have in mind, and I know that you were directing your answer to it, the particular point that I have in mind is this: Here we have a treaty, the purpose of which is to act as a deterrent to war, to make it concrete—whether you feel you want to say it or not, I want to say it—to make it clear to Russia that if she starts in she cannot take possession of Europe and just leave us to come back later on and by the slow process of war, liberate it.

If she thinks that she could take possession of Europe—and just leave us the slow process of future liberation—she would not be as greatly deterred from starting a war as if she knew right at the start that if she was going to start across the river she would be stopped in her tracks. Am I correct in that?

General Bradley. I think that is a question which cannot be answered “Yes” or “No,” Senator. May I pass the answer to that. I do not think it can be answered “Yes” or “No.” Whether or not they could do such a thing, and the conditions under which they can do it, get into certain questions of security which I do not believe should be discussed here.

Senator Donnell. If it gets into questions of security I certainly shall not press it further. I want to confine my questions to questions.

I observed that some of our friends on the committee have not only asked questions, but have made statements. I want to make this very brief observation: That it would seem to me perfectly clear that if Russia knew that she could not step across the river without being ruined—in other words, she is going to be repelled—that she would be much greater deterred from starting across than if she knew she could take possession and then make us, over a period of years, perhaps, try to push her out again. That is the point to which I was getting.

I shall not push that question further, however, because of the effect on security reasons to which you refer.

OBLIGATION UNDER THE TREATY

General, I want to ask you something along this line: Senator Lodge brought out, in considerable detail, the point that this treaty does not say in any precise way or any precise time, or any exact method, or any exact time, just exactly how we are going to do all this defending and so forth.

I want to ask you, however: this treaty does create an obligation of some kind, does it not, or else we would not go into it?

General Bradley. Yes, but what action you take as a result of that obligation would depend upon the circumstances at that particular time, and the nature of the act.

Senator Donnell. I can readily understand that. And I think Senator Lodge is quite correct in indicating that we cannot tell
exactly, precisely when, where, how, we are going to do these things.

But the point I wanted to get perfectly clear in my own mind is whether or not you agree that the pact does create an obligation, namely, an obligation set forth in article 5, and an obligation set forth in article 3, particularly those articles referring to military matters.

I am correct, it does create an obligation in those two considerations?

General Bradly. To take some action. But it does not prescribe exactly what that will be.

**OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP DEFENSIVE CAPACITY**

Senator Donnell. General, in connection with article 3, the provision there is that the parties separately and jointly—

in order—
by the way—
more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty—
which carries us back to the objectives—
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Am I correct in understanding that that article is talking about maintaining and developing capacity to resist the attack by armed forces?

General Bradley. Not necessarily, because your potential to make war does not depend just on the number of people in your service. It depends upon your industry, the stability of your government, and of course your armed forces are included. But many things are included in your ability to resist such a moment.

Senator Donnell. Pardon me, General. I do not think I made my question quite clear. I appreciate that, and I think that is exactly true, but what I was getting at is this: When article 3 obligates the parties separately and jointly to do certain things, to develop collective capacity to resist armed attack, the armed attack that is mentioned therein is an attack by military forces, is it not?

General Bradley. I would assume so.

Senator Donnell. And at least one of the most successful methods of resisting armed attack is by military defense. That is correct, is it not?

General Bradley. That is one way.

Senator Donnell. So that among the methods that are contemplated by article 3, and to which we bind ourselves to adopt, are in the instances where armed attack is made, to use military defense if that seems necessary in repelling the armed attack. Is that necessary?

General Bradley. It might or might not. As has been brought out here before, the methods to be used at the time would depend upon the circumstances and would be decided at the time by the Government.

**PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK**

Senator Donnell. If 500,000 troops were to enter into Norway some morning, coming over from Russia, and were making an armed attack on Norway, the normal, common-sense method of repelling that
attack, the physical repulsion of it, would be by military procedure, would it not?

General Bradley. That is about the only way you could meet them.

Senator Donnell. And in fact, it is the only way, is it not?

General Bradley. Whether or not you would do that would be decided at the time.

Senator Donnell. Very well. But I say that is the only way that you could meet 500,000 troops, to meet them by military force; is that right?

General Bradley. If you want to get them out, that would be the only way to do it.

Senator Donnell. And I understand that this treaty, by the term “restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area,” indicates at least a slight desire to get them out. Is that true?

General Bradley. I should think so.

Senator Donnell. Very well. Your answer was “Yes” on that one.

General, a question was asked you as to whether massed manpower is contemplated. I would like to ask you a few questions along this line. I asked some of them of Secretary Johnson the other day, and he referred me to you. I want to say, by the way, to take this opportunity to express—if I am not violating any confidence—my thanks for the fine cooperation emanating from your office, if not yourself personally, in having Major Button come in to see me and help get together whatever was necessary. I told him only in general terms what I had in mind.

NECESSITY FOR MASS MANPOWER IN WESTERN EUROPE

Are you able to say, General, first, in determining this question as to whether if Russia were to start across the Rhine, we will say, as to what military force would be necessary to prevent her from coming? I would like to know, if we can find out, about whether or not it would be necessary for United States troops to be there in addition to European troops, in order to prevent Russia from coming across.

Have you gone into that question? Or would that consideration of national security preclude discussion of that?

General Bradley. You certainly could not discuss any details, in answering such a question, without getting into questions of security. I doubt whether any of our people on this side have tried to make a study to determine even the number of divisions that it would take to stop a crossing of the Rhine because so much would depend upon the state of training, morale, and equipment that were available, and whether or not those divisions came from one country or three countries would not make any great difference as long as they had a division of fighting strength and equipment as we understand it.

I have never made any attempt to try to figure out the number of divisions it would require to hold the Rhine River.

Senator Donnell. So that your office has not yet looked into the question as to whether, in order to prevent Russia from coming in and taking charge of Europe, leading us up to this slow process of liberation thereafter, your office has gone into the question of whether United States troops would be essential, in addition to the European troops. Am I correct?
General Bradley. That is correct. But if something happened there now we would have some divisions on the Rhine, because we have our troops in Germany.

Senator Donnell. That is true. But I say you have not yet gone into the question of whether it would be necessary, in order to hold the Rhine against a Russian crossing, it would be necessary to have American troops in addition to European troops. Am I correct?

General Bradley. That is correct.

CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER SIGNATORIES

Senator Donnell. General, in connection with the mutual aid that we are to receive, one from the other, have you looked into the question as to what amount of mutual aid Portugal, we will say, would provide in the event of an attack by Russia?

General Bradley. No, sir; I have no details on that.

Senator Donnell. Or Luxembourg?

General Bradley. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. Or Denmark?

General Bradley. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. Or any of the other signatories to the pact?

General Bradley. No, sir.

COMPARISON TO PAST MILITARY ALLIANCES

Senator Donnell. General, referring to the question as to whether this is a military alliance or not, we find here, as I have indicated, the May 6 issue of the United States News says: "Military alliance of the United States and western Europe will be made effective."

That may be or may not be right. It is not true, General, that many of the pacts, alliances, or agreements of history have purported to be entirely defensive, and have not only purported to be but have been, as in the case of this one right here, actually contemplated as defensive pacts? Is that not true?

General Bradley. A lot of the combinations in the past have been for defensive purposes. Again I say I do not think this business of a definition of a military alliance means a thing. Whether it is a military alliance or not I do not think means a thing. I do not know that there is much to be gained by trying to compare this one with previous ones, because we do not know enough probably of what was in the minds of the people who made them or the people who implemented them at the proper time.

We do know that we pretty much control this one for the time being because we are the only nation of the 12 which really has any capacity at the present time. So we know that we control the results that are going to be obtained as far as any military action is going to be taken.

Senator Donnell. I have no doubt, and I assure you that I am raising no question, as to the fact that our motive in going into this pact, the United States motive, is purely defensive, and it may be entirely so with the other nations. Of course, that does not answer the question as to the difficulties or danger, if any, that may inure.

Did you observe, General, Senator Vandenberg referring back to these other treaties in history? He said it may be necessary sometimes to go behind the text of those treaties. At least my understanding
was that he was indicating that some of those pacts on their face say they were purely defensive, but he thinks we could go back of them and possibly find out that they were not.

I ask you whether or not you have gone back behind any of the texts of any of the preceding treaties to ascertain whether they were, in fact, offensive or defensive?

General Bradley. I have not made such a study.

COMMUNIST COUP AND ARTICLE 5

Senator Donnell. Article 5 says:
The parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

Do you mind telling me whether or not you think that the term "armed attack" would include a boring from within situation, for instance, as I gather took place in Czechoslovakia? Would you think that would be an armed attack from the outside force whose interests were in boring within?

General Bradley. I think a situation similar to that one would be very questionable, which it was, and would have to be determined upon the merits.

I do not believe that you could say, in advance, whether or not any similar one is an armed attack or not. Normally we do not think of that as an armed attack. We think of them as an internal change of government.

Senator Donnell. If, however, General, it were to be developed that the attempt to take over the government by, we will say troops, right there in the country, domestic troops, if it would be developed that those had been instigated by Russia on the outside, might it not be that that would constitute an armed attack by Russia?

General Bradley. I am not too sure that this example has application here, because in Czechoslovakia you had a condition where she was already under the domination of Russia because of occupation duties, and that condition does not exist in any of the countries we are talking about now.

Senator Donnell. Is it not true, General, that it is at least likely that if an aggressor could do so, that instead of coming in by evident, obvious aggression from the outside, it would prefer to use the devious means of boring from within in order to accomplish the overthrow of the country into which it actually wanted to enter?

General Bradley. I believe that is part of the Communist doctrine.

Senator Donnell. And such a plan as that would not, or might not, be covered at all by the Atlantic Treaty; am I correct in that?

General Bradley. I say that it would be questionable, and would be, in my opinion, decided upon at the time, as to whether or not it was armed aggression. Normally it would not be, in my opinion.

Senator Donnell. I want to ask you one or two points, very briefly. And again if this is contrary to the interests of the public security, I will not push it.

Senator McMahon. I think it ought to be stressed, General, that it might be. I am glad that you reserve that it might be.

General Bradley. It might be, and would be determined at the time.

Senator Donnell. Might be what?
AIR POWER AND THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

General Bradley. Might be an act of aggression or might not be and would be determined by the circumstances at the time.

Senator Donnell. General, the power of Russia is in large part due to its air power, is it not?

General Bradley. The power of Russia?

Senator Donnell. Yes, sir; today.

General Bradley. The power is included in not only air power but an army, submarines, and its total armed force.

Senator Donnell. And air power is a very material part of that power in Russia?

General Bradley. It is a very material part of any power.

Senator Donnell. Are you willing to tell us, or do you think that you should, from the standpoint of national security, whether it is contemplated that under this Atlantic Pact obligation of mutual aid, that this country is going to furnish air power to the signatories?

General Bradley. What do you have reference to? Furnishing air power in what means?

Senator Donnell. I mean furnishing them with airplanes and bombers and so forth. Is there any intention to do that, in carrying out this mutual help under article 3 of the Atlantic treaty?

General Bradley. It is certainly not part of this pact. It may be part of the military aid program. There is nothing provided in the pact that you will give them any arms.

Senator Donnell. There is no specific obligations, I take it. But there is an obligation, quoting from article 3, “by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,” to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” And the power of resistance to armed attack now is largely embraced in air power, is that not true?

General Bradley. No, sir; I would not say that is so.

Senator Donnell. You would not say it?

NEED FOR MASS MANPOWER IN EUROPE

General Bradley. Not against a land force such as Russia has, if you are talking about Russia, which has a tremendous army and has also in the past been traditionally ground-minded and has usually won her wars by ground troops in conjunction with supporting air force.

Senator Donnell. If the land force is of great importance, in favor of Russia, from her previous success in it, would it not follow, General, that it would require very large land forces in Europe to be placed there either by Europeans or the United States, or both of us, in order to repel a land force attack by Russia on Europe?

General Bradley. The size of that force would depend upon its training and equipment, and how good a team you had of ground troops and tactical air. Ground troops in themselves are limited in their value unless they do have that ground-air team.

When you speak of ground troops, if you are talking about effective ones, you must also include the air that works with them.
Senator DONNELL. The United States today has 570,000 men in the Army, has it not?

General BRADLEY. A little more than that.

Senator DONNELL. Of that number approximately 400,000 are supply men and are not in divisions, is that correct?

General BRADLEY. I do not have the accurate figures with me at the present time.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know whether that is approximately correct?

General BRADLEY. If you want to get technical, sir, I would have to go into a little bit of a discussion of what we mean by a division. When you get down to a division, for example, in the last World War, you had only about 3,340 riflemen in the front line. Pretty near everything else that was to get those particular men forward. That included the other 11,000-plus, men in that division, plus all the corps troops, plus everything else.

So that when you talk about a division you are not talking about the ones that are included in the tables of organization of a division, but you must include everyone that supports them at the front, whether they are right with them in the division or backing them up behind. So that it is not fair to say that you have 400,000 people in supply jobs and 200,000 in divisions, or something, because they are all to support the man at the front.

The ratio of those behind and in front depends on a lot of things. How much you depend upon civilian help, and the length of your lines of communication, and a lot of other things. So I do not think it means much when you say that 400,000 are in supply and 200,000 in divisions.

It does not mean a thing because they are all necessary to carry on modern war.

Senator DONNELL. I did not mean to be technical on it. What I was getting at, is that we have about 570,000 men in the Army today, of whom about 400,000 are supply men, as distinguished from combatant forces.

General BRADLEY. I do not have the figures here. I would have to go into a definition of what you call supply troops before I could say whether your figures are right or wrong.

Senator DONNELL. The number of combatant forces in a division is about 17,000, is it not?

General BRADLEY. The present division is 18,804.

Senator DONNELL. That is all, General. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins?

Senator WATKINS. General, I have been very much interested in the argument that has been made, that had such an arrangement—

RATIO OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE BUDGETS

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I interrupt just a moment? We were talking about the testimony of Mr. Acheson with regard to the budgets of the European countries who are members of this pact. I
have before me here the stenographic report of his cross-examination on April 27. Senator Hickenlooper was conducting cross-examination. And then the chairman said:

Would you mind if I intervene for just a moment?
Senator Hicklenlooper. Not at all.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that while under the budget and this proposed bill we give them $1130,000,000 for the next current year, their own budgets providing for arms and so on are something like six or seven times as much as that?
Secretary Acheson. Somewhere in that neighborhood, Senator.

He did not give the exact figure, but his answer was "Somewhere in that neighborhood." I offer that because of the discussion a while ago as to where the general received his information, and I thought I had a distinct remembrance that Secretary Acheson testified to that before this committee.

That is all. Thank you, Senator. Go ahead.

DETERRENT NATURE OF THE TREATY

Senator Watkins. General, I started to point out that I am impressed and somewhat concerned with the argument that has been presented repeatedly here, and I think was emphasized by you this morning, that had there been such an agreement or pact in existence between us and the European nations that we are now talking about, in connection with this pact, back in 1917 or back in 1914, that there possibly would not have been World War I. I understand that that was your opinion this morning.

General Bradley. I do not believe I mentioned World War I. I mentioned World War II specifically, I believe, in my statement.

Senator Watkins. Of course, it has been said about World War I. But you do not think you expressed any opinion as to that?

General Bradley. I did not. But I would also add that in my opinion, had there been such a pact in 1914, the chances are that there would not have been a war then.

Senator Watkins. With respect to World War II, it is your definite opinion that had there been such a pact as this, the aggressor nations would have known that they would have been met with overwhelming force, and under those circumstances they would not have attacked? Is that your opinion?

General Bradley. That is correct. Knowing our potential, that they would not have started a war had they been sure that we would get into it. Of course, that is merely an opinion, and it is pretty hard for anyone to say conclusively now that Hitler would not have started a war under any conditions.

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, men of his type are fanatics, and they do not reason like other people, or they would not have done the things that they have been doing. Is that not right?

General Bradley. Yes, but even he was shrewd about some things, and he might have been convinced that he had no chance to win. Certainly some of his staff were convinced that if the United States got into it they would eventually lose it.

Senator Watkins. But he in the final analysis, as we know now, was the man who said whether they did or did not do things.
General Bradley. Yes. But he undoubtedly took some advice from his staff. And of course, as I say, you cannot say conclusively that it would have prevented war. But certainly, in my opinion, it would have had a good chance of preventing a war.

Senator Watkins. That, of course, is highly speculative, is it not, to speculate on that, and say as a matter of fact if they had been threatened with this overwhelming force, if they had been assured it would have been forthcoming, they would not have made the attack? We speculate on it. But it is difficult for us to get back into those times, we do not realize what the times were, so after all it is just a guess.

General Bradley. You can call it a guess. You might say it is a question of opinion. I know it is pretty much believed by the students of history that had Hitler been stopped when he marched into the Ruhr, he might have been stopped right there.

Senator Watkins. France could have stopped him there.

General Bradley. And undoubtedly had we had some strong agreement between nations it would have been certainly a deterrent and make a man think twice before he pulls an aggressive act.

THE TREATY AS A PREVENTIVE

Senator Watkins. With respect to this present pact, as I understand it, it is your firm opinion that the mere existence of the pact will be such a threat, or such an obstacle to anyone who wants to wage an aggressive war, that the thought of the overwhelming force that is committed there will stop him?

General Bradley. Yes. And it prevents, maybe not prevents, but at least discourages trying to pick off one at a time by armed aggression.

Senator Watkins. And that of course is based on the assumption that if they do make an armed attack on any of these signatories to this treaty, that they will meet with overwhelming force?

General Bradley. That they will be faced then with some action on the part of all 12 nations.

Senator Watkins. Anything short of force will not be much of a deterrent, will it?

General Bradley. Of course that is its greatest deterrent. But there are other methods that could be used. I do not know what they would be. It would depend on circumstances. Several of them have been mentioned here this morning. Sanctions, blockade, psychological warfare, and trade.

Senator Watkins. In World War II did not Hitler and his generals and admirals all know as a matter of fact that they would be met with a blockade, and that the nations that were fighting them: France, Great Britain, and others, would have the world markets open to them and the manufacturing industry of the United States from which they could purchase weapons? They knew all those things about economics and blockade. They knew that they could get equipment, that their enemies could get equipment, did they not? They had had the experience of World War I.

General Bradley. Yes. However, the conditions they met in World War II were considerably different from World War I. In World
War I we were furnished equipment by our allies, and in World War II we furnished it to them.

Senator Watkins. They were furnished many other things that were necessary. We furnished the food, and they might have starved to death had they not received it.

General Bradley. Yes.

**ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AND DETERRENT EFFECT**

Senator Watkins. That is as important as bullets or guns. Do you think that mere economic assistance to the signatories to this pact with us would be any deterrent in stopping a nation, say like Russia, from attacking if she really intended to attack?

General Bradley. It might have some.

Senator Watkins. Would it not, as a matter of fact, require the idea that overwhelming forces would be there, before there would be any deterrent whatever to an aggressor nation as powerful as Russia is today?

General Bradley. Certainly military action is the biggest deterrent, the one they would fear, of course.

Senator Watkins. That is the one they count on in the final analysis. If they do not know that there is going to be force, and plenty of it, armed force, with whatever it means, almost immediately, then there is no deterrent, is there, actually, to a nation that is well armed and has the economic resources that a nation like Russia has?

General Bradley. I do not believe that I am in a position to answer that, because no one knows what they are thinking about.

Senator Watkins. I understand that. Of course you have taken the position of giving a judgment on what they are thinking. In other words, you have said to us that if they know about this overwhelming force they will not attack; it will be a deterrent. So you have to go into their minds to a certain extent to arrive at that opinion, as I understand it.

General Bradley. You can certainly list the pros and cons, and the things that they must take into consideration when they consider aggression. What decision they will arrive at after considering all these things that we have mentioned, only they can tell us.

**NATURE OF COMMITMENT TO TAKE SOME ACTION**

Senator Watkins. As I understand it, this treaty does not bind the United States to render armed assistance. Is that your understanding of the treaty? There is no commitment to render armed assistance to our allies?

General Bradley. Under every circumstance, no. I do not believe it commits us to armed assistance under every condition. I think it is going to depend upon conditions at the time, and the Government will decide at that time whether or not it includes armed assistance.

Senator Watkins. Knowing that, if the Russians or any other nation that has aggressive ideas know that it does not bind us to armed assistance, it does not bind the Congress of the United States to declare war, does not bind the United States Congress to appropriate moneys to go and fight, where would be the deterrent to that nation, knowing that the United States, under our own interpretation, takes.
the position that we are not bound to do anything except to consult and take probably some action short of war?

I think the war action, it is agreed by everybody, must be taken by Congress. I would like your comment on that situation.

Senator McMahon. General, they might give us credit for having common sense.

Senator Watkins. I appreciate the Senator's comment, but I would like to have the General's answer.

Senator McMahon. I am going to get mine in first. I think it is in point, and probably better comes from a Senator on the committee, or another Senator, than the General.

General Bradley. It is pretty hard for me to tell you under what conditions this country would go to war, because you are the gentlemen who decide whether or not we use armed force, depending upon the circumstances at the time.

Senator Watkins. I am going to the state of mind of these people that you say we will deter by reason of entering into this pact. We are going to keep them peaceful, we are going to stop their aggression, as I get it, because we have signed this treaty.

In order to arrive at that conclusion we have to do some mind studying, and I think you have done that when you indicate that your opinion is that they will stop and think twice about that.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A DETERRENT?

Now, if they take us seriously over here, that we are not bound to declare war, that Congress can exercise its own sweet will whenever that time arrives, because that power is inherent within the Constitution of the United States, and that they are not bound to appropriate money for any more than 2 years at a time, and that is in the Constitution, then knowing that, and believing that we are sincere about it, where is the strong deterring power in this pact?

General Bradley. I should think if they were considering the starting of a war, knowing this pact exists, and even assuming that they have read the testimony given before this committee, and have decided that we are not absolutely committed to a war in case of aggression, certainly they might guess that under certain circumstances the Congress would declare war and go to war, because we have done it twice within our lifetime under conditions which might not be too different from what you are talking about.

Regardless of whether we say absolutely that we will go to war if one man comes across the border and shoots up somebody, regardless of whether or not we say that definitely, certainly she is going to consider that there is a darned good chance that we will go to war under certain circumstances, whether or not we say it here today or say it absolutely in the law.

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, I think you would agree, and I think we probably all would agree, with the hint given by Secretary Acheson, and as characterized by a radio commentator when asked whether we made any commitment or not—he did not say it, but this is a characterization of his testimony: "We sort of" made a commitment.
ADVANTAGES OF THE TREATY

It seems to me, General, that there is not any real benefit in this pact, as I look at it. If it is absolutely necessary that we have it, then I would certainly support it. But it does not seem to me that there is any benefit of this pact under modern war conditions if we have got to wait, for instance, if a nation should attack while Congress is not in session, to get them together, because under modern war conditions the blows could be struck and many of those European nations could be overtaken before we could ever get the Congress together to declare war.

COMMITMENT TO DECLARE WAR

I understand that, and I have a feeling that probably the drafters of this treaty put into this article 5 the language which seems to me creates a condition where no Congress could possibly refuse to declare war.

And they said in this first clause, the first part of that sentence:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

In other words, we are saying there, in effect, that an attack on London is the same as an attack on New York for the purpose of defense, or on Washington.

We all know what would happen if anybody dropped a bomb on Washington or one of the other cities of the United States. We would immediately be on our toes and fighting. It seems to me that that situation puts us in a position where no Congress or no President could ever refuse to declare war.

Some of us could say that is in the Constitution. But it seems to me we are declaring war under certain conditions by the President of the United States, because when that attack is made on London or Paris, that is an attack on us. And we have got to act just the same—if we are fair and honest about it, just the same as if they had attacked one of our cities.

I would like your comment on that situation. Am I entirely wrong in that point of view?

General Bradley. No, sir. I think that if they attacked England, we will say, or any other country, with a large force, you certainly would be in a situation similar to the ones you had before, and I think that the Congress would very seriously consider declaring war. However, if one stray plane came over and bombed London, or a few individuals crossed into Norway and started something, you probably would not declare war. It would depend on circumstances at the time.

COMMITMENT TO TAKE SOME ACTION IN CASE OF ATTACK

Senator Watkins. But we are committed to some action, are we not? You go on to say, in the treaty—

consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
We are committed to assist, are we not?

General Bradley. As to whatever would be necessary at the time, possibly.

Senator Watkins. Let us forget that. Let us get down to the point and see first if we are committed to assist, and then get into the modifications.

But we are committed to assist, in your judgment; are we not? That is a commitment that is a first commitment to assist them?

General Bradley. It seems to me that the definition as to when and how much you should do in going to the assistance of the members in each of these cases, depending upon the circumstances at the time, could be answered much better by the State Department than by the military. We usually go in when we are told to do so, and when our Government has said it is now time to fight.

The time to fight is not determined by us. My opinions on when we would fight and under what conditions we would fight would not be worth very much because the military has nothing to do with determining that particular time. I doubt if my opinions as to under what conditions we would fight and would not fight are worth a thing.

Senator McMahon. That is a wonderful statement, General.

Senator Watkins. You have given your opinion here, General, that this pact has tremendous power just in and of itself to hold back an aggressor. That part that I just read to you, down to where we would assist, is that not really a commitment that would do the very thing that you have been contending?

General Bradley. I am not too sure that I am following your reasoning, Senator. I am sorry. But it seems to me—and I will restate it, in different words—that by signing this pact with 11 other friendly countries who have the same ideals and the type of institutions as ours, that we are offering a common front politically, whether it is writing notes or what not, that we would take combined political action; and I think that by signing this pact we also are saying, in effect, that under certain conditions we will go to whatever steps are necessary to aid these countries. Whether or not it was military aid or some other aid, I am not in position to say.

Senator Watkins. But we have to do something for them. We have to assist them. We are bound to do that. Is that not your interpretation?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. I am not the one who is ever going to have any say in it. Certainly we would have to do something, according to the pact, whatever it was thought was necessary to do at that time.

Senator Watkins. We are not going to hold a consultation about it. We say we will assist them. Then we go on to say:

* * * by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.

It would just simply follow as night to day that in case of attack about the only thing that you can do when they start to attack is to use armed force. We have therefore agreed to do that, and that ought to be necessary under any reasonable interpretation of the word “necessary.”

General Bradley. Senator, again may I say that it is not the military that is going to interpret the pact.
Senator Watkins. I thought you were giving a sort of a broad interpretation to it when you said it was one of those kinds of an instrument that would hold the aggressor back. That is the reason I am asking these questions, to get at the facts in your mind that enabled you to form such a judgment.

General Bradley. The reason that I stated that is that any aggressor nation which contemplates any aggressive action against one or more of the signatories of this pact, certainly must consider the possibility that war and armed conflict will follow, in accordance with that. There is a good chance that it might follow as a result of this particular article. I do not say that it absolutely would follow. It would depend upon the circumstances. But I think any country, in weighing the pros and cons, must very seriously consider that certain action going so far would bring armed conflict, and by all 12 signatory nations. What point they would have to reach before armed action would be taken is not for me or the military to interpret.

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, any guaranty that we gave them, unless it was a guaranty that we were going to come to their assistance, will not be worth a tinker's dam, will it?

UNITED STATES DEFENSIVE FRONTIERS

General, I want to go to another matter. I think you stated—if I understood you correctly, and I tried to follow you closely, because it is a matter of vital importance to us—that you took the position that our defensive frontier is in Europe, as far as going east from here is concerned; that our frontiers, the defensive frontier, I think you used that phrase, is in Europe. May I quote from the fourth page of your statement:

I assure you that our frontiers of collective defense lie in common with theirs in the heart of Europe.

Do you stand on that statement?
General Bradley. Yes, sir.

Senator Watkins. Will you tell us now where our defensive frontiers are in the Pacific? Or on the west? Of course we have a back door, and we have another shore line to defend.

General Bradley. We have troops in Japan, Okinawa, a few in the Philippines. I assume that you might consider that is where it is at the present time.

Senator Watkins. That would be our defensive frontier?
General Bradley. At least they are on that particular line at the present time.

Senator Watkins. They are there, but that is not quite the answer; that is not quite responsive to what I asked. Let me put it this way—

Senator McMahon. I think it is responsive.

Senator Watkins. I will ask it again, if I didn't get what I wanted.
Senator McMahon. That is exactly where we would fight, is it not?

Senator Watkins. Do you think our defensive frontier in the Pacific, then, lies in Japan, the Philippines, and Okinawa?

General Bradley. As far as our present disposition of armed forces is concerned, yes.

Senator Watkins. Looking to the future, like we are looking to the future in Europe.
General Bradley. Where it would be in the future would be determined not by the military but by the Government itself.

Senator Watkins. As I understand it, when we had the Secretary of State in here, he said we have to talk to General Bradley about the military side of it, about defenses.

General Bradley. As far as the present situation is concerned, that is our defensive line in the Pacific.

Senator Watkins. And you would not think that we would have to hold Japan or have a treaty of alliance with Japan, in order to have our defense over there?

General Bradley. Not necessarily. We have certain political obligations and commitments as a result of the last war, which puts us there. We have certain duties to carry out there under the Far Eastern Commission, and as long as those troops are there certainly that is your defensive line.

Senator Watkins. With that I heartily agree. But I want to get your opinion, if we have a defensive frontier in the heart of Europe, I just wondered where the one in the other direction would be, and if it is in Japan, all right. It would not be in China, by any manner of means?

General Bradley. We have no troops in China at the present time.

Senator Watkins. We do not have any troops in Norway, and we do not have any troops probably in France or Italy at the present time.

General Bradley. We have them just beyond there.

Senator Watkins. I realize that. But it is not the intention to keep them there permanently, is it, the full 20 years of this pact?

General Bradley. No, sir. You notice I used the word “collective” there.

Senator Watkins. Let us use the word “collective” on the Pacific. What about that?

General Bradley. If you are acting in concert with France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and you are acting collectively, that is where they are, in the center of Europe.

EMPHASIS ON EUROPE, NOT ON ASIA

Senator Watkins. The thing that bothered me about this, and it is difficult for me to understand all of this situation, and that is the reason I have to ask so many questions, is what seems to me to be—maybe I am mistaken in it—it seems to me to be the view of our military and our political planners, and I mean international political planners, in a broad sense, that they are putting all their defensive eggs in one basket in Europe, and that they are rather neglecting the Pacific. I live halfway in between, or somewhere near, so it does not make an awful lot of difference as far as we are concerned from the standpoint of immediate defense.

But have you any comment to make on that, General? Can you throw any light on that situation?

General Bradley. No, sir. The policy of our Government toward Europe, or toward Asia, is not a proper subject for me as a military man to comment on. I do not believe, because that is the job of the Government other than the military, because the military does not set any policy, foreign policy.
Senator Watkins. From strictly a military point of view, which you can express, I think, and probably are the best expert in the country today on that, is it absolutely necessary to have our defense frontiers in Europe, in order to defend the United States?

General Bradley. It is certainly much better to have them there. The farther away we get a security line, the better off we are. As I see it, ECA, this pact, and future military aid, are all part of a program intended to increase our own national security.

Before the last World War we had friends in Europe who were capable of certain amounts of defense by themselves, and in addition to what we had here at home, and we had a pretty wide ocean in between. The last World War pretty much destroyed that line of defense, or line of security, which was ours through friendship, you might say, in Europe. In the meantime, the ocean in between has been narrowed because of progress and science, in aircraft particularly, so that we now find ourselves in an entirely different situation from what we had in World War II.

As I see it, this whole program of aid to Europe, our friends, is an attempt to secure our security by establishing more security than we have on this side of the ocean. And the more security we could get for ourselves or our friends on the other side, the better off we are here.

POSSIBLE COMMITMENT TO A GROUND WAR

Senator Watkins. If we put many billions of dollars into the rearmament of our friends in Europe, it is going to strain our economy, is it not?

General Bradley. Undoubtedly.

Senator Watkins. If we go on the theory that you are now talking about, of rearming them to the point where they can fight a ground war, are we not in a measure committing ourselves to a ground war, with the only possible aggressor in sight, that could be any danger to us, and I do not mind naming it, the nation of Russia? I do not know whether you want to comment on any other nation or not, but we might as well be realistic about it. You cannot by any stretch of the imagination bring any other power into the picture.

General Bradley. Would you repeat your question in connection with that, sir? I did not get it.

Senator Watkins. It just slipped my mind at the moment. Are we not committing ourselves, in effect—I cannot repeat exactly—by what we do in rearming them, so that they can start the fighting there? I understand that a good defense is a good offense. Are we not committing ourselves to a ground war if war should come with Russia?

General Bradley. Again you are getting into definitions if you start talking about ground war. Modern war is total war, by every means that you can use, and certainly the last war was won on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. And I think any future war, while it may vary in relation to the importance of each of those from the last war, certainly it is going to involve all three again. Whether or not the preponderance will be more air or more ground—we certainly
know it will not be more sea because at the present time the country you are talking about has no particular surface Navy—when you try to define a land war it is pretty difficult to confine it to any one thing.

Certainly an army cannot fight without air closely supporting it, for example, if it is going to contend with another army which is so supported. I am not too sure that I get the total import of your question. Certainly it would be desirable if the security of Europe had been built up to the point where their combined forces could stop any aggressor in his tracks, with or without any aid from us.

**IS REARMING EUROPE SUFFICIENT TO DEFER AGGRESSION?**

**Senator Watkins.** As a military man do you think it is possible for those nations, just by us rearming them, to stop any aggressor in his tracks, without our sending troops to help them?

**General Bradley.** Given time, yes.

**Senator Watkins.** How much?

**General Bradley.** It depends upon the length of time, it would depend entirely on the rate of aid you wanted to give them, and the internal conditions, how much they want to help themselves, and as I see it, your question might vary over a very wide period. I do not believe anybody could answer it.

**Senator Watkins.** The assistance we are now giving them, in addition to giving them arms and armament, without going into a pact, would that accomplish the same purpose?

**General Bradley.** No, sir.

**Senator Watkins.** We could rearm them without going into a pact?

**EFFECT OF REARMAMENT WITHOUT THE TREATY**

**General Bradley.** No, sir. I do not believe it would accomplish the same thing as the two of them together, because arms in themselves are not sufficient. You must have a will to fight, morale, organization, training, collective action, in a modern war, and a lot of other things.

Mere arms aid in itself I do not believe would accomplish it because you would lose that something which would inspire them to help themselves. I do not believe that you can ever furnish them enough arms—I mean ourselves—furnish them enough to accomplish this thing. Most of these must be furnished by themselves.

And by furnishing them aid, as I see it, we are only speeding up the time when they will arrive at a condition where they can properly defend themselves. And how much you speed it up is going to depend on how much you are willing to give them year by year, and how much they do for themselves.

**RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

**Senator Watkins.** As I understand it, from what has been given to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, it has been announced that we are going to give them $1,100,000,000 in help of some kind, most of which is, as I understand it, to be in equipment.

**General Bradley.** As I understand it, that is military aid aside from this particular ratification of this pact.
Senator Watkins. It all has to do with it. It gets its genesis, its beginning, and its authority to some extent, from this pact.

General Bradley. I think it is a natural sequence to this.

Senator Watkins. Then we should get some light on it. We should not take this piecemeal. In other words, the Senate itself has to know what the over-all picture is, it has to know pretty much the same facts that you know in making up your mind and judgment.

We cannot just take one segment and say take the treaty today, and we will talk about the arms tomorrow, or some other day, and give you that information. We ought to have, do you not think, in order to make an intelligent decision and to give intelligent advice to the President, substantially the same facts before us that you have and that the President has or that the Secretary of State has, in order to make up their minds?

General Bradley. I believe the Secretary of State has outlined the program as far as the State Department is concerned, in that this ratification of this pact would be followed by a request from the State Department for the third step: some military aid. And I believe he has indicated to you that that military aid to these particular nations for the first year, which he would submit to you, would be in the nature of $1,100,000,000.

So that that is a sequence which I believe the State Department would follow if you ratify this pact. Then he would follow with that request for this aid.

ACTUAL COST OF THE MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator Watkins. It has already been indicated, I understand, in the Foreign Relations Committee, if you can believe the present stories on it. Do you think that that is actually the price tag on the first year: $1,100,000,000? Is that what you have been asked to prepare for, to ship just that much?

General Bradley. That covers the amount of equipment which we think could be furnished and used during the first year after this pact was signed.

Senator Watkins. That is at the marked-down price of about 20 percent of its actual cost?

General Bradley. I do not know whether you can use any percentage or not. Actually the rehabilitation and shipping costs, on an item which we will say is surplus, and we are not going to charge anything toward replacement or any of the original cost, runs between 10 to 15 percent to rehabilitate it and ship it.

Senator Watkins. And that would be put on the books at so much against this equipment, whatever the rehabilitation cost.

General Bradley. I do not know what you mean by going on the books.

Senator Watkins. You have to keep some kind of an account to know whether or not we have given them the $1,100,000,000.

General Bradley. The rehabilitation and cost of shipment would come out of that $1,100,000,000, yes.

Senator Watkins. And what would be the charge against this particular activity for the goods themselves, or the equipment itself?

General Bradley. As I understand, there would be no charge against that $1,100,000,000 for the original cost.
Senator Watkins. I say that they may be over and above. They may be surplus, and you declare various equipment surplus at various times.

General Bradley. Certainly.

**Original Cost and Rehabilitation Cost**

Senator Watkins. They may be over and above our present needs, but they still cost us something; they are still worth something.

General Bradley. Yes; they are still worth something.

Senator Watkins. Why should not that amount, whatever they are worth, or whatever it costs, be charged against this particular item so that the American people will know the full cost of this first year, rather than just the shipment cost, the rehabilitation cost?

General Bradley. That could be done, of course, at the time. You could tell them what this equipment cost originally. But I am not too sure that would mean anything and it certainly is not worth that to us today.

Senator Watkins. Do we not have to replace it?

General Bradley. No, sir.

Senator Watkins. Why not?

General Bradley. Because what we are talking about are things over and above our needs for peacetime, and for the first part of any mobilization. Collectively they might be worth a lot more to us in somebody else's hands than in a storehouse over here.

Senator Watkins. If we get into a war, would we not eventually have to replace it?

General Bradley. Yes, but you would probably replace it by something newer, and better equipment, than what we were giving. That does not mean necessarily that that is an obsolete piece of equipment, or no good. But when you start out to make something new, you take advantage of all developments and research since the last war.

Senator Watkins. I understand that. What I am trying to get at is this: Should not the American people be told what this equipment costs us, and not be led to believe, as I was for some time, that the price tag on this help was going to be $1,100,000,000? When I got to investigate it I found that was just the shipment cost, the rehabilitation cost. We are actually going to give it without making any charge against the cost of it, or any other item, except those two.

General Bradley. That is a policy matter which you gentlemen can determine, and at the time we finally decide how much is going to be given, if you want it we can announce the original cost of it, but I think it should be made clear if you do that, that that is not necessarily the present value of it.

If you keep it on for years and in storehouses, or out on a lot, somewhere, it may not be worth anything to anybody, whereas in this case some of this equipment adds to our own security if it is in somebody else's hands.

Senator Watkins. Will it not deteriorate in Europe just the same as it will here if it is not used?

The Chairman. May I intervene?

General Bradley, would those matters that you are discussing in answering questions be included in the arms program? We could lay down standards in that program as to how much.
General Bradley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Leave it up to the War Department to say what percentage of the original cost these things are now worth at the moment.

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Some item may be worth 10 percent, another item a different percent. It would be impossible in this treaty or in the arms program itself to fix a particular valuation on any kind of equipment, but that would no doubt be covered in the arms act when it is passed; would it not?

General Bradley. I should think it would be, and it would be up to you gentlemen at the time as to how you want to announce it.

Replacement of Surplus by Modern Equipment

Senator Watkins. I may say, general, I am not blaming you for giving out this information. It was given out by some responsible Government official—I think through the Secretary of State, to the committee. I think what the people are entitled to have is what I called your attention to. I want to know how this bookkeeping arrangement is being made, because Secretary Johnson told us that you probably could give us more of the details on it. He indicated that the general statement that you made would probably be the way it would be handled.

He also told us that we were not sending them junk. He indicated it was not obsolete; that it was usable material; if we had to go into war it would become good material. And I have a feeling that probably it is just as good or better than any possible enemy would have over there at the present time. Would not that be your judgment?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

I might give you one example. Take the 90-millimeter guns, for example. We have enough of those in stock to equip a very, very large number of divisions, and supporting troops for that number of divisions. We could very easily spare a lot of those, because by the time any future war came along, and we got to a point in mobilization where we would need those extra ones, way beyond this particular number of divisions, we certainly would have developed a better gun.

So that as I see it, it does not hurt us one bit to give a certain number of those guns to somebody else who can use them in any early stage of collective security.

Development of New Arms

Senator Watkins. That brings up a question in my mind that maybe we ought to explore, and I do not know whether you can answer these questions in open session or not. You say we will develop a better gun, we will develop better planes and better ships and better equipment of all kinds, which is very good. Then just what are we developing all these better weapons against?

And that leads to the next question: Just how strong is our only strong possible opponent? I mean in military resources, in weapons, and what not. I think you know the nation I mean. If you can answer that question I would like to get an answer to it.
General Bradley. Certainly we would be very remiss, as your Military Establishment, if we did not take every step possible to develop new equipment and improve upon equipment from year to year so that in case of a future emergency, if one should come, we would be able to provide the best possible equipment that could be developed. We owe that to the people who are going to serve it and use it, as well as to the whole Nation.

So that we feel that we are obligated—and that is one of our duties—to carry on research and development. We would like to say that there would never be another war, and there is no use to have any armed forces or any development. But we are not sure of that. Therefore we feel it is obligatory to carry on the development.

Now, then, in answer to the first part of your question I think you would agree that we must carry that on, so that in case of a war we would have the best possible equipment to pull off the drawing board and put into production.

Senator Watkins. I agree with you, General.

STRENGTH OF ONLY POSSIBLE AGRESSOR

General Bradley. As to the second question, as to how strong any possible aggressor might be—and you mentioned Russia—I do not believe that is a question that should be answered here. Of course, we have a certain amount of information as to her present armed strength in all the services.

Senator Watkins. That is more or less public?

General Bradley. No, sir; it is not public, and in general I think the fewer people who know the figures, the better off our security.

Senator Watkins. I did not want to press it, that is the reason I put the question the way I did. But sometime, somewhere, before we vote on this treaty, I would like to have that information. Because to a certain extent it will help me to determine whether or not we need an alliance to meet whatever threat there might be.

General Bradley. Could I put it this way: In my opinion, whatever that strength is, if the countries of western Europe are given time, sufficient time, to accomplish economic recovery, rearming and building up their own defenses, I do believe that those western countries can stop that strength. Is that sufficient to answer your question, sir?

Senator Watkins. It will answer it for the present. But I am still inclined to think that we ought to have some more detailed information. We can get it at some other time. I think you are the man to give it.

DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN WEAPONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES

From newspaper and magazine stories that have appeared frequently in our press, the public has been led to believe that some of our possible enemies have developed rather extraordinary weapons of various types and kinds, without naming each one. Can you give us any light on the possibility that a possible enemy may have some extraordinary weapons that might make them more formidable than they ordinarily would be?

General Bradley. Senator, I do not believe that is a question that ought to be answered in detail here, sir.
Senator Watkins. Some of these questions have been submitted by some constituents that would like some answers. They are concerned about this, that is the reason I put it to you.

Here is one that I think possibly you might be able to answer. As I remember, Ambassador Bedell Smith, who is in the Army now, and was on leave for a time at the time he was Ambassador to Russia, made a speech some time ago, which as I recall was reported that he did not think the Russians had the atomic bomb at this time, but that they knew how it could be made; that they had enough secrets to know how it could be made.

Is that one of the questions you can comment on?

The Chairman. I think that is a security matter and ought not to be discussed here.

Senator Watkins. In view of what the Ambassador said, do you—

The Chairman. The Ambassador is not on the stand.

Senator Watkins. He is a representative of the United States Government. It has become public. I would like to know.

The Chairman. You might like to know, but I do not think it would be proper for us to call here on the General to discuss these matters which are clearly within the security range and scope. I leave it to him, though. He can answer if he wants to.

Senator Watkins. So far as I am concerned I have already left it to him. I said and I say again that I do not ask you to give any answers that you think would endanger the security of the United States. But in view of calling that specific situation to your mind, I ask you if under those circumstances the former general of the Army, now in the Army, has made such a statement. Is there any light that you can give us on it?

General Bradley. I do not have the exact statement in front of me, and unless you have that exact statement I would rather not comment on it.

Senator Watkins. That is all right, General, if you feel that way. I am not pressing. I was just wondering if there was any light you could throw on it, because a lot of people are concerned with what has been said. And if we could be enlightened it might reassure them. It might and might not, depending on what the answer would be.

General Bradley. As we remember that statement by the Ambassador, it was that they had the secrets of fissionable material, but they did not have the atomic bomb. I think that is the way he expressed it, but I do not have the exact statement in front of me.

Senator Watkins. And you do not care to comment on it.

General Bradley. No, sir.

MILITARY STAFF ORGANIZATION UNDER THE TREATY

Senator Watkins. To go back to the treaty for a moment, you mentioned, in the examination by the other Senators, about the council and its work in connection with the military program, the council in the Atlantic Pact nations to be set up by this treaty if and when it is ratified.

Is it your understanding that this council will have the direction of any military defense measures which the so-called alliance will undertake?
General Bradley. Certainly some kind of an organization must be set up to coordinate the efforts of the various nations. I should think that one of the parts of that set-up certainly would be an Atlantic Pact Council, or whatever you want to call it, which would consist of the representatives of the various governments, maybe foreign ministers of the various governments, and then whatever organization was set up under that I think would have to depend entirely on what is agreed upon by the 12 nations.

Senator Watkins. Has it been discussed with you by the negotiators representing our country, by the State Department, as to what place the military should have in it? I mean our own military.

General Bradley. Of course, as your military advisers, we have thought a great deal about it, and discussed various plans that we think might be thought of. But as far as a decision is concerned upon which one of those organizations you will finally adopt, it has not been determined.

Power of the Council

Senator Watkins. Will it have power to direct the military of the various signatory nations?

General Bradley. The military of the various nations are controlled by their governments themselves. Certainly somebody has to do some coordinated planning, if that is what you mean.

Senator Watkins. What I am trying to find out: Will this be the grand council if we get into a fight, this group? Will this council be the group that will direct the campaign of the generals?

General Bradley. Certainly some group would have to be set up to control the over-all strategy.

Senator Watkins. Do you know whether or not it is the program to have this council do that very thing that you are talking about, rather than set up some other organization?

General Bradley. I think the final direction of a war would be some council set-up of military people, rather than foreign ministers. They would get their orders from the government, of course, in the over-all guidance—from the governments—but the actual planning and military strategy would be actually planned by some kind of military group.

Senator Watkins. You can see in this treaty itself it is very vague about the council. There is nothing spelled out. I would like to know, before we go into that, what is planned.

General Bradley. I think the State Department would be better qualified to give you what they have in mind for an over-all organization.

Senator Watkins. Can you give any light on it as far as what connection the military may have with it? I mean our own country and the other countries.

General Bradley. They would probably call some of us in to discuss various organizations for it. But the final decision would be left to the governments of the 12 nations concerned.

Senator Watkins. Let us go over to another matter for a moment.
CONTRIBUTION OF COSIGNATORIES

As I understand it, the Atlantic Pact nations would furnish about six or seven times as much as we give to them in the way of equipment or help in the initial stages of this program, if it is finally entered into.

General Bradley. As the chairman read a while ago from the Secretary of State's testimony, he indicated it would be somewhere in that neighborhood of six or seven times as much as we contemplated discussing here.

Senator Watkins. Is that your understanding, also?

General Bradley. Yes. I got it from that particular statement.

Senator Watkins. In the matter of the over-all strategy and the matter of their ability to deliver on that kind of an assignment, has your organization checked to see whether or not they could do it?

General Bradley. No, sir.

Senator Watkins. As I understand it, it is general information that we are now helping them to get on their feet; we are having to furnish them $5,580,000,000 in the next 15 months to help them get on their feet.

Can you see, as a military man, in connection with military planning, how they are going to supply six or seven times as much as we are going to furnish to them for this first year?

General Bradley. As I understood the statement of six or seven times as much referred to efforts to build up their defense, not to expand an industry or something like that.

Senator Watkins. I mean defenses. How are they going to have budgets of that size? Altogether they would have to have a budget, if ours was $1,100,000,000, they would have five times as much. How can they rely on us now? How can they go ahead and do those things, to carry on this particular assignment, to turn their resources, that much money, into armament?

General Bradley. It is not all into armaments. It is the upkeep of their military establishments, which would include pay, clothing, food for them, and so on.

Senator Watkins. Of course, it includes many extraordinary expenditures that they would not have on just a maintenance basis, otherwise it is not really adding to the general pool for fighting, is it?

General Bradley. It builds up the potential to fight.

Senator Watkins. Of course, we can keep them clothed and fed, and they will be alive when the time comes. But it does not build up weapons too much, in that proportion of 6 to 1, what we are sending.

General Bradley. I do not have any figures in front of me as to how they arrived at the 6 or 7 to 1. That is the State Department's figures. What they included in the amount being contributed by the various countries I have no way of knowing.

I took it that the total being spent by those countries for national defense was 6 or 7 times as much as the $1,000,000,000 that you were talking about here.

Senator Watkins. I was quite encouraged to think that maybe under this arrangement we would not have to do all the rearmament because they are going to put up 5 or 6 to 1. Under those circumstances we might get a real contribution, but then I began to wonder how they could do it if we have to help them in these other fields so much.

The Chairman. May I ask a question?

MAINTENANCE OF DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS OF COSIGNATORIES

The CHAIRMAN. These countries, even in their depressed state of their economy, have all had to maintain military establishments, have they not?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They have had their military budgets all along, and necessarily have to have them, not alone for defense against outside attacks, but for police powers within these countries.

Now, may I quote Secretary Acheson on this point? He was asked a question about how the recovery program and the arms program would go along. He said, and this is the Secretary I am quoting:

The first primary necessity is the economic recovery of western Europe.

That has been made very clear in a number of statements that economic recovery has priority.

That means that there are very definite limitations on the size of the military forces which western Europe can maintain, because if you withdrew greatly increased numbers of men from production and put them into military service, you would impair recovery and would impair the very ability of these nations to resist and to remain as free nations.

Therefore, the recovery comes first. That means that under the military assistance program we have started with the forces as they exist in 1950 budgets of these countries, and we are trying to give better armaments to those countries. As Senator Connally pointed out, the great bulk of this effort is being undertaken by the European countries themselves—

and so on.

What I was trying to point out was that they have had to have their military establishments all along, they have had their military budgets. They could not be expected to strip themselves to the bone and have no armed forces, no armed establishment, not alone for their temporary defense but in the long run they have got to maintain that sort of an organization to ever have an army or armed forces ready for an emergency which may break upon them at any time. Is that not true?

General Bradley. That is true. And they have to have a certain size force for maintenance of internal security, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Watkins. What the Senator has stated, of course, is enlightening. But what I want to know is, What they are to do to match the new effort we are going to make to help them? Is part of it to be considered as part of their regular budget, or are they going to add an additional budget at match what we are adding, additionally?

General Bradley. I do not know, sir.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE SINCE END OF WORLD WAR II

Senator Watkins. Two of those countries—France and Great Britain—received considerable equipment from the United States during the latter part of the war; all the way through the war for Great Britain, and the latter part of the war for France. Do you know what has happened to the equipment that we left with them that they now have?

General Bradley. They have some of it.

Senator Watkins. Is it usable?

General Bradley. Some of it.
Senator Watkins. As I recall, the statement has been made—I am not sure about this, General, you probably have the information, but it will give you an indication of what I am driving at and what I am trying to get information on—it was said that we sold to them, by Foreign Surplus Disposal, some $10,000,000,000 worth of equipment. Do you know anything about that? Can you throw any light on that?

General Bradley. No, sir. I have no figures on that.

Senator Watkins. We did sell them a lot of equipment after we pulled out? For instance, from England?

General Bradley. Yes. As I remember it we sold quite a number of things like trucks, tractors, and things that can be used in the peace-time economy, and in many cases they were pretty much worn, and it was a question of whether or not they were worth the expense of bringing home and storing.

We followed more or less the same policy here. We sold many things in this country to help the civilian economy.

Senator Watkins. I understand that. What I have in mind is strictly what we disposed of overseas. As I recall, the figure I saw lately was about $10,000,000,000 of equipment at a mark-down price.

The Chairman. You mean $10,000,000,000 of original cost?

Senator Watkins. I do not know, Senator. That is what I am trying to find out, what it really meant.

General Bradley. I do not have those figures. We sold such equipment not only in Europe but all over the world. We sold surplus equipment of that type. You may remember that a couple of years ago Congress passed a bill which made use of part of that money for education in the Fulbright bill. That set up funds for 15 or 20 countries where we had sold such property, and the money was used for educational purposes.

Senator Watkins. Do you know where we can get information on that rather accurately so we could know what happened?

General Bradley. I do not, offhand. But if I can find out exactly what you want, we will try to get it for you.

Senator Watkins. I would like to know what we furnished to members of this North Atlantic Pact, following the conclusion of the war, in the way of equipment that could be used for military work.

General Bradley. When you added the last clause on that I am not too sure.

Senator Watkins. Then I will leave that off.

General Bradley. It may not be fit for military use any more, and might not have been at the time. It might have had limited military use. As I understand it, you want a list in money value of the goods turned over to the other 11 countries of this pact.

Senator Watkins. In a general classification. I do not want you to give the detail of it, so many tractors and so much of this. I would like a general classification of what it was.

General Bradley. We will see if we can get that from the Foreign Liquidation Commission for you, sir.

[The committee has been informed that the Department of State is preparing this information for submission in connection with the proposed military assistance legislation.]
Senator Watkins. In considering plans for conduct of a defensive war in Europe, of course you have to take into consideration many elements, including probably the loyalty of your allies who may be fighting along with you, with our divisions. How do you feel about the situation, for instance, in France and Italy, where it is said that every fourth Italian or every fourth Frenchman is a Communist?

I do not want to ask too pointed a question, but I wonder if you could throw any light on what risks we would be taking in rearming those two nations, or helping to rearm them, and what we can count on if we get into a fight?

General Bradley. Of course any country which tries to fight a war with any considerable percentage of her people disloyal, is working under a handicap. However, I do not believe that any percentage of people considered disloyal now can be taken as anywhere near accurate of the percentage that will be disloyal in the event of war.

A lot of people talk one way until the test comes, and then you find that they are loyal and patriotic citizens. I might cite as an example, a few years ago we had in this country a movement by the Veterans of Future Wars in which a lot of youngsters said they would not fight, yet when I got to Africa I found one of the ringleaders of that group on my staff, and he was decorated several times for bravery. It may be that a lot of these people included in the 25 percent that we talk about now would be loyal to the country when the test came.

Senator Watkins. However, at the present moment they indicate, if you can judge by the expressions of some of their leaders, that they would not fight on the side of the United States in the event of war.

General Bradley. Undoubtedly there would be some such people.

Senator Watkins. At least they would not fight with their own countries to in any way assist the United States.

General Bradley. If that percentage caused too much trouble, I would guess that the country concerned would have to take a realistic view of the matter and take such steps as may be necessary to cope with it.

Senator Watkins. Can Italy be of any real assistance to us in a future war?

CONTRIBUTION OF ITALY

General Bradley. I would like to answer that, in general, I think they can. Specifically, I would not want to answer it here.

Senator Watkins. I wondered in view of the past record whether or not they would be of any particular good, particularly in view of the treaty which was entered into between Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Republics, as we have limited their armament very materially, and to what is now very obsolete armament. That is one thing that prompted my question. Do you know any way whereby we could rearm them and keep within the law?

General Bradley. I would rather not go into that. If I might answer it in a general way, in my opinion, even under those treaty
restrictions, they can contribute something to the Atlantic Pact. However, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular country does not fall in the province of the military. That was decided on a very high government level, and the State Department decided for our Government that it was proper that they be included. Militarily I think that they are in general an asset.

Senator Watkins. You could not answer it one way without violating security?

General Bradley. I would rather not answer it here, sir.

SENDING OF UNITED STATES TROOPS ABROAD

Senator Watkins. I have noticed from time to time statements by some people who are more or less responsible, that a part of our program contemplates the sending of considerable detachments to members of the Atlantic Pact not only for the purpose of instruction but also to bolster their forces. What can you say about that, General?

General Bradley. If any decision has been made as to sending any particular size group and for any purpose to these nations, I do not know about it.

Senator Watkins. It is not contemplated at the present time?

General Bradley. It may be on some levels—

Senator Watkins. I mean as far as you have been advised.

General Bradley. Certainly we have not been in any planning for sending any particular groups. Certainly if you furnish arms and then somebody has got to go over and see that they are properly received and distributed. But that does not come into this particular thing.

Senator Watkins. I think, General, that this concludes most of the questions that I want to ask you. There are some that I do not know if I will be permitted to ask at someplace where you can answer, that involve security. But I want to thank you for the very gracious way you have answered my questions. I appreciate your cooperation. I want to assure you that I was trying to get information that would help me, as one Senator, to make up his mind.

General Bradley. Thank you.

The Chairman. General Bradley, the committee thanks you for your presence here and for your very able and clear statement of the issues involved in the treaty. On the questions that are outside of the treaty at the moment, on arms and so forth, we think you have made a very comprehensive and able statement. We very greatly appreciate it.

You have gone directly to the point at issue, with a great degree of clarity, and perspicacity. You have enlightened the committee, and I hope have enlightened those who are here by our courtesy.

This committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. At that time Mr. John Foster Dulles will be the first witness.

(Thereupon, at 1:20 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., May 4, 1949.)
APPENDIX

Production data showing industrial capacity of the North Atlantic Pact powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coal (million metric tons)</th>
<th>Electric power (billion kilowatt-hours)</th>
<th>Motor vehicles (1,000 units)</th>
<th>Steel (million metric tons)</th>
<th>Crude (1,000 barrels per day)</th>
<th>Petroleum refinery capacity (1,000 barrels per 24 hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>395.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210.8</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total United States: 310.4 million metric tons of coal, 165.5 billion kilowatt-hours, 1,024,000 motor vehicles, 33.8 million metric tons of steel, 94,445,000 barrels of crude petroleum, and 6,278,000 barrels of crude petroleum per 24 hours.

1 Almost all production data are for 1948.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND TRADITIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCES

(Prepared by the Department of State)

The question has been raised whether the North Atlantic Treaty, since it envisages the use of armed force as a last resort for the suppression of acts of aggression, is a military alliance.

Throughout the course of history there have been military alliances of every conceivable type. Some have been high-minded in intent; others have been cynical steps toward aggrandizement. Some have been purely defensive in motive; others have been offensive. Some have been automatic; others have depended on the judgment of the parties. All traditional military alliances, in the accepted sense of the word, were designed to advance the respective nationalistic interests of the parties, and provided for joint military action if one of the parties in pursuit of such objectives became involved in war.

Most traditional alliances of the past, while piously denying aggressive or expansionist intentions, nevertheless made it clearly evident that the parties anticipated military action in contingencies other than defense against armed attack. Sometimes the parties to such arrangements were in a position themselves to provoke the anticipated crisis, or causa belli, if it did not otherwise arise. Typical among such treaties are the following:

1. The Act of the Holy Alliance (September 26, 1815)

This act provided that the parties “will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance.”

2. The Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) May 20, 1882

“Article 4: In case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally.”

[Italics added.]

334
The terms of article 4 envisaged the possibility that one of the allies might precipitate a war under the terms of the treaty if it felt its security threatened. The obligations of the other allies in such a case were not to incline them into a war brought about in this way, but the possibility of their entry to assist an aggressive ally was specifically provided for. The text of this treaty was not published until 1920.

3. The German-Italian Treaty of February 20, 1887

"Article 3: If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation, or even her protectorate or her sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North African territories, whether of the Spanish or of the French, or in the Moroccan Empire, and that in consequence thereto Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African territories, or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby ensue between Italy and France would constitute ipso facto, on the demand of Italy and at the common charge of the two Allies, the casus foederis with all the effects foreseen by Articles II and V of the aforesaid Treaty of May 20, 1882 (the Triple Alliance), as if such an eventuality were expressly contemplated therein.

"Article 4: If the fortune of any war undertaken in common against France should lead Italy to seek for territorial guarantees with respect to France for the security of the frontiers of the Kingdom and of her maritime position, as well as with a view to the stability of peace, Germany will present no obstacle thereto; and, if need be, and a measure compatible with circumstances, will apply herself to facilitating the means of attaining such a purpose." [Italics added.]

The terms of this treaty contemplated the possibility that Italy, in view of certain French measures in North Africa, might attack French forces in Africa or even France itself, in which case Germany would enter the war against France. German support was also promised for contemplated Italian claims for French territory along the Franco-Italian frontier. The German-Italian Treaty of 1887 was by its own terms to be kept secret and was not published until 1920.

4. The Austro-Italian Treaty of February 20, 1887

"Article 1: * * * However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers aforesaid, based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well founded claims of the two Parties." [Italics added.]

This treaty clearly envisaged the possibility of territorial changes in the Balkans and in the Adriatic and Aegean regions either by the action of nonsignatory powers or "otherwise," i.e., by the aggressive action of Austria-Hungary or Italy, if either of those powers should find itself "under the necessity of modifying" the status quo. In this case there was to be previous consultation between the two allies with a view to asuring both of them "reciprocal compensation" in territory or otherwise for the gains of either of them. The Austro-Italian Treaty of 1887 was by its own terms to be kept secret and was not published until 1920.

5. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902

"Article 1: The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninvolved by any aggressive action on either country. How, however, in view of the different special interests of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.
“Article 2: If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

“Article 3: If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.” [Italics added.]

This alliance envisaged the possibility of the necessity for taking “measures” which might involve one of the parties in war. Japan found its position sufficiently strengthened by the terms to the alliance to precipitate the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.


“Article 1: The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that their vital interests demand that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan, will frankly and loyally enter into communication whenever circumstances may demand, and will agree upon the measures to be taken to prevent such a situation being brought about.

“Article 2: In the event that, in consequence of the measures taken by mutual agreement as provided in the preceding article, war should be declared between one of the Contracting Parties and one of the third Powers contemplated by the preceding article, the other Contracting Party will, upon the demand of its ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party.” [Italics added.]

This secret convention envisaged the possibility that Russia or Japan might take “measures,” based upon mutual agreement, which would lead to war with another power—probably the United States—over their interests in China. In this case, providing that sufficient cooperation was forthcoming from other allies, the other party to the convention would enter the war. The terms of the treaty did not require that either of the parties be attacked, the key article having been drafted in such a way that the measures precipitating the war might very well be aggressive measures.

7. The Soviet-German Treaty of Nonaggression of August 23, 1939

“Article 1: Both High Contracting Parties oblige themselves to dealst from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

“Article 2: Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.”

Secret Additional Protocol of August 23, 1939

“1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each Party.

“2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

“The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.” [Italics added.]

The published articles of this treaty provided merely that neither party would attack the other or lend its support to any power with which the other party might be at war. The secret additional protocol, however, envisaged major territorial “rearrangements” in eastern Europe which could take place only through Soviet or German aggressive action. These agreements led directly to the German and Soviet attacks on Poland in September 1939.

The North Atlantic Pact differs from the traditional military alliances of the past both in letter and in spirit. When one examines the terms of the North Atlantic Pact, there can be no doubt as to the character of the commitments undertaken. Specifically, the Pact forbids “the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN,” and authorizes the use of force,
in accordance with the inherent right of collective self-defense expressly recog-
nized and preserved by article 51 of the Charter, only when a nation has com-
pletely violated the obligations of the Charter by launching an armed attack on
a Party to the Treaty, and only until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The North Atlantic Treaty is entirely free from provisions directed toward
territorial changes for the benefit of its signatories. It has no clauses recogniz-
ing special interests of certain signatories. It gives no nation a "free hand"
to take unspecified "measures" likely to lead to hostilities. It contains no am-
biguities or evasive generalities which could possibly sanction aggressive action
on the part of one of the signatories in the expectation that the resulting conflict
would constitute a casus foederis. The full text has been made public, and it has
no secret additional protocols.

It is inconceivable that 12 nations, all predominantly democratic in or-
organization, could or would negotiate any secret "deals" of the type associated
with many traditional bilateral alliances and ententes. The size of the member-
ship in the North Atlantic Pact is in itself a guaranty that the past, published
to all the world, means precisely what it says.

The treaty contains no obligation to defend any territorial status quo. It does
obligate the parties to assist in suppressing attempts to change the status quo by
armed attack. It obligates the parties to defend the purposes and principles of
the United Nations, the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of the parties
and their free institutions, based upon the principles of democracy, individual
liberty, and the rule of law. It obligates them to act in defense of peace and
security. It is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression.
It seeks not to influence any shifting "balance of power" but to strengthen the
"balance of principle."

The North Atlantic and Rio Treaties represent developments in the concept of
collective security. Like the United Nations Charter, they contemplate the use
of armed force only as a last resort for the suppression of acts of aggression.
The first purpose of the United Nations is stated in article 1 of the Charter as
being "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression." Article 42 authorizes the
Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore International peace and
security." Article 51
provides that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security."

In the words of former Secretary of State Byrnes:

"We have covenanted not to use force except in the defense of law as embodied
in the purposes and principles of the Charter. We intend to live up to that
covenant. But as a great power and as a permanent member of the Security
Council we have a responsibility to use our influence to see that other powers
live up to that covenant, and that responsibility we also intend to meet. Unless
the great powers are prepared to act in the defense of law, the United Nations
cannot prevent war. We must make it clear in advance that we intend to act
to prevent aggression, making it clear at the same time that we will not use
force for any other purpose."

The North Atlantic Treaty does exactly that. In Senator Connally's words the
treaty constitutes not a military alliance but "an alliance against war itself."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acheson, Dean G.</td>
<td>4-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act of Chapultepec</td>
<td>93, 94, 100, 104, 105, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission of new members</td>
<td>26, 48, 49, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages from treaty</td>
<td>148, 150-151, 239, 286-287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression (see also armed attack)</td>
<td>12, 13, 17, 116, 156, 162, 170, 183, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleutian Islands</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliances, military</td>
<td>14, 116, 143, 146, 149-150, 171-174, 181, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297, 298, 300, 303 ff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>18, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Soviet treaty</td>
<td>35, 44, 45, 86, 107, 130, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (See geographic scope.)</td>
<td>97, 110, 112, 113, 144, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits (See advantages.)</td>
<td>9, 67, 185, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin (see also Germany)</td>
<td>8, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bevin, Ernest</td>
<td>296-297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohlen, Charles</td>
<td>286-297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boncour, Paul</td>
<td>95, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley, Omar</td>
<td>326-333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bretton Woods Conference</td>
<td>267, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce, David</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels Treaty</td>
<td>8, 15, 27, 54, 60, 67, 69, 70, 83, 84, 95, 126, 146, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 194, 236, 237, 238, 239, 259, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrne, James F</td>
<td>92, 110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power</td>
<td>97, 110, 112, 113, 144, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (See advantages.)</td>
<td>9, 67, 185, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin (See also Germany)</td>
<td>8, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bevin, Ernest</td>
<td>296-297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohlen, Charles</td>
<td>286-297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boncour, Paul</td>
<td>95, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley, Omar</td>
<td>326-333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bretton Woods Conference</td>
<td>267, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce, David</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels Treaty</td>
<td>8, 15, 27, 54, 60, 67, 69, 70, 83, 84, 95, 126, 146, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 194, 236, 237, 238, 239, 259, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrne, James F</td>
<td>92, 110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9, 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective self-defense (See Self-defense.)</td>
<td>55, 168-177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial policies (See also Indonesia.)</td>
<td>55, 188-187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cominform (See also Soviet Union, countermeasures by)</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments (See also article 3, article 5)</td>
<td>11, 12, 20, 21, 29, 45, 78, 79, 80, 82, 146, 223-225, 244, 245, 265, 275, 280, 281, 294, 306, 316, 318, 317-319, 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>205, 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist coup</td>
<td>25, 26, 40, 41, 52, 58, 62, 76, 190, 196, 206, 207-208, 209, 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional procedure (See also Presidential power; armed attack; War, declaration of)</td>
<td>11, 19, 80, 81, 82, 84, 257, 317-319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment of Soviet Union</td>
<td>30, 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>59, 120, 327-329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe (See also Europe, unification of)</td>
<td>206, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughters of the American Revolution</td>
<td>146, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>163, 182, 185, 274, 293, 307, 322, 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense: Cape City</td>
<td>287, 295, 319-321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive nature of treaty</td>
<td>147, 150, 154-155, 158, 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>78, 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament (see also Armament)</td>
<td>112, 123, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulles, John Foster</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumbarton Oaks</td>
<td>101, 103, 109, 268-269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunkirk</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-West trade</td>
<td>220-222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration (see also European recovery pro-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gram)</td>
<td>208, 221, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic policies (see also Art. II)</td>
<td>151-152, 176, 218-220, 249, 289-292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic recovery</td>
<td>12, 40, 54, 91, 131-132, 190, 229-230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of treaty.</td>
<td>11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 43, 54, 81, 82, 154-155, 158, 285, 286, 290, 305, 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity In</td>
<td>12, 42, 69, 131-132, 190, 236, 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>199-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification of</td>
<td>62, 132, 198-199, 201-202, 204-206, 249-254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European recovery program, priority of</td>
<td>33, 37, 38, 40, 90-92, 145, 164, 178, 189, 190, 192, 196, 203, 205, 208, 223, 288, 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far Eastern Commission</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy, United States</td>
<td>5, 30, 55, 246, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forrestal, James</td>
<td>118, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9, 35, 44, 46, 47, 51, 67, 86, 151, 188, 190, 200, 206, 207, 208, 270, 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Soviet Treaty. (See Anglo-Soviet Treaty.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic scope</td>
<td>69, 70, 72, 220-238, 238-238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30, 55, 61, 200-204, 231-233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11, 90, 91, 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gromyko, Andrei</td>
<td>63, 160, 185, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross, Ernest</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harriman, W. Averell</td>
<td>189-233, 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Islands</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical development of treaty (see also North Atlantic Treaty, ex-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ploratory talks, negotiations: S. Res. 239)</td>
<td>9, 67, 68, 69, 70-72, 226-238, 267-286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>198, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>58, 180, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial capacity</td>
<td>152, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational activities</td>
<td>52-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal disorder. (See Communist coup.)</td>
<td>27, 102, 117, 126, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Law</td>
<td>222, 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (see also United Nations, nonmembers)</td>
<td>83, 90, 109, 118, 121-122, 133, 134, 150, 180, 181, 190, 200, 205, 207, 208, 297, 321-328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>319-320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Louis</td>
<td>145-197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff (see also National Military Establishment)</td>
<td>149, 157, 297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Page

K

Korea _____________________________________________________ 90

L

League of Nations ..................................................................... 5, 27
Lange, Halvard ........................................................................ 72
Limitations:
On military assistance program ........................................... 37, 40
On treaty ................................................................................. 22, 23, 116
Lovett, Robert .......................................................................... 8, 9, 67, 68, 70, 238-284
Luxemburg ................................................................................ 9, 67

M

Marshall, George C. ................................................................ 8
Mediterranean Pact .................................................................. 54, 99
Membership (see also Admission of new members) ................. 61
Military assistance
Allocation of arms .................................................................... 57, 58, 157, 163, 164, 177
Cost ......................................................................................... 11, 24, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 158, 159, 194,
186-187, 170, 174-175, 177, 208, 210, 298, 299, 302, 322-325, 329
Impact on domestic economy .................................................. 53, 151, 170-177, 208, 321
Loss of equipment to an aggressor ........................................... 51
Nature (see also Surplus property) ............................................ 24, 36, 37, 40, 41,
48, 55, 56, 147-148, 152, 162, 165-166, 176-179, 196, 206, 219, 289, 311
Necessity .................................................................................. 43, 44, 147, 165, 202, 203, 296, 290
Purpose .................................................................................... 11, 12, 22, 37, 287
Relationship to treaty ............................................................. 16, 17, 21, 23, 26, 84, 109, 216, 322-323
Military assistance since World War II ................................. 50, 330-331
Military budgets:
Participants ............................................................................ 37, 38, 39, 178-179, 293, 303-304, 313, 322-330
United States ........................................................................... 25, 52, 53, 59, 57, 123, 147-149, 163, 164, 166-170,
174-175, 176, 208
Military Establishment. (See National Military Establishment.)
Military Staff Organization (see also Council) ......................... 288-289, 327-328
Monroe Doctrine ..................................................................... 5, 30, 146, 165, 296
Morale in Europe .................................................................... 46, 47, 51, 58, 60, 180-181, 190, 192-193, 195, 199,
203, 211, 228, 230, 238
Moscow Declaration ................................................................ 34
Mutual aid. (See Self-help.)

N

National defense. (See Security, United States.)
National Military Establishment ............................................. 123, 145, 147, 152, 155, 159, 286
Nationalism ............................................................................. 198-199
Netherlands ............................................................................ 9, 67, 190
North Atlantic Treaty:
Article I .................................................................................. 10, 76, 121, 122
Article II (see also Economic policies) .................................... 10, 32, 33, 32, 76, 77, 130, 218-219, 222, 269-272
Article III (see also Self-help) .................................................. 10, 12, 21, 45, 47, 48, 77, 83, 84, 97, 119, 123-124, 148, 159, 178, 191,
Article V .................................................................................... 11, 20, 22, 28, 29, 38, 69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 117, 142, 143, 146,
(See Armed attack, Commitments, Constitutional procedure, Presidential power.)
Article VI (see also Geographic scope) .................................. 59, 60
Article VII ................................................................................ 22, 124-125
Article VIII ............................................................................. 35, 125-126
Article IX ............................................................................... 59, 97, 126
Article X ............................................................................... 48, 281
Compatibility with United Nations Chapter (see also United Nations, supremacy of) ........................................... 13, 21, 90, 115, 124-125, 146, 243
### INDEX

**North Atlantic Treaty—Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Essence</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory talks <em>(See also Historical development)</em></td>
<td>9, 67, 68, 70, 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>206, 239, 255, 286, 288, 291, 296, 298, 300, 314, 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity for <em>(See also Europe, insecurity in)</em></td>
<td>130, 132, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation of <em>(See also Historical development)</em></td>
<td>70-72, 228, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46, 72, 79, 80, 82, 84, 214, 290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Obligations. *(See Commitments.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54, 218, 220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pacific area, defense of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54, 168, 320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panama Canal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Philippine Islands *(See also United Nations, nonmembers)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61, 93, 99, 109, 121-122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Preparativeness *(See Security, United States)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80, 81, 84, 261-262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Provocativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1, 10, 291, 293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rasmussen, Gustav

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reciprocal trade agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>270-271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regional arrangements *(See also United Nations, ch. VII)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96-97, 99, 117-119, 120-121, 135-143, 268-269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Revolution. *(See Communist coup.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74, 75, 76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rio Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15, 27, 28, 30, 88, 107, 146, 165, 245, 264, 269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ruhr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Russia *(See Soviet Union.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83-90, 96, 108, 142, 268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Security, United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 158, 161-163, 167, 169-173, 194, 197, 200, 236, 288, 321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Self-defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11, 15, 63, 96, 98, 102, 116, 117, 119, 135-136, 140, 141, 146, 151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Self-help *(and mutual aid)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10, 12, 16, 17, 20, 45, 48, 50, 53, 78, 98, 138-144, 197, 211-212, 243, 273-274, 280, 292, 299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Senate debate *(February 14, 1949)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73, 74, 75, 76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Senate Resolution 239

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8, 9, 11, 19, 20, 30, 68, 69, 82, 83, 94, 240, 241, 242, 248, 256, 257-258, 290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legislative-executive cooperation on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9, 19, 69, 70, 237, 244, 247-248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Smith, Bedell

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sovereignty, surrender of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Soviet Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8, 36, 54, 55, 90, 91, 113, 130, 184-185, 190, 191, 203, 204, 207, 239, 240, 258, 306, 308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Countermeasures by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54, 55, 196, 226, 239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Stalin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Stettinius, Edward R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95, 103, 111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Surplus property *(see also Military assistance, nature of and cost of)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35, 139-160, 179, 298, 302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Truman, Harry S., inaugural address of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71, 72, 265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### T

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86, 87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (See Soviet Union.)</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9, 35, 44, 45, 67, 86, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>8, 9, 10, 26, 90, 93, 107-108, 122, 129, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievements</td>
<td>129-130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 51 (see also Self-defense)</td>
<td>11, 14, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 65, 93, 94-97, 109, 102, 103-107, 117, 119, 120, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140-142, 242, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 52 (see also Regionalism; United Nations, ch. VIII)</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 53 (see also Regionalism; United Nations, ch. VIII)</td>
<td>30, 31, 32, 95, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 54 (see also Regionalism; United Nations, ch. VIII)</td>
<td>31, 32, 136, 138, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 103</td>
<td>34, 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 106</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII (see also Regionalism)</td>
<td>96, 98, 104, 119, 120, 135-139, 242, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments under Charter</td>
<td>91, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Assembly</td>
<td>100-109, 117-119, 83-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII (see also Regionalism)</td>
<td>96, 104, 119, 120, 135-139, 242, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles and purposes</td>
<td>5, 6, 10, 107-108, 114, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of (see also S. Res. 239)</td>
<td>8, 9, 128, 241-242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supremacy over Atlantic Treaty (see also North Atlantic Treaty, compatibility with Charter)</td>
<td>21, 22, 23, 34, 90, 97, 100, 115, 124-125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States acceptance of Charter of</td>
<td>6, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto (see also United Nations, Security Council)</td>
<td>92, 109, 118, 130-131, 133, 143, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States, armed forces</td>
<td>47, 183, 184, 213, 217, 265, 291, 308, 312, 333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice of America</td>
<td>32, 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>W</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War: Declaration of</td>
<td>11, 18, 25, 28, 80, 146, 260, 261, 279, 301, 317, 318, 319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of</td>
<td>321-322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>76, 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation. (See Europe, unification.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>184, 185, 186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Y</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE L, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

PART 2
PRIVATE WITNESSES
MAY 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, AND 11, 1949

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1949
## CONTENTS

**Statements by—**

- Backus, Mrs. Dana C., interim national chairman, Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace .................................................. 624
- Beggs, Mrs. Frederic, consultant to the international relations department, General Federation of Women's Clubs ......................... 497
- Broy, Mrs. Cecil Norton .................................................................. 713
- Burr, Rev. Dudley H., chairman of the Peoples Party of Connecticut ........................................................................ 708
- Cadbury, Dr. Henry J., Friends Committee on National Legislation ........................................................................ 758
- Carey, James B., secretary-treasurer, Congress of Industrial Organizations ................................................................. 413
- Clayton, Will L., vice president, Atlantic Union Committee .................................................................................. 576
- Day, Stephen A., Counsel of We, the People, Inc.......................................................... 813
- Dennis, Eugene, general secretary of the Communist Party, U. S. A. .................................................................. 785
- Dobbs, Farrell, national chairman, Socialist Workers Party ................................................................................ 481
- Draper, Miss Muriel, Congress of American Women .................................................................................. 727
- DuBose, John Foster, member, United States Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations .................................................. 339
- Eicke, Mrs. Anna Steelman, American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association .................................................. 792
- Elliott, Dr. Phillips, Fellowship of Reconciliation .................................................................................. 753
- Ely, Robert B., III, attorney .................................................................................. 636
- Fadler, William F., Jr., member, legislative committee, Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia .................. 635
- Forbes, Kenneth Ripley, Philadelphia Council, the Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions ........................................... 790
- Gerard, James W .................................................................................. 489
- Imbrie, James, chairman, Progressive Party of the State of New Jersey ................................................................. 716
- Kline, Allan B., president of American Farm Bureau Federation ........................................................................ 574
- McKee, Frederick C., national chairman, Committee on National Affairs ................................................................................ 588
- Morford, Richard, executive director, National Council of American-Soviet Friendship .................................................. 804
- Ogg, W. B., director, department of international affairs, American Farm Bureau Federation .................................................. 583
- Patterson, Robert P., vice president, Atlantic Union Committee ........................................................................ 608
- Roberts, Owen J., president of the Atlantic Union Committee .......................................................................................... 526
- Rubenstein, Dr. Annette, American Labor Party .......................................................................................... 479
- Schwebel, Stephen M., national chairman, Collegiate Council for the United Nations .......................................................... 653
- Stone, Mrs. Kathryn H., first vice president, League of Women Voters of the United States .................................................................................. 563
- Taft, Charles P.................................................................................. 495
- Thomas, Norman ........................................................................... 730
- Wallace, Henry A., Progressive Party of America .................................................................................. 417, 490
- Warburg, James P ........................................................................... 672
- Warne, Prof. Colston E., the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions .................................................. 794
- Whatley, David .................................................................................. 719
- Wilson, E. Raymond, executive secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation .................................................. 778

**Note.**—The index to part 2 will appear at the end of part 3.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment on May 3, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Connally (chairman), George, Thomas of Utah, Tydings, Green, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Lodge.
Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have the pleasure to have Mr. John Foster Dulles with us, a very distinguished lawyer and great student of international affairs. Mr. Dulles has participated, I think, in all of the conferences including and following the United Nations at San Francisco. He has a very great scope of knowledge and a great reputation for his attainments. We will be glad to hear you, Mr. Dulles.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Dulles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very greatly this opportunity to appear before this committee to express some views I have about the Atlantic Pact. I should make clear that, although I am at the moment serving as a United States official representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the opinions which I here express are personal, and I do not purport in any way to speak for the administration.

Mr. Chairman, I support the Atlantic Treaty as a great historic landmark. Of course, its words do not, of themselves, create new realities. But there come moments when words that formalize an existing situation also serve to dramatize it and bring a new awareness of responsibility and of opportunity. I believe that the Atlantic Pact has that quality, or at least that it can be given that quality, and for that reason I support it.

UNITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

The underlying reality is that the peoples who make up the Atlantic community, the so-called west, do form a natural grouping, having
much in common. When in the west that community has been imperiled from without, its members have united their blood and their treasure in a common defense. Thus the Atlantic Pact does not attempt a new and artificial creation, nor is it a mere military expedient of the hour. It reflects a natural and oft-demonstrated unity.

It may be asked, why is there occasion now to formalize unity if, in fact, it exists? There are, I think, good reasons.

In the first place, the pact is needed to eliminate doubt that the Atlantic community will act quickly and unitedly for common defense.

**REMOVAL OF DOUBTS ABOUT UNITED STATES ACTIONS**

There are here at home some doubts or, more accurately, some hesitations. I think there are few who, in their heart of hearts, really doubt that we would react quickly and wholly against any war-intentioned armed attack within the North Atlantic area, for that would in reality be a war against us. But some would like to put off the day of decision. The European members of the Atlantic community have considerable doubt about our intentions, and there may be doubt in the minds of potential aggressors. Such doubts and hesitations increase the risk of war, and they need to be resolved for, as this committee said a year ago, last May, "the best deterrent to aggression is the certainty that immediate and effective countermeasures will be taken."

The proposed treaty poses clearly the issue of certainty and immediacy. It says that an armed attack against one of the parties in the North Atlantic area "shall be considered an attack against them all." That seems to me to be reasonably plain English. It means, I take it, that an armed attack upon Denmark, for example, is hereafter to be treated by the United States as an attack upon it.

If there is an attack upon the United States, then something happens, and it happens surely and quickly. Of course, what happens is not necessarily war. There have been many armed incursions into United States territory and armed attacks on United States ships and planes which have been successfully countered, and security restored, by measures short of war. The Atlantic Treaty says that the countermeasures to restore the security shall be such as each party "deems necessary." Thus, each case depends on its own facts. The situation may be one that can be dealt with by Presidential action, or it may be that Congress would be called on to declare war or to declare that a state of war already existed. It is certainly not necessary that each attack should be met by counterattack of the same kind, at the same place and at the same time. Much depends on the design of the aggressor state and how, in fact, evil designs can best be parried. But, if an aggressor wants to make war, our Constitution cannot stop him.

During the last 100 years, the United States has been at war with many countries. But the Spanish War is, I think, the only such war that came about through congressional declaration. In the others, the Congress found that a hostile attack had already created a state of war.

I repeat, any aggressor can make war. That choice lies with him, not with us. But this treaty, as I read it, takes away from him one
choice, one tempting choice, that he used to have; that is, the choice of making war on the parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the same time.

DETERRENT TO WAR

The treaty, by saying that in words that no potential aggressor can misunderstand, greatly reduces the risk of armed attack on the North Atlantic area and thereby, in my opinion, makes a great contribution to future peace.

PROBLEM OF GERMANY

In the second place, the pact is needed to make it possible to solve the problem of Germany.

There are still 70,000,000 Germans, possessed of great qualities of industriousness, discipline, and ambition, painfully compressed in a strategic area between the east and west. The Soviet Government is making determined efforts to enlist those Germans in its service. If the Soviet now lifts the Berlin blockade, that may be an act of conciliation toward the west. I hope it is. But until that is shown by other deeds it would be wise for us to look on it as a change of Soviet method, not a change of Soviet intention.

Soviet leaders had hoped to win Germany by blockade measures that would drive the Western Allies out of Berlin and so damage their prestige that the Germans generally would accept the Soviet Union as the dominant force in Europe. That method backfired, due to the magnificent resourcefulness of the Air Force. The Western Allies hold in Berlin, and the Soviet, by attempting to starve the Germans we were feeding, lost greatly in influence in Germany. It is understandable if Soviet leaders seek a different environment which might give them a better chance of success.

Under the circumstances that exist, Germans will be strongly tempted to develop a bargaining position between east and west and they might even come into a temporary alliance with the Soviet. It has much to offer the Germans at the expense of Poland, and the Soviets and Germans, in partnership, could readily dominate the Continent.

The statesmanlike course is to provide the Germans with a decent and hopeful future within the orbit of the west. But again the Germans would be too strong for the comfort and safety of our European allies, unless the west is strengthened by the adhesion of the United States. Germans can be brought into the west if that west includes the United States. They cannot safely be brought into the west if the west does not include the United States. The Atlantic Pact will superimpose upon the Brussels Pact another western unity that is bigger and stronger, so that it does not have to fear the inclusion of Germany.

Unless the Council of Foreign Ministers can plan on that assumption, another meeting would have little chance of success. In that respect also the Atlantic Pact can make a vital contribution to peace.
ECONOMIES IN ERP AND UNITED STATES MILITARY BUDGET

In the third place, the pact is needed to make possible substantial economies both under the European recovery plan and under our military budget.

As regards the European recovery plan, that plan is abnormally costly because it has to offset fear, which paralyzes constructive effort, and disunity, which curtails economic possibilities.

Fear is rampant in western Europe. Those who are best informed do not believe that Soviet leaders actually intend an armed invasion of Europe. But Communists, in France for example, gain adherents by spreading rumors that the Red Army will soon march in. Premier Queuille told me that he estimated that nearly half of the members of the large French Communist Party had joined up merely to gain security as against that risk. Many in Europe have been thinking of how, in an emergency, to get out and how to hide away some resources abroad. Few have been concentrating on long-range creative effort.

Also, the disunity of the countries of western Europe seriously curtails their economic opportunity. There are no single markets big enough to justify the great capital investments needed to produce goods cheaply for large-scale consumption.

The Atlantic Pact should do much to abolish fear, and the Atlantic Pact plus the European recovery plan can provide a great impulse toward increased unity. That should pave the way to reducing the cost and the duration of the European recovery plan.

As regards arms expenditure, the pact should also make it possible to cut that. On the one hand its political commitment of one for all and all for one greatly reduces the risk of war. On the other hand, it combines for defense the military resources and facilities of 12 nations. It means that from now on, for example, the navy available to defend the United States is not only the United States Navy, but a combined United States, British, and French Navy. Similarly, there would be combined air and land forces and common facilities. The most effective collective defense will probably require us to build up military establishments abroad, particularly on the Continent, where a dangerous vacuum exists. But the cost of that should be more than offset by economies made possible by the pooling of defense resources.

I am well aware of the present need for a strong Military Establishment. But I am also aware of the need to avoid a rate of unproductive expenditure that may itself destroy the free institution it is designed to preserve. The political commitments of this pact appreciably reduce the risk of war. Also, the pact combines, for common defense, the resources of some 350,000,000 people. Many, here and abroad, will be skeptical that the pact is indeed a peace measure if it is made an occasion for increasing military expenditures. The pact ought to make a beginning toward realizing the Atlantic Charter promise "to lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament."

RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TREATY

I have spoken of some of the reasons for the Atlantic Pact. Of course, with every great enterprise there are risks and disadvantages.
I think these should be seen and not covered up, because the risks are of such a character that if seen they can be guarded against.

In that respect I would say that first of all the pact should not be operated primarily as a military instrument.

**WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE**

There are those who believe that war with the Soviet Union is inevitable and that we must now concentrate on gaining tactical and strategic advantages which will help us to win that war when it comes. They would use the pact in that spirit.

I do not question the sincerity of those who hold such beliefs, but for myself I utterly reject them. I do not know of any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this Government or any other government, who believes that the Soviet now plans conquest by open military aggression. They have other and more efficient methods. If, for example, Soviet leadership, without using the Soviet Army, can win in China all that Japan there fought for so desperately and so futilely, why should Soviet leaders start a shooting war?

But if our international affairs are conducted on the assumption that war is inevitable, that fact alone will make it inevitable. Therefore, I consider it of the utmost importance that the pact should not be operated primarily as an instrument of military policy designed to win a particular war.

Of course, common defense is a usual and legitimate reason for people drawing together. One reason for the formation of our United States was that it made it possible, as said in the Federalist Papers, to "apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part." But a purely military alliance is not conducive to peace. I hope that the Senate may see fit to register its hope that the Atlantic Pact will be operated, not as a military instrument, but as a step in a political evolution that has behind it a long and honorable history and before it a great and peaceful future.

**NO DIVISION OF WORLD INTO SPHERES**

The Atlantic and Rio Pacts should not be understood as tacit offers to divide the world with Soviet communism.

There is danger that these two pacts, each delineating a geographical area that cannot be attacked with impunity, will be interpreted to mean that the only major concerns of the United States are with the American Hemisphere and North Atlantic areas and that so long as they are free from attack, we are relatively indifferent to what occurs elsewhere. This interpretation, in the eyes of some, seems confirmed by our conduct in relation to the events of the Far East.

I do not believe that the lines that demark the American and Atlantic areas, shown here in your booklet, are intended to demark the limits of our vital interest, and I feel sure that that ought not to be the case. Twenty-five years ago Stalin said:

The road to victory of the revolution in the west lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries.

He particularly mentioned China and India in this connection. We ought not to forget those words; at least, we ought not to forget them.
so long as they remain an integral part of the Soviet Communist "bible."

I know that the administration is aware of the risk of which I allude and that the President and Secretary of State have recently reasserted the concern of the United States with areas other than those marked out by the Rio and Atlantic Pacts. I believe, however, that the Congress may usefully reinforce that view and help to obviate a miscalculation so dangerous that, if it were allowed to persist, it might undo all the good otherwise potential in the pact.

**NO BYPASSING OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

Again, Mr. Chairman, the pact should not inaugurate a system of group consultations which would destroy the value of the United Nations as the "town meeting of the world."

There are some who argue that the Atlantic Treaty violates the United Nations Charter. I see no merit in that argument, assuming, as I do assume, that the pact is not an artificial military alliance, but a stage in a process of natural political growth. The Charter cannot stop such growth, and it does not attempt to do so.

The pact might, however, gravely impair the usefulness of the United Nations if consultations under its article 4 committed the pact members, or crystallized their views, in advance of United Nations discussion. The risk is greater because the occasions for consultation under article 4 are not merely "attacks" in the "Atlantic area" dealt with by article 5, but threats anywhere to any of the parties. Since the parties have interests and possessions throughout the world, the consultations under article 4 might relate to matters of deep concern to friendly nations of Asia, Africa, the Near East, the Pacific, and the Americas.

The United States does have a community with the west, but we have other communities as well and so many look to us for leadership that we ought not to seem to play favorites. Also, if we really believe in the United Nations, we shall, on matters which are within United Nations jurisdiction, give its processes an opportunity to influence our thought and conduct before making up our mind.

The United Nations, while weak in many respects, has shown a real capacity, through debate and exposure, to develop moral judgments that actually influence the conduct of member nations. The United Nations ought not to be weakened in this, its greatest field of usefulness.

I am confident that those who drew up the Atlantic Pact did not intend that consultations under it should encroach on the efficacy of the United Nations. But it might be useful if the Senate, in connection with the ratification of the pact, reaffirmed, as it did last year, the policy of the United States to use the United Nations to the full extent of its possibilities.

**DANGER OF RELIANCE ON MATERIAL THINGS**

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the pact should not lead the American people to feel that their primary reliance is in material things. There is danger that concentration of attention upon the military aspects of the pact, following closely the authorization of new eco-
For economic appropriations under the European recovery plan, my lead the American people to feel that material things are all-important. That would be a gross miscalculation. Napoleon said that in war the material counted for one-quarter and the nonmaterial for the other three-quarters. I suppose that the disparity is even greater in a "cold" war. Certainly, events seem to prove that. Soviet communism uses largely two imponderables, hope and fear. It offers leadership to the discontented and the idealists who want to change radically the existing order, and it tries to frighten into inaction those who oppose such change. Through playing on men's hope and fears Soviet leadership has won great victories.

There was a time when the western democracies were honored throughout the world because of their dynamic pursuit of liberty, equality, and fraternity; their great experiments in political freedom and their inventiveness in providing human labor with better tools. Our American people played a leading part in that, although materially we were then a weak and debtor nation and virtually without military power. But then we were carrying on the "great American experiment", as it was known throughout the world—the great American experiment in human freedom.

It is time to recapture those qualities. For most men are not interested in defending the status quo merely because communism attacks it. They want a part in what is dynamic and creative.

We have made a beginning. The European recovery plan has given us our greatest success, not because it threw a great weight of dollars to sustain what is, but because it sought something new. The Atlantic Pact should be imbued with that framework for constructive programs that will catch men's imagination and enlist their support.

We Americans know the great possibilities that reside in Europe. Most of us derive from Europe. We have taken from Europe the conception that the individual is the highest unit of earthly value and that has made our institutions what they are. We have long shared with Europe the richness of a society that encourages individual diversification and experimentation. Our Nation would not be what it is had it not been for the Magna Carta, the industrial revolution, and the declaration of the rights of man. We want Europe, which has produced so much, to find in new unity the strength, the courage and the hope needed to make that land again a land of economic, intellectual, and spiritual richness. We want that, not merely for Europe's sake, but for the sake of all of us. Also we want western Europe to be the mighty magnet that will set up an irresistible attraction which will gradually break down the artificial barriers that now dangerously divide east and west.

That, I take it, is our vision: and because the Atlantic Pact can help to make it real, I support that pact.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROGRESS OF ECA

The Chairman. Mr. Dulles, I notice in your testimony that you make reference a time or two to the ECA. May I ask what your general observations are, from your contacts in the United Nations, respecting the success or the nonsuccess of the ECA so far as it has progressed to date?
Mr. Dulles. I think that the ECA has done extremely well to date. So far, however, it has operated primarily as a relief operation, you might say, and I do not think it has yet completed the more constructive fundamental reforms in Europe which are needed for permanent recovery, but it has made a very good start.

The Chairman. Is it not true, though—and you spoke quite eloquently on the subject of material matters—that in addition to the material aid which it gives to Europe toward rebuilding its economy it does have very great value as evidence of the interest of the United States and its people in the substantial recovery of Europe and the strengthening of the forces in the countries that are associated with us in the ECA?

Mr. Dulles. It has made possible a great revival of hope in Europe. Certainly conditions in Europe now are much better than they were 2 years ago, and that improvement can be ascribed very largely, in my opinion, to the European recovery plan. Of course, most of the individual people in Europe are rather unaware of the extent to which they are the beneficiaries of the European recovery plan, so that the influence in that respect of the United States upon the people is not as great as I wish it were. It has a great influence upon top people in government and business, but unfortunately the propaganda of Soviet communism reaches down to the rank and file of the people much more effectively than anything we do under the European recovery plan.

The Chairman. One reason for that, is it not true, is of its newness? They do not realize yet. And as time goes on will not that information gradually seep down through the whole public, rather than be confined to governmental authorities? In other words, if, as a result of the ECA, conditions improve in Europe, will they not finally learn to trace that back to what we have done for them in the United States?

Mr. Dulles. I hope so, but I am not confident of that, Senator, because we deal through the ECA so much with governments. We supply wheat and flour, but the governments sell it for a going price in the market and the individual does not feel that he is getting his wheat free from the United States, or his bread free.

The Chairman. He knows he is getting his wheat, though.

Mr. Dulles. Yes, but he does not have any idea where it is coming from. It is hard to correct that. I think it is seeping down to some extent, but not to the extent which I would hope.

Immediate Action in Event of Attack

The Chairman. I notice in one paragraph in your statement you say, "The proposed treaty poses clearly the issue of certainty and immediacy." If I understand your terms, you mean the immediate necessity for acting in case of an armed attack by an aggressor, that the treaty emphasizes that and makes our joint action applicable to that sort of situation. Is that correct?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir. I used the word in, I think, the same sense that this committee used it a year ago. I tried to catch the spirit of what this committee said, and I think I was in agreement with that.

The Chairman. In other words, under the treaty it will not be so easy for an aggressor to pick off one by one of the weaker countries without action by the remaining members of this treaty.
Mr. Dulles. That is the case. In the First World War and the Second World War we took about 2 years to make up our minds, during which the aggressor had great opportunity to make great gains. I would expect that this treaty would bring about an awareness in the mind of any potential aggressor that it would not have a couple of years to consolidate its position before we had carried through the great debate as to what we should do. If there is any doubt as to what we are going to do under those conditions, I think the time to debate that is now. We can afford the time to do it now; once a war starts, we can't afford to have that great debate, because it is too costly and the enemy gains too great an advantage.

The Chairman. Is it not also true that one of the main objectives of the treaty is to advise aggressors before they start an aggression that if they do start an aggression they will be faced with the combined opposition of all the signatories to this treaty, rather than a weak nation which they know they can easily overwhelm?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR EACH SIGNATORY

The Chairman. I was also interested in your statement that if there is an attack on one of these nations the Atlantic Treaty says that the countermeasures to restore the security shall be such as each party deems necessary. The committee knows something of the origin of that language and of its being placed where it is. In other words, the treaty leaves to each nation, each country, the discretion of deciding what measures it deems necessary to meet the issue provoked by the armed attack. Is it not true that there might be a great variety of factors entering into the action and into the decision—the geographical location of the countries involved, and things of that kind? But the United States, for instance, would have the right to determine its own course and the particular method in which it would meet that situation in cooperation with the other signatories to the treaty. Is that correct?

Mr. Dulles. That is my understanding, that there would, of course, be consultation, but in the last analysis the United States decides for itself what part it takes in the common defense.

As you well know, during the last war there were some nations that were at war but it was generally agreed that they could make their greatest contribution not through contributing military contingents. That was particularly true of some of the South American countries who were able to do more in an economic way than they could have done in a military way. Obviously the treaty does not attempt, in my opinion, to prescribe any military plan of action. As I said, it would be folly if the treaty were interpreted as meaning that because a certain country attacks in a certain particular way we have to respond in that particular place and in that particular manner. There is a flexibility about our strategy, which the treaty fully preserves, in my opinion.

The Chairman. What you might properly add to that is that the treaty does not impose upon the United States any automatic obligation of going to war or declaring war on a great number of those occasions which we might otherwise; is that true?

Mr. Dulles. Certainly the treaty does not impose any automatic duty to declare war.
The Chairman. That is what I mean. Of course, also, as I say, the decision as to whether or not there is war is a decision which is primarily made by the attacking party, and not by the party that is attacked.

ATTITUDE OF NON-SOVET STATES IN EUROPE

I would like to ask you this question: Would you have any evidence or opinion that the signatures by these cosigners of this treaty will meet any resistance in countries in Europe other than those that have already spoken out on the subject? In other words, would this treaty be more or less accepted by the other European powers, leaving out the Soviet Union, which has already protested vigorously against the treaty?

Mr. Dulles. Do you mean, do I anticipate difficulty in the ratification of the pact by the other signatories?

The Chairman. No; I don't mean that. I mean the nonsignatories, other countries in Europe outside of the Soviet and its satellites. There is no opposition, is there, to speak of, that you know of?

Mr. Dulles. No. I don't know of any great criticism of the pact outside of the Soviet bloc. I have had contact with the United Nations Assembly here with the representatives of virtually all of the nations of the world, and the pact has been discussed a good deal and I have not found any sentiment running against the pact except in the Soviet bloc.

The Chairman. That is what I was directing attention to. There is no concern that it is an aggressive pact as against any of the nations of Europe, except from the Soviet Union and its satellites; is that correct?

Mr. Dulles. I think there is an assumption that it will not be operated as an aggressive pact. There is a little concern about that, but no great concern.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF TREATY

The Chairman. You have studied the treaty, of course. Is there anything in the treaty that has any objective or purpose other than that of the common defense of this territory? Is there any suggestion of aggression on the part of the treaty signers, or of conquest, or of overextending their influence or authority, except to preserve the peace?

Mr. Dulles. There is certainly nothing in the language of the pact to suggest that. But I have had too much experience with international treaties and pacts to be wholly satisfied that one can tell by reading them just what is going to happen under them, and I personally think that it is important to make sure that the intent is to carry out that spirit of the pact. There are some people who believe that the best defense is an offense, and that they can interpret a pact which calls for defense as leading to offense. There have been a great many defensive pacts and nonaggression pacts to which the Soviet Union was a party, and they did not operate that way at all.

I am quite sure we have no intention of doing that, but, as I say here, I think that the pact should be operated, and no doubt it will be operated, by people who believe that war is not inevitable and that this
pact is an instrument for peace and not an instrument for the winning of a future war.

EMPHASIS ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF TREATY

The Chairman. You mentioned arms. As I get your idea, it is that we should not emphasize or overestimate the treaty as a military instrumentality; we should not play up the military parts of it, is that correct?

Mr. Dulles. I think that if the intent of the treaty is carried out, with respect to developing a common defense, that is the most important military aspect of the pact; namely, whether the existing resources and facilities of the 12 nations will effectively be usable as a unit for common defense. If we can produce that result, then, in my opinion, the aggregate of those military resources and facilities is so great that it would permit us, I believe, to cut down very materially upon the expenditures we would otherwise have to make if our only defense was our own Military Establishment.

Now, I believe in the process that it is important to increase somewhat the military strength that exists in Europe. I am not a military person, of course, but I have talked with a great many, and the impression that I have is that it is not going to be possible to develop a military land force on the continent of Europe for a good many years which would be a serious obstacle to Russian invasion if Russia decided to do that. On the other hand, there is a great psychological value in having a little more military establishment on the Continent than is the case at the present time. They feel naked, you might say, because they virtually have no military establishment at all, and I believe, for instance, that France would feel more self-reliant and would take a more constructive part in working out some of the problems, particularly the problem of Germany, if France had some military force of its own. I think that is of greater psychological value than of military value, although, as I say, I have to qualify that as not being my own opinion, because I am not a military authority, but I have talked with military people on the Continent, both American and French and British, and that, in my opinion, is the consensus of their judgment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. Is it not true that one of the values of the treaty is the psychological effect, not only on the signatories but to possible aggressors, the unity of action, and so on?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

The Chairman. I made a very extravagant statement some time ago. I said that the treaty would be a valuable contribution even though there were no arms program under it at all, because the potentialities are there. An aggressor would know that the United States and other signatories, while maybe not acting immediately with arms aid and other things would have the possibility to go ahead much more promptly than we did in World War I and World War II. I do not advocate that. I am for the arms program.

Mr. Dulles. I entirely agree with you, Senator Connally. It has been often said, and perhaps this committee has said it, and I know
at least some of the members of the committee have said it, that if it
had been known in 1914 that the United Kingdom would go to war
if Germany attacked France, and if it had been known in 1939 that
the United States would go to war if Hitler attacked France and
England, probably those wars would not have occurred.

Of course, we all know that in 1941 England was without military
strength. We also know that in 1939 the United States was without
actual military strength. Nevertheless we all feel that because of
their potential military strength, if it had been known that they would
go into the war the war might not have occurred, and that seems to
me to illustrate the point that you make, that while the military
aspect is, of course, important, the potential military strength is most
important, coupled with confidence that it would be used.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles.

COMPARISON WITH PAST MILITARY ALLIANCES

Just one other question, and then I will leave you to the other
members. There is a charge by some people, at least, that this has
the character of a military alliance. You are a great historian and
are familiar with foreign relations over many hundreds of years.
It is our contention, and that of those associated with us, that this
is in no way a military alliance in the sense of the military alliances
of the past 100 years. This treaty is purely one of defense. It
does not contemplate conquest; it does not contemplate aggression.
And is it not true that most of the old military alliances, the Holy
Alliance and the alliances of Germany and the Central Powers in
World War I against the other powers more or less partook of a
league or an agreement that when one of the powers should go to war,
regardless of the reasons for or causes of the war, the others would
join. Their purposes were to strengthen themselves and to have
in view military action and conquest in some cases, and things of that
kind, that distinguish the military alliance from the present treaty?
I would like to have your views on that.

Mr. DULLES. I do not interpret this as a military alliance. If I
thought it were a military alliance I would oppose it unqualifiedly.

The distinction, it seems to me, is this, that as you say, most military
alliances are made between powers as a matter of temporary expediency
in pursuit of some particular ambition that one or the other of them
has. This is a treaty for the common defense which grows out of a
common unity and a disposition to have a common defense as has
been demonstrated historically on at least two great occasions within
the last 35 years, and as I say, to me it formalizes a reality in a way
which makes that reality more effective, more pregnant with meaning,
and more significant and more peaceful, because by formalizing it
it carries more effective notice of potential aggressors and it gives a
sense of unity and hope and opportunity for growth to the parties
to the pact.

COMPATIBILITY WITH UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The CHAIRMAN: Do you find any conflict between this treaty and
the United Nations or, on the other hand, does not this treaty specifi-
ally recognize the overriding authority of the United Nations, and the fact that the treaty is being made in subordination to the authority of the United Nations?

Mr. Dulles. I do not consider there is any conflict at all between this treaty, the Atlantic Pact, and the United Nations Charter. I draw that conclusion not from the fact that the opening words of the Atlantic Treaty pay deference to the United Nations Charter. You could draw up a treaty which would have those words in it and which in substance would be in conflict with it. The thing, as I see it, is that this Atlantic Pact is a stage in a political evolution of a certain political grouping. During the last few days the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have been meeting in London to decide about their relationships between themselves, and I have not heard anybody in the world suggest that the working out of that relationship with the British Commonwealth is a question which cut across in any way, or was subject to, the provisions of the United Nations Charter, because that is a natural political growth and evolution. If this treaty were essentially a military alliance, then I wouldn't care how many times it paid deference to the United Nations Charter; I would think in substance it would be violative of its spirit, if not of its words, but because I believe it is a normal political evolution, a drawing together for common defense of people who do have a community of interest, I do not think that the United Nations Charter operates against it at all.

Of course you know, from San Francisco—you and Senator Vandenberg, who worked so ardently on the thing—that it was very much in our minds that the Charter of the United Nations should not prevent things of this sort.

The CHAIRMAN. You were active in this matter?

Mr. Dulles. I helped you and Senator Vandenberg, I think, in drawing up article 51.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, you make a statement about the United Nations. You say, in article VI of your statement—

The United Nations, while weak in many respects, has shown a real capacity, through debate and exposure, to develop moral judgments that actually influence the conduct of member nations. The United Nations ought not to be weakened in this, its greatest field of usefulness.

I agree with you in that, and I want to say I am glad to have your view about the United Nations. While I personally have been disappointed because of some of its developments, because at San Francisco we all assumed that the great powers would cooperate and go along together, and while that has not been possible under the practices of the United Nations, still I do not desire to withhold from the United Nations the fact that it has accomplished many things. You point your finger to it when you speak of its real capacity in debate and exposure to develop moral judgments.

I think one of the chief values of the United Nations is its provision whereby member nations can drag out into the open controversial questions and turn the white light of publicity upon them, and to influence
thereby the nations not only participating, but the formation of public opinion of the world. Is that not true?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

I am greatly impressed by the fact that the United Nations, and particularly through its Assembly, does exert a great influence upon the actual conduct of the nations. I know so far as the United States is concerned that we have hardly ever taken a proposition in the United Nations but what we have changed it as a result of the debate and discussion and the views of other people that we heard there.

DANGER OF BYPASSING THE UNITED NATIONS

There has been no particular public discussion, so far as I know, about the scope of this article 4 of the Atlantic Pact. That could be operated, in my opinion, to cut the heart out of the United Nations. I do not think it is intended, but if it means a little group of nations representing the west are going to get together privately and make up their minds about the matters which affect the whole world, and come to the United Nations with the prearranged positions, that will take the whole value out of the United Nations, and particularly out of the United Nations Assembly, and I think it is extremely important to have that matter clarified so that the members of this Atlantic Treaty, if matters come up affecting the Far East, for example—well, that could be a matter for discussion under article 4, because, let’s say, the United Kingdom has possessions in the Far East. It has Hong Kong. Suppose there is a threat to Hong Kong and we get together and have a little group discussion of the Western Powers about what to do with the great events that are occurring in the Far East. If this little group of Western Powers then comes to the United Nations, having discussed matters of very general concern, with a preconceived position, that would take out of the United Nations its greatest possibility of value through having a general discussion, and I hope and believe that it is not the intention to operate these consultations out of article 4 in a spirit to cut the heart out of the United Nations.

The Chairman. I may say it is not the purpose of this committee to follow such a course but, as a matter of fact, even in the absence of article 4, they might do it now.

Mr. Dulles. They might do it anyway.

The Chairman. Under the United Nations Charter they could get together and form little groups, but that is what we are trying to prevent. It says:

The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.

That is undertaking, at least by limitation, to narrow the scope of any such consultations to preserving the integrity and freedom of the nations signatories to this treaty, but it gives them no more power than to consult. The treaty nowhere gives them any other authority except when one of them is the subject of an armed attack. Is that not true?

Mr. Dulles. That is quite true, except that this treaty does set up a consultative procedure and formalizes a consultative procedure which could be pretty broad, and I merely put up a red flag at that point, because I think it is a point which needs to be watched.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you are entirely correct, and so far as the committee is concerned, I feel sure that we thoroughly agree with you. This is nothing in this treaty and nothing under this treaty that will be in any wise called into operation that might impede or hinder the operations of the United Nations, and as I recall it now, there is a clause in this treaty, article 7, reading—

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

That clause was inserted in the treaty to do what you hope will be done, to preserve the integrity of the United Nations and to admonish the members that what we do shall be done in subordination to the overriding powers of the United Nations. Do you agree with that view?

Mr. Dulles. I agree with the view that that is probably the intent of that article.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I thank you very much. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate Mr. Dulles upon what I think is a very brilliant statement, one of the best I have heard in many a day. I know he is pressed for time, because he has to return to the General Assembly of the United Nations this afternoon, and therefore I shall get out of the way for other members of the committee with just one inquiry which deals with this subject, the latest under discussion.

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4

I think this is the first time our attention has been drawn to article 4, and I rather agree with you that it could contain implications which certainly are not intended by its sponsors. You would not think, would you, Mr. Dulles, that there is anything in article 4 which would change in any way the limitation of obligation in respect to self-help and mutual aid within the geographical confines which the treaty itself sets up? You would not find, in article 4, any expansion of that obligation outside the area of the North Atlantic community as defined in the pact?

Mr. Dulles. Yes; I would. I am quite sure that it is not only the interpretation that I think the language carries, but I am quite certain that those in the State Department who drew up article 4 did it consciously, with the realization that the scope of article 4 is world wide, as contrasted with the Atlantic area described in article 5.

Senator Vandenberg. I do not make myself plain. There is nothing, is there, in article 4, however broad the interpretation may be which you apply to it, which in your opinion expands the area within which we are obligated to self-help and mutual aid?

Mr. Dulles. No; nothing at all.

Senator Vandenberg. I think it is important that that should be made plain.

I think it is also important that the other point you make regarding article 4 should be made totally plain, and I am asking you whether you think it would be sufficient in the committee report to make em-
phatically clear that the consultative jurisdiction is as limited as the balance of the pact. Would you consider it sufficient?

DANGER OF BLOCS WITHIN THE UN

Mr. Dulles. I think that could be adequately clarified in the committee report. I find in this Assembly work one of our greatest obstacles is the fact that certain groups of nations which think they have a rather special interest get together before the United Nations meets and comes to an agreed position. Then you have a debate and discussion which often changes the minds of several of the members of that group, and then they say, “Well, we are sorry; we can’t change our minds, because we are committed, and unless we are released we have to go through with it. We are sorry, but we have taken these prior commitments,” and I hope that the United States, with its tremendous responsibility as a world power and with its growing interest in Asia and the growing feeling of unity, let’s say, between India and the United States, and that has grown greatly in the last 2 or 3 years—we don’t want to let these nations feel that we are still just a Western Power. We are a Western Power. We have a community with the west which we can properly recognize, as we do, by this pact; but we are also a world power, and a nation like India is entitled to our ear with respect to Far Eastern matters on a basis which is just as free to them as the United Kingdom is to have access to our ears about the great problems of the Far East. That is the reason I hope that nothing will be done under this consultative machinery which will seem to have us be playing favorites with a group of Western Powers with respect to matters which are world-wide in scope and which will interest nations even more than the problems of India and Pakistan, for example, receive the interest of the Western Powers.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. I want to preface a very few questions to you by a statement that I think your statement is an admirable one on this whole subject. It is a helpful one, also, to me with respect to a very troublesome problem that has, from the beginning, disturbed me somewhat.

INTERNAL REVOLUTION AS A THREAT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

But before we go there, referring to article 4, is it at all conceivable that a member of the North Atlantic Treaty or Pact might think that an internal revolution or disturbance within its own territory did threaten its political integrity or its geographic possessions and desire consultation?

Mr. Dulles. I would think that would be a very strained interpretation of the article.

Senator George. I know it is very strained, but you do anticipate that probably some member of this pact sooner or later will make some very strained construction of it, do you not?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator George. I think it is very helpful that you remind us of the fact that we ought to know that there isn’t any virtue in mere language. It is, after all, what you are going to do under the treaty that counts, and it is material.
Also, this article 4 provides for consultation, provides the machinery for it whenever there is a mere threat to the political integrity. It does not explicitly or expressly, in any part of the treaty, so far as I now recollect, bind us to do anything about it, but nevertheless if they can call us into conference and consultation because of a mere threat, and by a strained construction could even base that threat upon some internal revolution and disturbance within the territory of a member to the pact, it might be necessary to go a bit further than to put something in a report of this committee when we actually pass on this article 4.

I am not suggesting that at the moment, but I am suggesting the possibility that that might be necessary.

POSITION OF GERMANY

You point out, which I regard as most important, that this treaty makes it possible for Germany to find the way out of its present situation, and very forcefully you fortify that position. It has always been most disturbing to me to think that you do very much for the peace and security of western Europe at this present juncture in the affairs of the world, with Germany left entirely out of the picture. And yet, of course, it is a very difficult thing to get the members of this pact, if Germany should ever become a member, actively or nonactively, limited or general, to feel very secure if Germany was actually permitted to regain not merely economic strength but some military strength.

I am curious to know, do you think that this might be a way out for Germany? I know that is posing a pretty large order, but it is here.

Mr. Dulles. I would not think, Senator George, that the question of the admission of Germany to the Atlantic Pact ought to come up at any time that we are now thinking about, say 5 years or more, at least. It is hard to say what might happen eventually. But the immediate problem in my opinion is, let us say, the inclusion of Germany in the Council of Europe, or in some other form of European unity that might be devised. I think that some action of that sort is absolutely essential if we are going to have peace in Europe and, indeed, if we are going to save the free institutions of Europe, because Germany is in a remarkably strong bargaining position between the east and the west. And if the Germans should decide to throw in their lot temporarily, at least, with the Soviet Union, there would be nothing left on the Continent of Europe that we could hold. The very psychological effect of that would give the Communist Parties in France and Belgium and so forth such influence that they would probably automatically almost take over.

Therefore, it is absolutely vital that we find a place for Germany which will be reasonably satisfactory and hopeful for Germany within, as I say, the orbit of the west, and not drive Germany into the arms of the Soviet Union, which would be a process which would wipe out everything we have done under the European recovery plan, not to speak of what we did in the last war. We would lose Europe if that happened. Therefore we must find a place for Germany.

Now, the other side of the picture is that Germany still is so strong potentially, with its 70,000,000 people there. There are more Germans
in Germany now than there were before the war, because the Germans that were scattered around in Poland and Czechoslovakia and so forth have now all been concentrated in Germany. You have a high concentration there which is really dangerous, because of the degree of concentration, and the little periphery of countries around it—France, Belgium, and Holland—are afraid to bring that strong, powerful, highly concentrated group of people into unity with them if that is all there is to it, because they feel they would be dominated by that, and they probably would be.

Therefore, in essence, they say, “We have got to be sure that the power and the strength, the economic resources, the military power, the prestige, of the United States is tied up with us so that the package is big enough so that we can bring Germany in without Germany dominating the pact.”

Senator George. I agree with you in all that you have said, or substantially, at least, with all you have said. I was intrigued by your statement, in effect, of the assurance that could be given to France, for instance, that Germany’s presence in the western orbit in some way would not be disturbing if we were also a member of the pact.

**POSSIBLE FUTURE GERMAN AGGRESSION**

But then that brings this question: If Germany is within the western orbit, and if you can foresee a time when Germany is prepared to strike again and disposed to strike again, would that be an aggressor from without, as seems to be contemplated by the pact?

Mr. Dulles. Germany is not within the Atlantic area as now defined by the pact, so that if there—

Senator George. Not now, but we have the peace problem with Germany over and beyond this pact. We have to do something about it. I think you also very properly point out that while this pact does not affect the Far East, it is sort of a byproduct of the pact. Somebody in Europe and somebody elsewhere may say, “Are you concerned about what is going on in the Near East? Are you concerned, for instance, about what is going to happen in Japan? Because, ultimately, we have to do something with or about Japan. That seems to me to be very clear because we have too much direct responsibility there, and we certainly cannot leave that situation dangling in the Far East without very great danger to the peace and security of the world.

So I am just thinking, and I cannot help but come back to the point, that it strikes me that we are not going to do much for the peace and security of Europe unless we can do something about Germany. The thing that can be done about Germany is not very clear to my way of thinking at this time.

**PEACEFUL INTENT OF THE TREATY**

Now I wanted to ask you a few things about the pact. I agree with you, and it is the only reason why I would support it, that this North Atlantic Treaty, by all of its express terms, is peaceful. It has a peaceful purpose and peaceful intent. It is defensive by all of its express terms. But I also agree with you that when you come to agreements even among men, and particularly when you come to agree-
ments between nations, you have to look much beyond the mere lan-
guage and the poetry in which you may have phrased your agree-
ment. And I wish now to ask you if this is not true, that without
any regard whatever to the language that is used, the express lan-
guage in the pact, should a terrific armaments race commence in
Europe, will it be possible to convince the world that the object of
this pact is purely peaceful, entirely peaceful, and wholly defensive
in nature and character? In other words, does not the armament
program directly affect the intention of the parties to this agreement,
whatever we may say in the agreement? If Europe is overarmed
and aided and assisted by us to overarm, it occurs to me, and I think
you cannot be in great disagreement with the view, that regardless
of any language in the pact, the real intent would be disclosed by what
we were doing under it.

Mr. Dulles. I do not think that there is any practical risk of what
you call overarming Europe. That is a very long and very expensive
operation.

Senator George. I know that is very remote.

FUTURE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Mr. Dulles. But I would say this, Senator, that to my mind, in a
sense the acid test as to the peaceful purpose of this pact is whether
on the over-all basis, we begin to make some reduction of armament.
Here is a pact which, as I say, does two things, if it does what its
proponents claim for it. On the one hand it greatly reduces the risk
of war; on the other hand it puts together the resources of 350,000,000
people for common defense. There has never been anything like that
in the world before.

If our purpose is peaceful, and on the one hand we, by this pact,
increase the likelihood of peace, and on the other hand greatly in-
crease the assets available for common defense, then I think we ought
to begin rather quickly to make some reduction in our own military
expenditures, and I think that if that were done, that would prove
to all the world the peaceful intent of this pact, that it is not designed
to create an armaments race, it is not getting ready for war, not get-
ing ready to dominate the world purely by military power. But if,
after we have greatly reduced the risk of war, after we have, by a
single stroke, added, let us say, a million and a half tons of United
Kingdom fine naval ships to the common defense, we then go on and
still pile on us billions in terms of military armament, then I think the
pact will be looked upon as a military instrument and not a peace
instrument.

Senator George. That has been my view of it, Mr. Dulles. I may
say that I recognize this pact, by its express terms, as being motivated
by a desire for peace, and I recognize also that there isn't anything
necessarily implicit in the treaty that would make it a military instru-
mentation. But it is very easy to convert a peaceful charter or pact,
or should I say “pervert” it, into a military one, and it depends en-
tirely on what you are going to do. And it seems to me, therefore, that
not only is an armament program not a necessary corollary to this
North Atlantic Pact. If an armament program, however, does come
along and an implementing act is passed which places a great deal of
emphasis upon the rebuilding of arms in Europe, and at the same
time we are not checking but expanding our defensive program here,
let us say, for we always do regard our efforts as defensive, of course,
we will have much difficulty in convincing the world over a long pe­
riod of time that this is a wholly defensive measure that we are taking
here.

I find in it the machinery set up for quite a number of things that
probably some members of the North Atlantic Pact will be insisting on
 carrying out, not only in article 4 but elsewhere in it. The suggestion
is very strong that we may be brought together to discuss, and pre­
sumably discussion implies some appropriate action may follow, the
hardening of opinions which subsequently would be embarrassing in
the United Nations or the Security Council, or in any of the agencies
of the United Nations. Actually that consultative machinery is set
up and provided expressly here. It is very difficult to escape the
strong implication that at least some appropriate action may be taken
as a result of consultations in the face of some threat.

**EMPHASIS ON EUROPE**

I think that your statement, as I have already said, is a very strong
one, and I think it does point the way out for Germany in this treaty.
I am equally impressed that we are going to have to find some way out
for Japan, although Japan is not in this at all, but is a byproduct of
an agreement which deals with belligerents and associates in the last
war. It can be pretty forcefully said that in view of the importance
of the Far East we have some indifference to what may be taking place
there. Indeed our former ally may reach the conclusion that all
the efforts that we make are to help Europe, and may say, "The United
States is not concerned about what goes on in the Far East."

That is just an unfortunate byproduct of the thing. It is not in this,
of course.

Mr. Dulles. The greatest single danger, in my opinion, in the
Atlantic Treaty, is the fact that it draws geographic lines, and it is
extremely difficult to avoid inferences being drawn from that fact, and
when you draw lines like this and say "You can't step across those lines
without getting into trouble," all right; then the fellow says, "Well,
so long as I don't step across the line, is it all right?" And what do
you say?

As I say, that is the greatest danger, and that is a danger which it
will take great skill and effort to obviate, but this will be looked upon
in effect as a tacit offer to divide the world, and in effect say to the
Soviet Union, "Well, our two preserves are this Hemisphere, the
American, and western Europe. You can't attack those with im­
punity. But we are not saying anything about the rest."

If that is what it means, that will encourage them to feel that they
can do anything they like in the rest of the world, and if that is not
our intent, that encouragement, that unintended encouragement, which
may result from the pact, may lead to aggression outside of these areas
which may make war more likely. That is the big problem, as I see
it; the political problem that flows from the pact, and it will take, I
believe, the wisdom both of the administration and of the Senate to
make sure that inferences of that sort are not drawn, which, while
we decrease the risk of war from events within the Atlantic area
and the war, we may increase the risk of war from events outside of
those areas.

Senator George. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. Mr. Dulles, I want to join my associates in compli­
menting you on a very helpful and constructive statement.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE PACT

In your judgment, is there any alternative except to join in the pact?

Mr. Dulles. I think that the failure of ratification of the pact
would be a disaster of inexpressible proportions which would almost
surely increase greatly the risk of war. That does not mean you have
to ratify the pact without any expression of opinion, without attempt­
ing to influence the course of conduct which will take place under
the pact. I have indicated quite a few views of that sort.

But I would say this, that a failure of ratification of the pact
would strike such fear into the hearts of the people of Europe, and
such encouragement to the people of the Soviet Union, that I think
that very act would lost for us at a single stroke all our friends and
allies in the free institutions of Europe.

Senator Wiley. Thank you.

MORALE IN EUROPE

I was very much interested in that part of your statement about
what we might call almost a spiritual rebirth among the downtrodden
of Europe. Would you care to amplify that and show how that
very situation will add strength and direction to the pact and to the
operation thereof? I got from your statement the idea that our aid
gave courage and hope, and has to a large extent not only built up
the material wealth of the people but it has given them a sort of
spiritual cocktail, and given them what we all need, I guess. Is that
correct?

Mr. Dulles. It has done a great deal along that line.

Spiritual cocktail? Some of the church people do not believe you
can have a spiritual cocktail.

Senator Wiley. What do you think about it?

Mr. Dulles. I think so.

The point I was making, and the point I think you want to empha­
size, is that relief which is purely material, in the form of a dole,
does very little good. It may keep people bodily alive for another
24 hours or so, but life without hope and spirit is hardly worth while.
And, also, merely keeping people alive on a dole basis does nothing
at all to curtail the influence of communism among them. They want
to be engaged in production, create things, and the important thing
is that in everything we do we should tie it up, in my opinion, with
some kind of an ideal that will catch their imagination.

IMPORTANCE OF SPIRITUAL INSPIRATION

I was greatly impressed last winter in France. I was out in the
country with a friend and a group of French young boys went by.
They were shooting rabbits, I think. They were fine, strapping look-
ing fellows, as nice a group of young men as I have ever seen in France, and the friend who was with me said, "Those are all Communists."

I said to him, "Why are they Communists?"

He said, "Because communism gives them their only opportunity to work dynamically and creatively and to create better conditions in France."

That is where communism is getting its strength, and what we do has got to be not just passing out to people a certain number of ounces of bread a day to keep them alive, but we have got to gear our material support into ideas that catch their imagination and indicate that they can help build something new and better.

That has begun in Europe. Europe is a far more hopeful area than it was when I was there 2 years ago. That is very largely because of the help we have given, the inspiration we have given, and because of the fact that particularly under the European recovery plan it has been geared up to some new processes. They have new organizations at work. There is a beginning of unity in Europe. They are beginning to see possibilities in working out cooperatively, let us say, with Africa, where there are tremendous underdeveloped resources. They have all been thinking in terms of the East and West. Well, they cannot see much future in terms of the East and West. They have to think more in terms of North and South, and they find in Africa a kind of hinterland of Europe the way our West was to this country a few generations ago.

Things like that are instilling hope in them, and what we do we must realize has got to be not merely to help by giving them bread, not merely to help by giving them doles, but it all has to be geared to something which is going to capture their imaginations and raise their hopes.

Senator Wiley. My question is, then, that you do see a great spiritual awakening which did not exist several years ago?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. There is an esprit de corps which did not exist 2 or 3 years ago?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Senator Wiley. Does that mean, if and when the pact becomes a reality, there is a unity of spirit among the comakers and ourselves, that we are not simply the granary and provision merchant, but that there is, because of this rebirth, a gradual unification of the minds and hearts and souls of these people with ourselves?

Mr. Dulles. I think there is that, Senator, but that is not the kind of thing which you can do just by signing a treaty. It means that people like you and others have to speak and work for it. Maybe your committee report can bring that out.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

Senator Wiley. Just one other question: I wish you would give us a little more concretely your own ideas as to what extent there should be this arms implementation to the pact. You have told us very clearly that there is a possibility of a great misunderstanding if we
go to a certain extent. I think you imply, as many people imply, that
the pact itself would operate as a great torchlight to the world, that
here is a unified force that means business. What should we do
toward implementing it?

Mr. DULLES. Well, the pact calls for, as I see it, a common defense, a
collective defense. What does that mean? That means you look over
your assets and then you try to find out where they can be located to
the best advantage. That is essentially a military task.

I do not know, as a resident of the State of New York, whether there
are any troops in the State of New York or not, or what the defense
is. I never worried about whether there was a distinctive defense of
the State of New York. I have assumed that there was an effective
defense of the United States, and the State of New York is part of
the whole; therefore, I never concerned myself about the State of New
York, and I assume the residents of the State of Wisconsin or Califor­
nia, and so forth, all feel the same. We never think in terms of a
defense in being in each particular State.

I think after this pact comes into force we can think of defense in
somewhat those terms. We have a total defense, and if this pact re­
quires us to build up a national defense in each of the 12 countries so
that each of the 12 countries will alone be able to defend itself and
carry on a successful war, of course that is utter folly.

Now, in considering a total defense of the area there would, I sup­
pose, have to be given consideration to the desirability of having a
certain amount of military strength on the Continent of Europe. It
may be better to have it there than have it somewhere else. I cannot
judge the military factors. I can judge the psychological factors, and
as I said, I am quite sure that the morale in France would be consid­
erably improved if there were some appreciable French Army.
France has been used to having an Army for a long time, and when
they do not have an Army they feel kind of naked in the world, and
if they could see a few soldiers marching back and forth with some
modern equipment and all, their morale would be much better, and
they probably would be more sensible when it came to talking about
the problem of Germany, and so forth. And I can see reason for hav­
ing some increased strength in France, but I would say that I would
totally reject the idea that this pact requires us to develop separate na­
tional defenses in each of the 12 countries. It permits of a combined
defense, and because it permits of a combined defense ought to make
the aggregate cost of defense very much less than if you did have a
separate 12-nation national defense.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, I understand, from information that
has been transmitted to me, that you have to leave at 12:50.

Mr. DULLES. I had hoped to catch a 1:30 plane so as to be back at
some debates at Lake Success at 3 o'clock which it would be useful
for me to be at. I would be glad, if the committee wants to hold me
longer, to telephone New York and find out the condition of those
debates on the calendar.

The CHAIRMAN. You do hope to be there at the 3 o'clock session?

Mr. DULLES. I hope to catch the 1:30 plane.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Senator Green?
MORAL OBLIGATION TO DECLARE WAR

Senator Green. Your opening statement and subsequent testimony have been so comprehensive and so clear that little needs to be added, although there is one point you made that it seems to me might be amplified to the advantage of those of us who believe in the pact, and that is this: The argument against the pact is sometimes made that under article 5 an armed attack against any other nation signatory is an attack against us, and although there is no legal obligation under the pact for Congress to declare war, and under our Constitution it alone can declare war, yet there is a moral obligation because there is nothing else we can do.

You have very well said that in our history there are other measures which have been chosen other than the declaration of war or the recognition of an existing war, and I think it would be very well, in order to meet that criticism, if you would state for the record what these measures have been in the past, and what measures could be used in the future to show that Congress has a choice, and need not necessarily declare war.

Mr. Dulles. Well, it would be a rather long order, Mr. Senator, for me to recite all of the facts.

Senator Green. Some of them.

MEASURES SHORT OF WAR

Mr. Dulles. Some American official planes were shot down by Yugoslavia not long ago. That situation was dealt with through diplomatic channels and through the paying of indemnity, and did not involve us in war.

The Panay was bombed and sunk by a Japanese plane in 1937 or '38. Of course, we did eventually go to war against Japan. They attacked us in a way that forced war some 3 or 4 years later. But the Panay incident did not lead to war.

British gunboats have been shot and many people killed a few days ago on the Yangtze River. Nobody thinks that is going to lead to war.

The essential, Senator, in my mind, is this, that if this is a defensive pact, as I think it is, war is going to come about not because we declare war but because somebody else makes war. In other words, the choice between war and peace does not rest essentially with us. We have our Constitution, which deals with war and peace, but unfortunately that Constitution does not bind all the world and they are not bound by our rules about making war. They can make war if they want.

I recall the first conference that I attended—I was 19 years old—was the Hague Peace Conference, and I remember the Chinese delegate asked a question which at the time seemed rather amusing. He said, "Suppose one country wants to make war and the other fellow doesn't want to have war. Then what happens?"

He got a horse laugh out of that. We were dealing at that time with declarations of war and rights and duties and so forth. But the fact of the matter is that we have to judge war intent on the side of the other fellow, and if he chooses to make war upon us, nothing in our Constitution is going to keep us out of war.
Now, if it is a dubious case as to whether or not the other person is acting with war intent, then is where the question of judgment comes in, where the President has the responsibility, where the Congress has the responsibility. But if there is an attack with war intent, then Congress, I suspect, would do what it has mostly done, as I pointed out, namely, declared that a state of war existed.

**CHOICE OF MEASURES**

Senator Green. My point is that I think it is very desirable from the public standpoint to amplify the measures which might be taken as an alternative to war, either the declaration of war or the recognition of an existing war.

Mr. Dulles. So long as we have a choice, sir—the attacker may not give us any choice as to whether we have war or not, but if the nature of the attack is such that we have a choice—then obviously there is a whole series of measures in the way of breaking diplomatic relations, in the way of economic reprisals or threats of a blockade nature, and so forth. There is a whole series of measures short of war which are recognized in international law; they are recognized in the Rio Pact; they are recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. And so long as we have any choice we can use as pressure any one of those methods.

Senator Green. In other words, the Congress is under neither a legal nor a moral obligation, under this pact, to go to war just because an attack is made, an armed attack, against one of the other signatories.

Mr. Dulles. I agree with that.

Senator Green. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Dulles, I was very much impressed with your statement this morning. There are a great many questions I would like to ask you, but time has gone by so I will confine it to just one or two.

**COST OF ERP**

I notice on page 3 of your statement—incidentally, you have answered many questions that I was interested in—under (a) at the top of the page, that you make the statement.

The European recovery plan is abnormally costly because it has to offset fear, which paralyzes constructive effort, and disunity, which curtails economic possibilities.

I would appreciate a little amplification of that statement, if you would make it. In other words, precisely the statement that "the European recovery plan is abnormally costly because it has to offset fear." Does that mean in dollars and cents? Does it mean in effort? What do you mean by that?

Mr. Dulles. I mean that it is abnormally costly in dollars and cents, to bring it down to its crudest terms. I personally know a good many business people in Europe who normally would be putting their money back into developing and enlarging their own plants and factories. They are not doing that to any great extent because they have been afraid of war, and they have been thinking about how they could invest some of their money abroad so that if they can escape with
their families they will have some resources and foreign exchange in Spain or the United States.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The thing that troubles me about this statement is, How does the European recovery plan, which I assume is the ECA program——

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How does that make it abnormally costly? How can we get along with less money than we are spending now?

Mr. DULLES. You take the precise illustration I gave. A certain concern in Europe has 100,000,000 francs which it could use in building an added plant. People are afraid to put their money in it, and they have tried to hide their money in Spain, and so forth, so if they are driven out their families will have that 100,000,000 francs there. We come along with the European recovery plan and we provide the 100,000,000 francs to build the plant. In other words, our money is replacing the money which is escaping Europe through fear.

PARALYSIS OF FEAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had hoped that our establishment of the economic recovery plan would do just the opposite, and call that money back into these countries as a result of confidence established through the ECA.

Mr. DULLES. You need more than economic confidence. You need political confidence, and there has been the fear of war. If you have not been there, it is hard to appreciate the extent to which many of them have felt that the Red Army would march in almost any week, and they have been terrified. Those who could afford to do it have been keeping their children and their families away, and there has been very great fear, and I believe that if this pact mitigates that fear it will do what I have in mind.

POSSIBILITY OF DECREASING BURDEN OF ERP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was over practically all of Europe a year and a half ago, and I sensed that situation. I got the same sensing of the situation that you have expressed. But that leads me to this question: If we sign this pact, which I hope we do, and if we implement it with some arms stimulus, couldn’t we then say that the establishment of the pact and the security which it will add to Europe’s feelings there might make it very possible for us to cut down the dollars in the ECA program?

Mr. DULLES. It might make it possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. I think it would make it possible. I may say that I happened to be with, in the United Nations yesterday, a representative of one of the nations which is the greatest recipient under the European recovery plan. He had it open at this page, and read that heading, and he said, “That is a very true statement which has never been adequately emphasized.” You can cut down the cost greatly of the European recovery plan if this pact allays fear of a military invasion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then the next question obviously is, I think, Would it not be possible for us, in this appropriation for ECA, if the
Mr. DULLES. I would rather not answer that question because it involves a greater knowledge than I have as to the nature of commitments that have been made and actual programs which may require stuff to be fed into pipe lines.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other question. At the bottom of the page, in the last paragraph on page 8, the second sentence in the last paragraph, I find this statement:

But I am also aware of the need to avoid a rate of unproductive expenditure that may destroy the free institutions it is designed to preserve.

I do not quite understand what is meant by "the rate of unproductive expenditure that may destroy the free institutions" we want to preserve. Is it possible we can go in there with too much money?

Mr. DULLES. I am thinking, sir, of our expenditure here at home of $15,000,000,000 for our Military Establishment, and $6,000,000,000 for the European recovery plan, which from the standpoint of our economy and free institutions is unproductive. In other words, we are drawing out of our own economy over $20,000,000,000 a year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask you this question, then: With reference to your suggestion that renewed morale in Europe and reassurance of their security and our participation in implementing this pact no doubt will make it possible for us to reduce our own great expenditures for military matters here in this country, do you have an opinion at this time as to how soon we may be able to reduce our expenditures in this country for our own defensive program here, assuming that the European recovery program goes on at a satisfactory rate and that the pact and its implementation do create unity in Europe? Would you care to hazard a guess on how soon we can begin to reduce our own internal defensive expenditures?

Mr. DULLES. That involves technical factors which I think would make it unwise for me to attempt to say how soon, whether it could be in this year's budget or next year's budget. I would certainly hope that the constructive consequences of this pact would make themselves felt so that within a year or so the benefits I speak of we ought to begin to garner.

EVENTS IN CASE OF NONRATIFICATION BY UNITED STATES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On page 4, about the third paragraph in item IV, there is this statement:

But if our international affairs are conducted on the assumption that war is inevitable, that fact alone will make it inevitable. Therefore, I consider it of the utmost importance that the pact should not be operated primarily as an instrument of military policy designed to win a particular war.

Would you care to give an opinion at this time of this proposition, that if we should not go into the pact at all, but merely continue on with the ECA and other things of that kind, in that case war would eventually be inevitable? I am taking into account the factor of our own institutions and our determination to defend them, and the possible
encroachment of aggressors if we did not go into this pact, and what
the next few years—the next 5, 10, or 15—might bring if we did not
go into the pact. Would you say war might be inevitable if we did not
go into the pact?

Mr. Dulles. I think war is highly probable if we do not go into the
pact. I want to make clear what I mean by that. I do not think
that the pact in this particular form was perhaps imperative, although
I think it was desirable. But you are not now dealing with the situa-
tion as it was a year ago, before there was any discussion of a pact.
You are dealing with a situation where there is a pact which has been
heralded all around the world, which has been signed with solemnity
by the representatives of 12 nations, so that those events have created
a situation totally different from what the situation was a year ago.
And one could have argued then the pros and cons of the pact with
much greater freedom than you can argue them today, because there
is an accomplished fact which we have to take cognizance, and if, in
view of all that has now happened, there was a repudiation of this
pact by the Congress, that would reflect a point of view such that
other nations would change their plans, and I think it quite likely that
out of that would come a war.

Senator Hickenlooper. I would like to visit with you at great
length, Mr. Dulles, because I value your opinions, but I should not
impose on Senator Fulbright any longer. He is waiting.

Thank you very much.

Senator Fulbright. I first would like to associate myself with what
was said regarding your statement earlier. I think it is a very ex-
cellent one, and that part that you just discussed, on page 3, recalls to
my mind a very excellent statement you made a year ago last January
in the discussion of the ECA, I believe.

THE UNITY OF EUROPE

At that time, if I recall correctly, you said that several of the leaders
of the European countries had expressed to you the view that they
needed a little push toward European federation and European unity.
Do you consider that this Government is giving them an adequate
push in that direction, in this last year and 3 months?

Mr. Dulles. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Fulbright. I may say I agree with you. And I have the
feeling that that has been one of the principal failures of our foreign
policy.

Now, midway down the page, you say, "Also, the disunity of the
countries of western Europe seriously curtails their economic oppor-
tunity." By that I take it you mean their sovereign independence
which has always existed will continue to exist after this pact is
made, will it not?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Fulbright. And it stands as a difficulty long after the ECA
is completed, which is assumed to be completed in '52. Are you still
of the view that for real permanent recovery in Europe and security
in Europe they should have political unification?

Mr. Dulles. I think they should have a much greater measure of
political unification than they have today.
Senator Fulbright. Can you suggest to this committee anything that we might do that would encourage the move toward political federation in Europe, which I believe you thought was sort of incipient a year and 3 months ago, but not much progress has been made! Can you suggest anything that our Government or this committee might do?

Mr. Dulles. Well, in my opinion, if the administration would indicate more clearly its concern about these matters, much more would happen. That is the view of important members of the European governments concerned. The expressions of opinion about the importance of this unity have not come primarily from any members of the administration. I made a speech in Paris last winter about the importance of that, which I am sure had the concurrence of Secretary Marshall. He came to the occasion on which I delivered it and added by his presence moral weight to it. But so far as I can recall, there has been no public statement made by the President or by any one of our recent Secretaries of State which indicated the concern of the United States with respect to this matter.

A good deal of progress has been made in what you might call the scenery of unity. There is very little reality that underlies it. There are great difficulties in the way, and it may be that unity will have to be achieved more along functional lines, restricted functional lines, than is the case in this country. I do believe that it is possible, through achieving a common defense under this treaty, to take a further appreciable step toward unity. We can really bring about an effective unity of the armed forces of these different countries. At present they have a committee functioning at Fontainebleau, I think it is. But again there is no real unity there. You merely have the representatives of the different countries who confer together about what shall be done with their different land and air forces, and it may be that under this Atlantic Pact a beginning can be made in giving a reality to unity which, if we make it in terms of the military establishments, could then spread to economic and political matters.

ESSENCE OF UNITY

Senator Fulbright. Can you amplify a little what you mean by the realities of unity? What is the essence of federation or unification as among these countries? What is the indispensable quality?

Mr. Dulles. Well, I think that there are certain matters which are of common concern to a group of people, and I think the administration's handling of those matters ought to be in charge of a united body, whether it is a parliament or council, and so forth, which has authority to deal with the whole of the matter, and not merely with the national parts of it.

Senator Fulbright. Is that equivalent to saying there must be some merger of their sovereign power?

Mr. Dulles. There must be some merger of their sovereign power, but not necessarily a total merger of their sovereign power, just as in the United States there is still a considerable measure of sovereignty that resides in the States.
Senator Fulbright. That is what I mean. So long as it is nothing but a conference without any power of decision, it has not the character you speak of.

Mr. Dulles. That is right.

Senator Fulbright. And up to this point you are not aware of any significant statement or little push, as you put it last year, that this Government is giving any such movement, are you?

Mr. Dulles. I know that some of the administrators of the European recovery plan are personally exerting certain influence along that line, but there has been no public weight of United States authority put behind that, so far as I am aware.

Senator Fulbright. I am of exactly the same opinion, and officially the administration of the ECA denies any responsibility or interest in this phase of the problem. They have denied it before this committee. They believe and they state that that is not within their authority, and of course that has been the attitude of the Congress, too.

**AMENDMENT OF ECA ACT**

Mr. Dulles. I am very glad to see—I think I am correct, am I not?—that in this year's review of the ECA there was put in a more explicit statement about the policy of the United States with regard to European unity.

Senator Fulbright. In brief, Mr. Dulles, if you will refresh your memory, after that language was put in by the House and the bill went to conference, that language was taken out, which I think was a great mistake. It was taken out, I assume, by the Senate conferees, because it had been put in by the House. So that we finally ended up with practically the same that we had in the original language. Is that not correct? Are you not thinking of the bill as it went to conference?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, but the very fact that that was in the bill did attract attention abroad.

Senator Fulbright. Yes; but the fact that it was taken out may indicate that we have now consciously thought about it and disapprove of it. It seems to me it leaves certainly an equivocal situation which adds nothing or very little to the movement toward the political federation of Europe.

**ENCOURAGEMENT OF UNIFICATION**

But I agree. I think the primary responsibility is that of the Department of State to take the lead, but since they have not, and have refused to, I was wondering if there was anything that can be done to urge them along the line, which I think you have advocated now for some years. You do think that whatever we do in the military field and the economic, unless it is done in some political unity it will largely tend to be temporary?

Mr. Dulles. Yes; I think it will be largely ephemeral.

Senator Fulbright. Don't you also think that one of the principal motives for proceeding along this line is the bad conditions, the fears and so on, the difficulties in the economic field, and that as we cure those by the ECA we to that extent lessen the pressure to bring about political unity? Don't you think that is just a lesson in human nature!
It will be more difficult, in other words, to urge them to a fairly radical change in their traditional battle 3 or 4 years hence than it is today. It really should have been done last year, I think, and the time is running out when we might be effective in that field. Don’t you think that is the way in the past that nations or communities have responded? When everything is going fairly well they don’t want to make any change.

Mr. Dulles. It is quite possible that the historian may judge that the European Recovery Act and the Atlantic Pact were the two things which prevented a unity in Europe which in the long run may be more valuable than either of them. That is a possibility. I do not think it needs to be that possibility, but it may turn out to be that.

I said in the piece I wrote a year or so ago about this subject that a crutch is a very good thing if it helps people to make a healthy recovery. It is a very bad thing if people who could recover get in the habit of leaning on it and using it indefinitely, and there is danger, of course, that what we are doing here may be a kind of a crutch that they will continue to lean on instead of doing the exercises that they need to make their own recovery.

Senator Fulbright. I think that is a very excellent analogy, and while you do not want them to throw away their crutches now, at the same time there should be an insistence that the real remedy be applied. It seems to me that would be the wise policy for us to follow.

THE TREATY AND UNIFICATION

We were speaking in that connection, of course, of European unity, and you were a year ago. Do you feel that this pact, in the sense of bringing ourselves and Canada into it, may lead to a broader political unification, including all of the members of the pact, as opposed to the European? Do you feel that that is politically feasible?

Mr. Dulles. It will, I think, bring about a greater unity with respect to military establishments, and that is one important aspect of sovereignty, but I would think that the kind of unity that you are speaking of, which is envisaged indeed by the Brussels Pact, can be brought about on terms of a European unity more readily than it can be on terms of a unity that includes Canada and the United States, partially because of geographical propinquity and also because of the fact that they need the unity more than we do, so that the pressure of necessity is there. It certainly would be there if we did not relieve the necessity so that they do not feel it. But it is there.

IMPORTANCE OF UNIFICATION

Senator Fulbright. In other words, the necessity at that instant is a very important element in the situation. I have felt that as a practical matter the political federation of Europe is within the realm of possibility providing this country might give it a little leadership and a little encouragement, and we have the instrumentality to give it through, particularly, the ECA, and now with this. But if our policy is negative in that respect, we just fail to get one of the principal, if not the principal, advantages out of these efforts. And I have felt for a year and a half that you were one of the principal, if not the princi-
pal, advocates of that view in which I entirely concur, and unfortunately the State Department has not, up to this moment, seen fit to agree with it.

It is my hope, and it is about the only reason I keep bringing it up, that sometime they may be converted to that view, because I think the time element is extremely important. If nothing is done until the end of ECA, in '52, the principal reason and motive for doing it, that is, necessity, will have passed, and then we will have a return to exactly the same political pattern you had prior to World War II, and if that is true, would you say there was any reason to believe the same gradual evolution toward another war would take place? Because within such a political pattern there are the germs of the same kind of conflict, are there not?

Mr. Dulles. I believe that the disunity of Europe has been the underlying reason for the recurrent war in Europe.

Senator Fulbright. So if we do not cure that, we do not cure the real reason. We have only alleviated their temporary distress growing out of the war.

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Fulbright. So that it seems to me the emphasis in both of these programs should always be, or the conduct of them should be, directed toward that underlying cause.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like very much to further amplify this point, but I know Mr. Dulles is anxious to leave, so that I will forego the pleasure of pursuing it in other directions in more detail.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Dulles, we have present Senators Donnell, of Missouri, and Watkins, of Utah, who, by courtesy of the committee, are permitted to ask questions. I will turn you over to Senator Donnell.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Dulles, it happens that unfortunately for me I have an engagement that was made some weeks ago, and I am not going to be here during the examination by Senator Watkins, and I shall also attempt to make my questions very brief, so that he may have a little more time. I am sorry that he will probably not have as much time as I imagine he could very well use in most interesting questions.

I want to say, Mr. Dulles, first, that your testimony this morning, to me and I believe to others, has been quite refreshing, particularly because of the fact that, as distinguished from so much of these other witnesses, you recognize that there are risks in this Atlantic Treaty. We have had witnesses here who, one after the other, tell us that all of these dangers and possibilities and so forth do not exist, because of one reason or another.

Risks of the Treaty

As I understand, and I ask you if I am correct in this, you recognize as a possibility that the pact could be operated primarily as a military instrument, and you have warned us against the advisability of so doing. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. You have also recognized that the Atlantic and Rio Pacts might be understood as tacit offers to divide the world with
Soviet connivance, and you have warned us against conducting ourselves so as to leave that inference. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. You have also pointed out, have you not, Mr. Dulles, that article 4 of the treaty, which is the one which provides for the consultation by the parties whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened, that it would be possible that that should be construed, as I think you said, to cut the heart out of the United Nations, and you have warned us against any such conduct? Am I correct in any such understanding?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. You have warned us that there is a possibility that this pact might be so operated as to lead the American people to feel that their primary reliance is in material things, and you have warned us against so conducting ourselves as to leave that inference, have you not?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. I think you have agreed also with Senator George, that some of the parties to this pact may in the future, as you said, make very strained constructions of the obligations under the pact. You have agreed that that is entirely possible and might happen. Am I correct in that understanding, am I not?

Mr. DULLES. I think I agreed with Senator George that human nature is such that if people got in a very tight spot they would try to put strained constructions on it. Whether the other parties would agree to that or not I do not think I said.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Dulles, this pact runs for 20 years, does it not?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. And there is no provision in the pact for any termination of the pact or the obligations under the pact within that period. Am I correct in that, am I not?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.

DANGERS OF THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Dulles, I take it that you agree with me that many things can happen in 20 years in our governmental structure, in the attitude of the different departments of our Government. In that connection I want to ask you whether the New York Times of March 9 of this year; in an article headed "Dulles fears pact could stir Soviet; cautions against commitments that Russia may interpret as threat to homeland" quotes you correctly in this observation. This was an address made at the National Study Conference on World Order, sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, at Cleveland:

Furthermore, history shows that whenever a nation has a great military establishment it is under a powerful temptation to rely on the use or pressure of that power to gain its ends. The greater a nation's military establishment is, the greater should be the gulf between its military leaders and those who make its national policy.
Is that a correct quotation from your observations at that time?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Dulles, in a period of 20 years, which is the period since the depression of 1929 up to now, to illustrate the length of it, it is entirely possible that different views as to whether or not the Military Establishment should rise or decrease, should increase or be minimized, might prevail. That is true, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY

Senator Donnell. Mr. Dulles, this treaty does impose some kind of an obligation on the signers, does it not?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Senator Donnell. You mentioned on page 1 of your statement that, of course, what happens in the event of an attack is not necessarily war and, of course, obviously the illustrations that you used are apropos. You say there have been many armed incursions into United States territory and armed attacks on United States ships and planes which have been successfully countered and security restored by measures short of war. I do not know what those armed incursions into United States territory are, but I will not inquire about that for the moment.

Mr. Dulles. There have been some from Mexico.

Senator Donnell. But not of any material nature. There have never been any instances where 100,000 or 500,000 troops have crossed our border without war resulting. In fact, we have not had any instances of that kind at all, have we?

Mr. Dulles. No.

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Dulles, I want to pose to you a question which has been present and somewhat differently answered by Mr. Acheson on the one hand and Mr. Lovett on the other. That is this question: Suppose that 500,000 Russian troops were to cross the border of Norway 6 weeks after this treaty shall have been ratified, making an attack on Norway. May I ask you whether or not you would consider that to be an armed attack upon one of the signatories within the meaning of article 5?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And would understand, therefore, that that would be, by article 5, an attack which should be considered an attack against the United States?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. In the event of an attack against the United States by 500,000 troops who should come upon our shores some morning, would you consider that the normal thing to do would be immediately, by military force, to repel the attack if possible?

Mr. Dulles. Well, I would certain do something about it.

Senator Donnell. And the something you would do would be by way of military operations to the further incidence of the 500,000 troops. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. Not necessarily.

Senator Donnell. Can you envision a case where 500,000 troops would land on American shores with a hostile purpose and our country
not take immediate action to defend our shores and to repulse that enemy?

Mr. Dulles. I certainly said we should do something about it.

Senator Donnell. And you cannot envision any possibility that we would not immediately respond by armed force against the 500,000 troops; is that not correct?

Mr. Dulles. I certainly can envisage a possibility that we would not attempt to hurl armed force against those 500,000 men. If, for example, we had only 100,000 men available, it might be very well to march them backward instead of forward.

Senator Donnell. But you would have in mind that so soon as possible, would you not, Mr. Dulles, this country should engage in armed military opposition to the onslaught of 500,000 hostile troops?

Mr. Dulles. I think that whether or not you have this pact, if the Soviet Union starts marching troops through Europe, that, for all practical purposes, is an attack upon the United States. We would be the only object of that attack. And I think we should do something about it.

Senator Donnell. If we were not in the pact we would be under no obligation to do it, would we?

Mr. Dulles. No contractual obligation.

Senator Donnell. But the fact creates a contractual obligation between us and 11 other nations, does it not?

Mr. Dulles. It does, but it creates an obligation to do what in my opinion we would do otherwise.

Senator Donnell. Yes. In other words, the reasonable, the genuinely sound thing to do is what you think the pact creates an obligation on us to do.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK

Senator Donnell. And in the case, such as I have recited of 500,000 Russian troops coming into Norway, the thing that genuine, honest judgment would demand that we do would be to immediately cooperate with military force, which would mean an actual state of war. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. I think that attack would create a state of war; yes.

Senator Donnell. Now, with regard to the creation of the state of war, do you agree, Mr. Dulles, that if Congress were not in session the President might, if he desired, within his power as Commander in Chief, take immediate action, in compliance perhaps with this word "forthwith" in article 5, to repel that attack over in Norway? Or would he have to wait until Congress came together?

Mr. Dulles. I would think that if 500,000 Soviet troops marched into Norway and if the President were to try to send American troops to Norway to try to drive them out, he ought to have his head examined.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Dulles, suppose it became obvious that the smart thing to do was to send bombers immediately to try to do all the damage to the 500,000 troops that could be done. Is there any doubt in your mind as to the right of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take that action, even though Congress had not assembled?
Mr. Dulles. I think that certainly if the President, as Commander in Chief, under those circumstances, gave the orders, the orders would be carried out. I take it that that, however, is not your question.

Senator Donnell. No; that is not.

THE CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY

Mr. Dulles. The question is whether constitutionally that would reside within the President’s authority.

Senator Donnell. Yes, sir; that is my question.

Mr. Dulles. I think that is an extremely difficult question to answer on the basis of the facts you give. Certainly there is, in my opinion, a constitutional power in the President to take reasonable steps to repel an attack if, for instance, Congress is not in session and not in a position to act. I think that there is an inherent right to protect the vital interests of the United States which is normally exercised by the concurrence of the President and the Congress, but where physical or practical reasons make that concurrence impossible the President has certain emergency power.

Senator Donnell. So if New York were attacked by 500,000 troops you would have no doubt as to the power of the President, if Congress were not in session, to go ahead and protect our interests with military force?

Mr. Dulles. I think so; yes.

Senator Donnell. And under the pact an attack on any one of the signatories is agreed to be an attack against all the signatories?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. I must not infringe more on Senator Watkins’ time. I have already taken a little more than half the time that was available. I did want to conclude by saying that I note with much interest that you say conditions were quite different than they were a year ago because, although we were told when the Vandenberg resolution, Senate Resolution 239, was before us that the Senate would have absolute power to decide whether we should go to war or not, now we find that by reason of that act and by reason of the signature here with all that pageantry in Washington, it would be a disaster of the first magnitude if we were not to go ahead. That is not critical of your statement. I am just commenting on the situation.

I do not wish to trespass on Senator Watkins’ time any more.

The Chairman. Senator Watkins?

Senator Watkins. I want to say that I think you have given us the clearest statement that has been made here before this committee. You have, in my opinion, clarified the issues and taken away some of the fog that has been brought into this room by some of the statements we have had.

I have 8 or 10 pages of notes here that I wanted to ask you questions about. Manifestly in the 5 minutes left I can’t do it. I do not like to do it under pressure, because I take it that this is one of the most important questions ever to come before the Senate of the United States and the American people.

Mr. Dulles. I agree.

Senator Watkins. And I regard you as one of the best-qualified men to give us light and information on it, and I want to get that very
light, and if I am only going to be confined to the time allotted it is going to be very difficult to do anything.

I would like to ask you this question. I think it is the only one I will ask you, under the circumstances. Can you be made available, or can you come back to this committee upon the request of the chairman for further examination and investigation?

The CHAIRMAN. That is on assumption that the chairman is going to ask him. The chairman has not promised that. It seems to me a very unreasonable request, that Mr. Dulles should return all the way here from New York simply to answer the questions of one Senator.

Senator Watkins. That may be, but I happen to represent 600,000 people, and a lot of other Americans want some of these questions brought out by people who are not already committed to this pact.

I put it this way: If the request comes, can you come back? That is what I would like to know.

The CHAIRMAN. May I intervene and suggest that I assume, Mr. Dulles, that if the Senator from Utah would desire to write you and specify these things, you would be in position to answer them in writing.

Mr. Dulles. I would be very happy to try to answer in writing any of your questions, Senator.

Senator Watkins. That is not exactly the same as testifying under the same circumstances.

Mr. Dulles. I realize that. Naturally I would hold myself at the disposal of the committee. I hope the committee would have regard for the fact that at the moment I am engaged in the very critical phase of a very important matter before the United Nations Assembly—namely, this question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies—and I cannot be as free to absent myself as I would like to be.

Senator Watkins. I realize that, but it may be some time before this committee finishes its hearings, and I thought some time during those hearings you might be available. Would you be willing to come?

Mr. Dulles. I would treat a request from the chairman of this committee as a virtual command.

Senator Watkins. Mr. Chairman, under the circumstances and the fact that I would be under pressure and have only a very few minutes to ask these questions that cover such a very important subject, I decline to question under such circumstances, and I ask now of the committee that Mr. Dulles be requested to come back at some convenient time before this hearing is finished, so that I may ask such questions as I desire.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has 13 minutes at his disposal if he wants to ask any questions.

Senator Watkins. I decline in that limited time to start in on the examination, because I cannot any more than get started. It would not be fair.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, we want to thank you very much for your presence and your admirable and comprehensive statement. You, of course, have had an exceptional opportunity to gain information and contacts and experience with these foreign problems, and we always read your views and find out your views and give them the utmost consideration, because we have high respect for the source from which they emanate.
We are obliged to you, and we hope we will not have the necessity of recalling you at any time that would interfere with your performance of the high duties and responsibilities which are imposed upon you regarding the United Nations.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the opportunity. I appreciate what you have said.

The Chairman. We have two witnesses scheduled for this afternoon, Mr. Clayton and Mr. Carey. The committee will take a recess at this time until 2:30 this afternoon, in this room.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

We have with us today Mr. Will L. Clayton, a very distinguished Texan, who is a man of wide business experience and is also familiar with foreign affairs. He was in the State Department for a number of years and was active in negotiating foreign trade agreements in conversations at Geneva, Cuba, and other places, and is intimately in touch with and familiar with our foreign relations and foreign affairs.

We are very happy to have you, Mr. Clayton, to testify on the North Atlantic Pact.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILL L. CLAYTON, VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Mr. Clayton. I appreciate this opportunity of appearing before the committee. The greatest value of the Atlantic Pact lies not so much in the unification of the defensive strength of its members, valuable as that is, but in the proof which it will give to the democracies themselves that they can effectively unite, freely and openly, for peace.

For perhaps the first time in modern history, the democracies have seized the initiative by this bold stroke and have thus brought new hope and new courage to the world.

SELF-DEFENSE

Just as self-preservation is the first law of nature, intelligent self-defense should be the first order of business of a community of free nations whose independence and integrity are gravely threatened, within and without, by the menacing pressures of a powerful and ambitious dictatorship.

The separate strength of these free nations is not sufficient to resist these pressures. But their combined strength, pledged in the Atlantic Pact, will give pause to the aggressor, will impart courage to the harassed peoples of western Europe, and will afford time to consider and prepare for the larger enterprise which lies ahead.
For this pact is a natural and necessary step on the road to a federal union. We are in the midst of a world revolution, the implications of which are not yet fully understood. The seeds of this revolution were sown thousands of years ago when an unknown genius produced a wheel, said to be man's greatest invention. Vast reaches of time separate that event and the present state of scientific and industrial progress.

But all of us should now realize that man's victory over time and distance and matter renders completely archaic the present political and economic structure of the world. The machine has freed man of his physical handicaps, but he still remains bound by mental concepts, deeply rooted in the dead past. One machine calls for another and another, and so it will be until the end of time; and all machines cry out for freedom.

National boundaries and national sovereignties grew out of the limitations of nature on man's movements and communications; but they still remain long after man himself has broken down the barriers to his travels and to the range of his voice.

Like the old doctor in the Tale of Two Cities who continually went back to his prison job of shoemaking, long after regaining his freedom, we cannot break away from the habits and vested interests of the past.

CONTINUATION OF COLD WAR

When the Atlantic Pact is ratified, as it must be, the danger of a shooting war in the forseeable future will have been greatly lessened; but, make no mistake about it, the cold war will go on and with perhaps greater vigor than heretofore.

Soviet Russia's principal objectives in the cold war are to frighten democratic governments into excessive expenditures for defense, and to frighten private capital and initiative so that it will not operate freely. If both objectives can be achieved, economic disintegration will likely ensue. Economic disintegration is usually followed by political disintegration.

Soviet Russia is a past master at this type of warfare; she wages it on all fronts simultaneously, and at relatively small cost to herself. The cost to the democracies, on the other hand, is enormous.

We have won the battle of Berlin because that was a problem in transportation, a field in which we excel. But we have not won the battle of Greece, although we will soon have sunk a billion dollars there. The battle of the Middle East is still to be fought. And we have practically lost the battle of China and with it probably the entire Pacific area, so vital to our interests and security.

The mainland of Asia can live without Japan, but Japan cannot live without the mainland, except by the indefinite use of great sums of United States money, and probably of United States troops.

I read this morning in the Washington Post a very interesting article from Tokyo by Joseph Alsop. I think it is well worth reading.
Yesterday General Bradley, I believe, spoke of the fact that our frontier is in the Pacific—as long as we have troops in Japan and the Philippines and other nearby areas. Of course, I think we would all agree with that. But if the mainland of Asia falls to the Communists, we will maintain that frontier with a great deal of expense.

We have not as yet won the battle of western Europe. The cold war is still raging there. Billions of private capital and the creative genius and activity of its owners remain in hiding because of the danger of war and the fear of the integrity of certain European currencies.

Governments have thus been compelled to undertake the greater part of the job of recovery. But if western Europe is to be restored to a condition of financial independence and a decent standard of living, the job must be done largely by private enterprise. Government cannot do it.

**IMPROVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE**

Mr. Dulles this morning spoke very well indeed of the handicaps that we find in Europe due to the fear that people have of war. He did not speak of the fear that they also have regarding the integrity of certain currencies, but that also exists. Private capital and private initiative and private enterprise are enormously retarded and handicapped in Europe by just that fear.

Private enterprise will operate freely in Europe only when there is peace and confidence in currencies. Today there is neither.

ECA is doing its work well indeed. Without it, the battle of Europe would be lost. But, even with ECA, Europe will not be in balance with the rest of the world by 1952, nor, in all probability, by 1962, unless the democracies radically alter their present course, because, on balance, Russia is winning the cold war.

**DEMOCRACIES ON THE DEFENSIVE**

The democracies are on the defensive. Wars are not won that way. Total costs to the democracies are taxing their economies excessively. In our own case, the burden may get too heavy, even for our strong back.

But we dare not lay it down. Soon we must decide between additional taxes and deficit financing. Either route is fraught with grave danger to democratic government and free enterprise. Some less costly road to peace than the one we are now following must be found. Our victory in the battle of Berlin may be followed by a peace treaty on the German question. But there can be no peace in the world until Russia returns to her prewar boundaries.

The problem then of world peace is the problem of getting Russia back on her own ground without a shooting war and without a long cold war, the cost of which might bring the democracies to the verge of bankruptcy.

**BENEFITS OF ATLANTIC UNION**

The Atlantic Union, in my humble opinion, should make such a peace possible. The total military, industrial, economic and man-
power strength of the democracies of the world so greatly exceeds that of Soviet Russia that it would not dare attack.

Atlantic Union would bring the armed forces of all its members under one command, with bases wherever needed. Enormous savings would result. Soviet Russia could get nowhere in a cold war, or a shooting war either, without her European satellites.

In nearly every case, the satellite governments are dominated by Communist minorities—15 percent or so of the Czechoslovakian people, 25 percent at best of the Poles, for example.

A federal union of the democracies would be so powerful, so prosperous and free, that the pull on these satellite states lying in between would be so much greater from the west than from the east that in time Soviet Russia would surely lose them—and her drive for world conquest would end in failure and without World War III.

Federal union should take the offensive in the cold war in every country in Europe. And we would win that war, because federal union would fight with the weapons of freedom, of prosperity, and of a rising standard of living.

Senator Wiley. You used the word “federal” in the last two instances, and previously you used the words “Atlantic union.” Do you differentiate?

Mr. Clayton. I do not think so. I use them in the same sense. I mean a federal union of Atlantic democracies.

Senator Wiley. Under the pact?

Mr. Clayton. No; I do not associate it with the pact, except indirectly. It is broader than the pact. By federal union I mean a political and economic union.

The United States, having more to lose than any other country, should take the lead in calling a convention of representatives of the nations composing the Atlantic Pact, to explore how far they can go, in forming a federal union within the Charter of the United Nations.

Creating a Peaceful Climate

I would like to add, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee: it seems to me that it is absolutely essential that the political climate of the world be promptly shifted to one which is hospitable to peaceful plans and objectives, and away from the present climate which calls for preparations for war, such as this Atlantic Pact necessarily is.

So long as we have this warlike climate the democracies not only are saddled with the enormous cost and waste attendant upon preparations for war but those very activities, those very preparations frighten private capital and initiative and prevent them from doing their full job in reconstruction and recovery.

The best way, of course, to fight communism is to make democracy work, and the best way to make democracy work in an economic sense is to bring about those conditions which contribute to a rising standard of living so that people will have more to eat and more to wear and better homes in which to live.

Obviously conditions in which you are preparing for war do not permit of any such situation; so much of the economy is diverted to warlike preparations that there is not enough left to provide for a
rising standard of living for the peoples of the world. And in my opinion the best way to bring about this change in climate and to make democracy work is to bring about a federal union of the democracies of the world. These democracies could work together in a permanent way and not only in a military sense. A pact, by the very nature of things, is impermanent and the world has not learned by experience to rely too much upon pacts.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes, sir.

DIFFICULTIES IN FEDERATION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clayton, you realize, do you not, that to bring this about would meet with very serious difficulties, would it not? It would take a good long while to set up the organization of a world union with so many diverse states with different backgrounds and different traditions and things of that kind.

Mr. CLAYTON. Certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago that your idea was to incorporate into the union the democracies that were in the United Nations.

Mr. CLAYTON. I beg your pardon. I said that I thought we ought to start it by having the President of the United States call a conference of representatives of those governments which are members of the Atlantic Pact that we are now discussing, as a starting point.

The CHAIRMAN. I must have misunderstood you. I thought you said the United Nations.

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you would not draw any line as to where you would stop. You would take in all nations?

Mr. CLAYTON. That would be for the convention of the conference to decide.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it would. I am trying to get your conception.

NATURE OF THE ATLANTIC UNION

Mr. CLAYTON. My idea would be that in the beginning the union would be composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom, and that are composed of the white race.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you exclude others? Would you bring in others and teach them things that we believe in?

Mr. CLAYTON. I think that others would have to be admitted, and the group would want to admit others as they showed a willingness and a capacity to follow the ideals of democracy and of freedom. Others should be admitted if they are willing to agree to the constitution of the union and have shown their willingness and ability to live up to its conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Would your idea be to consolidate all of the debts of the various countries that might join, or leave the debts to be dealt with by each nation?

Mr. CLAYTON. Of course, Mr. Chairman, that was one of the big thorny questions that the 13 Colonies had to decide.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true.
Mr. Clayton. You remember Alexander Hamilton was a great exponent of the idea that the new Union should not only assume the debts of the Confederacy that preceded it but also assume the debts of each individual State of the 13 States. His position prevailed in the end, but after a great deal of difficulty. It was proven to be a very wise decision.

METHOD OF CREATING AN ATLANTIC UNION

I am just suggesting now that we should call a conference of representatives of these countries to discuss this matter to see how far they could go. Whatever I would say would be my own personal idea on it. I have checked on some of these statistics, however. If you take the debts of most of the democracies and convert them from their currency into ours at realistic rates of conversion, in other words, at market rates, and measure them by population, by national income and things of that kind, their debts are not so much greater per capita than ours.

The Chairman. As I understand you now, you are not undertaking to lay down the rules by which this union would be formed, or how it should progress. You want the question examined and understood, and therefore suggest the calling of a conference by the President of the United States to consider these matters. Is that correct?

Mr. Clayton. That is correct; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. Mr. Clayton, as I said, you had in your statement the term "Atlantic Union" and you used the term, also, of "Federal Union." In the previous part you meant it is contemplated the states would sign the pact, I take it?

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. And in the latter part, Federal Union, you had in mind a union of nations with similar ideals, similar objectives, that you hoped could be brought about some time in the future?

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir; that is correct.

The Chairman. May I intervene?

Senator Wiley. However, you endorse the pact?

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir.

NATURE OF THE ATLANTIC UNION

The Chairman. By "Federal Union" you mean the states would be federated?

Mr. Clayton. Yes.

The Chairman. They still would have their individual character, but be federated?

Mr. Clayton. Certainly. In very much the same way in which our own Union was formed.

Senator Wiley. That is a consummation devoutly to be wished. I think. Have you any basis in mind that would indicate that out of the 2,300,000,000 on earth there are more than those that we have practically gotten together under the Atlantic Pact that would consider a question of some kind of federated union?

Mr. Clayton. Yes; I think so. I think that, for example, Australia and New Zealand would do so if such a conference were called
and they were invited to send representatives. I imagine they would be delighted to send them. That is just my own personal idea.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE ATLANTIC UNION

Senator Wiley. Do you not think, for all practical purposes, that that is what we have gotten a stepping stone of, in the United Nations?

Mr. Clayton. You mean the United Nations or the Atlantic Pact?

Senator Wiley. No. The United Nations—a sort of stepping stone to a federation that we hope will eventually be consummated.

Mr. Clayton. Yes; I think all of these things, Senator Wiley, that we have done during and since the war to bring countries together, are stepping stones to an eventual union. But I think from what we have learned since the end of the war, and learned in the United Nations, that we have to consolidate our progress by a series of further steps.

I do not think it will be possible to work out at any time in the foreseeable future conditions under which all the nations of the world could join in one world government. I think that is very visionary.

I agree with everything Mr. Dulles said about the United Nations, and that was said here generally. It has been an extremely useful organization. We all ought to support it. I hope it will continue forever. If it had done nothing else, it has proven its worth by furnishing a forum in which the representatives of nations of the world can talk about these different serious matters as they arise and help form world opinion in reference to them.

WORLD SPLIT

Senator Wiley. Do you not think that if we can avoid a third international conflict that with the so-called rising spiritual temperature of people we may find more vitality in the United Nations to handle these very problems?

Mr. Clayton. I hope so. But we must recognize that Soviet Russia has split the world into two parts—the Communist world and the other part. And sooner or later every country is going to find itself in one or the other camp.

Senator Wiley. Then you would have two worlds.

Mr. Clayton. That is right. We have got them. We have them today.

Senator Wiley. Have you any hope that even that difficulty can be rubbed out through reason and judgment in the United Nations?

Mr. Clayton. No, sir. I have no hope that that difficulty can be worked out in the United Nations, because it will never be worked out, Senator Wiley, until Russia returns to her prewar boundaries. The United Nations will never get her to do it, in my opinion.

Senator Wiley. Do you not know that there is a philosophy to the effect that time cures many ills?

Mr. Clayton. I know.

Senator Wiley. Suppose that the leadership of Russia is obliterated by time, and this psychological warfare that is being carried on, back and forth over the iron curtain, results in international revolution and disintegration, and things that are apparent right now on the horizon;
do you not think that even with that the United Nations might be changed so that the matter of the veto, which Russia has exercised so potently, might also be changed and men’s minds might be changed as the advisability of carrying on in unity develops?

Mr. Clayton. It might very well happen, if there should be the kind of disintegration of which you speak behind the iron curtain. But I think it would be extremely unwise for us to count on anything of that kind. We might have to wait so long that the cost of fighting the cold war would bring the democracies to the verge of bankruptcy.

PROGRESS IN EUROPE TOWARD UNITY

Senator Wiley. Do you see any great signs in Europe of this unity of nations, any signs that they have obliterated this thousand years' internal strife—any real signs that have not been brought about by economic pressure? Do you see this love between nations and so forth?

Mr. Clayton. I see many signs of a growing feeling for unity, many signs of it. It needs leadership, and I am afraid it has not gotten it. If vigorous leadership could be supplied, I do not think it would be difficult to get the countries of western Europe together in a western European union.

Senator Wiley. You mean a political union?

Mr. Clayton. Yes. But I am afraid that that leadership is not there.

Senator Wiley. Do you attribute that to economic pressures, this feeling?

Mr. Clayton. I think it is perhaps due more to political pressures and fear.

Senator Wiley. Fear of Russia?

Mr. Clayton. Yes; fear of Russia more than it is a fear of economic pressure, although economic pressures are playing their part. You see France and Italy, for example, coming together in a customs union, which they have, proceeded very far in that direction, and there is very good reason to expect that it will finally be consummated. Of course, we have the Benelux Customs Union, and we have the Scandinavian countries considering a customs union.

These things usually are spurred by economic reasons. But I think the political reasons in the last 2 or 3 years have been just as powerful, if not more powerful, in the case of western Europe, than the economic.

Senator Wiley. Then you see many hopeful signs on the European horizon, and you see but one disintegrating thing, and that is the overpowering might of Russia?

FEAR OF WAR

Mr. Clayton. Yes; that is the only thing. If it were not for the fear of war, the world would go forward economically, in my opinion, at a very fast rate. It is the fear of war which is paralyzing free enterprise over the world except in the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

As long as that condition exists it is going to be extremely difficult to bring the world back in economic balance.
Senator Wiley. But you do reach the same conclusion as Mr. Dulles that the execution of this pact will have disintegrating influence on that fear?

Mr. Clayton. I think it will have—I would not say a disintegrating influence—I think it will have a very substantial influence on it, and ameliorate it, but it will not dissipate it entirely, not by a great deal.

I think that the people of Europe are a little more cynical about these things than we are. We are a little naive about them, and they have had a great deal of experience with them.

I do not think that the execution of the pact will restore—certainly not 100 percent, and perhaps not 50 percent—the confidence of capitalists and entrepreneurs in Europe.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

Senator Wiley. Do you think it is necessary after the pact is executed and signed, and becomes the vital law of this land, that we supplement it with arms?

Mr. Clayton. I would think so, unquestionably. I agree fully with what Mr. Dulles said about that. If you just make a pact and do not do anything else, and let western Europe go on as it now—and it is practically helpless so far as arms are concerned—you do not do anything.

Europe itself will say “This does not mean anything, it is just a nice gesture.” If you do not help them with arms I think the pact will lose most of its value.

Senator Wiley. Is it your conclusion, the same as Mr. Dulles, which he derives from interviewing military men, that in the foreseeable future you do not think there will be armed overt acts on the part of Russia?

Mr. Clayton. As far as I am concerned, that is just a matter of opinion which is not worth much. But I have not believed, since the end of the war, that there was any immediate danger, serious danger, of a shooting war with Russia. She is getting what she wants too easily the other way.

Senator Wiley. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

ECA AND EUROPEAN UNITY

The Chairman. Mr. Clayton, of course, you do not expect this plan to be accomplished just by our signing a paper and going on. It has to be developed, does it not?

Mr. Clayton. Certainly.

The Chairman. Over a long period of years.

Mr. Clayton. I am afraid so, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do you not recognize, however, that economics and political matters are very intimate and very intertwined, one reacting on the other?

Mr. Clayton. Certainly.

The Chairman. We have made, in the ECA, substantial steps toward making the people of Europe realize the importance of cooperating economically in rebuilding their broken fortunes; is that not true?
Mr. Clayton. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I am not in position to know to what extent they have cooperated, as required by the enabling act under ECA, to reduce tariffs and other impediments to trade among themselves and between themselves and the rest of the world. I have not looked into that.

I do not know to what extent they may have lived up to that condition of the agreement which the United States made with each of these countries in the consequence of the act. But I think that the post-war history in matters of that kind has been very encouraging.

We have had a great deal of international cooperation in the economic sense since the war, and in fact beginning during the war, at Bretton Woods. They attempted to write a charter for the International Trade Organization, what we call the GAT agreement, the agreement between 21 countries that we wrote and negotiated at Geneva, as you recall, in the summer of 1927. This dealt with over one-half of the trade of the world.

Then this last one, ECA, that has brought about very real cooperation among the countries in western Europe. And now this Atlantic Pact, which is not economic but at any rate has some economic implications and is a further evidence of the belief and feeling and desire of these countries to cooperate each with the other for their mutual benefit, protection, and security.

The Chairman. You say that this treaty does not have any economic implications?

Mr. Clayton. I beg your pardon. I said it did have some.

ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. I was going to suggest to you: is it not true that if we could remove the fear of war and the constant dread of war, that it would lift the economic level of every one of the countries which is signatory to this treaty?

Mr. Clayton. Indeed it will, of course. There is no question about that. If it should have the effect of removing the fear of war then private capital and private enterprise would operate freely again in Europe, but I do not believe it will have that effect.

I think you will see, after a while, a redoubling of the efforts of Russia in the cold war, maybe in a different way, at a different place, with different technique. But I feel sure you will see it, and that will keep everybody stirred up all the time and fearful. So I do not think that this pact alone will dissipate the fear of war in the world.

The Chairman. I did not mean to imply that, because there is no way of foreseeing something that might stir up a war irrespective of this pact. But to the extent that this pact may remove some of the fears, to that extent it will help the economic situation in these countries?

Mr. Clayton. Indeed.

IN FAVOR OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. I understood you to say a while ago you are for the pact, you want to see it ratified.

Mr. Clayton. Yes, I am strongly for the pact. I think if we should fail to ratify the pact it would be a world disaster. I agree with
everything Mr. Dulles said about the probable consequences of that act. It would be a kind of notice to Russia that they could go ahead. It would let the people of Europe down in a way that they have never been let down. They would lose all confidence in us. And I think that it would be a major disaster.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with the view that there is nothing in the treaty that is of an offensive character, but that it is confined to the peaceful conditions in the world?

Mr. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I have not made a letter study of the treaty, but I just know that is what it is, because I know our intentions and I think I know the intentions of the democracies of western Europe. I do not think anybody has in mind any intention of any offensive action under this treaty; nothing except purely defensive action.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not the language of the treaty itself confine it within those areas?

Mr. CLAYTON. It does.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Clayton, I would like first to say that I am happy to see you back in Washington. I hope you will stay around here and give us your advice on many occasions.

Mr. CLAYTON. Thank you, sir.

COSTS OF THE COLD WAR

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it fair to say that under the present conditions, as there is no change made in the political relationships in the democracies, that we are liable to disintegrate before Russia is with regard to the question asked by the Senator from Wisconsin? While many people may hope that this regime in Russia, especially that part of it devoted to aggression may disintegrate, your point is that the burden is so great on our economy that we may disintegrate first. Is it not fair to say that?

Mr. CLAYTON. Either disintegrate first or lay the burden down. And when we lay it down then that also is notice to Russia that she can proceed as actively as she likes. I say that I think Russia is winning the cold war because I notice the great expansion that is taking place in two or three items in our budget. If you would refer to one military item for ourselves, the ECA, lend-lease, which is military arms, which is sure to come, and things of that kind, you will see that they compose at least one-half of our total national budget.

While there are good reasons to argue that the Atlantic Pact should have the effect of reducing those costs, I think that we would be a little naive to expect that that would be the actual result. I think the result is likely to be the other way around. I think that the costs are likely to increase instead of reduce. And I think that under the present conditions of our economy, if we should have a moderate recession in economic activity in the country—which is not entirely out of the cards—we would find the burden very heavy. Our tax revenues would, under those circumstances, considerably decline.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Which would require an increase in the rate to compensate for the decrease, which in itself tends to depress the business. It is a rather vicious spiral when it starts.
Mr. CLAYTON. That is correct. And as I said in my prepared statement, we must decide pretty soon between additional taxes and deficit financing, and either road is fraught with a great deal of danger to our type of government and free enterprise.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That decision must be made within the next 2 or 3 months.

Mr. CLAYTON. That decision must be made very soon.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ATLANTIC UNION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Coming to you views about the Atlantic union, do I understand correctly that the reasonable beginning to that would be to take these same countries that have evidenced already at least sufficient unity to join this pact, tentatively joining it by signing it, that that would be a political union? Is that what you had in mind?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes, sir. That is what I had in mind. To start with the sponsors of this pact.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Further pursuing that, you do not mean to say that that is exclusive or ultimate at all, that that is a proper place to start, and that if that is started the future may develop according to the desires of the various other countries?

Mr. CLAYTON. That is right.

EUROPEAN UNITY AND NORTH ATLANTIC UNION

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think it is a very interesting idea. I think you are familiar with the fact that some of us have urged that European countries should join in the union at the beginning. I think the difference between that and the Atlantic union that you mention is probably one of feasibility, that is, our ideas as to whether or not it can be brought about as a practical political matter today.

I have had the view that it is purely as a practical point of view, that that would be more likely brought about than the broader union, including the other members of the pact who are not in the western European community. That, I think, was the main difference.

Mr. CLAYTON. I think you are right, Senator Fulbright, provided the western European idea could get strong, vigorous leadership, and I am afraid it lacks it now.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that this country ought to provide some leadership, and ought to promote or encourage it?

Mr. CLAYTON. I think that we should do so to the extent that we would be justified in doing so by reason of the aid which we are giving under ECA. I think perhaps that justification would be more secure and more easily defended in the economic field than in any other, but if there were some way in which the western European countries, or the ECA countries, could be brought together economically, I think the other would follow.

USING ECA FUNDS TO ENCOURAGE CUSTOMS UNIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. To use as an example, you mentioned the proposed treaty between Italy and France, looking to economic union. My understanding is that the terms of that treaty look to a consider-
able period of time before it is achieved, some 6 years, I think. Would you think it is a legitimate use of ECA funds to help them bring that about much sooner than that? What I have in mind is this:

You are thoroughly familiar with the economic situation. Under ECA we look at each country separately, and try to analyze, the administration does, their needs in textile mills, and so on, in each country, as they each present their program.

That is one way to approach it. The other would be that in this proposal to obliterate their barriers to trade, we say "We will use this money to specifically assist you in that project." In other words, if there is dislocation in certain industries, if there is money required for temporary employment, we will use it for that purpose.

Whatever the dislocation that arises from an economic union, a full economic union, by which I mean the free movement of goods and persons and capital, it seems to me that would be a direct assistance to an economic union between those two countries, contrasted with the other approach, which tends to build up the national efficiency of each country, which contributes in the long run nothing to the economic circumstances.

Mr. Clayton. I think you have put the problem very well. It is an extremely difficult one. I do not know, to begin with, to what extent such funds could be legally used for that purpose.

Assuming they could be legally used for that purpose I do not know, Senator Fulbright, the extent to which they might be needed for that purpose, because that purpose could be served purely with local funds. If there is some question of unemployment in Italy, the Italian money will handle that situation, and the same thing in France—French money would handle that.

I would think that possibly some of the counterpart funds could be very well used for the purpose which you outline. These funds accumulate in these countries by reason of the sale of goods which we ship over there at local currencies—and those currencies are impounded. It is a new thought to me.

Senator Fulbright. What made you think that it might be illegal?

Mr. Clayton. I do not know whether it would be legal or not to use dollars for that direct purpose. But I feel quite sure that it would be entirely legal to use the counterpart funds, and that is all really that would be necessary, to use the accumulations of lire in Italy, and the accumulations of francs in France, arising from the sale of these goods that they get from us.

I would not think there would be any question about the legality of that.

Senator Fulbright. I never thought there was any question of that. One of the expressed purposes of ECA was to bring about the free movement of trade and destruction of all barriers of trade.

Mr. Clayton. That is right. There may be nothing in it.

**CONVERTIBILITY OF CURRENCIES**

Senator Fulbright. The inconvertibility of currency today is one of the principal obstructions to trade.

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. That would be one of the principal objectives of such a program.

Mr. Clayton. That is right.

Senator Fulbright. I was told, for example, by a leading member of the Belgian Government that to make the currency of the Netherlands and Belgium convertible, we will say tomorrow, that it would impose a terrific burden on the Belgian economy because they have the production and the goods which the Netherlands need, and they would have to bear the burden.

I asked, "Could you give an estimate of what it would be?" He said, "It is purely an estimate but it might cost as much as 75 to 100 million dollars to satisfy the immediate demands for durable goods, especially durable goods. But once that is achieved and the immediate demand is satisfied, it would tend to level off."

It seemed to me it would be much more profitable to us to get them over that hump, and save money in the long run in making their currencies convertible. This would require, of course, many changes in their internal fiscal policies to maintain it—I mean the alterations in taxes, their social security, and all of the internal taxes. But he was prepared to undertake that or he said they were.

He said the great burden of the immediate demand from the Netherlands was something beyond their resources now. It struck me as much more beneficial to use our funds for that purpose than to, we will say, construct more oil refineries in each country, and more textile mills in each country because the two economies are fairly comparable. One is highly industrialized, and the other is highly agricultural. Would you say that is a fair description of that situation?

Mr. Clayton. It is a fair description, Senator Fulbright, and I think it is something that ought to engage the very careful consideration and attention of the ECA administration. It is something they ought to look into very carefully.

Senator Fulbright. Unfortunately they reject the idea that the union and political objectives are legitimate objectives for them to consider. That proposition was submitted directly and it was turned down by the committee and the Senate, of course, with the advice of the ECA.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS

There seems to be a very clear-cut distinction in their mind between political and economic matters and that they should deal only in the economic field, which I mention only because you say there is a lack of leadership in their move toward unity. There are a great many people in those countries that would like to see it come about, but there is no leadership.

Mr. Clayton. That is right.

Senator Fulbright. It comes back to the problem: Should we not try to give some leadership, and how could we do it if we had to decide? And it would be through the ECA, would it not, now, immediately?

Mr. Clayton. I would think that would likely be the most fruitful avenue to do it, yes.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you not think that if a federation of European countries could be brought about that that would be a very large step toward your further idea of an Atlantic federation?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes, I would think so. Of course, if the Atlantic federation is a long way off, as I dare say it is, the western European federation would go a very long way toward helping dissipate these war fears and helping in bringing about the economic recovery of Europe.

It would not go nearly as far as an Atlantic federation. I think in time, if we had the European federation, we would have the Atlantic federation. I think it is the right thing, and I think it is coming.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then as a practical matter it seems to me it is better to try to take the smaller step first, the one we think is most clearly within our reach, rather than skipping over it to one which people generally feel is so far off that we cannot do anything about it now. The European union could be done today, could be done tomorrow, that is, you could make the start toward it if our leaders had the idea that we ought to.

But to my knowledge they have not yet officially ever said they really thought we had any part to play in that field.

Mr. CLAYTON. Senator Fulbright, if this convention, of which I have spoken here, were called by the representatives of the governments that formed the Atlantic Pact, do you not think that the immediate effect of that would be to give a great impetus to the western European union, political union? It would give leadership to the idea, and while it might be recognized that here is something that will take a long, long time to perfect, at any rate it should not take nearly as long to perfect the union of western European countries, or at any rate the countries that are in this pact in Europe.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not know. There is such great difficulty in obtaining the attention of people on matters of this kind, as opposed to that of giving food or guns, that I am not very optimistic about the feasibility of focusing their attention on it, or for that matter, even getting a convention called, unless the President of the United States should all of a sudden decide that he is for it, or the Secretary of State.

But as an educational matter I think it is extremely difficult to get any attention on it. There are many things already done in Europe. They have tentatively made a move in this council of Europe, but it does not have any substance. They have not delegated to it, and there was an article in today's paper, this morning's Times, describing that there is no delegation of power to it. It is just another meeting of foreign ministers, which is all to the good.

I am not saying they should not do it. But with a very little urging you have got up to the point where something very important could be done immediately, practically, within a few months, if the little push that Foster Dulles has spoken of could be given by this country. The other undertaking, on the other hand, I cannot help but believe is a very good educational program, to begin with, in this country, to a great extent, and in Canada.
It has not been promoted in the past. It is a relatively new idea, whereas the idea of a European union has a respectable history for 300 years, and it is not new at all. It is one of the good ideas that is just waiting for the right time, and a little leadership.

That has been the distinction, it seems to me, as to which one we should pursue and devote attention to. If you go to the broader one, which you might say is the ultimate, I am afraid you will miss the boat on the immediate objective and make no progress toward it.

Mr. CLAYTON. I am for the western European union. I have said long ago that I seriously question if Europe will return to a condition of financial independence and a satisfactory standard of living for her people so long as they continue to operate in these little watertight economic compartments that they have had going there for so many years.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Even before this war they were not really self-sustaining. They were using up their savings before the war, were they not?

Mr. CLAYTON. They were using them up at the rate of about half a billion dollars a year.

PROBLEMS OF EUROPE

Senator FULBRIGHT. So it is not just a wartime situation that we are dealing with. It is an inherent deficiency in their economy due largely to this political fragmentation.

Mr. CLAYTON. Senator Fulbright, the beginnings of Europe's troubles go back even to the period prior to the First World War. They started then. And this is very simple. Europe had built herself up to where she was sort of a factory for the world, a workshop. You can stop the movement of goods by tariffs, but you cannot stop the machines. The machines move all over the world, and get installed, and commence doing the work of the machines that are way off somewhere else.

The rest of the world started before the First World War to industrialize, a natural ambition, and they gradually built up their industrial capacity to the point where they are not so much dependent on Europe as they formerly were. I am speaking now of the Southern Hemisphere and the Eastern Hemisphere, rather than the northern part of the Western Hemisphere.

So that Europe, with a highly industrialized population, for which she had to import a great deal of food and raw materials, and for which she paid with manufactures, had troubles even before the first war. There was a change coming about in the world before the First World War which started her troubles then.

The two wars, of course, enormously increased and hastened it.

THE TREATY AS A BREATHING SPELL

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would it be fair to say that your attitude is that this pact is a fine thing, but of a temporary nature, there is no lasting solution to it, and one of its principal merits is to give an opportunity to something along the lines you mentioned, of unity, to come about?
Mr. CLAYTON. That is the way I look at it. I think it gives a breathing spell.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That seems to me to be its principal function. We long since learned that we cannot rely on permanent protection, unless they turn into a political affiliation. If that should come about, then there might be what we call permanent solutions at least to that part of the world.

WEALTH HOARDING IN EUROPE

I think that is about right. You mentioned one matter that is not related to that, and a good deal of interest has been evidenced by the committee at other times, as to how much wealth is in hiding, so to speak, in western Europe, say in France and Italy, because of this condition. Would you venture to make an estimate at all? It is a matter of some curiosity.

Mr. CLAYTON. I could not, Senator Fulbright, but I am sure it is a very large sum. It is not only the money, but it is the daring and the initiative and the enterprise of the people who own that money that is lost. They are off on a holiday somewhere, they are taking things easy at home, they have their money outside of the country or, in the case of the peasants in many countries, they have got it soaked away in gold, maybe. Anyway that money is not working and the people who own it are not working and using their ingenuity and their enterprise as they would if they could freely employ their money.

This means that you throw a great deal of the burden of recovery and reconstruction on governments, and governments cannot do the job.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is your view that if that could be brought out of hiding by restoration of confidence, it would have a great effect upon the ECA program; that is, it would lessen the necessity for an ECA program?

Mr. CLAYTON. Well, it would probably, if it could be brought out completely and if Europe could be relieved of the awful fear of war; then I think that the objectives of ECA would be accomplished by 1952. Otherwise, I do not think they will be.

The I. M. F. has just published some very interesting figures which show that Europe was in the red with the rest of the world last year by $5,600,000,000 in 1948. That is a decline of $2,000,000,000 from 1947, which is very gratifying. But nobody who studied the matter carefully and thought over the matter believes that Europe will be in balance with the rest of the world by June 1952 if we go on as we are.

The best opinion that I have been able to get on it is that Europe will still be 2½ to 3 billion dollars in the red a year in 1952.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That was approximately the estimate made from their own programs?

Mr. CLAYTON. That is right.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clayton, we have here, with the permission of the committee, Senator Donnell and Senator Watkins, who desire to interrogate you, if it is agreeable to you.
All right, Senator Donnell.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Clayton, I am sorry that because of an earlier engagement I did not get to hear your testimony. I hastily scanned this, and there are only a few questions I want to ask you. I have no doubt Senator Watkins will ask other questions.

ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

I notice that you appear here on behalf of the Atlantic Union Committee. I do not know whether you explained into the record what the Atlantic Union Committee is, what its composition is, how many officers it has. Have you done that?

Mr. CLAYTON. I have not, Senator.

Senator DONNELL. Would you be kind enough to do that, Mr. Clayton?

Mr. CLAYTON. The Atlantic Union Committee was formed to solicit public support for the introduction in Congress of a resolution which would authorize the President of the United States to call a conference of representatives of the governments which are members of the Atlantic Pact to explore the idea of a federal union of such countries and to explore how far they could go in forming such a union.

The chairman of the committee is former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, and former Secretary of War Robert Patterson is a vice chairman, and I am a vice chairman.

I have not with me a list of its membership, but it is very large and covers prominent people in the different walks of life scattered over the country geographically.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know, Mr. Clayton, about how many members there are? You say it is a very large membership?

Mr. CLAYTON. I am sorry. I did not mean to imply that it was a very large membership, because it is not. It was only organized 2 or 3 months ago, and we are just getting the committee set up and organized. I am sorry; I do not know just exactly how many members there are at the present time.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know within reasonable limits? Are there 1,000, 5,000, 100, or what?

Mr. CLAYTON. We have a council of several hundred members, and I do not know just exactly how many members of the committee there are, but there is a council of at least two hundred members.

Senator DONNELL. Are there as many as 1,000 members of the Atlantic Union Committee?

Mr. CLAYTON. I do not think so, Senator Donnell, but I just do not know.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know whether there are as many as 500?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir; I could not tell you. The headquarters of the committee is in New York. That is where they meet, and I live in Texas and I have not been able to attend very many meetings lately.

Senator DONNELL. If it would meet the approval of the chairman of the committee, I wonder if it would be agreeable to Mr. Clayton to furnish to the committee the information as to the number of members and also as to the geographical distribution of them?

Mr. CLAYTON. I would be glad to do that.
Senator DONNEL. Thank you. You will furnish the secretary of the committee with that information?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes, sir.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND COUNCIL OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE FOR A FEDERAL CONVENTION OF DEMOCRACIES

Secretary: Walden Moore, New York City, N. Y.
Treasurer: Elmo Roper, Redding, Conn.
Executive director: Earl E. Hart, Washington, D. C.


THE COUNCIL (IN PROCESS OF FORMATION)

James D. Adams, San Francisco, Calif.
Henry E. Atwood, Minneapolis, Minn.
Dr. Robert R. Aurner, Carmel, Calif.
Dr. Frank Aydelotte, Princeton, N. J.
Mrs. Robert L. Bacon, Washington, D. C.
Emery W. Balduf, Chicago, Ill.
Howard Baldwin, New York, N. Y.
Hon. Joseph Baldwin, New York, N. Y.
Hon. Joseph H. Ball, Washington, D. C.
Mrs. Margaret Culkin Banning, Duluth, Minn.
R. E. Barlowskii, Augusta, Ga.
H. R. Baulkage, Washington, D. C.
Wendell Berge, Washington, D. C.
George Biddle, Croton-On-Hudson, N. Y.
Robert J. Bishop, Orlando, Fla.
Dr. Brand Blanchard, New Haven, Conn.
Hon. Robert W. Bliss, Washington, D. C.
William A. Boekel, San Mateo, Calif.
Mrs. Louis W. Breck, El Paso, Tex.
P. F. Brundage, New York, N. Y.
Harry A. Bullis, Minneapolis, Minn.
Lucius E. Burch, Jr., Memphis, Tenn.
Struthers Burt, Southern Pines, N. C.
Stephen F. Chadwick, Seattle, Wash.
Roy B. Childs, St. Louis, Mo.
Dr. Arthur H. Compton, St. Louis, Mo.
Aylette E. Cotton, San Francisco, Calif.
Russell W. Davenport, New York, N. Y.
Chester C. Davis, St. Louis, Mo.
J. Lionberger Davis, St. Louis, Mo.
Tom J. Davis, Butte, Mont.
Henry S. Dennison, Framingham, Mass.
Howard Dietz, New York, N. Y.
John V. N. Dorr, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Paul F. Douglas, Washington, D. C.
Max Eastman, New York, N. Y.
Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., Pacific Palisades, Calif.
Louis Fischer, New York, N. Y.
Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld, Washington, D. C.
Dr. Harry D. Gideonse, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Bishop Charles K. Gilbert, New York, N. Y.
W. B. Harrison, Wichita, Kans.
Rev. Leland B. Henry, New York, N. Y.
Bishop Henry W. Hobson, Cincinnati, Ohio
Dr. Sidney Hook, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Henry S. Houghton, Carmel, Calif.
Rabbi David Jacobson, San Antonio, Tex.
Betty Jameson, San Antonio, Tex.
Dr. Oscar Jasek, Oberlin, Ohio
Dr. Hans Kohn, Northampton, Mass.
Theodore J. Kreps, Stanford Univ., Calif.
Hon. Arthur Bliss Lane, Washington, D. C.
Russell V. Lee, M. D., Palo Alto, Calif.
Hon. Herbert H. Lehman, New York, N. Y.
Paul W. Litchfield, Akron, Ohio
Hon. Clare Booth Luce, Ridgefield, Conn.
Robert L. Lund, St. Louis, Mo.
Dr. James L. MacLachlen, Cambridge, Mass.
Clifford L. McMillen, New York, N. Y.
Mark V. Marlowe, Lexington, Ky.
Dr. James A. McCain, Missoula, Mont.
Mrs. Cole McFarland, Washington, D. C.
Leo B. McIntire, Louisville, Ky.
Edward McManus, Memphis, Tenn.
Crandall Melvin, Syracuse, N. Y.
Mrs. Walter J. Miller, Alexandria, Va.
Dr. Robert A. Millikan, Pasadena, Calif.
Dr. J. C. Montgomery, Detroit, Mich.
Mrs. Victor Morawetz, New York, N. Y.
Dr. John W. Nason, Swarthmore, Pa.
Bishop G. Ashton Oldham, Albany, N. Y.
Hon. Lithgow Osborne, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Wallace T. Partch, Oakland, Calif.
Grove Patterson, Toledo, Ohio.
Mrs. Hattie May Pavlo, Rye, N. Y.
Stanley Pedder, Carmel by the Sea, Calif.
Hubert Phillips, Fresno, Calif.
Roy Pinkerton, Ventura, Calif.
Dr. Daniel Polling, Philadelphia, Pa.
Stanley I. Posner, Washington, D. C.
A. W. Robertson, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Miss Elizabeth Robinson, New York City, N. Y.
Melvin Ryder, Washington, D. C.
A. W. Schmidt, Pittsburgh, Pa.
John F. Schmidt, Franklin, Pa.
Dr. Paul Schwarz, New York, N. Y.
George E. Shea, Jr., New York, N. Y.
Dr. Mary S. Sherman, Chicago, Ill.
Emil G. Sick, Seattle, Wash.
Theodore E. Simonson, Cazenovia, N. Y.
Spyros P. Skouras, New York, N. Y.
James N. Stee, Cornwall, N. Y.
Dr. Preston W. Stimson, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Dr. Francis A. Smith, Chevy Chase, Md.
Warren D. Smith, Eugene, Ore.
Mrs. Sara Sommer, Peoria, Ill.
Eugene R. Spaulding, New York, N. Y.
George F. Spaulding, Chicago, Ill.
Lawrence E. Spivak, New York, N. Y.
William Stern, Fargo, N. D.
Hon. Foster Steurrs, Exeter, N. H.
Roy F. Steward, Meriden, Conn.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Ralph G. Stoddard, New York, N. Y.
Ralph I. Straus, New York, N. Y.
Lester B. Vernon, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Dr. John A. Vieg, Claremont, Calif.
H. M. Warren, New York, N. Y.
Mrs. Patrick Welch, New York, N. Y.
Mrs. F. K. Weyerhaeuser, St. Paul, Minn.
Admiral H. E. Yarnell, Newport, R. I.

ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE FOR A FEDERAL CONVENTION OF DEMOCRACIES:
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BY GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

Akron, Ohio: Paul W. Litchfield, chairman of the board, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Alexandria, Va.: Mrs. Walter I. Miller.
Ann Arbor, Mich.: Dr. Preston Slosson, professor, University of Michigan.
Augusta, Ga.: R. E. Bartnowski, president, Feedright Milling Co.
Carmel, Calif.: Dr. Robert R. Aurner, Dr. Henry S. Houghton, Stanley Pedder, attorney.
Chicago, Ill.: Emery W. Balduf, Roosevelt College.
Cincinnati, Ohio: Bishop Henry W. Hobson.
Claremont, Calif.: Dr. John A. Vieg, professor of political science.
Croton-on-Hudson: George Bidde.
Del Monte, Calif.: S. F. B. Morse, chairman of the board. Del Monte Properties Co.
Detroit, Mich.: J. C. Montgomery, M. D.
Duluth, Minn.: Mrs. Margaret Culkin Banning, author.
El Paso, Tex.: Mrs. Louis W. Breck.
Framingham, Mass.: Henry S. Dennison, chairman of the board, Dennison Manufacturing Co.
Fresno, Calif.: Dr. Hubert Phillips, professor of social science, Fresno State College.
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Mrs. Dorothy McAllister, past president, Consumers' League, former Democratic National Committee Woman.
Harrisburg, Pa.: Bishop John Thomas Heistand.
Haverford, Pa.: Mr. and Mrs. Grenville Montgomery.
Hollywood, Calif.: Walter Wanger.
Lexington, Ky.: Mark V. Marlowe.
Louisville, Ky.: Lea B. McIntire, partner, Escott, Grogan, accountants.
Memphis, Tenn.: Lucius E. Burch, Jr., attorney; Edward J. Meeman, editor.
Memphis (Tenn.) Press-Sentinel.
Minneapolis, Minn.: Henry E. Atwood, president, First National Bank.
Harry A. Bullis, chairman of the board, General Mills.
Missoula, Mont.: Dr. James A. McCaig, president, Montana State University.
Newport, R. I.: Admiral H. E. Yarnell.
New York, N. Y.: Howard Baldwin, national advertising manager, The New Yorker; Percival F. Brundage, senior partner, Price, Waterhouse & Co.; Louis Fischer; Bishop Charles K. Gilbert; Rev. Leland B. Henry; Dr. Sidney Hook, professor of philosophy, New York University; Albert E. Lasker; Arnaud Marts, partner, Marts & Lundy; Clifford L. McMillen; Mrs. Marguerite Nott Morawetz; George Shea, Jr., editor, Barron's Weekly; Eugene R. Spaulding, vice president and general manager, The New Yorker; Ralph Stoddard, Institute of Public Relations, Inc.; Ralph I. Straus; H. M. Warren, vice president, National Carbon Co.; Mrs. Janet Underhill Welch.
New Haven, Conn.: Brandeis University, professor of philosophy, Yale University.
Northampton, Mass.: Dr. Hans Kohn, professor of history, Smith College; Rev. Franklin D. Loehr.
Oakland, Calif.: Wallace T. Partch, M. D.
Oberlin, Ohio: Oscar Jaszi.
COUNCIL IN PROCESS OF FORMATION

Business and professional affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.

AIMS OF THE COMMITTEE

Senator DONNELL. Now, this committee was not formed in advocacy of the adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. CLAYTON. No; it was formed before the North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated and signed; but the committee does advocate the ratification of the treaty.

Senator DONNELL. I take it that the primary interest of the committee in the treaty is that it considers that the treaty is a step which might well be availed of in the ultimate organization of the Atlantic Union for which the committee stands pledged? Is that right?

Mr. CLAYTON. Well, that; and in addition, the committee feels that this is a necessary step to be taken at the present time.

Senator DONNELL. I am not quite clear whether the committee has membership independent of the council, or is it just a committee?

Mr. CLAYTON. I do not quite get what you mean.

Senator DONNELL. Here is what I mean. You say you have a committee of possibly a couple of hundred members. You are not able to tell us how many members the Atlantic Union Committee itself has.

I am unable to distinguish between the organization that you say has about 200 members, which is some sort of a council or committee, and that known as the Atlantic Union Committee, the membership of which you do not know as to the number.

Mr. CLAYTON. There either are, or will be, Senator Donnell, a good many more than 200 members of the committee. There are about 200
members on what we call the council of the committee, but the committee will be larger than that.

Senator DONNELL. I understand, then, you are going to furnish this other information?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes, sir; I will.

Senator DONNELL. That is fine. Now, Mr. Clayton, were you in the Department of State as late as February 14 of this year?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. When did you leave the Department of State?

Mr. CLAYTON. I resigned as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in October 1947; but I stayed on for about a year as adviser to the Secretary on certain economic matters.

Senator DONNELL. Did you have anything to do with the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir; I did not.

Senator DONNELL. Did you hear the matter discussed from time to time in the Department of State?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, not specifically. I resigned definitely from the Department of State, I think, the 1st of November or the middle of October 1948, and went back to Texas.

Senator DONNELL. That is, your formal resignation was presented in October 1947, but you stayed on until about 1948, and then you went back to Texas?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator DONNELL. Have you studied this treaty itself in detail, Mr. Clayton?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir; I have not.

Senator DONNELL. Have you read all of it?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Are you familiar—well, I shall not examine you on this particular article, but are you familiar with article 2, which is the one which says that the signatories will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any and all of them?

Mr. CLAYTON. I have not read that.

Senator DONNELL. You have not read that?

Mr. CLAYTON. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. How much of the treaty have you read?

Mr. CLAYTON. I have not read any of the treaty itself, but I have read several reviews and digests of it from time to time that appeared in the magazines and in the newspapers; and I have read statements of Secretary Acheson on the treaty and I have read other statements of authoritative people in connection with it.

Senator DONNELL. Have you read any statements by anyone who was raising any question as to the advisability of entering into the treaty?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes; I have read some of those statements.

Senator DONNELL. Can you tell us who were the authors of those statements?

Mr. CLAYTON. I do not recall just now. I read the other day some church statement that was opposed to it.

Senator DONNELL. Was that the Methodist organization?

Mr. CLAYTON. Yes; the Methodist Church.
Senator Donnell. You read that in the newspaper, did you not?
Mr. Clayton. Yes.
Senator Donnell. Did you see the entire resolution of that organization?
Mr. Clayton. No; I did not, Senator Donnell. I just read the newspaper account of it.
Senator Donnell. How recently have you been in Europe, Mr. Clayton?
Mr. Clayton. My last trip was in September 1947.
Senator Donnell. So you have not observed at first hand whether or not there has been an increase in the confidence of the European nations since the signature which occurred here on April 4?
Mr. Clayton. No; I have not, Senator Donnell.
Senator Donnell. I do not think I will ask you any further questions, Mr. Clayton. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Watkins.

Senator Watkins. Mr. Clayton, some of the questions I will ask you may have been asked in part before, but I want to be sure that I get your point of view as you want to give it.

NEED FOR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

As I understand it, you feel that this is a necessary step, the adoption of the Atlantic Pact, in order to form a federal union?
Mr. Clayton. No, sir; I do not. I said that I felt that this was a step on the road to federal union; but I do not think that it is necessary to the formation of federal union at all.

Senator Watkins. In what respect do you think that it is necessary, then?
Whether you say it is on the road—

Mr. Clayton. I think that this is a step that is necessary in order to convince Soviet Russia that the members of this Atlantic Pact will stand together for the preservation of their independence and integrity.

Senator Watkins. As I understood from your main statement, you thought that there was no imminent danger of a shooting war?

Mr. Clayton. I think I said, Senator Watkins, that my opinion was of no value on that subject.

Senator Watkins. Well, for whatever it is worth—

Mr. Clayton. That is, my opinion for whatever it is worth, that there has not been and is not now in the near future danger of a shooting war.

The Chairman. May I interrupt a moment. I do not know whether you know it, Mr. Clayton, but the State Department has announced, and so has New York, that the airlift and the counterblockade are to be lifted within a few days. That is the agreement of the Four Powers.

Mr. Clayton. Thank you, sir. That is good news.

The Chairman. I thought it might help you in your being interrogated to know that.

Mr. Clayton. I would like, Senator Watkins, if I may, to amend the statement a little bit and say that I do not think that there is serious danger of a shooting war, and I have not felt so for a long time.
Senator Watkins. Do you not agree that this entering into the Atlantic Pact will be a departure from a very old and much revered foreign policy of the United States?

Mr. Clayton. Yes, certainly it is; and times have changed so greatly that we are departing from many things that 50 years ago we would have thought we never would have departed from.

Senator Watkins. That is, sometimes from policies, but have we departed from principles on which some of these policies are based? You may have a difference of policy, but a new application of an old principle.

Mr. Clayton. Senator Watkins, the world has gone through such a revolutionary change in the last few years that I cannot help feeling that if George Washington and our other forefathers lived in this present time, they would do exactly what we are doing; because I think they would realize that the times require it.

Senator Watkins. The reason I ask the question: I am not passing on the wisdom of Washington's statements about foreign policy, but I am trying to get your state of mind and whether or not you agree with me that in the changing of our policy, we should have a complete investigation and have all the facts laid before us so that we know whether or not it is a wise move to make.

Mr. Clayton. Indeed. I am in full agreement that all the facts should be before us in these matters.

Senator Watkins. And, in other words, the burden of proof, the burden for getting the evidence, is upon those who propose the change in our foreign policy.

Mr. Clayton. I think they should lay all the facts before the public.

Senator Watkins. And should make a case that would convince us that it ought to be changed.

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir.

Senator Watkins. Otherwise there should be no change.

Mr. Clayton. That is right. I think they should.

Cost of Cold War

Senator Watkins. I do not want to ask you too many questions, but I am interested in your statement that, in effect, we are now losing the cold war. As I get it from your main statement, which I did not get to hear you read, but I glanced over rather hurriedly, you said on page 3:

Soviet Russia's principal objectives in the cold war are to frighten democratic governments into excessive expenditures for defense, and to frighten private capital and initiative so that it will not operate freely.

If both objectives can be achieved, economic disintegration will likely ensue. Economic disintegration is usually followed by political disintegration.

Are you aware that under the proposed North Atlantic Pact, a part of the program is to rearm Europe partly at their own expense and partly at ours?

Mr. Clayton. Well, I know that that is the program, because measures to that effect have been introduced, I believe in Congress.
Senator Watkins. At least this committee probably has been advised that the cash outlay, or the first year's price tag, on the program is about $1,100,000,000.

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir.

Senator Watkins. And in connection with that, it has been said, and I think it was probably admitted by General Bradley yesterday to be substantially true, that we expect Europe to more than match that by putting up about six times as much for the defense rearmament as we are putting up.

Mr. Clayton. Yes, sir.

Senator Watkins. What would you think such an expenditure now on the part of these European countries would do to their economy?

Mr. Clayton. Well, if it is going to have an influence, of course, on their rate of recovery; and that is the reason that I say I think Russia is winning the cold war, because while we are doing the right thing in my opinion to enter into this pact, just the act of entering into it is going to increase the cost to the democracies of fighting the cold war. But they have no other alternative, in my opinion.

As that increase takes effect, it is going to naturally have an ill effect on the economies of the countries that are involved.

Senator Watkins. Can they afford to lose the cold war at the expense of rearmament? In other words, is that a wise policy?

Mr. Clayton. If they do not get ready, and if we do not assist them in getting ready, and if we do not assist them economically, then I think that the Russians will step in. I do not think that Mr. Dulles made an overstatement this morning when he said that if we failed to ratify this pact, he thinks we would lose Europe. I think we would.

I have spent a great deal of time in Europe since the war and have taken considerable part in connection with the Geneva Conference on Trade and Tariffs, and in connection with the early organization of the Marshall plan there with those countries. I had some opportunity to observe conditions there.

It is my opinion, as Mr. Dulles said, that if we should fail to ratify this pact we will lose Europe to communism.

DANGER OF LOSING THE COLD WAR

Senator Watkins. What I am trying to get at is the statement that you have made in effect that we are likely to lose the cold war irrespective of whether we enter into the pact.

Mr. Clayton. If we do not change our course—

Senator Watkins. In what way—

Mr. Clayton. And fight it in a different way. I think, Senator Watkins, that the only way to fight the cold war is in union.

Senator Watkins. In a federal union?

Mr. Clayton. Yes; I do.

Senator Watkins. In other words, you do not think we can win that cold war the way we are going? As you say here, there will be economic disintegration, and that will bring political disintegration if we do not win that cold war.

Mr. Clayton. I do not state it dogmatically, but I think there is grave danger that, if we and the other democracies go on spending
so much money in getting ready for a shooting war, we may lose the cold war. By these excessive expenditures, and not only by the excessive expenditures but by frightening people with capital and people with ability to make things go, we may keep people of that kind out of the economic picture because of fear of war. Then there is grave danger that we will get to the point where the burden will be so great that people will insist that it be laid down.

Then, if you lay it down, you run the risk of losing these countries to communism.

Senator Watkins. As I understood, you rather feel that merely by entering into the pact we will not give the assurance to these individuals in Europe who have means to invest to the point where they will invest them or take their part? That will not do it?

Mr. Clayton. It will give some assurance to them, but I am afraid it will not give enough.

Senator Watkins. In other words, not enough is dangerous? When you say it will not give enough, that means we are in danger on that point?

Mr. Clayton. Well, it is not so dangerous as now, because up until this time there is a great deal of capital that is hiding out and a great many people who could do things and know how to do them and have the money to do them with that are afraid to do them in the way of economic recovery and reconstruction in Europe.

I think that the consummation of this pact will give a good deal of courage to a good many of those people, but I am just afraid that it does not go far enough to give them all the courage that will be required to put them to work with their capital so that economic recovery and reconstruction can be finished within a reasonable time.

COST OF IMPLEMENTING PROGRAM

Senator Watkins. I called to your attention a few moments ago the probable cost of the first year's program, wherein we are to send about $1,100,000,000 in goods or cash, or whatever we do in the way of shipping goods, and Europe, these 11 nations, are to put up about six times that amount.

Suppose that the program increases and we extend our support to the extent of, say, $3,000,000,000 next year; and, if Europe is still working on the same formula, you would see where that would put them in a very short time. If they put up six times what we put up, that would be in the neighborhood of $18,000,000,000, which is completely beyond their ability, is it not?

Mr. Clayton. I imagine they would not go to any such length, but of course that would be a very, very heavy burden for them. I imagine they would not go to any such extent as that.

Senator Watkins. There is not any guide whatsoever, is there, as to what may happen when we get into a contest such as we are now having with Russia, for instance, in the cold war, which is continuing and which you think will continue, even though we adopt the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Clayton. Yes; I think it will continue.

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, is this not the way human nature reacts—and nations are very much the same because nations are made up of individuals—that if one group, such as Russia and
her satellites, see the opposing group, with which they are in a deadly contest, strengthen themselves, increase their armaments as we are preparing to do with Europe and preparing to do ourselves because of our heavy budget, that they likewise take the same steps as a matter of self-protection.

Mr. Clayton. That is usually the course of events, but I think that what Russia will probably do will be just to intensify the cold war without spending a great deal more than she is spending today for offensive armaments and for starting an offensive shooting war.

As I say, my opinion on the subject is no good; but I have talked with a great many people whose opinions I value and who know the Russians better than I do and who have the opinion that they do not have any intention at any foreseeable time of starting a shooting war. These people feel that the Russians are doing so well in the cold war that they just keep that up and intensify that and that costs them very little.

Senator Watkins. As a part of their cold war, is it not a fact that they are going ahead with their preparations, doing everything within their power now, to rearm themselves, to get the finest equipment, the best equipment, to get the atomic bomb and all the other weapons that they can get, so they can meet finally in this head-on clash which they say must take place?

Mr. Clayton. I assume that they have been doing a great deal of that, but the point I made was I doubt very much whether the consummation of the Atlantic Pact causes them to spend any more in that direction than they are spending now. I do not know.

REARMAMENT RACE

Senator Watkins. That is a recognition of the fact, then, is it not, that we are already engaged in an armament race with Russia?

Mr. Clayton. Well, I think that Russia, of course, started it.

Senator Watkins. There is a race then; if one has been started there must be a race.

Mr. Clayton. If you wish to call it that, a race. I do not think that it will be any race—I hope it will not be—on our part.

Senator Watkins. What would you say to the $15,500,000,000 that we are appropriating this year in what is supposed to be times of peace, if that is not a rearmament program, and a pretty heavy one at that?

Mr. Clayton. That certainly is, and it is a very heavy item; but I think in the state in which we find ourselves in the world today, that there is nothing else that we can do.

Senator Watkins. I voted for it on that theory, but it seems to me it is a clear indication that we are in an armament race with somebody and that somebody has to be Russia because it cannot be our friends overseas.

Mr. Clayton. Well, let us put it this way. We are certainly spending a vast sum of money to get ready to defend ourselves.

OFFENSIVE WAR AS A DEFENSE

Senator Watkins. I would like to take it that way, and I am sincere in believing that it is that way. I do not think my country has any offensive intentions whatsoever, and I do not think any of these 11
nations in this proposed Atlantic Pact have any offensive ideas whatever of going ahead with an offensive war unless by chance they become converted in time to the fact that sometimes the best defensive is an offensive.

Of course, that is always possible in military matters. We do not wait for the other fellow to hit us; we sometimes lead out after we get ready.

I can see circumstances arising where, if we are having a tough time, for instance, in this economic war and it looks as if we are going to have economic disintegration, we have gone ahead and rearmed, that we might finally determine that the best thing to do for this country is to end that suspense and to stop that economic disintegration by striking out offensively in order to defend ourselves.

Would that sound as though it might eventually come out of the condition that you have indicated here in the economic disintegration?

Mr. Clayton. I do not think that would ever come, Senator. I do not think that would ever come.

Senator Watkins. You do not think for a moment if we get in a tight place we are going to wait for somebody to attack us before we strike; do you? Is that your view, after your experience?

Mr. Clayton. I do not know whether we would wait to be attacked, but unless we were sure that we were going to be attacked, I do not think that we would take any offensive action in the way of starting a war.

Senator Watkins. Is it not the tendency, as history shows, that where you have two nations or two groups each building up its defenses and quarreling back and forth, each piling on its budget as we understand Russia is piling on theirs and we know we have increased ours tremendously over any other peacetime budget in our history, eventually they get to the point, back and forth, give and take, in the cold war or whatever you want to call it, which finally results in a blow-up and you have a war?

ATLANTIC UNION AS A CURE

Mr. Clayton. Yes, that is the lesson of history; and it may be that something like that will follow in this case. I frankly think that the only way to avoid it is to form a union of the democracies of the world; and if you have that, you have got so much strength—you have got 350,000,000 people with by far the greatest industrial and economic financial strength in the world; you have got 90 percent of the naval strength of the world—that I just do not think any power left in the world outside that group would be so foolish as to attack it.

Senator Watkins. That is precisely the argument, as I remember in substance, that General Bradley used yesterday arguing for the Atlantic Pact, rather than a Federal union.

Now you use substantially the same ideas that he advanced to justify the Federal union.

Do you not think the Atlantic Pact itself would be enough to accomplish the purpose of using all of these resources and the millions of people—some 350,000,000, say, altogether—rather than to go one step further and take us into some kind of Federal Government like the one we now have in the United States?
Mr. Clayton. I think the Atlantic Pact, as I said in answer to one of Senator Fulbright's questions, gives us a breathing spell—time to look ahead and consider what we are going to do about the conditions in the world.

Circumstances have thrust this country into a position of world leadership, which we did not want but which we cannot avoid, and this pact will give us a little time to consider what the next step ought to be.

History shows that these pacts are not permanent, and there have been instances in history where they have not been lived up to. So that they do not give the full sense of protection and security and confidence to the world that something else would give—something stronger, something of a political nature.

EFFECT OF LOSING EUROPE TO COMMUNISM

Senator Watkins. May I press you with another question in that direction. Do you believe that if we take this step now and go into the Atlantic Pact, that will put us in such condition, I mean have us so intermingled with the affairs of Europe for their protection—in other words, practically underwriting their peace for the next 20 years—that it is almost inevitable we would have to form a Federal union of some kind?

Mr. Clayton. No; I do not think so, and I would like to say that I do not think we would ever enter into this pact if the only product of it was the peace of Europe. I think we are entering into it to underwrite our own peace.

If the peace of Europe is destroyed, if Europe is overrun by the Russians, then I think this country would face an extremely grave situation; and I think we want to avoid that if we can.

As General Bradley said yesterday, under this pact our combined frontier with these countries is in the heart of Europe, and you cannot escape that.

Senator Watkins. I would say there are military men who disagree very violently with him on that assumption.

Mr. Clayton. If western Europe is overrun by communism, I think the situation which we would face in this country would be a very grave one, even if we faced no great military danger—and we would. The economic consequences of such a disaster would be very, very great to us. We would have to reorder and readjust our whole economy in this country if we lost the whole European market.

ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

Senator Watkins. I would like to switch over to another subject here a moment that Senator Donnell directed your attention to, and that is the article 2 of the Atlantic Pact which you said you had not read, but you had read comments on it and some general statements.

I take it, as the adviser to the State Department on economic matters, that you probably were called upon to advise them with respect to what, if any, economic conflicts were now interfering with the economic collaboration between our friends in Europe and ourselves?

Mr. Clayton. I was not called upon, Senator Watkins, to advise the State Department with reference to any aspect of this pact. I
had left, I think, before the pact was written. I had certain duties with respect to the International Bank, International Monetary Fund, the administration of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and the Habana Charter of the ITO, and perhaps one or two other things. I had nothing to do with this pact.

Senator Watkins. You regard, do you not, since you have been working in that field—for instance, tariff barriers as between the nations—ourselves and these 11 nations as an economic barrier?

Mr. Clayton. Yes.

Senator Watkins. I understood that you had taken the position in favor largely of free trade between these various groups?

Mr. Clayton. Not free trade, Senator Watkins. I have long been an advocate of freer trade than we have, and of a substantial reduction in the barriers to trade.

Senator Watkins. And you are strongly in favor of the reciprocal trade program as it is now being carried on?

Mr. Clayton. Yes.

Senator Watkins. You think that removes and eliminates economic barriers of conflicts?

Mr. Clayton. It reduces them.

Senator Watkins. Well, it goes in the direction, of course, then, of eliminating them.

Mr. Clayton. Under the act, as you know, the administration is only authorized to reduce duties by 50 percent, so they cannot go further than that.

Senator Watkins. I understand that that is the limitation, but what I am trying to find out is in, in your judgment, this article 2, when it states that the signatories, and I quote—

* * * will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them—

could possibly be referring to a greater program for the elimination of tariffs than we now have, and also for the adoption of this International Trade Organization agreement.

Mr. Clayton. I just could not say, Senator Watkins. I had nothing to do with the formulation of that sentence, the writing of that language; and I just do not know what the authors of it had in mind.

But I think we can pretty safely say that it means exactly what it says and does not refer particularly to the ITO or to reciprocal-trade agreements or anything else.

**Elimination of Economic Conflicts**

Senator Watkins. Could you illustrate by some specific thing? That is what I would like to know. When you just simply say economic conflicts—you have been in this economic field and working on it and working on these treaties, International Trade Organization, reciprocal trade treaties, and adviser to the State Department—I would like really to know if you could give us some information as to what possible conflicts they could have in mind.

Mr. Clayton. I would think that in that respect, they might, for example mean some discrimination that one country might be practicing against another in their international trade.

Senator Watkins. Could you be more specific with that?
Mr. Clayton. Country A, for example, might have certain import quotas with respect to the import of a certain commodity, and they might so construct that quota system that it would be more favorable to one country exporting to them than to another country. So you would have discrimination there.

Now, that would bring on what I call conflict.

Senator Watkins. That could be one that they might have had in mind?

Mr. Clayton. It could be.

Senator Watkins. That is the first time anyone has ever been able to give me any light on that. I wondered what the clause meant; the whole paragraph, as a matter of fact. I thought we should know what they meant before we went into it. No one up to this point could throw any light on it.

Can you think of any others?

Mr. Clayton. When you speak of conflict, that means some very serious disagreements. I would not think you could include high tariffs in that.

Senator Watkins. That causes a lot of trouble, does it not, in the world?

Mr. Clayton. Oh, yes; high tariffs do cause a great deal of trouble. But I do not know that you could speak of it as a conflict unless there is some discrimination that is involved.

These impediments to the movement of goods certainly engender bad feelings between countries, and in time set up irritations which may lead to some kind of conflict.

Senator Watkins. In your opinion would it not be very, very desirable to eliminate all tariffs between nations?

Mr. Clayton. I just do not think the world has quite got to the point yet where it can do that suddenly. It would bring about problems which it would take some time to work out, such as Senator Fulbright mentioned with respect to the attempt of Italy and France to come together in an economic union or customs union.

Elimination of Tariff Barriers

Senator Watkins. Suppose, Mr. Clayton, that the American people should authorize the President to immediately call a convention such as you have suggested as possibly the only way left to bring peace and to stop this idea of communism spreading, and we should go ahead and adopt that union and the nations would vote.

Would not that act alone eliminate tariffs as between the signatories, or I mean those who would come into the union?

Mr. Clayton. That would be a matter for the members to decide.

Senator Watkins. That would be the ultimate goal, would it not, to eliminate immediately such barriers between the states?

Mr. Clayton. I would hope so. That was a decision which our Thirteen Colonies had to make when they federated, when they formed the Union later—as to whether they would have tariffs or not.

Our forefathers very wisely put into the Constitution that there could be no tariffs between the States.

Now, whether this Federal union that we are talking about here now would so decide, I have no means of knowing. I would hope they would so decide.
Senator Watkins. That would be the aim of those who are sponsoring this particular movement, to have all of these trade barriers between the members of this particular union all removed; would it not?

Mr. Clayton. That would be my own idea, but I cannot speak for others.

Senator Watkins. I want to get at just what is behind it, what is the ultimate aim of this particular organization you are talking about.

As a matter of fact, if that is the aim, all of these states that would come in, say Italy, France, Belgium, and all the rest of them, Denmark, Great Britain if she should come into this union, and we should form that type of union, in order to make it operate and to promote good feeling and a peaceful feeling, it would of necessity require that all trade barriers between those various countries, including ours, would have to be removed as we have removed them in this country.

Mr. Clayton. I do not think so; certainly not in the beginning. But as I said a moment ago, I would hope that that would be their decision; and as I also said, it was something that the Thirteen Colonies had to decide. They decided it, I think, as you would admit and as I believe, in the right way.

DIFFICULTIES IN REMOVING TARIFF BARRIERS

Senator Watkins. I think that was absolutely right. Of course, we all lived on one continent; our economic conditions were very much the same, and we had common boundaries back and forth between us.

But you have got an entirely different situation when you take nations that have existed for many thousands of years, with all their extreme nationalities and the industries they have developed, many of which are in competition with ours. You would have a lot of difficulty, would you not, if you bring that group together and remove all barriers?

Mr. Clayton. May I say, Senator Watkins, that the distance in miles and in time between these Thirteen Colonies at the time they were formed into a union was much greater than it is between the countries represented in black on that map today. There were a great many better arguments for the retention of tariffs between those States at that time than there would be for the retention of tariffs between the members of the union that we are speaking of now under conditions as we find them today.

Senator Watkins. You think the conditions then were much more difficult to overcome than this—

Mr. Clayton. These colonies were much more isolated, in the conditions of that time, than these countries are today.

Senator Watkins. But they were without any industry. They were without any great conflicting interests, were they not?

Mr. Clayton. Of course, there was not any industry much anywhere.

Senator Watkins. That is right. But now you take, for instance, to follow your analogy, and I think it is quite important to see whether this whole movement you are talking about is a substitute or a next step following this North Atlantic Pact.
You have England, which has a large textile area; Belgium, the same way; France, more or less that way—all of them, Holland, probably not so much; Denmark, not so much; but you have strong competing countries with the United States. England and Belgium are strong competitors of the United States in an industrial way.

We had no colonies that were really competitors in an industrial way in the days when we formed our Federal Union.

Mr. Clayton. No; but nearly every one of them had something they wanted to protect.

Senator Watkins. They all had something, but they were minor as compared with what would happen—

Mr. Clayton. Certainly minor. because values in those days just did not run as high as they do today, and production was, of course, very minor then as compared with what it is now.

But you speak of competition. The difficulty that a great many of these countries have over there today is that they cannot compete with us. Just look at the exports from the United States.

Senator Watkins. They would, though, if the barriers were taken down. They would in many respects if the barriers were taken down.

Mr. Clayton. No, no; I mean in the markets of the world, where the barriers to us are the same as they are to them.

Senator Watkins. I mean in our own market.

Mr. Clayton. In the markets of Cuba, in the markets of South America; I mean in the free markets of the world, they have great difficulty in competing with us. All you have to do is to look at the commodities and the volume of the commodities that are exported from the United States today to see that our industries can compete with the world in the free markets.

Senator Watkins. In some respects I think that is true, but as between England, today it wants to ship us woolen goods, worsted manufactured goods, in competition with our manufactured goods in New England. We have shipped them machinery so that now they are in a condition to compete with us.

They have a different standard of living, as I understand most of Europe has a much lower standard of living than the United States has.

Mr. Clayton. Well, Senator, we get into a very difficult problem there. I could talk with you, if time permitted, about the woolen situation.

It so happens that we have never imported more than 5 percent of our total consumption of woolen goods in the United States for many, many years back, way back. We are exporting today a good deal more woolen goods than we are importing, which shows that we can meet these producers in the markets of the world.

There may be some specialties, certain kinds of goods, that they excel in, in the manufacture of certain specialties that our people like for example. We import those things.

But we are exporting a great deal more woolen goods than we are importing.

Senator Watkins. I understand, but I cannot understand why, if that has been true, many of our mills in New England are closed today
or running only part-time, a few days a week; and the English mills, as I understand it, are running full-time.

Mr. Clayton. We are importing extremely little of textiles, relatively; I mean relative to our consumption of either woolen or cotton textiles.

Senator Watkins. I realize we are both getting into deep water here in these particular fields, but I was interested to know just what the objective of this group that you represent is.

AIMS OF ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Mr. Clayton. Senator Watkins, the only objective is, at the present time, to get a resolution through Congress authorizing the President to call this conference so that these representatives of these countries can sit down and explore as to how far they could go in this enterprise. That is the only objective.

Senator Watkins. You have a belief also that if we once get into this North Atlantic Pact, it would be a much easier job to do what you next want to do?

Mr. Clayton. All of these evidences of cooperation among the democracies that we have had during and since the war have made it easier. Otherwise we would not be sitting here talking about this matter at all. It would not have been broached. There would not be any committee to promote it if the recent history of cooperation had not been written in the war and since the war, in many respects.

It is a gradual evolution up to this point.

Senator Watkins. Then, the answer is, if I gather from what you say, that it would be much easier if we get into the Atlantic Pact to take the next step.

Mr. Clayton. The mere fact, Senator Watkins, that these countries have been willing to sit down and negotiate and agree upon this document and sign it makes it easier, of course.

Senator Watkins. And if we get tied up with our affairs for 20 years, practically underwriting the peace over there for 20 years, we will be in so deep it will be difficult for us to get out. Then we may have to take them over and take them in as a part of the country, because there will be no other way out. Is that not right?

Mr. Clayton. I do not think it will come to that.

Senator Watkins. And it may not, but is that not a likely possibility?

Mr. Clayton. I would like to repeat that I think this document underwrites our peace as much as it does theirs.

RUSSIA AND HER PREWAR BOUNDARIES

Senator Watkins. I will pass that over for the time being. I see we will never settle it this way. I would like to go to the statement you have made—I am quoting from page 5:

But there can be no peace in the world until Russia returns to her prewar boundaries.

If Russia does not voluntarily give up or return to her prewar boundaries, there will be war?

Mr. Clayton. Not necessarily, but there will not be peace. We have not got war today, that is, shooting war; but we have not got peace either.
Senator Watkins. You cannot stay in that condition very long either, can you?

Mr. Clayton. I would hate to, but we have been that way now for nearly 4 years, and I do not know how much longer we will be that way.

Senator Watkins. There is only one way, then, to get peace in the world, and that is to get Russia back to her prewar boundaries?

Mr. Clayton. I think that is the only way we will get anything like a lasting peace in the world.

Senator Watkins. That should be our objective, should it not?

Mr. Clayton. I do not say that it is our objective in a sense that we would go to war with Russia. I think I made it clear here that the problem is—

Senator Watkins. I was just coming right up to a logical development of what you said, there cannot be any peace until Russia returns to her prewar boundaries, and our objective is universal peace or a lasting peace; the sooner we get Russia back within her boundaries, the sooner we will get that lasting peace. Does that not logically follow?

Mr. Clayton. That is absolutely right.

Senator Watkins. That is what I have in mind, and the United Nations cannot do it. We have found that out.

Mr. Clayton. I do not think they can.

Senator Watkins. And even if we did away with the veto and Russia would agree to the veto being eliminated, and we would say by passing the resolution here in an executive council that Russia is to get within her prewar boundaries and Russia said no, we would still have war and put her there, would we not, if we went through with the order?

Mr. Clayton. I do not favor going to war to put her there.

Senator Watkins. I do not either. But I am saying even if we did away with the veto in the United Nations—everybody has complained about that and said that is holding us up. But even if we did away with it, we could order things done by a majority vote, and the matter was finally put to a vote and the council would vote, say, 4 to 1 which would be, of course a majority, that Russia was to give up, that she was a threat to the peace of the world and she should get back within her boundaries, and Russia would not do it voluntarily, and apparently she would not, veto or no veto, it would mean a war to put her there or else going on as we are.

Mr. Clayton. I do not think it would. I think that—

Senator Watkins. What would happen under those circumstances?

DESECRION OF SATELLITE COUNTRIES

Mr. Clayton. I think if we play our cards right, these satellite countries will, one by one, in time, fall away from Russia.

Senator Watkins. Suppose they all did?

Mr. Clayton. Then she is back to her prewar boundaries.

Senator Watkins. In Poland she already has something by agreement there, does she not?

Mr. Clayton. I beg your pardon?

Senator Watkins. Russia has already taken over part of Poland by virtue of her agreement with Hitler.
Mr. Clayton. That is right.

Senator Watkins. Suppose we told her to get back over the line where she was in the beginning before that war started, before Hitler gave her any of Poland?

Mr. Clayton. If she loses Poland and Czechoslovakia and the other central European countries, she will go back to her prewar boundaries.

Senator Watkins. That of course is a possibility that she might, but she would not lose that unless we tried to set her back. In other words, if she is strong enough now to challenge us and to challenge these 11 nations, she certainly will not be in any military difficulty with the nations that lie immediately on her border, the way she has her people in complete control. Is that not right?

Mr. Clayton. I am sorry. I did not get your statement.

Senator Watkins. What I have in mind is this, that if she now has control of these nations that are on her border, most of them are satellites, she has her people in control and in power, I say if she is strong enough now to challenge us and to make us spend $15,500,000,000 a year, and to want to increase the armament of all the other people, she should not have any difficulty holding these satellites.

Mr. Clayton. I think she will.

Senator Watkins. That is a different—

Mr. Clayton. Even if we go on as we are, she is going to have difficulties holding them, because their economy is not complementary to the Russian economy. The economies are too much alike.

The central European countries need much that Russia cannot furnish them that they must buy from the west. They need to sell much that Russia does not want, because of the things she produces herself; therefore the economies of Russia and her satellite countries in central Europe are not complementary.

The economy of these satellite countries is complementary to the west, not to the east.

Senator Watkins. Politically how would they get out from under her control?

Mr. Clayton. I do not say that politically, if we go on as we are now, she is going to lose them. I do not say that. I say she would have difficulty in holding them, and I think what has happened in Yugoslavia is proof of that.

OVEREXTENSION OF RUSSIA

Senator Watkins. She has taken on more, in other words, than she can comfortably digest?

Mr. Clayton. I think so.

Senator Watkins. And if she takes on the rest of Europe, she will still have a heavier digestive load?

Mr. Clayton. Oh, yes, she will have plenty of trouble.

Senator Watkins. If she has trouble with what she has now, her troubles will be multiplied and probably will be way out of her control.

Mr. Clayton. They are used to trouble.

Senator Watkins. But if they get too much of it, like all other big nations of history, they go down from having bitten off more than they could chew.

Mr. Clayton. They may, Senator Watkins, but they might take all the rest of us down with them.
Senator Watkins. That could happen, of course. That all depends on how we behave ourselves over here, whether we watch our steps, whether we keep within our means, and whether or not we keep from taking on more than we can masticate.

Mr. Clayton. I wish it depended on that.

Senator Watkins. Well, it does to a certain extent. I think you will agree.

Mr. Clayton. Oh, to a certain extent, yes.

Senator Watkins. We can go beyond our capacity. I say it is a very easy matter for us to go beyond our capacity. I think you have already indicated that.

Mr. Clayton. We could.

Senator Watkins. And there is a danger now, even with this rearmament and in this cold war, of political disintegration not only for Europe but for us. You have already mentioned this in connection with this depression that might come.

Mr. Clayton. There is danger that the burden will get too heavy for us.

Senator Watkins. And it is even threatened now, if we should get a depression. You have mentioned that.

Mr. Clayton. Yes; that is right.

Senator Watkins. I think I have nothing more, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We thank you very much, Mr. Clayton. You have made a very splendid statement, and I will leave that copy of that treaty with you, if you care to take it along.

Mr. Clayton. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. I had a question or two, but the discussion has been protracted, so I will waive my right to interrogate you.

Mr. Carey.

STATEMENT OF JAMES B. CAREY, SECRETARY-TREASURER, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. Carey. My name is James B. Carey. I am secretary-treasurer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations—

The Chairman. Popularly known as the CIO?

Mr. Carey. Popularly known as the CIO—and come before this committee to testify on behalf of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

CIO STATEMENT ON ATLANTIC PACT

On March 20, 1949, the CIO issued the following statement on the Atlantic Pact:

The Congress of Industrial Organizations supports firmly an American foreign policy aimed at strengthening the political and economic condition of freemen everywhere. The European recovery program has had the CIO's unwavering support from its inception, not only from the point of view of organized labor, but also from the traditional American point of view of helping a freeman to help himself. The astonishing and heartening comeback of western Europe proves that our faith in the ERP was well-founded.

The CIO regrets the present-day conditions which make the North Atlantic Pact necessary. But no man can work effectively in an atmosphere tense with fear and foreboding. A pact with our neighbors will prove conclusively to them and to the rest of the world that America stands on her word and is ready to cooperate within the limits of her resources to preserve the social and political freedom of the North Atlantic community.
The Soviet Union has done everything in its power, short of war, to wreck the ERP. The powerful Russian propaganda machine has lost no opportunity to sow the seeds of fear and distrust among the nations of western Europe. In the opinion of the CIO, the North Atlantic Pact is the necessary reply to this terrorist campaign.

More important than that, however, is the fact that the pact will insure the full operation of the ERP. The CIO would not support a pact which diverted money aimed for reconstruction to the purchase of arms. Fortunately that is not the purpose of this agreement, and the CIO is happy to go on record as a firm supporter of the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Pact.

REASONS FOR ATLANTIC TREATY

It is our opinion that the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact with the democratic countries of western Europe is sound American foreign policy in the light of international conditions as they have developed during the last 3 years.

The break-down of the wartime unity between the United States and the Soviet Union was followed by the excessive use of the veto power by the Soviet Union to disrupt the work of the United Nations and a series of tactics in the international field which are known as the cold war. The United States has been compelled, because of its desire to support free political and economic life, to elaborate a series of policies in complete conformity with the United Nations Charter but outside of the United Nations structure. It is our opinion that the Atlantic Pact is a necessary development following the Truman doctrine and the European recovery program.

PRIORITY OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY

In the statement which I quoted above, our organization said that it would not support a pact which diverted money from reconstruction to military purposes and it is our understanding that this pact will not require any such diversion. We still believe that one of the major threats of communism against the free world is the exploitation of economic distress and economic chaos.

The Tenth Constitutional Convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations held in Portland, Oreg., in November 1948, adopted a resolution on foreign policy which read in part as follows:

We condemn the organized opposition to the ERP by the Soviet Union and its satellites and the method by which the economic misery of Europe is used for political advantage and to promote chaos and confusion. One of the ways to peace is the abandonment of this short-sighted and unjust opposition.

Although, therefore, economic reconstruction remains a major task, as we constantly learn from our trade-union friends in western Europe, economic recovery itself is being handicapped and delayed by the uncertainty and insecurity that arises from the fear of military aggression from the east. An outstanding example of this hindrance to economic recovery, although a slightly different character, is provided by the discussions regarding the revival of the industries of the Ruhr Valley.

Our European friends who in the past have had so much reason to fear the potential military value of this area have naturally been reluctant to agree to its economic restoration unless there were reasonable grounds for believing that its tremendous productive capacity
would not be transformed into yet another military assault against them.

It would, indeed, be ironic if, after having taken all the necessary steps to prevent such a use of the Ruhr industries in the hands of Germans, western Europe was left so undefended that after they have been reconstructed they could be seized by another potential enemy for the destruction of what remains of western European democracy.

DEFENSE NATURE OF THE PACT

We support the Atlantic Pact because we believe it is purely defensive in character. It is the answer to fears of aggression in Europe which result from the presence of enormous standing armies in the east. The resolution already cited above also states:

We condemn vigorously all assumptions of the inevitability of another world war. We reaffirm the basic devotion of the American people to peace and reject as absurd and unfounded the charge of the Soviet Union of warmongering unfairly directed against us. We are confident that the will of the people in every country, if freely expressed, would quickly end minority propaganda for war. The Soviet-imposed blockade of Berlin is a danger to the preservation of peace.

We condemn the use of military power to enforce economic policies which deprive 21½ million men, women, and children, of medicine, food, clothing, and fuel. We commend the courage and fortitude of the men and women operating the airlift which has prevented the success of such callous action. A solution to the present crisis in Berlin can be found if the use of political and economic coercion is renounced and the four powers can resume discussions free from economic and military threats.

It is because of the continued existence of these threats that the western European powers have welcomed the opportunity to join with us in this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, Mr. Carey. Your considered opinion is that this is a treaty in behalf of peace, and that there is nothing in it suggestive of aggression or conquest or anything of that kind. Is that true?

Mr. CAREY. Yes, sir; that is true of our own Nation, and the purposes of our Nation in attempting to bring this treaty about, as well as the people of the nations I visited recently.

I have had the opportunity of being in Europe a great number of times in the last few years. In addition to that, I have been in the Soviet Union three times in the last few years. The last time was just a year ago at this time.

I do believe that the ratification of this Atlantic Treaty will help clarify the atmosphere in Europe as well as in the United States and also, I might say, especially in the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much for the committee. We greatly appreciate your presence and your testimony.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow at 10:30 a.m., in this room.

(Thereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee recessed until Thursday, 10:30 a.m., May 5, 1949.)
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment on May 4, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee), presiding.


Also present: Senators Ferguson, Donnell, and Watkins.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, as well as the audience.

We have been having the Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We have been hearing a good many witnesses on the pact, principally those who favor its ratification. Today we will hear some of the witnesses who are opposed to ratification.

We have the pleasure of having with us former Vice President Wallace, also the former Secretary of Commerce, whom we invite to discuss the matter and submit his views to the committee. You have a prepared statement, I assume, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Wallace. I have, Senator Connally, and thank you for the kindness of the introduction. And, if you do not mind, I was Secretary of Agriculture for a little while.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Insert that in the record, Mr. Reporter.

After you shall have concluded your formal statement you will be willing to submit to questions, of course?

Mr. Wallace. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Mr. Wallace. Proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WALLACE, REPRESENTING THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF AMERICA

Mr. Wallace. Two years ago when President Truman announced the Truman doctrine of containing Russia and communism at every point I predicted it would cause us to bleed from every pore. I said that it was a vain and hopeless policy to contain an idea with guns; that the cost would be fantastically high, that it could have no end but war.

DANGERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Military Pact is now taking us toward that end. It would make all Europe into a Greece, and perhaps a China.
It demands spending by Americans without limit in dollars or time. It will create an intolerable burden on our own people, exacting lower living standards and the loss of fundamental freedoms.

The pact destroys the chances of European recovery. A permanently militarized Europe is doomed to living on an American dole. And it will accelerate all those social strains and increase that poverty which are the breeding ground for the very doctrine that it would contain. The pact is not an instrument of defense but a military alliance designed for aggression. It bypasses the United Nations and violates its Charter in a most flagrant manner. It takes away from Congress the power to declare war and lodges it in the hands of a military staff 3,000 miles from the seat of our Government. It becomes the instrument for intervention in the internal affairs of Europe. It divides the world permanently into two armed camps. And it provocatively establishes military bases on the borders of the Soviet Union.

**DOCTRINE OF CONTAINMENT**

I am confident that if we examine the maze of contradictions and difficulties into which the pact leads us, we shall reject it, as well as the arms program with which it is linked, and the doctrine of containment on which both rest. That doctrine is not an American doctrine, but a policy first advocated and since pursued by Mr. Churchill. It has failed ever since Mr. Churchill failed to "strangle bolshevism," as he puts it, in 1919. With but a short interlude during the war, Mr. Churchill has steadily adhered to a doctrine which can serve only the domestic purposes of reaction and the narrow interests of a decaying imperialism.

It is not the business of an American, in or out of the Senate or executive branches of Government, to further the policies of Mr. Churchill—and the small group of military men and imperialists who join him.

It is the business of an American to look after our own national interest. For more than 3 years now, we have been wasting our resources in furthering the narrow interests represented by Mr. Churchill. The end of that policy can only be a war from which we have nothing to gain—even should we be fortunate enough to win a military victory.

There will be only the loss of trillions of dollars and untold millions of American lives, and, in all likelihood, the end of our system of government.

It is the plain duty of every American to stop and reconsider this policy which will bankrupt our people, create intolerable burdens on both America and Europe, and can have no end but war. I assert that that policy has been a failure in any realistic sense during the past 3 years, a failure that is spelled out for us every day in the headlines from China. It is written into our tax payments. It is apparent in the bogging down in this Congress of the promised program of domestic reform, and in the lengthening lines of the unemployed.

I say that the time has come to substitute for the war policy a peace policy which will restore the basis of great-power unity within the United Nations and build a productive world.
INCOMPATIBILITY WITH UNITED NATIONS

I ask this committee—in this spirit—to examine with me the pact and the testimony which has been presented to you in its support.

In his appearance before your committee, Secretary of State Acheson said: “The hopes of the American people for peace with freedom and justice are based on the United Nations.” To this statement I most heartily subscribe.

But when Mr. Acheson claims that the pact “is an essential instrument for strengthening the United Nation,” he is being far less than frank with the American people.

For the plain fact is that the pact substitutes for the one world of the United Nations the two hostile worlds of a “divided nation.” Moreover, it flagrantly violates the plain provisions of the Charter itself.

The United Nations as envisioned by Franklin Roosevelt arose from the determination of the war-weary peoples to abandon power blocs and military alliances for a world organization based on the agreement of the great powers to work together as sovereign and equal nations for the maintenance of world peace.

Secretary of State Stettinius, appearing before this committee just 4 years ago, made our choice clear. He told you that there were two postwar roads open to the United States—one the road of great-power alliances, the other the road of collective security through the United Nations.

He made it clear that the United States was rejecting the first road because it was alien to our traditions, because it was warlike, and because it could not secure the peace.

He said:

We know that for the United States—and for other great powers—there can be no humanly devised method of defining precisely the geographic areas in which their security interests begin or cease to exist. We realize, in short, that each is a world-wide problem and that the maintenance of peace, and not merely its restoration, depends primarily upon the unity of the great powers.

There were theoretically two alternative means of preserving this unity—said Secretary Stettinius.

The first was through the formation of a permanent alliance among the great powers. This method might have been justified on narrow, strategic grounds, but it would have been repugnant to our traditional policy. It also would have contained elements of danger because it might have been interpreted as a menace by nations not party to it. Accordingly, this method was rejected.

The second method was through the establishment of a general security system based upon the principle of sovereign equality of all nations. The provisions for the Security Council recognize the special responsibilities of the great powers for maintaining the peace and the fact that the maintenance of their unity is the crucial political problem of our time.

This is from the report to the President by Secretary Stettinius on the results of the San Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945, appearing in hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, July 8, 1946, at page 72.

Yet today, Mr. Acheson presses upon your committee a treaty which embodies the very policy that our Nation rejected 4 years ago. And he does so in the name of strengthening the United Nations.
The Wall Street Journal, with which I do not often agree, spoke the blunt truth when it said that "propaganda notwithstanding, the Atlantic Pact does nullify the principle of the United Nations' and marks "the triumph of jungle law over international cooperation on a world scale."

The pact not only rejects the basic principles upon which the United Nations was founded. It violates the plain provisions of the Charter.

**REGIONALISM AND THE TREATY**

Initially an attempt was made to justify the pact as a regional agreement under article 52. That attempt now appears to have been abandoned. The argument that a pact covering all the territory from the Aleutian Islands to the Mediterranean and from north Africa to Scandinavia constitutes a "regional agreement" is too thin even for our State Department. Indeed, the argument now runs the other way. It is now insisted that the pact is not a regional agreement. For the State Department has belatedly recognized that if it were, any enforcement measures would require Security Council authorization under article 53, the very procedure which the authors of the pact want desperately to avoid by bypassing the United Nations entirely.

**SELF-DEFENSE AND THE TREATY**

The proponents of the pact argue that it is authorized by article 51 of the Charter which preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense "if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations." But this article affords no support for the military alliance contemplated by the pact. It simply preserves the inherent right of every nation to repel invasion. It is not a blind behind which military alliances outside of the United Nations can be freely entered into. No armed attack has "occurred" against which the Charter authorizes measures of self-defense. Article 51 does not permit a group of nations to determine for themselves that there is a potential threat of aggression and to enter into an alliance outside of the United Nations for the purpose of resisting it when it comes. To do so would destroy the supreme power of the Security Council to determine the existence of aggression and threats to peace.

The emergency situation to which article 51 addresses itself is similarly dealt with in section 10 of article 1 of our own Constitution. This section prohibits the separate States, without the consent of Congress, to make an agreement or compact with another State or engage in war, "unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."

I cannot believe, if the State of Michigan feared a possible attack from Canada—that Senator Vandenberg would argue the constitutional right of his State to enter into a compact with Texas, or Florida, to raise an army, organize a joint military council, and engage in other armed preparations in the name of self-defense. Section 10 of article 1 of our Constitution does not supersede the war and treaty-making powers of the National Government.

No more does article 51 of the Charter supersede the peace-making powers of the Security Council.
Yet that is exactly the interpretation which our State Department would place upon it.

Not only does the pact destroy the basis on which the United Nations was founded and violate its Charter. It would also appear to make impossible a return to the one-world principle.

AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

For article 8 of the pact provides that “each power undertakes not to enter any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.”

The pact, in purpose and effect, is directed against the Soviet Union. Once signed, the obligation of article 8 would preclude the United States from negotiating a treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. Thus, the pact not only denies that peaceful one-world understanding is attainable. It would make the attainment of that understanding impossible.

If, as Mr. Acheson has said and as I believe, the hopes of the American people “for peace with freedom and justice are based on the United Nations,” then I say with all the earnestness of which I am capable that ratification of this pact which violates the solemn pledge our Nation took when it signed the Charter and destroys the principle on which the United Nations was founded, will doom these hopes and betray the peace that America and its allies won at so great a cost.

It is urged, however, that we must abandon the one-world principle upon which the United Nations is based, return to the old way of power blocs and armaments races, and incur the terrible risk of war because of the threat of Soviet aggression.

Is there really such a threat?

THREAT OF SOVIET AGGRESSION

Every spokesman for the administration who appeared before this committee insisted that the pact is an essential measure of self-defense against Russian aggression. But none of them suggested that the Russians threaten or even intend to use armed force as an instrument of their national policy. On the contrary, the two principal Republican leaders of the bipartisan foreign policy have given us the most explicit assurance that the contrary is true.

Speaking in Cleveland on March 9, John Foster Dulles told the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America:

So far as it is humanly possible to judge, the Soviet Government does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy.

I do not know any responsible high official, military or civilian in this Government or any government, who believes that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

And only last month, Senator Vandenberg wrote:

War is the last implement they (the Russians) want to invoke.

Thus the warlike alliance implicit in the Atlantic Pact and the tremendous show of armed might with which it is proposed that the pact shall be implemented is concededly not prompted by any military threat from the Russians.
It is urged, however, that the Soviets are intransigent and uncompromising; that agreement with them is impossible of attainment, and that only a show of force can bring them to terms.

**UNITED STATES-SOViet RELATIONS**

The first question to which I submit that your committee must find an answer is: What are our Nation's terms? What are the conditions on which we are prepared to end the undeclared war we are now waging and negotiate a settlement with Russia?

These terms have never been stated. Instead, the administration has persistently refused every invitation extended by the Russians to state them.

If it is unconditional surrender that we would exact from the Russians, then indeed we will have to wage a war to gain it. For unconditional surrender cannot be won from a strong and proud people. It can only be imposed on a defeated enemy.

If the demands are for something less, then why the hesitance to state our terms? Why the cold rejection—at least three times in the past year, of the Soviet offers to talk peace?

It is not my purpose here to review the difficult and tragic course of Soviet-American relations since the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945. But I say that no honest and objective student of the events of these 4 years can conclude that the failure of agreement can be laid wholly on the Russian doorstep.

**BERLIN CRISIS**

Let me cite but one example—the question of the Berlin blockade. As you all remember, Premier Stalin took the initiative last summer in proposing a settlement of this highly controversial and most dangerous question by offering to lift the blockade simultaneously with the acceptance by the western powers of the Soviet mark as the exclusive currency for Berlin.

The agreement which resulted in Moscow and raised the hopes of the whole world for an over-all settlement with Russia was blocked in Berlin. Was the failure to solve the Berlin crisis and thus to pave the way for a general settlement of the whole German question a result of Russian intransigence and refusal to compromise?

Senator Connally is authority for the fact that the exact contrary was true. In a transcript of his press conference on November 29, upon his return from Europe, he said:

The plan proposed by the earlier talks was not looked on with favor by the military governors who did not accept it.

In plainer words, the agreement reached by our diplomats in Moscow was kicked overboard by the military men in Berlin.

Is it not clear that last fall it was the Americans and not the Russians who were intransigent and uncompromising—who really didn't want a settlement of the Berlin question?

More recent events only confirm this view.

On March 21 of this year, the Russians confirmed to our State Department what was clearly forshadowed in Premier Stalin's interview with Kingsbury Smith 2 months before—that they were prepared to
lift the Berlin blockade on the sole condition that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers be convened to discuss the German question.

Yet, for a full months the State Department concealed from the American people this further Russian concession in an effort to settle a key controversy. It was revealed only when the Russian news agency, Tass, disclosed that the offer had been made and that negotiations were pending. I wonder how many members of this committee heard this important and hopeful news from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue before they read it from Moscow?

In the meantime the State Department was filling the press and the radio with stories about Russian aggressiveness, intensifying the atmosphere of fear and hostility which it evidently thinks necessary to assure the ratification and implementation of the Atlantic Pact.

I charge that the story of this Russian initiative for peace was deliberately withheld from the American people and the American Congress because it explodes the myth on which the North Atlantic Pact is based and destroys the basis on which it is being sold to the American people.

Last night’s and this morning’s headlines carry the welcome news that agreement has now been reached to lift the Berlin blockade and convene a meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES WITH RUSSIA

Nothing must be done to prejudice the success of these negotiations. Every delay in arriving at an understanding with the Russians has cost us dearly in American dollars, American prestige, and world peace.

We would have been in an infinitely better moral position if my exchange of letters with Premier Stalin last spring had been followed up with the discussions that were then proposed. We would have been in a stronger position if the Stalin proposal to lift the Berlin blockade had been consumated last summer—and we would have saved at least $13,000,000 a month in the cost of the air lift.

I propose, therefore, that this committee withhold any action on the North Atlantic Pact pending the outcome of the Foreign Ministers Conference which it now seems certain will be convened.

If our Government sincerely desires a peaceful arrangement with the Soviet Union on the vital German question, then we must approach her with the peace of good faith negotiations not with the sword of the Atlantic Pact.

This is our great, and it may be our last, opportunity to arrive at a peaceful settlement of our differences. By withholding action on the pact pending the Foreign Ministers Conference, this committee can make a material contribution to the successful outcome of the Berlin negotiations and this new hope for world peace and understanding.

I have shown that even the most ardent proponents of the pact do not contend that the Soviet Union threatens or plans a war against the West. I have shown too that here is no evidence that peaceful understanding with Russia cannot be obtained if our Government frankly states its terms and sits down in good faith negotiations to obtain them.
If this be true, as I believe it is, then how must the North Atlantic Pact appear to the Russians? Can they interpret it as anything but a plan of aggression on our part? Stripped of legal verbiage, the pact moves American military and air bases up to the very borders of the Soviet Union, establishes a general staff on the European Continent, arms western Europe and places it on a war footing.

Recently a national conference of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing all Protestant denominations, declared:

No defensive alliance should be entered into which might validly appear as aggressive to Russia, as a Russian alliance would undoubtedly appear to us.

If we apply this Christian principle to the Atlantic Pact, its meaning to the Russians becomes clear.

Suppose the Soviet Union entered into an alliance with Mexico, Canada, and Cuba, built airstrips on their soil, established a joint chiefs of staff in Habana, and supplied its allies with billions in arms? Could we be convinced that the treaty which surrounded us with this military might was a pact of peace?

Could we be prevailed on to avoid the countermeasures for our own defense which would inevitably take us down the road to war?

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF TREATY

The American people too, are entitled to a fuller, franker, and more candid exposition of American aims and objectives under the pact than they have yet been given.

I have read Secretary of State Acheson's efforts to reconcile the pact with the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. I am no lawyer—let alone a constitutional lawyer. But I think I can understand the English language. And when the pact says that an armed attack (provoked or unprovoked) against one of the signatory nations shall be deemed to be an attack against them all, I regard this as not only a moral, but a contractual commitment to go to war without a declaration by the Congress.

And when I know, in addition, that the pact provides for American participation in the Joint General Staff, already established at Fontainbleau, with power to command the movement of troops, long-range bombers, and warships, then I must conclude that the power to commit this country to war has been moved 3,000 miles away from the Chambers of this Capitol, to quarters in an ancient French palace.

SUPPLYING AMERICAN TROOPS TO EUROPE

Another vital question to which the American people are entitled to a full and frank answer is whether any American troops will be quartered in Europe and subject to the command of the Fontainbleau military staff.

I have not had an opportunity to read the testimony before this committee in full. My information comes from the press. There, on April 28, I read that Secretary Acheson assured the committee that—

There was absolutely no intention to send substantial numbers of American troops to Europe in any eventuality short of war.
But on April 29, I read that Secretary of Defense Johnson—declined for what he called the "best interests" of the United States and western Europe to respond to a question by Senator Donnell as to whether a plan was in preparation to provide manpower to Europe along the Rhine.

I ask the members of this committee, in all conscience, whether you are prepared to act on the pact on the basis of such contradictions, half truths, and evasions? Shall we wager the peace of the world and the lives of Americans on this kind of testimony?

ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN EUROPE

Mr. Acheson told your committee that one of the objectives of the pact was—to establish an arrangement which would promote full economic recovery through removing the drag of a sense of insecurity.

Last year the American people were assured by Mr. Acheson’s predecessor that the Marshall plan, by contributing to the economic recovery of western Europe, would make an arms program unnecessary. Today, we have the Marshall plan. It has not succeeded. The report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation made it perfectly clear that at the end of the Marshall plan, Europe will be suffering from a deficit of $3,000,000,000 annually and the standard of living of her people will be 10 percent below the not-too-prosperous year of 1938.

Now, we are told that the cure for this failure is exactly the medicine that the Marshall plan was to make unnecessary—a military alliance and a rearmament program. This is bad politics and worse economics.

There is not a nation in western Europe which is not suffering from inflation, which does not have difficulty balancing its budget, which does not need every single able-bodied man and woman to rebuild its economy. Yet the pact and its arms program now propose to saddle these nations with an intolerable burden of armaments.

Mr. Acheson made it clear just how great that burden would be when he said that for every dollar of American arms sent to Europe, the European nations would be required to furnish 6 or 7 dollars. We plan to supply them with 1.1 billions in arms next year. Their military budgets already exceed 5.2 billion dollars annually.

Does Mr. Acheson seriously think that his requirement that the European nations shall more than double their arms spending next year will "promote full economic recovery"?

Does Mr. Acheson, or anyone else, seriously believe that the "drag of a sense of insecurity" will be removed when a nation is forced to double its military budget?

I submit the answer to a vote of this committee. Senator George, as chairman of the Finance Committee, has expressed grave doubts about the addition of 1.1 billion dollars of arms under the pact to our present military budget. But that amounts to a little more than a 7-percent increase. It is only 2 1/2 percent of our total budget. Yet we are genuinely worried about the effect such an increase would have on our economy—and most important, on the confidence of our businessmen.
Does Mr. Acheson think that there are one set of economic laws that operate in America and quite another in Europe? I say that the effect of the arms program will be to destroy forever western Europe's chances of recovery. And what will be its effect on the people of western Europe to whom we look as allies? It is bound to result in sharp cuts in their programs for social welfare and a serious deterioration in their living standards.

Senator Giua, a member of the Italian Senate who is visiting me, has told me something about the growing problem of unemployment in Italy at the same time that large-scale Italian industries such as Fiat are turning from the making of tractors to the making of tanks and machine guns.

Does this sit well with a half-starved people? Let me read you what an active French political leader has written in judgment on this policy:

Under present conditions it is impossible to increase both civilian and military production. To impose a program of military production on western Europe is to paralyze a civilian production that is already far from sufficient. That would mean creating living conditions socially and politically favorable to the Communists. (From an article by David Rousset, in the Nation, April 9.)

But even as the pact creates the conditions favorable to Communists, it also sets up the machinery, according to Mr. Acheson, for military intervention in the internal affairs of the pact nations, after the pattern we have followed in Greece.

I submit that a pact which has these consequences is too dangerous for sane men to adopt. It creates the conditions of uncertainty and despair. It lowers living conditions and creates the conditions for communism. Then it provides the means for suppressing the very condition it created.

Such a policy can serve no good. It can only earn us the hatred of every European, regardless of his politics.

COST OF THE ARMS PROGRAM

Senator Vandenberg said last week that the 1.1 billion-dollar arms program that has been tied to the pact is "comparatively trivial" and "relatively insignificant."

That judgment may well be prophetic. It is trivial by comparison with the fantastic and endless spending for arms that the pact will set in motion. And it is insignificant relative to the costs that weigh more heavily than money costs—the cost in less welfare, the cost in reduced freedom, the cost of a growing militarization of our way of life.

The money cost of the pact will be fantastic. Mark Sullivan, the most conservative of the columnists, pointed out only last week that the doctrine of containment having failed so miserably in China means that there is no end to the billions we shall have to spend in western Europe and Japan. The House has recently approved more than $15,000,000,000 for the military budget for next year, an increase of almost a billion over the President's budget estimate. And it has been estimated that we have already spent over $24,000,000,000 on the cold war to date.
I measure those expenditures in terms of what we have been deprived of—housing, slum clearance, cheaper power for farms and industry, the development of our great river valleys, hospitals and schools, better social security. But these losses are as nothing compared to the greater losses to come as the full impact of the arms program is felt.

The relatively low estimate for the first year of this military program is in itself a gross deception. The administration asks for only 1.1 billion dollars. We are told that about half of this will be in "surplus arms," valued at 10 cents on the dollar. But Colonel Johnson, in his testimony on April 21 before this committee, made it perfectly clear that the National Military Establishment wants this surplus replaced. The New York Times reported as follows:

Secretary Johnson was understood, however, to have made it plain that the National Military Establishment expected to be paid back in time for all equipment that might be taken from its arsenal.

The bill for replacement will not be 10 cents on the dollar, nor even a dollar on the dollar, but considerably more because the equipment shipped abroad will be replaced at higher prices and with more expensive models.

The United States News put it this way:

Europe in the first year is to get $4,520,000,000 of United States arms, written down to $45,000,000 to calm taxpayers. Replacement cost of arms to be given might be around $8,000,000,000.

The New York Times characterized this transaction as "A liberal system of bookkeeping." I would call it a plain fraud on the American taxpayer. It is the method of confidence men, not of statesmen. It is the obligation of this committee to read the fine print on the contract they are being asked to sign on behalf of the American people; to determine the full cost, and the real cost, not only for next year but for succeeding years.

MILITARY DEFENSE OF EUROPE

There are apparently two schools of thought concerning the military defense of Europe. Both are equally costly. One school would use American long-range bombers and European manpower. That is the Air Force point of view, so callously expressed by a venerable Member of Congress last week. His comment may rank with young Mussolini's description of the "beauty" of dropping bombs on defenseless children in Madrid. The other school is represented by the leaders of most of the western European nations and by General Bradley—if I understand his Army Day speech and recent testimony before your committee. They would send sufficient American soldiers abroad to hold the Rhine or Elbe or whatever line is chosen as the new Maginot line of western Europe. Since the arms program is so definitely tied to the pact, it is the duty of this committee to scrutinize the costs of these two different strategic concepts.

The Brussels Pact powers recently said they required 36 to 70 divisions of their own. The cost of equipping a modern division is estimated at between $200,000,000 and $400,000,000. The story from Brussels gave the latter figure. That means a total of fourteen to twenty-eight billion dollars for a small force which has comparatively
little defensive value. This figure does not take into account the billions for planes, for ships, for military bases, for equipment docks and airfields, and for raw materials and equipment. It is reasonably certain that the minimum rearming of western Europe will exceed $20,000,000,000—more likely it will come to $30,000,000,000. But this is minimum rearming, and it must be squeezed into a very short time.

If there is a war, 36 to 70 divisions will only make a Dunkerque of all Europe. Hitler's 300 divisions could not stop the Russians. And M. Queuille, the French Premier, has hinted that America must defend all of France. Military experts say this would require a million American soldiers. So the cost will soar into many times $30,000,000,000. It will mean a compulsory draft; it will mean strict controls over manpower to provide American manpower overseas and reserves in this country.

That way may be one way of eliminating the unemployment that is already upon us, but it is scarcely the way that sane men would choose when they have an alternative.

If we choose the method of long-range bombers, the bill is not appreciably less. The cost of a bomber is anywhere from two and one-half to four million dollars. New models cost more. Bombers need protection and they need bases and they need servicing, and above all, they still need ground force somewhere along the way.

NEOLIOE OF WELFARE NEEDS

Last January when the President released his budget I warned that the size of the military spending was seriously endangering our welfare needs, that it was unnecessarily cutting appropriations for housing, for veterans, for schools, for roads and power, and for the development of natural resources.

Dr. Nourse, the President's Economic Adviser, has since confirmed this statement. On April 7, he said:

To provide even $15,000,000,000 for military spending he [Truman] had to hold down on recommendations for maintenance or expansion of the Nation's natural resources and its public plant and limit the scale of social services for education, health, and social security far below the level of his own deferred civilian needs are still there, ready to employ any manpower or block of materials made available by reduction of our preparedness effort.

Any increase in military spending takes its toll in human welfare. In the same week that the House voted to increase the military budget, the Agriculture appropriation was cut by $25,000,000 and Public Works by 15 percent.

I should like to point out to any who think that an arms program is the cure for economic crisis, that Government spending is now running at the rate of six to seven billion dollars a year above 1948. Much of the increase is for the military. Yet industrial production is today down 7 percent. Farm income is off $2,000,000,000 a year. Small business failures are rising to alarming proportions. Pay rolls of factory workers are off $4,000,000,000 per year. Unemployment and part-time employment are becoming major problems.

In Detroit, 60,000 jobs were lost in 4 months.

In the Chicago Federal Reserve District unemployment has mounted to 575,000.
The New York City relief commissioner estimates that more than a million residents belong to families whose principal breadwinner is unemployed.

The arms program to date has not meant jobs or profits to the 98 percent of Americans who neither own nor work in munitions factories. Arms spending is definitely not a WPA with guns.

Since January it has become perfectly clear that the President's Fair Deal program has virtually collapsed under the pressure of a foreign policy that demands more and more money for military uses and more and more compromise to achieve its ends.

THREAT TO LIBERTIES

Two months ago, the administration abdicated on civil rights and now it is abdicating on repeal of Taft-Hartley. Equality for the 13,000,000 Negro Americans and a free labor movement for American workers have both fallen victim to the growing atmosphere of repression and restraint that is the inevitable accompaniment of a war-breeding foreign policy. In the name of the anticommunism which dominates our foreign policy, precious freedoms are being lost. Men are afraid to speak because they may lose their jobs in an atmosphere of terror and repression.

And now, freedom of thought itself is again under attack as the Senate Judiciary Committee rushes hearings on the 1949 versions of the Mundt thought-control bill.

The loss of freedom of thought—the loss of freedom to criticize what you think is wrong; the loss of the right to say no—is even more serious than the hundreds of billions we will eventually lose in the cold war.

That is why I was so appalled by the deliberate denial of visas by the State Department to my good friends Pierre Cot of France and Konni Zilliacus of England, members of Parliament in both countries, leaders in the fight against the forces of fascism in the days when theirs was not everywhere a popular cause and leaders today in the fight for peace.

It is shocking that we should subject members of the oldest parliament in Europe, our fellow democracies, to such a humiliating experience.

But it is indeed more shocking and indeed sobering that they were barred from this country by a man who once was an associate of the late Justice Holmes, our most eloquent advocate of free trade in ideas.

It is indeed a tragic commentary on the state of our American democracy that the anti-Communist fear complex has claimed the mind of our own Secretary of State.

AMERICAN POLICY IN GREECE

The policy of the pact has been given a laboratory test in Greece. The results in that country to date scarcely commend it extension on the vastly greater scale now proposed.

An enterprising reporter who examined and compared the successive reports of the President on Greece calls our experience there the greatest military miracle of all time.
After 2 years and the expenditure of more than a quarter of a billion dollars, with a reputed casualty rate of 640 percent, there are more guerillas in Greece today than when the Truman doctrine was first invoked on behalf of that unhappy country.

Should we not seriously examine a policy which has yielded such results? The truth is that the Greek impasse is susceptible of settlement—and has been for over a year.

Last year Herbert Evatt, who undertook conciliation on behalf of the United Nations, complained that it was not the three-border countries that were holding up a settlement of the Greek situation, but the American-dominated Greek monarchy which refused to settle because it would not give up its claim to land beyond its present borders.

If Greece reveals the folly of our policy, China demonstrates its complete bankruptcy.

AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA

In the case of China, Mr. Acheson has shown an awareness of the irreparable nature of our failure. Some 2 weeks ago, he answered Senator McCarran’s proposal for an appropriation of one and a half billion dollars to Nationalist China. That answer delivered, I believe to you, Senator Connally, is as good a summary of the case against the pact as I have seen anywhere.

Mr. Acheson admits that our Chinese policy has failed. But more important than this admission of failure is his analysis of the fatal defects of the policy.

Mr. Acheson says that the economic and military conditions which Senator McCarran would tie to China aid, would be deeply resented by the Chinese people as an extreme infringement of China’s sovereignty. It would arouse distrust of this country’s motives in extending such help.

Further, says Mr. Acheson, to try to reverse the present military situation in China, would “require the use of an unpredictably large American armed force in actual combat.”

Such action would represent direct United States involvement in China’s fratricidal warfare and would be contrary to our traditional policy toward China and the best interests of this country.

I take these quotations from the New York Times, account of his letter on April 15.

Now I submit, gentlemen, that Mr. Acheson has not only pronounced a judgment against the McCarran proposal. He has indicted the policy that underlies the pact as well. For the McCarran proposal is nothing but the policy of the pact—applied to China. We have tested that policy in action and it has failed. It has failed for one thing, as the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post have both pointed out, because you cannot fight ideas with guns.

Another reason for the failure is that in the effort to fight an idea like communism we inevitably make compromises with the worst reaction and even with fascism.
We are adopting methods at home in fighting communism that are completely repugnant to free men. We are doing the same thing abroad.

The Salazar dictatorship of Portugal is now proclaimed in the preamble to the pact as a member of a group of nations with "common heritage and civilization * * * founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."

But Portugal is only a way station on the road to alliance with reaction.

The State Department and the military are apparently planning to bring Franco Spain into the pact as well. This very day, efforts are being made to sneak Franco into the back door of the United Nations. And only yesterday, the State Department authorized Spain to apply for a large Export-Import Bank loan.

To me and to millions of freedom-loving men and women in Europe and America, this consorting with the butcher Franco in the name of defending democracy marks a new and shocking low in international morality.

Even worse is the rebuilding of the western German war potential. Mr. Acheson said in his press conference on the pact that Germany is not to come into the pact "now." But he has made it clear in previous speeches, as early as May 1947, that he regards Germany and Japan as the workshops of western Europe and Asia. So again we begin the grim journey over which we and western Europe have twice already traveled.

Already, even before a peace treaty is signed, the American military governor defends the hiring of Nazi cartelists to run Germany industry. Again German industry is to become the arsenal of Europe, in the hands of the same men who twice before have used it for wars of conquest.

Is this the way to win the friendship, the support and the allegiance of the people of western Europe, twice in a generation the victims of German aggression? If we are ever to fight a war of self-defense, if ever we are in danger of attack we shall need all the friends we can get. We will not find them among the reactionaries, the enemies of democracy.

We can find them only among those people who love democracy and whom we have helped find their way to its full expression.

Gentlemen, the North Atlantic Pact and the arms program which is tied to it has been offered to the Senate and to the American people, in the name of self-defense, national security, and the preservation of our democratic system. It will gain us none of these.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATLANTIC TREATY

As I have pointed out, any fair appraisal of its consequences demonstrates that it can lead only to national insolvency, the surrender of our traditional freedoms, war, a possible military disaster, and the certain sacrifice not only of life and treasure but of the very system of government which it is supposed to preserve.
I say that there is an honorable, a peaceful and a practical alternative to this mad course. I say that great nations which really believe in peace can find the road to peace.

The Russians have shown their willingness to travel that road by lifting the Berlin blockade that seemed to stand across it. If the administration sincerely desires peace, let it state its terms to the Russians. Let the heads of both nations, after preparation at the expert level, sit down to negotiate. Peace will require compromise and accommodation on both sides.

But no government that sincerely wants to serve its people can refuse to discuss the terms of peace and instead engages in war alliances and initiate armaments races.

**PRINCIPLES FOR UNITED STATES-SOVIET AGREEMENTS**

I present again as a basis for such discussions the major points on which agreement can be reached without sacrifice to any American principle or interest.

First, the conclusion of a treaty that would establish a unified and democratic Germany dedicated to peace and stripped of its war potential.

Second, agreement to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

Third, agreement by both nations to give up all military bases in other UN countries and to halt the export of weapons to other nations.

Fourth, the resumption of unrestricted trade, the establishment of the free movement of citizens and the resumption of free scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries.

Fifth, a general reduction of armaments that would free the economies of all the world of the burdensome weight of arms and enable them to devote their energies and resources to peacetime production.

Finally, the establishment of a World Reconstruction and Development Agency within the UN to build a productive and economically unified Europe, without barriers between east and west, and to assist the free development of the industrially backward countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

This program is the practical, the same, the peaceful alternative to the Atlantic Pact.

By withholding action on the pact, it is within the power of your committee to create the atmosphere in which this program can be discussed by the diplomatic representatives of the United States and Russia as they bring the Berlin blockade to an end and prepare to tackle the German problem.

It is a program which can end the cold war and avert the atom war.

It is a program completely in our own national interest that yet serves the best interests of a growing and united world.

We insure our own enduring prosperity by helping other nations to a better life.

It offers security based on friendship, not fear.

It opens up a new century of hope for mankind.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, your statement seems to encompass not only the pending treaty that we are considering, but the whole field of international policy, does it not?
Mr. WALLACE. The relationship of the treaty to the entire structure of our foreign policy. I do not see how the treaty can be considered except in this framework of reference.

ATTITUDE TOWARD AMERICAN POLICY IN GREECE

The CHAIRMAN. Take the case of Greece, for instance. You complain about our policy in Greece. Were you opposed to our entering into the Grecian situation and aiding Greece originally?

Mr. WALLACE. In the very first instance, Senator, when I was still Secretary of Commerce, in August of 1946, I made representations, not in any official sense but in an informal way, to the Export-Import Bank, pointing out that there was very great misery in Greece and that I thought that Greece should be helped by an Export-Import Bank loan. I was informed, however, by the officials of the Export-Import Bank at the time, and also, I may say, by certain members of the State Department, that the big financial men of Greece were conducting affairs in a very bad way, that money was fleeing the country, that graft was rampant, and I was convinced while I was still Secretary of Commerce, by the presentation made by Government officials, officials of the Export-Import Bank, and the State Department, that that was an unwise course.

The CHAIRMAN. Aside from that particular aspect, did you oppose or favor our aiding Greece in the methods we have pursued?

Mr. WALLACE. I have made as complete a statement as I can about my attitude in August 1946. If you are referring particularly to the statement as made by President Truman on March 12, 1947, at which time he announced the so-called Truman Doctrine and used aid to Greece and Turkey as the illustration of the implementation of the Truman doctrine, I can assure you, Senator, that I opposed it with all the vigor at my command, and made a strong statement over the radio against the policy on March 13.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have, have you not, steadily resisted that policy since in the press and on the radio?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I have been convinced it was most unwise.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, you have aggressively opposed that in the press and on the radio.

Mr. WALLACE. In every way I could.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. You open your statement on the Russian situation, largely. You say that Russia has made several efforts to have conferences with the United States with a view to settling these difficulties. Was there ever any official communication from the Premier of Russia, or any responsible authority, to the President of the United States, asking for such a conference?

Mr. WALLACE. I am not aware of any official document, sir. Undoubtedly Stalin made various statements to individuals that indicated that he was willing to consider something of the sort, and I believe there might have been something in the nature of a semiofficial interchange about a year ago between our Ambassador Bedell Smith and the Russians. I am not aware of the exact wording of that
interchange. I think Molotov at that time did make a precise and more or less official statement to Bedell Smith. It was along in April or May of 1948, as I remember it.

The Chairman. Was it a general statement or did he point out particular matters?

Mr. Wallace. It indicated a willingness to talk business.

The Chairman. Mr. Molotov at that time, of course, was Secretary of Foreign Relations of that country, and you assumed that he was speaking for Mr. Stalin, is that correct?

Mr. Wallace. I think that would be a correct assumption, sir.

The Chairman. But he did not point out any particular objective of such a conference, did he?

Mr. Wallace. I do not have a copy of it here. It is in the record. You can verify the precise nature of it. It would be surprising to me if he went into any very great details. It would be altogether against diplomatic procedure to go into any very minute details in opening up negotiations.

WALLACE LETTER TO STALIN

The Chairman. You spoke of a letter that you wrote to Mr. Stalin, I believe, did you not?

Mr. Wallace. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Did you consult with the President of the United States before you wrote that letter, or with the State Department?

Mr. Wallace. I did not, sir.

The Chairman. You assumed——

Mr. Wallace. I may say it was an open letter. It was not a letter that was transmitted in any underhanded way.

The Chairman. I understand that. It was in the press, of course.

Mr. Wallace. I do not believe it was in contravention of the Logan Act of 1798, if that is what you mean.

The Chairman. I have no reference to the Logan Act. I am just referring to your assumption that on account of your position, your prestige, and your former connection with the Government that you thought that an approach to Mr. Stalin on your part would have the desired effect. Is that correct?

Mr. Wallace. I felt the points which I had in my letter would help contribute some to peace, and I have reason to think that those points listed in my letter did contribute some to peace, just as I think that a certain statement made to Kingsbury Smith by Stalin was utilized to bring the crisis to an end. I think statements of that kind oftentimes serve as a very useful and important prelude to actions that are taken later.

The Chairman. Mr. Kingsbury Smith is a British citizen and a representative of the press. He is a very capable man, no doubt. But do you regard it as proper or desirable for the President to take up a matter that was only communicated to Mr. Kingsbury Smith instead of being communicated to our State Department or to the President himself?

Mr. Wallace. I regard anything as proper and desirable if it works toward peace, and I very much question whether anything improper was done in this case. I know I am very grateful and very happy indeed to see this Berlin crisis working out the way it is at the moment.
BERLIN CRISIS

The CHAIRMAN. Has not the Berlin crisis, as you call it, worked out because the United States has for a long period of time been urging its settlement and making overtures to get a settlement of the airlift?

Mr. WALLACE. I think there is considerable difference of opinion with regard to that.

The CHAIRMAN. It worked, didn’t it? They got the airlift lifted.

Mr. WALLACE. Returning to the earlier part of your statement, I remember a statement that appeared in the United States News last fall by Mr. Hawkinson, I think it was. It was in the September 10 United States News, in which Mr. Hawkinson said:

We had failed at London to present a concrete program for the unification of Germany, and I have the feeling we went to that meeting convinced that it would not work. We did not want unity then, and seemed determined to push ahead with a west Germany. We thus were vulnerable. Somehow we had gained the idea that we could tell off the Russians. They surely were aware of this, and I think we greatly underestimated them.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a statement from a paper. That does not necessarily represent your view?

Mr. WALLACE. No. It is interesting as coming from what is generally looked on as being a rather conservative publication.

THE ATLANTIC TREATY AND MR. CHURCHILL

The CHAIRMAN. On the second page of your statement you level your guns on Mr. Churchill. You say:

It is not the business of an American in or out of the Senate or the executive branches to further the policies of Mr. Churchill and the small group of military men and imperialists who join him.

Do you regard Mr. Churchill as being the author of the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. WALLACE. I do in effect. In all reality I look on him as the author of the North Atlantic Pact, more than any single individual.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he participate in any of the negotiations looking toward the formation of it?

Mr. WALLACE. No, but he has been the architect, I would say, looking toward this consummation. While the war was going on I talked with Churchill myself, and heard him express his views. There is no question in my mind about his being the architect of this whole approach. I remember so well when he made his Fulton, Mo., speech. It was generally interpreted—perhaps to some degree unwarrantedly at the time because he did not express his full mind on that occasion—in foreign quarters that that was a straight-out plea for a military alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in free speech, you say, and he has a right to express his views; has he not?

Mr. WALLACE. I am not criticizing that at all. I want to have the other side presented also.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a strong international figure who contributed very greatly to our success in the war. Is it not natural that he have some concern as to the future of Europe?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir. He has that right. I agree with you completely and enthusiastically about the great contribution he made to
the victory in the war. I want to make sure he does not spoil the
peace.

The Chairman. He did not write the North Atlantic Pact, I may
say to you. Negotiations were carried on among the nations that were
signatory thereto, and the State Department was in constant con-
sultation with the Committee on Foreign Relations, and revealed to
us every step that took place in that treaty, and so far as I know, Mr.
Churchill's name was never mentioned.

Mr. Wallace. I would assume that the statement you made is
utterly correct, but I would hope that you would also agree with me
that he was the architect of it.

The Chairman. No. I do not.

Mr. Wallace. We just don't have the same point of view, then.

The Chairman. I do not agree with that. His views may be in
accordance with it; I do not know about that. But so far as the con-
struction of the pact, I know of nothing that Mr. Churchill did or
said—

Mr. Wallace. I am sure you are correct in that statement.

The Chairman. It may have had some agreement with his views.
It no doubt had, because his country is a signatory to the treaty.

Mr. Wallace. What I mean to say is, he is one of those world
statesmen who can, by making statements at strategic times and places,
so influence public opinion as to cause those who are in legislative
bodies and in foreign offices later on to embody that which he
originated. That is what I meant to say, and what I shall continue to
say.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ATLANTIC TREATY

The Chairman. You attribute the unemployment, that you say is
growing, to the Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Wallace. No. I did not say that.

The Chairman. I know you didn't. I am asking you now.

Mr. Wallace. No. Of course, the Atlantic Pact is not yet in effect.
But I think we can say this: That from the behavior of the stock
market yesterday, the prospect of settlement of the Berlin crisis did create
confidence. When the stock market moves up, often employment later
on also moves up, so I would say that if some way could be found to
obviate the Atlantic Pact there would be a marked strengthening in
business confidence and in employment.

The Chairman. Of course, the settlement of an international diffi-
culty like the Berlin air lift would stimulate confidence in business
and have an effect on the stock market; would it not?

Mr. Wallace. Yes.

SETTLEMENT OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

The Chairman. For that result at Berlin I think you ought to give
credit to the authorities of the United States who have been working
for the solution of that problem, not simply for a short period, but
for months and months and months.

Mr. Wallace. I do not agree with your analysis, then.

The Chairman. What analysis do you have, that the United States
did not have anything to do with it?
Mr. Wallace. I hold to Hawkinson’s analysis.

The Chairman. Let’s stick to your analysis.

Mr. Wallace. I would say that there was abundant opportunity to have settled the Berlin situation last fall if we had wanted to settle it.

The Chairman. How?

Mr. Wallace. And we didn’t.

The Chairman. How would we have settled it?

Mr. Wallace. We could have settled it by talking with the Russians. They wanted to settle it at that time.

The Chairman. How do you know they wanted to settle it?

Mr. Wallace. All I know is what I read in the press.

The Chairman. You say the Russians did want to settle it at that time but we would not settle it?

Mr. Wallace. We did not want to settle it at that time.

The Chairman. I do not think your statement is quite fair to our people, because my understanding—and I read the papers occasionally—

Mr. Wallace. I will try to find some quotations for you on that if you care to have them.

Steps Toward Peace

The Chairman. You say that the time has come to substitute for the war policy, which I do not admit, a peace policy which will restore the basis of great power movements within the United Nations and build a productive world. What are your views? What should we do to bring about this condition?

Mr. Wallace. I tried to outline the possible alternatives in the last page or two of my printed statement. The all-important thing, it seems to me, is to have an agreement on general reduction of arms, prohibition of export of arms by any nation to any other nation, and, above everything, the routing of international relief through a United Nations agency rather than the United States carrying it on directly. I believe that when the United States carries on international relief directly she is continually being suspected of interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, and she will be accused by one nation or another or one group or another within nations of having imperialistic designs. My program is to build up a strong United Nations, have such an understanding between Russia and the United States that both, without either one appeasing the other, will be happy to see a strong United Nations and route these international matters through United Nations agencies instead of through either regional agencies or by one particular country carrying on the activity unilaterally.

The Chairman. That is easy to say, but how are you going to convince Russia that she ought to go along?

Mr. Wallace. I think we have the door open part way now. Let’s talk things over.

The United Nations and Russian Actions

The Chairman. Let’s wait a minute, please. When Russia 30 times in the Security Council has vetoed the overwhelming vote and the overwhelming sentiment of the other members of the United Nations, how do you expect her just to cave in and go along with us and others through the United Nations now?
Mr. WALLACE. It is not my business, and never has been my business, to condone what the Russians do. But I think it is altogether appropriate to indicate how they got that way if we are going to act intelligently ourselves. I can understand very well how they got that way, because in late April and May of 1945, when the United Nations was formed out at San Francisco, I was still a member of the Government of the United States. I was Secretary of Commerce at the time. And I knew pretty well what was going on.

We had an observer for the Department of Commerce out there reporting several times a week as to just what was going on, and I know his grave concern. This man I inherited from Jesse Jones; it wasn't a man that I had hired nor had I changed his position. His report told of the very greatest concern. He said in some of his reports that the Russians were right in the stand that they were taking, and that we were setting up a situation that would result in an era of power politics.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Mr. WALLACE. I do not want to mention his name. You can readily find out, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I could readily find out if you would answer the question.

Mr. WALLACE. Frankly, I don't want to cost any man his job in this present state of anti-Communist hysteria. It might very readily cost him his job. I would not mind telling it to you face to face.

The CHAIRMAN. We are face to face now.

Mr. WALLACE. I do not mind telling it to you privately.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not press you.

You were for the United Nations?

REASONS FOR RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. WALLACE. Very strongly for the United Nations, and if I might continue with the statement which has to bear upon how the Russians got that way, and exercised the veto right on 30 occasions—

The CHAIRMAN. You know why they did things, and you were acquainted with their motives and all that; were you?

Mr. WALLACE. Senator, before you infer matters of that sort—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not. I am just saying, you are going to tell me why.

Mr. WALLACE. If you will allow me to complete my answer—

The CHAIRMAN. I will allow you, but I want to tell you what I want you to answer. You are assuming to say why Russia did this and that and the other, and I want you to answer frankly how you know that.

Mr. WALLACE. That is what I want to speak about now, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. WALLACE. In early May of 1945, after a considerable part of the work had been carried on at San Francisco, one of the members of the State Department who now occupies high elective public office attended a gathering in my home. I am inclined to think you yourself were there on that occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whom you are talking about, so I cannot say whether I was there or not.

Mr. WALLACE. Anyhow, this particular gentleman stayed after the other guests had left, and he told me of his very grave concern, in
view of the fact that the United States had insisted on Argentina coming into the United Nations and of the strong feeling of Russia with regard to Argentina coming in. He told me of the very grave concern of the Russians.

This is how I got the information. It was through this particular gentleman. He said the Russians felt that from now on out, so far as the Assembly was concerned, there would be against them the votes of all the American nations plus Liberia, the Philippines, plus, on occasion, any Latin nations in Europe that might later join the United Nations, plus on occasion a number of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. And he was very much discouraged—just like the representative from the Department of Commerce at San Francisco—about the outcome.

Now, about the same time Averell Harriman had a conference with some 12 newspapermen at San Francisco. He was our Ambassador to Russia, as you may remember, and in this conference you may remember he took his hair down with regard to Russia in a very frank and very complete way. That was noised all over San Francisco. As you know, newspapermen will talk, and I assume that the Russians must have heard that. I do not know that they heard it, but I do not see how they could have avoided hearing what Averell Harriman said to these 12 newspapermen, and it was very strong medicine, a week before the war with Germany was ended.

That same first week in May of 1945 Nelson Rockefeller, appearing before the House Appropriations Committee, put in a strong plea for more money for his work with Latin America. He was Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin-American relations. He spoke, as I remember the press reports that came to me, along this line. This was supposed to be an off-the-record statement, but even Congressmen will leak news on occasion.

This is the way the press reported it to me, that Nelson Rockefeller had spoken of how important it was to have some four or five million dollars for Latin-American relations, and cited specifically that it was a great triumph to have brought about this unity in Latin America, taking great credit for bringing Argentina into the unity, basing it on the fact that Argentina hated Russia so much.

Well, now, that kind of thing got about generally in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, though, right there: Was not Russia contending for White Russia and the other Russian states to have votes—

Mr. WALLACE. At that time she was contending, as I remember it, for some 17 seats in the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. She got two on her own insistence, White Russia and the Ukraine.

Mr. WALLACE. That is what came out of it all. I think we put forward the proposal informally that we get 48.

The CHAIRMAN. We did that in the papers; there was nothing official about it.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to interrogate you on one other point.

Mr. WALLACE. Could I finish the statement with regard to the 30 vetoes?

The CHAIRMAN. You can, but I do not think it is very material. Go ahead, though.
Mr. Wallace. If I might, I will just say that in view of the atmosphere that resulted at that time, Russia apparently concluded that she was going to be in a minority at all times. As we know, when people are in a minority, sometimes they take steps which psychologically are unsound. I think Russia has taken those steps from time to time. She has not considered adequately and fully world public opinion. But she felt that the veto was her only protection.

The Chairman. You talk about her being in a minority. The man that gets in a minority is the one that chooses where he goes. He gets in a minority because he wants to, not because he is forced to.

Mr. Wallace. I do not think you want to follow up that statement too far, Senator.

The Chairman. You always want to follow up your statements.

Mr. Wallace. I will follow it up for you, if you wish, but I do not think you want to follow it up too far.

The Chairman. I do not think you had better.

WORLD SPLIT

You say that this treaty and our policy and acts have split the world up into two systems, is that right?

Mr. Wallace. Yes.

The Chairman. All right. Let's see what Mr. Stalin thinks about that, or Mr. Lenin.

Mr. Wallace. Do you happen to have the date of the quotation?

The Chairman. I am going to find it if I can. It was before Lenin died, I will say that.

Lenin has said that the Soviet and capitalistic state "cannot live in peace. In the end, one or the other will triumph. A funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet or over world capitalism."

That was in 1920, a good way back. It is quoted from the English edition of International Publications, and so on.

He also said:

If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the bourgeoisie in its own country, and is waged with the object of strengthening and extending socialism, such a way is legitimate and holy.

Does that not envisage a view that the rest of world has got to be conquered for their type of socialism?

REASONS FOR RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE

Mr. Wallace. Well, Senator, it is not my purpose to condone anything that Communists may say, or that Russian leaders may say, but again I think it is important for our own safety that we inquire how those people got that way. And I do know that in 1919, and Bill Bullitt told me this himself, in February or March of 1919, he, on behalf of the Allied Powers, went to call on Lenin, in Moscow or Leningrad. He put up to Lenin the proposal that the Bolsheviks should be satisfied with a relatively small area in central Russia. It did not include the Ukraine or cross the Urals, and Lenin agreed.

Bullitt returned with the proposal, but Churchill said, "No; we can get rid of the whole crowd," and they went ahead and tried to get rid of the whole crowd.
When I was Secretary of Commerce I sent over to Russia—this was at the time the British were endeavoring to find out about Russian trade—one of the representatives of the Department of Commerce whom I had inherited from Jesse Jones, and he in turn had inherited from Harry Hopkins, and he in turn had inherited from Dan Roper and he in turn from Secretary Hoover. He was a reputable man. I sent him over there, and as I remember, he had conversations with Mr. Mikoyan, who was the Russian Secretary of Commerce, and it was either he or his associate, who also went over as a member of the Department of Commerce who told me that Mikoyan had been one of 19 men who had been captured by the British when they were driving on Baku at that time. The other 18 were shot, and Mikoyan had survived.

I am mentioning that on this occasion merely to indicate that Lenin, in 1920, might have been acting under considerable stress of feeling. I think Mr. Mikoyan perhaps to this day acts under considerable stress of feeling as he contemplates his recollection of near approach to death.

I think you can understand how those people feel. But I think also it should be said that men’s opinions in course of time change. I think many capitalists have said very strong things against the irreconcilability of the two systems. I do not happen to hold to that irreconcilability. I do not agree with Lenin. I do not agree with the capitalists. I think we can live in the same world, and to a degree I think the Lenin doctrine was denounced. Stalin has made some very strong statements from time to time, but during the past 2 years he has made repeated statements that the two systems could live together in the same world, and I noticed in last Sunday’s New York Times an article in which it stated that Mr. George Malenkov is coming to the fore in Russia now, and Mr. Malenkov stands very strongly for this idea of it being possible for capitalism and communism to live in the same world at peace. That happens to be my feeling.

But I am sure you can get very strong quotations from Stalin on the contrary back 15 years or so ago, and perhaps even more recently.

**STALIN’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WEST**

The Chairman. Let’s come around a little nearer to this date. In 1938 Stalin justified war “to liberate the people from capitalist slavery.” That is documented in A Short History of CPSU, Moscow, 1945. If that was Mr. Stalin’s view and idea in 1938, he has made no public pronouncement of repudiation of that statement, has he?

Mr. Wallace. I think his statements of the past few years are of quite a different character from the statements he made in 1938. You can say, of course, “How can you believe him?” I would say the only way you can believe him is because it is to his self interest to have a different attitude now.

**HOLY WAR AGAINST RUSSIA**

The Chairman. Did you or did you not, in a May Day speech in Detroit some time ago, term the pact “merely another line-up of nations under the cover of anticommunism for another holy war on Russia, just like Hitler’s?”
Mr. WALLACE. It sounds familiar to me. I do not mind saying it again, if you want. I do not have a copy of my speech here. At the moment you have an advantage over me there. It is the kind of thing I have been saying.

The CHAIRMAN. You have the advantage over me. You said it first.

Mr. WALLACE. But, Senator, you cannot verify the complete text with accuracy from memory.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to embarrass you.

Mr. WALLACE. It is the kind of thing I have been saying steadily all the time. I still hold that view.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you about this "merely another line-up of nations under the cover of anticomunism for another holy war on Russia." When was the other holy war on Russia? You say "another holy war on Russia."

Mr. WALLACE. The other holy war to which I am referring in that statement, the particular holy war on Russia, was the holy war of Italy and Germany on Russia, especially Germany. Japan did not really join it at the time, although she was a member of the anti-Comintern pact.

The CHAIRMAN. But in your statement you say "a holy war on Russia just like Hitler's." Are you referring to the last war?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right. That is what I am referring to.

The CHAIRMAN. As being a holy war against Russia?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We were not against Russia, were we?

Mr. WALLACE. No, no. We were an ally. I am talking about Hitler.

The CHAIRMAN. We gave Russia arms and munitions and lend-lease and a great many aids in the last war, didn't we?

Mr. WALLACE. We certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. And we fought by her side, with her?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So how do you get the idea that the United States, if they adopt this treaty, is engaged in another holy war against Russia?

Mr. WALLACE. You are putting a misconstruction on my sentence, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. I quoted you.

Mr. WALLACE. I am referring to the holy war Hitler waged against Russia. It was proclaimed as a holy war against communism.

The CHAIRMAN. So you say we are participating in just another scheme?

Mr. WALLACE. We are whipping up another holy war against communism; that is what we are doing.

MATERIALS ON THE FLOOR

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, I have the pending amendment in charge, and offered it for myself and three other Senators. I very much want to question Mr. Wallace on several statements which he has made today, and I think it is important that I have an opportunity to do so. I would assume that the questioning will proceed until you adjourn for lunch, but I wanted to make sure, if I leave now, Mr. Chairman, to go to the floor, that Mr. Wallace will return later in the afternoon, so that he and I might have a brief conversation.
The CHAIRMAN. I assume that we will not finish with the Secretary prior to lunch. I assume he will be ready to come back this afternoon.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, certainly.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, it happens that immediately after Senator McMahon’s amendment shall have been disposed of it is my plan to offer another amendment to the same bill to which this pertains, and the subject matter of the two amendments is at least of joint interest, although we may not approach them from the same angle. It will therefore not be possible, in my judgment, for me to remain at this time, although I, too, have a few questions I should like to ask Mr. Wallace. But I am fearful I cannot get back this afternoon, because I think the amendment I have proposed will require at least several hours of consideration by the Senate.

I just wanted the record to show that fact.

Senator McMahon. If I can govern the disposal of mine, it will take about 20 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do that, the Senator from Missouri will want considerable time to develop his. It is going to disrupt the committee action. You are a member of the committee, however.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I am not asking that the committee take any action with regard to having Mr. Wallace back. I simply want the record to show why it is that I am not remaining at this time. I feel that I should go to the floor for the reasons indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you an opportunity this afternoon.

Mr. WALLACE. I would appreciate it if I could leave here by 4.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we can let you go.

Mr. WALLACE. I will be at your disposal to come back at any moment you indicate.

The CHAIRMAN. We will undertake to accommodate you in every way we can, but this is a most important matter.

Mr. WALLACE. I agree with you it is very important. I will be at your disposal completely, of course.

ARME D FORCES OF RUSSIA

The CHAIRMAN. You speak about the danger under this military treaty of rearming. Do you know what the military strength of Russia is?

Mr. WALLACE. No, I don’t. All I know is what I read in the papers. They speak about 200 divisions. I do not know whether it is true or not. Generally they have been disbanding some of their armament recently, according to the press, but I assume they still must have about 200 divisions. I do not know the size; I do not know just how they compare with ours. I know it is a very great land force.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the greatest land force on earth, is it not?

Mr. WALLACE. I think undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it for? Is it just for protection, for defense?

Mr. WALLACE. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for defense?

Mr. WALLACE. I think so.
The CHAIRMAN. And it does not tie in with their foreign policy?
Mr. WALLACE. I would say to about the same degree as armaments tie in with the foreign policy of any great power.

RUSSIAN ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking about interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, you do not subscribe to the policy of what we call infiltration and the pressure from outside governments on the independence or integrity of other governments, do you?
Mr. WALLACE. No. I think it is bad business.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve of what Russia did in the case of Czechoslovakia?
Mr. WALLACE. No; but there is a very interesting thing that ought to be cleared in the record at that point.
The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, now. You do not approve of it?
Mr. WALLACE. No; but the question is just what Russia did, and that was the point which I made—I don’t know just what Russia did in Czechoslovakia, and I still don’t know.
The CHAIRMAN. You read the papers, you say, and you have been quoting from the papers here all morning.
Mr. WALLACE. I quote from the papers and believe the papers when it fits in with credibility.
The CHAIRMAN. When it fits in with your views, is that it? What do you mean by “credibility”? What you think ought to be said?
Mr. WALLACE. There are some things that are obviously false.
The CHAIRMAN. Some things obviously false?
Mr. WALLACE. Yes, definitely.
The CHAIRMAN. I commend that to the attention of the press.
Mr. WALLACE. And I do not say it is deliberate at all times on the part of the press, either. Oftentimes the press is very poorly informed.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you know better than the press as to what happened?
Mr. WALLACE. On a great many things I know better than the press, and so do you.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know better what happened in Czechoslovakia than the press did?
Mr. WALLACE. I think I know better than was customarily reported back in February of last year.
The CHAIRMAN. How did you gain that information?

EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. WALLACE. I would like to quote from an article by Bruce Lockhart, of the British Military Intelligence, an article which appeared in July of 1948, entitled “The Czechoslovak Revolution.” Said Bruce Lockhart, “The Communist coup was in fact a spontaneous and quickly organized counterstroke to a legitimate but inept tactical move by the anti-Communist ministers to force out the Communists.”
The CHAIRMAN. What do you offer that for? It was quickly organized, you say, and spontaneous among the Communists, and they overpowered the legitimate government and threw it out of power.
Mr. WALLACE. Let me read it again.
The CHAIRMAN. I remember what you said.
Mr. WALLACE. I think you did not hear it correctly, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. I heard it just as you said it.
Mr. WALLACE. No; the word "legitimate" is used in a different context.

The Communist coup was in fact a spontaneous and quickly organized counter-stroke to a legitimate but inept tactical move by the anti-Communist ministers to force out the Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. That says they were legitimate. It says that the government of Czechoslovakia was a legitimate government.
Mr. WALLACE. No; it says it was a legitimate but inept tactical move by the anti-Communist ministers.

The CHAIRMAN. It may have been inept. Evidently it was, from what happened, because Russia marched in and took possession of the government and installed its own premier, and has dominated and controlled Czechoslovakia ever since. Mr. Vishinsky—I think it was Vishinsky—went down to supervise the matter and bring it about, did he not?
Mr. WALLACE. So far as I know, there is no proof of that contention that there was any relationship between the coup and Mr. Vishinsky.

The CHAIRMAN. He was down there.
Mr. WALLACE. I think he was supposed to be taking the cure at some baths.

The CHAIRMAN. He took the cure—and he gave it to the Czechs.

REASONS FOR COMMUNIST COUP

Mr. WALLACE. At any rate I think it should be said—and I am a great admirer of the old Czechoslovakian democracy. I was in Czechoslovakia in 1929. I am a great admirer of the old democracy, and I expressed great regret that that democracy had disappeared at the time, but there were some provocations in view of the pressure we had put on in France and Italy to get Communists out of the government, in view of the fact that we had made it clear that we were making Marshall plan money available only to governments that had no Communists in them; and in view of the fact that we had stated that we would be glad to have Marshall plan money going to Czechoslovakia. All of that added up in a way which could not help but convince the Communists, who were the strongest single party in Czechoslovakia at the time, with 38 percent of the vote in the previous election, that they, the strongest party, were going to be forced out as a result of, well, this inept move.

The CHAIRMAN. The press also carried statements that Russian military forces were not in Czechoslovakia, but they were around the borders of Czechoslovakia with armed military might. Do you approve of that?

Mr. WALLACE. I question the statement of the press. I was informed by a Columbia commentator broadcasting from Geneva at the time, a Mr. Howard K. Smith, that there were fewer Russian soldiers in Czechoslovakia at the time than there were American soldiers. The American soldiers were there on leave.

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking with regard to the border.
Mr. WALLACE. I do not necessarily believe the press with regard to that, because I know the press reported altogether false statements
with regard to the disposition of Russian troops in the Iran incident. That was completely disproved.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's stick to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was one of the outstanding democratic states of Europe, was it not?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Czechoslovakia back through history for four or five centuries was struggling for freedom and independence and a democratic form of government, was it not?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. They have a marvelous and glorious history.

The CHAIRMAN. And the democratic forces were in power, with Mr. Benes as president, and Mazaryk as Foreign Minister. They were in power in Czechoslovakia, and this coup of the Communist forces ousted them and substituted a corps of Communist leaders, isn't that true?

Mr. WALLACE. That is true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the dictation of Russia.

Mr. WALLACE. I do not know of anyone who has any means or any knowledge to indicate that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anybody who has any knowledge that disproves that?

Mr. WALLACE. I just say we don't know. We do know this, that oftentimes Communist leaders in other nations are in disagreement with Russia. We do know that.

The CHAIRMAN. I have never heard of that. Tito is the only one I know of.

Mr. WALLACE. You have heard of Tito. You hear reports also that Mao Tse Tung is not in agreement with Russian communism.

The CHAIRMAN. You have better sources of information than I have, evidently, about the Russian situation and their views.

Mr. WALLACE. We just have different sets of information, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I try to have what I figure is the truth.

EVENTS IN RUMANIA

Do you remember the transactions in Rumania by which Rumania was incorporated into the Soviet system, the satellite system, to be accurate?

Mr. WALLACE. I believe they had some kind of an election. I have forgotten. They say Russia doesn't keep her word, and I think the instance that can be most successfully cited has to do with the free elections in the states on her border, of which Rumania would be one, in contravention to the Yalta agreement. I may say also, however, that in the fall of 1946, in October or November, I stated repeatedly, and this was based on information I had obtained from one of our military men who had been in Rumania and the other Balkan countries, that I assumed that Russia would break her Yalta agreement in that respect, because we were moving in there very quietly and very determinedly to influence the outcome of the elections. That was especially true in Rumania. We moved in with a certain group; the Russians were moving in with another group. I said I assumed that the Russians would make dead sure that they had friendly governments on their borders and that they would not hesitate with regard to the methods employed.
I do not condone that kind of thing; but in view of the very definite and specific actions we were taking inside of those countries at the time I can understand why she did what she did.

UNITED STATES-SOVET RELATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Under that system where you have to have all the border countries friendly, as soon as you get the ones that border on your country friendly then you have some more borders, haven't you, beyond that? And the Russian idea now is to go out and get some more of these new borders and incorporate them. Will that not result in an absolute system of Russian domination of all the countries she faces and touches?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say, Senator, that many of the smaller countries would feel that both Russia and the United States were moving on that hypothesis.

The CHAIRMAN. What countries have we annexed?

Mr. WALLACE. Our method is somewhat different. We establish bases close to Russian borders. Russia hasn't established an air base in Cuba. If you look at the map—

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want us to do, just sit down and let Russia absorb the world and do nothing about it?

Mr. WALLACE. Senator, I have made my views on that subject abundantly clear in congressional testimony from time to time. I have indicated very clearly that I think it would be a very serious matter indeed if Russia would take over the Dardanelles, for example. I think that both the United States and Russia, in the interest of their respective securities, should have a clear-cut and positive idea as to what the limits are on the part of both the nations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are opposed to her taking over the Dardanelles. Was not our Greek and Turkish policy intended to prevent that very thing? And you are against them both.

Mr. WALLACE. I am, indeed, against them both.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have sat still and let Russia come in and have a coup and take over Greece and take over Turkey and thereby insure the control of the Dardanelles?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course, as I have said, and I have said it repeatedly, and it has appeared many times in the press and before congressional committees, that in case Russia moved in to take over the Dardanelles, that would be a war matter. I have said that. That has appeared many times.

But on the other hand, I think that when we move in with air bases in Turkey it becomes seriously close to being a war matter so far as Russia is concerned. It is very dangerous, and John Foster Dulles apparently looks on it in that light.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had Mr. Dulles here, and got his views.

Mr. WALLACE. All this adds up to is, with our bases distributed as they are, we can bomb any point in Russia without passing over anybody else's territory, whereas Russia cannot bomb any place in the United States without passing over somebody else's territory.

The CHAIRMAN. If we can reach Russia without passing over anybody else's territory, what is to prevent her from reaching us without passing over anybody else's territory? That is a new wrinkle, that this is only a one-way street.
Mr. WALLACE. The points in particular are Greenland, Iceland, and Spitzbergen that Russia has to pass over. I do not say that we own those countries, but under our system we have effective control.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not put up a coup to get them, did we?

Mr. WALLACE. Our own methods are very effective, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You want them effective, do you not? If you are going to do something, you want to do it effectively?

Mr. WALLACE. I want peace. I do not want war.

The CHAIRMAN. We want peace.

NATURE OF THE TREATY

I want to ask you a categorical question. Is it not true that this treaty is purely a defensive treaty against an armed attack and in the interest of peace and not of war?

Mr. WALLACE. If I believed that, Senator, I would not be here for a moment. I do not believe it. I believe it is most emphatically driving directly toward war, and I shall do everything I possibly can to oppose it.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is going to start a war, with this peaceable arrangement that we will only act when one of the signatories is attacked by an armed attack? Who is going to start a war over that?

Mr. WALLACE. Or internal aggression when one of the signatories suffers—and how do you define internal aggression?

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; the treaty does not say that.

Who has any right to fear this treaty unless he is an aggressor or intends to become an aggressor?

Mr. WALLACE. It depends on how you define aggression, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We all have a pretty fair knowledge of aggression. It is armed attack. It goes beyond attack. We know what an armed attack is.

Need anybody fear this treaty unless they contemplate an armed attack on another nation? Need any nation fear this treaty unless it contemplates an armed attack on some other nation?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I think they do have definite reason to fear it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Mr. WALLACE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already, I assume, pretty well explained what you mean by that term?

Mr. WALLACE. I have submitted a very long statement.

RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. In that long statement you have undertaken to do that. You think Russia, then, is afraid of this treaty; is that right?

Mr. WALLACE. I do; very much so. I think there is grave danger that following these tactics we will, in effect, make Russia—

The CHAIRMAN. Attack us?

Mr. WALLACE. Make her into the very thing that we have said she is; that is, we will make her into a wild and desperate cornered beast. That may be the objective of the pact. I do not know, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that Russia contemplates an armed attack after we signed this treaty because she protests the treaty?

Mr. WALLACE. I certainly do not. I think Russia will do everything she can to avoid war.
The CHAIRMAN. If she does, we will have peace.
Mr. WALLACE. If John Foster Dulles is correct, there is grave danger if we establish bases too close to her.
The CHAIRMAN. That is another matter. John Foster Dulles was here yesterday. He unequivocally approved the treaty. He unequivocally supported the reasons that actuated us in writing the treaty.
Let me ask you, do you think we ought to have asked Russia’s consent to our forming this arrangement with these other nations?

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. WALLACE. I am for strengthening the United Nations, and frankly, I think this kind of thing should be passed on more specifically by the United Nations than it is.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it not specifically provided in this treaty that we recognize the authority of the United Nations, and there are several references to it, and is it not provided that any action that is taken under this treaty shall immediately be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations?
Mr. WALLACE. Senator, as much as I do not like to do it, with regard to this particular point, I agree completely and utterly with the Wall Street Journal, that it vitiates the United Nations. I think the Wall Street Journal in this point is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. You are taking the Wall Street Journal as your text and Bible?
Mr. WALLACE. I say, much as I dislike to do it, I think the Wall Street Journal’s analysis is sound.
The CHAIRMAN. You are picking out anything that supports your view.
Mr. WALLACE. It happens to be a human failing which does not affect only myself.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not only a failing; I consider it is a clear-cut objective that you have.
Mr. WALLACE. I want peace, obtained through the United Nations.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you not for peace in any way we can get it?
Mr. WALLACE. No. I want no appeasement of Russia, but peace after the two great principals of the world have talked over the fundamental points of difference.

COMMUNIST COUPS IN SATELLITE COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. You think, then, in effect, that we ought to have consulted Russia and got her consent before we made this treaty. If that be true, did she consult us before she incorporated Czechoslovakia into her military system?
Mr. WALLACE. Of course Czechoslovakia is an independent nation.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean it was an independent nation.
Mr. WALLACE. Well, 2 years ago you would have said that with regard to Yugoslavia. Now Yugoslavia is standing up very sternly, and you cannot tell when Czechoslovakia will do the same and when China will do the same.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Russia consult us before she incorporated Hungary and Bulgaria into her system, and made them a complete tool of Russia?
Mr. WALLACE. There are local Communists. We do not know how
the local Communists were trained in each case. These were local
Communists who did the work. It was not done by Russia as Russia.
The CHAIRMAN. Many of these Communists we speak of were trained
in Russia and sent back down to Bulgaria, Rumania, and other coun­
tries to work their will.
Mr. WALLACE. But, Senator, I will say this, and I think it is very
important for the committee to bear this in mind, that Communists can
bring about results of this kind without any arms from outside. They
cannot bring about results of that kind unless there is great misery
in a country or very unequal distribution of wealth.
The CHAIRMAN. They take advantage of those conditions.
Mr. WALLACE. Therefore I say that our objective is, rather than to
provide arms, to make sure that those conditions do not exist, and that
is why I have stood at all times for what certain people have called
"globaloney." I have stood for it steadily ever since in the early
1940's, spending money through the United Nations. It will cost a
fraction of what this present program of ours is costing, spending
money to eliminate the causes of communism.

POSITION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask you a question, and you do not
need to answer it unless you want to. As between the course of the
United States and the course of Russia in the international field,
would you choose the course of Russia or would you not?
Mr. WALLACE. Senator, I have stood steadily for what I call pro­
gressive capitalism and I have stood for it at all times—I have very
strong feelings against reactionary capitalism. I have stood for
progressive capitalism, and that certainly is not the course of Russia.
I have stood for complete civil liberties. and that is not the course of
Russia. I also stand, however, for the equality of the races, and that
is not the course of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. You did not answer my question. I said, as be­
tween the two courses, you prefer the Russian?
Mr. WALLACE. No. I prefer to live in the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. I know, but that is not necessarily answering the
question. I said, as between the two policies—
Mr. WALLACE. You are talking about purely foreign policy now, is
that correct, Senator?
Senator CONNALLY. Yes. Which would you choose, the United
States foreign policy or Russian foreign policy?
Mr. WALLACE. I would say that neither one has been devoted to
attaining peace. I do not hold a brief for either one of them.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not hold a brief for your own country as
against a foreign country?
Mr. WALLACE. Now you are shifting the base of your argument.
You are talking about a country and not foreign policy. A foreign
policy is a policy of a particular administration. I disapprove of the
foreign policy of the present administration, and that is an American
privilege to do so.
The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you oppose pretty nearly every­
thing else that the present administration does, do you not?
Mr. Wallace. Senator, with regard to domestic policy I am on record during the last campaign for very much what the present administration said at that time it stood for. But with regard to foreign policy it is another matter. I do not agree with the present administration on foreign policy.

The Chairman. I fail to find anywhere in your statement an approval of anything that the present administration has agreed to, and I am not trying to make this critical at all.

Mr. Wallace. All I ask you to do, Senator, is to put in the words "foreign policy," for I disagree completely and utterly with the foreign policy of the present administration. I will agree with you on that. There is just one thing that I approve of at the present moment, and that is, I do say that Mr. Jessup did a very good thing in pushing along his conversations with Mr. Malik, and that was very hopeful and should be followed up.

Mr. Jessup and the State Department

The Chairman. That is part of the American foreign policy we have been trying to put over for months and months and months.

Mr. Wallace. I say we were not trying to put it over for months and months and months. Quite the contrary. And I say it is greatly to Mr. Jessup's credit that he reversed what had been the trend.

The Chairman. He did it alone? He did not do it after consultations with the President and after consultations with the Department of State? And what he did was not in harmony with their intentions or their purposes? Is that what you mean to say?

Mr. Wallace. I have no means of knowing what conversations he may have had, but I would say that in all probability Mr. Jessup is entitled to a very great deal of credit.

The Chairman. He is. Of course he is. I give him credit. But I am not assuming he would pursue that policy unless he had consulted with the President of the United States and with the Secretary of State. As a matter of fact, I know that he did consult at least with the Secretary of State. I do not know about the President. I think he deserves a great deal of credit. You are trying to distinguish between what Mr. Jessup did and the policy of the governmental authorities who directed his actions.

Mr. Wallace. What we have available in the newspapers is what Mr. Jessup did. I must say I am rather attracted to Mr. Jessup's face. He looks like a serious, earnest man.

The Chairman. But you are trying to draw a distinction, and kick the other authorities in the State Department and the President into the ash can by elevating Mr. Jessup to the top of the pile.

Mr. Wallace. He happens to have been the one who tried to accomplish something constructive, and the other actions have been destructive, in my opinion.

The Chairman. He was the agent, though, the representative, of the United States in the United Nations, and it was his function and his business to be the hand that executed the orders of his superiors. Is that not true?

Mr. Wallace. I have been in government.
The Chairman. I know you have, and you did not let your subordinates run the show, either. You ran most of it and you were in the paper nearly every other day, were you not?

Mr. Wallace. But every once in a while there would be someone down the line who would come forward with a bright idea, and I was glad to accept that bright idea and help implement it. I am quite willing to agree with your statement that Secretary Acheson was glad to push this along. I am quite happy to agree with that, but I still have a suspicion that Mr. Jessup had the bright idea in the first place.

The Chairman. You think he originated it?

Mr. Wallace. I don't know.

Efforts of the United States to Settle Berlin Question

The Chairman. You say you think that. As a matter of fact, we have been irked and irritated by this airlift ever since it was begun, and we have been trying to bring about measures to alleviate it.

Mr. Wallace. Senator, I will be happy to do this, and maybe we can come to an accord with regard to this point. I will be glad to do this. I will be glad to assume that when Secretary Acheson was appointed it meant a slow, certain, and gradual turn in the whole administration policy. It may be true. I hope it is. This may be the first sign of it. I hope it is.

The Chairman. You think he is coming over to your view on everything?

Mr. Wallace. It may be that the President himself is. I hope so. At any rate, I know the President at one time was quite completely in accord with my view.

The Chairman. Everybody knows who reads the papers that we have been making an effort to get rid of the Berlin blockade ever since it started, and I assume that you know, because you read the papers, although as you said this morning, you did not have much faith in some of them when they published some things that did not agree with your views.

Mr. Wallace. Senator, this is sort of interesting. Speaking about the papers, in the New York Times this morning we find a most intriguing juxtaposition of headlines: "Berlin blockade to end May 12th. Big Four meeting set for May 23." Then, under it, "Note of caution sounded by Clay. General is worried."

The Chairman. He was not talking about the immediate question of the airlift. He is over in Germany, and this happened up in New York. All he said was that communism was still on the rampage, and that it wanted to incorporate all the countries that it could. Wasn't that the effect of his statement? You did not read it? You are testifying here about the paper and you have not even read it?

Mr. Wallace. I was interested in that interesting juxtaposition of the headlines. Yes, I read the Clay statement. Referring to your belief that Russia wants to incorporate all the countries of the world—

The Chairman. Do you deny its expansionist intentions? I do not mean all the countries of the world.
Mr. Wallace. I think in her own interest, so far as any foreseeable future is concerned, she would be utterly foolish to engage in any expansionist policy from the standpoint of her own self-interest.

The Chairman. Why don't you tell the Russians that? You wrote them a letter about wanting to negotiate with them. Why don't you tell Stalin, "Look here, Mr. Stalin. You are all wrong about this expansionist doctrine."

Mr. Wallace. You will find essentially that in my letter to Mr. Stalin, as a matter of fact. If you want to put it in the record, you will find it there.

The Chairman. I haven't got it with me.

VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to terminate my interrogation. Do you favor the abolishment of the veto on the ground of peaceful settlements in the United Nations?

Mr. Wallace. In my letter to Stalin, Senator, I put it this way, that the veto was not a cause but a symptom of lack of understanding between the United States and Russia, and the veto would cause no concern once the points of difference were settled. I think that is where the difficulty really lies. It is not in the veto itself, and I have no doubt that if the real points of difference were cleared up it might be possible to arrive at an agreement on the part of both the United States and Russia to abolish the veto with regard to certain matters. Just what those matters would be I do not know. I do know that in the first instance the United States would be more interested in the veto than Russia would. I assume there are still many Senators who would think long and seriously before giving up the veto.


Mr. Wallace. I think that is a matter that might well be discussed between the United States and Russia in the hope of coming to an accord.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Stalin answer your letter on that point?

Mr. Wallace. He did not go into detail. He just said it served as a basis for getting together.

The Chairman. We think, or some of us do at least, that the veto could be very safely abolished on peaceful settlements; on the issue of war or armed action it could still be retained, if necessary.

Mr. Wallace. I think that is a very hopeful statement.

The Chairman. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Wallace. You cannot answer a matter of that sort briefly, for this reason, that there is such a thing as economic warfare, and the use of economic tools in a way which eventually works out toward military objectives. So I do not think you can give any complete yes-or-no answer. I think it is an approach that ought to be explored.

The Chairman. I am speaking, though, about direct issues that come before the United Nations. If they regard peaceful settlements as desirable, why shouldn't they settle them peacefully, without invoking the veto?

Mr. Wallace. I think eventually that kind of approach can be brought up fruitfully. I doubt if the time has yet come.
The Chairman. One other question, Mr. Secretary. You say on page 4 of your statement, "The pact not only rejects the basic principles upon which the United Nations was founded; it violates the plain provisions of the Charter."

What provision of the Charter does this treaty violate?

Mr. Wallace. Where is that sentence?

The Chairman. Page 4, line 9. It is in the third paragraph on page 4.

Mr. Wallace. Well, Senator, you will find the succeeding paragraphs dealing with that very point. It is just simply an elaboration of the flat statement.

The Chairman. You say, though, that it violates the plain provisions of the Charter. If the provisions are plain, why can’t you find them and point them out?

Mr. Wallace. First, I would like to know, does this committee look on the pact as a regional pact?

The Chairman. We do, but we do not base it solely on that ground.

Mr. Wallace. If you do look on it as a regional pact, I believe it violates the plain provision of the Charter.

The Chairman. What plain provision of the Charter?

Mr. Wallace. If it is a regional pact, I believe there are some members of the pact that are not members of the United Nations, as a matter of fact.

The Chairman. That is true.

Mr. Wallace. If it is a regional pact, the enforcement measures would have to come before the Security Council, and it is obviously the design, under the Atlantic Pact, not to bring matters before the Security Council.

The Chairman. Doesn’t it specifically provide that any actions taken have to be immediately reported to the Security Council?

Mr. Wallace. But article 53 provides that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

The Chairman. That is why we report them to the Security Council.

Mr. Wallace. You are saying “report.” This has to do with enforcement action. The Charter of the United Nations has to do with enforcement action. You speak about reporting.

The Chairman. I am talking about this treaty.

Mr. Wallace. It gets around to a question, after it is reported, whether the action is going to be authorized by the Security Council. If you do look on it as a regional pact and do intend to have any action taken authorized by the Security Council, I think that places a considerably different light on the whole matter from what the public has had reason to believe heretofore.

The Chairman. It is plainly written in the treaty. Here is what the treaty says:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the
other powers such action as is deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack, and all measures taken as a result thereof, shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Does not that particular provision require that, just as soon as the Security Council takes means to restore the security of this area, the activity of the various countries under the treaty will terminate?

Mr. WALLACE. Senator, it seems to me that the governing point, if this is a regional pact, is in article 53.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the article that I have quoted, and I have asked you a plain question. Does it not provide that, as soon as the Security Council takes measures to restore the safety and security of this area, the action of the nations shall terminate? Is that not true, by the plain words of the treaty?

Mr. WALLACE. Senator, you have quoted the second paragraph of article 5 of the treaty, saying:

Any such armed attack, and all measures taken as a result thereof, shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

That is a matter of report.

Now, article 53 says:

But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements, or by regional agencies, without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception—

and so on, which seems to me to be a plain contradiction.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Vandenberg, I will turn over the examination to you.

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not think there is very much that the distinguished friend and I have to discuss this morning, because of a fundamental disagreement regarding objectives. I would like to say, first of all, just as Mr. Wallace himself said that he agreed with the Wall Street Journal in some observation that it made which was contrary to his usual policy, that, contrary to my usual policy, I agree with Mr. Wallace when he says that two different ideologies can live together in this world, in a live-and-let-live world, and I think any other concept would be very, very fatal.

**MOTIVES OF TREATY AUTHORS**

Mr. Wallace, it seems to me the fundamental difference between us is one in assessing motives. Do you think the authors of the North Atlantic Pact want war?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I don't think so. Whom do you mean as the authors?

Senator VANDENBERG. I wouldn't know. You said this morning it was Churchill. You said in Detroit the other day it was I. I hope you are not retracting that compliment.

Mr. WALLACE. I said Churchill was the architect.

Senator VANDENBERG. I mean when I say "Do you think the authors of this pact want war?" the President of the United States, the State Department, and the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. WALLACE. No; I don't think any of those want war.
Senator Vandenberg. Do you not think that your whole campaign in the country, and even abroad, because you have taken your doctrine abroad, attributes to all of us who disagree with you on this matter belligerent motives and unworthy motives?

Mr. Wallace. Well, I would say that my attitude is fundamentally this: That, whether it is from ignorance or from design, there is an intent at the present time on the part of many influential and highly placed people in the United States to try to impose our will by force in many parts of the world, and that effort to impose our will by force can end, in my opinion, only in ultimate bankruptcy and disaster.

Senator Vandenberg. I understand that is your opinion.

Mr. Wallace. I have known many people, the effect of whose actions I feel to be utterly evil, who themselves, as individuals, I know have the greatest internal sense of rectitude. That does not prevent me from opposing them with everything that I have got. It makes them more difficult and dangerous antagonists, in my opinion.

Senator Vandenberg. I quite agree with that estimate, and I reciprocate the estimate so far as you and I are concerned.

The point I make is that it is possible for honest men to disagree as to the methods of pursuing peace, and just because you disagree with my belief as to the proper method, that does not assign you to a category of infamy, but I decline to accept any such category either just because I disagree with you.

Now, do you insist upon attaching bad motives to those who honestly believe that this is the very best way to get peace? I know you think they are crazy. I am not talking about that.

Mr. Wallace. No; I wouldn't insist that they are crazy.

Senator Vandenberg. Can they not be perfectly honest, sincere, conscientious, patriotic Americans?

Mr. Wallace. Sure, sure. I would like to have the same privilege accorded to me, however.

Senator Vandenberg. Well, I hope you get it.

The Chairman. You have been asserting it everywhere.

POSSIBILITY OF ROOM FOR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION

Senator Vandenberg. Wherever you have presented a challenge in fact, Mr. Wallace, I think your challenge is entitled to complete exploration. As I have sensed your attitude toward this problem, it has been one of insisting that your country is imperialistic in its attitudes and objectives, and that all of us who have any responsibility in government are determined upon world conquest in some form or another. I think you have even gone to Europe and told them over there that we are imperialistic in our objectives.

All I am trying to get you to say to me, and I think perhaps you have said it, is that there is room in this field for honest differences of opinion, and that you will concede that some of us who disagree with your method of reaching peace may be just as sure that we are seeking peace as you are.

Isn't that true?

Mr. Wallace. There is no question about that, Senator.

Senator Vandenberg. You have assigned particular infamy to the resolution adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, as being the source of most of this evil. I assume you have read that resolution?

Mr. Wallace. Not for some time.
Senator Vandenberg. There are six sentences describing six objectives in this resolution. The first one says:

Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of International disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

Would you condemn that objective?

Mr. Wallace. I would say it is premature. I said that other things have to be done first before you can get that. I say it is likely to be mischief-making at the moment.

Senator Vandenberg. So you are opposed to efforts to remove the veto from pacific settlements?

Mr. Wallace. I say there are some other things that have to be removed first. I am for the objective.

Senator Vandenberg. The objective is O.K.?

Mr. Wallace. The objective is O.K. It is the timing.

Senator Vandenberg. Another objective:

Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

Do you condemn that objective?

Mr. Wallace. That particular thing, in slightly different words, was in my letter to Stalin.

Senator Vandenberg. So you do not condemn that objective.

Mr. Wallace. Calling for general disarmament; no.

Senator Vandenberg. No. 6:

If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Do you disagree with that?

Mr. Wallace. I think a great deal can be said on behalf of that.

Senator Vandenberg. In other words, that is exactly half of this resolution, and at least that half has some elements of virtue.

Mr. Wallace. Yes.

Senator Vandenberg. Would you not think that the gentlemen who proposed three out of six suggestions which meet with your approval might have been well intentioned when they also suggested—

Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the charter—

and might have been moving in the right direction also?

Mr. Wallace. No; I would not.

Senator Vandenberg. You would not agree with that?

Mr. Wallace. No.

Senator Vandenberg. I repeat that wherever you present facts I think, so far as I am concerned, facts coming from you are just as challenging as from any other source, and just as entitled to complete and honest consideration. I would like to test out one or two of these facts, however.
I call your attention to page 5 of your statement, the next to the last paragraph, beginning, "The pact and the purpose in effect is directed against the Soviet Union," and then I call your attention to the next two sentences:

Once signed, the obligation of article 8 would preclude the United States from negotiating a treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union.

Will you show me upon what you base that conclusion?

Mr. WALLACE. Article 8 of the pact reads:

Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any of the other parties, or any other third state, is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with this treaty.

My contention is that article 8 would make it very difficult for the United States and Russia to engage in a discussion to eliminate the outstanding points of difference; that the United States, having been committed to the Atlantic nations, to a kind of union with the Atlantic nations, will then find it very difficult to settle the outstanding points of difference.

Senator VANDENBERG. Do you find anything in the text of this treaty which precludes treaties of peace and friendship with anybody? I wish you would point it out to me if you do.

Mr. WALLACE. Well, that is my point, just as I have read it there. It makes it difficult to enter into a discussion with Russia.

Senator VANDENBERG. The pact itself, on the contrary, by its text, would invite total cooperation for peace and security, would it not? Is that not its stated objective?

Mr. WALLACE. That is its stated objective, and I underline the word "stated."

Senator VANDENBERG. You do not think that the Government means what it says?

Mr. WALLACE. I think its real objective is to get an alliance with nations against Russia. It is for the purpose of shipping arms to Europe.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BERLIN CRISIS

Senator VANDENBERG. On page 7 you say, "The agreement" referring to the Berlin agreement) "which resulted in Moscow and raised the hopes of the whole world for an over-all settlement with Russia was blocked in Berlin." Then you raise the question as to who blocked it.

What is your understanding of what happened, first in Moscow with respect to currency in Berlin, and then what happened in Berlin when the agents of the four powers in Berlin were given a week in which to implement the agreement? What is your understanding of what happened?

Mr. WALLACE. My understanding is that in Moscow there was an agreement with regard to currency problems, which had so deeply concerned the Russians, and matters were all set to go ahead. And then the military people in Berlin decided not to go ahead.

Senator VANDENBERG. Which military people?
Mr. Wallace. Here again I am relying on Hawkinson, who says that the unwillingness to proceed came from the United States, and I quoted Senator Connally in his press conference on November 29. He said, according to the press, "The plan proposed by the earlier talks was not looked on with favor by the military governors, who did not accept it." That does not indicate whether Senator Connally had in mind—

The Chairman. That is part of my statement, just one sentence.

Mr. Wallace. Yes, or course. I do not know whether the Senator had in mind any particular military governors when he said that. The military governors, whoever they were, did not carry out that which had been arrived at in Moscow.

The Chairman. The military governors were the ones that were in practical operation of those zones, were they not?

Mr. Wallace. Yes.

The Chairman. And naturally they faced this issue of currency probably more intimately than anybody else?

Mr. Wallace. Yes.

Senator Vandenberg. I assumed that it was common knowledge, Mr. Wallace, that when this agreement came down from Moscow to Berlin and was referred to the military governors that it was the Russian representative who flatly declined to implement the directive from the four powers in Moscow, in keeping with its clear and explicit undertakings.

Mr. Wallace. Well, Senator, I have as much respect for facts wherever they may be found as you have, and if you have some facts along this line, I will certainly be glad to have them.

Senator Vandenberg. I would like to call your attention to just one other thing, not meaning by these limitations upon myself that I am agreeing with the things I do not discuss with you.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

At some point in your statement you were discussing the military implementation and the pact, stating that the allied powers in western Europe would be required to spend on the basis of 6 or 7 to 1. Where is that?

"Mr. Acheson made it clear just how great that burden would be when he said that for every dollar of American arms sent to Europe, the European nations would be required to furnish $6 or $7." Then, subsequently, you draw from that premise, I believe, the assumption that this means we are requiring these nations practically to double their existing budgets. Is that not stated in here somewhere?

Mr. Wallace. Yes. That is on the bottom of page 12 and on the top of page 13.

Senator Vandenberg. That is your information on the subject?

Mr. Wallace. The statement with regard to six or seven times as many dollars to be spent by the European nations as we would spend I got from the New York Times. Apparently Secretary Acheson had made some such statement. I assume he had.

Senator Vandenberg. Yes.

Mr. Wallace. With regard to the doubling, the matter is not altogether clear. It is a question of whether that $6 or $7 that the European nations would spend for each dollar that we would spend applies
to the new money that will be added or whether it applies to their total. If it applies to the new money, it would mean that the European nations, instead of now spending $5,000,000,000, would be spending a total of perhaps 12,000,000,000, which would be more than double their present expenditure.

Senator Vandenberg. You would put that construction on it?

Mr. Wallace. Yes; I put that construction on it. It is obvious I have put that construction on it to have said what I said.

Senator Vandenberg. I agree you had to set up that premise in order to reach your conclusion. If you were dependably advised that that is not the proper construction, and that this $6 or $7 to our $1 is merely the measure of the existing budgets of these countries for the next fiscal year, which I believe is the fact, and that there is no intention to apply the measure—

Mr. Wallace. I think the American people ought to know that that is what the truth is.

Senator Vandenberg. I think I can say to you that that is the plan, insofar as it has been disclosed to us in any authentic degree.

Mr. Wallace. I am glad to have the facts, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. I think that is all.

Mr. Wallace. In that case it would indicate that the European countries would have to increase their own domestic budgets by only $2,000,000,000, as they are now spending $5,200,000,000, according to the information I can get, and if we furnish $1,100,000,000 this coming year they would be under the necessity of raising the $5,200,000,000 to maybe 6 or 7 billion, and if we send 2 billion next year I presume it will be expanded in like ratio.

Senator Vandenberg. I want to say to you quite frankly that we do not yet have detailed information regarding military implementation, but it is the general understanding from the witnesses who have testified insofar as they could on the subject up to date that there is no intention to increase the over-all military budgets of the western European countries in connection with this next fiscal year’s program. The only intention is to gear them together and to increase their efficiency within these existing limits, which would put quite a different face on the thing than you have indicated in your comment.

I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That was made quite clear in the hearings, Mr. Secretary, that they have a normal, and have had a normal, budget for military defense through the years, and that it is not intended to increase that by 6 or 7 billion dollars but that all of their present budgets would amount to about six or seven times as much as we would contribute under this treaty. And I hope you won’t get that confused in your mind, because you say in your statement yourself that their budgets are now $5,200,000,000.

Mr. Wallace. I am glad that the committee has made that clear. It certainly was not clear before.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

SOVIET ACTIONS OF LAST FEW YEARS

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Wallace, I do not want to take up much time, but hasn’t it occurred to you that perhaps one reason why last year, when the proposal by Mr. Stalin through Mr. Smith was not
taken too seriously, was that after 3 years of such grave difficulties there was not much confidence on our part that anything would come of it? Do you not think that that was probably one of the reasons?

Mr. WALLACE. I do not know what the real reason was. I will say this, that each year we delay, our bargaining position from a strictly selfish point of view will be lessened.

Senator Fulbright. I believe I understood you to say a moment ago that you felt Russia had not lived up to the requirements of the Yalta Pact, but that you thought she had good reasons not to. Is that your position?

Mr. WALLACE. I said I did not condone her actions, but I could understand why she had acted as she did.

Senator Fulbright. To make it a little clearer, do you feel that Russia has lived up to the Yalta agreements with regard to the elections in the Balkan countries?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I have never claimed that she has.

Senator Fulbright. She has not lived up to them?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say that neither nation has acted as I would like to see them act. I think we have both interfered in the internal affairs in various undercover ways.

INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator Fulbright. What did you have in mind that we have violated our undertaking?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not say we violated the Yalta agreement, but I say we endeavored to influence the outcome of the elections there.

Senator Fulbright. What did you have in mind in that connection?

Mr. WALLACE. This is just testimony that I get from returned soldiers who have seen the way things have gone. I don't want to get any of them into trouble. But on the matter of carrying out agreements, I would say that we are much more guilty for failing to carry out the demilitarization of Germany under the Potsdam agreement than Russia has been guilty of anything in the nature of having to do with free elections in the Balkan States.

Senator Fulbright. Do you think that the conduct of Russia during the last 3 years has not had some effect upon the attitude of our Government toward carrying out in the last detail the agreements?

Mr. WALLACE. There must be some explanation. I can understand how the United States got that way just as well as I can understand how Russia got that way.

Senator Fulbright. You can understand that there is less confidence in being able to get along, and therefore, that is the reason?

Mr. WALLACE. On this matter of elections, and this does not happen to violate any agreements, the United States certainly is not guiltless with regard to any other countries. I went to Mexico in September of 1940 as Ambassador Plenipotentiary to attend Camacho's inauguration, and I know at that time that we were interfering in Mexico's election in a way.

The Chairman. The elections were over.

Mr. WALLACE. I should not say with the elections, but with the final outcome. It was a very interesting situation, but I have seen us do that on many occasions.
Senator VandenBerg. We were not doing that through our Special Ambassador on that occasion, were we?

Mr. Wallace. Yes; in a way, we were. It prevented, to a degree, a revolution at that time.

But as Secretary of Commerce I sat on the National Advisory Committee that has to do with the making of loans, and I know that—and I disapprove of this altogether—we hastened the loan along to France in the hopes of affecting an election outcome in France, and we have done an awful lot of that kind of thing.

Senator Fulbright. Do you think your relations with Mexico are the same as those between Moscow and Rumanian today?

Mr. Wallace. You can never make an exact analogy.

Senator Fulbright. You said it was very similar.

Mr. Wallace. There are many points in common.

Senator Fulbright. Do we dictate who holds the offices, and so on, in Mexico?

Mr. Wallace. We influence Mexico in many unusual ways.

Senator Fulbright. Do you think the result, just to take an example, of what happened in Mexico with regard to the oil properties of Americans is the same as what happened to the oil properties in Rumania?

Mr. Wallace. I happen to know the details of how we happened to arrive at the oil settlement in Mexico.

Senator Fulbright. Regardless of the merits in either case, do you think they were handled in a similar way?

Mr. Wallace. No; but I also know that if it had not been for Roosevelt the outcome in Mexico would not have been as it was, and it was not the intent of a great many people in government that the outcome should be the way it was. It was due to Roosevelt himself that the outcome was what it was.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FASCISM AND COMMUNISM

Senator Fulbright. You made reference to our possible attitude toward Spain and Portugal as being dictatorships. Do you see any difference between the character of the Government in a so-called Fascist government and that of Russia?

Mr. Wallace. I would draw the same distinction, for example, that the United States Army draw in the report which it put out in 1944 or 1945—March 24, 1945. The United States Army, anticipating the question, perhaps, says, “What is the difference between communism and fascism? Aren’t they essentially the same?”

And the United States Army answers in this fact sheet:

In any discussion on fascism there will some who will argue that there are strong similarities between fascism and communism. Under both systems there is neither freedom of speech nor of press as we know it. Both forms of government permit only one political party. Both have a secret police. But beyond this there are important and fundamental differences in philosophy, aims, purposes, and methods.

Then it goes on at some little length:

Let us take three fundamental concepts, war and peace, race, and the purpose of the state, and see how the two systems stack up. Since the Soviet system is associated in most minds with communism and is the only working example, reference is frequently made to Soviet practice in comparison with characteristic Fascist practice.
Senator Fulbright. Can’t you sum it up in your own words? I am sure we do not have time to go into the whole philosophy of communism. But do you feel that there is much distinction, or are they very similar?

Mr. Wallace. As the Army points out, and I am in complete accord with the Army in this particular, the ultimate objective is entirely different. The objective in the case of communism is peace. I do not think there is any question about that. And the attitude with regard to race is totally different.

Senator Fulbright. Was not the objective of Hitler peace—and his terms?

Mr. Wallace. I think you ought to read this Army pamphlet. I think it will do you a lot of good.

Senator Fulbright. I was seeking information from you. I thought you would probably know more about their differences than anyone else. You think they are different?

Mr. Wallace. I do, very definitely. I think with regard to civil liberties they are very similar.

ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Senator Fulbright. Don’t you think basically that the difficulty, or the caution with which in recent months the West has had to proceed, has been due to that distrust which has been generated during the prior 3 years with regard to former agreements?

Mr. Wallace. No; I do not think it went fundamentally to that at all. I think there was a consciously and carefully cultivated propaganda, an anti-Communist campaign most extraordinary in nature, and that campaign—

Senator Fulbright. Where was that campaign, here?

Mr. Wallace. Here in the United States, a terrifically, very strongly motivated, anti-Communist crusade.

Senator Fulbright. What do you think was the reason for that?

Mr. Wallace. Well, sir, I think there were certain very specific interests in the United States—

Senator Fulbright. What interests?

Mr. Wallace. I can name them.

SOURCES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Senator Fulbright. I think you ought to name them, for the benefit of the committee. I am sure I do not know what those interests are.

Mr. Wallace. Well, maybe you wouldn’t, in Arkansas.

Senator Fulbright. That’s right.

Mr. Wallace. I am not reflecting in any way on the people in Arkansas. But I think, for example, that there are certain elements in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in this country and abroad which have carried on, since the war came to an end, in the same, and even in a more bitter fashion than they did before the war. Because the Vatican has had very great interests in eastern Europe, for example, it has carried on a continuous and most vigorous campaign. It is not a matter than anyone cares to deal with. I share with nearly everyone else in the United States the abhorrence of anything in the
nature of religious intolerance. I have no feeling of intolerance with regard to the Catholic religion as a religion. But when it gets into politics—and I don't think the rank and file of the Catholics are in any way immediately concerned with this, and many of them are not even aware of it—it has to meet the battle on the political level, and I think the Catholic Church is in world politics to an extraordinary degree at the present time. I would go so far as to say exactly what Rabbi Stephen Wise said before he died.

Senator Fulbright. What was that?

Mr. Wallace. I do not have the precise quotation, but it was to the effect that there were elements in the Catholic Church that wanted war.

Senator Fulbright. Is that the interest? Are there any other interests that you think are behind this?

Mr. Wallace. Yes; of course, you have the British imperial interest, which is a very great one, indeed; and we do have some common interest with the British. I am quite willing to grant. I think the balance of the world would be destroyed if Russia would move in all the way to the Persian Gulf. That is why the matter of the Dardanelles is quite important. I think there is an area there that should be dominated neither by the British nor the Russians. I think that is a very important thing, under the doctrine to which both Senator Vandenberg and I adhere, that it is possible for both systems to live in the same world. I don't care whether Russia is under the Czar or under the Communists; there is a geographical entity that has long pushed to get to the Persian Gulf and to get other warm-water outlets. It is entitled to a certain degree of satisfaction if it can be obtained without overbalancing the world.

I think the United States does have some community of interest in seeing that the British Empire is not destroyed, but I do not think that we should go along with Britain, shall we say, in backing up Arab States: I don't think we should go along with Britain in engaging in a lot of things, carrying the whole British load all over the world. I think we are going to bankrupt ourselves doing that all over the world. There are only certain points of identification.

Now, I want to mention one other interest, and that is our American big business interest, which has made common cause at times, not in a completely systemic fashion but in a very effective fashion, with these other two interests. The three, at the present time, in my opinion not in any completely worked-out plan, have been engaged in this anti-Communist campaign which has so completely blacked out all other news that is not in conformity with the anti-Communist crusade.

REASONS FOR ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Senator Fulbright. You think those interests have inspired the anti-Communist crusade on their own initiative, and this did not arise as a reaction from the actions of Russia in the Balkans?

Mr. Wallace. When you talk about action and reaction you have to go all the way back to the early incidents in 1919, when the various nations were trying to choke the Bolsheviks at the start. You have to go through that entire period, and there was only the briefest intermission during the war, and the whole thing was picked up again.
Senator Fulbright. You do not think our actions in the war had any real bearing on that?

Mr. Wallace. We began before the war ended in April, after Roosevelt's death, of 1945, as I pointed out, at San Francisco, to give the Russians very real cause to distrust us. There are a large number of specific instances that can be documented with regard to that, and the Russians immediately gave us, because they are that kind of people, equal cause to distrust them. It was just a get tough and get tougher policy on both sides all the way.

Senator Fulbright. I believe that is all.

SCOPE OF THE ARMS PROGRAM

Senator Vandenberg. May I call the Secretary's attention to one thing I forgot when I was running over his address. At the top of page 14, Mr. Wallace, you include a quotation from me which I will read:

Senator Vandenberg said last week that the $1,100,000,000 arms program that has been tied to the pact is "comparatively trivial" and "relatively insignificant."

The literal phrases are quite correct. I was wondering if you saw the total statement in which they appeared.

Mr. Wallace. All I saw was what appeared in the New York Times.

Senator Vandenberg. I am sure you would agree that you would not want to take words out of their context and misinterpret them, and for your information, I want to say to you that those words were used in respect to a billion dollars in two comparisons which I made: No. 1, comparatively and relatively insignificant as compared with the cost of another world war, which, in my opinion, I believe just as completely the North Atlantic Pact helps prevent as you believe otherwise; secondly, it was used to compare what to me is the relatively inconsequential part of this program, to wit, the limited contribution to arms in western Europe, compared to the fundamental obligation which underlies the pact, which involves, of course, all the assets and resources of the whole people of the United States and all the other 300,000,000 people who are involved in the pact.

I do not ask you to agree with my use of the phrase, but I want you to understand that I am not one who thinks that a billion dollars, just abstractly, is trivial or insignificant.

Mr. Wallace. I was saying it was insignificant using somewhat your own reasoning, I guess.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you have denounced and ascribed to certain interests a campaign against communism; is that correct?

Mr. Wallace. Yes, sir.

ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA

The Chairman. You are aware, are you not, of the bitter, and I think unprovoked and baseless, campaign that Russia is making every day through Pravda and through all of these sources of propaganda and information against the United States, are you not?

Mr. Wallace. Yes; and I have, as a matter of fact, recognized that as I have made public appearances from time to time. For instance,
when I appeared on this recent program of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, I deplored the name calling. I did not speak of it specifically; I was referring to the way in which Mr. Lysenko has called some of our western scientists names, which I felt did not contribute to good feeling.

The Chairman. Is it not true that almost daily, through official sources, their propaganda has denounced the United States as being an imperialist power trying to spread our imperialism, and that this treaty here is evidence of our desire to incorporate these countries of Europe into an imperialistic system? And they have denounced us as warmongers and all the other vicious things that they can say about us.

Mr. Wallace. I would say, Senator, if you were to weigh up the tons of ink spilled in Russia in calling us names, and the tons of ink spilled in this country in calling them names, our tons of ink would be 100 times as great.

The Chairman. You insist on your former expressed statement that in a contest between Russia and the United States you are for Russia?

Mr. Wallace. No, Senator. You are twisting—you are doing more than twisting; you are utterly misrepresenting what I said.

The Chairman. I do not mean to misrepresent you.

Mr. Wallace. All I am saying is that we call Russia names just as well as Russia is calling us names, and I deplore name calling on both sides. That is the point I started out making and the point I shall continue to insist on making.

The Chairman. If I misquoted you, I did not intend to. But I am doing it to your face so as to give you an opportunity to correct it. I am not saying it behind your back. But your insistence now is that by many, many more times all the slush that is being carried over the Russian propaganda machine is multiplied here in the United States against them; is that it?

Mr. Wallace. Yes; that is what I am saying.

The Chairman. That is what you are saying?

Mr. Wallace. Right.

The Chairman. And you insist on that view?

Mr. Wallace. I will not say that our adjectives are as picturesque as their adjectives.

The Chairman. You would not say they are as bitter and as mean as their adjectives?

Mr. Wallace. I will say their statements are a little stronger, but I say we make it more continuously, and I would say on the whole more effectively.

The Chairman. Do you blame anybody who resents the attacks of Russia on us?

Mr. Wallace. No; but I would say that Russia must have been gravely disturbed when the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the House of Representatives talked so specifically and directly about bombing her. I say that kind of thing, while it may not be name calling, was far more provocative than any of the picturesque names that the Russians use with regard to us.

The Chairman. That was only quite recently that that occurred, and has it not been true that ever since the end of World War II Russia has turned her heaviest artillery pouring out denunciations upon the head of the United States, who sent her arms to help her
in the war and gave her lend-lease, and aided her in every way in the world she could during the World War? It is not true that immediately when the war ended they turned their guns on us and have been abusing us and denouncing us ever since?

Mr. Wallace. Well, Senator, I have entered into the history of that already, as to how I think that came to pass. I do happen to know, with regard to lend-lease, that our lend-lease representative told Russia we were helping her not because we were doing it for Russia’s sake, but because we thought by helping Russia we were most effectively helping ourselves. I happen to know that for a fact.

The Chairman. Who was it who told them that?

Mr. Wallace. I will tell you privately, if you wish it.

The Chairman. This is a public hearing, and you asked to come here and testify.

Mr. Wallace. Frankly, I do not want to get other people into trouble; in the current state of anti-Communist hysteria I would be getting somebody into trouble.

The Chairman. You should not quote people unless you can tell who they are.

Mr. Wallace. I will tell it to you privately. I have no objection to telling it to you privately. I am not going to tell it for the benefit of the press. It just causes hardship.

The Chairman. You do not have to tell it unless you want to. You asked to come here to attend this public hearing, and I thought you were going to bring your views with you.

Senator Wiley, take the witness.

Senator Vandenberg. May I just ask one more question? Mr. Wallace, what is your opinion of Americans, if there be any, who say that in case of war between Russia and the United States they would not fight on the side of the United States?

Mr. Wallace. At the time that statement was made I said I deplored it, and I still deplore it.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley?

Russian actions since the war

Senator Wiley. In your approach to your conclusion, which I take it is sincere, you feel that there are possibilities for peaceful arrangements between Russia and this country. Do you differentiate between what we call the Russian people and Stalin and his subordinates?

Mr. Wallace. Of course, I differentiate between the people of any country and the officials.

Senator Wiley. Then do you feel that with the people of Russia themselves there is a bigger chance for peace than there would be with Stalin and his subordinates?

Mr. Wallace. I think the people of all nations want peace and want it tremendously. I think the people of all nations want peace more even than their elected officials.

Senator Wiley. How do you explain the activity of Stalin and his subordinates in relation to the better than 100,000,000 people in the various countries they have taken over since the war. Is that indicative of imperialism, or what?

Mr. Wallace. I think Stalin, moved by the same motives that have animated us since Roosevelt died in April of 1945, wanted to do every-
thing he could to make sure that they are secure. Both sides have been moving in every possible way to make sure of security.

Senator Wiley. Have you personally talked with Stalin about peace?

Mr. Wallace. I have never been in Soviet Russia. I have been in Soviet Asia. I have never seen Stalin.

Senator Wiley. Have you had personal contact with him?

Mr. Wallace. No.

Senator Wiley. Through anyone else?

Mr. Wallace. No.

Senator Wiley. Have you any reason to believe that what has been set forth here as the philosophy of communism has changed any in the last year or 2 or 10?

Mr. Wallace. I would say the answer that Stalin has made to Alexander Werth, the British correspondent, to Elliot Roosevelt, to Harold Stassen, and now more recently to Kingsbury Smith, add up in my mind to a very definite desire on the part of Russia at the present time, and I think for specifically selfish interests, to come to an agreement. I think she has every reason, from a strictly selfish point of view, to come to an agreement.

POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

Senator Wiley. Do you think, from history that has passed, that a treaty or an agreement would be effective? Do you think it would express the intent and the will to maintain and continue peace?

Mr. Wallace. I think such a treaty could be arrived at. I do not say it is certain to be arrived at. I say there is an even chance to arrive at such a treaty, and I believe it will be carried out by both parties because it is in the interest of both parties.

Senator Wiley. Do you think until that time has arrived, when we can sit down together and beat our swords into plowshares, that we should keep our powder dry?

Mr. Wallace. You won't be keeping your powder dry by the Atlantic Pact. You will be getting your powder awfully wet.

Senator Wiley. You know your friends of the CIO said to the contrary yesterday. They are in favor of it.

Mr. Wallace. I am quite aware of the way the CIO testified.

Senator Wiley. You would not include them with big business and the other factors that wanted war?

Mr. Wallace. No. I simply say with regard to them that in their ranks there are certain elements in the Catholic Church that have a tremendous influence, a very tremendous influence.

Senator Wiley. I am sorry that I was not able to hear all of your statement. I shall read it with interest.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Wallace. Senator, if I can get away this afternoon I will appreciate it.

The Chairman. I think maybe you can. We will take you back at 2:30, if you will.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. Come to order, please.

Senator Wiley was interrogating you, Mr. Wallace, was he not, when we recessed?

TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. WALLACE—Resumed

Mr. WALLACE. I think he was through, but I am not certain.

The CHAIRMAN. I saw him a while ago. He might come up. We will go on with Senator McMahon.

CONSPIRACY AGAINST RUSSIA

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Wallace, as I read your statement, and as I heard you give it, it struck me that it really consists of an allegation that your country and my country is engaged in a gigantic conspiracy to make an aggressive war upon the Soviet Union. Do you agree with that analysis of your statement?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say, Senator, that we are in very grave danger of getting into that position.

Senator McMAHON. I am glad that you modified my analysis of it. I still think my analysis of it is valid, based upon what you have said.

Mr. WALLACE. I think with the adoption of the Atlantic Pact that we would be in essentially that position.

Senator McMAHON. That would be the thing that would convince you that we were engaged in a gigantic conspiracy to make an aggressive war upon the Soviet Union?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not and would not use the word "conspiracy." That suggests something subterranean, underground, hidden, which is not an integral part of my testimony, because the Atlantic Pact is very open. I think conspiracy conveys a wrong impression.

Senator McMAHON. Conspiracies are not always hidden. Sometimes they are very open for all the world to see. I could give you and describe a couple to you, and may a little later in my questioning, which were undoubtedly conspiracies and were open for the whole world, including people who would see, in this country, that they were conspiracies.

ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE STATE DEPARTMENT

On page 8, Mr. Wallace, you charged the State Department, as I read it, with "a deliberate misrepresentation" in the fourth paragraph, starting:

In the meantime the State Department was filling the press and the radio with stories about Russian aggressiveness, intensifying the atmosphere of fear and hostility which it evidently thinks necessary to assure the ratification and implementation of the Atlantic Pact.

That is a very great, very severe indictment of the American State Department. Do you feel that that allegation is warranted by the facts?
Mr. WALLACE. I will be glad, for the purpose of the record, to give you documentation along that line.

Senator McMAHON. I think it would be a good thing if you would proceed. I think the American people ought to know whether or not Mr. Dean Acheson, our Secretary of State, is making an attempt to use his official position and the position of the Department in order to intensify the atmosphere of fear and hostility between Russia and ourselves.

That is a very grave accusation which comes pretty close, in my mind, to an accusation of treasonable conduct.

Mr. WALLACE. I will be glad to furnish documentation along that line. I do not happen to have it with me at the moment, but I can furnish that documentation for purposes of the record.

Senator McMAHON. I doubt whether you will ever furnish it, because it does not exist.

My analysis of your statement is, as I say, in my opinion at least, a charge of a gigantic plot—if you do not want to call it a conspiracy—on the part of the American Government to make aggressive war on the Soviet Union.

DEMOBILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES

I would like to ask you which country it was that tore down the greatest Air Force, Navy, and Army in the world and demobilized them and put them away in moth balls. Was it Russia or was it the United States?

Mr. WALLACE. Both countries reduced their armed forces and reduced their armed budgets. We reduced ours in a somewhat greater proportion.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Secretary, we found ourselves a year and a half or 2 years ago practically denuded, with the exception of the atomic weapon.

Mr. WALLACE. I find it hard to believe that we were practically denuded when we were spending more than 10 times as much for military purposes as we did before the war. I would hardly call it practically denuded.

Senator McMAHON. I do not think it is necessary to press the point. I think the record speaks for itself.

In the spring of 1946, the winter of 1946, I think the record will show that the Army and Navy and Air Force were at an extremely low ebb.

Mr. WALLACE. Senator, could I interject there, that when the war came to an end, as I remember it, we were spending almost half of our entire national income for war purposes. I think the figure amounted up pretty close to $100,000,000,000. I think it is unthinkable that we would, in time of peace, continue to spend in the neighborhood of 90 or 100 billion dollars for war purposes.

Senator McMAHON. Of course, it is unthinkable, and of course it would be impossible for us to continue the expenditures at that rate. But the point that I wish to make to you—and I think you have got to admit it if you want to be fair about this thing at all—is that the United States of America went into a period of demobilization after VJ-day, did it not?

Mr. WALLACE. I think it is exactly the same kind of demobilization that any nation would go into after a war comes to an end.
Senator McMahon. At least it was not the kind of conduct that was consistent with this plot to conquer the world that you have suddenly found in the American Government and in the American people, Mr. Wallace, is it?

Mr. Wallace. I would say it was consistent with making America strong; that is all.

THE IRON CURTAIN

Senator McMahon. Mr. Wallace, you seem to find good cause for the conduct of the Soviet Government at each and every point. It was not the United States Government that erected the iron curtain, was it?

Mr. Wallace. No, it was Winston Churchill.

Senator McMahon. Did he erect it, or did he give it a graphic name?

Mr. Wallace. He borrowed the name from Mr. Goebbels.

Senator McMahon. No matter where he got it, your answer signifies that it is a creature of his imagination, and that it does not exist. It is your contention that there is no barrier to the transmission of ideas from this country to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Wallace. I would say that the fact of Mr. Churchill making that speech on March 5, 1946, helped to make that which he declared a fact.

Senator McMahon. You evade the answer to my question. Do you contend that there was no barrier to the transmission of ideas and information from the west to the east before Mr. Churchill made that speech?

Mr. Wallace. I would say that Mr. Churchill had made any separation that had begun to grow—as a result of what had happened in May of 1945—grow very much faster than before had been the case.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Wallace, do you not realize that the Soviet Government, the Soviet Union, has never permitted the transmission of the ideas and culture of the west into the east, into her own borders?

Mr. Wallace. I may say that as a part of my letter to Stalin I listed, as one of the points for consideration, free exchange of ideas and free movement of citizens.

Senator McMahon. And you got no response on that, did you?

Mr. Wallace. Well, there was no response on any one of the six items which I listed. But there was a statement that the approach was worthy of discussion.

I listed the free exchange of scientific information, and the free exchange of newspapermen, scientists, and so on.

With regard to this iron-curtain thing, I may say that I have had a little experience with that just recently. I tried to bring in Pierre Cot as a guest of mine, from France, and Konni Zilliacus. Mr. Zilliacus, is in print as against Russia sitting astride the Dardanelles, is not a Communist, and has gotten into the Communists' hair from time to time.

I invited them over as my guests, and—it seemed to be part of this paper curtain that we are endeavoring to erect now—both of them were denied visas by our State Department. I do not know how to explain that on the part of our State Department. I think they were very foolish in doing that kind of thing.
Senator McMahon. Without disagreeing or agreeing with you on
that, you would not compare the barring of these two gentlemen—if
you say they have been barred—from the shores of this country, with
the policy that has been pursued in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Wallace. Compared with what?

Senator McMahon. Compared with the policy that has been pur­sued in the Soviet Union, where even officials of the United States
Government have been refused permission to visit their own Embassy
in Moscow. You know that is so; do you not, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Wallace. I do not happen to know the particular case.

Senator McMahon. You can take it from me that the Assistant
Secretary of State, in my presence, tried to get permission, in 1946,
in Paris, to go to Moscow; and he was refused permission to go.

Mr. Wallace. I have insisted on not being put in the position of
condoning what the Russians do. As a matter of fact, there are many
things with which I disagree most heartily, especially on this partic­cular front. That is not my purpose, to condone what they do.

On the other hand, my voice can be heard more effectively here in
the United States than it can in other countries, and I can condemn
what is being done here in the United States without condoning what
Russia does.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

Senator McMahon. In fact, Mr. Wallace, your voice cannot be
heard in Russia at all, except at the whim and caprice of 14 men who
sit in a place called the Kremlin, and who have the power of life and
death over 300,000,000 people.

Mr. Wallace. I would assume that in Russia what appears in the
press is very closely controlled.

Senator McMahon. You would assume it?

Mr. Wallace. I would assume it; yes.

Senator McMahon. You are in no doubt about that?

Mr. Wallace. I do not know all the details. I am sure I do not
know to what extent a village paper can print this, that, and the other
thing. But I would assume it is very closely controlled. I would
also assume that we have more freedom in our own press here.

Senator McMahon. Relatively, just a little more?

Mr. Wallace. It is a different kind of control we have here. We
have very substantial control here, very substantial control.

But if, momentarily, a particular paper can have enough money to
put out other ideas, that particular paper is at freedom to express
itself. Ordinarily it is very effectively denied advertising, however.

Senator McMahon. It is rather rudimentary, and yet perhaps not,
pointing out that you are here in this room before Senators of the
United States, and here assembled are 50 or 75 representatives of the
press and radio. It is obvious, of course, that there is not any such
performance in the Soviet Union, is there? Any comparable perform­ance?

Mr. Wallace. No. That is obvious.
Senator McMAHON. When you disagree with the government in Russia, Mr. Wallace, you die; do you not?

Mr. WALLACE. I beg your pardon?

Senator McMAHON. You die, do you not, when you disagree with the government in Russia?

Mr. WALLACE. I do not know whether you die or not, but that is what the American press says.

Senator McMAHON. And the only reward that is preserved for you here is to weigh your ideas, and to accept them or reject them, as their worth is indicated to the people of the United States.

Mr. WALLACE. I certainly want to keep the United States that way, and I say there is grave danger that the United States will not be kept that way if we allow ourselves to be overcome by this anti-Communist hysteria.

Senator McMAHON. And there is grave danger that the United States will not keep the privileges which you are exercising now if we retreat in front of their determination, evidenced from the time they founded their conspiracy in 1917 and which they still persist in in every speech that they have made and by every bit of conduct and every peace conference that has been held since the end of the war.

And, Mr. Wallace, if the same conduct were applied here, as it was for the citizens of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria and Rumania and Hungary and Poland and Finland, believe me, you would not be permitted to sit here and say anything.

Mr. WALLACE. Senator, I want to say that so far as the United States and her free institutions are concerned, there is at the present moment 100 times, at least, as great a threat from the right, as from the left.

Senator McMAHON. Well, Mr. Wallace, I suppose you are entitled to your own estimate. I know you are, and I want you to have it. I cannot agree with you. But that is neither here nor there for the moment.

I am sure that you will agree with me, because you quote Justice Holmes, our most eloquent advocate of free trade and ideas, as you call him—and certainly if he was not the most eloquent he was one of the most eloquent—on page 18 of your statement. You thoroughly endorse the free trade and ideas.

BROADCASTING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Wallace, what would you think of a proposition to broadcast in every nation, including Russia, the proceedings of the United Nations Assembly?

Mr. WALLACE. I think it would be marvelous if that could be done.

Senator McMAHON. Do you think that the Soviet Government—

Mr. WALLACE. I would also like to see the proceedings of the United States Congress broadcast to the American people. I have long advocated that that be done.

Senator McMAHON. We do print every word that is said. Maybe very few people read it; sometimes I suspect that very few read it.
But let us stick to the idea. Would you be willing to advocate that the Russian Government accede in the United Nations to a proposal that the proceedings of the United Nations be broadcast inside the Soviet Union?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say that probably any contention for that at the moment would not get very far, because there are other matters that have to be cleared away first. But as an ultimate objective, I say that that would be a very admirable outcome.

EXCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN COUNTRIES

Senator McMAHON. You come out strongly here for free trades, free exchange of ideas. I take it that you believe that the exchange of ideas, as between people of the same country, and as between the people of all countries, is of very great importance; do you not?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, certainly.

Senator McMAHON. You make the point that wars are not won with guns, they are won with ideas, at least achievements of nations are won with ideas.

Mr. WALLACE. I would say ideas in friendly competition.

Senator McMAHON. I am not asking you as to the possibility of the Russian Government agreeing with the United Nations to any such simple proposal. I have my own ideas as to whether or not they would agree. I am asking you whether you, as a man in public affairs, will publicly advocate that the United Nations be permitted to broadcast factual reports within the Soviet Union of the doings that take place in the General Assembly.

Mr. WALLACE. At the moment, in the present state of international tension, I would say advocacy of that kind of proposition would tend to increase international discord, rather than allay it, and I would not advocate it. I would advocate, if you are so much interested in having ideas broadcast of that sort, that we start that kind of thing right here in the United States and broadcast the proceedings of the American Congress to the American people.

Senator McMAHON. The proceedings of the United Nations are broadcast over one network every single night. I am rather surprised at your reluctance to advocate such a proposal when you believe—

Mr. WALLACE. If I thought it would decrease international tension at the present moment, I would advocate it, but I do not. I believe there are other things that will have to be done first before you can get away with that.

Now as a Congressman you know that sometimes there are admirable proposals which you cannot push very hard at a particular moment, for one reason or another. This is one that I just do not think you can get very far with at the moment.

POSSIBILITY OF A SETTLEMENT WITH RUSSIA

Senator McMAHON. Do you honestly believe that a nation which refuses to permit its own people to hear the views of the leaders of a nation that is having difficulties with that nation, do you really believe that it is possible to come to a lasting and durable peace?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, I do.
Senator McMahon. You do?

Mr. Wallace. Yes, of course. That does not mean that I condone their system or their methods. But I do think, as I thought when President Roosevelt was alive, and when he believed it was possible to arrive at an agreement, I do believe that it can be done with Stalin, just simply because of what Roosevelt told me about Stalin.

Senator McMahon. And you, based upon what Mr. Roosevelt told you about Stalin, are now willing to predicate the course of your country and its 140,000,000 people, regardless of everything that has happened since Mr. Roosevelt’s death? Have these events not affected your judgment in the slightest? Are you still going on the basis of what Mr. Roosevelt told you about Stalin, is that right?

Mr. Wallace. I would say that in the interval Mr. Stalin has made at least five different statements to different individuals, indicating that he would like to have a discussion of the elements entering into peace with the United States.

MANNER OF CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Senator McMahon. Mr. Wallace, you certainly are not going to make the Nation understand that you approve of the way the Russian Government has been approaching this Government with cries that they want peace! What would you think of the President of the United States if he called in a newspaperman, one of our eminent correspondents, and said to him, “Say, Joe, or John, you know I am thinking about calling a peace conference.”

What would you think of that kind of a performance?

Mr. Wallace. If it resulted in a peace conference, I would be all for it.

Senator McMahon. Yes. But is that the way the President of the United States would conduct that kind of an operation? Or would he not send, to his Ambassador in Moscow, word to carry certain definite proposals to the Kremlin? He would do it, Mr. Wallace, just exactly the way Mr. Stalin conducted his negotiations with Von Ribbentrop, when they had the Germans in Moscow and were negotiating with them, and he sent his Ambassador in to Von Ribbentrop and made the German deal.

That is the way he would conduct his negotiations if he really wanted to do business. This conduct of a gigantic crusade to the peoples of the world on the spurious ground that what he wants is peace, when he will not permit the views of our own Government and other governments of the world to get behind the iron curtain, Mr. Wallace, just does not add up.

Mr. Wallace. I would say your view certainly does not add up, and your view can only end eventually in war. You have got to break through this extraordinary tension in some manner. Any manner of breaking through it is all to the good, so far as I am concerned.

CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Senator McMahon. Mr. Wallace, I suppose you are in complete agreement with the proposals of the Russian Government for the control of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Wallace. I think that there should be discussion at the same time of the problem of controlling all weapons of mass destruction; yes.

Senator McMahon. You realize, do you not, that every country except Russia and her satellite states, has agreed on a proposal to control the atomic bomb, for instance?

Mr. Wallace. Yes.

Senator McMahon. But Russia has seen fit not to agree with that proposal. If she did see fit to agree with that proposal, I should think the cause of peace would be somewhat advanced.

Mr. Wallace. No.

Senator McMahon. You do not?

Mr. Wallace. No. I suggest the Senator read Mr. Blackett's book, three or four chapters.

Senator McMahon. I have read it. I think you will find a review of it in the Scientific Bulletin, which, without any pride of ownership, completely demolishes Mr. Blackett's thesis.

Mr. Blackett. Mr. Wallace, happens to be a very fine physicist, but as a person dealing in political ideas, I think you will find that people who have studied the problem are unanimously of the opinion, at least those who are not infected with virus, that he is very far from the truth. He makes a persuasive case only to those who are convinced before they start.

Mr. Wallace. As the Senator well knows, I have, as early as July 1945, expressed my opinions with regard to this matter in a letter to President Truman, and I have not changed my opinions with regard to this particular matter. It is based fundamentally on human nature, on how we would act if we were in the same position as Russia was, how we would act if, on one day, Russia dropped a bomb, and on the next day demanded air bases all over the world.

That is exactly what happened here in the United States. On August 8 we dropped a bomb on Hiroshima; on August 9 President Truman came out in a speech and asked for air bases all over the world, and said we are going to get them.

That unquestionably, at that particular moment, started very great grief for the whole world. That is a matter of human nature. It is not a matter of being an expert physicist, or an expert political scientist. It goes deeper than that. How do people react to declaration of force?

Senator McMahon. We could continue, I suppose, the argument in this field for a long while. Mr. Harold Laski, who was never noted for his sympathy with us, particularly, and is nearer to you ideologically certainly than he is to me, in commenting on the policy which we have pursued in regard to the atomic weapon, and not too long ago, stated that in his opinion it was probably the most generous, the finest, and the most statesmanlike policy that had ever been pursued in history.

Mr. Wallace. You were in the Cabinet in 1946, until November; you were in the Cabinet when we were forging the policy, both domestic and international. As I recollect it, you approved very very much of the Acheson-Lilienthal report when it was released in April 1946. I think you are on record to that effect.
Mr. WALLACE. If so, I may say, Senator, that you will find within a very few months, at any rate by July of 1946, I was not embracing that approach.

Senator McMAHON. I see.

Mr. WALLACE. I felt that the situation was becoming gravely tense.

Senator McMAHON. I trust, Mr. Wallace, that was not after Mr. Gromyko, on June 16, 1946, said that it was unacceptable either in whole or in part to the Soviet Union?

Mr. WALLACE. I will assure you that my comments and my attitude were in no way governed by what Mr. Gromyko or any other representative from Russia said.

Senator McMAHON. I want to believe that. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any other questions?

Senator VANDENBERG. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I think we will excuse you now, and thank you very much for coming. We are very glad to have your views and opinions. Thank you very much.

VISA QUESTION

Mr. WALLACE. I certainly wish to thank you. I would hope, in the interests of the high ideals which the Senator from Connecticut has expressed, that the members of this committee, having very strong influence, I am sure, with the State Department, will use that influence to permit Mr. Konni Zilliacus and Mr. Pierre Cot to get their visas to enable them to come to this country. Also Sonia Branting, the daughter of the ex-Premier of Sweden, to permit her to come to this country.

The CHAIRMAN. That is something that I will have to consult the committee about. That is a little beyond our scope of activity, getting visas for people. Are they coming over for propaganda purposes?

Mr. WALLACE. I have invited them as my guests, sir. If you want to consider what I stand for as propaganda, you can call it that they are coming for propaganda purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not intend to be offensive.

Mr. WALLACE. No; I know you do not.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to know if that is what you wanted them for.

Mr. WALLACE. I have invited them to come and present to the people of the United States what they believe are the ideas and attitudes of their respective countries which have not received any attention from the press of the United States, and which I think should receive attention. Since I cannot get it in the press of the United States, I want to find some way of getting it to the people of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have any fear that their views and their opinions and their statements about their government would in anywise conflict with yours as you have expressed repeatedly?

Mr. WALLACE. About their governments?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. About the attitude of their governments. You said that is what they wanted to tell us.

Mr. WALLACE. I wanted them to tell the people of the United States the attitude of their people.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But I say you do not fear any conflict between their estimate of how their people feel and the statements that you have been making all over the country?
Mr. Wallace. There may be conflicts. But in the interest of this free exchange of culture and ideas, in which Senator McMahon has expressed such great interest, it seems to me all points of view should be made available in these United States, and especially between non-Communists and this western world. There are lots of non-Communists who agree completely and heartily with the points of view which I represent, and Sonia Branting represents, as well as Miss Lunden, Mimi Sverdrop Lunden, in Norway, and Pierre Cot in France, and Zilliacus in England. There are lots of non-Communists that hold to that point of view. And they are all from the western world, where we are supposed to have free exchange of ideas and where we are not supposed to have either iron curtains or paper curtains. It does seem to me, in the interests of what both Senator McMahon and I hold very, very dear indeed, that there should be permitted free exchange of those ideas.

The Chairman. Are all these people non-Communists?

Mr. Wallace. They are non-Communists; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yet you want them to come over here to lecture!

Mr. Wallace. There are two of them, I may say. Pierre Cot and Konni Zilliacus, who is a Member of the House of Commons in England. Pierre Cot is a Member of the Chamber of Deputies in France. Hitherto, as I understand it, all that was necessary was for a Member of the House of Commons to go to the Speaker and say that he wanted to come to the United States and the matter was arranged with great speed in a day or two. But now things seem to be different.

The Chairman. We will consult the State Department. I cannot promise you what action they will take. They have the authority. We do not have it.

Mr. Wallace. I know you do not have the authority, but you undoubtedly have very great weight with them.

The Chairman. We will consider it and get their reasons. They must have some reasons for their action. I do not know what the reasons are.

Mr. Wallace. If they have reasons, I would appreciate it if they would publish what they are.

The Chairman. I do not know about publishing. I am sure they answered, told the people to reply, the sponsors.

Mr. Wallace. We have not been able to get anything. And as far as I know Konni Zilliacus and Pierre Cot have not been able to get anything out of them, nor Miss Lunden or Miss Branting.

The Chairman. How are these matters taken up with the State Department? By correspondence?

Mr. Wallace. I have wired Acheson repeatedly with regard to the matter myself. We talked with his office on the phone. On the other side, application has been made through the American Embassy.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. We are glad to have had you.

At this point we will announce that Mr. Dennis, Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, was scheduled to follow Secretary Wallace, but I have a telegram from Mr. Winston, of New York, which says:

In view of refusal of Judge Harold R. Medina to adjourn trial permitting General Secretary Eugene Dennis to testify in person this Thursday in opposition to the North Atlantic Pact, he is preparing and sending a written statement in behalf of the Communist Party.
It is signed by Mr. Henry Winston. I suppose he has some connection with the party.

So we will not have the opportunity to listen to Mr. Dennis, who is the secretary of the Communist Party, but he will send down a statement, which we can all understand. That is, we can read it. I do not know whether we can understand it.

Mr. James S. Martin, of the Progressive Party of Maryland. Is he present?

(The CHAIRMAN. We do not seem to be progressing much. He is not here. We have some others. Mr. Gitt, representing the Progressive Party of Pennsylvania, was supposed to be here, but he is sick and will not appear.

Dr. Annette Rubenstein, representing the American Labor Party.

**STATEMENT OF DR. ANNETTE RUBENSTEIN, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN LABOR PARTY**

Dr. Rubenstein. I represent the American Labor Party of New York State. I am their present candidate for Congress in the Twentieth Congressional District in the special election, May 17.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to make a campaign speech?

Dr. Rubenstein. No; I want to make a statement. I cut it down because Mr. Wallace' statement covered so much of the material it will not take very much of your time, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed with your statement.

Dr. Rubenstein. I am here as a representative of the American Labor Party, its candidate for Congress in the special election, May 17, in the Twentieth Congressional District of New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the district which Mr. Bloom formerly represented?

Dr. Rubenstein. That is right. The district young Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. MacIntyre represented.

The CHAIRMAN. The feeling and policy of that district must have changed violently from that pursued by Mr. Sol Bloom, who was an eminent Member of Congress, a leader in the very things that this treaty is supposed to carry out. He was a peace advocate.

Dr. Rubenstein. We are peace advocates and that district gave a very big majority to President Roosevelt in 1944 on a platform that we still are fighting for.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

**DANGERS OF RATIFICATION**

Dr. Rubenstein. But I am here also as a woman and as an educator. I speak for the working people, the women and children of America, in pleading with our Senate to take a stand for life, and not for death; for peace, and not for war; for the United Nations, and not for the Atlantic Pact.

The ratification of the North Atlantic Pact would be the first definitive step on the suicidal road to a third world war. Attempting to deter the Senate from giving full and calm consideration to the chain reaction which would be set up by its acceptance of this war-breeding
military alliance, the Executive and its State Department have set up a hysterical clamor to create the impression that this pact has a de facto existence, and that Senate approval is a mere technicality.

Presenting the pact as a fait accompli, they warn the Senate of the terrible consequences its denial of the United States' obligations—which in reality the Senate alone has the right and duty of undertaking—would have.

Yesterday Mr. Dulles had the effrontery to tell this committee it is dealing with a totally different world situation today than it was a year ago. The pact then was only being discussed, he said, whereas now it has been formally signed by each of the participating nations. It has already become apparent in this testimony of Secretary Acheson that if the Senate allows itself to be involved by such tactics it will no longer be free to decide independently about military assistance to any signatory nations.

COMMITMENT TO DECLARE WAR

Furthermore, the Senate would actually have compromised its most sacred and solemn responsibility as the final guardian of our Nation's peace. It would have implicated itself in advance to a declaration of war under an appalling number of ill-defined circumstances.

For example, it is terrifying to know that article 4 of the pact has already been interpreted by Secretary Acheson to mean that an uprising inspired, armed and directed from the outside, would be considered an armed attack under the pact. The charge of outside inspiration in the event of strikes or popular movements is the easiest refuge of a reactionary government.

The Netherlands could today claim our protection in Indonesia under this interpretation. Who knows what further interpretations might be made by the State Department were the pact ratified.

Almost 100 years ago Stephen Douglas, arguing for the continuation of slavery under the mistaken belief that it would be the basis for an enduring and powerful nation, said America would then become the scourge and terror of the world. Our great leader, Abraham Lincoln, said he had no desire to see America become the scourge and terror of the world. He wished rather that it should become the wonder and admiration of the universe.

VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The United States set out on this path of peaceful and constructive leadership under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even the Wall Street Journal, which is not the organ of the American party, admitted that all propaganda notwithstanding, the Atlantic Pact does nullify the principles of the United Nations.

Both articles 1 and 53 of the United Nations Charter are very clear in requiring authorization by the Security Council for action against aggression, and the North Atlantic Pact is equally clear in ruling such authorization as being unnecessary. We can scarcely hope to gain confidence in our professions of peace when we are so casual about violating the Charter of the international agency for peace which our country joined with other countries in creating.
There are today two alternatives before us: Prosecution of a world war with, as Mr. Clayton said, perhaps greater vigor than before, through ratification of the pact, or the brightening prospect of peace created by the successful initiation of the Berlin negotiations. The American Labor Party urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to defer all further actions on the North Atlantic Pact in view of the agreement to lift the Berlin blockade.

A settlement of the Berlin situation can lead to a settlement of all the outstanding difficulties in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Russia. It can lead to a lasting peace. The women of America want a lasting peace. I therefore beseech you to search your hearts and your consciences and exercise your constitutional power in defense of America's future and the peace of the whole world.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The Chairman. You are excused. Thank you very much.

Mr. Dobbs, representing the Socialist Workers Party. Are those two different ones? One is the Workers and one is the Socialists?

STATEMENT OF FARRELL DOBBS, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

Mr. Dobbs. It is a Socialist party, but a different party from the party that is known as the Socialist Party headed by Norman Thomas. We used to be members of that party, but we are not any more.

The Chairman. What caused you to break away? Did you break away, or did they break away?

Mr. Dobbs. We left them over the question of the last war.

OPPOSITION TO WORLD WAR II

The Chairman. You were against the war, and they were for it?

Mr. Dobbs. That is right.

The Chairman. You are still against it?

Mr. Dobbs. I am still against war, and I will always be against it.

The Chairman. You were against that war. You were against the war we fought?

Mr. Dobbs. That is right.

The Chairman. And you did not fight in that war?

Mr. Dobbs. No, sir.

The Chairman. And you did not let them get you in that war?

Mr. Dobbs. I registered for the draft.

The Chairman. You registered, but you did not get in?

Mr. Dobbs. No, they decided to jail me instead because I said war would not bring peace to the world and would not do the American people any good. And history has shown I was right.

The Chairman. Did they jail you?

Mr. Dobbs. They did, under the Smith Act.

The Chairman. How long did they jail you?

Mr. Dobbs. Sixteen months.

The Chairman. As soon as the war was over they let you out?
Mr. Dobbs. No. I got out just a few months before the war was over. When I served my time I got out.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

OPPOSITION TO ATLANTIC TREATY

Mr. Dobbs. I am opposed to ratification of the North Atlantic military pact. You will find my position different from that of other witnesses appearing before you on this question, for I speak neither as an apologist for bankrupt capitalism, nor as a tool of treacherous Stalinism. I speak as a genuine advocate of socialism, which I sincerely believe represents the only road to lasting peace.

In my opinion, although the Atlantic Pact is represented as an instrument to preserve peace, its real aim is to preserve outlived capitalism. While propaganda in support of the pact is directed only against Stalinism, the pact itself is directed against the movement for socialism. This is demonstrated by the record of postwar diplomacy and by the presence of Fascist totalitarians in the Atlantic alliance.

PRESERVATION OF CAPITALISM

From the Tehran Conference down to the present moment, the central objective of American foreign policy has been to safeguard European capitalism against the mounting pressure of the European working people for socialism. All the evidence indicates that Roosevelt and Churchill as the leading spokesmen for world capitalism, made a deal with Stalin at Tehran whereby he agreed to support the capitalists in western Europe in return for which Stalin was to be granted his present sphere of influence in eastern Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. That is from the Tehran Conference?
Mr. Dobbs. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a copy of it here?
Mr. Dobbs. Of the conference?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Dobbs. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Then how do you get that? What makes you say that?
Mr. Dobbs. First, and most striking of the evidence——
The CHAIRMAN. Were you in attendance on the conference?
Mr. Dobbs. No, I was not.
The CHAIRMAN. You were not?
Mr. Dobbs. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.
Mr. Dobbs. Do you want me to answer your question?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. What basis have you for making that statement?
Mr. Dobbs. First and foremost, I say that the character of the Stalinists' policy, following the Teheran Conference, is the clearest indication of this.
The CHAIRMAN. You are just testifying from your imagination, then, and not from facts?
Mr. Dobbs. I am stating my opinion, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. You did not state it as your opinion. You stated it as a fact.
Mr. Dobbs. I said all the evidence indicates.
The Chairman. All the evidence?
Mr. Dobbs. Yes.
The Chairman. If it is all the evidence, it must be a fact.
Mr. Dobbs. That is my definite opinion of what happened.
The Chairman. All right. Go ahead.

STALINISM AND SOCIALISM IN EUROPE

Mr. Dobbs. Toward the end of the war, hundreds of thousands of European workers poured into the Stalinized Communist parties, mistakenly believing the Stalinists would help them establish socialism. But the Stalinist leaders in western Europe entered capitalist coalition governments and helped to prop up the weak capitalist class. In the countries of eastern Europe, they set up totalitarian regimes modeled after Stalin's brutal police dictatorship over the Soviet Union.

With the socialist aspirations of the European working people thus betrayed by the Stalinists, the puppets of the Kremlin were driven out of the coalition governments in western Europe. World capitalism then launched the present cold war against the Soviet Union, a cold war that is growing dangerously warm.

The propaganda of the cold war is focused on the police-state methods of the Stalinists wherever they are in power. This propaganda has struck a responsive chord because of the terrible crimes the Stalinists have committed against the world working class.

The criminal Stalinists must be overthrown in the course of the struggle for world socialism, but the working people dare not entrust that task to the capitalists. For it is the aim of world capitalism to destroy the system of nationalized economy in the Soviet Union, impose upon the Soviet people the rule of monopoly capitalism under a Fascist-like dictatorship, and in the process stamp out all Socialist movements everywhere in the world.

PRESERVATION OF CAPITALISM

To serve this sinister aim, a reactionary coalition is forming under the leadership of imperial America, whose only requirement for membership is support of the capitalist system.

Examine the list of governments that have signed the Atlantic Pact, with its fraudulent pledge to safeguard the freedom of the people, founded on the principles of democracy and individual liberty.

Among signatories to the pact you will find the Salazar Government that has kept the people of Portugal under totalitarian police rule for the last 23 years. Even before the Senate has acted on the pact, a campaign has started to include in the so-called freedom alliance the butcher Franco, who maintains his brutal fascist rule over the Spanish people by executing his political opponents.

As the Dutch foreign minister signed the Atlantic Pact, his government arrogantly decreed that “Indonesia is outside the spirit of the pact,” and the Dutch imperialists, with the aid of American dollars and military equipment, continue to suppress by force and violence the heroic attempt of the Indonesian people to win their freedom, founded on the principles of democracy and individual liberty.
No less hypocritical are the democratic pretensions of the French Government, which seeks to crush by force of arms the struggle for freedom of Viet Nam, Algeria and Madagascar. By what stretch of the imagination can the Italian Government be called a champion of democracy when it demands restoration of its imperialist rule over the people of its former African colonies?

The people of Puerto Rico, ruled by the United States Government in defiance of their democratic right to rule themselves, also have a right to question the sincerity of the high-sounding motives proclaimed in the Atlantic Pact.

Another candidate earmarked for membership in the so-called freedom alliance will be the capitalist government, well-staffed by Nazis, which the State Department is trying to carve out of the western zone of partitioned Germany.

REACTIONARY COALITION

The watchword of the reactionary coalition now gathering in the North Atlantic military alliance will be, "Preserve the status quo!" Secretary Acheson provided the diplomatic cover for this objective when he indicated at a recent press conference that a revolution against any government in the coalition, alleged to be inspired, armed and directed "from the outside," would constitute an attack on that government within the meaning of the pact.

Secretary Acheson may have gotten the idea from the Dutch Government, which launched its imperialist attack on Indonesia with the fantastic charge that the Indonesian Republic was a "Communist movement instigated from the outside." If the people of Portugal should rise up against the Fascist dictator Salazar, he could falsely pose as the victim of a revolution "from the outside" and demand armed aid against the Portuguese people from the other governments in the Atlantic alliance.

EFFECT OF COLD WAR ON THE UNITED STATES

For the American people the cold war has already meant high prices, heavy taxes, a peacetime draft and a vicious attack on their civil liberties. Billions are appropriated for war, but the people can not get homes, schools or hospitals. The Negro people are abominably mistreated. The Taft-Hartley Act remains on the books.

An unrestrained witch hunt is raging among government employees and in the public-school system. Conscientious objectors to the draft are persecuted. Liberal-minded religious leaders are harassed. Minority political parties are subjected to thought-control prosecution. A flood of bills curtailing traditional American democratic rights have been poured into the hoppers of Congress and the State legislatures.

These hardships and evils inflicted upon the American people are a natural consequence of the Government's war-like foreign policy, for there is a direct and intimate connection between foreign and domestic policy. If the Senate should ratify the Atlantic Pact, conditions here will rapidly grow ten times worse as further steps are taken to impose military police-state rule over the American people in preparation for impending war.
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I ask you to recommend the following measures for adoption by Congress:

RECOMMENDATIONS

Repudiate the Atlantic pact and censure the President and Secretary of State for their unseemly haste in rushing to sign it.

Require the State Department to make public all the details of secret negotiations concerning the pact, so that the Senate and the American people may have all the facts about this unprecedented military alliance for atomic war into which the Truman administration is dragging this country.

Order the withdrawal of all troops from foreign soil.
Repeal the peacetime draft law.
Cancel the military budget and all financial grants to foreign imperialists.
Halt the witch hunt.
Initiate a measure to provide for a referendum vote of the people to decide whether there shall be war or peace.

The CHAIRMAN. You want all the military budgets canceled?
Mr. DOBBS. That is right.

OPPOSITION TO ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE

The CHAIRMAN. Have no army, have no navy; is that right?
Mr. DOBBS. I am in favor of—

The CHAIRMAN. Answer that.
Mr. DOBBS. I am in favor of a military training, of a militia of the people, under the control of their unions and other organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are not in favor of any army at all?
Mr. DOBBS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not in favor of a navy?
Mr. DOBBS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not in favor of an air force?
Mr. DOBBS. I am not in favor of any instrument for aggressive war.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why do you want to train a militia?
Mr. DOBBS. They need training for defensive war.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the army not be a defensive army?
You are not for an army or navy.
Mr. DOBBS. I am not for an army as it is based now.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not for the Russian doctrine in any sense?
Mr. DOBBS. No, sir. I am irreconcilably opposed to Stalinism.

The CHAIRMAN. You are opposed to the Russian system?
Mr. DOBBS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are opposed to our system?
Mr. DOBBS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any system that you are not opposed to?
Mr. DOBBS. I am for socialism.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in operation in any place on earth right now?
Mr. DOBBS. No; there is no socialism.

The CHAIRMAN. The British have made very long strides toward socialism.
Mr. DOBBS. They have carried out a few acts of nationalization; that is not socialism.
The CHAIRMAN. You say in your statement that from the Tehran Conference down to the present moment the central objective of American foreign policy has been to safeguard European capitalism against the mounting pressure of European working people for socialism.

Mr. Dobbs. That is my belief.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the United States exert any pressure on the United Kingdom to prevent their socializing their industries?

Mr. Dobbs. There has been a great deal of pressure. I was not there, as I was not at Tehran. But as I read the reports in the press, I have seen manifold signs of pressures put on England to curtail and hold back their program of nationalization.

The CHAIRMAN. But she did not do it. She did not hold back. She went right on doing it.

Mr. Dobbs. They have nationalized a few industries.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is a capitalistic press. I do not know how the gentleman could believe what was printed in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator Hickenlooper. I just say, reading of those things in a capitalistic press, I did not think you would believe what you read there.

Mr. Dobbs. I do not know what the basis of that statement is. I read the press, and glean such an impression of what goes on in the world as I can out of it. And on the basis of my own studies of history and the operation of social forces, arrive at the best conclusion I can as to what I believe has happened and what I believe should be done. It is on that basis that I have submitted this statement to you.

The CHAIRMAN. You say all the evidence indicates that—

Roosevelt and Churchill, as the leading spokesmen for world capitalism, made a deal with Stalin at Tehran, whereby he agreed to support the capitalists in western Europe in return for which Stalin was to be granted his present sphere of influence in eastern Europe.

Mr. Dobbs. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Opinion? You have no proof of it, have you?

Mr. Dobbs. That is exactly the way the situation looks to me, on the basis of all the knowledge I have obtained of what happened since the Tehran Conference.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your reconstruction, as it were. When the police get a murder, they usually reconstruct the crime to show just how it was done. So you are just reconstructing the Tehran Conference out of what you imagine took place?

Mr. Dobbs. Out of such clues as I can get as to what took place.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The CHAIRMAN. You have got some pretty nifty clues, but they do not nifty-out in actuality. I do not want to be personal, but what is your business? How do you make a living?

Mr. Dobbs. I spend full time working for the party.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a paid party man?

Mr. Dobbs. That is right. I get $40 a week.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on the Socialist pay roll?

Mr. Dobbs. About a year and a half.
The Chairman. How do they derive their funds? By contributions?

Mr. Dobbs. Contributed by the members.

The Chairman. Are they assessed? Do they assess the members, or are they contributions?

Mr. Dobbs. They pay $1 a month dues, and occasionally make contributions.

The Chairman. So they are a sort of a capitalistic organization, collecting money from members in it.

Mr. Dobbs. We live in a capitalistic world, and we have to adjust ourselves to it.

The Chairman. That is exactly what I was getting at.

Mr. Dobbs. That does not negate the concept of socialism.

The Chairman. Not at all. Socialism might be entirely desirable, and yet it might pursue capitalistic methods. How many members have you got?

Mr. Dobbs. About 2,000.

The Chairman. Just a local?

Mr. Dobbs. No; that is the national organization.

The Chairman. You have just 2,000 members in the entire United States?

Mr. Dobbs. That is right.

The Chairman. The Socialist Workers Party?

Mr. Dobbs. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That is not the regular Socialist Party?

Mr. Dobbs. That is right.

The Chairman. That Mr. Thomas heads up?

Mr. Dobbs. That is right.

The Chairman. How old is your organization?

Mr. Dobbs. We celebrated our twentieth anniversary last year.

The Chairman. What sort of a celebration did you have?

Mr. Dobbs. A banquet and ceremonial affair.

The Chairman. That is nice. I believe that is all. Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. No questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. That seems to conclude our list for this afternoon.

We will adjourn until tomorrow at 10:30 o'clock, when we will have the Honorable Charles P. Taft; Owen Roberts; Mr. Allan Klein, American Farm Bureau Federation; Mr. Gerard, of New York; Mr. Frederick McKee, chairman of the Committee on National Affairs; Mr. Clifford W. Patton, National Association of Consumers.

I wish we had some of them here now, but we have not. The committee stands in recess.

(Whereupon at 3:35 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Friday, May 6, 1949.)
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

FRIDAY, MAY 6, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The session convened at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment on Thursday, May 5, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally, George, Thomas of Utah, Fulbright, Vandenberg, and Lodge.

Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order.

The committee is meeting in consideration of the North Atlantic Pact, and we have the pleasure of having with us a distinguished American, Judge James W. Gerard, who was former Ambassador to Germany, and who has rendered great and distinguished public service. We will be glad to hear you, Judge, at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. GERARD, ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW, NEW YORK CITY

Mr. GERARD. This is one of the decisive moments of history.

The failure to ratify the Atlantic Pact and to arm the nations of western Europe will mean war, the end of democracy everywhere, and the domination of the world by Russian communism.

I have sent to you gentlemen a little sketch of Russian history. It was written to show that the Russians always have been, in the words of Mr. Acheson, "aggressive and expanding."

Do not fail to ratify this pact and to arm Europe because of any change in the attitude of the Soviets. That change is due to the organization of the pact. Do not be fooled.

ATTITUDE OF EX-AMBASSADORS TOWARD THE PACT

Several years ago I organized a council of ex-ambassadors. All, with one exception, joined. I recently sent them a circular asking their position with reference to the Atlantic Pact. I have here the short answers of the 23 who responded. If you are interested, I shall submit them. There is only one objector.

The CHAIRMAN. You may submit the list, and we will put it in the record.
EXTRACTS OF REPLIES BY FORMER AMBASSADORS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO JAMES W. GERARD TO THE QUERY, ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT?

In answer to the question, Are you in favor of the North Atlantic Pact? the following replies have been received from ex-ambassadors:

"I am heartily in favor of the North Atlantic Pact and trust that not only the pact itself but the important supplement to it in the form of furnishing military equipment will receive the emphatic endorsement of our Congress."—Norman Armour.

"Certainly I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact. The Russians can start a war whenever they feel like it, yet this may make them less anxious to commence one."—E. Lamont Belin.

"Given the faulty policies and actions of the United States and Allied Governments of the past, which have brought us to the present situation, it is my opinion that the North Atlantic Pact is a necessary result and that we should carry it through to its logical conclusion."—Robert Woods Bliss.

"I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact. I do not think it adds very much to the plan of the United Nations, but if it can give confidence to democratic nations of Europe it will be well worth while because it is confidence, more than anything else, which will make them stand firmly against the Russians."—William R. Castle.

"Are you in favor of the North Atlantic Pact? No. At best it is just another pact, but with this added situation, that if the language of the pact is interpreted to mean anything near what it might be interpreted to mean, any little country in the central European Balkan area could involve us in a global war by thumping its nose at Russia over some little bit of policy or action which would have no effect whatever on the rest of the world and of which the rest of the world might really not even know till it was all over.

"The situation of the Atlantic Pact versus the United Nations reminds me in one way of the remark of Canning on the Congress of Verona, who is quoted as saying: The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy. * * *

Villele is a minister of 90 years ago—no revolutionary soundcloth; but constitutionally hating England, as Choulieu and Vergennes used to hate us—and so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all. To which may be added the old dictum. 'And the Devil may take the hindmost.'"—J. Reuben Clark, Jr.

"I strongly favor it."—William Miller Collier.

"Yes."—John W. Davis.

"I am strongly in favor of the Atlantic Pact. I trust it will be followed by—
and that soon—a Mediterranean pact, a Near Eastern pact, an Asian pact, and a Latin-American pact. Africa and Australia may line up where they choose."—Fred Morris Dearing.

"A good beginning in lining up United States popular understanding and support for realism."—Wesley Frost.

"As to your second question as to whether I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact, my reply is emphatically in the affirmative, and in a recent speech in Boston on the subject Faith and Freedom I expressed my support of the treaty in an uncertain terms. I do not think I need to argue the reasons for my approval of the pact, which should be patent to all."—Joseph C. Grew.

"I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact."—Lloyd C. Griscom.

"The answer to question 2 is in my mind quite simple. I am heartily in favor of the North Atlantic Pact."—Harry F. Guggenheim.

"Not in favor but think it necessary."—Ogden H. Hammond.

The answer to question 2 in your circular letter of April 1 is easy for me. I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact, although I hope that in due time, with general consent, Spain may be included in the pact. The strategic importance of the whole Iberian Peninsula should be self-evident."—Carlton J. H. Hayes.

"In favor."—Boas Long.

"I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact."—John Van A. MacMurray.

"I am heartily in favor of the North Atlantic Pact."—John Van A. MacMurray.

"I am wholeheartedly in favor of the Atlantic Pact."—Lithgow Osborne.

"I am heartily in favor of the Atlantic Pact."—William Phillips.

"I am strongly in favor of the North Atlantic Pact and believe that both national safety and honor require that the pact be ratified as soon as possible.
Whether we as a people realize it or not, we are living in a great historical moment comparable, as Mr. Churchill pointed out a few days ago, to that period when the eastern hordes were before the gates of Europe and only the death of the Stalin of that time saved the civilization of the world. We can, of course, say that Europe is not our affair and for a certain time go our complacent way, but that only puts off the day of reckoning.”—Robert P. Skinner.

“Yes; in the absence of any enforcing agency for the United Nations, the Atlantic Pact is, in my opinion, a good substitute.”—William H. Standley.

“I am strongly in favor of the North Atlantic Pact. I regard it as a positive step toward collective security under the United Nations. I hope, however, that this Government will take every opportunity during the months to come to use the pact as a means of strengthening the authority of the United Nations and as a means of encouraging the Federation of Western Europe.”—Sumner Welles.

“On balance, I favor the Atlantic (North Atlantic) Pact. The advantages deriving therefrom or the reverse vary considerably for the different regions in which it may affect our policies.

“The United States of America: The Truman policy, now rarely mentioned, committed us to rendering assistance to those peoples disposed to resist Communist aggression. That policy is morally decent and has the strategic advantage of bespeaking allies and bases in the event of a shooting war. It is true that economic and financial implications of this policy are serious; on the other hand we tried to make single-handed preparation for war on an isolationist basis, adequate measures would probably have been frustrated by public indifference and the claims of pressure groups. The Atlantic Pact, if ratified, will make it more difficult for the American people in general and professional pacifists in particular to evade those preparations, which afford the best chance of averting war.

“Other signatory countries: The pact should have a good propaganda value, provided that it is properly implemented from a military point of view; otherwise it may prove a boomerang.

“Other friendly, but non-signatory countries: The limited participation may have a bad propaganda effect in the Moslem world. For instance it may be asked, Is the Mediterranean part of the Atlantic, why not all the Mediterranean area and not merely Italy and Algeria?

“Soviet satellite countries and Yugoslavia: The pact should have a good propaganda effect—if implemented adequately—for what that may be worth.

“The Kremlin obviously cares not a jot for what we may say or write; the pact will only produce an impression to the extent that it is followed up by military coordination. Indeed as far as the Soviets are concerned, unobtrusive military arrangements would have been better without the publicity of the pact, which given an opportunity for counterpropaganda, as to encirclement, etc.”—John Campbell White.

Mr. Gerard. Norman Armour [reading]:

I am heartily in favor of the North Atlantic Pact and trust that not only the pact itself but the important supplement to it in the form of furnishing military equipment will receive the emphatic endorsement of our Congress.

The next one is from F. Lammot Belin:

Certainly I am in favor of the North Atlantic Pact. The Russians can start a war whenever they feel like it; yet this may make them less anxious to commence one.

The Chairman. Are those two fair samples of all of them except one?

Mr. Gerard. Yes.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg, have you any questions?

Senator Vandenberg. No.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. No.

The Chairman. Senator Thomas.

Senator Thomas. No questions.
ATTITUDE OF J. REUBEN CLARK, JR.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask Judge Gerard who the objector was, and what did he say? Who was the one who objected?

Mr. GERARD. The one who objected was Mr. J. Reuben Clark, Jr., who, I think, at one time was in Mexico, and comes from Utah.

The CHAIRMAN. He was at one time Under Secretary of State; was he not?

Mr. GERARD. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he was Ambassador to Mexico during the Republican administration.

Mr. GERARD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. I am glad the Senator mentioned the Republican administration.

I just wanted to ask Judge Gerard if he has at hand the observation made by Mr. Clark. Do you have that, Judge, and would you be kind enough just to read that one into the record, and let us hear what he says?

Mr. GERARD. He is much longer than any of them.

"Are you in favor of the North Atlantic Pact?" That was the question put to him. He answered:

No. At best, it is "just another," but with this added situation, that if the language of the pact is interpreted to mean what it might be interpreted to mean, any little country in the central European Balkan area could involve us in a global war by thumbing its nose at Russia over some little bit of policy or action which would have no effect whatever on the rest of the world and of which the rest of the world might really not even know till it was all over.

The situation of the Atlantic Pact versus the United Nations reminds me in one way of the remark of Canning on the Congress of Verona, who is quoted as saying: "The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy.

Villete is a minister of 30 years ago—no revolutionary scoundrel; but constitutionally hating England, as Choiseul and Vergennes used to hate us—and so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all." To which may be added the old dictum, "and the Devil may take the hindmost."

Senator DONNELL. May I ask, Judge, do you know where Mr. Clark lives now?

Mr. GERARD. He is living in Utah at the present time.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Judge.

Senator Watkins?

Senator Watkins. I just came in, so I have not heard anything and I could not very well ask any questions.

Since he mentioned Mr. Clark of my State, I just heard the last two or three sentences. Was that a letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Gerard wrote 21 or 22 ex-ambassadors, and asked them their views, and Mr. Clark was the only one who said "No," so he read his statement and we are putting it into the record.

Senator Watkins. May I state, then, if it is not already in the record, that Mr. Clark was not only an Ambassador to Mexico, but he was also Solicitor to the State Department at one time, and also Under Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. I stated that, except that I did not mention his having been Solicitor. I mentioned his having been Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to Mexico.
Senator Donnell. Mr. Gerard, would you be kind enough, if it is agreeable to the committee, to insert into the record also the letter which he sent to these various gentlemen?

The Chairman. Insert a copy of your letter to them along with the list of responses.

(Communication from the witness to the ambassadors previously identified appears in the record, as follows:)

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., April 1, 1949.

To the Members of the Council of Ex-Ambassadors:

Robert P. Skinner, long in the diplomatic service and for 5 years Ambassador to Greece, has made the following suggestion:

"The news from Greece is unsatisfactory. We have spent large amounts of money upon limited projects such as reconstruction, rehabilitation, and public health leading to nothing in particular, in spite of which, as the Department of State admits, 'the number of indigents and refugees continues to increase.' The military measures have not succeeded in terminating the guerilla war, the Greek Government is feeble, and it is high time to adopt a program giving at least some promise of pacifying the country.

"The guerilla army is Communist-led but only in small part composed of Communists. Recruits are impressed into the rebel troops and terrorized after being put under arms. The whole country is disorganized, and we cannot get out until order is restored. It is believed that many if not most of the guerillas would like to give up but they fear punitive measures from the Government.

"The suggestion I have put before the Secretary of State is that until work, wages, bread, and security are offered to the rebels the present situation will probably continue. It will cost far less to provide these things than to try to shoot them. There are vast areas in Greece that need drainage, irrigation, and so on. Why not set up an organization under American management and control and boldly offer work and wages for a period of 5 years, an offer which would bring the rebels out of the mountains, first in a trickle and soon in a steady stream. In less than 5 years' time these same men would have their minds turned to other than their present political thoughts, and would become the cultivators of the areas prepared by themselves. In the long run the project would yield some return upon its cost.

"I have suggested, as one capable of directing such a movement as described, Mr. Charles House, now the head of the American Farm School at Salonika. Through the years he has acquired the confidence of all classes of the Greek people. Technical advisers we can offer in plenty.

"The present attitude in Washington is that economic recovery will not be possible 'until the guerilla menace has been overcome.' But the guerilla menace cannot be overcome except with economic assistance. This is a vicious circle through which we must break."

I. What do you think of this proposition?

II. Are you in favor of the North Atlantic Pact?

The Council of Ex-Ambassadors can exercise great influence but not unless the members answer promptly questions sent to them.

Please answer immediately your opinion on the two questions above to

James W. Gerard.

Mr. Gerard. The letter included a question about the handling of Greece, submitted by Mr. Skinner, and as all the ambassadors were doubtful and said they did not know enough about it, I have not made any reference to it here, because this is only the Atlantic Pact, and these gentlemen to whom I sent this request are all of the ex-ambassadors of the United States, and I give the responses of all who answered—25 out of about 35. The others, some of them, are away, abroad, or someplace else, and of the ones who answered me who are all ex-ambassadors there was only one who was against the Atlantic Pact, namely Mr. Reuben Clark, who, as you correctly said a moment ago, was Ambassador to Mexico, and also Assistant Secretary of State.

The Chairman. Under Secretary of State.
FAILURE TO RATIFY

Senator Donnell. May I ask you just one further question: As I understood you, you mentioned at the outset the thought that the failure to ratify the Atlantic Pact and to arm Europe would mean war?

Mr. Gerard. I said it would mean war. If we retreat now, after this Atlantic Pact has been signed by all the nations, that is an announcement to the world that we are retreating before Russia, and it will mean that they will continue an aggression so fierce and distinct that we will be driven into war.

Senator Donnell. Do you not think, Judge, that when the treaty was signed on April 4, here, with all these gentlemen present, it certainly ought to have been known that that was only the signing, and that the Senate’s ratification was just as necessary to the effectiveness of the treaty as the signatures—the fact that the treaty cannot be made effective until the Senate ratifies?

Mr. Gerard. That is, you might say in international law, a technicality. If we have signed this treaty, even if it requires the consent of the Senate, and retreat from that position, we will be in a war within a year as sure as anything.

OBLIGATION TO RATIFY

Senator Donnell. Judge, do you think that is good public policy, for a plan to be carried out under which the ratification by the Senate is made virtually obligatory upon it? Is that not bad public policy, and is it not tending away from the very thing the Constitution had in mind, namely, that the Senate should have the right to ratify or not to ratify as it deems proper?

Mr. Gerard. Well, of course, any treaty has to be ratified by the Senate.

Senator Donnell. That is known all over the world.

Senator Donnell. And every Senator has the absolute right in his own conscience and judgment to refuse to vote for this ratification, just as much as he has the right to vote in favor of it. That is right, is it not?

Mr. Gerard. Certainly every Senator has the right, but any Senator that exercises that right and votes against it will be helping to send the young men of our country into certain war.

Senator Donnell. Judge, when this treaty was ratified, or when it was signed, I should say, do you not think that those present, and who signed it on behalf of the other countries, fully understood that the Senate had a right to refuse to ratify as well as to ratify?

Mr. Gerard. I do not know what the other people thought. But I think that Europe and the other countries of the world, since the affair of the League of Nations and the failure to ratify that, understand thoroughly that the Senate is the final judge.

Senator Donnell. And it should be the final judge and is the final judge under the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. Gerard. Absolutely.
Senator Donnell. And should not be precluded by the fact that the executive department has caused the treaty to be signed. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Gerard. Of course, the Senate is the final judge.

Senator Donnell. Do you know, judge, that Senator Watkins, who sits here on my left and who is a Senator from Utah, called attention by letter to the President of the United States to the very fact that you are now mentioning, namely, that after it is signed, that then the whole argument will be made that because it is signed, we must go ahead with it? And do you know that Senator Watkins suggested that the President give 60 days in which to study this treaty before it was signed? Did you hear that?

Mr. Gerard. I don't know what the Senator said at the time.

Senator Donnell. Do you not think, judge, that it is a very unwise course to put a compulsion on the United States Senate by getting the treaty signed, with all the pomp and pageantry of it, and then saying to the Senate that because it has been signed, "You have got to approve it"? Don't you think that is very poor public policy?

Mr. Gerard. No; I think it is excellent, for the good of the country.

Senator Donnell. And do you think, therefore, that the Executive, by having the power to get the treaty signed in advance, has the right, and do you think it is excellent policy that it should have, to virtually compel the Senate to approve the document? Is that right?

Mr. Gerard. The Executive has the right to manage our foreign policy up to the point of signing the treaty, and then the Senate must come in.

Senator Donnell. And as I understand it, you say that now that the treaty has been signed, the very fact of its signature would make it a grave mistake for the Senate to refuse to ratify it. Is that your thought?

Mr. Gerard. That is my point, yes.

Senator Donnell. Very well.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your attendance.

We have the pleasure of having with us this morning Mr. Charles P. Taft, of Cincinnati, a very distinguished American who has rendered splendid public service in several capacities.

Mr. Taft.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. TAFT, FORMER PRESIDENT, FEDERAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mr. Taft. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am appearing to urge a favorable vote of this committee and of the Senate upon the ratification of the Atlantic Pact. I believe this step is and has been essential for the preservation of peace, but at this stage a failure to ratify would be the greatest encouragement to ultimate war. Idealists who now withhold support of the pact do great disservice to the cause of peace which they serve.
With support of the Atlantic Pact I would give vigorous warning of the dangers still involved in its implementation. Its success depends entirely upon the effective continuance of well-considered group decisions on foreign policy in the National Security Council, under the leadership of the Secretary of State, with the withholding from such consideration of no important policy which touches our security in relation to the Soviet Union.

The ideology and the methods of the Soviet Politburo have made the Atlantic Pact inevitable. It has not been a question simply of the Red Army and the reestablishment of the boundaries of the Czars, which was the thesis of Mr. Lippmann some years ago. The accomplishment of that military fact is not what has frightened all of western civilization. It is the infallible dogma of a fanatic religion whose high priests have carried Machiavelli's prince to a point which neither Machiavelli nor his prince, I think, would have considered seemly or effective. The Soviets as the exponents of a state socialist system of economics proved through 20 years quite able to live with us in peace; they were far less upsetting to international trade than the Nazis.

INTERNAL WEAKNESS OF RUSSIA

It is the development of internal political weaknesses which has in part driven the Politburo to such extremes. The sudden discovery by the Soviet Army of the standard of living of what they called "decadent" western capitalist countries, even such relatively backward countries economically as Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, upset much internal political balance in Russia, and 6,000,000 heroes of the Soviet Union, who won the war with no help from the West, as they were told, could not be pushed around quite so easily. The absence of any real understanding of human nature in successful organization has further undermined administration and shaken the confidence of the dictators. That produces more repression, more suspicion, and a tougher exterior to those with whom they deal abroad.

But it is the missionary spirit of this religious fanaticism that has produced an unscrupulous dual system of agents abroad on a worldwide scale, dealing in violence wherever it is considered safe, and in infiltration propaganda and incitement elsewhere.

Are they really seeking to undermine and destroy the western world? Many people of good will think not. I can only say to them that they have not read the record. That record as compiled by Historicus in Foreign Affairs for January 1949 from the most popularly distributed words of Stalin in Russia over the 30 years since the revolution, is no mouthing even of a ranting German corporal after an unsuccessful putsch, and that turned out to be dangerous enough. It is the religious canon of a most successful revolution, from its greatest leader, based upon an ethic which sees in deception of its enemies its most accepted tool. We are up against an organization for world revolution.

It seems to be foolish, in the face of such a threat, to close one's eyes and vote for universal simultaneous reduction of armaments, for the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy, although I am in favor of both of those, or even for world federation. There is
no way for the fellow attacked to end a cold war insistently waged by
the other fellow with obvious determination. It seems to me equally
foolish to start a holy war against the Communists, although their
methods, their materialism, and their complete reliance on man with­
out God, is profoundly contrary to Christianity. They represent a
heresy which is the exaggeration of some of our own faults, not the
less dangerous on that account, but subject eventually to conversion so
far as the Russian people are concerned, in my opinion at least.

The policy of the United States which was so brilliantly set forth by
George Kennan in the July 1947 article of Mr. X in Foreign Affairs
seems to me therefore the only solution, and it seems to have been
carried out in the last 2 years with great success under Marshall,
Lovett, and Acheson.

CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA

It involves the containment of Russia within her present boundaries
of influence by diplomacy and not by war. The strength of our
diplomacy does depend in turn first upon our physical power, and
upon the economic health, first of the United States, and then of
everybody on our side. We cannot place our army of American
soldiers at every point where Russia might seek to break her bound­
daries. That is not necessary. All that is necessary is the knowledge
that certain steps by the Soviets will bring war. The Soviets have
not attacked Iran, where heaven knows we cannot put a defending
force; and they have not stopped the airlift or taken the allied sectors
of Berlin, which they could have done very readily.

Our weakness during these 2 years has not been the determination
of the American people, but the determination of our allies. The
Marshall plan, the conduct of the Soviets themselves, and the Atlantic
Pact, have eliminated that weakness in the West. The task of main­
taining that determination is political and not military. We have
lost ground in China, although I do not agree with the common crit­
icism of our policy there, but I do not care to discuss that question
here when it is not involved in the question before you.

The pact must therefore be ratified, but I cannot urge that without
stating why I believe its implementation is critically important.

I do not believe that the issue is whether the pact undermines the
constitutional prerogatives of the Congress. As I have already said
it is impossible for American troops to defend against a sudden attack
by the Russians. We can only plan a defense in depth, as General
Vandenberg described it the other day, and our share in that need
be no such commitment as would deprive the Congress of its entire
discretion.

At the same time, I believe with Mr. Acheson that any such truly
aggressive action against any of the signatories to the pact as the
pact contemplates, would impose on the American people, almost irre­
spective of the pact, a profound moral impulse and obligation which
would be reflected at once, and overwhelmingly so, in a special meeting
of the Congress to consider the situation. Such a situation will not
arise if the pact is signed, and if its implementation is adequately
administered.
The Atlantic Pact was inevitable, but war is not, and it is not in my opinion, probable. But the cold war will continue, with intervals like the present of temporary relaxation. Those intervals cannot be permitted to slacken our determination to maintain our policy. The cold war will continue until there is still greater failure in the integration and control of the politburo, something which will certainly be no interior revolution, but a gradual and perhaps imperceptible, almost, deterioration.

Arming the Atlantic Pact members is not, in my opinion, the first implementation, but rather standardization of armaments of all types with our American equipment and production. That must begin with the United Kingdom, since my impression is that the continental members are presumably using American equipment to a considerable degree already.

**STANDARDIZATION OF ARMAMENT**

I am deeply concerned with the procedures by which this standardization and rearming takes place. During 1944 I was the chairman of a State Department working committee on export of munitions of war, a committee which worked under a policy committee consisting of Mr. Acheson and the heads of the four geographical—political—offices. We were directly concerned with the effort of the Air Corps and of the Joint Chiefs to secure standardization of arms on the American model in the Latin-American countries, where you may not realize that somewhere between 80 and 90 percent have been supplied by European armament makers, and to furnish them with surplus American munitions and planes, either on lend-lease, or later by specific legislation. The experience was not one to inspire confidence in the effects on political policy of military missions. A distinguished admiral promised Peru 15 divebombers, and certainly upset the equilibrium, then not at all stable, between Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. A distinguished general of high rank by somewhat similar conduct incurred two reprimands on State Department insistence, and on a third occasion we were begged not to request another because of the effect on his service record. The military missions to the Latin-American countries returned with recommendations that would have increased some Latin-American military budgets to 30 percent of their total budgets, would have completely upset civilian control through existing civilian police by increasing the army beyond what could be managed by the police, and recommended a number of fighters, bombers, and transport planes for Argentina which would seriously have disturbed the balance in the southern area. The knowledge in those countries of what these recommendations were did not make the task of preserving the peace any easier.

While the ambassador was theoretically in charge of these discussions in each country, he had no actual control. There was no adequate process for coordination in Washington. Pressure on the State Department was such that while it stood firm against lend-lease as a means for providing these arms, its representatives much against their better judgment had to appear before the Congress as sponsors for the legislation when it was introduced.
I would be the first to recognize that the western European powers are more stable and responsible. But it is equally true that the situation in Europe is far more dangerous and precarious and less able to stand any kind of boners by military missions. Such boners have not turned up too frequently recently under the competent hand of Lucius Clay, but military missions to each country are a different matter. I repeat that our problem is the state of mind of the people of western Europe, to which military preparedness contributes only a small part, in my judgment. They would feel far safer for instance if they knew more about the weakness of Russian transportation facilities across eastern Russia and Poland, or about the effectiveness of united direction of all western European armies, than by the knowledge of many millions poured into their own individual military establishments and left for them to maintain at substantially greater annual costs. The problem is broadly political, and not military.

One of the political problems not to be minimized is the danger of commitment of the Allies, including the United States, by the act or omission of a weak ally or, for that matter, of any ally. I need only refer to our difficulties in Greece on the one hand, or some of our problems in earlier collaboration with the United Kingdom in the Middle East when action by the United Kingdom was assumed by observers to be the policy of the United States when it was not.

**STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

The success of implementation under the pact therefore depends on administration of foreign policy. In Washington the thoroughly sound procedures under the National Security Council need to be even more firmly established, and no area and no policy, which even vaguely affects our relation to Russia, not even Israeli and the Arabs, should be withdrawn to domestic politics at the White House. This success has depended upon the particular people running the operation. The Merger Act should be amended as proposed to include the Vice President on the Council and eliminate the secretaries of the three services. I hope that the Armed Services Committees, however justified their feelings about the famous flat-top, will not for that reason block this necessary step. The greatest weakness in our foreign-policy operation is in the process of being cured, and nothing should prevent its complete progress.

In the field there must be established through the National Security Council, with the State Department and, I suppose, ECA as its agents in part, a discipline over all United States representatives, especially those from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which demands agreement on a United States policy and position, and then close-mouthed adherence to it. We cannot afford the luxury abroad of the kind of interagency feuds we have permitted at home, or of one-man policymakers in the field.

If there exists real determination at the top, and if that is based on the conviction beyond question that our national safety depends on good foreign-policy administration at home and in the field in western Europe, then the Atlantic Pact will prove what it should be, the turning point toward a peaceful world.
The Chairman. Mr. Taft, in discussing the particular provisions of the treaty, do you agree with the view that it is a purely defensive pact?

Mr. Taft. I think there is no question about that, Senator.

The Chairman. Is there anywhere in the treaty any suggestion or intimation or implication that it has any other purpose except the defense of the security and integrity and safety of the nations who signed the treaty?

DANGER OF MILITARY BASES CLOSE TO RUSSIA

Mr. Taft. There is none to me, Senator. I think I would say this, however. I agree entirely with Mr. Dulles that the establishment of actual military bases in which we share in any country which is directly neighboring to Russia it seems to me would not be justified, although it might be authorized under the operation of the treaty, because in that case it would seem to me a step that to a reasonable nation would appear as a threat.

The Chairman. There is no specific provision in the treaty authorizing or directing that, is there?

Mr. Taft. No, sir; that is correct, and that is why I am for the treaty; but I am pointing out that its administration is something which is extremely important.

The Chairman. Of course, though there is no direct statement in the treaty as to offensive action, your view is that if the treaty should be utilized to create offensive action then it would be a bad step?

Mr. Taft. By what I described I did not intend to describe as an offensive action. The establishment of a base at an advance point is not necessarily offensive at all, and in this case it would not be, in my judgment, but it might be taken as such.

The Chairman. Of course it might be so construed by a nation that felt itself imperiled or threatened by that action.

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

The Chairman. But so long as it did not trespass upon the rights of the other nation it would not be pertinent, would it?

Mr. Taft. I think that the sample which was given by Mr. Dulles, which certainly was given at the Federal Council conference at Cleveland, was the establishment of a base in which any European power shared in Colombia. It would be taken as a threat to us, even though it was put there only as a defensive proposition in actual intent.

The Chairman. You said something about Colombia?

Mr. Taft. I mean Colombia, Latin America. We would take that as a threat, no matter what the intent was.

The Chairman. I see your point.

Mr. Taft. And I am saying only that it should be approached considering it from a reasonable consideration of what the Russians ought to feel about it. I do not mean what they actually would say, because they would say anything about anything.

The Chairman. Under the terms of the treaty, if carried out properly, could any nation level a legitimate objection to the treaty except—and it would not be legitimate—a nation that contemplated aggression?
Mr. TAFT. I think that is absolutely correct, Senator. I agree with that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It is defensive as against the action of any foreign power that would violate the integrity, the safety, or the security of any of these nations?

Mr. TAFT. I agree with that completely. I think it follows the exact model of the Latin-American treaty of the same character.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer, of course, to the Rio Pact?

Mr. TAFT. That is correct.

COMPARISON WITH PAST MILITARY ALLIANCES

The CHAIRMAN. You are a student of history and things of that kind. I would like to have you comment on the claims of some people that this is a military alliance. I want you to contrast this treaty with what was the traditional theory and foundation of the old-time military alliances of a hundred years ago or 50 years ago, or even more recently.

Mr. TAFT. I am not too much of an expert, Senator. But my impression is that most of those were both offensive and defensive alliances. That is to say, they contemplated the association of the nations concerned if anyone were attacked, but also to a pretty considerable degree if any one of them should undertake an offensive operation. That is certainly not the case in this instance at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not true of the historic alliances like the holy alliance and others that they had offensive intentions? For instance, the holy alliance hoped to reconquer the western world and place it back under a monarchy. It failed, but still that was understood generally to have been the motive of the holy alliance.

Mr. TAFT. They would not have put it quite that way. They felt that they were restoring the legitimate authorities in Europe, first, and in other parts of the world afterwards; but certainly the effect of it was certainly an offensive alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. While it was not perhaps explicitly stated in the alliance, their objectives were that these three monarchs, and they regarded themselves as more or less ruling the European Continent, at least, would act together in whatever war or whatever enterprise might follow, is that not true?

Mr. TAFT. I think that is true, although they attempted to state a general objective which on the surface had certain moral foundations but which in fact came out as an offensive alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the Monroe Doctrine had its birth and sprang from the ambitions and protections of the holy alliance?

Mr. TAFT. I think that is unquestionably true. The original suggestion of it from Canning was an effort to balance somewhat the powers in the holy alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. The purpose of Canning in making that suggestion, and his correspondence shows it, was to offset or discourage the formation in this hemisphere of the old regime.

Mr. TAFT. That is right, Senator. I have not read his correspondence. You are getting a little out of my depth in history, I may say.

The CHAIRMAN. It is pretty well understood generally.

Then let me ask you one other question and I will have finished.
Prior to World War I you recall, I think, that the so-called Central Powers had a treaty or an alliance with Italy, in which Italy bound herself to go along with the Central Powers. She did not do that. She did not follow that in World War I. But she was charged with having breached her treaty and her agreement because she did not. Is that not true?

Mr. Taft. Yes, and I think she probably did.

The Chairman. I think she did too, but still the basis of the whole thing was that she had been in one of these military alliances pledged to go to war when Germany or Austria went to war.

Mr. Taft. There was a similar claim, of course, in World War II, and that time Italy jumped the other way.

The Chairman. Still, the same principle was involved.

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Taft, I like your statement very much, particularly the note of warning you put into it. I have no trouble whatever with the pact itself. I think it is just elementary common sense in behalf of peace. But I think the problem of implementation requires the precise cautions that you indicate.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACT

You point, in this connection, to the difficulty that arose in pan America in connection with efforts to provide limited armaments. Is it not true that under the pact the requirement for continuous self-help and mutual aid, and the requirement for the constant integration of western European defense plans, is calculated, if properly carried out, to integrate these decisions to a point where none of the difficulties found in South America would arise?

Mr. Taft. I think that is absolutely correct. There was no such provision for coordination—at least none that was working—in Latin America, and there was no provision for coordination in Washington at that stage.

Senator Vandenberg. In the second place, in your statement you note the danger of our commitment through an act of omission of a weak ally, and perhaps an act of commission by a weak ally. Is it not true that under the terms of article 5 of the pact we are left in a completely obvious and completely legitimate right of self determination in judging the character of the crisis and the nature and extent of our contribution to the restoration of peace and security?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir; I think there is no question about that. I think it should be emphasized at every stage, however, that that is the fact.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. I have no questions of Mr. Taft.

The Chairman. Senator Thomas?

Senator Thomas of Utah. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Taft, I associate myself with Senator Vandenberg’s estimate of your statement. I think it is a very informative one in raising questions I have not seen raised prior to this time in these hearings regarding the influence of the military in the implementation.
There is one paragraph particularly that I would like for you to amplify. That is on page 3, where you say:

This success has depended upon the particular people running the operation. The Merger Act should be amended as proposed to include the Vice President on the council and eliminate the secretaries of the three services.

Who proposed that?

Mr. Taft. I understood there was a bill actually introduced, Senator, in one House or the other, which did provide for the elimination of the three secretaries. The addition of the Vice President I think was simply a casual suggestion, but one which seemed to me to have much merit, because in my own thinking, in connection with the operation of the State Department and, in fact, of the entire foreign and domestic policy of the Government, the place where the Vice President, it seems to me, could do the most good would be as the chairman of a committee like the National Security Council, but covering a somewhat larger area, so that I thought of myself, and when I saw the suggestion in the papers it seemed to me a very wise one. It also provides a contact with the Senate which is a very desirable one.

Senator Fulbright. I would gather from the whole statement on that page that you realize how very difficult it is to coordinate the civilian and military, and in military affairs they usually tend to go their own way, do they not?

Mr. Taft. I was very much encouraged, however, Senator, by the Alsops' article in the Saturday Evening Post, to which I was referring in my statement, actually, in discussing the success of the National Security Council. I had heard that that was the case before, and their article amplified it with a good deal of detail on a basis that seemed to me quite accurate and sound.

MILITARY BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator Fulbright. When you mentioned, up at the top of that page, that Latin American countries, as a result of the military recommendations, would have increased their budgets to over 30 percent of the total budget for military expenses, our budget is over 30 percent for military items. The percent of our budget which includes foreign aid, which really has a very close association—

Mr. Taft. I am referring strictly to the military budget.

Senator Fulbright. Our own budget is nearly 50 percent.

Mr. Taft. You are dealing with countries in which there is no such necessity for military operations, and in which a percentage of thirty is a burden on their economy which they are quite unable to bear.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Fulbright. There is some question—at least the matter is being discussed here—as to how long we can bear 50 percent for this purpose including, as I say, the two items of ECA and the military.

Mr. Taft. I would not include the ECA, myself.

Senator Fulbright. Its ultimate purpose is the same, is it not?
Mr. TAFT. I do not think so. I was involved in the setting up of the first European Economic Committee in the fall of 1944, which was the forerunner of the ECA, and the objective at that time was not military but was in a broad sense commercial for the prosperity of this country, rather than the military considerations that subsequently made it possible to put it through.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What I mean, the object is the security of the western democratic people.

Mr. TAFT. That is one object.

Senator FULBRIGHT. One is military and the other is economic in its approach, but I did not understand and do not understand that the principal objective of the ECA is better economic opportunity for this country. I thought that was entirely incidental. In fact, I could not support it if that was its only purpose.

Mr. TAFT. I would support it on that basis, and I was for it before any question of military defense came up. The military defense is unquestionably the consideration that put it through the Congress of the United States.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am not able to accept the idea that we can be prosperous by giving away goods. It seems to me prosperity must depend upon a real economic exchange of values.

Mr. TAFT. I think there is no question about that, but I think also that our prosperity could not exist if the rest of the world were in the economic status that it was at the end of the war, and it would be worth giving a good deal in order to restore it to its situation in western Europe as the other great workshop of the world.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is purely temporary. The objective of it is to establish them where they can stand on their own feet.

Mr. TAFT. Certainly. There is no question about that.

Senator TAPT. One of the principal objectives or ingredients in that is this question of security, first security from invasion by the Communists.

Mr. TAFT. That is correct, and it has been a very successful implementation of the policy that was described by Mr. X.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

Senator FULBRIGHT. At one point you say the problem is broadly political and not military. In that broad sense I agree with that. I wondered if you had given any thought to the political problems that exist in Europe; that is, the political fragmentation of that area. Do you think that there would be any advantage to this country in rearranging the pattern of political associations in Europe?

Mr. TAFT. I think it might, but I think it is a very long-term project. I don't think it is anything which the United States could do from the outside, and I think we have to approach the problem in the light of the situation as it is. In that situation, the moral determination of a nation like France, in my judgment, is the key to the defense of Western Europe, rather than their military budget. I think in that respect there is probably the greatest progress in the course of the last 2 years.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that if these countries remain independent sovereignties they will become strong enough to support themselves either economically or militarily?
Mr. TAFT. That is a very difficult question, Senator. We are out of balance to the extent, I think, of some $5,000,000,000. They, I see from the latest figures, taking western Europe as a whole, were out of balance to the extent of $6,600,000,000 for last year, for the year 1948. I think that is our most serious economic problem, as to whether those two imbalances can be corrected. I hope they can, but I do not think it is at all certain that they can.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think if these countries in western Europe to some extent merged their sovereignty so that they could rid themselves of the economic barriers that it would be beneficial to that area?

Mr. TAFT. I think there is no question about it. I only say that that certainly is not a project which the United States can put over, so to speak. It has to be done by them.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If we are investing our money and our efforts and taking considerable risks of even greater dangers, do you think we have no interest in suggesting to them that they do what you feel, and I think a good many others feel, would contribute to the ultimate objective?

Mr. TAFT. I have the greatest interest in that. I still would say that the problem has to be solved in the long run by a self-starting operation in Europe. We cannot do it by any pressure that we would put on from the outside, although we may definitely insist on doing so, and in view of our investment I think probably we should.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We are seeking to do that in the economic field.

Mr. TAFT. That is right, and we have made some progress.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF UNIFICATION

Senator FULBRIGHT. And many of us feel those efforts will be fruitless in the economic field unless it is accompanied by political change. It seems, therefore, we have every reason to at least suggest to them that that ought to be done.

Mr. TAFT. I think so. I only say that as a practical matter I think we have done so. I do not think as a practical matter we can compel it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. When do you think we did so?

Mr. TAFT. My impression from the reading of the press for the last 3 years has been that we have assisted and given such push as we felt was appropriate in that direction.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Can you think of any instance in which we officially gave any such push?

Mr. TAFT. No; I cannot think of any instance where we did it officially, and I am not at all sure that that would not react if we did.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Unofficially?

Mr. TAFT. I can only say, in reading the papers, the New York Times and other organs of opinion and of fact, there have been reported instances where we have attempted to assist in that direction. I am very, very skeptical of how much can be done by us from the outside, Senator. I do not think that just because we put $5,000,000,000 a year in there that we can compel them to do anything. We may stop the money, but that still will not compel them to do it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have no faith in persuasion, either?

Mr. TAFT. Well, I am for persuasion. I am saying that it has to be internal and self-starting in order to accomplish the purpose.
Senator Fulbright. You know that they themselves have been talking about this on and off for 300 years. It is nothing new. And they have a very strong movement now in Europe.

Mr. Taft. Conversation for 300 years is not significant, because the national problem has not arisen until the 19th century, but during the last 50 years there certainly has been a lot of discussion about it, starting with Mr. Briand's proposal for a United States of Europe, which I think was the first official statement about it.

Senator Fulbright. You know that even yesterday, or the day before, they did finally sign the so-called statute of Europe setting up a Council of Europe. You saw that?

Mr. Taft. I saw that; yes.

Senator Fulbright. So it is not imposing something on them that they do not want. There is a great sentiment there. I am not aware of any efforts on our part, or even strong expressions of approval of those efforts, and there are people who believe that this country does not approve of a federation of Europe because it might interfere with the objective you said ECA had, which was to keep free markets for this country. It is obvious if you had a strong Europe economically and politically it would be a competitor of this country, not only in Europe but throughout the world, and there are people—I am not saying you do—who think that in considering this for our future economic profit we ought to keep these countries in a state in which they are not too strong, but just strong enough to keep out the Communists.

Mr. Taft. That was not the objective I described for the ECA which I was supporting. What I was saying was that you cannot have nations which are flat on their backs economically and have the United States prosperous, and therefore it seemed to me it was an obligation, in fact a necessity, for the United States to do in any event what we have attempted to do in the ECA. That does not in any sense support the objective that you have just described, which may be somebody's objective. I don't know.

Senator Fulbright. I may say it is not mine. I think temporarily perhaps we might profit a little more by them not being too strong and becoming a real competitor, but over the long run, if we are really looking after the security of the West, we would be in a much better position to have a really strong consolidated Europe.

Mr. Taft. I think there is no question about that, and if, as you said, the administration has not supported it, then I think they should. My impression was that they had.

Senator Fulbright. I am certainly not aware of their taking any steps or making any statements specifically approving or encouraging a move to political unity. Their idea is it is premature, and we should not do it now, and we would be interfering in their internal affairs. But we interfere in every other direction. This military obligation is certainly not free from that charge, nor is the economic, because we tell them that we pass judgment and plan what kind of plants they shall build, whether they shall build a refinery or whether they shall build a textile factory, how much they can build, whether they shall electrify their railroads or not, and so on. There is no hesitancy in that field, but for some reason in the political field it is beyond good taste.

Mr. Taft. Senator, we are only disagreeing on the facts, and if you are correct then we are not disagreeing at all.
Senator Fulbright. In any case, I think it is a very good statement. I did not intend to be arguing with you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Taft. I think I would like to go back, however, to one suggestion you made, and that was what I had to say about my experience in dealing with the Latin-American problem was still an effective criticism of the present situation. What I know about the operation of the National Security Council and the coordination which it has brought about in foreign policy would indicate that it now provides something in the Government that absolutely did not exist at the time that I was in the State Department. It was one of the most necessary elements, and it was not there. Apparently it is there now, but it is there in my judgment primarily because of the people that are operating it, and therefore it should be made as firm and as established as Congress can help to make it.

Senator Fulbright. I think that is an excellent suggestion. I am thoroughly in accord with that suggestion.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Thomas of Utah. Mr. Chairman, may I just say here, with regard to the creation of the National Security Council, under the original Merger Act or bill which did not become law there was no provision in it for the Secretaries who were called the Secretaries for the Army, for the Navy, and for the Air Forces. They were definite subordinates, and the Security Council, had it been set up as it was planned in that bill, when the bill was on the Senate Calendar and reported out, was of course made up of, first of all, the President of the United States, who would be represented by his aide if he had one, you see; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; with the Chief of Staff, who would be Chief of Staff of all of them, and then the Chairman of the National Resources Board and then the Secretary. So that in that way you would have the type of representation which you have been suggesting here, and not a military dominated National Security Council.

Mr. Taft. Apparently it has worked effectively with general civilian control, even in its present set-up. But it does seem to me that it should be brought back closer to the original plan of the Merger Act.

The second thing I should say, because in both my statement and what I have said here I have left it out, is that the relationship of the President to the Security Council has been the most important factor in its success. It has been his confidence in the Secretary of the Council and their daily contact, the daily advice to the President of what is going on, and I assume the fairly continuous word from the President that he is for it or he is against it or commenting on whatever is being done that is in a sense the most essential thing in making it successful up to date. The President must be in it and must cooperate. He has done so with the one exception to which I have called attention, and that is the withdrawal of certain specific policies from the consideration of the National Security Council. None of them should be withdrawn from it. All of them should be discussed and decided in that council.

The Chairman. Senator Lodge?
Senator Lodge. I would like to direct your attention to the next to the last paragraph on page 2 of your statement, in which you make the following observation:

Arming the Atlantic Pact members is not the first implementation, but rather standardization of armaments of all types with our American equipment and production.

Well, now, does that mean that you do not think we would undertake any assistance of any kind until they have standardized their weapons?

Mr. Taft. Oh, no; I do not think that. But I think the standardization should be the first effort, and certainly should parallel any effort to supply arms. As I say, my impression is that in the case of all but England most of their arms come from the United States, and therefore standardization in the sense I am talking about has been accomplished. To a substantial degree the standardization must have been accomplished with the British during the war, but I should think that that is the place where we would have to begin.

Senator Lodge. You do not mean we ought not to do anything until complete standardization has been achieved, because even during the war, under the pressure of war, we did not achieve standardization with the British in artillery and a whole lot of other things.

Mr. Taft. I know. I recognize that difficulty, Senator. I was only pointing out the necessity of standardization, which has not been referred to in any of the publicity coming from these hearings.

Senator Lodge. You just feel we ought to make a good effort to get it.

Mr. Taft. Exactly, because the supply of goods coming out of our factories to equip our Army they can then divert immediately, and that becomes the greatest defense.

Senator Lodge. I think it is very desirable, but I also know what a terribly slow job it is to get it accomplished.

Mr. Taft. Is it not also your impression that most of the continental countries have achieved a considerable degree of standardization due to the fact that their equipment comes from this country?

Senator Lodge. Yes.

The Chairman. We have present Mr. Taft, through the courtesy of the committee, Senator Donnell, of Missouri, and Senator Watkins, of Utah. They are not members of the committee but they desire to ask questions and the committee has consented to that. I will turn you over to Senator Donnell.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, I wanted to ask you a few questions with regard to the text of your prepared statement, and then some further questions.

URGENCY FOR IMPLEMENTING TREATY

I notice that on page 3, about the middle of the page, you say:

I repeat that our problem is the state of mind of the people of western Europe, to which military preparedness contributes only a small part.

I notice, however, that on page 2 there is this language:

The pact must therefore be ratified, but I cannot urge that without stating why I believe its implementation is critically important.
Well, now, if military preparedness contributes only a small part over in western Europe, why is it that implementation is critically important?

Mr. TAFT. Well, I have tried to state in all of the second half of the statement why I think it is critically important, Senator. What I am trying to emphasize, however, is the fact that, taking France, for instance, in the state of mind that it was 2 years ago I do not think it would make any difference how many arms you gave them. You still would have a serious weakness at the heart of western Europe. The tremendous progress in the political operation of France, a large part of which is economic but which, on the other hand, depends almost entirely on the courage and backbone of the Government in establishing and collecting taxes and establishing a fiscal policy and maintaining it, that, it seems to me, is much more important in the case as the situation existed during these last 2 years than supplying military forces to them, and it is part of the implementation of the Atlantic Pact, because without that kind of backbone and solidity in the heart of western Europe the arms and all of the obligations under the Atlantic Pact become useless.

Senator DONNELL. Then am I correct in understanding, Mr. Taft, that your view of this is that two things are vitally essential to the operation of this pact: One, the creation of a spirit of confidence and determination and psychological strength on the part of Europe; and, in the second place, the implementation by military equipment?

Mr. TAFT. That is right.

EXTENT OF MILITARY OBLIGATIONS

Senator DONNELL. I wanted to ask you whether or not there is anything in the treaty which defines at all accurately the extent of the obligation into which we are entering in regard to the military implementation over this period of 20 years.

Mr. TAFT. I would agree with Senator Vandenberg that that is a matter of judgment which is reserved under article 5 to the United States. All the United States operation is under the Constitution in any situation may arise.

That does not mean to me that the United States is going to sit back and take a cold-blooded view of whatever the Soviets or anybody else may do. It does mean to me that it will have to be a step taken by the Soviets or by any other country which is so clearly and unquestionably aggressive that the United States, both its Government and its people, are united in believing that that is a threat to their security.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Taft, I was not referring particularly to article 5, which relates only to the contingency of an armed attack. I was referring, and perhaps I should have stated it more clearly, primarily to article 3, which does not refer solely to the contingency of an armed attack, but refers to "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." There will be maintained and developed the individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. That means, does it not, that by the term "continuous and effective" certainly there is the reference to continuity throughout the period of the treaty, 20 years. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. TAFT. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnell. And by "effective means," some kind of aid which really will have some effect. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And the type of mutual aid, in your judgment, includes, as you have earlier indicated in response to one of my questions, as I understood you, first the aid in creating a spirit of confidence and psychological strength in western Europe, and, second, the mutual aid in implementation by arms. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Taft. Yes; I would say so. If your question is the extent of the obligation assumed under article 3, I would say exactly what I said with reference to the arms or the situation of an armed attack on any one of the European nations, and that is that the extent of that help is certainly something to be decided by the United States, in view of all the circumstances and without any compulsion other than the obligation that it feels in the interest of its own security.

Senator Donnell. I am very much interested in that observation, Mr. Taft, because article 5 is the only article which contains any provision as that which you suggest, namely, "such action as it deems necessary."

Article 3, as I read it, says affirmatively that there is a positive obligation to do something specific. I do not mean that it is going to say how many guns or how many tanks, but there is nothing in article 3 that says, so far as I have observed, anything about leaving it to this country to decide what we are to do. Article 3 reads, does it not:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

LIMITATIONS ON ARTICLE 3 OF THE TREATY

Now I want to ask you, in your judgment is there not a distinct difference between article 3 and article 5, inasmuch as article 3 does not contain any such language as "as it deems necessary," but contains this positive obligation to do this, to give this continuous self-help, et cetera, to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack?

Mr. Taft. I would agree that the language is different, but I do not agree that the obligation is any different in that respect.

Senator Donnell. Then why was it necessary, if you know, Mr. Taft, to put in the language "such action as it deems necessary"?

Mr. Taft. That I cannot say, sir. What you are referring to is the old legal principle of interpretation that if you put it in one place it means you leave it out in the other. I do not think that applies to article 5 and article 3.

If I may give you a sample, for instance, it may well be that the provision of $10,000,000,000 of aid in 1 year, under the Economic Cooperation Act, would in fact produce a more effective self-help and mutual aid. That nevertheless, in the judgment of the Congress, would be considered as more than we could economically provide. There is no question that a limitation of that kind is to be implied. We cannot be asked to do more than we economically can do.

If that is a limitation, certain I would have no question whatever that there is also a limitation which leaves to our own individual
judgment, through the parts of our Government that have to decide that question, how much we should contribute in order to produce continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.

Senator DONNELL. Do you not think, Mr. Taft, that the fair meaning of article 3 is that there is a positive, definite, final obligation on the part of every signatory to give such effective mutual aid as is reasonably necessary to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, and it is not left to each signatory to decide what is reasonably necessary, but there is an outright obligation to do whatever is in fact reasonably necessary to effect those results?

Mr. Taft. I think the judgment of each individual country is the only basis which is in this treaty for deciding that issue. I cannot agree that there is any body set up by this treaty which has any authority to establish what you call the fact. The fact is something which is certainly not like the fact of this being a hardwood table. It is a fact on which there are bound to be differences of opinion, and the judgment of the individual country as to what is continuous and effective self-help, and what is the mutual aid which it owes to others, is something which it will have to decide, and no one else.

I might say that one reason for the difference in the language is because there, in article 5, you are dealing with the possibility of war, which is such a wholly undesirable eventuality that the writers of the treaty did not desire to have any doubt as to the question that you have raised. In the case of article 3, my own judgment would be that there could be no possible doubt, and that not being the case of the possibility of war, there was felt no necessity of spelling it out any further than it is clearly implied in the present language.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Taft, I think you are quite correct in your view that there is no provision in this treaty for any specific council or body to decide what is the duty of each nation, and that each nation, of course, has the physical power to decide for itself. But to my mind, the fact that article 3 imposes, as I see it, a direct definite obligation, not in the numbers of tanks or guns but a direct obligation, not to do what the signatory thinks is proper but to do what is in fact reasonably necessary to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, can lead to what your answer a moment ago suggests, namely, a very grave difference of opinion between the different signatories as to what is necessary and ultimately as to whether the respective parties have complied with their obligation.

Mr. Taft. Well, Senator, may I say, certainly any treaty offers the possibility of some difference of opinion as to its interpretation, and some parts of the treaty are possible of determination by the World Court, others are not, where it is a question of judgment of the kind that was called for under article 3. All I can say is that what this treaty does, as one of a number of other steps, is to attempt to build up a moral determination to resist aggression and to stand together for effective self-help and mutual aid, which is good only so long as that moral determination continues. And I do not think that you can avoid the possibility of some possible future differences of opinion when the national interest of some particular nation seems to have moved in a slightly different direction.
Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, in the second paragraph of your statement you mention the National Security Council. Are you referring there to the Council of Resources, the one to which Mr. Wallgren was recently nominated by the President?

Mr. Taft. No, no. I am referring to the National Security Council, under the Merger Act, which Senator Thomas described in the original form, which now consists of the chairman of the body to which you refer as one member, to the Secretary for Defense, to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to the President's representative, Secretary of State, and such others as they may invite to sit with them, and they have invited others. I understand the Secretary of the Treasury now frequently sits with them.

Senator Donnell. In that same sentence you say:

With support of the Atlantic Pact I would give vigorous warning of the dangers still involved in its implementation.

I want to come back to those dangers here in a few minutes. Then you continue, “Its”—that means the Atlantic Pact, does it not?

Mr. Taft. Yes; that's right.

Senator Donnell (reading):

Its success depends entirely upon the effective continuance of well-considered group decisions on foreign policy in the National Security Council, under the leadership of the Secretary of State—

And so forth. Is the National Security Council placed under the leadership of the Secretary of State?

Is the National Security Council placed under the leadership of the Secretary of State?

Mr. Taft. I think he is the Chairman of it, if I am not mistaken.

Senator Thomas of Utah. Yes; he is the Chairman.

Senator Donnell. And he exercises, as you regard it, of course, a very great position of power and influence on the Council?

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

CONTROL OVER FOREIGN RELATIONS

Senator Donnell. I notice over on page 3 that you refer to what to my mind is a very serious situation which has developed, you point out, in which the State Department seems to have been not free from outside compulsions. I am talking about the leadership of the Secretary of State. Let me ask you about what you mean here. You say, on page 3, near the top:

Pressure on the State Department was such that while it stood firm against lend-lease, its representatives much against their better judgment had to appear before the Congress as sponsors for the legislation when it was introduced.

Who was it applied that compulsion which made these men, against their own better judgment, come here as sponsors for legislation?

Mr. Taft. I do not know, but I would assume the President of the United States.

Senator Donnell. The President of the United States? That is exactly what I am getting at. So that this Security Council, under the leadership of the Secretary of State, is at least subject to the possibility of danger of one man, the President of the United States,
requiring those men to go ahead on policies that they did not believe in at all; is that right?

Mr. Taft. Senator, the first thing I would say is that I was describing here, as I just said to Senator Fulbright, the situation at the time I was in the State Department, which was in 1944 and 1945. The presentation of that legislation I think followed in the spring of 1946. At that time the Merger Act had not been passed, the National Security Council was not in existence, and there was no body, no effective body, before which the State Department, the military services, and the others concerned with foreign policy could meet and thresh out a coordinated policy.

As the National Security Council is now working, that kind of pressure would not exist except out on the table where the matter was fully discussed.

Now, so far as the President of the United States is concerned, the Secretary of State, under the legislation which creates the State Department, is required to administer the Department of State in accordance with the instructions of the President of the United States. It is just as broad and just as simple as that. I don't have the exact language, but it is approximately that. So that the President is always in the position to decide a question in favor of the military and against the Secretary of State, and to instruct the Secretary and his subordinates to follow that policy. Under the Constitution of the United States there is no other possible result.

I can only say that the operation of the National Security Council during the last year and a half or 2 years that it has been in existence has gradually developed what I have described here as a group decision in which the President participates and which in the ordinary case he has supported and implemented.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, you have touched on something that I think every Member of every committee and of the Senate has observed right up to this time, and that is, that when the administration, the President of the United States, determines upon a policy, we find one witness right after the other coming before us from the administration, all of them heartily in favor in every respect of what the President has suggested, and I want to ask you whether you know that in the instance you described on page 3 the representatives of the State Department had to appear, to quote your language, "before the Congress as sponsors for legislation much against their better judgment."

Do you know that to be a fact?

Mr. Taft. I do not know it to be a fact from a direct conversation with any of the people who were concerned, or from any direct information about that particular instance. I do know about the attitude of the State Department in connection with that whole proposal at the time that I was in it, and some of the gentlemen who were concerned were not in favor of what they subsequently supported before the Congress. That is all I can tell you.

Senator Donnell. So that they came before Congress expressing opinions which were not actually their opinions?

Mr. Taft. I am not sure that I would say that. They came and stated that the State Department was in favor of it.

Senator Donnell. And that was much against their better judgment?
Mr. Taft. Their individual better judgment; but, Senator, I think I would have to say that I do not believe the Government can operate unless in the end on questions of policy the President decides it. One of the things that turned my hair gray during 4 ½ years in Washington was the fact that we could not get the President to decide some of these things.

TESTIMONY ON ATLANTIC FACT

Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, the point that I am disturbed about, as you, of course, observed, is this: Here sits a committee of 13 gentlemen of the Senate, trying to get the facts and the views of people about this North Atlantic Treaty. If the President of the United States controls the opinion of every man that comes here, why not just get one of them to say "That is the opinion of the President, and it is our official duty to follow it"? In other words, are we getting anything of any special value when we get witness after witness, all of them exactly and precisely convinced that this thing is right? Are we getting anything of value?

Mr. Taft. Well, Senator, I read with care—in fact I have here—Mr. Acheson's statement before this committee. I worked for Mr. Acheson for a year as his direct assistant. I have a very high opinion of him. I think the statement that he presented was a very carefully worked out statement which represented his opinion, which he stood for, and stood back of in every respect, especially in connection with his interpretation of the language of this particular document. He did not quite agree in that in every detail with Mr. Lovett, who happens to be a classmate and very close friend of mine also.

Senator Donnell. And who is no longer in the Department, is he?

Mr. Taft. And who is no longer with the Department; but I think nevertheless Mr. Lovett would equally have expressed his judgment about it had he been in the Department at that time, as one of those who negotiated it.

Certainly the stronger the caliber of the associates and assistants whom the President employs the more likely they are not to come down here and present anything in which they do not believe.

MILITARY BASES NEAR RUSSIA

Senator Donnell. You spoke something about the matter of bases being established right up close to Russia, and I believe you indicated that it might be that Russia might feel that such establishment of bases up close there by the parties to this treaty would indicate aggression. Am I correct in so understanding and interpreting your observation?

Mr. Taft. I was referring to the establishment of bases which Russia, acting as a reasonable people might consider as a threat to them, not what the present Politburo would consider as a threat or not what they might say they considered as a threat.

Senator Donnell. I was not particularly differentiating between the two.

Mr. Taft. I do, and I think it is very important to differentiate in that matter.

Senator Donnell. I was not particularly differentiating between the two because that is not the question to which I desire to address.
myself. I understood you to indicate that you think that somebody in Russia, whoever the proper parties are, might feel that there was aggression intended by the establishment of bases at some strategic point or points near them. That is right, is it?

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. Very well. Now, Mr. Taft, Senator Connally then said, in substance, to you, "Well, now, Mr. Taft, there is no provision in the treaty, no specific treaty provision, authorizing and directing bases near Russia," and you said—I may not quote it exactly, but that is the substance of his statement as I understood it—and you said, "That is the reason I am in favor of the pact."

"Remember, now, he had stated that there is no specific treaty provision authorizing and directing establishment of such bases.

I want to ask you, Mr. Taft, although there is no provision in here that directs that such bases be there placed, there certainly is authority under this pact for the signatories to go ahead and establish them there if they want to do it, is there not?

Mr. Taft. I would say there is the possibility under the pact without any violation of its terms, and perhaps as a result of some of the processes which the pact sets up. That is exactly why I have stated as strongly as I have that there are dangers involved in its implementation, and that no such steps should be taken except as a result of a group decision in which the political considerations are the ones that have the final decision.

Senator Donnell. I understand, then, that one of the dangers, and I quote from your statement on page 1, at the top, "still involved in its implementation," is precisely the situation that I have described, namely, that of bases.

Mr. Taft. That is one of them; yes, that is right.

DANGERS IN IMPLEMENTATION

Senator Donnell. Now I want to ask you in a few minutes about some others. In the first place, the Military Department in our country has its opinions, and not only is the State Department under the Executive, but the Military Department likewise.

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. It may come in with plans too which may attract the President—not this particular President but some other President, perhaps—saying that we should vastly increase our military implementation. That is entirely possible, is it not?

Mr. Taft. Certainly.

Senator Donnell. And, as you have pointed out here at the bottom of page 2 of your statement, sometimes the military authorities make mistakes like anybody else. That is right, is it not?

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. And the particular ones to which you have referred here are the mistakes made by the admiral and the distinguished general mentioned in your statement. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. So you have emphasized the fact that while it is possible, while it is advisable, to take up this matter of implementation and safeguard us, there is at least a danger and a possibility that there might be a bad implementation. That is correct, is it not?
Mr. Taft. Certainly there is. The danger, however, of not signing the pact is far greater.

Senator Donnell. Well, of course, that is a question for opinion, but there is a danger and a possibility of actual bad errors being made in implementation. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Taft. That is always true in foreign policy.

Senator Donnell. And it is true now in connection with this Atlantic Treaty, is it not?

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

COMMITMENT TO POLICIES OF ALLIES

Senator Donnell. You mentioned another thing that I do not recall having been mentioned in these hearings, and I think it is tremendously interesting and important. On page 3 you talked about the political problems, the third full paragraph. You say:

One of the political problems not to be minimized is the danger of commitment of the Allies, including the United States, by the act or omission of a weak ally.

Mr. Taft. And I added, "or any ally."

Senator Donnell. That is not in the text, but I will add it.

Mr. Taft. I added that, because I did not, of course, consider the United Kingdom as a weak ally.

Senator Donnell. That is certainly true, that the same problem not to be minimized is the danger of commitment by the Allies through the act or omission of any one of our allies.

Mr. Taft. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. Now suppose, Mr. Taft, that we ratify this treaty which has already been signed. Obviously we are associated, then, with its 12 signatories, is it not 12, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Eleven nations other than ourselves, and we are subject for 20 long years to the very danger that you point out, of commitment of ourselves by the omission or act of some one of those 11 other allies. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir. I would only say that that is the danger to which any mature nation has long since been subject, but which the United States has avoided by not reaching its full maturity in foreign policy. I am in favor of the signing of this pact, which brings the United States into a situation in which it has never existed and never has been in in its past history, because I believe we have reached a state in the world situation in which it is absolutely essential and necessary to do so for our own security. That danger is one of the dangers which is involved in growing up in the world today. Nobody can avoid it by anything, whether you sign this pact or do not sign it.

Senator Donnell. Referring to the situation where we do not sign it, we are certainly not under any contractual obligation to do anything unless we do ratify the pact; are we?

Mr. Taft. That certainly is true, yes.

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Taft, suppose that during those 20 long years, which is as long as the time since the beginning of the depression in this country in 1929 until now, some 1 of these 11 other allies, as for illustration Italy, should make some material blunder,
should irritate a prospective enemy, should cause such action to be
taken as would precipitate an attack by that other enemy by com-
mitting an act that you or I or the United States would never have
agreed to. We are bound contractually by this obligation, are we not,
for the entire period of that 20 years, in the event of an armed attack
by that enemy, to forthwith take such action as we deem necessary,
which Mr. Acheson has indicated means in our honest judgment, in-
cluding the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic area?

That is true, is it not?

Mr. Taft. Yes; and the only way that you can avoid that is by hav-
ing an administration and foreign policy which keeps up with what
is going on and, in the event anything as serious as you are describing
arises, knows about it in advance and takes some steps to prevent it.

Senator Donnell. Just how could our administration and our
foreign policy prevent Italy or France or Denmark or any one of
these other countries, including even little Luxembourg, whose Min-
ister is a close friend of mine and for whom I have great admiration,
step in and tell those countries what they should or should not do?

Mr. Taft. The administration of foreign policy is, among other
things, to induce other nations to do what you want them to do or
not to do what you do not want them to do. It is not an easy task
which is assigned to the State Department in that connection, but it is
one which you certainly can attempt to do and which you can accom-
plish more or less successfully.

Senator Donnell. I emphasize the fact that you have put in, very
properly, the word "less." It is entirely possible that the administra-
tion of foreign affairs of our country might not be persuasive enough
to induce the other country to do what we wanted it to do?

Mr. Taft. Certainly. A war could happen. My own judgment is
that I believe it is not probable, because the effect of the pact as well
as the other steps that have been taken, as well as the greatly forward
steps in the administration of foreign policy, have made it impossible.

EFFECT OF COMMUNIST COUP IN ONE OF SIGNATORIES

Senator Donnell. Is there anything in this treaty, from begin-
ing to end, that provides that if 1 of these 11 other signatories should
become Communist that it could be expelled from the combination
formed by the treaty?

Mr. Taft. No, sir. I think that the danger of any one of them
becoming Communist was greater in the last 2 years than it is likely
to be in the course of the next 20.

Senator Donnell. Of course it is entirely possible, is it not, that
in a country like Italy or France, and possibly some others, the Com-
munist influence might become very strong gain, and perhaps is not
so weak as yet? Is that not true?

Mr. Taft. I would say it is possible, but not likely.

Senator Donnell. There is nothing in the pact, at any rate, that
says that at any time during this 20-year period if any one of the
nations shall become Communist it can be expelled from the pact.

Mr. Taft. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, in the sixth paragraph on page 2 of
your statement you say you believe with Mr. Acheson that any such
truly aggressive action against any other signatories of the pact as the pact contemplates would impose on the American people, you say almost irrespective of the pact, a profound moral impulse and obligation, et cetera, and I will come to the et cetera in a minute.

**MORAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PACT**

Up to that point, however, you say you believe with him that any such truly aggressive action against any one of the signatories to the pact as the pact contemplates would impose on the American people a profound moral impulse and obligation. Am I not correct, Mr. Taft, that in addition to any moral obligation the pact would impose a legal obligation, a binding legal obligation to take, as the pact says, in the event of such an attack, "forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force," not only to restore but to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area?

Am I not correct?

Mr. Taft. That is correct. I was attempting, however, to paraphrase what Mr. Acheson said, which, as you will recall, was along a very delicate line, a very sharp ridge, should I say.

Senator Donnell. May I ask you, Mr. Taft, this question: You are familiar, of course, with the fact that Mr. Acheson, first in his radio speech when he discussed the pact with the American public, second in the State paper called the white paper, and third, I believe in a subsequent address—I might be wrong about the subsequent address, but certainly in the other two—referred to the pact and said that provision about "as it deems necessary" still leaves it obligatory upon us to do what in our honest, genuine judgment is required. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Taft. I think that is correct. However, I nevertheless believe that what I have said here is a fair transcript of what Mr. Acheson said in his testimony to the committee.

Senator Donnell. I am not questioning the fairness of it, Mr. Taft. It may be quite accurate. But the point I am getting at is twofold, one of which I have stated, namely, that the pact creates, as I understand you agreeing, do you not, a legal obligation and not a mere moral obligation, under the circumstances recited, where there is a truly aggressive action against any of the 12 signatories?

Mr. Taft. Certainly that is true. I was only pointing out here that at the same time it creates a moral obligation it creates it in a situation in which I believe the overwhelming probabilities are there would be a very profound moral obligation at the same time.

Senator Donnell. You may be quite right. The point I am getting at is that we have here created a legal obligation so we are no longer free to determine for ourselves what is the moral obligation. We might have no moral obligation. It might be an obligation of prudence that would lead us into war, but we might have no moral obligation at all.

**PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK**

I wanted to ask you this, speaking of Mr. Acheson's testimony. There was put up to him, as the Secretary of State, and there was put up to Mr. Lovett, as the man who participated in all of the
initial negotiations up until the day Mr. Acheson became Secretary of State in January of this year, there was put up to the two of them, substantially the same question, namely: Suppose that 500,000 troops were to be sent by Russia in an armed attack against Norway 6 weeks after this treaty has gone into effect. Would you consider that there is any obligation under article 5 of this treaty for the United States to take immediately some action of a very pronounced military character, in view of that action?

Mr. Taft. Well, Mr. Lovett said "No." His answer was that the President would have to consult Congress before there was a declaration of war. I think that is correct.

What I have said here—

Senator Donnell. What did Mr. Acheson say?

The Chairman. Let him answer the question.

Mr. Taft. What I said about that here is something which amplifies that a little bit. I cannot find the place, but it is a statement something like this, that I do not believe that such preparatory steps for a defense in depth as our military department might take would in any way prevent a complete discretion in the Congress when it was called in such a situation, which goes a little bit further than what Mr. Lovett said, although I do not say it is inconsistent with it, necessarily.

As to Mr. Acheson, I am afraid I could not put my finger on what he had to say to that subject without going through his statement and taking too much time.

Senator Donnell. Is it your opinion, Mr. Taft, that in the suppositional case that I mentioned, of the 500,000 troops being sent by Russia in an armed attack against Norway, if the Congress were not in session the President would have no power and no duty under this treaty to take immediate military steps of such nature as he deems proper in view of that contingency?

Mr. Taft. I think the obligation on the President would be to call Congress into session at once.

Senator Donnell. Suppose that it was obviously—

Mr. Taft. And to take such steps as I have described, as the preparation for a defense in depth, which is the only kind of defense you could put on anyhow, so far as we are concerned.

Senator Donnell. Suppose, for illustration, that a situation should develop such as did develop in the First World War, when the troops of Germany came across Belgium, and when every minute was of great importance. Suppose that the 500,000 troops should come into Norway, and that military advisers of the President should say to him, "Unless bombers are immediately sent from this country to reinforce the European bombers it is going to mean a million other troops will come in and Europe is going to be conquered subject only to the ultimate slow process of rehabilitation." Suppose Congress were not in session. Do you think the President would be powerless then, or without obligation, to act under the terms of this treaty, which says "forthwith"?

Mr. Taft. I can only answer as I did before. I think the President's first obligation would be to call Congress into session, which would certainly not take over 2 days if that, and that in the meantime he would make all preparations so that he could begin to operate. I do
not think that he would be obligated to send bombers at once, and I question your statement that sending bombers at once would stop an additional million from coming into Norway.

Senator Donnell. I did not say it would. I said, if his military advisers advised him it was important and necessary to send them promptly in order to prevent further aggression, or words to that effect.

Mr. Taft. I think he would call the Congress into session.

Senator Donnell. That is your opinion as to what he would do. I am asking whether he would have power or authority to proceed to send the bombers on the exercise of his judgment as Commander in Chief without waiting for Congress to convene.

Mr. Taft. That is a question of constitutional law in which I do not really find myself qualified to answer.

Senator Donnell. Very well. May I ask you this question: In the first place, you are a lawyer and have practiced many years; have you not?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, suppose an attack were made on New York City by 500,000 men and bombers, and the Congress was not in session. Would you say that the President could not take immediate steps by military action to defend New York City?

Mr. Taft. Yes; I think he could.

Senator Donnell. Does it not say, under the terms of this treaty in article, that "the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," which of course would include an attack against this country. Does it not say that?

Mr. Taft. It says that; yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Then, if the President would have the power in the case of New York, as I referred to it, would not have precisely the same power in the case of a sudden attack upon London to send bombers or take any other action he deemed proper before waiting for Congress to come back together? Would he not have that right, under the terms and obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. Taft. He might conceivably. If he did, then he also has it under the terms of the Rio Treaty.

Senator Donnell. He does? Well, let's see about that.

Mr. Taft. That is my impression. I have not a copy of the Rio Treaty here. My impression was that the language was taken from that.

**COMPARISON WITH RIO TREATY**

Senator Donnell. I am very glad you mentioned the Rio Treaty, because it involves a very important point. The Rio Treaty we will get in this book which is provided for us by the Foreign Relations Committee. The Rio Treaty is at page 20 of this little booklet which I now hold in my hand. I refer you to article 8. Would you like to have a copy of it before you, Mr. Taft?

Mr. Taft. If you will read the parallel provision to that, that is all I need.

Senator Donnell (reading):

For the purposes of this treaty, the measures on which the organ of consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of
diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.

That is article 8. Article 20 reads as follows:

Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in article 8 shall be binding upon all the signatory states which have ratified this treaty, with the sole exception that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

Mr. TAFT. Yes. But, Senator, the comparable provision is not article 8, it is article 3, which has exactly the same language as article 5. It says:

The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Senator DONNELL. Yes; it says that.

Mr. TAFT. Well, all right. Then I would say that the obligation under the Atlantic Pact in the case of an attack on any one of the American states of the kind that you are talking about would have exactly the same effect, and give the President exactly the same powers that he has under the Atlantic Pact. I do not see any difference whatsoever.

Senator DONNELL. With respect to the powers of the President, let us just pass that for the moment.

Mr. TAFT. That is what you are asking me about. You have gone off on to various other kinds of provisions. The thing that we were discussing is the power of the President to send bombers as soon as Norway is attacked. I am saying that he has exactly the same power under the Rio Pact, as soon as any American state is attacked, within the language of article 3.

Senator DONNELL. I think I did digress from the question I asked you, and I ask your pardon for so doing, and I shall come back to it. Since you mentioned article 3 of the Rio Pact, which does contain the language:

The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states, and consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations—

I call your attention to the fact that when we get down to article 20 of the Rio Pact, which refers to article 8, which contains all of these different items that I have mentioned to you, including the use of armed force, the Rio Pact contains something that is not in the North Atlantic Treaty, namely—

Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in article 8 shall be binding upon all the signatory states which have ratified this treaty, with the sole exception that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

Do you find any provision reading as that in the North Atlantic Treaty?
Mr. Taft. No; I do not; but I do not think that changes the situation at all. I think the power of the President to order bombers to meet an attack on Norway is a power which exists or does not exist under the Constitution of the United States, as covering a case where the United States is attacked. There has been a long argument about that. In general, I would say the conclusion is that the President does have such power.

Senator Donnell. Very well.

Mr. Taft. Certainly he has exercised it in certain instances without having had a declaration of war by the Congress.

I still say that the President’s first obligation is to call the Congress together, and if he feels that the situation is so exactly comparable to an actual attack on the city of New York I think that he might order the bombers. He would do it under either pact, under the Rio Pact or under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Taft, I am pleased that you called me back to the question of the President’s powers, and you have explained your point there, and very clearly. I want to ask you, if he has the power to order bombers to protect New York, would he not likewise have the power as Commander in Chief of this Nation, under a treaty which says that an armed attack against any of them, in Europe or North America, shall be considered as an attack against them all, would he not have the same power independently of congressional prior action in respect to the Norway or London situations as he would have in respect to New York?

Mr. Taft. He might, and you are drawing the difference between the North Atlantic Pact and the Rio Pact by referring to article 20. I do not think that that makes any difference whatsoever, because under article 20 the language is “without its consent,” and that gets you back simply to an interpretation of the Constitution as to what is its consent, whether it requires the approval of the Congress of the United States to declare war, or whether it is something which is within the implied power of the President.

Senator Donnell. I think you are precisely correct.

Mr. Taft. So that the difference in language between the two does not help you out a bit.

Senator Donnell. I think you are precisely correct and I think you have properly answered the question with respect to the President in connection with the two documents, the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty.

But may I ask you this question? Under the North Atlantic Treaty there is a provision outright that the parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all, and in the exercise of the right of self-defense that each of them will individually, and in concert with the other parties, take forthwith such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.

DIFFERENCE OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER RIO AND ATLANTIC TREATIES

Now, the point to which I address myself has nothing to do with the President at all. It goes back to the comparative obligations of
the United States as a country under the two instruments, and I want to ask you this: Is there not an entire difference of obligation under the two instruments as regards the obligation of the nation in this respect, that whereas article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty obligates this Nation forthwith individually and in concert with the other parties to take such action as it deems necessary, which Mr. Acheson concedes does not mean any arbitrary decision but what we honestly and genuinely believe necessary, there is no restriction or provision that we are released from the obligation to use armed force; whereas in the Rio Treaty, in article 20, referring as I have just done to the decisions which require the applications of the measures specified in article 8, one of which is the use of armed force, it expressly says that while those decisions are binding upon all the signatory states, there is "the sole exception that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

There is a great difference in obligation under the two treaties in that respect.

Mr. Taft. No, sir; I do not agree with you at all. Article 20 refers to article 8, which is the measures on which the organ of consultation may agree, which is not necessarily a direct implementation of article 3; and in the second place, you are assuming that the provision "No state shall be required to use armed force without its consent" means that the consent can only be given by the Congress.

I just said a moment ago that that is not my interpretation, that there may well be situations in which the consent may well be given by the President, because of the urgency of the situation.

Senator Donnell. You agree that article 8, referring to measures on which the organ of consultation may agree, includes "use of armed force"?

Mr. Taft. Certainly.

Senator Donnell. And under article 3 of the Rio Pact, which is the article from which you have quoted, the statement in the agreement that "an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states" contains in section 2 thereof this language:

The organ of consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

Mr. Taft. That is correct, but that refers to measures of a collective character, and not to those which any individual nation might take on its own, so that I would say that section 1 of article 3 of the Rio Treaty could be implemented without having the organ of consultation meet.

Senator Donnell. So you do not think the measures mentioned in article 8 include the measures referred to in article 3 of the Rio Pact?

Mr. Taft. They may or may not. I am saying they do not necessarily include the measures under paragraph 1 of article 3.

Senator Donnell. They certainly do, do they not, Mr. Taft, include both the measures under article 3 of the Rio Pact and possibly some other measures not contained in article 3?

Mr. Taft. Not necessarily. The action under paragraph 1 might be taken before the organ of consultation met at all, in which case article 8 and article 20 do not apply.
Senator Donnell. I do not want to argue this indefinitely and I shall not, but I shall observe that, of course, while I only read the concluding sentence of subdivision 2 of article 3, there is a provision in the first sentence that—

On the request of the state or states directly attacked and until the decision of the organ of consultation of the Inter-American system, each one of the contracting parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity—

and then follows the sentence which provides an obligation on the organ of consultation to meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken; and then article 8 refers to the measures on which the organ of consultation may agree. Certainly that would include those in article 3.

Then it refers to the use of armed force as among those, and then in article 20 excepts from the decisions which are binding upon all the signatory states "the sole exception that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

There is no such statement in the Atlantic Treaty as this statement in article 20 of the Rio Pact, "the sole exception that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent," is there?

Mr. Taft. I agree that there is no such statement. I do not agree that the obligation undertaken is any different in character for that reason.

Senator Vandenberg. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Donnell. Certainly.

Senator Vandenberg. I do not want to prolong the argument, but merely for the Senator's subsequent consideration I suggest to him that the organ of consultation under the Rio Pact has affirmative power, whereas the organ of consultation under the North Atlantic Pact has no affirmative power whatever.

Senator Donnell. I agree thoroughly with the Senator, but the point I am making is that the Rio Pact excepts specifically the requirement that any one of the signatories shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

Mr. Taft. Under article 8, Senator, it may not apply, therefore, to paragraph 1 of article 3:

Senator Donnell. I can not bring myself to agree with that. I shall not go through that course of reasoning again, but obviously article 8 refers and specifies, "the measures on which the organ of consultation may agree," and article 3, subdivision 2 thereof says:

The organ of consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

So it would appear to me perfectly clear that there is an exception in the Rio Pact of the obligation of a state signatory to use armed force; namely, that it does not have to do so without its consent, and I find nothing to that effect in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. Taft. Even in that case the consent in my judgment in some circumstances could perhaps be given by the President of the United States.
Senator DONNELL. That is entirely possible, and I thoroughly agree with you, and that is the point I was trying to get you to give us your idea on a little while ago, about the New York, London, and Norway cases. I think the President can. I think when we sign this treaty and agree, as we have here, that an armed attack against Norway is to be considered an armed attack against us, that the President does not have to wait until Congress is convened, but can send the number of bombers he thinks proper to Europe, waiting in advance of the coming of Congress, and I think further that the practical effect of the situation would be that Congress would have no alternative except to declare war under circumstances where the President himself had either involved us or been involved in an actual state of war.

ALSOP ARTICLE IN SATURDAY EVENING POST

Now, Mr. Taft, I do not want to take more of your time or that of the committee except to ask you this: You referred to the Alsop article in the Saturday Evening Post, did you not?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Do you recall the date of that article?

Mr. Taft. I think it is last week. That would be last Saturday's date, Senator.

Senator DONNELL. I am glad you told me that. I had not seen that one. In fact, I hadn't seen the one which I think was earlier, several weeks ago, but I am informed that the Alsop brothers published an article in the Saturday Evening Post, which I think was several weeks ago, outlining consideration of the proposed military features of the treaty, and my understanding is this. It has been given to me, and I think the gentleman who caused it to be given to me was referring to the Alsop brothers' article:

The plan is to organize 40 to 60 allied divisions along the Rhine for the purpose of slowing down, absorbing the shock, and eventually, after being reinforced, assuming the offensive should the Red Army attack. Is that the Alsop article?

Mr. Taft. Not in the one to which I am referring.

Senator DONNELL. Have you seen the earlier article by the Alsop brothers?

Mr. Taft. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Taft, I want to thank you very much for your kindness and your courtesy, and also the committee for permitting me to examine you.

LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION UNDER THE ATLANTIC PACT

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri stresses the fact that in the Rio Pact there is a provision that no country shall be forced to take military action without its consent, and he tries to distinguish that from the present treaty. While here is no explicit language in the present treaty like that in the Rio Pact, there is language in the present treaty, however, that each nation is to be the judge of what action it is necessary take under the treaty, in view of whatever action might be taken by other countries. Is that not true?

Mr. Taft. Yes, sir; that is correct, and my statement therefore that the obligation undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty is no greater
than the Rio Treaty was based on that assumption, that the constitutional methods of giving consent, whatever they may be, are called for before any action is taken under the North Atlantic Treaty, just as much as they are under the Rio Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, Senator?

Senator VANDENBERG. I want to add this further supplement on that point, that in my opinion the obligation at this point under the Atlantic Pact is less than it is under the Rio Pact, because the consultative body under the Rio Pact can order action up to the point of the use of armed force and make you submit to it, whereas, the consultative organ under the North Atlantic Pact cannot make you submit to anything.

Mr. TAFT. I would not doubt that, Senator. My statement was, of course, in reverse, that the obligation is no greater than that under the Rio Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taft, the committee wants to thank you very sincerely for your valuable contribution. Your background and experience in government are such that your views and opinions, at least with the committee if not with all of the visitors, are very persuasive and very splendid, and a fine exposition of the treaty.

Mr. TAFT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The session will be in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee wants to notify those who may desire to appear that it will not consider any applications to appear filed later than next Tuesday morning by 10:30 o'clock. I say that for the information of any who desire to testify.

This is the Committee on Foreign Relations, holding hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We are very fortunate today to have present with us former Justice Owen J. Roberts, of the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Roberts has taken a great deal of interest in international affairs in behalf of peace, conciliation, arbitration, and all the other methods toward maintaining and preserving peace.

The committee is very glad indeed to have you here, Mr. Justice Roberts, and welcomes your advice and counsel and suggestions.

STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS, PRESIDENT OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Mr. Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief statement that I would like to give you in support of the North Atlantic Pact.

The board of directors of the Atlantic Union Committee, of which I am president, has wholeheartedly and unanimously voted to support ratification of the Atlantic Pact. I consider it of top priority for those who support the pact to make their convictions known to you. Accordingly, I have brought with me statements in support of the pact, which I have received in correspondence from leaders in a cross section of American communities.
These statements come from author Margaret Culkin Banning; radio commentator H. R. Baukhage; Harry R. Bullis, president of General Mills; Curtis E. Calder, chairman of the board of the Electric Bond & Share Co.; A. G. Cameron, vice president of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Export Co.; Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.; foreign correspondent Louis Fischer; Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Nobel prize winner; Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld, of Washington; Hon. Clare Booth Luce; Dr. Fritz Machlup, professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University; Dr. James A. McCain, president of Montana State University; Dr. Robert Millikan, Nobel prize winning physicist; and Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president of the International Business Machines Corp., and I could add a score, indeed a hundred more statements that I have received in correspondence about this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those statements that you just mentioned very long?

Mr. Roberts. I have made very short excerpts of them. I have copies of those.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will be incorporated in the record.

(The information is as follows:)

"The Atlantic Pact provides the best supplementary method we have for temporarily protecting the free nations."—H. R. Baukhage, radio commentator.

"All Americans who wish to work for peace have a chance personally to be useful by urging ratification of this pact. It is the only way to give the world time to perfect an organization strong enough to maintain peace."—Margaret Culkin Banning, author.

"The preservation of peace requires positive action. The recognition of this fact is the reason for the Atlantic Pact. The wisdom of taking this step can be summarized in the old saying, 'A stitch in time saves nine.' And time is of the essence."—Harry A. Bullis, chairman of the board, General Mills.

"In recent years we have all seen the necessity for those who believe in the preservation of independence and freedom to stand together. I understand that your committee supports a Federal Union of the Atlantic Democracies, and urges ratification of the Atlantic Pact. I strongly support these purposes. My prayers go with this endorsement."—Curtis E. Calder, chairman, Electric Bond & Share Co.

"I should like to add my endorsement of the Atlantic Pact and encourage your committee to use every effort to convince Members of the Senate of the importance of having the pact overwhelmingly ratified."—A. G. Cameron, vice president, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Export Co.

"Anyone with the best interests of a free America, a free West and eventually a free world, must enthusiastically work for the passage of the North Atlantic Pact."—Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.

"I want to join you in endorsing ratification of the North Atlantic Defense Pact."—Louis Fischer, foreign correspondent.

"Events have shown that to forestall war, we must make clear united determination to resist further forcible encroachment on the self-government of democratic peoples. This is why I am for the Atlantic Pact."—Dr. Arthur Compton.

"The Atlantic Pact is the first step toward a union of free nations for which free men pray. If we drift and fail to ratify the pact in time, we will be engulfed by tyranny. It is for such a time as this that God has given us our strength."—Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld, Washington, D. C.

"The Atlantic Pact is an anchor for peace and a shield against war."—Clare Booth Luce.

"The Atlantic Pact is one of the most important steps taken for the preservation of peace and order in the world. Opposition to the pact is either due to misunderstandings or to a system of values not shared by, and probably unin-
ileal to the American people."—Fritz Machlup, professor of political economy, Johns Hopkins University.

"The Atlantic Pact is not only an urgent security measure, but also a momentous stride toward world government."—Dr. James A. McCalin, president, Montana State University.

"The only hope of peace lies in such implementation of the principle of collective security as is supplied by the Atlantic Pact."—Dr. Robert A. Millikan.

"I consider ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty essential for the freedom and security of our own Nation and that of our neighbors of the Atlantic community."—Thomas J. Watson, International Business Machines.

**SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO THE TREAY**

Mr. Roberts. Opposition to the pact, though I think weak numerically, makes up in lung power what it lacks in strength. Four groups oppose it: Well-meaning but impractical pacifists, pseudo liberals, rabid isolationists, and, of course, the Communist Party, with its assorted fronts. These groups are loudly complaining that the Atlantic Pact will divide the world into two hostile camps, which will lead to war.

**WORLD DIVISION**

Nothing could be further from the truth. The truth is that whenever the democracies have been afraid to acknowledge the fundamental division between dictatorship and democracy, the delay has permitted the dictators to pick off the democracies one by one, just as Hitler did.

**DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY**

The lives lost in two world wars of our century might have been saved if Germany and Japan had known in advance that they would meet with united resistance. The road to world unity is not through appeasement of tyranny, but rather through strengthening democracy. The North Atlantic Defense Pact is an essential emergency measure to prevent an attack by Soviet Russia.

A fortnight ago I made a similar statement to the American people in an open letter. This letter was printed in some of the great newspapers of the country. It was also attacked in the New York Daily Worker for April 22 as a "letter composed of lies and hate propaganda."

The Communists in this country, in Russia and in Europe, know the truth as well as we do, gentlemen. They are aware that the North Atlantic Defense Pact puts a damper on Soviet aggression. How they must welcome the support of those who are either too stubborn or too short-sighted to have learned the lesson taught by two world wars in 25 years.

That lesson is that there is no such thing as freedom for me and not for you; safety for our national institutions and not for the institutions of other freedom-loving nations. In short, there is no security except collective security, and collective security requires collective action.

These, gentlemen, are the hard facts of international life. The stork does not bring peace. Peace is born of positive union of those determined to prevent war.
That is why the Atlantic Union Committee proposes that, after the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, the President of the United States invite pact sponsors to a federal convention. Our committee hopes that such a convention would discuss federal union of the Atlantic democracies as a means of making the Atlantic Pact work to the full.

Atlantic Union would bring great economic and military advantages, savings in defense costs hand in hand with increased military protection. The political and social advantages would include strengthening of the United Nations, and encouragement to other nations to develop representative forms of government, and to protect individual liberty by law. The concept of such a federal union of Atlantic democracies can, however, become a practical reality only if the Atlantic Pact is ratified.

I ask you, then, to consider the fact that delay in ratification of this pact will encourage Russia and will discourage those nations that are resisting aggression. Delay will devaluate American leadership and damage our prestige throughout the world. It will stop the clock of history.

I urge you, gentlemen, to go forward with the ratification of the Atlantic Pact now, and then to move on to consideration of Atlantic Union as a practical means of permanently securing the benefits which the Atlantic Pact will confer upon us and upon our sister democracies.

**Steps Toward Atlantic Union**

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. I only want to make this comment without passing upon the merits of a broadened Federal union in this area.

I know the great devotion that Mr. Justice Roberts has to this concept, and I simply want to say for myself, I think we are all greatly indebted to him for the broad-mindedness and long-range wisdom with which he has subordinated the federal union concept to the immediate necessity of action on the Atlantic Pact.

Mr. Roberts. Senator, I just feel that this is one step in a long process, and I think you do. We started with the United Nations, the British loan, the international fund, the Greek policy, the Marshall plan. Now this comes next. Each one of them has been an effort on the part of freedom-loving nations to come closer together, and each one has evidenced a world-mindedness on the part of the American people that I think is unparalleled in history, because it is not mere grimy dollars and cents, and it is not mere economic benefit that we are after.

We have shuddered at the thought that free men who have the same traditions that we have, and live to an extent under a representative government such as we cherish, should be blotted out from the earth. We have taken one step after another, if we can, to prevent that thing, and to let freedom live in the world.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. I believe I have no questions except to thank the Justice for coming down here and talking to us. I concur, of course, in the statement made by Senator Vandenberg.
The CHAIRMAN. I will say, Mr. Justice Roberts, that I have great admiration for your devotion to these principles, and to your labors over a long period of years. While I regret very much to see you leave the Supreme Court, I think you have been actively engaged in a matter that is equally important to your service on the Supreme Court.

Mr. Roberts. I am facing the sunset, but if I could go down the hill to the sunset, feeling reasonably sure that order, under law, that preservation of individual liberty against aggression, was on its way to accomplishment in this world, I would face the sunset with a happy smile.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very beautiful statement. I want to ask you just one or two brief questions: Is there anything in the pact that we have before us that suggests any offensive or hostile action contrary to these efforts that we have been making to secure peace and harmony?

Mr. Roberts. On the contrary; on the contrary. Anybody who knows anything knows that the people who are parties to this pact want merely to live in peace and to develop their own way of life, and that is all the pact purports to do, to protect them jointly against aggression, and against the destruction of their way of life.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Justice Roberts, we have with us Senator Donnell, of Missouri, and Senator Watkins, of Utah. They are here by the agreement with the committee, and by our courtesy. They are being permitted to ask questions, so if you are willing—

Mr. Roberts. May I say a word to Senator Donnell in advance. I think you asked Mr. Clayton something about the personnel of our committee.

Senator Donnell. Yes.

Mr. Roberts. I have a sheet here which was printed about 10 days ago, which has the names of the persons who have joined the council. They are a sort of board of advisers, or sponsors. That is not complete, Senator. There are perhaps 50 names that have been added since, of Nation-wide reputation.

Senator Donnell. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator Donnell. Thank you very much, Mr. Justice Roberts. I appreciate this information and am pleased to have it. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this document be included in the record at this point, though I would like to hold it in my possession for a few minutes.

(The list of names is as follows:)

OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND COUNCIL OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE FOR A FEDERAL CONVENTION OF DEMOCRACIES

Secretary: Walden Moore, New York City, N. Y.
Treasurer: Elmo Roper, Redding, Conn.
Executive Director: Earl E. Hart, Washington, D. C.
James D. Adams, San Francisco, Calif.
Henry E. Atwood, Minneapolis, Minn.
Dr. Robert R. Aurner, Carmel, Calif.
Dr. Frank Aydelotte, Princeton, N. J.
Mrs. Robert L. Bacon, Washington, D. C.
Emery W. Balduf, Chicago, Ill.
Howard Baldwin, New York, N. Y.
Hon. Joseph Baldwin, New York, N. Y.
Hon. Joseph H. Ball, Washington, D. C.
Mrs. Margaret Calkin, Running, Duluth, Minn.
R. E. Barlowiski, Augusta, Ga.
H. H. Banklage, Washington, D. C.
Wendell Berge, Washington, D. C.
George Biddle, Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.
Robert J. Bishop, Orlando, Fla.
Dr. Brand Blanchard, New Haven, Conn.
Hon. Robert W. Bliss, Washington, D. C.
William A. Boekel, San Mateo, Calif.
Mrs. Louis W. Breske, El Paso, Tex.
P. F. Brundage, New York, N. Y.
Harry A. Buell, Minneapolis, Minn.
Lucius E. Burch, Jr., Memphis, Tenn.
Struthers Burt, Southern Pines, N. C.
Stephen F. Chadwick, Seattle, Wash.
Roy B. Chips, St. Louis, Mo.
Dr. Arthur H. Compton, St. Louis, Mo.
Ayllette B. Cotton, San Francisco, Calif.
Russell W. Davenport, New York, N. Y.
Chester C. Davis, St. Louis, Mo.
J. Lionberger Davis, St. Louis, Mo.
Tom J. Davis, Butte, Mont.
Harry S. Denison, Framingham, Mass.
Howard Dietz, New York, N. Y.
John V. N. Dorr, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Paul F. Douglass, Washington, D. C.
Max Eastman, New York, N. Y.
Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., Pacific Palisades, Calif.
Louis Fischer, New York, N. Y.
Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld, Washington, D. C.
Dr. Harry D. Gildeonse, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Bishop Charles K. Gilbert, New York, N. Y.
Mrs. Louis Gross, Philadelphial, Pa.
W. B. Harrison, Wichita, Kans.
Rev. Leland R. Henry, New York, N. Y.
Bishop Henry W. Hobson, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Dr. Sidney Hooke, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Henry S. Houghton, Carmel, Calif.
Rabbi David Jacobson, San Antonio, Tex.
Betty Jameson, San Antonio, Tex.
Dr. Oscar Jaszi, Oberlin, Ohio.
Dr. Hans Kohn, Northampton, Mass.
Theodore J. Kreps, Stanford University, Calif.
Hon. Arthur Bliss Lane, Washington, D. C.
Russell V. Lee, M. D., Palo Alto, Calif.
Hon. Herbert H. Lehman, New York, N. Y.
Paul W. Litchfield, Akron, Ohio.
Hon. Clare Booth Luce, Ridgefield, Conn.
Robert L. Lund, St. Louis, Mo.
Dr. James J. MacLachlan, Cambridge, Mass.
Clifford L. McMillen, New York, N. Y.
Mark V. Marlowe, Lexington, Ky.
Dr. James A. McCain, Missoula, Mont.
Mrs. Cole McFarland, Washington, D. C.
Lea B. McIntire, Louisville, Ky.
Edward Meehan, Memphis, Tenn.
Crandall Melvin, Syracuse, N. Y.
Mrs. Walter I. Miller, Alexandria, Va.
Dr. Robert A. Millikan, Pasadena, Calif.
Dr. J. C. Montgomery, Detroit, Mich.
Mrs. Victor Morawetz, New York, N. Y.
Dr. John W. Nason, Swarthmore, Pa.
Bishop G. Ashton Oldham, Albany, N. Y.
Hon. Lithgow Osborne, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Wallace T. Partch, Oakland, Calif.
Grove Patterson, Toledo, Ohio
MRS. Hattie May Pavlo, Rye, N. Y.
Stanley Pedder, Carmel by the Sea, Calif.
Hibber Phillips, Fresno, Calif.
Roy Pinkerton, Ventura, Calif.
Dr. Daniel Poling, Philadelphia, Pa.
Stanley I. Posner, Washington, D. C.
A. W. Robertson, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Miss Elizabeth Robinson, New York City, N. Y.
Melvin Ryder, Washington, D. C.
A. W. Schmidt, Pittsburgh, Pa.
John F. Schmidt, Franklin, Pa.
Dr. Paul Schwarz, New York, N. Y.
George E. Shee, Jr., New York, N. Y.
Dr. Mary S. Sherman, Chicago, Ill.
Emil G. Sick, Seattle, Wash.  
Theodore E. Simonton, Cazenovia, N. Y.  
Spyros P. Skouras, New York, N. Y.  
James N. Slee, Cornwall, N. Y.  
Dr. Preston W. Slosson, Ann Arbor, Mich.  
Dr. Francis A. Smith, Chevy Chase, Md.  
Mrs. Sara Sommer, Peoria, Ill.  
Eugene R. Spaulding, New York, N. Y.  
Mrs. F. K. Weyerhaeuser, St. Paul, Minn.  
George F. Spaulding, Chicago, Ill.  
Mrs. Patrick Welch, New York, N. Y.  
Lawrence E. Spivak, New York, N. Y.  
Admiral H. E. Yarnell, Newport, R. I.  
William Stern, Fargo, N. Dak.  
Hon. Foster Stearns, Exeter, N. H.  
Roy F. Steward, Meriden, Conn.  
Ralph G. Stoddard, New York, N. Y.  
Ralph I. Straus, New York, N. Y.  
Lester E. Vernon, Pittsburgh, Pa.  
Dr. John A. Vieg, Claremont, Calif.  
H. M. Warren, New York, N. Y.  
Mr. Justice Roberts, would you tell us, please, whether or not the purpose of the Atlantic Committee is, as expressed on this sheet that you have handed me “For a federal convention of democracies”?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Do you consider that Portugal is a democracy?

Mr. Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. Is it one of the signers of the North Atlantic Treaty, is it not?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Are there any other signers to the treaty that are not democracies?

Mr. Roberts. I would think not.

Senator Donnell. Do you know why Portugal was included as one of the signatories to the treaty?

Mr. Roberts. I do not, sir. Our plan is to ask those who brought about the pact to call the convention and to first participate, and then invite any others that they deem democracies, who could come in and join with them. That might leave Portugal out of that convention.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice Roberts, the membership of the Atlantic Union Committee—this sheet which you have handed me—

Mr. Roberts. That is not a membership. That is a membership of the sponsors.

Senator Donnell. I wanted to ask you about the membership. I asked Mr. Clayton about it the other day, and he was not able to give us very accurately, as he very frankly stated, the number of members, and the geographical distribution.

Mr. Roberts. The committee was organized about 8 weeks ago. The first thing we desired to do was to get a list of sponsors, or council, and we have communed with, I should think, 300 or 350 people, asking if they cared to become such.

There are about 150 who have so signified. We have not started to create memberships, except that we know that in communities all
over the United States there are large groups of people who have been for this idea and have been agitating for it. Those will be asked to become members of this organization, and we hope to have hundreds of thousands of them.

Senator Donnell. So up to the present time, then, the organization of the Atlantic Union Committee has progressed only to the extent of the officers, directors, and council of the organization?

Mr. Roberts. That is right.

Senator Donnell. And the council consists of about 150?

Mr. Roberts. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. And the officers, I would judge—

Mr. Roberts. Ten or a dozen.

Senator Donnell. The board of directors is listed also on this sheet that you have very kindly given to me.

Mr. Roberts. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. May I ask you, Mr. Justice, whether the board of directors is substantially all, if not entirely all, with the exception of Mr. William L. White, located east of the Mississippi River?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. Mr. Orgill is on the Mississippi at Memphis, Mr. Bissantz is at San Francisco.

Senator Donnell. I think Mr. Cowles is of Des Moines, Iowa.

Mr. Roberts. That is right.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Elmo Roper is in Connecticut.

Mr. Roberts. That is right.

Senator Donnell. Earl E. Hart of Washington?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Agar, of Arizona, is that Mr. Agar formerly of Memphis, in the newspaper business?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. Herbert Agar, the writer-lecturer.

Senator Donnell. Has he moved to Arizona?

Mr. Roberts. Yes, sir. He is a resident of Arizona.

Senator Donnell. There are others that I did not observe at first glance. Mr. Bissantz.

Mr. Roberts. Yes, he is an architect at San Francisco.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Cowles, Dr. Davies of Washington, Mr. Flower of New York City, Mr. Moore, Easton, Pa., Mr. Orgill, Mr. Scherman, Mr. Streit, Washington, Mr. Urey, of Chicago, a Mr. William L. White, the son of William L. White.

Mr. Roberts. Yes, he is well known in his own right.

Senator Donnell. And John Young of Connecticut.

Mr. Roberts. Yes, sir.

ENDORSEMENT OF PACT BY ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Senator Donnell. You say in the opening of your statement that the board of directors, which consists of these gentlemen, has wholeheartedly and unanimously voted to support ratification of the Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Did the board of directors come together, meet, and discuss this matter?

Mr. Roberts. Absolutely.

Senator Donnell. When was that meeting?

Mr. Roberts. At least 6 weeks ago.
Senator Donnell. Was there a copy of the pact at that time before the meeting?

Mr. Roberts. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Was it before—

Mr. Roberts. No; it was just before the pact, but it was when the general lines of the pact had been disclosed.

Senator Donnell. It was before the signature of the pact?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Was it before the official announcement of the contents of the pact had been made?

Mr. Roberts. I think not. Just afterwards.

Senator Donnell. But there was no copy of the pact present at the meeting, so far as you know?

Mr. Roberts. I think there was.

FAMILIARITY OF ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE WITH PACT

Senator Donnell. Was it read to the members present?

Mr. Roberts. They were all familiar with it, or said they were.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall whether or not any of them, as did Mr. Clayton, who was here the other day, one of the vice presidents of this organization, state that they had not read a word of it?

Mr. Roberts. I do not think so.

Senator Donnell. Was Mr. Clayton there also, in attendance at that meeting?

Mr. Roberts. He either was or afterwards gave his written assent to what was done. I think he was present.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Clayton testified the other day that he had not read any of this pact, up to the time he testified, that he had not read any of it.

The Chairman. Mr. Clayton testified that he had read a number of articles, that they were discussing it, discussing various portions of it, and read all the newspaper reports. He said he had not read the actual text as it was signed by the signatories.

Senator Donnell. I think that is precisely what he said, at least in substance. In other words, he had read the newspapers, perhaps the magazines, commentaries, but has never read the treaty, in advocacy of which he appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. You say he was either at this meeting of the board of directors or joined in its action?

Mr. Roberts. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall whether or not a copy of the treaty was read before the board of directors?

Mr. Roberts. I think not. I think it was not read in extenso.

Senator Donnell. Was any part read before the meeting of the board of directors?

Mr. Roberts. I think it may have been.

Senator Donnell. Was it?

Mr. Roberts. It is my recollection.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall who read it?

Mr. Roberts. I read portions of it.
Senator DONNELL. You had a copy of it at that time?
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.
Senator DONNELL. Was that one of the official copies issued by the Secretary of State or some prior newspaper draft of it?
Mr. ROBERTS. It may have been the one that appeared in the New York Times.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Justice, the Union Committee, the Atlantic Union Committee, therefore, is not created primarily for the purpose of advocacy of the North Atlantic Treaty as you have observed.
Mr. ROBERTS. Our desire is to go farther, but we think the pact is under all circumstances an essential step to anything more we desire.

CONSTITUTION OF ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Senator DONNELL. Does this Atlantic Union Committee have a constitution or other declaration of principles?
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.
Senator DONNELL. Did you bring a copy of it with you today?
Mr. ROBERTS. No, sir.
Senator DONNELL. Would you be kind enough, if the chairman consents—
Mr. ROBERTS. I would be glad to send you a copy.
Senator DONNELL. And would you furnish a copy for the record?
Mr. ROBERTS. I would be very glad to.
Senator DONNELL. May that go into the record?
The CHAIRMAN. It is not a large document?
Mr. ROBERTS. No. The resolution of purpose would go into 15 lines.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be incorporated in the record.
(The resolution is as follows:)

Resolved, That an action committee be formed for the purpose of—
(a) enlisting public support for a resolution to be introduced in Congress inviting the other democracies, with whom the United States is forming an alliance, to meet American delegates in a federal convention to explore possibilities of uniting in a Federal Union of the Free; and
(b) continuing this support until such a Federal Union of democracies becomes an accomplished fact.

STATEMENTS ON ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Justice, you speak of having brought with you today—and I understand you filed, I believe—statements from a number of persons listed in your mimeographed statements.
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.
Senator DONNELL. Did those statements come as a result of a written request, and in response to that?
Mr. ROBERTS. A request as to their point of view on this pact; yes, sir.
Senator DONNELL. Do you have with you a copy of that request?
Mr. ROBERTS. I will get one. I do not have it.
Senator DONNELL. Will you supply it?
Mr. ROBERTS. Certainly.
Senator DONNELL. May that also go in the record, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. It may.
The Atlantic Union Committee was organized to develop support for a Federal Union of the Atlantic Democracies within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

We consider ratification of the Atlantic Pact urgently necessary for the preservation of the independence and freedom of the United States and other countries involved. We invite you to join us and others as sponsors of this pact. Soviet Russia is using every means to block ratification. Powerful American newspapers are attacking the pact. Some Senators are wobbling.

This pact must be overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate. Soviet Russia must know that not only the governments, but the peoples of free nations, are united in determination to defend their independence and freedom.

If you are willing to add your strength to ours in this great effort, please wire or write us a brief, strong statement supporting the Atlantic Pact. Address 531 Fifth Avenue.

Senator DONNELL. To how many persons was that request sent?

Mr. ROBERTS. I think 50.

Senator DONNELL. And you received replies from approximately how many?

Mr. ROBERTS. I think 40 or so. I did not list them all here. I just took the most significant statements out of them.

Senator DONNELL. How was the list prepared; how was it determined?

Mr. ROBERTS. We just picked out prominent people who we knew were interested in the cause of peace.

Senator DONNELL. Did you pick out Professor Nichols, of Columbia University?

Mr. ROBERTS. I could not say.

Senator DONNELL. Do you have a statement from him?

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not.

Senator DONNELL. I notice he participated in the town hall meeting the other night. I did not hear him. I gather from the context of the notice he was to appear in opposition to it.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know.

Senator DONNELL. Did you send a request to Mr. Paul Warburg?

Mr. ROBERTS. I think not.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know that he is opposed to the pact?

Or, at least, that is my impression.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know.

Senator DONNELL. I may be in error in that. I am just inferring that from observations that I have seen made, and I want to be quick to say that I do not know.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know, either. I think Mr. Warburg has recently been advocating some amendment to the United Nations Charter.

Senator DONNELL. That is entirely possible. Was a copy of the request sent to Professor Borchard, of Yale Law School?

Mr. ROBERTS. I could not say.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Senator Donnell. Do you know what the position of Professor Borchard, of Yale Law School, is?
Mr. Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Donnell. He has been quite ill. Did you know that?
Mr. Roberts. No, sir.
Senator Donnell. Do you know him?
Mr. Roberts. No.
Senator Donnell. Do you know he is a man of high standing?
Mr. Roberts. I suppose so.
Senator Donnell. Would it be violative, do you think, of the proprieties if I might ask you to give us a list of the entire 50 persons to whom it was addressed?
Mr. Roberts. I shall see if I can find it. If I can, you shall have it.
Senator Donnell. May it be inserted in the record of this proceeding?

The Chairman. If the Justice desires that it be inserted.

Mr. Roberts. I have no desire. I do not mean to conceal anything that is of value here.

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PERSONS TO WHOM WIRE WAS ADDRESSED

Lewis H. Brown, chairman, John-Manville Corp., 22 East Forty-fourth Street, New York, N.Y.
Curtis E. Calder, chairman, Electric Bond & Share Co., 2 Rector Street, New York, N.Y.
Philip Cortney, president, Coty, Inc., 730 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.
Ferdinand Eberstadt, F. Eberstadt & Co., 30 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
Thomas F. Finletter, Couvert Bros., 2 Rector Street, New York, N.Y.
Alexander Fraser, president, Shell Union Oil Co., 50 West Fifty-fifth Street, New York, N.Y.
Ralph T. Reed, president, American Express Co., 65 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
Joseph M. Hatfield, White & Case, 14 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
W. Rogers Herod, president, International General Electric Co., Inc., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y.
William M. Robbins, vice president, General Foods Corp., 250 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.
Murray Shields, vice president, Bank of the Manhattan Co., 40 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
Theodore Smith, Motion Picture Association of America, 28 West Forty-fourth Street, New York, N.Y.
Christian H. Sonne, president, Amsinck, Sonne & Co., 96 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
Dr. Richard G. Gettell, assistant to publisher, Fortune Magazine, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.
Charles T. Rittie, president, M. J. Corbett & Co., 8 Bridge Street, New York, N.Y.
Benjamin M. Altschuler, Altschuler & Morrison, 39 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
S. B. Penick, president, S. B. Penick & Co., 50 Church Street, New York, N.Y.
Harry S. Radcliffe, National Council of American Importers, 45 East Seventeenth Street, New York, N.Y.
Thomas H. McKittrick, vice president, Chase National Bank, 18 Pine Street, New York, N.Y.
W. Randolph Burgess, vice chairman, National City Bank of New York, 55 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
J. E. Crane, director, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y.
Edgar Smith, vice president, General Motors Overseas Corp., 1775 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
Ogden White, room 5900, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y.
Henry B. Fernald, Loomis, Sutphen & Fernald, 80 Broad Street, New York, N.Y.
Ellsworth C. Alvord, Alvord & Alvord, 1200 Eighteenth Street, Washington, D.C.
M. G. Connally, M. G. Connally & Co., 590 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.
Stanley W. Duhig, vice president and treasurer, Shell Union Oil Corp., 50 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N. Y.

Maxwell E. McDowell, tax department, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.

Clifton C. Owens, tax attorney, United Shoe Machinery Corp., 140 Federal Street, Boston, Mass.

W. J. L. Patton, assistant comptroller, National City Bank of New York, 55 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

John J. O'Connor, manager, United States Chamber of Commerce, 1015 H Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Henry Bristol, chairman, Bristol-Myers Co., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Giovanni Pagninment, vice president, Bankers Trust Co., 16 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

William R. Strelow, vice president, Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 140 Broadway, New York, N. Y.


Leol. Welch, treasurer, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.

H. W. Balgooyen, assistant secretary and treasurer, American and Foreign Power Co., 2 Rector Street, New York, N. Y.

Neal Dow Becker, president, Intertype Corp., 300 Forman Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.

James A. Farley, chairman, Coca-Cola Export Corp., 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Warren Lee Pierson, chairman, Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

James Crafton Rogers, president, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., 90 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

Victor Schoeppele, vice president, National City Bank of New York, 55 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.


S. Bayard Colgate, chairman, Colgate-Palmolive-Per Co., Jersey City, N. J.

William H. Harrison, vice president, American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 165 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

Ira Mosher, president, Ira Mosher Associates, Inc., 605 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Robert H. Patchin, vice president, W. R. Grace and Co., 7 Hanover Square, New York, N. Y.

George A. Sloan, chairman, Southern Agriculturist, 122 East Forty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

Arnold J. Wilson, president, General Time Instruments Corp., 100 Lafayette Street, New York, N. Y.

John A. Zellers, vice president, Remington Rand, Inc., 315 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Thomas Roy Jones, president, American Type Founders, Inc., 200 East Elmor Avenue, Elizabeth, N. J.

Charles S. Munson, Air Reduction Co., Inc., 80 East Forty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

Edwin J. Schwahnhauser, vice president, Worthington Pump and Machinery Corp., 401 Worthington Avenue, Harrison, N. J.

James H. Robinson, president, the American Pulley Co., 4200 Wissahickon Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa.

Walter Sibbensack, president, American Horse products Corp., 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Lee Swem, assistant to the president, Forster Wheeler Corp., 165 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

Leland D. Albin, vice president, Ingersoll Rand Co., 11 Broadway, New York 4, N. Y.

H. Edward Billkey, president, H. E. Billkey Corp., 35 Liberty Street, New York 5, N. Y.

Donald K. David, dean, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Soldiers Field, Boston 63, Mass.

Frank M. Folsom, president, Radio Corp. of America, RCA-Victor Division, Camden, N. J.

C. D. Jackson, vice president, Time, Inc., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 22, N. Y.

Sigurd S. Larson, president, Young & Rubicam, Inc., 285 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Malcolm Muir, president, Newsweek, 152 West Forty-second Street, New York 11, N. Y.

Thomas J. Watson, Jr., vice president, International Business Machines Corp., 500 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Sidney J. Weinberg, partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co., 30 Pine Street, New York 5, N. Y.

James W. Young, executive vice president, J. Walter Thompson Co., 420 Lexington Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.
Robert A. Whitney, president, National Federation of Sales Executives, Shelton House, New York 17, N. Y.

Eaton G. Borton, president, Advertising Federation of America, 330 West Forty-second Street, New York 18, N. Y.

Frederic R. Gamble, president, American Association of Advertising Agencies, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Clarence B. Goshorn, president, Benton and Bowles, Inc., 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y.


Charles G. Mortimer, vice president, General Foods Corp., 250 Park Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Joshua B. Powers, president, Joshua B. Powers, Inc., 345 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y.


Robert Brougham, president, Arabian American Oil Co., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Gerald E. Donovan, vice president, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 5 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

W. S. S. Rodgers, chairman, the Texas Co., 135 East Forty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

Robert Schley, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.

Arthur H. Deau, partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, 49 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

C. R. Smith, president, American Airlines, Inc., 100 East Forty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

Henry Rose, vice president, Sears, Roebuck & Co., 360 West Thirty-first Street, New York 1, N. Y.

Juan T. Trippe, president, Pan American Airways, Inc., Chrysler Building, New York, N. Y.

Lowell P. Welcker, president, E. R. Squibb & Sons, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Irwin Vladimir, president, Irwin Vladimir & Co., 255 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Dr. John C. Cooper, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.

Frazer A. Bailey, president, National Federation of American Shipping, 1909 G Street NW., Washington 6, D. C.


Arthur E. Bayliss, assistant general freight traffic manager, New York Central System, 696 Lexington Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.

Fred Brun, vice president, General Motors Overseas Corp., 1775 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

James Farrel, Jr., president, Farrell Lines, Inc., 26 Beaver Street, New York 4, N. Y.

General John Franklin, president, United States Lines, 1 Broadway, New York 4, N. Y.

B. F. Howard, director, Standard Oil Co., of New Jersey, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.

John McAuliffe, director, Isthmian Steamship Co., 71 Broadway, New York 6, N. Y.

Emmet J. McCormack, vice president, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 5 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

H. W. Warley, president, Culver Steamship Corp., 25 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

A. Lane Cribber, Investment Building, Washington, D. C.

R. A. HummeU, president, Lone Star Cement Corp., 342 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

Pyke Johnson, president, Automotive Safety Foundation, Hill Building, Washington 6, D. C.

L. T. Kittinger, vice president, Shell Oil Co., suite 1120, Shoreham Building, Washington 5, D. C.

Frederick Horner, director, room 2001, Hill Building, Washington, D. C.

A. B. Barber, manager, transportation department, Chamber of Commerce of United States, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Charles Darlington, Foreign Trade Department, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 26 Broadway, New York, N. Y.


Walter C. Hundle, vice president, American Express Co., 65 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

Russell E. Singer, general manager, American Automobile Association, Pennsylvania Avenue at Seventeenth Street, Washington, D. C.

Eugene S. Gregg, vice president, Westrex Corp., 111 Eighth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Jerome Kohlberg, president, Kane Import Corp., 10 East Fortieth Street, New York, N. Y.

Frederick Leighton, president, Leighton's Mexican Imports, 24 University Place, New York, N. Y.
Charles T. Rillette, president, M. J. Corbett & Co., 8 Bridge Street, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Paul Horn, School of Commerce, New York University, Washington Square, New York, N. Y.
Morris S. Rosenthal, president, Stein, Hall & Co., 285 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y.
James S. Carson, vice president, American & Foreign Power Co., Inc., 2 Rector Street, New York, N. Y.
Curt Pfleffer, National Council of American Importers, 45 East Seventeenth Street, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Martin Domke, international vice president, American Arbitration Association, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
Stephen P. Ladas, Langner, Parry, Card & Langner, 120 East Forty-first Street, New York, N. Y.
Walter E. F. Bradler, Otis Elevator Co., 260 Eleventh Avenue, New York, N. Y.
Donald Brooks, Texasco Development Corp., 135 East Forty-second Street, New York, N. Y.
Conway P. Coe, vice president, Radio Sales Co. of America, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
Dean S. Edmonds, Pennell, Edmonds, Morton & Barrows, 247 Park Avenue, New York City, N. Y.
Lawrence Laugner, Langner, Parry, Card & Langner, 120 East Forty-first Street, New York, N. Y.
Edward S. Rogers, chairman, Sterling Drug, Inc., 170 Varick Street, New York, N. Y.
Jose Luis Hernandez, 120 East Forty-first Street, New York, N. Y.
Charles R. Carroll, general counsel, General Motors Overseas Operations, 1775 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Harrison Chauncey, secretary, International Business Machines Corp., 590 Madison Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.
Nicholas C. Caloias, legal department, Coca-Cola Export Sales Co., 315 Madison Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.
George S. Eveleth, vice president, International General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.
Arthur B. Foye, partner, Haskins & Sells, 67 Broad Street, New York 4, N. Y.
Earl I. McClintock, vice president, Sterling Drug, Inc., 170 Varick Street, New York 13, N. Y.
Victor C. Folsom, foreign counsel, Sterling Drug, Inc., 170 Varick Street, New York 13, N. Y.
F. B. Glaser, assistant traffic manager, International General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N. Y.
J. E. Hill, assistant to the president, United States Steel Export Corp., 30 Church Street, New York, N. Y.
Leone A. Jacobson, Riegelman, Strauss, Schwarz & Spiegelberg, 160 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
William S. Swingle, executive vice president, National Foreign Trade Council, 111 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Horace M. Chadsey, vice president, First National Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass.
Carlos Kelly, vice president, Fidelity Union Trust Co., Newark, N. J.
Fred I. Kent, director, Bankers Trust Co., 100 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
W. R. Strelow, vice president, Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 140 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Henry Hardfield, Shearman & Sterling & Wright, 20 Exchange Place, New York, N. Y.
J. F. Cameron Jr., assistant vice president, National City Bank of New York, New York, N. Y.
John Fischer, assistant treasurer, Bank of New York, 48 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.
Amos B. Foy, vice president, Chemical Bank & Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
William Hartney, vice president, National Shawmut Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass.
Philip F. McGovern, assistant vice president, Manufacturers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
David A. Scott, assistant cashier, Chase National Bank of New York, 18 Pine Street, New York, N. Y.
J. A. Stahl, vice president, Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
W. H. Wheeler, Jr., president, Pitney Bowes, Inc., 757 Pacific Street, Stamford, Conn.
Frederick Parsons Fairfield, Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Dr. Fritz Machup, professor of economics, Johns-Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Donald L. Millham, comptroller, General Electric Co., Schenectady, N. Y.
Senator DONNELL. I am sure you do not. We appreciate—and I am sure I do, as the others do—your courtesy in this regard.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think our proceeding was exactly as yours would have been under the circumstances. We took prominent people that we knew had been interested in the cause of peace, wrote them and asked them how they stood on this pact, and if they thought it ought to be ratified, would they express themselves on it. Some did and some did not.

Senator DONNELL. I notice that your council, which is in the process of formation, includes considerably more than 50 persons.

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. How many?

Mr. ROBERTS. I think 150.
Senator DONNELL. Here is Mr. Chester C. Davis, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank, was, and perhaps still is.
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.
Senator DONNELL. Do you recall whether you addressed a request to him?
Mr. ROBERTS. I think not. I think we should have had an expression. I may have an expression from him, which may not be as significant as the rest.
Senator DONNELL. He may be in favor of it?
Mr. ROBERTS. I feel sure he is.
Senator DONNELL. Why was it that the request was not sent to the entire 150?
Mr. ROBERTS. It was sent to the people all over the country, not to members of our organization at all. It was not intended to be limited. There are a number of names here who are not on our council, not in our organization, and who I do not think are for the Federal idea that we are, but they are for the pact.
Senator DONNELL. I did not observe the fact that—
Mr. ROBERTS. They are not the same as our council at all.
Senator DONNELL. I appreciate your telling me that. Margaret Culkin Banning, author. Do you know how you happened to include her in the list of persons to whom—
Mr. ROBERTS. She has been very much interested, to my knowledge, in the peace moves.
Senator DONNELL. I observe you have a very distinguished gentleman from my home city, of whom we are very proud, a good friend of mine, Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Nobel prize winner, and his letter I assume is among those placed on file.
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes. He happens to be a member of our council also.
Senator DONNELL. I see. I had not observed that.

OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY

Mr. Justice Roberts, in your statement, which I have here, you state that opposition to the pact, "weak numerically, make up in lung power what it lacks in strength," and you say "Four groups oppose it—well-meaning, but impractical pacifists, pseudoliberals, rabid isolationists, and of course the Communist Party with its assorted fronts."
Do you mean to say that that is an exclusive list, that there is no one else besides those four groups?
Mr. ROBERTS. I think there may be others. I took four large classes that I thought—
Senator DONNELL. I wonder within which group I should fall.
Mr. ROBERTS. I think that is a matter of choice for you, Senator, if you fall in any.
Senator DONNELL. I certainly am not a pacifist. I would not classify myself as a Communist, or as a pseudoliberal, and I certainly am not a rabid isolationist, although I was against the League of Nations, I was the chairman of the St. Louis World Court Committee, advocated, I think, in this very room, before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, our hearings for it, voted for all these measures, except the original ERP, and I was back in Missouri detained for a day at the time, on account of my mother's death.
Mr. ROBERTS. If you do not fit in these boxes then I will have to classify you as a maverick.

Senator DONNELL. Very well. There are people, are there not, Mr. Justice, that are not what you might term extremists, but are conscientiously, sincerely, doubtful of the advisability of going into this agreement. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. ROBERTS. Senator, really, I do not want to be unfair, but it is hard for me to understand a thoughtful appraisal that leads you to think that this pact does something to change our position in the world. I think our position—and with great submission, I think your position, as mine—would be exactly what it is toward aggression that would destroy our democratic friends in western Europe, whether we signed this pact or not.

Senator DONNELL. I appreciate—

Mr. ROBERTS. That is what I think. I think that without this pact you and I would both exhort the American people to do whatever, and to use whatever force was necessary to prevent France or Great Britain from being ground to powder. I think we would, treaty or no treaty.

Would we stand for a free people being obliterated by vicious aggression? We would not, would we? I do not think this pact says any more than that, that we would not stand for that and we say we will determine what we will do if such a thing starts. That is what the pact comes to.

SINCERITY OF OPPOSITION

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Justice, I certainly do not, in the slightest, mean to question the very fine integrity and sound honesty of your position. You served with great distinction on the Supreme Court of the United States. It is frequently true, is it not, or if I may withdraw the term “frequently,” it is sometimes true that the Supreme Court divides sharply and one group believes just as earnestly, just as sincerely, as the other, in a position diametrically to that taken by the other. Is that true?

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Therefore, Mr. Justice, even though you cannot see the other side of this matter, I am sure that you will immediately concede that perfectly honest persons, and not necessarily extremists, may take a contrary view, and may have some, what they consider honestly to be a basis for their opinion. Will you concede that?

NEED FOR THE TREATY

Mr. ROBERTS. My difficulty, Senator, is the one that I just stated. I believe that the overwhelming sentiment of patriotic and broad-
minded people in this country is that we cannot allow the free nations, who are our friends and allies and natural collaborators, to be snuffed out by aggression.

Now, as I understand, the opposition to this treaty is that those who oppose it say, "But we want to decide, when the time comes, whether we will come to the aid of one of these nations on whom aggression is practiced." Both times we came in almost too late, and both times we were forced in at a cost that was simply frightful in blood and treasure and economic status.

If the people of Europe felt perfectly sure that we would come in more promptly another time, that we would not allow the degradation to go as far as it went in Europe before we woke up and came in, we would not need any treaty. This treaty, in my judgment, will guarantee the peace, simply because these people want an assurance that we will lay our hands on our heart as a Nation and say we mean what we say, that we will not see them destroyed, and, by George, we will not stand by and see them destroyed.

Secondly, Russia will not become an aggressor against these democratic friends of ours if she believes we mean it. But as long as we say we will not say so, we will reserve the right to say so until the fire starts, I think you are perpetuating a frightfully dangerous position because you are encouraging the same kind of psychology that Germany indulged in in the First World War.

She thought she could even sink our battleships and we would be too pusillanimous to come along; she thought she could go the ultimate, that we were a bunch of cowards. The way to preserve peace is to have the people of Europe, whether they are our possible enemies, understand our position. Make it plain. That is what this treaty tries to do in my mind. It makes it plain that we cannot contemplate the destruction of these free nations, and we will not contemplate it, without concern, and we will do what we deem necessary to prevent it.

That kind of an assurance is to my mind the greatest guaranty of peace there can be in the world. If Adolph Hitler had known that the moment he crossed the French frontier he would be at war with the United States, we would never have had the Second World War. At least we would not have had it at the time it occurred. I am as sure of that as I am that I sit here.

**EFFECT OF TREATY ON POSSIBLE AGGRESSOR**

Senator Donnell. Justice Roberts, as was mentioned by one of the gentlemen, I believe Senator Watkins, a few days ago, there are fanatics, and persons like Hitler, with some insane idea of world conquest, that perhaps could not be deterred by any treaty or any action. You agree with that, do you not?

Mr. Roberts. I do not agree that Hitler was that kind of fanatic. Hitler calculated his chances with great astuteness, in my judgment. We would never have had the Second World War if England had stood up and prevented his taking over the Rhineland without a fight. He did not think it would happen. He was scared to death and got away with it by bluff.

Senator Donnell. You refer to the First and Second World Wars. Do you not think that Russia—to mention a specific nation—realizing that this Nation poured her treasure without any contractual obliga-
tions preceding them at all to do so, poured her treasure of men and women and matériel into those two wars, went in for the defense of humanity, do you not think that Russia would realize that this country, without any contractual obligation, if this country at the time thought that the interests of humanity demanded it, would go to war, regardless of the existence of any treaty or not?

Mr. Roberts. Maybe Russia would figure that we would get our feet under use and get in as late as we did in the Second World War, and it was nearly after the clock struck 12.

Senator Donnell. But we did get in.

Mr. Roberts. Yes; but we did get in, at a frightful cost, and almost too late.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice——

Mr. Roberts. If Hitler had known what we know now, we would have been in too late. England would have gone before we got in.

Senator Donnell. Of course, Mr. Justice, I take it we would agree, that whether or not Hitler would have been deterred is a matter as to which there is no actual proof. It is purely a matter of opinion. Your opinion may be right. It is possible that there might be error in it. We would agree to that, would we not?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. I have been wrong before.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice Roberts, I hope you will not feel this is in any sense either an impudent or mean question. I do not mean that at all.

Mr. Roberts. Certainly not.

Senator Donnell. And you believed just as sincerely in your view as the majority believed in theirs.

Mr. Roberts. I think so.

Senator Donnell. As regards this pact, may I mention just one or two things. Of course, you have read it and studied it carefully, I am sure.

Mr. Roberts. I have read it carefully; yes, indeed, sir.

Senator Donnell. And you believed just as sincerely in your view as the majority believed in theirs.

Mr. Roberts. I think so.

Senator Donnell. As regards this pact, may I mention just one or two things. Of course, you have read it and studied it carefully, I am sure.

Mr. Roberts. I have read it carefully; yes, indeed, sir.

Senator Donnell. And I have no doubt that you are modestly indicating by that language, perhaps, not even indicating it, but I am sure you have studied it and I will not ask you anything further on that.

In that agreement, however, there are certain obligations imposed that do not now exist against this country, are there not, or by this country, I mean?

OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY

Perhaps I used the wrong preposition. I will restate the question: The treaty does impose on this question certain obligations that do not now exist. That is right, is it not?

Mr. Roberts. Well, in a sense; yes. In a sense; yes. I think the clause that makes an attack on any one member of the treaty an attack on all is a position advanced beyond pure selfish nationalism, pure selfish separatism.

Senator Donnell. And it is a position that does not today exist. We are under no contractual obligation at this minute to——
Mr. Roberts. No: that is what is the matter with the world. We are a lot of independent, suffering nations, and each pursues his own selfish way, and can do exactly as he pleases, when everything arises. And this is an assurance that we feel a common interest with these nations, that what is bad for them and injurious to them we consider would be injurious to us.

Senator Donnell. I get your point, and it is very clear. But returning to my question, which you have in effect answered, though I would like to have it just a little more concretely answered: This treaty does create, on the part of the United States, an obligation which it is not presently under. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Roberts. That is a very difficult question to answer for this reason: Under our constitutional system there is a question whether we can, in advance, automatically bind ourselves to national action. If you say this creates an obligation it creates, if you want to call it an obligation, the obligation seriously to consider, and take appropriate action, under circumstances which may develop. Well, that is an obligation.

If I agree with you that I will seriously consider a proposition that you put to me, I suppose in morals it is my obligation to do it. But, after all, this pact is, to my mind, an expression of the purpose and the mind and the spirit of the people of the United States of America. That is what it is, and it is an assurance to the people of Europe that we look upon this thing as a very serious thing to us, as well as to them.

Senator Donnell. And the obligation you have described does not today exist.

Mr. Roberts. No. Today, under the old nationalistic theory, I suppose we are entitled to turn our back on what is happening in Europe, and say it does not concern us. That is why I say out-and-out isolationists are against this pact. Because it was the isolationist’s position to shut our eyes to what was going on in the rest of the world.

Senator Donnell. If the treaty should be ratified by the Senate, we shall not be able to turn our back on Europe and disregard any obligation.

Mr. Roberts.—There you use the word “obligation” again. Disregard the deep concern which this treaty says it will be to us if there is an aggression on one of our allies under this treaty.

Senator Donnell. I want to make the question perfectly clear, and I did not mean to incorporate any new element: The question I am asking is, after this treaty is ratified, we will be under a contractual obligation with 11 other nations. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. And we are not under that contractual obligation today with any of them. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Roberts. That is correct.

**NATURE OF OBLIGATION**

Senator Donnell. You speak of the obligation that will be created by this treaty as one to seriously consider. Is there anything in the treaty that says that? Do you find that language anywhere in that treaty from beginning to end?

Mr. Roberts. I think the language that an attack on any of them shall be considered an attack on all of them.
Senator DONNELL. Does that say that we are to seriously consider what we shall do? That is an agreement, is it not?

MR. ROBERTS. It goes on to say that we shall then do what we think is adequate and proper in the premises.

Senator DONNELL. I beg your pardon, Mr. Justice. It does not say that. It says this: "The parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

MR. ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. I quoted it exactly. The language to which you evidently refer follows shortly thereafter. That is:

Consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right—

et cetera, which is not material—

MR. ROBERTS. I think it is material.

Senator DONNEELL (reading): will assist the parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with other parties—

now I come to the language you have in mind—

such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

That does not say, does it, Mr. Justice, that upon this attack we will seriously consider what, if any, action we should take? This obligates us, does it not, as I am quoting, "by taking forthwith such action as it"—that we—"deem necessary, including the use of armed force"; and I take it you agree with the Secretary of State that that does not give an arbitrary right of determination, but such as we honestly and genuinely believe to be necessary. That is the object, is it not?

MR. ROBERTS. Certainly. That is what we sit down to consider.

Senator DONNEELL. But there is an obligation to do what we honestly think is necessary.

MR. ROBERTS. That is right. And that honest judgment must be reached by consideration of the circumstances.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK.

Senator DONNEELL. Suppose 500,000 troops were to be sent into Norway, which is the illustration that you doubtless heard this morning, were to be sent into Norway by Russia for armed attack. Do you think that we would be complying with our duty under this article 5 if we should say, "All we have to do is to take such action as we deem necessary. We think that just sending over 10 gallons of coal oil would be sufficient"?

MR. ROBERTS. Certainly not.

Senator DONNEELL. We would be obligated to do what you and I consider reasonably and honestly and genuinely necessary; namely, to take the reasonable steps toward repelling that attack, and treating
in effect and in fact the attack against that other nation as an attack against ourselves. That is what we would have to do under this obligation.

Mr. Roberts. Who do you mean by "we"?

Senator Donnell. Our country.

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Now, as regards who is to do it for our country, as between the President and the Congress, I want to ask you just a little about that Mr. Justice, if I may.

Suppose that New York—well, let us get away from New York, we have used that so many times. Suppose Charleston, S. C., were to be attacked by 500,000 soldiers and 500 bombers, and Congress is not in session, and the attack occurs on Saturday of the week, and Congress cannot get here for 2 days, or 3 days, perhaps, a quorum cannot be secured any quicker than that, and some of us do not like to fly very much, and I am one of them. Suppose that situation.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Do you think the President, as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and Air Force of our country, would have legal authority to order troops and bombers and whatever is necessary to repel that attack against Charleston, S. C., or would he have to wait until the Congress could be convened before he could do anything?

Mr. Roberts. I am inclined to think that he would have the right to take emergency measures.

Senator Donnell. That is your best judgment, that he would?

Mr. Roberts. That is my best judgment; yes.

Senator Donnell. And as Commander in Chief he would have that power?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. This agreement—

Mr. Roberts. Of course, that is domestic invasion. Now you are trying to ask me whether Norway is made a domestic country by this treaty.

Senator Donnell. No; I am not going to ask you that. This treaty does say that the parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them, and Norway is one or more of them—

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Shall be considered an attack against them all. And we are one of the all. So that the contract as far as we are concerned is that we agree that an armed attack against Norway shall be considered an attack against the United States of America.

Mr. Roberts. But I do not know whether that makes an attack on Norway a domestic invasion in the United States of America that would allow the President to call out the militia and the troops.

Senator Donnell. I have not said it is a domestic invasion.

Mr. Roberts. This agreement say that if Norway is attacked we shall consider that that is an attack upon us. But it does not necessarily mean it is similar to an attack on Charleston, S. C., or whatever city you mentioned.

Senator Donnell. Are you prepared to express an opinion, one way or the other—we have had, I think, really, two expressions, one by
Mr. Acheson and one by Mr. Lovett, somewhat contrary, perhaps entirely so—would you be prepared to tell us today whether or not in your opinion, if Norway were attacked by 500,000 troops and by 1,000 bombers, and something had to be done quickly, and every minute counted, do you think the President of the United States would have power, under his obligation created by this treaty, and as Commander in Chief, to take whatever military action he deemed proper under those circumstances?

Mr. Roberts. I doubt it, because I think, in a situation of this kind, it would be entirely possible to call the Congress and lay the situation before it in time.

This is not like an attack on Philadelphia or some city in South Carolina, where the bombers are there. It is an attack on one of us, which we will consider an attack on ourselves. But what we are to do about it, what means we are to take, I think can easily be resolved by Congress, and very properly so.

And, if I were the President, I would take that course. Whether under our Constitution he has the power to take another course could only be tested by an attempted exercise of power by him, and, as often unfortunately happens, a long-after decision as to whether he exceeded his power by the Supreme Court. I would not take that chance if I were the President.

Senator Donnell. If he were to take the view that he had the power to take immediate military action, say by sending some bombers across the ocean right away, on the theory that that was necessary in order to prevent Europe from being overrun like Belgium was in the first few days in the First World War, if he took that view, the Supreme Court of the United States would have no power to review that action, would it? Would that not be the action of a coordinate branch of the Government?

Mr. Roberts. It may very well be so. And some of many other usurpations by the Executive.

Senator Donnell. Do you regard that as a usurpation?

Mr. Roberts. No; I say if you regard it as a usurpation.

Senator Donnell. I do not. I think he has thorough power to do that. I think under this contract this country would be obligated.

Mr. Roberts. I think that is very doubtful. If I were the President, I would take no such chance.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice, you say the road to world unity—that is what your organization stands for—

Mr. Roberts. That is the long-range objective; yes.

UNITY OF DEMOCRACIES

Senator Donnell. That is to say, the world unity so far as the Convention of Democracies is concerned. Do you say your organization stands for world unity of all kinds of countries, whether they are democracies or Portugals, or what?

Mr. Roberts. No, sir.


Mr. Roberts. As a starter, and to federate the kind of people that can federate, that understand our system of a people’s government,
a state that is the servant of the people and not its master as in some
aocracies. Those people will have to start world law, international
law, because they understand it.

You cannot undertake world law with people who have lived for
centuries under an autocracy. I do not see how I could ever be a joint
citizen in a world government with the citizens of a pure autocracy.
The thing does not jell.

Senator DONNELL. In your statement you say the North Atlantic
Defense Pact is an essential emergency measure to prevent an attack
by Soviet Russia.

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.

AUTOCRACIES AND DEMOCRACIES

Senator DONNELL. Do you think it would be a much stronger pre­
ventive of an attack by Soviet Russia if the President had authority
to send bombers across instantly in the event of an attack than if they
had to wait 2, 3, 4, or 5 days for Congress to convene and maybe a day
or two before Congress acted?

Mr. ROBERTS. Senator Donnell, many, many things can be done more
effectively if power is concentrated in one man, one group of men.
The difficulty that democracies always face is that they work close
at the elbows because there is a division of power, and we do not like
to concentrate power and authority in one man.

Certainly I think it would be stronger. I think the United States
would be in stronger position today militarily if we had an autocracy
or dictatorship, if you and I were ordered around by a boss that we
could not gainsay. But that is not the democratic way of life. It
is not the way we have practiced.

Senator DONNELL. I am not so sure I would agree, although I am
not expert in military matters. It would appear to me that our forces,
acting under American institutions and American traditions, have
been able to take care of themselves pretty well so far. You agree
with that, too, of course?

Mr. ROBERTS. No. I think democracy is the weakest form of gov­
ernment for aggression, for military activities, that can be conceived
in the world.

Senator DONNELL. I am not talking about aggression.

Mr. ROBERTS. Autocracies are efficient, powerful.

Senator DONNELL. How about defense? Do you think democracies
are inefficient for defense, and among the most inefficient means devised
for that?

Mr. ROBERTS. Always so, because public opinion has to be mobilized
in a democracy, and it takes time to do that.

Senator DONNELL. It would not take very much time if Charleston,
S. C., were to be attacked, to mobilize public opinion over this country,
would it? It did not take much time, in the case of Japan's attack
on Hawaii in 1941, to mobilize on December 7, did it?

Mr. ROBERTS. No.

Senator DONNELL. Congress was in session then, and we started in
the next day, I believe, with a declaration of war.

Mr. ROBERTS. If we had been able to mobilize public opinion a few
months earlier, we would not have lost nine battleships in Pearl
Harbor.
Senator Donnell. You say if you were the President you think you feel that you would be very loath to accept this responsibility of sending the bombers over without congressional action. What do you understand the word in article 5, "forthwith," to mean when it says that "the parties agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them" and so forth, would assist the parties by taking "forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary."

Do you think that would permit of some delay?

Mr. Roberts. "Forthwith" means just as fast as you can do it. That is all it can mean.

Senator Donnell. And if the President does have power—and I am not asking you to commit yourself for the moment on it—if he does have power, then forthwith would mean forthwith, so soon as he could act.

Mr. Roberts. Certainly.

Senator Lodge. If the Senator will permit an interruption.

Senator Donnell. I certainly will.

Senator Lodge. Do you not hold, Mr. Justice, that the President has the legal authority to order the Army and the Navy and the Marine Corps and Air Force wherever he wants to?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. You mean, for instance, if he orders a fleet to Japan, to the Japanese Sea now? They go, certainly.

Senator Lodge. He can order the Air Force anywhere. Of course, he runs the risk of having public opinion disapprove. But he certainly has the power to do it; has he not?

Mr. Roberts. Certainly.

Senator Watkins. Would he have the power to order an attack on Russia right now if he wants to? Or order the planes to fly over Russia? I ask that because it seems to me it is made necessary by the question of Senator Lodge.

Mr. Roberts. He is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. However bad it would be for the Chief of Staff to order it, if the Chief of Staff could order it, and the troops followed his orders, it would equally be true if the President ordered it. They would follow the order of the Commander in Chief. But are we assuming that we are going to have, in this country, of course, ourselves, a President who will provoke a war by ordering something done to provoke another country?

Senator Donnell. Do you think we are going to have a President here who would permit 500,000 men to go into Norway with a 100 or 500 bombers, with every intent obviously to capture Europe within 3 or 4 days? Do you think we are apt to have a President say, "I cannot do anything now until I send word for Congress to come to Washington from all over the four corners of the country"?

Mr. Roberts. Do you think a President who was really concerned about saving this country ultimately, whether he had this treaty or not, would act differently? I do not think President Roosevelt had any treaty when he loaned over-age destroyers and sent muskets to Europe, which saved us and saved England.
NEED FOR SPEEDY ACTION IN CASE OF ATTACKS

Senator Donnell. I think it comes back to one of the questions I asked at the outset. Is it not a fact that Russia should believe, from our previous action in the two world wars, that if we thought it was essential for the best interests of humanity we would get into the war without any Atlantic Treaty forcing us into it? Is that right? You would agree to that; would you not?

Mr. Roberts. That Russia would feel that way?

Senator Donnell. Yes.

Mr. Roberts. No. I think they would calculate that we would be too late. This next war is going to be a blitzkrieg war. It would be a swell job for use to get into it after Russia was at the shore of the Atlantic and all over England.

The Chairman. Russia might have the view that she could pick them off in the meantime.

Mr. Roberts. Certainly.

The Chairman. Instead of waiting for us to mobilize.

Mr. Roberts. Certainly. That is what I said in my statement. That was the Hitler technique.

Senator Donnell. Do you not think that the very fact that the next war, if we ever have one—and we all hope we will not—may and probably will be a blitzkrieg, lightning war? In other words, do you not think that was the reason for the insertion in article 5 of the word "forthwith"?

Mr. Roberts. Very likely.

Senator Donnell. To take forthwith that action?

Mr. Roberts. Very likely.

Senator Donnell. And if the President has to wait 3 or 4 days, as we found way back in the much slower days of 1914 and the days of 1939, if we found out then that Belgium could be overrun in 4 days, I think it was, or thereabouts, do you not think it likely that the President, in the exercise of sound discretion and judgment, would and should and could send bombers across instantly after that action took place, and would consider himself bound to do so under the terms of article 5 of the treaty?

Mr. Roberts. And how would you have him act if we had no treaty?

Senator Donnell. I would have him act in accordance with what he considers the military best interests of our country and the actual interests of humanity. I would say that there might be a situation in which he would have to act immediately. He might not, however.

Mr. Roberts. Is it conceivable that the interests of our country should be that France and Great Britain should fall?

Senator Donnell. No.

Mr. Roberts. Is it conceivable that humanity should dictate that we stand aside and see it happen? If not, what less would our President do? What less would he do in case of such an attack without this treaty than he will do with it?

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACIES

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice, I am not going to ask too many more questions, but I do want to ask just a few. You say, "The road
to world unity is not through appeasement of tyranny, but rather through strengthening democracy. I suppose you mean strengthening in numerous ways, among which are military strengthening; is that right?

Mr. Roberts. That is, in my judgment, a small part of it.

Senator Donnell. But it is a part of it?

Mr. Roberts. A small part of it. I have also had the complete conviction, Senator Donnell, that if in 1939 the United States, Britain, and France had been in a federation—we were all unprepared, utterly so, and Hitler knew it—Hitler would never have struck, because to strike France would have brought us into the war the same day. He would not have done it. The potential was too great, but he figured what every aggressor figures: if you can keep these democracies apart, then do what Senator Connally suggested—snipe one, then another, in the hope that the United States at the moment will be busy with something, or asleep, and you will have a fait accompli like Czecho­lovakia, when it is too late; it is an accomplished fact.

That is the advantage of our being together. It is an assurance to Russia that the whole potential is together, and it is an assurance to our friends abroad that the whole potential is together. What good is the Marshall plan without this assurance to them, an assurance they think they can rely on? If you were an industrialist in France, would you build up a factory with the thought that Russia would take it when it was ripe? Can you rehabilitate economically a country which has always got its elbow up against an aggressor, where nothing but fear is rife?

These people abroad are afraid of a shilly-shally shifting policy in the United States. Our past record gives them some cause to feel that way. I do not think this treaty is any more than a piece of paper. I think this treaty is writing down for them the deep feeling of the people of the United States that we are not going to let them be destroyed, and turn our backs and say it is none of our business. That is the reason it is going to prevent war. This assurance is going to strengthen them. That very assurance is going to hold off an aggressor, who does not want to tackle the whole kettle of fish at once but whose technique is to get one at a time.

The Chairman. This treaty is, in effect, a double assurance: (1) to the people of the democratic countries, and (2) an assurance to any aggressor that contemplates armed attack.

Mr. Roberts. That is the story exactly.

Military Strengthening

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice, you mentioned the factory owner or investor in France, who you say hesitates to invest funds if he thinks there is danger of Russia crossing into that country and capturing France. Incidentally, your reference to Hitler having struck France was not correct. He struck Poland; did he not, instead of France?

Mr. Roberts. What I was trying to say was that, if France, Britain, and the United States had been in a union at that time, the moment he struck France he would have known we would be in the war.

Senator Donnell. This is the point, however, to which I was really leading up, regardless of whether it was France or Poland that he first struck: You spoke of the factory owner in France who hesitates
to make investments or to increase his investments with the fear hanging over him that Russia may come in same way and take them. Well, the best way to give that man confidence—is it not—is to have enough power and force so that, to adopt the words of President Truman, Russia can look at overwhelming force, to have that force then and there, so Russia can look at it and figure, "We cannot take it." That is the best way for the investor.

Mr. Roberts. Where would you put that force—in France?

Senator Donnell. I am not saying that. I say the best assurance that would lead to the most confidence on the part of a fellow who is fearful that Russia is going to overrun France is to provide military force to present Russia from overrunning the European nations.

Mr. Roberts. I do not know what you mean by that.

Senator Donnell. I could not say it any more clearly, I think.

Mr. Roberts. I think this pact is on the way to save us a great deal of money in the provision of military forces and matériel. I think a federation would save us much more, but that is another story, way beyond it. What are you talking about—the force that would assure this?

Senator Donnell. I will tell you what I am talking about.

Mr. Roberts. Build up that force and keep it bottled up here? Run a separate military policy and a separate army here? Send it to France to let them build up a separate military policy? Is that going to give any assurance? Those European nations, alone or together, cannot build a sufficient military potential to protect themselves separately or jointly.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice, I did not mean to interrupt you. I understood you to ask me what I meant, and I was going to state it. I mean this: In the first place, the investor in France, putting money into his plant, would derive more confidence if he knew there were military forces—men, material, bombers, whatever it may be—who could prevent Russia from coming in there. That is the best assurance he could have in putting his money into a factory; is that right?

Mr. Roberts. I do not know what you mean. If there was overwhelming force in the United States, and he thought the United States would not use it to protect France, that would not help him much.

Senator Donnell. That really is not the answer to the question.

Mr. Roberts. You say: Would not assurance of overwhelming military force give him the courage to go on? Military force available to protect him? Yes.

Senator Donnell. Military force, since you ask it, that will prevent Russia from crossing the rivers and getting into the country—in France or other nations of this pact.

**AMERICAN TROOPS TO EUROPE**

Mr. Roberts. I do not see the prospect of France as having that within your lifetime or mine.

Senator Donnell. Very well. That leads to this question: Do you think, in order to provide an adequate guaranty that Russia could not come across the borders, that it would be necessary for the United States to supplement the forces which France and these other nations have by not only bombs and bombers and matériel but by American troops garrisoned in Europe, in order to prevent it?
Mr. Roberts. That is a military question that I am not competent to answer, but I should think there would have to be joint planning, joint pooling of matériel, and making of the matériel available, so that you would have available promptly a force big enough to do what you are talking about. What that would involve in dispositions of troops and placing of materials, I would not know.

Senator Donnell. Your answer is entirely consistent with your view that this next war, if we have one, will be a blitzkrieg, and it would not help much if American soldiers are needed—we will not argue whether they are or not: at least I do not care to—if they are needed, it would not help much to have them 3,000 miles away and have to be sent there by ships, in the case of a blitzkrieg which is perhaps going to take London and Paris and these other place within a few days. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Roberts. You are beyond my depth. I do not know. It depends on what our Air Force says about it, and I do not know.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE III

Senator Donnell. I mean to refer to article 3 of the treaty—and by the way it does not contain any such language as the words “as it seems necessary,” but reads this way: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous”—and note the word “continuous”—“and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity”—to do what?—“to resist armed attack.” Is there not there, Mr. Justice Roberts, a clear, definite, expressed promise on the part of our country to, by means of continuous and effective mutual aid, cooperate with these other countries in maintaining and developing their collective capacity and individual capacity, to resist the armed attack? Is it a definite obligation?

Mr. Roberts. I think so. And you, I take it, would not do that. You would wait for some European attack to be made before you did that, because that would preserve your national autonomy?

Senator Donnell. I say this, since you have asked it: I think the proper thing for this country to do is to wait on each particular set of circumstances and do what we think proper at the time, rather than binding ourselves for 20 long years as to a course of conduct to treat the attack upon any one of 11 other nations, which may have their quarrels with other nations—

Mr. Roberts. Let me put one thought: Yes; we will wait. And then the question arises: Who will command the joint force? How long will we wait to settle that? And then the question arises: How shall the forces be allocated between the nations? We will take a couple of months to settle that.

I would a good deal rather rely on the President to get the Congress together and say, “Go to it, boys.” I think your delay is much longer than my way.

Senator Donnell. Does this treaty say anything about who shall be the chief of staff?

Mr. Roberts. No. We say we will continuously confer with each other and try to settle these matters, which is the sensible way to do it, it strikes me, so that you will know which way you are going when you are going.
Sen. DONnell. There is nothing in here, however, which contains any requirement whatsoever for any particular nation to designate the chief of staff?

Mr. Roberts. No. That is because we are still preserving national sovereignties. Those things will have to be settled by agreement.

Sen. DONnell. How many of these nations would have to agree, by the way, out of these 12?

Mr. Roberts. I guess all of them.

Sen. DONnell. I suppose sometimes it is pretty hard to get a unanimous decision on most anything?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. You think the pressure would be greater after there had been an attack and France overrun. I agree with you.

Sen. DONnell. It might very well be. Just this final question or two, Mr. Justice: This is a 20-year treaty, is it not?

Mr. Roberts. I believe so.

WITHDRAWAL FROM TREATY

Sen. DONnell. Is there any provision by which any nation, during that time, may be expelled from the community created by the treaty because of having become a Communist country?

Mr. Roberts. I think not. I suppose you realize that although this treaty is a 20-year treaty, the body of which you are a member could revoke it in 2 years, under our present Constitution.

Sen. DONnell. You do not mean the Senate could do it?

Mr. Roberts. I mean Congress could do it.

Sen. DONnell. Under what provision do you mean? The provision in regard to 2 years beyond which provisions for war cannot be--

Mr. Roberts. No. I mean the treaties of the United States are on the same parity with law.

I think you are familiar with the fact that a law passed by Congress inconsistent with the treaty, repeals the treaty.

Sen. DONnell. That is correct. But I understood you to say something about 2 years.

Mr. Roberts. I say 2 years, 5 years, or 10 years.

Sen. DONnell. I thought you might be referring to the provision in the Constitution by which a Congress cannot be bound by more than 2 years to provide arms and maintenance.

Mr. Roberts. No; I did not mean that.

Sen. DONnell. Do you think, Mr. Justice, if this treaty is entered into, that for 20 years, where the parties have all signed up for 20 years, that it would be regarded as in the best of good faith if our country should, within 3 or 4 years, say we repeal that treaty by statute of Congress, and it comes to an end, though nothing is said in the treaty that it can be done?

Mr. Roberts. It has not been the thought of nations, where conditions developed, unforeseen when the treaty was made, for parties to denounce the treaty.

I suppose if this alliance were turned into a Communist pact—which is inconceivable to me at the present time—the American people might have the moral right to say that we do not care to stay in the Communist nest.
Senator DONNELL. Do you think that would be true if just one of these nations became Communist?

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know.

Senator LODGE. May I ask a question?

Senator DONNELL. Permit me to ask one question before I yield.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is it not true, Mr. Justice, that there is considerable difference of opinion among different persons, as for illustration the St. Lawrence seaway debate, as illustrated on the floor of the Senate, as to whether this country can do more than exercise the physical power to revoke a treaty? What I am getting at is this: While it is entirely true, I think, under the law, that Congress can revoke a treaty 10 minutes after it is made, may there not be some liability under international law upon the country which has thus violated its contract with other nations?

Mr. ROBERTS. There is no such thing as international law.

Senator DONNELL. No such thing as international law?

Mr. ROBERTS. No. International law is power. If some of the nations who did not like our revocation of the treaty wanted to take the club to us, they might subdue us. That is the only international law that is applicable. It is the law of power.

Senator DONNELL. You say there is no such thing as international law?

Mr. ROBERTS. No.

Senator DONNELL. I ask you to state whether or not you read the statute of the World Court, Permanent Court of International Justice.

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Did that not expressly refer to international law by name?

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes. We have used the name all the time, and anyone of us who were parties to that could have denounced that treaty and walked out.

Senator DONNELL. Is it not true that among those who so strongly urged at hearings by this country, to the World Court, the Permanent Court of International Justice, with that language in it, saying it should administer international law, was no less a personage than Elihu Root?

Mr. ROBERTS. You know very well that any decision of that Court was subject to the will of the nation that was immersed. If it did not obey, there was no means to make it obey. Its decisions were advisory.

Senator DONNELL. No, I do not.

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, you ought to.

Senator DONNELL. I do not know that at all. I know that there would be no way to enforce it without a police power. But I am not at all willing to concede that there is no such thing as international law.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think we are pretty far off the subject of this treaty.

Senator LODGE. Will the Senator yield?

Senator DONNELL. Yes.
Senator Lodge. This question of what happens if one of the signatory nations falls under the domination of the Communists, as I see it, is a question that comes up, and will come up again. I would like to read two brief quotations from the text of the treaty, and then ask you whether you do not think that those two quotations would make it obviously inconsistent for a Communist nation to be party to the treaty. The first quotation is this:

They—

that is, the parties— are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples—

and here is the significant part—

founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

That is the first quotation.

The second is from article 2:

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations—

and here is the pertinent language—

by strengthening their free institutions.

My question is, in the light of that language, would not the United States or any other party to the treaty, be justified in taking the initiative in seeing to it that any nation was no longer a member of the pact if it fell under the domination of the Communists?

Mr. Roberts. I should certainly think so.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Justice, the Senator from Massachusetts referred to the language in the treaty, the preamble:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy.

As I understand it he used that as one of two bits of language in the treaty which he thinks would permit the expulsion of Communist nations.

Senator Lodge. It continues:

individual liberty and the rule of law.

Senator Donnell. Where is that?

Senator Lodge. I read from the second sentence in the preamble and the first sentence of article 2.

Senator Donnell. That is what I thought. Those are the same sentences that you referred to on the floor of the Senate the other day.

EXPULSION FROM THE PACT

Mr. Justice Roberts, referring to this provision of the preamble:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy—

first, is Portugal founded on the principles of democracy, in your opinion?

Mr. Roberts. I have told you; no.

Senator Donnell. If these parties desire to do so, the other parties, they can expel Portugal on that very principle 5 minutes after the treaty is signed?
Mr. Roberts. I do not think so.

Senator Donnell. You do not think they would have any right to?

Mr. Roberts. I think the parties to this treaty can expel anybody from the treaty, but I do not think they have any moral right to do it.

Senator Donnell. There are 12 members to this pact. Is there any provision by which 11 of them can expel the twelfth?

Mr. Roberts. I think 11 of them can denounce the pact and get a new one, and leave the twelfth out.

Senator Donnell. In which event they have violated the provisions of the treaty, have they not?

Mr. Roberts. I do not know. If some member of the pact violated the treaty I would think they would have a perfect right to walk out.

Senator Donnell. Is there anything in the treaty, Mr. Justice, that says that a member nation becoming a Communist nation, is a violation?

Mr. Roberts. No, sir. Not in those words.

WORLD DIVISION

Senator Donnell. I want to ask you about one final point. On page 2 of your statement, after giving these four groups, which oppose the pact, you say:

These groups are loudly complaining that the Atlantic Pact will divide the world into two hostile camps, which will lead to war.

And you say:

Nothing could be further from the truth.

You do not regard it as any possible danger at all that there might prevail the opinion that the Atlantic Pact would divide the world into two hostile camps?

Mr. Roberts. I do not think it will make the division any more marked than it is today.

Senator Donnell. I wonder if you read or heard the statement of Mr. Dulles given to us yesterday. I think it was, in which he said, among other things, this:

Of course, with every great enterprise there are risks and disadvantages. I think these should be seen and not covered up, because the risks are of such a character that if seen they can be guarded against.

Then he recites what these risks are and he sets out:

(1) The pact shall not be operated primarily as a military instrument.

And the second risk, as to which he says:

There is danger that these two pacts will be interpreted to mean that the only major concerns of the United States are within the American Hemisphere and North Atlantic areas and as long as they are free from attack we are relatively indifferent to what occurs elsewhere.

He lists the second of the dangers as:

The Atlantic and Rio Pacts should not be understood as tacit offers to divide the world with Soviet communism.

I take it you do not share Mr. Dulles' view that the danger which he mentions—I am quoting him, “the danger of this interpretation”—is a real danger. You do not think it is a danger at all.
Mr. Roberts. I do not think my statement is inconsistent with that, and I do not disagree with what he says.

Senator Donnell. In what way do you not see an inconsistency?

Mr. Roberts. There are two ideologies in the world today. One is statism and the other is representative government, based on the democratic suffrage of the people. Those divide the world today. The making of a pact by those of us who believe in a democratic way of life is not going to divide the world and it is not going to threaten the peace any more than the peace is threatened by this ideological cleavage which you cannot eradicate.

I agree with Mr. Dulles that we ought not to treat the Atlantic Pact or the Rio Pact, either of them, as little top drawers in which we belong, and all the rest of the world is excluded, left out. We ought not to treat this pact as a sign that we want to possess the world. In the name of Heaven, that is the last thing that a democracy wants to do. They want to be let alone and develop their own way of life in cooperation with each other.

To suggest that this pact might be treated as an attempt to wall off, steal part of the world for ourselves, close out the rest from trade, from benefit, is just grotesque to me. I do not think it is a real danger. Mr. Dulles thinks there may be some danger it will be so construed. I do not think so, but I can understand his point of view.

Senator Donnell. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I read these two sentences from Mr. Dulles's statement. This is in the section pertaining to the subject matter, about the Atlantic and Rio Pacts should not be construed as attempts to divide the world:

I know that the administration is aware of the risk to which I alluded and that the President and Secretary of State have recently reasserted the concern of the United States with areas other than those marked out by the Rio and Atlantic Pacts. I believe, however, that the Congress may usefully reinforce that help to obviate a miscalculation so dangerous that if persisted in might undo all the good potential in the pact.

Atlantic Union and the Treaty

Finally, one sentence in your statement:

The concept of such a federal union of Atlantic democracies can, however, become a practical reality only if the Atlantic Pact is ratified.

That is the key that is the point at which your particular organization, the organization which has as its purpose the federal convention of democracies, is particularly focusing its comments with respect to the pact. Is that correct?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. If the Congress of the United States should say, "We do not want to even have a treaty of alliance with our democratic friends, we are going to live in isolationism," then I would have very little hope that the Congress of the United States would ever explore a closer union of the democracies than is represented by this pact.

But as I have said to you, we have had a progression over 8 or 9 years now, one step after another, trying to bring these democratic countries into a better understanding and better cooperation; and an exhibition of utter-mindedness and generosity on the part of my people, for which I am utterly eternally proud, on the part of the Marshall plan and everything else that has been done here.
To turn back now and say, "You plow your own road, you take your own risks; we are friendly, if anything happens come see us," I think that is turning back the clock.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Justice, and Mr. Chairman, for the privilege of examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Justice. You have made a very enlightening and able statement. Now we have Senator Watkins, of Utah, with us.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Justice, I listened very carefully—
The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. Senator Lodge?

Senator LODGE. I have no questions, but if Senator Watkins suggests anything to me I will break in.

The CHAIRMAN. You are entitled to the witness now if you have any questions.

Senator LODGE. I have no questions, but I may interrupt Senator Watkins if he suggests something to me.

Mr. ROBERTS. There is my friend, Senator Fulbright, also.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. He came in during the interrogation by the Senator from Missouri. That puts me in the clear. Go ahead, Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not wish to delay the proceedings, and I know that the Justice wants to return to Philadelphia. I have one or two points.

I wonder if you could expand a little on the thought that you expressed on page 2 where you say that the North Atlantic Pact is essentially an emergency measure, the implication being that there are further measures?

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes.

STEPS BEYOND THE ATLANTIC PACT

Senator FULBRIGHT. You do not regard this as a final solution to our difficulties.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not think anybody does. I doubt if any man who sits behind that table does. Once this pact is made we have economic questions to consider, we have military questions to consider. As Senator Donnell has pointed out, these parties to the treaty have to proceed by agreement. It is all a question of what the instrumentality is to be, and how they are to be set up to work out cooperation. I look at this treaty, and I look at the start that this treaty makes as a far bigger thing than a mere military arrangement. It is essential to us that these people restore their economy. It is essential to us that these people restore their economy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think it will contribute to a closer political and economic union between these 12 countries?

Mr. ROBERTS. That the treaty will?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think it will contribute to it, but I do not think it is the be all and end all, as you know. You know my views very well on that. You think it will be a great help to have a union of the European democracies, a union of these western European states.

I see greater difficulties in that than the union that I envisage in which we shall be a part, but a union of the European democracies now
will have to be supported by the United States of America. There is not the potential there to build up their economy without our help, and I do not think it makes very much difference whether we give them the Marshall plan or ECA help individually, or whether we give it to them as a union or a federation.

I do not think any union of the democracies will ever work unless the United States of America is a part of it. We have got to take the leadership. That is the reason why I think a union of the European nations, the western European nations, would be a step toward my goal just as I think this pact would be a step, but I think it is a pretty impractical step. I think we have got to be behind it, just as we have to be in this treaty.

Senator Fulbright. Do you not see more signs, as a practical matter, of an interest and movement toward European union than Atlantic union?

Mr. Roberts. I do not, because Europe is just waiting until we take the lead on union. It is a very different thing for us to stand off and say, "You unite, you do so and so, than to say, "We will unite with you." Very different.

LEADERSHIP TOWARD ATLANTIC UNION

Senator Fulbright. Do you see any signs whatever in the Government of this country taking the leadership in the Atlanticunion?

Mr. Roberts. I believe I do.

Senator Fulbright. What specifically encourages you to believe that?

Mr. Roberts. The constant growth of public opinion. Constant growth, steady growth.

Senator Fulbright. I said in the Government of this country.

Mr. Roberts. I think the Government of this country is taking what it considers one step at a time, but I think it is laying aside everything else now for this pact. It has been committed to it, the administration has been committed to it for years. I have great hopes that the Government of the United States will not discourage open discussion of further steps such as I advocate.

I believe greatly in the process of public discussion, of open debate.

UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

Senator Fulbright. Yesterday, I believe it was, the Europeans signed what they called a statute of Europe, creating a Council of Europe. I know of nothing that this country has encouraged, either in Europe or in the Atlantic area, comparable to that. That is as a practical move, I do not see any signs.

Mr. Roberts. I have not read the statute of Europe, as perhaps you have. I think it attempts to protect the complete sovereignty of every individual nation.

Senator Fulbright. That is a defect, but it is something.

Mr. Roberts. It is something like this treaty. It is a step.

Senator Fulbright. It is something like it, but it is not confined to military matters.

Mr. Roberts. No.

Senator Fulbright. It purports to have authority at least to discuss all types of things.
Now, they had the Brussels Pact, which had more emphasis upon military matters. It goes into the other field, at least important discussion, a consideration of economic and political matters without any power to act. That is quite true.

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Fulbright. I think it would be much better if they did have power to act.

Mr. Roberts. So do I.

But at least it is something, Senator, whereas among the Atlantic countries, including ourselves and Canada, I do not know of governmental people at least who are seriously considering any steps which might involve our sovereignty.

Senator Fulbright. Would you say we have advanced in this field in an economic way, and do you contemplate that there will be a step perhaps in the political field?

Mr. Roberts. I do. There have got to be some kinds of steps. We have to make some economic arrangements.

Senator Fulbright. I want to distinguish what ought to come about and what is coming about. Actually is there any movement toward it?

Mr. Roberts. I think we will be able to show that there is a movement for it, and that the thinking people of America want it discussed very seriously. It has grave difficulties in its way. Everybody knows that. I do not blame them.

ECA AND UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

Senator Fulbright. Do you think that in Europe the ECA is tending to bring about political or economic unity?

Mr. Roberts. I would not know. I would not venture an opinion.

Senator Fulbright. Have you happened to see a statement in the paper today on a report of the United Nations Commission on Europe?

Mr. Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Fulbright. It was in the front page of the Star. It is a long article, two columns. There is one paragraph. I wondered what you thought of it. It is a report by the United Nations Commission, which as you know is composed of members from and including the United States and the European countries [reading]:

In 100,000 words the Commission said European nations striving for an economic comeback are tripping over their own isolationism, and that the ERP is aggravating the situation.

And it goes on to elaborate, which I will not take the time to read.

Mr. Roberts. Of course, the ERP is a very stopgap sort of thing. I do not see how you can strike down customs barriers, and to reach lack of parity of currencies, and shortage of economic change, and a thousand and one other economic things. I do not think it is an instrument calculated to do it. The only way it could do it is by bringing pressure on these sovereign nations to say, “If you do not do so and so, you do not get any more ECA aid,” which will, in the end, create more division among the democracies than it will union among them.

Senator Fulbright. Supposing it could be, that there was a way that it could be applied. Would you say it ought to?

Mr. Roberts. The pressure?
Senator Fulbright. No. Persuasion, we will say.

Mr. Roberts. You see, Senator, you run up all the time against the old bogey of sovereignty. Even little nations do not want other nations to pressure them to do something; do they, to persuade them to do something or pretend to be wiser than they, and tell them how to run the shop? If they are in a union where there is a common citizenship, and where a deliberative body acts for all, then views are expressed and entertained.

But when you have got this business of sovereignty, nations are very, very tender about other nations poking their noses into what they call their domestic affairs.

Senator Fulbright. You have seen evidences of some resistance, of representatives of certain areas in this country?

Mr. Roberts. They are the exception and not the rule.

Senator Fulbright. We have just had a very good demonstration of it.

Mr. Roberts. I know.

Senator Fulbright. Yet of much greater value than that particular aspect of it is our union, and we are perfectly willing to stay in the union, even though there is this attempt. So I believe that there is such a thing as being too concerned over this sovereignty that you speak of, under the circumstances that exist in Europe today.

They are bound to have to do some things we want them to do. I think under your own description in the military field, you just said, I believe, that you did not think this would be very effective if they, each one of them, had their own military establishment.

Mr. Roberts. No. And the difficulty we are going to face after this pact goes into effect is the difficulty of persuading sovereigns.

Senator Fulbright. Why do you say "persuading" here?

Mr. Roberts. Perhaps I am using merely a softer term. Maybe we are going to use pressure.

Senator Fulbright. Why will it not be as offensive in the military field if we say no?

Mr. Roberts. That is what worries me. That is why I say a pact is not a perfect instrument.

Senator Fulbright. You are quite prepared, though, to risk that in this field?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Fulbright. Because you are for the pact?

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Fulbright. I cannot understand why you draw a distinction between the military and the civil.

Mr. Roberts. If they want to make an economic pact with us, then we can work persuasion within the pact after we finish this pact. But this business of standing outside with the purse strings and saying "You had better do so and so, or else," I think if you are dealing with independent nations that is a very ticklish proposition.

Senator Fulbright. It is ticklish in both instances; I agree with that.

Mr. Roberts. Not nearly so much after you have come into a brotherhood, a pact.
Senator FULBRIGHT. You think the whole difference, then, between the two, is whether or not we are members?

Mr. ROBERTS. They have expressed a desire for voluntary cooperation in this pact, or the pact does not mean anything.

Senator LODGE. Will the Senator yield for a minute?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I will be through soon; but go ahead.

MILITARY OPERATION DURING THE WAR

Senator LODGE. It is on the point you are making. Is it not true that the nations of Europe have had, during the war, very extensive and intimate experience in working with us, in the military field, which is why they fall in so readily into the Military Establishment?

Mr. ROBERTS. I think it may very well be so. It is the most successful cooperation that there has ever been between allies in the military field. Do you not think so?

Senator LODGE. I think so. I think this is also true: When you are dealing in the military field you are dealing in a field where there is obedience to orders and not merely so much talk and debate in the very nature of the thing.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Of course, that is in a traditional field, I grant you, where people are much more accustomed to doing things than in the other fields; but that is to win a war. I thought we were talking about preventing a war; but I believe the political affiliations of this country were even more effective in prevention than a pact which is, as you think, of an emergency, which means a sort of temporary nature and that to really get something constructive out of it has to involve closer ties than the pact.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think you have to go farther, probably.

EUROPEAN UNION AND ATLANTIC UNION

Senator FULBRIGHT. The difference, then, between the two is that you think the political association of European countries would not add anything substantial.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do. I think it would not add anything substantial.

It might be a step.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Therefore, unless you can get in a broader union, you are not interested in pursuing the European?

Mr. ROBERTS. I am not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think the difference, then, is whether or not there is a practical possibility of achieving either one. I have not seen the signs to encourage me, in fact either way I see very few, particularly in this country. I think there is much less concern in this country with any kind of a union, either European or Atlantic union, than there is in Europe today.

Those evidences that I mentioned were the adoption of the statute, as weak as it may be, but at least it concerned itself with other than military and economic. It gets into the basic. It seems to me the basic relationship is political.

Mr. ROBERTS. That is right. There is no doubt of that, sir.
Senator DoNNELL. I would like to call your attention to what I am inclined to think is a slight error of fact which I know you would want corrected if it is. I understood you to say that the 12 statements—I do not think you said 12, but it is 12 that you brought—were derived from persons who, with the exception possibly of Dr. Compton, are not on the council?

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not think I said that. I said not all the people whose statements I had were on the council.

Senator DoNNELL. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I want the record to show that 7 of the 12 whose statements you have given us are on the council, and if Mr. Harry R. Bullis and Harry A. Bullis are the same person, 8 of the 12 are on the council.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think they are.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lodge?

Senator Lodge. No further questions.

Senator WATKINS. I almost feel like apologizing to start a series of questions after being on the stand as long as you have been.

Mr. ROBERTS. I am holding up pretty well.

Senator WATKINS. I think you are holding up very well, indeed. I want to say at the outset that I agree with that last statement you made just before we started to question you about the rule of law.

I think it was very well said, and I agree with that objective. I do not think I can come within any of the classes that you have described, and I have not yet made up my mind on this particular pact.

But I have committed myself to get as much information as we possibly can to get before the people, because if it is not sustained by the people it will be meaningless.

CONSTANCY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

I was particularly interested in your statements about what would have happened had we had a pact like this at the beginning of the First World War, and then at the beginning of the Second World War, your judgment as to what should have been done.

Is it not a fact that American public sentiment is rather fickle, that it changes rapidly? I remember in the First World War, after we got into it, there was a period of time when I think maybe 100 percent of the people thought we ought to join the League of Nations.

I want to review this in a way so I can get to the question I want to ask you about. Then, after the campaign that President Wilson put on, and those in opposition put on, finally the sentiment went the other way. It seemed to swing away from it.

Then we went so far as to pass the Neutrality Act, which apparently was sustained by public sentiment. Then we finally got into the war, and now we have this apparent feeling at the moment that we ought to join this pact.

It seems to me that what we say when we speculate on what would have happened is that we are not taking into consideration all the elements of public psychology, Mr. Justice, that what you have said is very speculative, and probably it would have been impossible at the time of the First World War to have entered into any kind of a
pact with European nations, in view of the state of the public mind in the United States. Is not that true?

Mr. Roberts. Yes. I think so. The Wilson campaign was pitched on the fact that he kept us out of war.

Senator Watkins. He did not want to get into a fight over there, or do anything about it.

Mr. Roberts. I think we have gone a long way since then.

Senator Watkins. We may have, but we seem to swing around.

Mr. Roberts. I do not think that has been a swing-around. I think it has been a long, bloody, and terrible education. It has taken two world wars to educate us to realize that the free way of life, if it is to persist in this world, depends very largely on our motivation and our initiative. That I believe from the bottom of my heart.

Senator Watkins. I can believe that is a sincere point of view and has considerable merit to it. Just to call your attention to what took place immediately after the First World War about pacts, the League of Nations, in the nature of the pact, went in this direction. I remember very well that former President Taft came to my State to show you what was taking place in the country. They held a mammoth meeting in the Mormon Tabernacle and took a vote. There were some ten or twelve thousand people. And there was not a single person voted against entering the League of Nations.

A little later President Wilson was there, and with substantially the same result. Within a few months, if not within a few weeks, some of those who were opposed to the proposal came and presented their speech, and at the beginning of that speech, one or two instances, one I remember, Senator Hiram Johnson was almost hooted out of the place to begin with.

He stood there, stood his ground, went on with his talk, and before he got through he had at least half of the people with him on that very thing. I do not know whether my people are more fickle than others or not. But apparently the sentiment of the country changed.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

In getting to this point that you have made, which has been made so many times, I am wondering how much virtue there is in that argument, that if we had had such an agreement back there, these men would not have attacked. To get down to the Second World War, I have had a sort of feeling that these fanatics feel that they have been hemmed in, as Hitler said he felt, and kept telling the German people, and irrespective of the strength against them, they became so egotistical—as the Russian people are, they have been told they won the war. Why should they hold back when they have practically all of Asia with them now, practically half the population?

I wonder if you have some specific thing in mind that you say will stop them, other than general opinion that it will? Can you help me on that? I am telling you that the trouble in my mind is that it is difficult to give much weight to that. Maybe I am not properly considering it, and maybe you can throw some light on it.

Mr. Roberts. You take these Atlantic democracies that are represented in this pact. They certainly have a very large percentage of the know-how, of the physical and spiritual resources of the entire world,
I cannot help thinking that if they are together they represent a far greater deterrent to aggression than if they are apart.

It has been the technique, both of the Kaiser and of Hitler, to deal with the democracies one at a time. Look at what the Soviet has done to the free nations of Europe. It sniped off the Baltics, it sniped off Poland, it sniped off Czechoslovakia, it sniped off Hungary, it sniped off the Balkan countries. And for one reason or other the democracies were not united about what they should do about it, and they have done it with impunity.

Hitler had the same technique. If an aggressor in this world, Senator, can keep the freemen, the nations of freemen apart, and deal with them piecemeal, he has a tremendous advantage.

Senator Watkins. I will come back to that.

Mr. Roberts. If we put it together, we have the potential, we have the know-how, we have the vital spiritual quality that is indomitable. But it cannot be indomitable if it is in the water-tight compartments that can be dealt with one at a time.

Senator Watkins. I think we have the know-how. I think we have the basic philosophy of the dignity of man under the Christian ideals. I am a firm believer in that and absolutely against the idea of a man being the tool of the state. I think we have made greater progress, we have greater power, than any combination that the Russians may get together.

**RUSSIAN RESPECT FOR TREATY**

But what I am trying to get at is this fact: Do they know that? Do their people know it, do their rulers know that, and by reason of the fact that we get together, are they going to be deterred if they do not know it, and if they do not concede it? That is what worries me.

Mr. Roberts. So far as the foreign relations are concerned, “they” constitute perhaps 15 men. That is all. They are the ones who have all the opinion and all the power.

Senator Watkins. They cannot go very far unless they have their people with them in the end.

Mr. Roberts. Why not? What they do is to whip up a campaign of patriotism for dear old Russia and turn these poor fellows in by the thousands.

Senator Watkins. Does it make any difference to them, their men who have no regard for human life? I think as General Eisenhower pointed out in his conversation he had with Russian leaders when he asked them how they removed the mines, they said they just moved in the troops, marched them over them, and blew them up. “It does not make any difference about the losses. We would not have any more than if we had made an attack.”

The men who have no regard for life do not seem to be deterred from that sort of thing, do they? In other words, they are deceived by their own propaganda. Sometimes the Republicans get deceived that way. We are deceived by our idea that we are going to win and do not win.

Mr. Roberts. No; I think they are very astute and very acute judges of the probabilities and all the considerations, and that would prompt aggression.
Senator Watkins. Now of course, this is a matter for argument. I am presenting that point of view, and I want to get your reaction to it. I may be entirely wrong on that. I have been wrong a good many times in my life.

Mr. Roberts. We are together on that.

Senator Watkins. Well, I think we have much better people; we have got a better idea; we have got more to fight for. Of course, it is a matter in the difference of the objective and how we are going to deal with it.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

Now we come to these nations you mentioned that the Russians have taken off one after another just like Hitler did. Suppose the Atlantic Pact had been in existence when Czechoslovakia was in the path of the Russians. How would we have stopped Czechoslovakia from setting up the type and form of government that she did? How could we have intervened if we had this pact, which, as I understand it, is against armed attack?

Mr. Roberts. Is what?

Senator Watkins. It is against armed attack only. It does not go any further than armed attack. Now, I think it will be generally conceded there was no armed attack by Russia on Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Roberts. I do not know that we could have reached it. I do not know that this pact would reach the complete denegation of French civilization by Communist infiltration.

Senator Watkins. I would like to point out to you, and probably you will agree with me on this; so far as I can see, looking over the record, I cannot find any nation that Russia has actually taken over by armed attack.

Could you name one that she has taken over by an external armed attack?

Mr. Roberts. In and since the last war, no.

Senator Watkins. During the last war, of course, she took over some by our agreement. Of course we cannot kick about that. She got part of Poland; she got the three Baltic states; and in effect she got most of the Baltic states, or at least her special sphere of influence, by reason of an agreement made at Yalta.

Mr. Roberts. Yes.

Senator Watkins. We cannot complain about that. I have been examining this record to see how we could use this pact, if we had it, as a practical matter to stop the kind of a campaign that she wages, and up to date the only kind she has waged.

Mr. Roberts. Senator, I have a very strong feeling that this pact would bolster the democratic governments in a number of these countries and almost put communism out of business there.

Senator Watkins. Now there is that possibility.

Mr. Roberts. I think it is a very strong probability.

Senator Watkins. But you said in your statement a moment ago, and I did not think you meant it, that Russia, just like Hitler, had picked off the Baltic states and Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Roberts. Yes, she did, just like Hitler did. She picked them off one at a time, not by war, but picked them off because we were not prepared to say "No."
Senator Watkins. Do you want this treaty amended so that it will take care of the infiltration as well as the armed attack? Now remember, this only goes to armed attack. We have an agreement that only covers certain things.

Mr. Roberts. I know.

Senator Watkins. I voted for ERP. I voted for the Greek-Turkish loan. I voted twice for ERP. I feel we ought to help these people. There are certain things that bother me tremendously. I am going to come to one of those in a moment.

How on earth will this pact, maybe you can find a way, that is what I would like to get light of: How can this pact stop the kind of an attack and the kind of war that Russia is waging?

Mr. Roberts. Senator, I can only repeat what I said to your colleague, I cannot see how the economy of our friends in Europe is going to be rebuilt if they have got this constant threat that in a few days they could be over-run if Russia thought fit to over-run them. There is no way to stop them. They are without hope, I think.

FEAR OF WAR

Senator Watkins. I call your attention to the fact that I think there has not been one single witness that has appeared here yet that says there is any imminent danger of war with Russia. They do not believe Russia is planning any armed attack. There may have been. I think I have heard them all, and I have not heard a one—the Secretary of State, the general of the Army, and all the men down the line have all agreed that they do not think Russia is planning an armed attack.

Mr. Roberts. You think, then, that the French all feel perfectly comfortable and happy and they do not fear Russia?

Senator Watkins. Oh, no; we fear her over here.

Mr. Roberts. I disagree with you completely.

Senator Watkins. No; I will agree with you that they fear Russia. We fear her over here. We are 3,000 miles away. We appropriate five or six times the money that anyone else—

Mr. Roberts. I would like to remove that fear if I could.

Senator Watkins. I wonder if this will do it?

Mr. Roberts. They seem to think so. The French want it; they are anxious for it. Why do they want it?

Senator Watkins. Maybe the next agreement, then, will be the logical step; that you think it is necessary that we have to take them in and make them a part of our country, not only for the purpose of—

Mr. Roberts. Make them a part of the federation; not a part of the country.

Senator Watkins. I mean in the same government. Probably I have pursued that far enough.

Mr. Roberts. I think that would give them even greater assurance, of course.

Senator Watkins. I do not see, unless you wish to add to that, that you can give, or anyone else up to date has given, any way to stop this infiltration thing by reason of this pact because we are already doing the economic thing under ERP in our Greek-Turkey—
The CHAIRMAN. The witness has already said that he did not think the treaty reached that.

Senator Watkins. I just wanted it cleared up.

The CHAIRMAN. He said it. I do not see how he could make it any clearer.

OPERATION OF ATLANTIC UNION

Senator Watkins. I have not asked him. I was just merely making a statement at that moment. Now, we come to this idea of yours that this first step in the pact is necessary in order to get this Atlantic union we are speaking of.

Have you projected into the future at all to see how a union of that kind would work among the States that are now in this list of those that have signed this pact?

Mr. Roberts. I think it would work very well with most of them.

Senator Watkins. Suppose, for instance, over here we have a strong attachment to the private-enterprise system. Great Britain is now in the throes of nationalizing—going into socialism, and France, I understand, is more or less in that direction, and there is a definite trend over there for the socialistic idea.

Mr. Roberts. I think there is.

Senator Watkins. There are more people over in Europe that would be in this union than we have in the United States. What as a practical matter would we do about that? Would we preserve the private-enterprise system or would we put it to a vote and go to socialism?

Mr. Roberts. They have nothing to do with our economy.

Senator Watkins. But they are socialistic, you see.

Mr. Roberts. The Constitution of the United States guarantees the republican form of government. Suppose California by a vote of its elected legislature adopted certain forms of State socialism. Would you exclude her from the Union of the United States as long as she sent her representatives by election to Congress? Certainly not. She would have whatever government she had by virtue of her suffrage of her electorates. They would choose their form of government. As long as they have a republican form of government, which means representative form of government, that is all the Constitution guarantees.

Senator Watkins. And the constitution that you would project into the future would be the one that would let them preserve whatever they had?

Mr. Roberts. Certainly they could make their own internal economy, whatever they wanted.

Senator Watkins. Notwithstanding it might be the cause for some irritation as between this part of the Federal Union and, for instance, Great Britain?

Mr. Roberts. I do not see why it should cause any irritation.

SOCIALISM AND FREE ENTERPRISE UNDER ATLANTIC UNION

Senator Watkins. We do have them, do we not, in the matter of trade and competition and all that sort of thing?

Mr. Roberts. I suppose that if California had a State socialistic system, her oranges and her lemons would still be shipped into other States, sold there, and paid for.
Senator Watkins. I assume that. But when it comes to putting up the money from private enterprise, I mean paying the taxes to run a national federation, or I mean a federation of that kind—

Mr. Roberts. A national federation would collect its taxes from the citizens of California just as it does now, whether California had a Socialist system or what it had.

Senator Watkins. How would the people of this country feel when they had to compete against solid blocks of people over there maintained by part of their taxes as competitors in their individual businesses over here? In other words, in Great Britain the steel industry would all be in one block partly paid out of taxes and protected by taxes paid by private enterprise over here in this country.

Do you think that would be fairer than anything that could possibly work under that condition?

Mr. Roberts. I think it would be entirely possible to work it out.

Senator Watkins. I want to get your point of view. I am not going to pursue it any further. We have been a long time, and I would like to come to a statement made by Mr. Dulles with respect to the meaning of this pact.

The Chairman. Do you expect to interrogate the witness here and have him to construe what Mr. Dulles said or criticize what Mr. Dulles said?

Senator Watkins. No, I do not intend to do that. I merely intend to refer to that to point up the problem that has been here more or less before us all the time, and that is as to the meaning of this pact.

Senator Donnell has asked some questions about it, but I want to call his attention to what I think is a very clear-cut statement of the purpose of the pact and what it actually means. I am quoting now from Mr. Dulles' statement made the other day.

The Chairman. Senator Watkins, I do not want to be abrupt, but I hope you can indicate about how long it is going to take you. We have had a witness here all day. He has stood aside for others. He has to leave town, and he is a very important witness. We hope to hear him this afternoon.

Senator Watkins. I do not think, Senator, I will be very much longer. This is the only one thing which I want to ask about.

The Chairman. Very well.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK

Senator Watkins. Mr. Dulles in his very able statement on the pact, and I felt a very frank one, pointed out that the value in deterring war over there came because in this treaty, in this pact, we made it certain, and he emphasized the word “certain,” that if any attack came on any one of the members that there would be a certain overwhelming force to meet it from all members of the pact.

He said, I recall, later on in his testimony, that we might just as well decide now and debate it now what we would do and what we certainly would do rather than to wait, because there would not be any time later on.

I think probably everybody would agree with that; that is, there would not be any time later on because of the blitzkrieg type of war that is engaged in.
As I gathered from his statement—I did not have the time at the moment while he was here to cross-examine him on it to be certain about it—but it seems from his language he indicates very clearly that he took the position that an attack on Norway—I do not just mean an incident, but I mean a major attack—

The CHAIRMAN. Five hundred thousand troops?

Senator Watkins. I do not care whether it is 500,000; 200,000; or any other number, but any force that indicated, at least to Norway, that it was an all-out attack that she ought to repel and that she would repel; and she would call on us through her ministers and representatives to invoke the pact, get our help.

His point was, as he said it:

It means, I take it, that an armed attack upon Denmark—

let's put the word Norway, for example—

is hereafter to be treated by the United States as an attack upon it—

meaning the United States.

In other words, as I get it from his statement, he was clear-cut of the opinion that we would have to react just the same as if it were a major attack that had been made upon us. I think he finally said, in answer to Senator Donnell's question, that, under those circumstances, the President could go ahead, even if Congress were not in session, and start the fighting back and send our forces to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness has already gone into that and told his own views about it at some length right on that same point. Now, if we are just going to rehash every point in this whole discussion by every member of the committee, we would be here until Christmas, I am afraid.

Senator Watkins. You will never be here until Christmas by any holding up on my account. I assure you that.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead. Ask your questions.

Senator Watkins. I have used less time than anybody up to date. Do you agree that that is the way we would have to treat it, as if it were an attack on our own country and that the President, under those circumstances—

Mr. Roberts. I stated, in answer to a number of questions by Senator Donnell, what my view was on that; and I do not think I care to add anything.

Senator Watkins. Well, if you do not care, of course, to add anything to it; but I wanted to make it clear that if you take the position that Congress has no other choice left but to declare war if we live up to this agreement when that happens, that is what I want to know.

Mr. Roberts. I have not said anything of the kind.

Senator Watkins. Is that your view; or do you feel that Congress still is free to act under those circumstances?

Mr. Roberts. Congress, in my judgment, is free to adopt the measures that it thinks are essential to carry out its obligation under the pact, to treat itself as if it had been attacked when some one of its allies has been attacked.

Senator Watkins. Is it your view that Congress is free to decide not to do anything, has the right to decide not to do anything?

Mr. Roberts. Yes, Congress can violate a treaty. Nations have violated faith over and over again, but it cannot do it with any moral—
Senator Watkins. I mean still keep within the treaty. I am not asking about the violation of the treaty. Mr. Justice. I am asking about can it, in your view, refuse to do anything and still live within this treaty? That is the whole point that--

Mr. Roberts. No, it cannot, no. No, in my judgment, no.

Senator Watkins. In other words, it is bound to act?

Mr. Roberts. If it determines there has been aggression, it is said:

We will take what we think are the proper measures to repel that aggression even to the extent of armed resistance.

Senator Watkins. And will take the same steps we would have as if we had been attacked ourselves?

Mr. Roberts. Not necessarily. That is not what it says.

Senator Watkins. That would be the reasonable interpretation, would it not?

Mr. Roberts. No, it would not, because I think in domestic attack—I have explained all this at great length in my views to Senator Donnell—I think a domestic attack calls on the President to repel the enemy from our borders immediately. He does not have to wait for Congress or anybody else.

Senator Watkins. I was not clear whether you meant that an attack on Norway would not be the same as a domestic attack.

Mr. Roberts. I did not say it would be the same as a domestic attack on our own borders.

Senator Watkins. You would not agree, then, with the statement made by Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Roberts. I do not know what Mr. Dulles said, and your question really confused me. It was such a long statement I could not follow it.

Senator Watkins. I merely read what he said.

Mr. Roberts. I have stated my own view.

Senator Watkins. Apparently it is not in agreement. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Justice, we are very greatly obliged to you for your outstanding statements and your clear views, and the distinctions which you make to these various questions and aspects.

Mr. Roberts. I feel it my duty as a good citizen to come and give you whatever little I can.

The Chairman. We think you are doing a great work in the field in which you are now active, as you did when you were in the Supreme Court.

Mr. Roberts. It is a privilege to be here.

The Chairman. Mr. Kline, we will now hear you, sir.

STATEMENT OF ALLAN B. KLINE, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, ACCOMPANYING W. E. OGG, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

Mr. Kline. I am Allan B. Kline, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation. I am happy to be here to present to you the views of our organization on the Atlantic Treaty for this committee.
The American Farm Bureau urges the approval of the pact. The members of the American Farm Bureau Federation, like the rest of America, want international peace and security. We do not like war. We want to live at peace with all the world. We want a peaceful and stable world in which men and nations can be free from fear and aggression. We want to assure that the basic human freedoms which we hold dear will be preserved.

Twice in our generation, America has fought in world wars to preserve these basic freedoms and to check totalitarian aggression aimed at world domination. Again, the peace and security of the world are threatened with totalitarian aggression. Already this ominous pattern of aggression has engulfed eastern Europe and much of the Far East.

Experience has shown that security from such aggression cannot be obtained through appeasement of totalitarian dictators. Therefore, totalitarian aggressors have followed the familiar pattern of divide and conquer, picking off their victims one at a time, while lulling the others to a false security by nonaggression treaties or promises which later proved worthless. Each concession made to such dictators serves only to strengthen and encourage them to make further demands or seize further territory or power.

The American Farm Bureau Federation believes that America and the other peace-loving nations of the world must be strong enough to protect themselves against aggression and to preserve the peace. Peace-loving nations should unite their strength to protect each other and to safeguard their freedom.

RESOLUTION OF AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

I wish to quote the following excerpt from the resolution adopted at the annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation held last December:

Pending the time when the United Nations can become more effective, the United States should assist peace-loving nations to strengthen their leadership and resources to provide mutual security. We favor regional arrangements such as the Inter-American Pact, the Western Union agreement, and the proposed North Atlantic Pact, so long as they are in accord with United Nations principles.

We favor continued support and strengthening of the United Nations. It must be recognized, however, that the United Nations has not been able thus far fully to achieve its objectives of maintaining international peace and security. Hence, the need for a regional pact.

SECURITY FROM AGGRESSION

Security from aggression is basic to the success of the European recovery program. We have invested huge sums to aid European recovery. Great progress has been made in spite of enormous difficulties. The very announcement of this program gave new hope and courage to the free people of Europe. The new spirit of unity in western Europe must be encouraged. It is now realized that these nations must also attain security from aggression, if they are to attain fully the goals of economic recovery and well-being contemplated.
under the European recovery program. Businessmen and financiers are reluctant to invest huge sums in plants, equipment, and other productive enterprises, so long as they are fearful that their countries and their properties and investments might be seized by Communist aggression from without or within.

These countries realize their own relatively defenseless position at this time and their inability, individually and unaided, to defend themselves successfully. But some 200,000,000 peoples in these countries, with their large industrial resources and technical know-how, when joined with the power and aid of the United States, constitute a formidable barrier to any nation which might contemplate aggression.

The North Atlantic Pact, therefore, is a powerful instrument for international peace and security. I believe that the chances of maintaining peace and preventing another world war will be greatly improved if this pact is ratified and implemented with the necessary military assistance.

Agreement by the nations signatory to the pact is a monumental achievement. This unity of purpose to present a united front against aggression, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and to adhere to the principles of the United Nations is of great significance.

**SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID**

Like the European recovery program, the North Atlantic Pact is built around the principles of maximum self-help and mutual assistance. In article 3, the signatory nations agree separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

This pooling of resources in planning and mutual assistance will make these efforts far more successful than any individual efforts of the various countries concerned. Had these countries had such a pact, implemented by effective mutual military coordination and assistance, World War II might have been averted.

The signatory parties agree that an armed attack against any one of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and that they will assist any signatory nation that is the subject of an armed attack. This is the heart of the North Atlantic Pact.

The very fact that this powerful group of nations agree to such a commitment will have great influence in restraining would-be aggressors and creating confidence among the peoples of these nations. We know this from our own experience in this hemisphere with our historic Monroe Doctrine. The North Atlantic Pact is patterned after the Inter-American Pact, which was signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and which, in turn, is an outgrowth of the Monroe Doctrine. The Inter-American Pact provides that an armed attack against one of the signatory parties is to be considered an attack against all, and the members are obligated to consult and extend aid to any member that is attacked or threatened with aggression.
The North Atlantic Pact is designed to supplement and strengthen the United Nations, instead of undermining or jeopardizing it. It fits into the pattern and purposes of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations, in article 51, specifically recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense by members of the United Nations.

The Charter also permits and contemplates the development of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The North Atlantic Pact makes it very clear that this regional arrangement must be conducted in accord with the United Nations Charter.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

The pact is clearly directed toward self-defense against aggression. As Ambassador Austi1 and others have pointed out, no nation need fear this pact unless that nation is itself plotting aggression against some member of the pact.

The peaceful character of the pact is further evident from its provisions wherein signatory parties agree to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the use or threat of force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area; to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”; to seek “to promote stability and well-being in the North American area”; to develop “peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being”; to “seek to eliminate conflict in their international policies” and to “encourage economic collaboration between any or all of the members of the North Atlantic community.”

These are not the purposes and declarations of warmongers but they represent the aspirations for peace, security, and economic well-being of the hundreds of millions of people in these nations.

THE MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

It is recognized that mutual aid in the form of military assistance will be required in order to make the Atlantic Pact fully effective. This assistance, like that furnished under the ECA program, should be based on the principle of maximum self-help and the coordination of programs. The relative need for economic and military assistance must be carefully appraised in the light of all relevant factors, and United States aid necessarily must take into consideration our own security requirements and our own resources.
We recognize that such additional assistance by the United States will impose an additional burden on our economy and will entail substantial sacrifices by the American people. It seems obvious, however, that these nations, by pooling their resources and by uniting their strength in common purpose and planning, can provide far greater security against aggression and at less cost than will be the case if each undertakes independently to provide adequate security for its own nation individually.

We believe that such expenditures should be regarded as investments for peace and security. The attainment of collective security is imperative, if all of the gigantic efforts and vast sums we have expended in the European recovery program are to be safeguarded and the gains under that program are to be maintained.

The purpose of the pact is to avoid a war, which would destroy all the gains so far made and more.

The nations signatory to this pact represent the culmination of western Christian civilization. The institutions and freedoms embodied in this civilization are gravely jeopardized. However, these same nations, given the means for unity of action behind the common purpose to maintain peace can be successful. This is the purpose of the North Atlantic Pact, embodying the combined will of hundreds of millions of people of good will who are determined to stand together to safeguard their freedom and security.

POSITION OF AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

The basis for our position in support of the pact is, first, the action of the voting delegates at the regular annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation last December. At that time we noted our belief that the regional pact approach to security was a sound one; and the proposed North Atlantic Pact we mentioned by name as one which in our opinion might well be followed, or might well be considered seriously as an approach in this regional pact field which would lead toward real international security.

It is fundamental in the thinking of our farmers that there is a close unity between the economics of security and the military aspects of security. We believe that the North Atlantic Pact as it has been approved by representatives of the European nations involved and the United States represents a continuation of the cooperative effort as between the United States and these various European countries for their mutual protection.

This North Atlantic Pact seems further to give a basis for a new confidence in and among the European nations, one which can lead to a dramatic furthe[rance of the sort of economic development in those countries which will not only support security in the military sense, but which also will further the kind of development which makes them strong in the economic sense and thereby contribute likewise to the economic aspects of security.

It is our opinion—it is, in fact, our desire as an organization—that the pact does make additional commitments on the part of the United States and that they are sincere and that they are significant. If it were not so, we would see no reason why any European country should feel any great benefit or enthusiasm for the proposition; nor would we think that citizens of the United States might feel that there was
here something which would really correlate and unite the tremendous resources—the human resources and physical resources and technical resources, of the countries covered by the pact—so that they might individually spend less of their energies in this matter of defense and more in the promotion of the sort of things which democratic countries are designed to further as the fortunes of the individual citizens involved.

Mr. Chairman, that is the basis for the thinking of our farmers on the proposition. That is all.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much. I want to ask you one question. I notice in your statement on page 4 you point out that the pact is clearly directed toward self-defense against aggression.

As Ambassador Austin and others have pointed out, no nation need fear this pact unless that nation is itself plotting aggression against some member of the pact.

That is true, is it not?

Mr. KLINE. That, we think, is a clear intent of the pact.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no aggressive action suggested anywhere in the pact, is there?

Mr. KLINE. We believe that this pact is a pact for defense. It is a pact to defend against the possibility of aggression. It is a bulwark against the probability or even the possibility of war. It is entirely designed to protect liberty. It has no aggressive aspects in it any place. Its purposes are clearly stated in the pact. Its purposes are further supported by the traditional attitudes of the countries which are signatory to the pact.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there not a specific clause that “the peaceful character of the pact is further evidence of its provisions wherein signatory parties agree to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the use of further force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the unit nations, to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,” and other statements of that character?

Mr. KLINE. That is right, and it seems to me it is a perfectly clear statement and that it carries additional force because it is consistent with the traditions of the nations which are signatory to the pact.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins?

APPROVAL OF AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

Senator WATKINS. I notice you state this is made in behalf of the Farm Bureau Federation. When was the matter of the approval or disapproval of the pact put up to the federation by the officials?

Mr. KLINE. The specific approval of this pact has not come to our federation’s delegates, because actually the meeting was held in December. However, there is a quotation from the resolution passed at that time, which I read in my statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Was that resolution by the membership?
Mr. KLINE. Yes, sir. The American Farm Bureau Federation has one annual meeting each year. At that meeting all the member States have delegates. There are some 130 delegates to the annual meeting. This was approved by the delegates.

Senator Watkins. What date was that held?
Mr. KLINE. About the 14th of December 1948.

Senator Watkins. The reason I ask the question, I think I am still a member of the Utah Farm Bureau; I have been for many years. I think I am still in good standing. But I do not remember this question ever being submitted to that State farm bureau for approval; it may have been.

Mr. KLINE. The resolutions committee of the Farm Bureau Federation is drawn from many States. In this instance I am sure that President Schenck, of Utah, was on the resolutions committee.

However, the resolutions committee is always free to approve resolutions on the basis of their best judgment and always take into consideration the various resolutions of all the States, the States again taking into consideration the resolutions of counties.

But it would be ridiculous to assume that all the resolutions which appeared in the national resolutions appeared in the resolutions of each of the States, of course.

Secretary Watkins. What I wanted to know is just how far the members themselves have committed themselves on this points. I received many letters from our people at home. Some of them are Farm Bureau people, and they are violently against the pact. That is what suggested the question.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. His State was represented? Utah had a delegate?
Mr. KLINE. Oh, yes; all member States are represented.

The CHAIRMAN. And they had a vote on this resolution?
Mr. KLINE. Certainly.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman, may I ask some questions?

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon, Senator.

Senator Donnell. Is that agreeable?

The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Kline, you say the meeting was held about December 14, 1948?

Mr. KLINE. It was the second week in December. December 16 was the date of the official passage of the resolution.

Timing of the Treaty and the Resolution of the American Farm Bureau Federation

Senator Donnell. Of course, you are aware of the fact, as stated in the letter from the Secretary of State to the President, dated April 7, 1949, that negotiation of the treaty was begun in December and finished on March 15. There had been some preliminary conversations and agreement reached on the general nature of the treaty, but that actual negotiation of the treaty was begun in December and finished on March 15, 1949. You know that, do you not, Mr. Kline?

Mr. KLINE. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. So that at the time the resolution by your body was passed on December 14, the actual negotiation of the treaty had
not been under way very long, and certainly the treaty had not then been completed, had it?

Mr. Kline. That is quite true.

Senator Donnell. I think we have had testimony here to the effect that there was a very material change in the treaty after Secretary Acheson went in as Secretary of State, January 21, 1949. Had you seen any draft of the treaty or had anyone in your organization, so far as you know, seen any preliminary draft of the treaty at the time this resolution was passed, December 14, or thereabouts, 1948?

Mr. Kline. We did not at that time study the details of any draft of any treaty. We did, however, discuss the general principles of collective security; and we have, I think, as you know, a department of international affairs which closely follows the interests, as we see them, of our members in the international field.

We have followed closely the procedures with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty; and it does seem to us that, as it is stated in the more or less general terms essential in so brief a statement on so broad a matter, that the treaty is consistent with the principles which we had in mind at the time the resolution was adopted.

Senator Donnell. At any rate, when the resolution was passed, you had never seen the draft of the treaty?

Mr. Kline. That is right.

Senator Donnell. And you know it has been quite considerably changed, even from what it was January 20, 1949?

Mr. Kline. I think it is quite inconsequential in our present position what it may have been at various stages or in the minds of various people.

Familiarity with Text of Treaty

Senator Donnell. Have you read the treaty yourself?

Mr. Kline. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. When did you last read it?

Mr. Kline. About 30 minutes ago.

Senator Donnell. When did you first read it?

Mr. Kline. This kind of thing we let our Department study. I would not be ready to say. Further, I do not exactly remember.

Senator Donnell. Had you ever read it before 30 minutes ago?

Mr. Kline. Yes.

Senator Donnell. About how long ago had you read it?

Mr. Kline. I am just not prepared to answer.

Senator Donnell. Had you read it within the last week?

The Chairman. He said he could not answer.

Senator Donnell. Surely he can tell whether he read it in the last week. I am not asking this critically. I think we are entitled to know.

The Chairman. You are not asking. You are making an argument.

Senator Donnell. I am not. I am asking him a question.

The Chairman. He has answered the question that he does not know when it was that he had read it before a half hour ago.

Senator Donnell. He may not know exactly when he read it. Do you know whether you read it within the last week?

Mr. Kline. Is it fair to ask the purpose of the question?
Senator DONNELL. It is to find out whether you read it within the last week.

Mr. KLINE. It does not seem to be pertinent to me to the attitude of the Farm Bureau on the treaty.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of the committee, but I respectfully submit that that is not an answer to the question; and, after all, the witness, if he is appearing here in behalf of this Farm Bureau Federation, ought to answer the questions.

The CHAIRMAN. He cannot answer if he says he does not know, and that is what he says.

Senator DONNELL. I would like to ask him one further question. Had you read this treaty within the last month?

Mr. KLINE. I think the answer to that is "Yes." If you mean, had I read it within the last month, I have already answered it.

Senator DONNELL. You read it 30 minutes ago. I want to know if you had ever read it before that, during the last month.

Mr. KLINE. Yes, I had read the treaty before, during the last month.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Very well. Now, Mr. Kline, you speak on page 2:

Hence the need for a regional pact.

Then again on page 4 you quote from the Charter:

* * * regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate * * *

which is quoted precisely from article 2 of chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter, headed "Regional Arrangements."

Then you say:

The North Atlantic Pact makes it very clear that this regional arrangement must be conducted in accord with the United Nations Charter.

What do you mean by this regional arrangement? Are you talking about the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. KLINE. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. You think it is a regional arrangement under this article 52 that you have quoted from here on page 4 of your statement?

Mr. KLINE. As a matter of fact, I am not a constitutional lawyer.

Senator DONNELL. I did not ask you that.

Mr. KLINE. I am not prepared to discuss technically the legal relationships between the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Kline, with all due respect—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. He had not finished.

Mr. KLINE. I am through.

Senator DONNELL. With all due respect and without the slightest criticism of you or the Federation, for which, as you know, I have great respect, you come in here before this committee and say, "The North Atlantic Pact makes it very clear that this regional arrangement must be conducted in accord with the United Nations Charter."

I am asking you, therefore, whether this regional arrangement to which you are referring, which you say is the North Atlantic Treaty,
is a regional arrangement under this article that you quoted immediately in advance of this sentence, namely, article 52 of the United Nations Charter?

Mr. Kline. Again I say that I am not a constitutional lawyer. If the committee will permit, I will ask Mr. Ogg if he is prepared to make a technical answer.

Mr. Ogg. Mr. Chairman and Senator Donnell, it is my opinion, for what it is worth, that this is a regional arrangement such as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. In fact, throughout this Atlantic Pact there are references to the Charter of the United Nations. The very first declaration in the preamble reads as follows:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

And in article 5 it specifically requires that any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Furthermore, article 5 specifically requires that such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

It seems to me that that is very clear that the parties intend to maintain the supremacy and jurisdiction of the Security Council in any matters involved in restoring and maintaining international peace; so that, in fact, when the Security Council is able and does act effectively, they must terminate any measures under this.

You have here some very distinguished Members, Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg, who helped draft the United Nations Charter. They are much better qualified to answer that question than I.

The Chairman. You made a very clear statement.

Senator Donnell. I thank you very much, Mr. Ogg. I am wondering if either you or Mr. Kline would answer this question. On page 4 of Mr. Kline's statement appears the language quoted right out of article 52 of the United Nations Charter, which is in chapter 8, which, in turn, is entitled "Regional Arrangements." Then immediately after that quotation, from article 52, is this sentence in Mr. Kline's statement:

The North Atlantic Pact makes it very clear that this regional arrangement must be conducted in accord with the United Nations Charter.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE CHARTER

I understand that that regional arrangement which the North Atlantic Pact makes it very clear that must be conducted in accord with the United Nations Charter is the North Atlantic Treaty. Is that right?

Mr. Ogg. That is my interpretation; yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Ogg, I have known you for some years. I want to ask, are you a lawyer?

Mr. Ogg. No, sir.

Senator Donnell. But you have studied the Charter and you have studied the treaty?

Mr. Ogg. I certainly have, very carefully.

Senator Donnell. Perhaps you assisted in the preparation of the statement? Am I correct in that?
Mr. Ogg. I assisted.

Senator Donnell. In fact, I should not be surprised if the statement is very largely your work. Is that correct? Is that correct, Mr. Kline?

Mr. Kline. We have a considerable staff; we divide up the work. It is quite true that Mr. Ogg did prepare most of this statement. It is in his field.

Mr. Ogg. May I just add this, Senator Donnell?

The Chairman. That does not disparage your agreement with the statement?

Senator Donnell. Not at all.

Mr. Kline. It makes no difference in the responsibility of the statement whatever.

Mr. Ogg. May I add this comment in the interests of clarification, Senator Donnell, with reference to your earlier question about the Farm Bureau’s position in December. You will note the excerpt from our annual meeting resolution which President Kline quoted in his statement is worded in a way in which it states that we favor regional arrangements such as the Atlantic Pact, the Inter-American Pact, and so forth. Of course, you could not endorse something specifically that had not been actually negotiated, but it had been certainly publicly discussed for some time. Several months earlier, the Senate of the United States, in passing the Vandenberg resolution—I think there were only four votes against it—specifically directed the Government of the United States to use every effort to negotiate such an arrangement as is now embodied in this treaty.

Senator Donnell. My question is not in the slightest critical. What I wanted to find out is this, and I am glad to find it: that you prepared a large part of the statement. May I ask you, if you will turn to page 4 of the mimeographed statement, the first paragraph, which is the one that quotes from article 52 chapter 8, under the heading of “Regional arrangements,” and then makes that statement:

The North Atlantic Pact makes it very clear that this regional arrangement must be conducted in accord with the United Nations Charter.

Did you prepare that paragraph, please?

Mr. Ogg. As a matter of fact, that particular statement was prepared by President Kline. That last statement.

Senator Donnell. Do you concur in it?

Mr. Ogg. I certainly do, 100 percent.

Senator Donnell. I am very much interested to note your concurrence in the view that this is a regional arrangement under this particular article 52, chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. I understand that is your view? Is that correct?

Mr. Ogg. I think it is such an arrangement.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Ogg, have you observed other statements to the effect, either official or unofficial, that this North Atlantic Treaty is a regional arrangement?

Mr. Ogg. Almost every statement I have seen explaining it or commenting on it, as I understand it, so regards it as one of the types of arrangements contemplated under the Charter.

Senator Donnell. In fact, it is called the North Atlantic Treaty, is it not?
Mr. Ogg. You only have to look at the map there on the wall to see that it is regional in character. Whether it is to be recognized as a regional arrangement under article 52 is a legal question for decision by the nations signatory to the pact and by the United Nations organization.

Senator DONNELL. Of course, there might be some question in the mind of some of us as to whether or not the United States of America and the Aleutian Islands are in the same region with the topmost part of Norway.

Mr. Ogg. Of course, it might be a little difficult to draw the line in some spots. You might have a difference of opinion as to just where it ought to be drawn, but it certainly is a very distinct region.

Senator DONNELL. And the treaty itself says:

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.

And that fortifies you in your opinion to some extent in the view that this is a regional arrangement: does it not?

Mr. Ogg. I think, as I said before, it very clearly is a regional arrangement.

Senator DONNELL. Now, Mr. Ogg, referring to this region, is Italy, in your opinion, on the Atlantic Ocean or anywhere close to it, particularly the North Atlantic?

Mr. Ogg. It is not very far away from the Atlantic Ocean. I have ridden across there from Italy to the Atlantic Ocean. It does not take very long. It would not take a military plane very long to fly over there.

Senator DONNELL. But it does not front on the Atlantic Ocean in any way; does it?

Mr. Ogg. And certainly it is a vital part of the community in Europe who are signatory to this pact, including France, which adjoins Italy.

Senator DONNELL. Do you recall that the original negotiations for this treaty did not include Italy at all? Did you know that?

Mr. Ogg. It started out with a smaller group.

Senator DONNELL. It started out with the Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. Ogg. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. And did not include Italy.

Mr. Ogg. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know why Italy was comprehended within a regional treaty called the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. Ogg. Well, I think that is a question the State Department could answer with much more authority than I; but, as I said before, it does seem to me that, first, the inclusion of Italy is a very vital part of the security of the European nations that are signatory to the pact; secondly, it does seem to me very evident that, since the purpose of this treaty is to present a united front of the democratic nations against the threat of totalitarian aggression or aggression of any type, the more strength you unite in this purpose, the more successful it will be.

I just express that as an opinion.
Senator DONNELL. I notice in this statement which Mr. Kline has presented that the use of this term "regional arrangement" involves precisely the same language as is contained in article 54, which is within chapter 8, Regional Arrangements, of the United Nations Charter, save only that it is "regional arrangement," whereas in article 54 of that chapter 8 it is plural, "regional arrangements."

Had you observed that?

Mr. Ogg. I had not observed it until you called my attention to it. One is singular and the other is plural. I do not know what significance you attach to it. Mr. Kline’s statements used both the singular and the plural forms, where appropriate to do so.

Senator DONNELL. There is no difference as far as I can see. In other words, the point I have in mind is: It is precisely the same language except that one is singular, and the one is plural that is used in the article 54 of chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter; is it not?

Mr. Ogg. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. And article 54 says:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Is that not so?

Mr. Ogg. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know the membership of the Security Council?

Mr. Ogg. I do not know that I could give you every country right offhand. The United States, of course, is a permanent member.

Senator DONNELL. If you would be kind enough to turn to article—

Mr. Ogg. I am familiar with that, but I do not believe I could give it to you from memory.

Senator DONNELL. I was just going to ask you if you would be kind enough to turn to article 23 of the Charter—do you have that before you?

Mr. Ogg. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL (reading):


There is provision in the next section for the nonpermanent members. So that we find, then, Mr. Ogg, as I see it, that you or Mr. Kline make it very clear with your concurrence that the North Atlantic Treaty is a regional arrangement under article 52, chapter 8, of the United Nations Charter entitled "Regional Arrangements"; that article 54 provides that the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements, or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that among the permanent members of the Security Council, which is required by article 54, of the United Nations Charter, to be so kept fully informed of activities, is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
That is correct; is it not?
Mr. Ogg. I believe it is a regional arrangement of the type contemplated by the United Nations Charter. Whether it is intended to be such an agreement is a matter for the signatory countries to determine; whether it is to be recognized legally as such is a question for the United Nations Organization to determine.

Senator Donnell. That is all, Mr. Ogg.

Mr. Kline. Mr. Chairman, would it be all right for me to summarize an attitude here and expression of attitude on the part of the American Farm Bureau Federation concisely?

The Chairman. If it does not provoke too much discussion,

Mr. Kline. I withdraw.

The Chairman. No; go ahead and make it.

Mr. Kline. I do not know about the discussion. I can guarantee nothing.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Kline. In the first place, the objective of the pact is collective security. To a group of farmers, it seems that there is a real significance in an article like article 3 in that it is designed to mean something further than what we already have.

It is based on confidence and trust. It is not based on a quibbling with regard to the exact meaning of the legal definition. It is, after all, an over-all approach to the problem of collective security based upon confidence and trust.

It is accepted with a certain enthusiasm in Europe. I have been to Europe 4 out of the last 5 years. For each of the 3 years prior to this year, I found a very considerable unrest, and one of its major features was the fear that, while the United States was now there, when the zero moment came, if it came, we might be gone.

It does seem to me that there is here the intention to create a confidence that these nations in the North Atlantic Pact would be with each other when the zero hour came.

COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

It is, then, based on the assumption that we can create the atmosphere in which the third world war does not come along. We have had two just in my lifetime. We sort of backed into them. A little at a time we were dragged into them. Now we say, "That approach did not work. Let us try now to get together all these magnificent resources, all these grand determinations in the minds of the men in the free nations and let us see if that will work."

That to me is the meaning of the Atlantic Pact. It is not a thing of quibbling about the exact definition. It is a matter of committing the United States of America to the purposes of collective security with, to be sure, that intention and determination understood, that you will act upon the basis of your best judgment as problems arise from time to time that require decisions.

But you have committed yourself to the proposition. That seems to me to be a very great and very significant thing in the proposal of the North Atlantic Pact.

That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. We thank you for your good statement.

We have one more witness, Mr. McKee.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK C. MCKEE, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. MCKEE. Gentlemen, I will make this very brief. You have my statement. I know you want to get away.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been here all day; you have been patient. We want to hear you. Tell the reporter your name and your business.

Mr. MCKEE. Frederick C. McKee, Pittsburgh businessman, national chairman of the Committee on National Affairs, with its headquarters in New York.

DEFERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

I believe that an Atlantic Pact would probably have prevented the First and Second World Wars and that the Atlantic Pact can probably prevent a third world war if its principles are applied throughout the world.

The Kaiser apparently never thought that the British would fight to defend Belgium and France. Had he imagined that both Britain and the United States would ultimately be involved, he would probably not have taken the risk of a war of conquest to satisfy his personal ambitions. After Britain and France had sacrificed the well-equipped army and air force of Czechoslovakia at Munich, Hitler apparently never thought that they would fight to defend Poland.

Mr. Winston Churchill is reported to have said that there were at least six times that Hitler could have been stopped short of a world war. We can see now where, over and over again, the failure of the democracies to take adequate cooperative action against aggression encouraged the Axis to think that they could get away with new seizures.

For lack of an Atlantic Pact, the democracies allowed Hitler to overrun one potential ally after another until at last the Axis, in control of most of Europe and China, felt strong enough to attack us.

COMPATIBILITY WITH UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Some critics of the Atlantic Pact have argued that it is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. I am national treasurer of the American Association for the United Nations, and I firmly believe that not only is the Atlantic Pact in keeping with the spirit of article 51 of the Charter, but that such defense pacts are essential until the United Nations can have its own international police force, superior in strength to that of any other nation.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Some have argued against the pact on the basis that we cannot afford the rearmament involved. Certainly a pact without rearmament is better than no pact at all. But the proposals for rearmament represent less than 3 percent of our total budget, less than five-eighths of 1 percent of our national income, and less than one-half of 1 percent of the cost of World War II.

Certainly this is a very small premium to pay for insurance to help protect what we have invested in Europe, what we have at home, and our very lives. The further away our front lines of defense, the fewer
Americans would die in a war of guided missiles and atomic bombs. We could not exist for long as a North American island of 175,000,000 people in a world dominated by 2,000,000,000 Communists and slaves.

If our potential allies were sufficiently armed to render improbable further Soviet aggression, the increase in confidence, international and domestic trade, and security values would probably produce increased tax revenue far in excess of the expenditure involved.

**PROVOCATIVENESS OF TREATY**

Some of the critics of the pact have argued by some strange logic that the Atlantic Pact would bring on a third world war. This same argument was used against Greek-Turkish aid and ECA. On the contrary, whenever we have stood firm without potential allies Soviet aggression has halted, and where we have procrastinated it has moved forward.

I believe that part of the fuzzy thinking about the pact arises from an illusion that we are living in a state of peace, whereas we are actually not even living in an armistice. To a considerable extent we are living in a state of war—a hot war in Greece and China and a cold war in other parts of the world. Whether this condition can be converted into a state of peace will depend largely on whether we and our allies are so united and armed that the ruthless realists in the Kremlin will not risk new attempts at conquest.

We have studied this problem. Our executive committee has sent to a number of prominent Americans and has received letters from 120 of them endorsing the pact; and that has been sent to each Member of the Senate and was reprinted in the Herald Tribune and other papers.

The question in dealing with these men too often has been deferred. There is the question, Shall we irritate him? The question was said about Hitler; give him each time what he wants. Each time he wanted just one more country.

We will not read what they said. Hitler wrote Mein Kampf; Stalin has made his statements; Mao Tse-Tung in China has made his statement. We will not take these men at their word that they have no other ambition than complete world domination and conquest.

On the other hand, they are realists, and we have seen that where there is a united effort they have stopped.

The statement is made about fanatics. Will they see the facts? That same thing might be argued against any insane person. We do not give way to them. We get together sufficient force that they can be restrained.

I think that we are at a very critical point. I think that the failure to ratify this pact will be as great a disaster as Munich.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to thank you. I have no questions.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. Just on one point alone. Your testimony is titled “Testimony of Frederick C. McKee, National Chairman, Com-
mittee on National Affairs." Are you appearing here for the Committee on National Affairs, Mr. McKee?

Mr. McKee. That is right.

Senator Donnell. You are the national chairman of that committee?

Mr. McKee. That is right.

MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Senator Donnell. How large a membership, and where is it located?

Mr. McKee. We have an executive committee of about 20, with headquarters in New York. We do not have a large membership as you would call in thousands throughout the country. It is made up of many of the people who are active in the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, in which I was the national treasurer. That committee had about 900 branches and sent millions of petitions to Congress. This committee is composed of leaders.

Senator Donnell. Wait a minute. You mean this executive committee?

Mr. McKee. Yes.

Senator Donnell. The committee of 20 in New York City?

Mr. McKee. Yes; that is right.

Senator Donnell. Is composed of what, you say?

Mr. McKee. That is composed of people who have been active in the Committee to Defend America and other committees of that type. We have not attempted to get membership running into the hundreds of thousands.

Senator Donnell. Mr. McKee, if it is agreeable to the chairman, would you be kind enough to file for the record here, to be incorporated in the transcript of these proceedings, a list of the members of the executive committee?

Mr. McKee. I will be glad to do that.

Senator Donnell. Do you know what the total membership of the entire organization is?

Mr. McKee. I cannot give you that exactly.

Senator Donnell. I do not want it exactly. Is it as many as a thousand.

Mr. McKee. It is less than a thousand.

Senator Donnell. Is it as many as 500?

Mr. McKee. I will not say that. I will have to check it.

Senator Donnell. Would you be kind enough to put that information in also, and please also state the geographical distribution by States? Would you do that, please?

Mr. McKee. I will give you a list of that.

(The list is as follows:)

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL AFFAIRS
OFFICERS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Frederick C. McKee, Oliver Building, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Richard J. Cronin, 40 Wall Street, New York City.
Westmore Wilcox, Jr., 68 William Street, New York City.
Arthur J. Goldsmith, 100 East Fiftieth Street, New York City.
Donald H. Alken, 102 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.
Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, 170 East Sixty-fourth Street, New York City.
Senator DONNELL. One final question, and that is this. Did your executive committee meet and authorize you to present this statement?

Mr. McKee. Yes; they did.

Senator DONNELL. When was that meeting held?

Mr. McKee. That meeting was held a week ago last Thursday.

Senator DONNELL. And was a copy of the Atlantic Pact exhibited to that committee at that time?

Mr. McKee. I happened to be in Chicago on business. The other officers were there; that is, the secretary and treasurer. The Atlantic Pact had been under discussion by us for some time, both before and after it was actually published. That is, working on the basis of the newspaper reports.
Senator DONNELL. I mean, though, was there actually a copy of the North Atlantic Treaty before the executive committee at its meeting in New York that it held recently?

Mr. McKee. I think they were all familiar with it. I am not able to say that because I stated I was unable to be at the meeting, being in Chicago on business.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know whether a copy of the North Atlantic Pact has ever been circulated to each member of the executive committee?

Mr. McKee. I think each of them has read it. We did not send an actual mailing to all of them, because they are all people who are interested and have kept themselves informed on that. So I cannot answer that question specifically.

Senator DONNELL. You do not know actually, personally, whether they have all read it or not?

Mr. McKee. I cannot say that as to each one.

Senator DONNELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to thank you, Mr. McKee, very much for your statement. It was very informative and very clear.

The committee will recess at this time.

(Thereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed until 10:30 a.m. Monday, May 9, 1949.)
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

MONDAY, MAY 9, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on May 6, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C., at 10:30 a.m., Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Tydings, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Vandenberg, and Hickenlooper.
Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations has the great pleasure and honor of having with us today former Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, of New York, a very able and outstanding citizen and one of the warriors in behalf of peace and the settlement of international relations by peaceful means.

Judge Patterson, we have representatives here of the League of Women Voters and the General Federation of Women's Clubs and the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace. You were really scheduled ahead of them, but I understand they have very short statements to make and I was wondering if your characteristic chivalry would not allow that we hear them first.

Mr. PATTERSON. It is quite agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The League of Women Voters; Mrs. Stone.

STATEMENT OF MRS. KATHRYN H. STONE, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mrs. Stone. The League of Women Voters supports United States ratification of the North Atlantic Pact. We believe that the pact is a necessary step at this time toward a more stable world.

We in the league have been concerned for many years with the difficult and painfully slow task of building an adequate system of collective security. We had hoped and expected that the next advance in such a system could be taken by the United Nations itself. Unfortunately the hoped-for cooperation between the major powers has not materialized and the United Nations has not yet been able to fulfill its security functions. There is today no collective force to check aggression; yet fear of aggression, particularly among the nations of western Europe, has become a pressing reality. Some immediate security measures are needed to fill the gap. Reluctantly the league has come to the conclusion that the North Atlantic Pact is necessary to help keep the peace until the United Nations is able to do so.
In supporting the pact, the league would like to stress two principles:

1. A universal system of collective security under the United Nations remains our goal. The pact should be used as a means toward that end, to give time in which a strong United Nations and a stable peace can be built. This goal should be kept constantly to the fore. We urge our Government to continue to work toward reaching agreement in the United Nations on UN forces, the regulation of armaments, and control of atomic energy.

2. While considering the pact a necessary holding measure, the League of Women Voters believes that the United States should build positively toward peace by vigorous action in the economic and social field—through such means as the European recovery program, the reciprocal trade agreements program, and United States membership in the International Trade Organization. These positive steps are as important in the long run as the security measures. In implementing the pact, its military arrangements should be subordinate as far as possible to the economic needs of Europe through ERP.

AUTHORITY FOR POSITION OF LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

The league's position on the pact has been reached only after thorough consideration by our membership. I think you gentlemen on the committee will be better able to weigh our statement if I explain briefly the process by which it developed.

Authority for the league position comes from the program adopted by the delegates at the national convention in March, 1948, at Grand Rapids. The program reads:

The League of Women Voters will work for United States policies directed toward an enduring world peace, supported by a strong United Nations and made possible by a sound domestic and world economy.

In adopting item IV—

Use of all means available under the Charter to increase the security functions of the United Nations—

the convention foresaw the possibility of league support of a measure such as the Atlantic Pact. The explanation of the program which is based on convention discussion reads:

Pending the implementation of the major provisions (security provisions of the UN Charter), other steps toward international security are possible under the Charter. Joint action for self-defense is permitted under article 51, in case the Security Council fails to act. There are further possibilities in the development of regional arrangements—economic, political and military. The league will follow closely the growing trend toward regional integration, as seen in the Pan-American system and the progress toward a European union. The league will weigh, with a view to supporting, action which the United States might take to strengthen collective security through such special arrangements within the framework of the United Nations.

The league will keep to the fore the principle that a universal security system under the United Nations is still the primary and urgent objective; regional arrangements, or collective agreements under article 51, should be subordinate to this objective and integrated into a universal system once it is established.

Since the convention league members have carefully followed the development of the pact. In their discussion groups throughout the
country, they have weighed the pros and cons, and have helped bring this important issue to the attention of others in their communities. The leagues have been unusually conscientious in keeping their national board abreast of their thinking as it evolved. During the week of April 25, our national council, consisting of two delegates from each State, met in Washington and brought to us the latest thinking of the membership.

I should like to add that we in the league are not enthusiastic about this step, but consider it as one which must be taken at this time. As one of our members has said, "We live in unsatisfactory times and must make unsatisfactory choices."

Beyond the immediate problem of ratification, the league will watch constantly, urging that the pact be carried out in accordance with the standards which we have outlined. We consider it the responsibility of all citizens to see that our Government works under the pact to build toward a world system of collective security within the United Nations.

The Chairman. I assume from your statement that your group feels that the membership of the League of Women Voters is heartily in favor of the ratification of the pact.

Mrs. Stone. We do feel that way, Senator Connally. We feel that it has been one of the longest and most thorough considerations we have ever given an important issue in the league. We began last November with a publication on the subject of regional pacts, and I would say we had about three full rounds of discussion.

ADVANCEMENT OF THE CAUSE OF PEACE

The Chairman. You construe it as an advance in the cause of peace, the cause of peaceful arrangements, do you not?

Mrs. Stone. Under the conditions, we do.

The Chairman. I do not know what your conditions are, but if there are conditions we have to face them, have we not?

Mrs. Stone. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg!

Senator Vandenberg. I think I have no questions except to observe that I am happy to hear that this action stems from a meeting at Grand Rapids, Mich.

The Chairman. Senator Green!

Senator Green. I have no questions to ask, but I do want to congratulate the League of Women Voters through Mrs. Stone on having made this presentation, because I know from sources of information elsewhere that they have given most prolonged and conscientious consideration to this question. A great many doubts had to be considered, and I think that their conclusion is all the more worth-while because of those facts.

The Chairman. No doubt you are correct, Senator Green.

Senator McMahon?

Senator McMahon. I, too, have no question, but I just want to make the comment that I am intrigued with this line in the second to the last paragraph. It says so succinctly what I am sure most of us think:

We live in unsatisfactory times, and must make unsatisfactory choices.
Mrs. Stone. I would like to say that that stems from one of your constituents.

The Chairman. We suspected that when the Senator commented.

Senator McMahon. We had better make it plain that this is not a conspiracy now.

Mrs. Stone. Quite. I have not talked with Senator McMahon in advance of coming here.

Senator McMahon. Regardless of where it comes from, I still think it says it pretty well.

The Chairman. All right. Senator Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate Mrs. Stone upon a very excellent statement. I know from personal experience how serious the League of Women Voters is, not only on this matter but on all matters of public importance, and I agree with their conclusions thoroughly.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Senator Watkins?

THE TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Watkins. As I understand, you are not enthusiastic about this step, because you would much rather have had the situation taken care of by the United Nations directly.

Mrs. Stone. That is right.

Senator Watkins. And you feel that this is more or less of a substitute for the time being, until the Security Council of the United Nations can operate satisfactorily?

Mrs. Stone. We feel that it is an essential holding measure.

Senator Watkins. Would I be stating it too strongly by saying that this is a substitute for the United Nations?

Mrs. Stone. No; it is not.

Senator Watkins. What would you call it, if the United Nations is not functioning and you have this as a holding measure? Isn't it something else being called in to take the place of the United Nations temporarily, at least?

Mrs. Stone. I believe that our Nation can carry out the provisions of the pact within the spirit as well as the letter of the United Nations, and it will ultimately be integrated into the United Nations system completely.

Senator Watkins. The trouble with the United Nations is—

The Chairman. Ask a question, please; do not make a speech.

Senator Watkins. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that I cannot always ask the question in the form that the gentleman might think is a question.

The Chairman. All right; go ahead.

Senator Watkins. I decline to ask any more questions, in view of the chairman's attitude. I decline because this is not the first time I have been chided by the chairman when I think I have been conducting myself properly.

The Chairman. I am not complaining of the Senator when he asks a question to find out the witness' attitude, but the Senator spends a great deal of his time explaining his attitude. We have a great host
of witnesses here. We have been working hard. I have no feeling against the Senator. We invited him here; we are consenting for him to be here. Why he should complain I cannot understand.

Senator Donnell, do you care to interrogate the witness?

Senator DONNELL. I just got here, having been in another meeting, so I don't care to ask any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Thank you, Mrs. Stone.

The General Federation of Women's Clubs, Mrs. Frederic Beggs, committee on international relations.

STATEMENT OF MRS. FREDERIC BEGGS, CONSULTANT TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, GENERAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS

Mrs. Beggs. I am the consultant to the department of international relations, presenting the statement of the General Federation of Women's Clubs in support of United States ratification of the North Atlantic Pact.

RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS

The General Federation of Women's Clubs is an organization with an affiliated membership in the United States of approximately 5,000,000 and a voting membership of 1,300,000. On October 15, 1948, the board of directors of the General Federation of Women's Clubs had the foresight at its regular fall meeting to adopt the following resolution:

Resolved, That the General Federation of Women’s Clubs supports necessary legislation to implement the plans for self-defense of those members of the United Nations with whom the United States may join, in the interests of its own security, provided that such action is consistent with and supplementary to the continuation of the Economic Cooperation Administration program (European recovery).

The board of directors, numbering about 200, consists of the officers of the general federation, the chairmen and members of all departments and committees, and the presidents of each State federation and those of Alaska and the District of Columbia. The action of the board was subsequently reported to all federated clubs and copies of the resolution were sent for their consideration and support.

As soon as the terms of the North Atlantic Pact were available, they were reported and analyzed by our chairman of international relations in the bulletin of the department which is issued monthly.

As the result, therefore, of careful consideration over a period of 6 months, and following through on the policy established by the board, the following resolution was unanimously adopted by the General Federation of Women’s Clubs at its recent convention held at Hollywood Beach, Fla., and time was requested to present our statement to the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate.

Although copies of this resolution are in your hands, I beg to quote it in full:

Whereas the board of directors of the General Federation of Women's Clubs at its October 15, 1948, meeting, recorded its support of necessary legislation to implement the plans for self-defense of those members of the United Nations
with whom the United States may join in the interests of collective security; and

Whereas, since this date the signature of the United States has been affixed to the North Atlantic Pact, which now awaits Senate action; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the General Federation of Women's Clubs in convention assembled, April 1949, urges prompt ratification by the United States Senate of this treaty; and be it further

Resolved, That after ratification adequate means for implementation of the North Atlantic Pact be provided by the Congress of the United States; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent to the proper authorities.

I should like to point out that the delegate body to our convention was comprised of more than 1,000 registered delegates from all over the United States, and it is significant that this resolution was the only resolution considered by the convention which met with no opposition from the floor. It was adopted unanimously.

REASONS FOR SUPPORT OF ATLANTIC PACT

The reasons for this unanimous action may be found in the following points:

1. We consider the North Atlantic Pact as being fundamentally a measure designed to assure the peace and security of all peoples of the world.

2. We regard the North Atlantic Pact as being within the provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter which recognizes the possible need for regional pacts during its period of growth, and until a security force has been developed by the member nations acting in unison.

3. We find the commitments undertaken by the member nations under the pact to be wholly constructive and defensive in character: (a) to settle all disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means; (b) to strengthen their free institutions; (c) to promote conditions of stability and well-being; (d) to encourage economic collaboration; (e) to consult together if the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any one of the parties is threatened.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

Concerning these commitments under articles 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, we believe there can be no honest division of opinion. With regard to article 5, in which the parties agree to consider an armed attack against any one of them as an attack against them all, we believe that the history of two world wars should have convinced us that in the event of an armed attack against any member of the North Atlantic community the United States would be forced eventually to consider it an attack on our own security. And we are of the opinion that recognition by the United States of this inevitability will serve as a deterrent to any act of aggression which might be contemplated in the future against any member of the North Atlantic community. With American arms, western Europe can become a strong line of defense. Without them, it could become an area which American forces might again need to liberate after it had been overrun.
We are urging prompt ratification of the North Atlantic Pact as part of our own defense, and do so with the understanding that adequate implementation must follow. Inasmuch as "action" under article 5 might be economic, political, psychological, or military, depending on the character of the attack, we consider that adequate implementation demands such legislation as may be necessary to enable the United States to move quickly in any one of these four directions.

To conclude, we are presenting our statement in support of prompt ratification by the United States Senate of our membership in the North Atlantic Pact.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to congratulate you on a very splendid statement, a very clear distinction between the different processes.

Mrs. Beggs. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much gratified that the Federation of Women's Clubs is supporting the treaty.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. I think I have no questions. I would like to observe, as you have done, that I think the paragraph on page 2, the third from the bottom is about as cogent and complete a summary of the irresistability of argument for the North Atlantic Pact as I have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. I have marked that particularly on my copy.

Senator Green?

Senator Green. Mrs. Beggs, you state that this was the only resolution on which there was no opposition from the floor. Were there other resolutions?

Mrs. Beggs. Yes.

Senator Green. Many?

Mrs. Beggs. Yes. There was one which dealt with, shall we say, socialized medicine; there was one that dealt with extending the age at which people are retired for social security from 60 to 65; there was a resolution to raise the dues of the general federation.

Senator Green. I think the point is a valuable one, because it shows, as you intended it to show, that it was not a cut and dried convention where they just adopt everything that is recommended. That is the point you wish to make, is it not?

Mrs. Beggs. Yes.

I might say that we of the International Relations and Legislation Committee were prepared for a vigorous fight on the floor and were perfectly astounded ourselves at the unanimity and the general approval of the resolution; I mean the expressed approval in conversations.

Senator Green. I think the fact that there was no opposition is significant, as you point out.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

There is one question I would like to ask. At the very end of your statement you said that you thought that the Congress ought to provide implementation as may be necessary to enable the United States to move quickly in any one of these four directions. Do you not mean all four?
Mrs. Beggs. Yes, I do. I think it was phrased "in any one" because we consider that through the Marshall plan and through the various other measures that are before the Senate the cooperation along economic lines is cared for.

Senator Green. Do you not think they ought to be ready to move quickly in all four?

Mrs. Beggs. Yes; we definitely do.

The Chairman. It is a very splendid statement.

Senator Hickenlooper, have you any questions?

Senator Hickenlooper. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator McMahon?

Senator McMahon. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. No questions, except to say that I think it is a very excellent statement. You do not happen to be from Connecticut too, do you?

Mrs. Beggs. No, sir; I don't. I am from New Jersey.

Senator McMahon. After that statement we will be very happy to adopt you.

Mrs. Beggs. My name was Wadsworth, so perhaps I belong to you.

Senator Fulbright. It is a very excellent statement.

The Chairman. Senator Tydings?

Senator Tydings. No questions, thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. I should like to ask Mrs. Beggs just a very few questions, with your permission.

In the first place, Mrs. Beggs, on page 2 of your statement, paragraph 2, if you have it before you--

Mrs. Beggs. Yes.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Senator Donnell. You say, "We regard the North Atlantic Pact as being within the provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes the possible need for regional pacts during its period of growth, et cetera."

Is there anything in article 51 that refers to regional pacts?

Mrs. Beggs. Not by name, but as I understand it, it recognizes the existence of the Pan American Union and the pact which exists between the members of the Pan American Union which was arrived at at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1940. That existed, and there had to be a provision for it in the United Nations Charter.

Now, as I see it, or as we see it, this is simply another community of interest which exists. It is recognized that there is a community of interest in the North Atlantic area similar to that which exists on the continents of North and South America.

Senator Donnell. Do you consider Italy as being in the North Atlantic area?

Mrs. Beggs. It depends on what "mutual interest" is. I would not say that it is within our province to designate which nations should join the pact. I should say that if the interests of Italy are such that they extend into the North Atlantic area, it definitely is.
Senator DONNELL. You consider this pact, the North Atlantic Treaty, as a regional pact, is that right?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Are you familiar with the fact that the United Nations Charter, which I am confident you carefully studied in your work, contains the portion applicable to regional arrangements in chapter VIII, which does not include article 51, to which you refer in this resolution?

Mrs. BEGGS. It uses the term, but article 51 implies it.

Senator DONNELL. Do you have before you a copy of the Charter?

Mrs. BEGGS. No; I do not.

Senator DONNELL. I would like to hand you a copy, if I may, for a moment.

ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND REGIONALISM

Mrs. BEGGS. Could I say that in article 5 of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty the wording is "in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter," and "collective self-defense" would imply regional pacts, I would say?

Senator DONNELL. I have just handed you, Mrs. Beggs a copy of excerpts, I believe it is, from the United Nations Charter; perhaps all of the Charter, I am not certain. But at any rate, at the bottom of page 31 of the booklet, namely, Document 48, Senate Document, Eighty-first Congress, first session, do you observe that chapter VIII, beginning with article 52, is entitled "Regional Arrangements," and that that chapter includes articles 52, 53, and 54? You notice that, do you, Mrs. Beggs?

Mrs. BEGGS. I notice. May I answer?

Senator DONNELL. Certainly.

Mrs. BEGGS. Under article 51 the wording is "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. * * *" I am quite sure that collective self-defense implies regional agreements.

Senator DONNELL. Mrs. Beggs, I want to get your idea. I understand that you take the view that the North Atlantic Treaty is a regional pact. That is correct, is it?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. And you have so indicated in point No. 2, set forth at page 2 of the statement which you have handed in this morning, and then you have reiterated that view after reading article 51, or part of it, and after having your attention called to chapter VIII. I am correct in that?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. I am very much interested to note that, Mrs. Beggs, particularly as I understand the position of the Secretary of State as taking the view that this is not a regional pact. I think that is a correct statement of your position, and I am glad to get the information that your organization takes a view which I interpret to be diametrically opposite to that of the Secretary of State.

In the preparation of this statement that you have given this morning, who collaborated, particularly as to that portion of it giving the reasons for the unanimous action taken at Hollywood Beach, Fla., recently?
Mrs. Beggs. I wrote the statement, sir, and then I called headquarters and checked it with our secretaries there, and not the exact wording but all of the points that are included here. I conferred with Mrs. Leslie Wright, who asked me to represent the department of legislation. That, I think, is all.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator Donnell. May I inquire, are you a lawyer? I hope you won't take any offense if I ask a few questions to get your background.

Mrs. Beggs. I am a business woman. I am a Republican, sir.

Senator Donnell. That stands very well for you. I am mighty glad to hear that.

Would you tell us just briefly what is the nature of the work in which you have been engaged over the past few years?

Mrs. Beggs. I was former chairman of international relations in the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, from 1938 to 1941. At that time my husband, who also was a Republican, I might point out, passed on, and in carrying on his estate I organized a silk finishing and dyeing company, reorganized it, for war work, and have carried on as its active president ever since. At the present moment, and in this administration of the General Federation, I have been very glad to serve as the consultant on international relations. Mrs. Ambrose Biehl, of California and New York, is the chairman, and Mrs. Dick Sporburg is the other consultant. She also is a former chairman of international relations. None of us is a professional lawyer, sir.

Senator Donnell. Thank you.

IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY

I notice also on page 2 of your statement that you say:

We are urging prompt ratification of the North Atlantic Pact as part of our own defense, and do so with the understanding that adequate implementation must follow.

Mrs. Beggs. Yes.

Senator Donnell. In other words, I take it that you regard adequate implementation as being essential to the success of the North Atlantic Pact. Am I correct in that?

Mrs. Beggs. Yes, but I should like to say that I think that the weakness of our democratic system is that very often we ratify charters and we make grand, wonderful, idealistic statements with our tongues in our cheeks, and when the implementation comes we are not willing to follow through. We are simply trying to be entirely realistic in this.

Senator Donnell. Certainly. And you feel, as many of the rest of us do, that if this treaty is to be signed, in order to make it effective it must be followed by, to quote your statement, “adequate implementation.”

Mrs. Beggs. I should say “adequate legislation.”

Senator Donnell. It says “implementation.”

Mrs. Beggs. Yes. But I want to point out that the implementation, as I have said here, could be along any one of four or five lines.

Senator Donnell. I understood in answer to Senator Green that it should be not along any one of them but along all of them.
Mrs. Beggs. You are right.
Senator Donnell. And that includes military implementation?
Mrs. Beggs. Definitely.
Senator Donnell. Was this statement that you have presented here this morning, beginning particularly with the part of it which says “the reasons for this unanimous action may be found in the following points” before the convention at Hollywood Beach, or was that subsequently prepared?
Mrs. Beggs. It was subsequently prepared, but as the basis of our discussion at Hollywood Beach, you see, the Department of International Relations had a luncheon at which several points were covered, including the International Trade Organization, and then later there was a workshop meeting at which these points were discussed, and it became very clear to us that what the United States is trying to accomplish in the world, all of these things fit into one picture. There is the Marshall plan, and following that comes the need for the International Trade Organization, and certainly if we are expecting our program to be successful in Europe we must be willing to assist in whatever means we can the nations that are turning their eyes toward the democratic way of life. We feel that all of these efforts are an effort, or that the general policy of the United States is an effort, to extend our way of life into the world, and we feel that if world leadership is to be forced upon us we must be willing to back it up. I did not include it in the statement because I felt it was extraneous matter, but when the matter of implementation comes up we will be very glad to be heard again.

We did discuss the budget of the United States, its break-down, and we discussed the estimated amount that the Secretary of State has made, that it would cost probably in the nature of $1,130,000,000. It seemed to us in comparing that with the items in our budget which deal with paying for past wars and preparing for the wars that we fear may come upon us, and carrying the service of debt that has been necessary, and veterans’ services and so forth, that the $1,130,000,000 was rather reasonable, and we considered it, or we talked about it, as a sort of an insurance for our future security.

Nothing is positive in this world, but we believe in the League of Women Voters that this is the best step to take at the moment.

Senator Donnell. The convention, as you stated, in Hollywood Beach, Calif., was last week?
Mrs. Beggs. No; it finished a week ago last Friday night.

Senator Donnell. And more than 1,000 registered delegates were present at the convention?
Mrs. Beggs. Yes.

FAMILIARITY WITH TREATY

Senator Donnell. Could you tell us, Mrs. Beggs, please, whether the North Atlantic Treaty was read to the delegate body of more than 1,000 registered delegates before action was taken by that body on this resolution that you have presented to us here this morning?
Mrs. Beggs. No, but it was read and discussed point by point at the workshop on international relations and, I think—I am not sure of that, as I was not there—at the legislative committee. It was discussed and the points were made, as I said before, at the luncheon.
Senator DONNELL. It was read at the workshop; it was not read at the luncheon?

Mrs. BEGGS. No.

Senator DONNELL. And it was not read at the meeting at which the delegates themselves voted on the resolution?

Mrs. BEGGS. No, but if you notice on my statement, the terms of the treaty had already been analyzed and sent out to all our clubs by our department of international relations. We have a monthly bulletin that goes to all of our federated clubs and to the local and State and national chairmen of international relations, and I also pointed out that even before the terms were available the whole subject of possible collective defense had been indicated by the board and the clubs had been asked to include it in their programs, to consider it carefully.

Senator DONNELL. At the workshop, would you tell us, please, approximately how many persons were present?

Mrs. BEGGS. I really could not tell you. It was in a moving-picture theater in the hotel and people were standing up. I am not very good at figures. There were several hundred.

Senator DONNELL. At the workshop at which this question of the North Atlantic Treaty was considered?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Do you remember about how much time was devoted to the consideration of it?

Mrs. BEGGS. The whole workshop.

Senator DONNELL. How much time was that?

Mrs. BEGGS. An hour.

Senator DONNELL. One hour was occupied in the consideration of this pact by the workshop?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes, sir.

DISCUSSION OF TREATY BY FEDERATION

Senator DONNELL. In the analysis which had been previously sent out throughout the country, had there been, generally speaking, any opinion expressed at all as to whether or not the North Atlantic Treaty should be adopted or something of that kind?

Mrs. BEGGS. The policy had been established. That is my reason for including both resolutions in this statement. It was to indicate that the board of directors has the power, in our organization, to indicate the direction of policy, and at their fall meeting held here in Washington—

Senator DONNELL. October 15, 1948?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes—it was indicated that the group there, and the analysis of the group you will find there—

Senator DONNELL. That is the resolution set forth in the second paragraph of your statement?

Mrs. BEGGS. Yes, sir. Then, following that resolution, you will find that the board of directors is a very representative body. All of the presidents of each State come to Washington to the board meeting, and in addition to that the officers of the federation and all of the chairmen of all committees and departments, and as many members of the committees as are able to be there, and at that time the pos-
sible need for some such thing as an Atlantic Pact was discussed and it was determined to put the policy down in principle.

You see, it works this way: The federation has many, many interests. We are the largest women's organization; we also are the most catholic in our interests, and each club will have many departments. When the board sends the notice of a resolution of this sort, it says to the clubs, "Here is something about which you must be concerned." That was the purpose of that resolution. That is one reason that I might point out that your question indicates that we only discussed it for an hour, and the charter was not read to the entire body, which might be answered by saying that the previous information that had gone out, and the fact that all of the delegates there knew that this was coming up, even though it was an emergency resolution, they knew that this matter was going to be discussed. It had to be an emergency because the signature of the United States was not attached until just a month before.

Senator DONNELL. It was attached on the 4th day of April of this year.

Now, Mrs. Beggs, I thank you for giving me so fully the outline of procedure, but what I wanted to know primarily were two things: First, was the expression of policy which has been put down in principle sent out throughout the country? Would you say that that was generally speaking favorable to the general idea behind the North Atlantic Treaty as you understand that idea to be?

Mrs. Beggs. The paragraph is there, and I would say it definitely was, and I would leave it to your own discretion to decide whether you think it was.

Senator DONNELL. You think it was definitely favorable to the idea behind the North Atlantic Treaty; is that right?

Mrs. Beggs. I see no other way of interpreting that, sir.

AVAILABILITY OF TREATY TO MEMBERSHIP

Senator DONNELL. Was there sent out at any time, either during the convention at Hollywood Beach, Fla., in April of this year, or prior thereto, a copy of the North Atlantic Pact to the membership of the General Federation of Women's Clubs?

Mrs. Beggs. It was available.

Senator DONNELL. I want to know, was it sent out? Was it distributed throughout the country to the members of the Federation of Women's Clubs, either before or at the convention held in Hollywood Beach, Fla.?

Mrs. Beggs. I understand your question, sir, and was attempting to answer it.

We have in our headquarters thousands of copies of the North Atlantic Pact, and it is available to any club that writes in. We do not have the resources to send out unless it is requested a million or five million copies of the North Atlantic Pact.

Senator DONNELL. So it was not sent out to the membership of the Federation of Women's Clubs, either during or at any time prior to the Hollywood Beach, Fla., convention. I am correct in my understanding, am I?

Mrs. Beggs. I am not sure whether it was sent out or not; whether the entire wording of it was sent out I do not know.
Senator Donnell. You have never heard of it being sent out?

Mrs. Beggs. I would not say that. I know that our chairman sent out what she considered a complete report on its terms. Whether it contained the exact wording I am not sure.

Senator Donnell. One final point. In the next to the concluding paragraph of your statement you say:

We are urging prompt ratification of the North Atlantic Pact as part of our defense, and do so with the understanding that adequate implementation must follow—which I previously read. Then this sentence:

Inasmuch as “action” under article 5 might be economic, political, psychological, or military, depending on the character of the attack, we consider that adequate implementation demands such legislation as may be necessary to enable the United States to move quickly in any one of these four directions.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK

I would like to submit to you a hypothetical question that has been submitted to various other witnesses, and I would like to have your opinion, if we may have it.

Suppose that in connection with the question of military action, 6 weeks after this pact shall be ratified, if it is ratified, that 500,000 troops from Russia shall enter into Norway attacking it militarily. Would you consider or would you not that adequate, prompt, forthwith action in pursuance to article 5 would make it reasonably desirable that military action should be taken in order to repel such an attack?

Mrs. Beggs. I think, Senator, that that would be completely within the realm of the Senate decision, but I would say that if Norway had received aid enough before that happened, to be adequately prepared herself, that military aid might not be necessary from the United States. I would say that my personal opinion is that if this treaty is quickly ratified, probably that decision may not have to be made.

Senator Donnell. If the city of New York were to be attacked by 500,000 foreign troops, would you consider that the President of the United States would be justified, in the absence of Congress being in session at that time, in taking prompt military action to repel the attack and protect America?

Mrs. Beggs. I think it would be done, whether the President did it or not.

Senator Donnell. Do you think he would be within his rights in so doing?

Mrs. Beggs. I do not care to answer that. I don't know. I should say that he is Commander in Chief once Congress has declared war. I think it is a rather hypothetical question, and a rather academic question, if you will pardon me. I don't know whether I am allowed to answer back to a Senator, but I would say that I live right across the river in New Jersey, and in my feeble way I would be very willing to aid in any measures that might be necessary, whether the President told me to or not.

Senator Donnell. Certainly. And do you think you might be interested in having the President take some action to assist in the local implementation of repulsion of the attack?
Mrs. Beos. I think it is entirely academic, and my personal opinion does not matter.

Senator Donnell. You are familiar with the provisions of article 5, that “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”?

Mrs. Beos. Certainly.

Senator Donnell. That is all.

**Article 51 and Regionalism**

The Chairman. There are several questions I would like to ask you, but we are pressed very much for time.

There was a statement by the Senator and yourself about regional pacts under article 51. You said that it was a clear implication that it meant regional pacts. Is not the language in article 51 perfectly clear? “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” That “collective self-defense” means more than one, doesn’t it?

Mrs. Beos. Yes.

The Chairman. And that carries the idea that there will be a number within the scope of the collective agreement, which would be a regional pact under article 51?

Mrs. Beos. That is as we understand it.

The Chairman. That is the way we all understand it, except for some contrary gentlemen.

Senator Donnell. I thank the gentleman for the compliment I gather he has delicately put to me.

The Chairman. I assume the Senator includes others besides himself. I did not mean to single out the Senator from Missouri.

Senator Donnell. I do not want to speak for any others than myself.

The Chairman. We thank you very much for a splendid statement.

Mrs. Beos. Thank you for your courtesy.

The Chairman. At this point we are going to call Mr. Patterson. We cannot hold him any longer, and the other witnesses will have to bide their time.

We have at this time former Secretary of War Patterson, a distinguished jurist, a lawyer of high ability who made a very outstanding and valuable contribution to the service of the United States while he was Secretary of War. He has shown a spirit of self-sacrifice and a desire to serve that is unusual, and I want to pay high tribute to Secretary of War Patterson, or Circuit Judge Patterson, and all the other honors that have been heaped upon him deservedly. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Patterson. May I first state the pleasure I feel, Mr. Chairman, in appearing before this committee, and may I as a citizen express the confidence that we all feel in this committee and in the care that this committee gives to our foreign relations. We are sure of the exercise of wisdom, experience, and patriotism in your hands, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Patterson. I am here to urge ratification of the North Atlantic Pact.

I am appearing as a vice president of the Atlantic Union Committee and as a citizen.

The most urgent issue before the American people is prevention of another world war. That war would surely result, sooner or later, in the involvement of the United States as a participant. There are solid reasons for the belief that we would not be defeated in such a war. But the waging of a third world war would mean untold suffering and misery to millions of people, and the winning of it would cast such colossal expenses on the Nation as to bring utter ruin to our economic structure. The social changes that would attend an economic collapse of that character would be profound—so profound that the United States after such a war would not resemble the United States that we have lived in. No other issues of the day approaches in importance the warding off of another world war. I see no room for doubt on that point.

PREVENTION OF WAR

How are we to prevent that war? How are we to preserve peace! Not by wishful thinking. Not by appeasement, which is a synonym for surrender when we are dealing with dictators. Not by shutting our eyes to the fact that the world is faced with an ambitious and power-hungry dictatorship that has never had any moral scruples against launching a war, a dictatorship whose guilt in starting World War II in 1939 was second only to that of Hitler—I refer to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty—a dictatorship that has respect for nothing but physical force. To follow those counsels of timidity is to take a straight road to war. Those policies led us unwillingly into a war 8 years ago, and they will lead us there again.

On the other hand, we reduce the chances of war to a minimum—there can be no absolute guaranty, of course, but we reduce chances of war to a minimum—if we, along with the nations of Europe that are still free, present a united front against conquest out of Moscow. Moscow, it will bear repeating pays strict attention to physical power.

The combined strength represented by the free nations that have signed the North Atlantic Pact is far in excess of any that Moscow could muster—manpower at least equal, steel-making capacity 10 times, petroleum production 6 times, a lead in science and invention and industrial skill that cannot be measured in tons or cubic feet but is undoubtedly a long lead. (I say nothing as to the tremendous asset of freedom, for however priceless we feel it to be it is not an asset in the eyes of Moscow.) In the presence of that combined strength in the resources it takes to wage war the autocrats in the Kremlin will see no prospect of victory and will not give their soldiers the word to march. The case for ratification of the North Atlantic Pact, I submit, is as simple as that. It is a pact to preserve peace.
DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

Why has the signing of the pact brought forth such wrath in Moscow? They know well enough that they have nothing to fear in the way of aggression against them, notwithstanding their stale and hollow charges of war-mongering, imperialism, Wall Street, encirclement, and the like. The true cause is that the taking effect of the pact will mark the end of their chance that intended victims may be knocked off one by one. I trust that we will not flinch in the face of the Moscow bluster.

The idea that anyone would be willing to start a war is hard for the average American to believe. But we know that Hitler in 1939 was utterly reckless as to whether his attack on Poland brought on a general war; and the rule of Stalin, point by point, is the same substance as that of Hitler. The Kremlin has pursued the same ruthless aggression and will continue on that course as long as it believes that it will not run the risk of defeat by so doing. We may also be sure that if there had been a North Atlantic Pact in existence in 1939, there would have been no World War II.

I have the firm conviction that this Nation cannot afford to quibble, to stall, or to equivocate on this measure. We gamble with war if we retreat. I urge that ratification should be prompt and unmistakable. If we have learned anything in the last decade, we have been made aware of the disaster that goes with “too little and too late.”

After the pact has been ratified, the Atlantic Union Committee proposes that the Senate examine the project for Atlantic Union as a means of implementing the pact by a firmer union of the people who are free and are honestly devoted to the cause of world peace. But first and foremost we urge ratification of the North Atlantic Pact.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, just a question or two.

NOT PEACE AT ANY PRICE

When we state our desire for peace, we mean a desire for peace with our liberty and our independence preserved, do we not?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. We could, of course, have peace by simply allowing the aggressor or the dictator to have his way, and bow down in appeasement and submission, but that is not the kind of peace that we want.

Mr. Patterson. That is the peace that ends in slavery.

The Chairman. Exactly; so that the extremists who want peace at any price could attain it only by submission to tyranny and to dictatorship and eventually to slavery, is that right?

Mr. Patterson. That is the way I see it, sir.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE TREATY

The Chairman. Judge Patterson, you are a very eminent lawyer. Do you find anything in the proposed treaty that impinges upon the authority of the United Nations, when it is specifically stated in several places that we recognize the authority of the United Nations?
Mr. Patterson. I believe that the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact is in line with the United Nations, subordinate to the broad objectives of the United Nations, and thoroughly consistent.

The Chairman. Is it not set forth in the treaty that when military or other measures are taken by the signatories to the pact to carry its purposes out, that they shall continue only until such time as the Security Council of the United Nations shall take adequate means of taking over the problem?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. That is in article 51. This is a measure of collective self-defense, as I see it, within the terms of article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It would not have been necessary if our hopes in 1945, when the Charter was signed, had been fulfilled, but they have not been fulfilled.

The Chairman. Is it not true that when we were at San Francisco it was the view of the Four Great Powers, or the Five Great Powers, that in peace, under the Charter, they would cooperate and try to attain the purposes of the Charter just as we had cooperated in time of war to win the war?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. But in that we have been disappointed by 30 vetoes of measures by the Soviet Union in the Security Council?

Mr. Patterson. That is right, and there has been an obstruction of the expected military security force to be set up under the United Nations. In spite of efforts for over 3 years there has been no fulfillment of that aim.

The Chairman. There has been obstruction in the military staff committee, whose function it was to revise and set up an international force, is that not true?

Mr. Patterson. That is right.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. And in single sentence, Mr. Secretary, no nation on earth needs to have the remotest fear of the slightest ultimate impact of the North Atlantic Treaty unless it first identifies itself as an international criminal through armed aggression.

Mr. Patterson. That is it, in a sentence. Its aim is purely defensive. There is not a shred of aggression in it at all.

The Chairman. In other words, all we ask of the other nations is to restrain their criminal intent and their criminal purpose to make armed attacks upon peaceful free nations.

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Green?

Senator Green. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not believe I have any questions.

The Chairman. Senator McMahon?

Senator McMahon. I have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

Steps Necessary Beyond Atlantic Treaty

Mr. Secretary, I note that you sum up the assets on both sides of this situation, that is, the Soviet side and our own side, and you come
to the correct conclusion, I think, that this amalgamation of power will be so overwhelming as to certainly deter them from proceeding. I also note that in the last paragraph of your statement you suggest that you are going to examine a project for Atlantic Union. I wish to congratulate you and the organization for withholding that suggestion until at least we could get this done, but I take it that you feel as I do, that when we ratify this pact we will not have done the last thing that is necessary to forge a foreign policy that will protect this country in the future.

Mr. Patterson. I feel with you on that. I agree with you. That is true. There will have to be follow-up measures.

Senator McMahon. I do not want to be understood as endorsing your proposed Atlantic Union, because I have not given that specific suggestion enough study, but I do think it is important that the American people not get the idea that we can go to sleep just as soon as we have done this, and any arms implementation that might be decided upon.

Mr. Secretary, do you agree that while the situation that you outline exists today, time might bring a different balance in the scales?

Mr. Patterson. We are going to have changes all the time. There is no doubt of that. Look at the changes that we have had in our own lifetime.

STRENGTH OF SOVIET UNION

Senator McMahon. I am talking about increased power of the Soviet Union. As I say, you cast up the account and you say this will make us much stronger than they. But do you think that, say, in the next decade that necessarily is going to be so?

Mr. Patterson. I do not think the free nations of the world, preserving their freedom, need fear being overtaken in resources by countries under autocratic rule. In other words, I think that there is good reason to believe that the lead the free countries now have will be maintained, if not widened. I cannot see any other way to it. The individual initiative that is given to the citizens of free nations is a very powerful resource in itself, a resource that is absolutely denied to people who live under the rule of a conspiracy.

Senator McMahon. I agree with you on that. I would point this out to you, however, that total resources and resources devoted to aggressive warfare are not the same thing.

Mr. Patterson. That is true.

Senator McMahon. In other words, this freedom that you and I think pretty well of and are for must exist in a civil and not a military state. The tremendous burden of increasing armaments pro tanto reduces your chances of maintaining that kind of freedom in a civil state.

Now, granted the terrific differential between the efficiency of the free state and the slave state, you, I am sure, would agree with me that 85 percent of the total resources and potential devoted to aggressive warfare might overcome the free state that could not in time of anything except actual conflict maintain that kind of an expenditure and remain free.

The point that I am trying to make, Mr. Secretary, is that this balance that we talk about today certainly is not something, in my
opinion, that we can look forward to in the next 10 years or the next 15 or 20, and certainly while that may sound like a long time, as you and I know it is tomorrow in the history of nations.

I think it is so important to impress upon the country and the world that we do not regard this as the last thing that we must do. This perhaps is not the time or place to go into some things that I think we ought to do in addition to this pact. I propose to develop that another time. I am definitely interested in the fact that you, along with Mr. Clayton and Justice Roberts, and men of your stamp and caliber, are thinking in terms of an expansion of our drive for peace, and I want to congratulate you on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Patterson, I think it is a very excellent statement. In view of your long and distinguished service during the war, particularly in the armed services, I think it is especially significant. I do think a little time could be devoted to your thoughts, because you are here, and I think this pact is going to be analyzed and confirmed, and then we are going to be concerned and analyzing what we are going to do further.

ATLANTIC UNION

In your idea about an Atlantic union, what is the particular significance of that union as contrasted to the pact?

Mr. Patterson. Of course, the pact is for self-defense, and relates to security alone. We have it in mind that a basis exists for a federation or union of the free countries; not world federation, but of the free countries, along broader lines of an economic character and political character, and we would like to have that explored.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Certainly I am agreed on that, and from what we have heard in this committee the great preponderance of people are for that now, but simply because you have obviously given great thought to this further step I think it is appropriate that we examine it in order that we can begin to think about it and that the people can.

Would you say the principal difference between the pact and what you are advocating in the Atlantic Union Committee is that it is based upon political affiliations, whereas this is among sovereign states and for military and defensive purposes?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. This is a treaty. We would have in mind, as a longer-range objective, a governmental federation or organization.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Let us assume for the purposes of illustration that we are dealing with the same 12 countries. Would you say that they would have relationships similar to those among the 48 States of this country?

Mr. Patterson. Not welded into so complete an entity as the 48 States, but toward that objective, yes. I regard the United States as a political entity, with a fairly strong Central National Government.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But you know there are some of us who think the States still have some rights, do you not?

Mr. Patterson. I think they have, but they certainly do not nearly the exercise of the powers that they had, say, 100 years ago.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And when this country began the theory was certainly that of a limited central government. In that sense the
theory of your idea is similar, limitation on the central government that might be set up among these Atlantic countries.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So that the basic theory is the same, although how rapidly you develop into a centralized government depends upon future developments.

EUROPEAN UNION

Do you think that that is the ultimate objective? Would you say that a federation of European countries who have progressed much further along this line than these Atlantic countries have would contribute to greater strength and stability in the world and, I would say, contribute to the ultimate formation of an Atlantic union?

Mr. PATTERSON. A good beginning has already been made toward European union of the west European nations, and further progress along that line is to be expected any day, and to be welcomed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You approve of that? You think it would make a contribution?

Mr. PATTERSON. Surely. It is a very good stepping stone.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And the attitude of this country ought to be to encourage that?

Mr. PATTERSON. To encourage that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree thoroughly with that view.

Mr. PATTERSON. I am working toward that too.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think that would make a contribution not only to the present stability of the countries, but to the ultimate formation of an union of the kind that you desire.

I think the way you state it, particularly, is a very excellent statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tydings?

Senator TYDINGS. Mr. Patterson, I am not going to ask you any questions, except to say that your statement is just about what I would expect it to be, that—

* * * the native hue of resolution in your face is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.

I want to congratulate you on it. That is a little Shakespeare—Hamlet's Soliloquy:

And enterprises of greatt pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action.

That does not apply in the case of Mr. Patterson, and I am in thorough accord with the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has scholarship as well as legal ability.

All right, Senator Donnell.

Senator DONNELL. I know that you are not including me in either of those categories, Mr. Chairman. But I will proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not including yourself by not being a member of the committee. If you had shown the proper ambition to have gotten on the committee when it was organized, you might have acquired those qualities.
Senator Donnell. I am sure the association with the members of the committee, particularly the chairman, would have been helpful along those lines.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Donnell. I notice with interest the fact that you are appearing not only as a citizen but as a vice president of the Atlantic Union Committee. There are two vice presidents; are there not?

Mr. Patterson. I think Mr. Clayton and myself are the two.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Clayton has already appeared before us, as you probably know.

Mr. Patterson. Yes.

Senator Donnell. And the president is Mr. Justice Roberts?

Mr. Patterson. Yes.

Senator Donnell. And he, you know, has appeared also.

I was interested to know, and I am wondering if you could place into the record your knowledge, if you have it, as to why three members of one organization have been permitted to testify in this matter, and particularly an organization known as the Atlantic Union Committee.

Mr. Patterson. That is up to the committee. That was not up to us.

NATURE OF ATLANTIC UNION

Senator Donnell. The name of your committee, "Atlantic Union Committee," has been somewhat explained, I think, by particularly Mr. Justice Roberts, as indicating that the committee is formed in advocacy of a federation of democracies; is that right?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. These democracies would include the United States of America; would they?

Mr. Patterson. Yes.

Senator Donnell. The name of the committee, "Atlantic Union Committee," is therefore appropriate, in that it would include not only members on one side of the Atlantic but at least the United States of America on the other; is that correct?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. I was referring to the Atlantic Union as contemplating the formation of a union between not only democracies on one side of the Atlantic but at least one on the other side of the Atlantic, namely the United States of America. I take it, Mr. Secretary, that although you are favoring the North Atlantic Pact for itself, that you are also favoring it as a step in your judgment toward the ultimate creation of this Atlantic Union to which you refer; is that right?

Mr. Patterson. That is right.

Senator Donnell. Do you mind telling us just briefly, Mr. Secretary, what is this Atlantic Union that is contemplated in your mind, into which the United States of America would become integrated as a member?

Mr. Patterson. We believe that Congress should examine carefully how far we can go toward a Federal union with the free countries of the world, an organization along permanent lines with control over certain common interests, particularly in economic and political lines.

Senator Donnell. Yes. Would it include military lines?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnell. So it would be economic, political, and military lines?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnell. Any other lines?
Mr. Patterson. I do not think of any right now.
Senator Donnell. You speak of this proposed organization of the free countries of the world as being a federal union. Do you consider the United States of America a federal union?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL UNION

Senator Donnell. So that this organization that you are advocating would be an organization analogous in large part, if not in all details, to the Union of the 48 States of our country; is that right?
Mr. Patterson. Analogous to it, but it would not be as firmly knit, certainly in the beginning phases, as the United States of America.
Senator Donnell. How about in the ultimate phases, as distinguished from the initial phases?
Mr. Patterson. You would have to take that as it came.
Senator Donnell. Would you contemplate the organization of a congress similar to the present Federal Congress of the United States of America, which Congress would operate for the federal union of all the free countries of the world?
Mr. Patterson. Not similar to the Congress of the United States, but a congress, or legislative body, yes.
Senator Donnell. There would be a legislative body which would pass laws which would apply to all of the component entities, one of which would be the United States of America; is that right?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir; within the limited fields.
Senator Donnell. Which include the political, economic, and military fields?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, but, of course, limits within those fields, too.
Senator Donnell. Could you tell us what those limits are?
Mr. Patterson. Those are the limits where local interests were believed to be predominant.
Senator Donnell. And who would decide whether or not they were predominant?
Mr. Patterson. That would be in the charter that you would adopt.
Senator Donnell. Would you plan that the union itself, the Atlantic Union, would decide whether or not local interests were predominant, or would each particular component country in that union have the right to determine whether local interests were predominant?
Mr. Patterson. No nation would join it who thought its proper local interests would be infringed.

OPERATION OF ATLANTIC UNION

Senator Donnell. And after such a union were formed, suppose that some matter of legislation should come up before the congress of the Atlantic Union and the point were made that it was a proposition that improperly infringed on local interests. Would it be your idea that the mere statement to that effect by any one of these free countries of the world with respect to itself would suffice to take that item of proposed legislation off the agenda of the congress?
Mr. Patterson. I think if you had good will and a desire to make the organization work you would not have any undue amount of trouble along that line. Those are problems, the details of which I acknowledge I have not considered, Senator.

Senator Donnell. Has there been a tentative draft prepared of the proposed fundamental law or constitution of the Atlantic Union?

Mr. Patterson. Not that I know of.

Senator Donnell. Would you have not only a legislative department in the Atlantic Union but also an executive department?

Mr. Patterson. I just do not know about that. I have not given it thought, myself.

Senator Donnell. And you do not know of anyone that has explored that point?

Mr. Patterson. It has been explored, possibly, but not by me.

Senator Donnell. Would there be also a judicial department in the Atlantic Union?

Mr. Patterson. I suppose there would have to be.

Senator Donnell. That would be somewhat in the nature of the Permanent Court of International Justice that came out of the First World War, and perhaps similar to the court under the existing United Nations Charter?

Mr. Patterson. Yes. It would decide matters that arose under the Charter.

Senator Donnell. Would there be a power of enforcement of the decisions of that judicial department of the Atlantic Union as you envisage the plan?

Mr. Patterson. I suppose that would be up to the national governments themselves that were into it. I suppose they would be looked to to enforce it.

Senator Donnell. If there were a decree issued by such a court, you would expect the country in favor of whom the decree was rendered to take adequate steps to enforce that decree against the others?

Mr. Patterson. Of course it would have to be enforced with the consent of the national government against whom the judgment was rendered, but I think you would have that support.

The Chairman. May I interrupt? I want to suggest that as I understand, the Secretary has already testified that the details of this organization have not been formed by anybody, that there is no written statement about the functions of each department and each branch, so that it seems to me that in view of that statement it is unnecessary to go into great detail about what somebody might think would be the details.

Mr. Patterson. I have no blueprint on it, Senator, myself.

Senator Donnell. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that inasmuch as the Secretary has stated very frankly that he regards the ratification of the North Atlantic Pact to be desirable in itself, but not only in itself but as a step toward the formation of an Atlantic Union, I think it is of some importance to get at least the outlines of what his plan is. I shall not go into it in great detail, and if I am exceeding the bounds of propriety in that respect I shall certainly observe the admonitions of the chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you speak of the proposed Atlantic Union as one which would be a federation of democracies or free countries of the world. Would Portugal qualify under that definition?

Mr. Patterson. I believe so.

Senator Donnell. I think you differ in that respect with Mr. Justice Roberts, as I recall his answer the other day when a similar question was asked of him. You think it would qualify?

Mr. Patterson. I do.

Senator Donnell. You regard Portugal as a democracy?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, I do.

Senator Donnell. Do you regard Spain as a democracy?

Mr. Patterson. I do not think Spain at the present time is.

**THE TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS**

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, Senator Connally asked a question which I am not able to quote with exactness, but I think I have the general gist in mind. When you were discussing whether or not the proposed North Atlantic Treaty is in harmony with the portions of the United Nations Charter he pointed out, not ipsissimis verbis but in substance, this provision in article 5, of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

I understood you to concur with his general view that inasmuch as there is this provision in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the provision for forthwith action by the parties in the event of an armed attack against one of the signatories is in harmony with the United Nations Charter, since it is expressly provided in here that the measures taken under the North Atlantic Treaty shall be terminated when the Security Council, under the United Nations Charter, has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Did I correctly understand your view on that?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. I believe the treaty fits right in under the United Nations.

Senator Donnell. Now, suppose that Russia—and I pause to ask, is not Russia and its conduct the predominant, primary reason for the proposed North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. Patterson. The conduct of those who are rulers of Russia; yes, sir.

**PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK**

Senator Donnell. Suppose Russia were to take action along the line of an attack against one of the signatory nations under the North Atlantic Treaty. We will say that Russia put in a tremendous force, a million or 2 million or 3 million soldiers in the field. It is pro-
vided in the North Atlantic Treaty that the armed attack so made by Russia would be considered as an attack against each and all of the signatories, as I understand it. You so understand it too, do you not?

Mr. Patterson. I so understand it.

Senator Donnell. And then it is provided that “Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, you recall the fact that among the permanent members of the Security Council is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is to say, Russia. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And also that in matters of this type the Security Council, I take it, could act only by unanimous vote. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. In the event of such a war by Russia against any one of these signatories, do you think it would be merely a temporary measure that would be taken under the North Atlantic Treaty? In other words, how long would it be before Russia, as a member of the Security Council, would vote in favor of approving the measures taken against her?

Mr. Patterson. They never would, of course.

Senator Donnell. So that in that particular instance, instead of the North Atlantic Treaty providing for a merely temporary expedient to be replaced by action of the Security Council, the temporary expedient would be the permanent one.

Mr. Patterson. In that case you put, yes. But still the language is good language, because you can have temporary measures that would last only a week, another a month, and another maybe years.

Senator Donnell. I realize that that is entirely possible, and I have no criticism of the language of the treaty, but the substance of it, because of the fact that the potential enemy of these various nations is Russia, is this, that to my mind the practical effect is virtually nil; that is, the practical effect of this last sentence in article 5, in any

Senator Donnell. I realize that that is entirely possible, and I think you would agree with that, would you not?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, I would.

Senator Donnell. I want to take this opportunity to express first my great appreciation of your frankness. It has been very characteristic of you. As you know, we have been friends for some years. We met in my own home State under very interesting surroundings, as you remember.

Mr. Patterson. When you were Governor.

Senator Donnell. I want to ask you this: In addition to being Secretary of War and having served upon the United States circuit court of appeals, you are today the president of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, are you not?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And a committee of that organization has been appointed of which Mr. Adolph Berle is the chairman, which is expected to report tonight on the subject of the North Atlantic Treaty. That is correct, is it not?
Mr. Patterson. Mr. Berle is chairman of the committee of the Association of the Bar on International Law. I think he is due to make a report tonight. I expect to hear it in a few hours.

Senator Donnell. I understood, and as you say, you are now the president of the organization?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. I do not know what his report is going to be.

Senator Donnell. In substance, portions of it were set out yesterday in the New York Times, Mr. Secretary.

I am not going to infringe on the propriety of your modesty to ask you as to the prospects of reelection, which I am not in any sense bringing up in satire or criticism but in compliment, in fact. The paper does indicate that you will be reelected at that meeting.

Mr. Patterson. That is very good news.

Senator Donnell. It is perfectly clear that that is not in any sense that I am using any sarcasm about you, but I know that the committee was appointed by yourself and you are president of it, and Mr. Berle is to present the report.

Mr. Patterson. The committee of which Mr. Berle is the chairman was appointed a year ago. It is not a special committee for this project.

Senator Donnell. As I understand, it is a permanent committee.

Mr. Patterson. It is a committee that has been in existence for many years, and Mr. Berle became chairman of it by my appointment just a year ago.

Senator Donnell. The term of this North Atlantic Treaty is how long?

Mr. Patterson. Twenty years.

PROVISIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL OR EXPULSION

Senator Donnell. Is there any provision in it by which any nation may either itself voluntarily withdraw or be involuntarily expelled from the community forming the treaty?

Mr. Patterson. Not that I know of.

Senator Donnell. So it is a 20-year obligation?

Mr. Patterson. A 20-year engagement.

Senator Donnell. There is a provision regarding a review of the treaty at the end of 10 years, but that does not constitute any provision for withdrawal or expulsion.

Mr. Patterson. I would say not.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, do you know Prof. Edwin Borchard, of Yale University?

Mr. Patterson. No.

Senator Donnell. You refer in your statement in this language: "Moscow, it will bear repeating, pays strict attention to physical power." Am I correct in inferring from that statement that Russia would be deterred much more effectively by a powerful, or to adopt the language of the President of the United States, "an overwhelming" force than it would be by a mere signature of a pact, than by a mere small display of force? Am I correct in that?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
NEED FOR AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, have you given attention to the question as to whether or not Europe—that is to say the countries signatory to this pact in Europe—could successfully slow up and retard the coming in of Russian troops and the overrunning of that country without the assistance of United States troops joining with European troops?

Mr. Patterson. I believe that in the event of a march to the West by Russia there are elements of military strength in the countries of Europe still present.

Senator Donnell. Do you regard those elements of strength which are still present are sufficient to hold back Russia and prevent her from overrunning Europe and leaving Europe subject to the slow process of liberation as took place in the war against Germany, the Second World War?

Mr. Patterson. I do not think anybody could say. You mean without the help of the United States?

Senator Donnell. Yes.

Mr. Patterson. I do not think anybody could say. That would be a very doubtful matter, in my opinion.

MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY

Senator Donnell. You say in your statement:

In the presence of that combined strength—

and that combined strength is the strength under this North Atlantic Treaty, I take it—

In the resources it takes to wage war the autocrats in the Kremlin will see no prospect of victory and will not give their soldiers the word to march.

I take it in view of that statement and others which you have made that you do regard the military implementation of that treaty as a very substantial and material and important element in the effectiveness of the treaty, is that right?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Have you given consideration to how much of actual money or the equivalent of money would be required to properly implement this treaty, the money to which I refer being that to be put up by the United States in the next 4 or 5 years?

Mr. Patterson. Some consideration, but not detailed study. I think the amount mentioned and requested by the State Department is right.

Senator Donnell. That is the $1,130,000,000?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And that is, of course, for the first year?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. You have not given consideration, Mr. Secretary, or have you, to the probabilities of what will be required for the second, third, and fourth years?

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I regret it extremely, but I am going to have to leave. I did not anticipate this would take up so much time, and Senator McMahon will conclude the hearing. I apologize. We have some representatives of the British dominions over at the
office. I had made an engagement to see them and extend some
courtesies.

I want to congratulate you on your very clear and your very able
view on this question, in all of which I most heartily concur.

Senator McMahon, will you take over? There is only one other
witness.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, I assure you I shall not infringe
very much longer upon your time either.

PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK

I wanted to ask you a question, the substance of which has been
presented to several witnesses on the stand, and that is this: Suppose
that this treaty shall be ratified, shall come into effect, and that we will
say 6 weeks after it has come into effect Russia should send into Norway
an attacking force of 500,000 troops, and that at the time the troops
were so sent into Norway the Congress of the United States should not
be in session. Would you, Mr. Secretary, be of the opinion that the
President of the United States, by virtue of his being Commander in
Chief of the armed forces, would have the legal right to determine
what, if any, military action should be taken by our country prior to
the assembling of Congress, by reason of the attack so made by Russia,
and in view of the obligations under the treaty?

Mr. Patterson. I would expect the President to immediately sum-
mmon Congress into special session, and I would expect Congress at that
time to make the necessary declaration of war.

Senator Donnell. So that you would consider that in the eventuality
that I have mentioned the most probable result would be a declaration
of war by Congress?

Mr. Patterson. I would.

Senator Donnell. And that means by both Houses of Congress?

Mr. Patterson. It is their prerogative. But it would be my expecta-
tion, after the signature to the North Atlantic Pact and the ratification
of it, that that would be up to the Congress.

Senator Donnell. So that the signing of the pact and the ratification
of it, to quote your words, among the provisions of it being that
“the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all”—you say that such signing and ratification of the pact would, in
your judgment, plus the circumstances of attack by the 500,000 soldiers,
produce inevitably, I assume you in effect judge, a declaration of war
by Congress?

Mr. Patterson. I would expect Congress to take that action; yes, sir.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Secretary, suppose, however, that the
Congress could not be assembled, we will say, within 2 or 3 days, and
that in the meantime the President should be advised by the Secretary
of Defense or his other military advisers that in order to prevent Rus-
sia from obtaining such tremendous advantage as might result in her
being able to conquer the European nations attacked—that and the
others—it was of the utmost importance that he should immediately
dispatch bombers in great numbers from the United States of America before he waited for Congress to come together; is there any doubt in your mind as to his power to do that?

Mr. Patterson. I think he could easily dispatch them; yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. You have no doubt as to his power to do so, in compliance with the obligations of the United States under the pact!

Mr. Patterson. But Congress still has the power to declare war, and he has not.

Senator Donnell. I think that is precisely correct. But you do think that the necessary, or at least the most probable, effect of the facts that I have recited would be that Congress would feel it would be obligatory upon it to declare war and would do so. Is that right?

Mr. Patterson. In the case you put; yes.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACT

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, in your concluding paragraph you say, "After the pact has been ratified, the Atlantic Union Committee proposes that the Senate examine the project for Atlantic union as a means of implementing the pact by a firmer union of the people who are free and are honestly devoted to the cause of world peace." You consider, therefore, as I understand, that this Atlantic union of free countries of the world, which would include the United States, would, as you say, be a project, as I understand it, to be used "as a means of implementing the pact." Is that right?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Do you have in mind what additional implementation would be needed for this pact, other than what is already set forth in it, in the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. Patterson. No. You can have the North Atlantic Pact and means of implementing or exercising it and still not have an Atlantic union. That is true.

Senator Donnell. As a matter of fact, article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

That section would certainly provide adequate powers for the implementation of the treaty, would it not?

Mr. Patterson. That is right. The idea of the Atlantic union is an extension rather than an implementation of the pact. I do not think my language was very good in that particular.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the Atlantic Union Committee, Mr. Justice Roberts kindly gave us the list of the members of the council. You have a council, I believe, of possibly 150 or 200 members, something like that; is that correct?

Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. I think he said to us that the membership has not as yet been formed; that is to say, no great number of people have become members. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Patterson. It is still in process of formation.
Senator DONNELL. So that at the present time how many persons, substantially, would you say compose the Atlantic Union Committee for which you today appear, in all of its branches, committees, councils, or just ordinary members? How many persons?

Mr. PATTERSON. I would not have any idea.

Senator DONNELL. Would you say, Mr. Secretary, it would be as many as 250?

Mr. PATTERSON. Whatever number Justice Roberts says would suit me. He knows much more about it than I do.

Senator DONNELL. Have you been particularly active in the affairs of the committee, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, as active as I could be, but I have a living to make.

Senator DONNELL. How many times has this committee met since it was organized?

Mr. PATTERSON. It has met a good many times, but I have not been to many meetings.

Senator DONNELL. And it was organized, if I am not mistaken, about 8 weeks ago?

Mr. PATTERSON. Sometime in March, I believe.

Senator DONNELL. And of its membership today, about what proportion of it is in New York, do you know?

Mr. PATTERSON. I have no idea.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you and the committee for the courtesy of permitting me to interrogate you.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Senator McMHAON. Mr. Secretary, this treaty does not add or subtract from the President's constitutional powers, does it?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir.

Senator McMHAON. As I understand this proposed Atlantic union, and I must confess I understand it in a most limited way at the present time, it is your objective to explore what could be done to bring about closer union among the free countries. That is the basic thought, is it not?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Senator McMHAON. Senator Donnell asked you many questions about a specific blueprint, and you said that, of course, you could not give it. I suppose that blueprint would come out of the discussion between selected representatives of free countries, if that meeting were held?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. That is quite a distance off.

Senator McMHAON. And that is quite a distance off?

Of course, when the framers of the Federal Constitution met, it was for the purpose of framing the charter which we know as the Constitution of the United States, and in that Constitution the States granted certain powers to the Federal Government, reserving all other powers to themselves. I suppose you have something of that nature in mind?

Mr. PATTERSON. The same approach.
Senator McMahon. I just wanted to clear that up for the record. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Patterson. It is good to see you again.

We have Mrs. Dana C. Backus, the interim chairman of the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace. Mrs. Backus, you may go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF MRS. DANA C. BACKUS, INTERIM NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE

Mrs. Backus. It may seem strange to some that an organization of women dedicated to the cause of lasting peace should be urging the ratification of a military pact, even though that pact is of a purely defensive nature.

Because our hearts are set on lasting peace, it would be nice if we could join the ranks of those who feel that the way for this country to achieve peace is to say that we won't fight and that we will disarm. The difficulty with that isolationist-pacifist approach is that it won't work unless every nation agrees to it and puts it into practice. The other approach to lasting peace, of course, is through collective consultation to settle disputes and collective action to prevent or stop aggression.

Last fall, when the North Atlantic Defense Pact was still only a rumor as far as the public was concerned, the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace adopted the following policy as part of its legislative program for the coming year.

Grant security guarantees and military aid to western Europe on terms that would be in accord with article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The stated purpose of our organization is—to unite American women to work for full participation by the United States in the United Nations and related efforts to build a world of peace and justice under law.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PACT

When the North Atlantic Defense Pact was published, we analyzed it from the point of view of these two statements. We consider that both the letter and the spirit of the pact are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

I need scarcely quote the text of the pact to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee but, just to show that I have read it too, I would like to bring out these points. The signers of the pact not only give a general pledge to abide by the principles and purposes of the Charter, they commit themselves to carrying out certain specific procedures called for under the articles of the Charter. I refer particularly to the following passage in the pact:

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures will be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measure necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

We are convinced that the North Atlantic Pact is a well-considered and useful document. However, no treaty can of itself keep the peace. The effectiveness of the pact must be based on action, not on words alone. There are two aspects of the implementation of the pact which
the people of the United States must consider. One is a decision which this country must make now for itself; the other depends on continuous consultation among all the signatories of the pact.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PACT

The first step which this country must take is to prove that we mean what we say in the pact by supplying our colleagues, as well as ourselves, with the physical means of carrying out the defense pact. Defense without weapons is an empty word. If an armed attack should occur in Europe and our friends were not adequately armed, we would either have to forget the pact or let the armed forces of the United States do the job of stopping aggression. Military aid provided now will enable the nations of Europe to help defend themselves in case of emergency.

The second aspect of implementing the pact involves the practical interpretation of its provisions. What constitutes an armed attack? What measures will be necessary to counter that particular attack? Above all, what will be the practical day-to-day relationship between the pact and the UN?

The pact itself provides for integration with the United Nations. In practice the nations who join the pact may either use article 9 as the basis of a separate little club for conferring outside the UN, or it can carry out the stated intent of the pact, which is to supplement and strengthen the United Nations. We urge that the latter course be followed.

Our organization does not consider that the North Atlantic Defense Pact is the sole or even the primary solution of the security problem. The settlement of disputes through negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration will always be the world's best hope for lasting peace. We have watched with interest and hope the slow but steady progress of the United Nations in developing practical techniques and achieving practical results in this field.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE PACT

Peace, however, depends not only on cooperation alone but on security against those who refuse to cooperate. For this reason the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace has always urged prompt agreement concerning armed forces to be made available to the Security Council; we have greeted with enthusiasm the proposal for a United Nations guard force; and we have studied various proposals for developing security commitments under article 51 of the Charter.

To tie in the implementation of the Atlantic Pact to the obligations under the Charter, we suggest action under article 43 of the Charter. The group of UN members in the Atlantic Pact might well offer to the Security Council to make available a mobile task force. Then, on the initiative of the Security Council, were it so minded, a special agreement for armed forces for the United Nations could be negotiated. If a veto were to intervene, the mobile force could be made available for use under General Assembly resolutions calling for its use for which the larger Atlantic Pact members have voted affirmation.

We feel that in view of the current lack of unity between East and
West which manifests itself both within and outside the United Nations, the North Atlantic Defense Pact is a necessary step in the effort to provide a temporary security against disunity. We feel, however, that while Europe is the focal center of our security problem it is not the only danger point in the world. We must never lose sight of the global nature of our security.

Our organization would like to suggest that in addition to ratifying the North Atlantic Defense Pact and appropriating funds for arming our friends under the pact, the Congress, and this committee in particular, might well consider the advisability of a multilateral security pact open to all members of the United Nations and tied in with the machinery of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Senator McMahon. Thank you very much.

Senator Donnell?

HISTORY OF WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE

Senator Donnell. Mrs. Backus, you appear today on behalf of the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace?

Mrs. Backus. Yes; that is right.

Senator Donnell. You are the interim national chairman of that organization?

Mrs. Backus. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. How long have you acted as interim national chairman?

Mrs. Backus. For a little over a year.

Senator Donnell. What is that committee? Tell us, please, as to the number of members and how widely spread geographically.

Mrs. Backus. To go back historically a little bit, the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace is an outgrowth of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, which was founded under the inspiration of the late Carrie Chapman Catt in the 1920's, and it was in 1942, I believe, that that committee, after Pearl Harbor, felt that merely to study the cause and cure of war at the time we were plunging into another World War would not be a very effective approach, and therefore that committee disbanded and the Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace, which was our name during the war, was created out of the ashes, shall we say, of the older organization.

Senator Donnell. What was the date of the creation, then, of the Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace?

Mrs. Backus. That was created in March of 1943. It was just the time of the famous B2-H2 bill that went through before there was a United Nations or Dumbarton Oaks.

Senator Donnell. Subsequently the words "Victory and" were stricken out, and the present title is "Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace"?

Mrs. Backus. That is right.

MEMBERSHIP OF WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE

Senator Donnell. How large a membership does the committee have?

Mrs. Backus. We are both a holding company and an organization of individual members also. There have been 14 national mem-
ber organizations, women's organizations, who have been affiliated with us and who have had representation on our general committee, which is our board, and then in addition to that we have now about 11,000 individual women members.

Senator DONNELL. How widely scattered are the 11,000?

Mrs. BACKUS. Throughout the United States.

ATLANTIC PACT DISCUSSIONS OF WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE

Senator DONNELL. You say that last fall the committee adopted the policy sentence you just read, in which you refer to article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Where was that convention held, and how large was the attendance?

Mrs. BACKUS. That particular policy was not adopted at a convention.

Senator DONNELL. At what was it adopted?

Mrs. BACKUS. I will explain that to you also.

Actually our general committee, our board, is our policy governing group.

Senator DONNELL. How large a body is that board?

Mrs. BACKUS. That is about 65 members, but there again I have to go back into history a little bit, if I may. At our convention which was held in Washington a year ago April, the delegates at that convention did bring up the subject of implementation of the United Nations Charter under article 51. Actually that subject was brought up by one of our local groups, one of our very strong local groups, in Buffalo, N. Y. At that time various plans were discussed.

Senator DONNELL. It is all right, but I would like to make this statement. I just wanted to find out approximately how large a body it was which last fall adopted this expression which you quote as a part of the legislative program for 1949:

Grant security guarantees and military aid to western Europe on terms that would be in accord with article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Mrs. BACKUS. That was 65, but I do not think, without that background, it would give quite a fair picture. In other words, the general principle of either a general multilateral pact, a universal pact under article 51, or possibly some regional set-up under article 51, that overall principle, was accepted at our convention over a year ago, and the general committee was asked to consult with our national consultants, with our member organizations and with our local groups, as to ways and means of putting that into more concrete terms, and therefore last fall, when our new policies were set up, we had in consultation with these various groups worked through and thought through the development of that idea, and that is why we were in a position last fall to put that statement in among our policies.

Senator DONNELL. The convention that you speak of a year or more ago, where was that held?

Mrs. BACKUS. That was in Washington.

Senator DONNELL. How largely was that attended?

Mrs. BACKUS. That was attended by about 200 representatives from throughout the country.

Senator DONNELL. Were these mostly from one section of the country or were they from all over?

Mrs. BACKUS. They were from all over.
Senator DONNELL. Just one further question along this line. You say, after telling us in your written statement of the adoption of this particular sentence that I have quoted, beginning with the words "Grant security guarantees and military aid • • •", as part of the program for the coming year, "When the North Atlantic Defense Pact was published, we analyzed it from the point of view of these two statements," referring to that statement and another. Has your membership had a convention and acted at all upon the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mrs. BACKUS. It has not acted as a body.

Senator DONNELL. Who is it that you refer to when you say "we" analyzed it?

Mrs. BACKUS. There again it is the policy forming board of directors.

Senator DONNELL. Has it held a meeting since last fall?

Mrs. BACKUS. Oh, yes; it holds a meeting once a month.

Senator DONNELL. And has that board passed any resolution with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mrs. BACKUS. Yes, it has.

Senator DONNELL. Did you bring that with you today?

Mrs. BACKUS. That I do not have, but the resolution itself was merely confirming the general action taken last fall, and saying that we feel the North Atlantic Pact lies within, as I stated, the U. N., and our purpose of supporting the United Nations.

Senator DONNELL. Would you be good enough, if it meets with the approval of the acting chairman of the committee, to furnish the chairman of the committee with a copy of each and all expressions, official expressions, by any committee or board of your national organization which has occurred since the meeting last fall, which was participated in by the 65 members whom you have mentioned? Will you do that?

Mr. BACKUS. I will.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., May 10, 1949.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO TESTIMONY PRESENTED BEFORE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, MAY 9, 1949, BY THE WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE, INC.

On November 4, 1948, our board (general committee) adopted the policy regarding security guarantees and military aid quoted in my previous testimony. This subject had been discussed also at the October meeting of our general committee. In December our full new statement of policies was mailed out to all of our cooperating organizations and local groups (see exhibit A) and a summary of our new policy statement was included in our monthly chairman's letter which goes to all of our individual members (see exhibit B).

On March 3, 1949, the general committee empowered me to write to each of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee indicating our support of the general principles of the proposed North Atlantic Pact, together with military aid to implement that pact. A summary of this letter was sent to all of our members in our March chairman's letter (see exhibit C).

During April members of our general committee and executive committee studied the published pact and attended several meetings of citizen's groups at which the pact was discussed. An informal statement regarding a possible integration between articles 3 and 5 of the pact and article 43 of the Charter was drafted but has not been officially acted upon.

On April 29, after informal consultation with members of our executive committee, I followed the advice of our Washington chairman of governmental information and requested a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee.
On May 5 our general committee empowered me to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee in support of the pact. In discussing this move, note was taken of the fact that we have not had an annual convention this year. It was pointed out, however, that (1) at our 1948 convention the idea of defense pacts under article 51 of the United Nations Charter had been discussed and had received general approval; (2) the subsequent action of our general committee had been fully publicized to the members and ample background information on this subject had been circulated to our members over a period of 6 months; (3) during this period we had received less than a dozen letters from our members questioning the committee’s stand and only two voicing strong criticism.

EXHIBIT A. STATEMENT OF POLICY

The concern of the Women’s Action Committee for Lasting Peace is with United Nations recommendations and agreements and with congressional and executive action by the United States Government concerning foreign policy or closely related matters. When a measure is before the United Nations, we may present our stand to the United States delegates to the United Nations and to the executive branch of our Government. When measures adopted in the United Nations require action by the United States, we may urge such action upon Congress and upon the appropriate Government agencies.

I. The Women’s Action Committee for Lasting Peace urges that Congress shall—

A. Give continued support to the European recovery program, with the appropriation of adequate funds to enable the Economic Cooperation Administration to carry on effectively.

B. Encourage and expand international trade by—

1. Prompt approval of United States membership in the International Trade Organization under the terms of the Habana charter, with adequate enabling legislation to provide for effective participation.

2. Continued authority to the executive, not subject to congressional veto, for negotiating reciprocal trade agreements under a unified system for the planning and administration of United States trade policy.

C. Grant security guaranties and military aid to western Europe on terms that would be in accord with article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

D. Amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 to provide—

1. Admission of a greater number of refugees.

2. Elimination of discrimination for eligibility of refugees.

3. Elimination of cut-off date of December 22, 1945, for eligibility of refugees.

4. Efficient and humane administration.

E. Authorize and appropriate funds for an adequate and carefully planned program of international information and educational exchange.

F. Appropriate promptly $65,000,000 for the building loan and pass measures necessary to the establishment of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations in the United States.

G. Revise or repeal the prewar neutrality acts to bring our national policy into line with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and our other collective security commitments.

H. Pass domestic legislation which will give concrete effect to the international declaration of human rights.

I. Ratify the international convention outlawing genocide.

J. Approve an amendment to the United States Constitution to provide for ratification of treaties by a simple majority of both Houses of Congress.

II. The Women’s Action Committee for Lasting Peace urges that our Government continue to support the United Nations in the full exercise of its powers as conferred by the Charter. We recommend that particular attention be given to the following measures now before the United Nations:

A. Full use of the General Assembly as a medium for registering the will of the nations on matters involving international peace and security, including the permanent establishment of a year-round committee of the Assembly.

B. Fulfillment of the recommendations of the Interim committee with regard to the application of the veto; particularly with respect to not using the veto in the case of peaceful settlement, or admission of new members.

C. Progress toward eventual international reduction and limitation of armaments, stressing at this time:
(a) Continued search through the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission for new areas of agreement on the effective International control of atomic energy. Pending further developments we continue to support:  
   1. The setting up of an International Atomic Energy Development Authority along the lines of the majority reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.  
(b) Conclusion as rapidly as possible of agreements for contingent forces to be furnished to the Security Council.  
D. Establishment of a United Nations guard force immediately available to perform duties of a protective nature.  
E. Admission of Israel as a member of the United Nations. Agreement on a just and peaceful settlement in Palestine.  
F. Full use of the Economic and Social Council and its commissions not only for study and discussion but as a medium for solving specific problems and developing constructive projects.  
G. Provisions for the free exchange of information among nations.  
H. Adoption of an international convention on human rights with adequate provisions for implementation.  
I. Development and codification of international law.

EXHIBIT B

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., NOVEMBER 1948.

DEAR MEMBER OR SPONSOR: High lights of the meeting of the general committee, November 4, were as follows:  

--- New policy statement.---The general committee approved a revised statement of policy. The most important items in the new statement are:  
I. Legislative program:  
A. Adequate funds for the continuation of the European recovery program.  
B. (1) United States membership in the International Trade Organization; (2) continuation of the executive authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements without congressional veto.  
C. Security guarantees and military aid to western Europe.  
Other legislative measures to have our support include (1) international and cultural exchange; (2) appropriation of the United Nations building loan authorized last summer; (3) revision of the prewar neutrality acts; (4) domestic support of the international declaration of human rights; (5) ratification of treaties by a simple majority of both Houses of Congress.  
II. Measures before the United Nations:  
A. Permanent establishment of a year-round committee of the Assembly.  
B. Fulfillment of recommendations of the Little Assembly concerning the use of the veto.  
C. Agreement on the international control of atomic energy.  
D. Agreement on the forces to be made available to the Security Council.  
F. (1) Admission of Israel to the United Nations; (2) agreement on a just and peaceful settlement in Palestine.  
Other items include (1) full use of the Economic and Social Council; (2) free exchange of information; (3) a convention on human rights; (4) a convention on genocide; (5) development and codification of international law.

LOUISE LAIDLAW BACKUS,  
Interim National Chairman.

EXHIBIT C

WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE,  
NEW YORK 22, N. Y., MARCH 1949.

DEAR MEMBER OR SPONSOR: The following is a summary of discussions and decisions at the meeting of the general committee on March 3, 1949.

--- Full text of the revised statement of policies will be available on request.
North Atlantic Pact.—Our committee on governmental information advised us that Congress has had little reaction so far from the country at large concerning the proposed North Atlantic Pact. The general committee voted to send a letter to all members of the Foreign Relations Committee asking that when the pact is presented to the Senate every effort should be made to give prompt and favorable consideration both to the pact and to supplementary legislation for military aid. The letter also contained the following points:

1. "We consider that the pact will lose much of its value unless it contains specific, though perhaps limited, commitments for the prompt use of military force in case of an armed attack.

2. "We feel strongly that the pact should be definitely tied in with our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

3. "It might be advisable to consider, in addition to the North Atlantic Pact, some broader commitment for collective action under article 51 of the United Nations Charter that would be open to all members of the United Nations."

Louise Laidlaw Backus,
(Mrs. Dana Converse Backus),
Interim National Chairman.

EXHIBIT D. RESOLUTION ON ARMSTRONG PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE CHARTER
ADOPTED BY THE WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE AT ITS FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION APRIL 7-9, 1948

Whereas it is daily becoming increasingly apparent that the power of the United Nations must be strengthened; and

Whereas the use of the veto in the Security Council is one of the major factors in the situation; and

Whereas the studies of this subject recently begun by the interim committee of the Assembly, on the initiative of the United States delegation, will in all probability take a considerable length of time; and

Whereas revision of the Charter at this time would be a most difficult and hazardous task;

The delegates to the annual convention of the Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace recommend that the general committee, in cooperation with the consultants, give careful consideration to the Armstrong plan for the implementation of article 51 of the Charter, by a supplementary agreement, binding as many nations as may desire, in a pact of collective self-defense, as has already been done in the Western Hemisphere, and more recently in Brussels.

EXHIBIT E. STATEMENT OF THE WOMEN'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR LASTING PEACE CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

In the present state of the world, the strength of the United Nations must at times rest on the power of the Security Council to use force. Ultimately it rests upon the determination of the member nations to cooperate in building up a system of collective security which can effectively prevent or check aggression. The Women's Action Committee considers that it is most unfortunate that there are still no armed forces immediately available to the United Nations.

There are three types of circumstances which warrant the use of armed force within the framework of the United Nations.

1. The Security Council may take military measures to restore international peace and security.

2. It may also take military measures to maintain international peace and security.

3. Individual nations have the right of self defense, both individual and collective, in case of an armed attack.

1. Armed forces.—Under article 43 of the Charter member nations are, by special agreement, to make available to the Security Council a specified number of armed forces and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. In case the Security Council found it necessary to apply military sanctions to prevent or stop aggression, these national forces would be turned over for use by the Security Council under the strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the five great powers.

Under the Charter it would be impossible to use these national forces against a great power because of the veto, but they would be useful in dealing with minor international disputes and with cases of aggression on the part of smaller nations. However, because of disagreement between the great powers concern-
ing some of the principles that should govern the use of national armed forces, no such forces have yet been made available to the Security Council. It does not seem likely that agreements will be reached for some time to come. Moreover, as a matter of practical application, there will be many situations in which the use of national contingents would not be considered advisable.

2. United Nations guard force.—Before the San Francisco Conference, many organizations in the United States, including the Women’s Action Committee for Lasting Peace, advocated the setting up of an International police force directly responsible to the United Nations. At that time, however, it appeared impossible to get the great powers to agree to anything more than the joint use of national forces to maintain peace and security.

It has now become apparent that the recruiting of an international police force on a very small scale may become the first practical step toward developing force to back up the decisions of the Security Council. Recently Secretary General Trygve Lie suggested that “a beginning could be made now through the establishment of a comparatively small guard force as distinct from a striking force.” Indeed, more recently on the request of the United Nations Mediator Count Bernadotte, the Secretary General has actually sent over 50 United Nations guards to Palestine to check on the supplies being sent into Jerusalem. While the United Nations Charter does not specifically provide for such a force directly recruited under the United Nations, neither does it say anything which would prohibit such a force. Indeed, the Secretary General may, within the budgetary provisions and other regulations adopted by the General Assembly, appoint and assign whatever staff may be required by any organ of the United States. Thus, if the General Assembly wishes, it could authorize Mr. Lie to assemble a sizable guard force. It would be extremely useful to have on hand a guard force of several thousand men who could be sent to trouble spots to guard against outbreaks of violence until a solution has been reached.

Thus an adequate guard force would prove most helpful in Palestine during the truce period. Such a force should also be helpful in creating a sense of security in a situation like that in Kashmir where the chief obstacles to acceptance of the Security Council’s recommendations for a plebiscite seems to be fear on the part of both sides as to what the other side may do if it complies with the Security Council’s request to withdraw the contending forces.

3. Collective action.—Article 51 of the Charter guarantees the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. This article would come into play in an emergency pending action by the Security Council. It also would operate if for some reason the Council failed to act.

Article 51 may be implemented by regional agreements as provided in chapter VII of the Charter, or it might be implemented through a general multilateral pact under which the signatories to the pact would take action upon the recommendation of the General Assembly. The advantage of regional pacts is that they are built on a community of interest which would tend to facilitate prompt and effective action in an emergency; on the other hand, regional pacts might accentuate the current tendencies toward power politics and spheres of influence. The chief advantage of a general multilateral pact would be its approach toward universality; however, it might suffer the disadvantage of unwieldiness and lack of focused responsibility.

Article 51 opens the way for collective action in circumstances beyond the control of the Security Council, that is in case of aggression on the part of a great power. However, this article provides for the pease type of action—agreements to join forces against the aggressor after the aggression is committed. This is not a substitute for having armed forces in existence immediately at the service of the United Nations.

Conclusion.—It is the considered judgment of the Women’s Action Committee for Lasting Peace that the above methods for maintaining peace and developing collective security are in no way mutually exclusive and no one of them can be thought of as a substitute for the others. Every effort should be made to encourage the immediate development of United Nations machinery along all three lines—the joint use of national armed contingents, the development of an international guard force, and commitments for collective self-defense.

Turning to the future, the Women’s Action Committee suggests that eventually a large-scale international police force should be established. Permanent international security cannot be achieved until the world is freed of the fear of military domination by one or more of the great powers. Gradually the balance of power must be shifted to the world organization itself.
A United Nations Air Police Force would be particularly important. The development of such an international air force should be coupled with the international control of all weapons of mass destruction under a United Nations Authority along the lines of the atomic energy control plan already agreed upon by 9 out of the 11 members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

Attention should not be centered solely, however, on the use of force. It is vital that profound and sustained consideration be given to the development of machinery for conciliation and other means of peaceful settlement. The existence of United Nations forces and commitments for the use of force within the framework of the United Nations should be considered primarily as supplementary instruments for creating security and maintaining order which will facilitate negotiations leading to the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, that is all I desire to ask.

POSITION OF PROFESSOR BORCHARD

There is one matter I would like to bring to the attention of the committee at this point. Senator Connally, the chairman, made a statement the other day in the record to the effect that the last date for the application by persons to testify would be at 10:30 tomorrow morning, Tuesday morning of this week. I may tell the committee—think I ought to do this in fairness both to it and myself—that I thereupon communicated over the telephone with Professor Nettles, of Cornell University, whose name I have observed frequently in the press, and I also attempted to communicate with Prof. Edwin Borchard, of Yale University. I learned some weeks ago of the illness of Professor Borchard, although I received a telegram back from him at a time of an earlier attempt to communicate with him. I reached Mrs. Borchard on the telephone possibly Friday or Saturday of last week, and explained to her the fact that the time limit for persons to apply for permission to testify is Tuesday of this week.

She told me of the very serious illness of Professor Borchard and indicated he would not be able to be here. I made inquiry along the line of whether he would desire to present a statement, and I just left it that way, as to whether he would or would not. I have subsequently received a telegram, which is short, from Professor Borchard, which I would like, if I may, to read into the record at this point. It is dated May 7 at New Haven, Conn., and was received, I may say, in Washington May 7 at 6:16 p. m., and was telephoned to me. It is addressed:

Hon. Forrest Donnell,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:

I am entirely in accord with you as to the true meaning of the Atlantic Pact. If Gerard thinks we will be at war with Russia within 1 year if we do not sign the pact I think we shall be at war in less time if we do sign it. I am opposed to this tremendous change in our foreign policy. We are repudiating the founders of this country, but we shall be at war with or without declaration because a vote for war automatically follows the pact. An alliance is constitutional as I explained to Vandenberg.

EDWIN BORCHARD.

QUALIFICATIONS OF PROFESSOR BORCHARD

Mr. Chairman, I should like, with your permission, to introduce in connection with this statement first the current statement in Who's Who In America with respect to Professor Borchard, which
I shall furnish to the reporter; and, second, excerpts from certain remarks made on January 28, 1949, in the course of the St. Lawrence Seaway debate, by the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Member of the Senate of the United States, in which comment is made by him with respect to the experience of Professor Borchard, in which he offers a copy of a certain agreement with Professor Borchard's underlinings.

May I have the statement inserted in the record at this point?

Senator McMahon. That certainly will be done, Senator.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)


SENATOR LODGE, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, SENATE, JANUARY 28, 1948

Reverting to the 1941 compact itself, Prof. Edwin Borchard prepared in 1944 a very informative analysis of the 1941 agreement. It will be recalled that Professor Borchard has had wide experience as an official of the Department of State, a practitioner in many important cases before the Supreme Court, and other Federal and State courts; was counsel for the United States and for other governments in outstanding international arbitration; was representative of the United States on international legal commissions and for 20 years was professor of constitutional and international law at one of our leading university law schools. He is also the author of several recognized standard works on constitutional and international law. Professor Borchard took a copy of the 1941 executive agreement between the United States and Canada and underlined in that agreement those provisions which he believed, in his considered opinion, were properly the subject matter of a treaty rather than an agreement. I do not have the time and I do not want to take the time of the Senate to go through this agreement line by line, pointing out Professor Borchard's emphasis. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted at this point in my remarks a copy of the 1941 agreement between the United States and Canada, with Professor Borchard's underlinings included therein. I think that if Senators will take a look at this document, as analyzed by Professor Borchard, they will be impressed, as I am, with the fact that by every test of form, substance, and magnitude the St. Lawrence seaway and power project are most certainly well within our traditional concept of a treaty.
Senator DONNELL. I thank the Senator for his courtesy.

Senator McMAHON. Senator, I direct your attention to the fact that I not only have a luncheon engagement, but I want to eat. We have two more witnesses here, the first of which is Mr. Fadler, of the Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia. I understand you want only 2 or 3 minutes, Mr. Fadler.

Mr. FADLER. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. That is, 3 minutes with me, but how long with Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. I did not catch that.

Senator McMAHON. Maybe it is just as well.

He promised me he would take only 3 minutes, and I hoped he would not have much more than that with you, because I want to go to lunch, and also see if I can make an appearance on the floor.

Go ahead, Mr. Fadler.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. FADLER, JR., MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, YOUNG DEMOCRATIC CLUB OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. FADLER. Mr. Chairman, my name is William F. Fadler, Jr. I am a practicing attorney in the District of Columbia with offices in the Union Trust Building.

I am happy to have the opportunity to appear in behalf of the Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia as a member of its legislative committee.

The Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia is an organization composed of 400 young men and women, nearly all the men being veterans, in the District of Columbia, who are actively interested in governmental affairs and have organized to foster and perpetuate the ideals and principles of the Democratic Party.

Although our organization is located in the District of Columbia, over 90 percent of the members maintain a voting residence in various States throughout the country.

RESOLUTION OF YOUNG DEMOCRATIC CLUB

At a regular meeting of the club on April 18, 1949, the following resolution was passed, which constituted an endorsement of the North Atlantic Treaty:

Whereas the American people earnestly desire assurances of peace in these troubled times; and

Whereas under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman and through the earnest efforts of the Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State for the United States, and through the efforts of other outstanding statesmen in both the legislative and executive branches of the Government, the United States has signed the Atlantic Pact; and

Whereas the free peoples of the world look to the Atlantic Pact and the United States as bulwarks of their freedom; and

Whereas the Atlantic Pact is an instrument of peace and is properly entered into under the provisions of both the Constitution of the United States and under the articles of the United Nations Charter: Now, therefore,

We, the Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia, in regular meeting assembled, do hereby earnestly petition the Senate of the United States to ratify promptly the Atlantic Pact and to thus show the world that the United
States is not an aggressor, but rather a country which is jealous of the freedoms of its peoples and which believes that freedom can best be protected by joining with other freedom-loving peoples in an effort to preserve the peace of the world.

MEMBERSHIP OF YOUNG DEMOCRATIC CLUB

Senator McMahon. How many members have you in your club?
Mr. Fadler. About 400, sir.
Senator McMahon. How many were at the meeting?
Mr. Fadler. A few over 100. I was at the meeting.
Senator McMahon. Was the matter carefully debated?
Mr. Fadler. It was, sir. I think the meeting lasted for about 2 hours. Of course the legislative committee had previously discussed it at great length.

Senator Donnell. Was a copy of the North Atlantic Treaty read to the meeting?
Mr. Fadler. It was not read in open meeting. However, it was debated and deliberated upon by the legislative committee, and there were pros and cons of the deliberation presented to the group, both sides.

Senator Donnell. How many members are there of the legislative committee who considered the actual text of the North Atlantic Treaty?
Mr. Fadler. Approximately 20, sir.
Senator Donnell. And those are lawyers in the District of Columbia, is that right?
Mr. Fadler. I would say a good portion of them—lawyers and law students. They are young Democrats.

Senator Donnell. I am sure that the fact of the youth of the members is no argument against them. It is very commendable indeed that they are studying these questions. I am glad they are. At any rate, there were about 20 members of the committee who did?

Mr. Fadler. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Are they all members of the Democratic Party?
Mr. Fadler. They are all members of the Young Democratic Club.

Senator Donnell. And one of the qualifications for membership is membership in the Democratic Party?

Mr. Fadler. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. I believe you said, though, that the treaty itself was not read to this gathering of 100, the meeting which actually passed on the matter?

Mr. Fadler. No, sir; it was not.

Senator Donnell. That is all.

Senator McMahon. Thank you very much.

Mr. F. B. Ely III.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. ELY III, ESQ., ATTORNEY, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Mr. Ely. This is a problem which I have studied intensely for the last few years, the problem of how one may work for the form of world government that the Secretary of War mentioned. The proposal which I offer to the committee was characterized by the editors
of the American Bar Association Journal, whose editorial staff have characterized it, in volume XXXV, American Bar Association Journal, page 3132, as—

a closely reasoned proposal for the creation of an important instrument for promotion of greater international understanding, and through that understanding of a more secure peace for the world.

The proposal is that as a preliminary step to the type of world order which the Secretary mentioned—

Senator McMahon. I think it is important that we keep the record straight. The Secretary specifically put aside world government as that is commonly known, and talked about a closer union between this country and the free countries of the world.

Mr. Ely. That is right, sir. That is the essence of what I have in mind as a first step toward the union, not toward a complete world federation. I think that is completely visionary, and I would echo Senator Austin's words quoted in yesterday's Times on that.

INTERNATIONAL COURTS

My proposal is that as a step toward world order we take a repetition of what our English ancestors found as the first step toward the development of the reign of law which we rejoice in today; that is to say, the establishment of additional international courts, through whom and through whose daily operations in the activities of individuals international law can be given a real meaning, so that people will appreciate not only that it exists, but that it works, and I conclude only by reading from the statement, and this is all I shall read from it, the specifications which such a court should meet, and which it seems to me that the council established under the Atlantic Pact might devote its attention to and act as a drafting committee in preparing a protocol for. I say "a court;" I should have said "a series of courts."

The proposed courts must be created by the United Nations, as the supreme authority in international affairs.

They should be created by the General Assembly of that Organization, in view of its duty under article 13 of the Charter to encourage "the progressive development of international law," and its authority under article 22 "to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary."

The proposed courts must be subsidiary to the International Court of Justice, designated by article 92 of the Charter as "the principal Judicial organ of the United Nations."

Their jurisdiction, although it should be compulsory so far as it extends, should only be imposed with the unanimous consent of the countries concerned.

That jurisdiction should extend to individuals, corporations, and other legal entities, as well as states, in the same manner as does the jurisdiction of the national courts in the countries concerned.

On that we have the authority of our Ambassador to the United Nations, that the keystone of a revised international law is its application to individuals.

That jurisdiction should, for the present at least, be civil only—in order to avoid a premature venture into the highly controversial and ill-defined criminal field.

It should also, for the present, be appellate only, so that there may be no sudden and unnecessary departure from established national trial procedures.

The decisions of the proposed courts should, in the interest of certainty and uniformity, be superior to rulings of national courts on questions of inter-
national law; just as constitutional considerations require decisions of national
courts of last resort to be supreme in questions of national law.

Similarly, the decisions of the proposed courts should be given in the field of
international law the same force as precedents as, in the field of national law,
is given under the doctrine of stare decisis.

The argument in favor of such a proposal would go on for far
greater length than I know you want. I would, however, with your
permission, like to submit for the record a draft of a statute such as
that which the United Nations General Assembly might enact to bring
into being such a set of courts, and an article written by me for the
American Bar Association Journal.

(The draft of statute referred to is as follows:)

(Drafted by Robert B. Ely III, Philadelphia, Pa., April 22, 1949)

PROTOCOL FOR STATUTE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF CIVIL APPEALS

PREAMBLE

We, the peoples of the states signatory to the present protocol, believing that
the progressive development of international law would be effectively promoted
through the establishment of permanent international judicial machinery for the
enforcement of the rights and duties of individuals, associations, and other legal
entities, as well as states, under international law, have resolved to combine
our efforts as members of the United Nations to assist that Organization in the
accomplishment of that aim.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through their duly authorized rep-
resentatives, have agreed to present to the General Assembly of the United
Nations for enactment the present statute establishing International Courts of
Civil Appeals as subsidiary judicial organs of the United Nations:

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF CIVIL APPEALS

Article 1

We, the peoples of the states signatory to the present protocol, believing that
the progressive development of international law would be effectively promoted
through the establishment of permanent international judicial machinery for the
enforcement of the rights and duties of individuals, associations, and other legal
entities, as well as states, under international law, have resolved to combine
our efforts as members of the United Nations to assist that Organization in the
accomplishment of that aim.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through their duly authorized rep-
resentatives, have agreed to present to the General Assembly of the United
Nations for enactment the present statute establishing International Courts of
Civil Appeals as subsidiary judicial organs of the United Nations:

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF CIVIL APPEALS

Article 1

The International Courts of Civil Appeals, hereinafter described for the sake
of brevity as the “Courts,” established by the General Assembly of the United
Nations as subsidiary judicial organs of that Organization, shall be constituted
and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present statute.

Chapter I. Organization of the Courts

Article 2

1. Each Court shall be composed of a President and Associate Judges chosen
in the manner hereinafter provided.

2. The President of each Court shall be that judge of the International Court
of Justice who shall be from time to time designated by rule of that Court to
exercise this office.

3. The Associate Judges of each Court shall be those persons who shall be
appointed in the numbers specified in section 5 of this article by the governments
of the countries signatory to the present statute in the same manner as though
appointed to the supreme court of the country in question, shall file with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations a written agreement to accept such
office in accordance with this statute, and shall be confirmed in such office by the
General Assembly of the United Nations.

4. The Associate Judges of the Courts shall be commissioned by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations in the name of that Organization.

5. The countries signatory to the present statute are grouped into the following
judicial districts, for each of which there shall be one Court, and each country
shall select Associate Judges for the Court of its district in the number specified:

[This division into districts to be as the signatories may agree.]
Article 3

1. No member of a Court may exercise any political or administrative function, or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.
2. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the said Court.

Article 4

1. No member of a Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case, nor may he participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part in such or any other capacity which would incapacitate him from sitting in the national courts of the country in which the proceedings arose.
2. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the said Court.
3. If, for some special reason, a member of a Court considers that he should not take part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President of said Court.
4. If the President of a Court considers that for some special reason one of the members of the said Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly.
5. If, in either of such cases, the member of the Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Article 5

1. No member of a Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.
2. Formal notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Registrar.
3. This notification makes the place vacant.

Article 6

The members of the Courts, when engaged on the business of the Courts, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Article 7

Every member of the Courts shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously.

Article 8

The Courts shall appoint Registrars and may provide for the appointment of such other offices as may be necessary.

Article 9

The seats of the Courts and the offices of their Registrars shall be established at the site of the United Nations. However, sessions of the Courts shall be held as provided in article 11.

Article 10

1. The Courts shall remain permanently in session except during the judicial vacations, the dates and duration of which shall be fixed by the International Court of Justice.
2. The President and Associate Judges of the Courts shall be entitled to such periodic leaves as are granted them by the International Court of Justice.
3. Members of the Courts shall be bound, unless they are on leave or prevented from attending by illness or other serious reasons duly explained to the President of their respective Courts, to hold themselves permanently at the disposal of the Courts of which they are members.

Article 11

1. A quorum for a session of any of the Courts shall consist of a President and not less than the following number of Associate Judges: [as the signatories may agree].
2. Should illness or other serious reasons, as provided in article 10, or disqualification, as provided in article 4, prevent a quorum for any session of the Courts, the number of Judges requisite to complete the quorum shall be assigned by the International Court of Justice from among its own members or the members of other of the Courts hereby established.

3. Sessions of the Courts shall be held in the rooms of the national supreme courts of the countries signatory to the present statute at such times as shall be fixed by rules of the Courts with a view to the speedy dispatch of business and the convenience of the said national supreme courts.

Article 12

The Courts shall frame rules for carrying out their functions. In particular, they shall lay down rules of procedure, which shall conform as nearly as may be with the rules for appellate procedure in the courts of the nations in the district concerned.

Article 13

1. The compensation to be paid to the members of the Courts shall be fixed by the General Assembly and shall not be decreased during the term of office.
2. The salary of the Registrar and other officers of the Courts shall be fixed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the Courts.
3. Regulations made by the General Assembly shall fix the conditions under which retirement pensions may be given to the members, the Registrar, and the other officers of the Courts, and the conditions under which they shall have their traveling expenses refunded.
4. The above salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be free of all taxation.

Article 14

The expenses of the Courts shall be borne equally by the countries in their respective districts.

Chapter II. Competence of the Courts

Article 15

The jurisdiction of the Courts shall comprise all proceedings involving questions of international law as defined in article 16, arising in the national courts of the countries signatory to the present statute, which shall be certified to the Courts by the national supreme courts of those countries in the manner provided in article 19.

Article 16

1. A proceeding shall be considered to involve a question of international law for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon one of the Courts whenever it is alleged, and there is produced prima facie evidence to support the allegation, that the proper determination of the rights or obligations of any one or more of the parties to the proceedings requires an interpretation, definition or application of—
   (a) Any international convention, whether general or particular, or
   (b) Any international custom generally accepted as law, or
   (c) Any legal principle generally recognized by civilized nations as being one of international law.

Article 17

In the event of a dispute as to whether one of the Courts has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of that Court.

Chapter III. Procedure

Article 18

The official languages of the Courts shall be [as the signatories may agree] but all reports of the Courts shall be published in English, French, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish.
Article 19

1. If, upon any appeal to the national supreme court of any country signatory to the present statute it shall appear to that court from the record, or be argued in the pleadings or brief of any party, that the proceedings involve a question of international law, as defined in article 18, the appeal shall not be finally decided by that court, but the full record, pleadings and briefs therein, shall be certified to the Court for the district of which that country is a part, for final disposition.

2. In certifying a case to the Court for its district the national supreme court so doing shall accompany its certification with an opinion (which shall be binding upon the Court) only as to such questions, if any, of national law as it may be necessary to decide in determining the rights of the parties to the appeal.

Article 20

Each Court shall have the power, upon such conditions as it shall deem proper, to grant a supersedeas or make such other interlocutory order as may be necessary to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending final disposition of an appeal to it.

Article 21

The parties shall be represented by members of the bar of the respective Courts, who shall comprise such of the members in good standing of the bars of the national supreme courts of the countries signatory to the present statute as shall apply for admission to the bar of the Courts and shall be admitted thereto as the Courts may by rule provide.

Article 22

The hearings in the Courts shall be public.

Article 23

1. Minutes shall be made at each hearing and signed by the Registrar and the President.
2. These minutes alone shall be authentic.

Article 24

1. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present.
2. Judgment of the Courts shall state the reasons on which they are based, and shall be accompanied by the opinions rendered in accordance with article 19 by the supreme court of the countries in which the proceedings arose.
3. It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the decision.
4. If a judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the Judges, any Judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
5. Each judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open court.
6. The minutes, judgments and opinions of the Courts shall be published in official reports under the direction of the Registrars.

Article 25

The decisions of the Courts shall be enforced in the same manner as are decisions of the supreme court of the country in which the proceedings arose, except only, that any process issued for such enforcement shall be in the name of the United Nations.

Article 26

Judgments of the Courts shall be final and without appeal, except that construction or revision of such judgments may be had upon the same conditions.
as might apply to construction or revision of a judgment of the supreme court of the country in which the original proceedings arose.

Article 27

The Courts shall by rule provide for the intervention as amicus curiae in appeals before them of any states alleging interest in the questions of international law raised by such appeals.

Chapter IV. Amendments

Article 28

This Statute may be amended, either to admit as adherents members of the United Nations other than the present signatories or in any other respect, only upon the consent of the peoples of all of the countries adherent to this statute at the time of the proposal of any such amendment, and upon the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Chapter V. Ratification and Approval

Article 29

This proposed Statute shall become effective upon ratification by the constitutional authorities of the countries signatory hereto, and upon enactment by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF APPEAL: A JUDICIAL APPROACH TO WORLD ORDER

(By Robert B. Ely III, of the Pennsylvania bar, Philadelphia; reprinted from American Bar Association Journal, February 1949)

One of the most important problems today facing the world in general, and lawyers in particular, is that of substituting world order under law for the periodic and ever-increasing horrors which were last suspended on VJ-day. This problem will not be remedied by any form of inter-governmental arrangement until the peoples supporting those governments have formed the firm habit of settling all disputes by legal means, rather than by war.

History shows how this habit of law-abidance has grown: from the family into the tribe, city, and state. It must now be spread throughout the world. As before, its growth must be from the private and domestic into the public and foreign. The roots are in the individual, the branches in institutions. Without these roots, the branches will never come to flower. Above all, the seeds must not be sown on barren ground.

What, then, are the circumstances under which the habit of law abidance can be formed?

A necessary condition to orderly life in any community is an adequate body of legal rules that are clearly defined, widely known and universally respected. The sufficiency of this condition has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout the world at the municipal, state, and national levels. Its necessity becomes apparent when one considers the comparative chaos which accompanies its absence from the international field. Two world wars in a single lifetime have been the effects, and Judge Manley O. Hudson (as quoted in 30 A. B. A. J. 560; October, 1944) has well stated the cause:

"To many laymen [international law] seems to present itself as a ghost which stalks only in distant parts of the earth, without any relation to the workaday world in which we live and toil. Even to some lawyers it looms as an esoteric if not an evanescent mystery to be invoked only when it serves to bolster a prior political opinion."

William E. Jackson, personal assistant to the American chief of counsel at the German war crimes trials, writing in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, put the matter more succinctly when he said:

"For a long time prior to Nuremberg international law was scoffed at as pious but impotent."

The reason for these attitudes of bewilderment, cynicism and scoffing is not hard to understand. To the average layman and to nearly all lawyers, a
respective body of law is one which consists, in addition to legislative enactments and executive rulings, of systematically published and collected decisions of permanent courts with jurisdiction to declare the law and to enforce it on individuals. International law lacks all these essentials to knowledge and respect, which alone can make it effective.

AN INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IS THE ONLY SOLUTION

There are no regularly constituted international legislative assemblies or executive departments. Apart from the International Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction is limited to proceedings in which states are parties and is only contingently compulsory, international law has no permanent tribunals of its own. It is obliged to rely on isolated and temporary ad hoc courts and commissions or on the good graces of national judicatures. The awards and decisions which compose the precedents of international law are not collected into a single International Law Reporter of the form familiar to lawyers in other fields, but have to be sought under such misleading headings as "War," "Aliens," or "States" in national digests or in textbooks whose only authority lies in the reputation of their authors. Finally, none of these awards or decisions has ever been enforced against individuals by other than national law enforcement officers.

In short, international law is now in the easily imaginable state in which the states and the International Court of Justice might as well be the United States and its Supreme Court. Had it ever been merely a national open forum; had the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court been made subject to consent of the parties and limited to suits between States; had there never been any Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal and district courts; had the declaration of Federal law been left to State courts and its enforcement to State sheriffs; and had there been no interpretations of Federal law other than such writings as the Federalist, the decisions of State courts and interstate compacts. Under such circumstances the words of Judge Hudson and Mr. Jackson, quoted above, would but mildly describe the attitude of the average layman or lawyer toward American Federal law.

The foregoing catalogue of the weaknesses of international law suggests the general form of necessary remedy. To achieve complete world order under law will require the development of an international judiciary to declare and enforce international law in particular cases, an international legislature to enact laws in keeping with changing world conditions and an international executive to perform traditional administrative functions. For the purposes of present discussion we put aside the legislative and executive problems with only reference to the comments of the winner of the American Bar Association's 1947 contest for essays on the improvement of international legislation. He says in effect that attempts to constitute an international legislature or executive with authority to make international law what it should be would be both futile and dangerous until there has been built up a world-wide consensus as to what international law is.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY

Turning to the question of an international judiciary, our discussion so far indicates that it must meet the following minimum specifications:

(1) The courts composing it must derive their authority from an international rather than a national or multinational source.

(2) Its rulings must be superior to those of national courts;

(3) Its decisions must be binding upon the individuals concerned, and must have all the future force accorded under the doctrine of stare decisis.

In seeking to establish such tribunals by other than forceful means, it would seem that the greatest chance of success would be insured by close adherence to the following principles of action:

(1) No step should be taken without the unanimous consent of all countries concerned in that step;

(2) In order to make such consent likely, surrenders of national sovereignty should be kept at an absolute minimum, while no greater than necessary departure should be made from existing procedures.

Proceeding along these lines, we find that the only possible international creator of international courts is the United Nations. That organization already has an International Court of Justice as its principal judicial organ. Could this tribunal be remodeled to meet the foregoing requirement? In theory, yes,
but in practice, no. Any revision in this court's set-up would be subject to the veto which the Russian bloc would certainly use. On the other hand, the General Assembly is given by article 22 of the Charter the authority to establish "such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions," including (article 13) "encouraging the progressive development of international law"; and here no more than a two-thirds majority vote is required.

Why, therefore, should not a group of nations operating under substantially similar legal systems (as for example the United States and one or more members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or the countries of Central and South America plus Spain and Portugal) execute a protocol for a statute of the General Assembly providing, subject only to the Assembly's approval, for the establishment of an International Court of Civil Appeals with organization, competence and procedure substantially as next indicated?

Its full bench would consist of a president judge, designated to the task by the International Court of Justice, and of additional judges appointed in equal numbers by each nation of the circuit in the same manner as judges of the national court of last resort, subject to confirmation and commissioning by the General Assembly. Particular sessions would be composed as the adhering nations might agree.

Whenever there came before the court of last resort of any adhering nation a proceeding in which it appeared or was claimed that there was involved a question of international law (in the sense that disposition of the case required interpretation or application of any international convention or any generally accepted international custom or legal principle) the proceedings would be certified by the national court of last resort to the International Court of Civil Appeals for final determination. The certification would be accompanied by an opinion (to be binding on the ICCA) by the certifying court on all questions of national law. The final decision by the ICCA would be remitted and enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the court of last resort of the country in which the proceedings arose, and would thereafter be accorded in each of the adhering countries the same force as a judgment of the court of last resort in that country.

If no more than one such court was established, its day-to-day functioning in actual litigation involving individuals would go far toward publicizing and more firmly establishing those principles upon whose recognition and respect rests the whole future of international law, namely:

1. That international law already exists, independent of and superior to national law;
2. That it is binding directly on individuals;
3. That it is possible to establish international agencies for its interpretation and enforcement.

If more than one such court were established, and if conflicts were to arise among the decisions upon particular points, the various countries concerned might then avail themselves of the International Court of Justice's power to render advisory opinions as to which of such decisions was correct. In this fashion the codification of private international law would progress in an orderly and efficient manner.

Full discussion of the arguments in favor of the foregoing proposal would unduly extend this discussion. However, in support of the principles it seeks to embody, we quote brief portions of a recent address by Justice Robert H. Jackson, of the Supreme Court of the United States (22 Temple Law Quarterly 153):

"It is indispensably to development of an effective modern law of nations that it lay obligations upon living individuals as well as upon that abstraction known as the state * * * We should take advantage of every opportunity to deal with international controversies by adjudicative or arbitral techniques. In this way we will enlarge and expand the world's experience in using these orderly and reasonable processes, fashion and increasing body of decisional and customary international law, and encourage the law-abiding habit among nations."

THE PACT AND PEACE

Senator McMahon. How do you feel about the pact?

Mr. Ely. The pact, I think, is a striking development toward world peace, not so much for the military reasons which have heretofore been
advanced, but as an international analogy to the foundation of the Republican and Democratic Parties in this country. By this pact a group of like thinking nations have expressed their desire to strengthen their free institutions and increase the understanding of them, and it seems to me the parties to this pact can do a tremendous job within the framework of the United Nations, precisely analogous to what the Federalists, Democrats, Republicans, and even the Dixiecrats are doing in this country.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Ely, I was not quite clear as to whether the primary proposition you desire to present to the committee is the matter of the creation of the courts or whether you were intending primarily to discuss the pact.

Mr. Ely. I intended, sir, to discuss the pact, because I think within the terms of the pact lie the means whereby these courts may be established, through the Council in article 9 acting as a party caucus and as a drafting commission to assist the United Nations General Assembly.

Senator Donnell. I assume you are filing with the committee your complete written memorandum, which is marked "Memorandum Favoring Ratification and Proposing Implementation."

Mr. Ely. I am, sir.

Senator Donnell. I assume that will be printed in the proceedings.

Senator McMahon. It will be.

(The memorandum is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM FAVORING RATIFICATION AND PROPOSING IMPLEMENTATION

To the Honorable, the Members of the Senate Committee:

The purpose of this memorandum is to recall respectfully the attention of the committee to what the Secretary of State, in his testimony on this pact, described as "the really vital things with which we are concerned," and to submit a proposal as to how these things may be brought about within the terms of the pact.

Mr. Acheson, in his statement before the committee on April 27, 1949, described as the real "ethical essence of the treaty—the common resolve to preserve, strengthen, and make better understood the very basis of tolerance, restraint, freedom, and well-being." In making this statement, the Secretary gave an accurate paraphrase of article 2 of the pact, in which the parties agree to "strengthen their free institutions by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded. * * *" Those principles are enumerated in the preamble as "democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."

As a means for accomplishing this end, article 9 provides for "a Council, on which each of [the parties] shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty."

While it is true that the only specific duty conferred upon this Council is the immediate establishment of a "defense committee" to provide for the "capacity to resist armed attack" (art. 3), clearly its additional duties include the accomplishment of the nonmilitary aims sketched in article 2. After all, to what purpose is the next war to be postponed or won if the peace thereby continued or renewed is to be one without "individual liberty and the rule of law"?

Consequently it would seem that the more important function of the Council should be to act, not as a military super-staff, but as a party caucus of like-thinking nations. In this capacity its activities would be free of any criticism for inconsistency with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The creation of eastern and western parties in global affairs need not be more subversive of world order than has been the existence in this country of Republicans and Democrats.

Acting as such a party caucus, the Council provided by the pact could well undertake, in an atmosphere free from the Soviet Intransigence which seems
inevitable in plenary United Nations activity, the progressive development in the international field of those theories of law and order common to the signatories of the pact, but radically different from those of the east.

As to what those next steps must be, we have the combined authority of our Ambassador at Large to the United Nations, Dr. Jessup, and our Chief Prosecutor at the recent Nuremberg trials, Justice Jackson of the Supreme Court of the United States. As the former has said in his Modern Law of Nations:

"The first [keystone of a revised international legal order] is the point that international law, like national law, must be directly applicable to the individual. It must not continue to be remote from him. * * *"

After referring to this passage, Justice Jackson goes on to say in a recent address:

"We should take advantage of every opportunity to deal with international controversies by adjudicative or arbitral techniques."

The crucial need for such use of judicial machinery and procedure was earlier well expressed by the late Justice Cardozo in New Jersey v. Delaware (291 U. S. 361 (1933)) quoted in a most stimulating article by Robert B. Walkershaw in the current issue of the American Bar Association Journal at page 362:

"International law * * * has at time * * * a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests its jural quality."

It would, therefore, seem essential that, among the duties assigned to the Council created by article 9 of the pact, there should be included that of drafting plans, to be promulgated in a statute of the General Assembly of the United Nations, for the establishment of tribunals subsidiary to the International Court of Justice with power to bring private international law out of this shadowy twilight and into the full glow of common knowledge, understanding, and respect. It is hoped that your honorable committee will direct its efforts to seeing that such an assignment is given to the North Atlantic Council.

A general outline of the necessary competence and procedure of such courts was sketched in an article by deponent, appearing in the current volume of the American Bar Association Journal at page 105. Reprints have heretofore been informally submitted to the members of your honorable committee, and are herewith resubmitted for the record. A brief summary of the salient points in this sketch is as follows:

(a) The proposed courts must be created by the United Nations, as the supreme authority in international affairs.

(b) They should be created by the General Assembly of that Organization, in view of its duty under article 13 of the Charter to encourage "the progressive development of international law," and its authority under article 22 "to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary."

(c) The proposed courts must be subsidiary to the International Court of Justice, designated by article 92 of Charter as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."

(d) Their jurisdiction, although it should be compulsory so far as it extends, should only be imposed with the unanimous consent of the countries concerned.

(e) That jurisdiction should extend to individuals, corporations, and other legal entities, as well as States, in the same manner as does the jurisdiction of the national courts in the countries concerned.

(f) That jurisdiction should, for the present, at least, be civil only, in order to avoid a premature venture into the highly controversial and ill-defined criminal field.

(g) It should also, for the present, be appellate only, so that there may be no sudden and unnecessary departure from established national trial procedures.

(h) The decisions of the proposed courts should, in the interest of certainty and uniformity, be superior to rulings of national courts on questions of international law, just as constitutional considerations require decisions of national courts of last resort to be supreme in questions of national law.

(i) Similarly, the decisions of the proposed courts should be given in the field of international law the same force as precedents as, in the field of national law, is given under the doctrine of stare decisis.

At the outset there is no need to establish a single such court. The signatories to the pact might group themselves into, say, civil and criminal-law circuits, each with its own court—alogous to a United States circuit court of appeals. Differences in opinion among these courts as to a given legal question could be taken, on petition of the countries concerned, to the International Court of Appeals for an advisory opinion under article 65 of that Court's statute.
Similarly, the original organization, competence, and procedure of the court or courts could be modified from time to time as the countries concerned might unanimously agree and as the General Assembly might approve. This latter approval would only require a two-thirds majority vote (United Nations Charter, art. 18,2), free from Soviet veto. Inasmuch as the United Nations members directly concerned would, by hypothesis, already have agreed, there would seem to be little doubt that such approval could be readily obtained.

For example, original circuits might be merged or new ones created; additional adherents could be admitted; the method of selecting judges for the courts might be changed from a nation-by-nation basis to that used for the bench of the International Court of Justice; or the jurisdiction of the courts might be extended to include appeals from state as well as national supreme courts in countries having federal governments.

The United Nations as a whole has taken a great step forward in stimulating the progressive development of international law by establishing the International Law Commission, of which our own Judge Manley O. Hudson is a member. Given the same working conditions as the American Law Institute has had in this country, there is every hope that this Commission will produce a catalog of international law, both as it is and as it should be, comparable in scope and authority to the Institute's various "restatements," which have been cited by every court in the United States and are known to nearly every lawyer.

The most important of such working conditions for the American Law Institute has been the existence of full-fledged national and state judiciaries, ready, willing, and able to adopt the works of the institute and give them the vigor of binding rules in actual cases. It is hoped that your honorable committee, and the Senate as a whole, will use their full powers to secure for the International Law Commission of the United Nations similar working conditions in the area covered by the North Atlantic Pact through the establishment of courts of the type suggested.

Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT B. ELY III.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Ely, I understood you to say you are not advocating world government in the sense of all the world coming under one government.

AREAS OF AGREEMENT

Mr. ELY. Definitely not, sir. It seems to me that there are areas of agreement, agreement on different principles but nevertheless varying areas of agreement throughout the world. The Pan American Union is one. The signatories to this pact are another. And insofar as such areas of agreement may be consolidated and put into working form, it seems to me that every time that is done we are getting one step closer toward the world order which, although at present it is remote, we all hope will eventually come.

Senator DONNELL. Am I correct in understanding that you favor, generally speaking, the same proposal that the Atlantic Union Committee, which was represented here by Mr. Secretary Patterson this morning, favors? Is that correct?

Mr. ELY. Not at the present time. I think that is an ultimate goal, but I think to attempt to set up a world federation or even a regional federation with full executive and legislative powers at the present time would be a mistake. I think it is going too far in advance of the law, and would probably get into the same trouble that the prohibition amendment did, when you try to legislate on matters that are not yet the subject of common consent.

The first step, I feel, is a crystallization of the agreements of the world through judicial means, so that it would be known what is agreed on and that agreement is put into action. After international law, as it is known, then you can begin to consider changing that law into what it should and ultimately may be.
Senator DONNELL. Do you advocate a federation of various countries of the world, including the United States of America?

Mr. ELY. Not until the preliminary step which I suggest has been taken.

Senator DONNELL. After that preliminary step has been taken do you deem it advisable that such a federation of certain countries, including the United States, should be effected?

Mr. ELY. I think that will be the inevitable result, sir, automatically.

Senator DONNELL. Would you favor including in that federation only countries that are democracies or republics?

Mr. ELY. Yes, sir. Within each group it seems to me there should only be countries whose political and legal theories are so close that the friction which bringing them together would produce is at a minimum.

Senator DONNELL. Do you regard Portugal as a country which it would be advisable to introduce into such a federation of countries of which the United States would be one?

Mr. ELY. I hesitate to speak on that, sir. It seems to me that is a political question and I am not sufficiently familiar with the legal and political theories to which Portugal adheres to come to a conclusion.

Senator DONNELL. In my last question to you I used only the words "United States." I meant the United States of America, and I assume you so understood my question.

Mr. ELY. The extent of divergence between their political and legal views and our own is not well enough known to me for me to give you precise answers.

Senator DONNELL. Have you studied the proposed North Atlantic Treaty, the text of it?

Mr. ELY. Yes, sir; word for word, clause by clause.

Senator DONNELL. I am very glad you have, Mr. Ely. Are you practicing law in Philadelphia at the present time?

Mr. ELY. Yes, sir. I am a member of the bar of the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and of the United States and am at present a member of the legal department of the Insurance Co. of North America.

Senator DONNELL. Located at Philadelphia?

Mr. ELY. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Are you also a member of the Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia?

Mr. ELY. No, sir.

Senator DONNELL. There must be an error, then, in the typewritten memorandum given me of the list of witnesses. It gives Mr. Robert Ely as a member of the Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia.

Do you mind telling us whether you are a member of the Democratic Party?

Mr. ELY. I am a Republican.

Senator DONNELL. How long have you been practicing your profession?

Mr. ELY. Since 1932.

Senator DONNELL. Have you been practicing for nearly all of that time in Philadelphia?

Mr. ELY. Yes, sir, except for 5 years' tour of duty with the Navy.
World Court

Senator Donnell. I have been interested in your observations about the courts, and while it has nothing to do with the particular matter under discussion it might have some application to my own attitude. I would like to state into the record and I would like to have it noted at this time that for some years I was chairman of the St. Louis World Court Committee which advocated very strongly adherence by this Nation to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and appeared, I think in this very room, in advocacy of it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That is not relevant to your testimony, but I wanted the record to show it at this point.

I notice in your statement you quote Judge Manley O. Hudson, who happens to come from my own State, and you say, "The United Nations as a whole has taken a great step forward in stimulating the progressive development of international law by establishing the International Law Commission, of which our own Judge Manley O. Hudson is a member."

International Law

Do you think there is such a thing as international law?
Mr. Ely. Yes, sir. I am quite convinced of it.

Senator Donnell. I wanted to ask you your reasons for your belief to that effect.

Mr. Ely. Well, my reason for saying so, first, is, you can point to it in bound books. The only trouble is that there are inconsistencies within those books. If you ask me what is the law of Pennsylvania, I can show you 300 volumes of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reports. I can do the same thing for the United States law. When it comes to international law, and here is the difficulty with international law as I see it, it exists, but it is declared by the Supreme Court of the United States; it is declared by the Supreme Court of Canada and by every court of last resort across the world. If there is consistency in those decisions it is a matter purely of chance. There is no single authoritative source of international law as there is in national, State, and municipal law, and it seems to me that it would be a tremendous advance if this country should take the lead and give to the International Law Commission established by the United Nations parallel working conditions to those which have been had by the American Law Institute in this country.

As the committee well knows, the American Law Institute has done a magnificent job in preparing restatements of the law, but those documents have only been given force and reality by the fact that courts have adopted and applied them. The United Nations has taken the first of those two steps. It has created an International Law Commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Lian. That Commission is undoubtedly going to do an equally superb job in compiling a statement of international law, but that statement will have no meaning other than as one more text in the field until some set of courts adopts and applies it, and that is what I think, acting with the terms of the pact, this country might see to, that the Council created by that pact could do it.

Senator Donnell. Your suggestion is very interesting, and I know the committee, and certainly I as a nonmember, are very much interested to observe it.
You are familiar, of course, with the statute of the International Court of Justice which was established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations? You are familiar, I say, with that statute?

Mr. Ely. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the proposed protocol which I submit is patterned, I should say, 80 percent upon the wording of that statute.

Senator Donnell. And the International Court of Justice therein mentioned is presently functioning, is it not?

Mr. Ely. Yes, sir, but with jurisdiction limited to States only, and therein lies the difficulty. It has no significance to individuals other than as members of a country.

Senator Donnell. But it is functioning, and if I am not mistaken I observed recently some quite interesting decisions by that Court. Am I correct in that fact?

Mr. Ely. Yes; in the British-Albanian case of the mining of Corfu Channel, and an extremely interesting advisory opinion with respect to the juridical personality of the United Nations.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman, I should like, if I may, to ask that the committee be kind enough to incorporate at this point in the record a copy of article 36 and of article 37 and of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which Court was established by the Charter of the United Nations.

Senator McMahon. It is so ordered.

Senator Donnell. I call attention to the fact that article 36, I observe, begins—

Any question of international law—

I observe in article 38 this language:

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law, such disputes as are submitted to it—

et cetera.

Mr. Ely, I thank you very much for your courtesy, and the chairman for his permission to me to interrogate you.

Senator McMahon. Thank you very much.

(Aarts. 36, 37, and 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice are as follows:)

**ARTICLE 36**

1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.

2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
   a. the interpretation of a treaty;
   b. any question of international law;
   c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
   d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time.
4. Such declaration shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.

5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.

6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

ARTICLE 37

Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.

ARTICLE 38

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
   a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
   b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
   c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
   d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case _ex aequo et bono_, if the parties agree thereto.

Senator McManion (acting chairman). The committee will reconvene at 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee adjourned until Tuesday morning, May 10, 1949, at 10:30 a.m.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment on May 9, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Pepper, Green, McMahon, Vandenberg, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Senator Donnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Our first witness this morning is Mr. Schwebel. Mr. Schwebel is national chairman of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations. Proceed, Mr. Schwebel.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE COLLEGIATE COUNCIL FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Schwebel. The Collegiate Council for the United Nations is a national federation of student associations of 170 American colleges and universities uniting a great part of that segment of the student community of our Nation which takes peace as seriously as it should be taken. The Collegiate Council is the college affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations, though it presents this testimony on its own behalf. We believe that the best hope for peace is to be found in the development of a potent system of universal collective security, and we view the United Nations as the best available instrument of that development.

That is not to say that we are content with the present stage of the evolution of collective security. On the contrary, concerned as we are with the UN's success, we are the more sensitive to its failures; concerned as we are with the realization of collective security, we find today's insecurity particularly oppressive.

So we unreservedly favor strengthening the existing security structure.

The limitation we would put on an effort to do so would be that of consonance with the universal demands of security. We see meaningful security as world-wide, collective security. We see peace as indivisible today as it was just yesterday in Manchuria and Ethiopia and Spain. The tragedies of the 1931-41 period surely carry the lesson that an armed attack on any peaceful nation is an armed attack on every peaceful nation. In our view, to lose sight of the global dimensions of security is to lose security altogether.

653
We welcome the North Atlantic Treaty insofar as it is a reaffirmation of America's awareness of its crucial international role. We of course favor the promotion of the "stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area," and recognize that the bolstering of the defenses of this particularly sensitive area can be a bolstering of the defenses of the peace-loving world. We agree with Secretary of State Acheson's statement that—

if peace and security can be achieved in the North Atlantic area, we shall have gone a long way to secure peace and security in other areas as well.

We are in full sympathy with the obviously nonaggressive, peaceful aims of the treaty.

DANGER OF REGIONALISM

However, our adherence to the aims of the Atlantic Treaty is not matched by a like cordial endorsement of all of its procedures, nor by an unqualified accord with its spirit. For we fear that a regional pact, of its very nature, may tend to emphasize regional security obligations in contrast with universal ones. And we believe that any weakening of universal security obligations is a step in the wrong direction, away from the development of that world rule of law which is the expression and stimulus of the spirit of international community upon which our best hopes for peace must ultimately rest.

Our reservations about the North Atlantic Treaty thus fall into two categories, the first in the form of a brief exposition of the weaknesses of the regional approach to security, the second a briefer critique of certain clauses of the treaty. May I then conclude by offering for your consideration one possible means of coincidentally providing for the security of the North Atlantic community while strengthening the universal security structure.

UNIVERSALITY OF UN CHARTER

When the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2, the American people accepted wholeheartedly a universal security commitment. Nowhere in the charter is there a geographical limitation on the rights and duties of the members. The spirit of the charter is dominantly universal. Regional arrangements are authorized, to be sure, in chapter VIII. Chapter VIII, however, concerns regional arrangements for the settlement of disputes among the states of a particular region, and apparently does not authorize regional accords for defense against violations of the peace originating in an extra-regional source. It is significant to note in this regard that the charter's legal basis for the Atlantic Treaty, article 51, which authorizes individual or collective self-defense, is not to be found in the chapter dealing with regional arrangements, but rather in chapter VII, which is concerned with action with respect to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. It could be said with some justice then that the Atlantic Treaty, while within the letter of the charter, is not so decisively in accord with its spirit.

Our concern with any tendency to substitute a defensive pact or series of defensive pacts within arbitrary geographical boundaries for the general commitment of the charter is not grounded in metaphysics, however—in any mere variance of the treaty with something as elusive, if important, as the spirit of the charter. There are down-
to-earth, practical reasons for concern over a regional concept of security.

REGIONAL PACT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

A regional pact, because it pertains to a restricted geographical area, provides, or attempts to provide, security reinsurance only for its members. It obviously does not provide this reinsurance for non-signatories. Thus, the danger arises that within the UN there might be first- and second-class members: On the one hand, those who have the imposing reinsurance of America's specific pledge to regard an attack upon them as an attack upon herself; and, on the other hand, those who must content themselves with the somewhat less explicit obligation of the United States to their integrity which is assumed by all members of the United Nations, America included. Of the nature of the situation, there seems some danger that those nations included in a regional scheme will tend to feel that their pact sets the actual practical limits of their obligations. Correspondingly, those nations not included, necessarily feeling their secondary degree of protection, may tend to drift into the other camp to seek by conciliation what they now lack in collective security. Or, less ominously, the "second-class members" may incline toward neutrality.

In fact, the limitation of obligation implicit in regionalism may very well tend to rehabilitate the amoral and strategically obsolete concept of neutrality. A state contemplating aggression would, no doubt, welcome a refurbishing of neutrality, but the United States can have no interest in limiting geographically the right of all UN members to receive aid against aggression and the duty of all members to render such aid. On purely strategical grounds, a resuscitated neutrality is a danger to the United States. Who can say, in case of aggression, where and what facilities we or any other UN member would need in order to defeat an aggressor? How many of our military strategists in 1939 could then perceive the later importance of New Caledonia or Dakar to American security?

The force of all the reservations so far made is increased by the fact that the parties to the regional alliance under consideration embrace so much of the world's power potential. The size and importance of the nations adhering to the Atlantic Treaty could result in the creation of organs overshadowing those of the United Nations. Article 4, combined with article 9, raises the possibility of a consultative council, ranging beyond the limits of the North Atlantic in its discussions, which could drain consideration of world problems from the organs of the United Nations—which, in the words Mr. John Foster Dulles used before this committee, might "cut the heart out of the United Nations." We wish to associate ourselves with Mr. Dulles in urging that it be made clear that such a possibility has no place in the intentions of our Government. It is further our belief that any action which might be recommended as a result of consultation under article 4 of the treaty should be effected through United Nations machinery.

REAFFIRMATION OF UN CHARTER

It is with pleasure that we note that in other clauses the relation of the Atlantic Treaty to the United Nations is more carefully and posi-
tively defined. We find it reassuring that in the preamble the “parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations” and that the relation of the treaty to the charter is detailed in articles 1, 5, 7, and 12, reaffirming the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security.

We further welcome the restatement of America’s universal obligations under the charter by the President in his message of April 4, and by the Secretary of State in his statements of April 10 and 28. We are in cordial accord with Mr. Acheson’s declaration before this committee that—

the hopes of the American people for peace with freedom and justice are based on the United Nations.

However, we feel the need for vitalizing these declarations with specific action designed to strengthen the United Nations security structure.

ARMSTRONG PROPOSAL

We therefore recommend to our Government the initiation of negotiations for a multilateral treaty, based on article 51 of the charter, and open to all members of the United Nations, which, we believe, would supply much of the reassurance the current inadequate state of collective security demands, while sacrificing the least possible of the charter’s universal ideal.

Such a treaty has been proposed with slight variations by the American Association for the United Nations, its research affiliate, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, by Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and, most recently, by Senator Paul Douglas. In view of the demands upon your time, I will not discuss the proposed protocol in detail at the moment.

The legal basis of such a protocol, under article 51 of the charter, is clear. Certainly it is wholly within the letter and spirit of the charter, for it would commit the signatories to doing nothing substantive to which the charter does not already commit them, and it would commit them procedurally merely to doing as a group in certain cases what they said they intended doing unanimously in all cases.

Moreover, the initiation by our Government of negotiations for such a protocol would be in conformity with Senate Resolution 239, the Vandenberg resolution, unanimously reported out by this committee on May 19 of last year. Clause 2 of the resolution recommends that our Government promote the—

progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the charter.

Even the Atlantic Treaty itself appears to adumbrate such a protocol in its reference in article 12 to—

the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
In conclusion, then, we favor ratification by the Senate of the North Atlantic Treaty, and concurrently respectfully suggest for your consideration the adoption of a Senate resolution of two parts:

The first, advising the President of the sense of the Senate that in ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty it is understood that articles 4 and 9 in no sense authorize the creation of a council which may arrogate to itself the consideration of world problems properly within the competence of organs of the United Nations, and

The second, advising the President of the sense of the Senate that this Government should initiate negotiations for a multilateral security covenant, as elsewhere detailed, open to all members of the United Nations.

Like all treaties—
said the Honorable Warren R. Austin in testifying before this committee—

the words of the North Atlantic Treaty will take on meaning in the light of the policies and actions that the signatories follow in implementing it.

We believe that the Atlantic Treaty will be a pillar of peace if the rest of the structure is correspondingly strengthened, and we submit that the adoption of a Senate resolution along the suggested lines will give the treaty a meaning of unquestioned consonance and harmony with the high purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

The CHAIRMAN. You are for ratification?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These other matters you will postpone until a more appropriate time, is that right?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. We would favor the adoption of a Senate resolution saying that it is the sense of the Senate that it be made clear that articles 4 and 9 do not envisage the creation of a Council which may drain consideration of world problems from the UN, and pressing for the negotiation of such a multilateral treaty now, we would favor adoption of such a resolution more or less at the same time as the North Atlantic Pact.

REAFFIRMATION OF UN CHARTER

The CHAIRMAN. It is not clear from the whole text of the Treaty in four or five different places that it recognizes the over-all authority of the United Nations, and its purpose to be in harmony with the United Nations. You have read the treaty carefully, of course?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes. It is certainly good that the treaty does take such careful cognizance of the United Nations, as it does in articles 1 and 5 et cetera but as we hope we have pointed out, there are dangers that the treaty will impinge on the correct jurisdiction of the United Nations and set up a sort of "little United Nations" which will perhaps be an exclusive club of the Western World, and there is a danger in that which is not made sufficiently clear in the text of the treaty, and
the danger lies in articles 4 and 9 which, combined together, could set up a Council whose limits of discussion are not defined in the treaty. The CHAIRMAN. We would be represented, would we not, on the Council?

Mr. Schwebel. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator Green. I might ask one question.

In the first place, in this text there is a mistake, I think, if you want to give it to the public. On the second page, in the fifth from the last line, you refer to chapter VII when you mean chapter VIII.

Mr. Schwebel. The text is correct. My reading may have been erroneous.

ARMSTRONG PROPOSAL

Senator Green. You recommend that the Senate pass certain resolutions in connection with this, how you want to have a multilateral treaty similar. I suppose, to the Atlantic Treaty. What do you think of the practical chances of any such initiation of negotiations resulting favorably?

Mr. Schwebel. I think the chances are very good.

Senator Green. Why should they be more than operating under the present United Nations? The chances there are not very good, are they? Or perhaps you think they are.

Mr. Schwebel. I think they are good in some senses, but certainly it cannot be said that the United Nations is fulfilling its security obligations in the full.

Senator Green. Does that not provide the necessary machinery?

Mr. Schwebel. It would.

Senator Green. Then why do you go to other machinery?

Mr. Schwebel. It would suggest other machinery assuming that the Soviet Union would cooperate. In the second case we do not assume that the Soviet Union would join in a multilateral treaty.

Senator Green. I thought your idea was to include all the nations and not leave any of them out.

Mr. Schwebel. And we would certainly have the door open to the Soviet Union should she wish to join, but certainly the treaty would be a much closer approximation of universality than it would in the Atlantic Treaty.

Senator Green. I do not see how it would be. There would still be some nations outside, all those behind the iron curtain, in one case as in the other. It seems to me it is a very impractical suggestion, and I give you the opportunity to explain why it isn't.

PRACTICALITY OF ARMSTRONG PROPOSAL

Mr. Schwebel. I am happy to take that opportunity. I have a list of reasons here which perhaps you might be interested in hearing, as to why we believe that this multilateral approach is somewhat superior just to the approach of the Atlantic Treaty.

Senator Green. What do you understand my question to be?

Mr. Schwebel. I understand your question to be, Why is the multilateral treaty at all practical since it will not include all nations any-
way, and therefore will not be truly universal? And my answer to that will be that it will be virtually universal. We believe it would include all nations save those of the Soviet bloc, and we see such a protocol as superior to the Atlantic Treaty for seven reasons, and I can detail them if you like.

First. Such a protocol, rather than catching the United Nations fabric with an Atlantic alliance via a pact would integrate and cohere the necessary procedure of strengthening collective security. It would tie together the existing regional pacts and cover the gaps left by them.

Second. We feel this protocol more closely approximates universality than any regional pact and would to that degree more closely conform to the universal spirit within the idea of the Charter.

Senator GREEN. My question was not that. My question was, Why is there a greater chance of success under this proposal than under the United Nations, which already exists?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Under this proposal, if the Security Council failed to take action in the case of aggression—that is, if the Soviet Union vetoes Council action in the face of aggression or threat to the peace—then the problem would be turned over to the United Nations General Assembly, and all the signatories to the multilateral pact beforehand will have pledged to take account and to follow any recommendation of the Assembly made by a two-thirds vote, including three of the permanent members of the Security Council, as binding upon them. Therefore, should two-thirds of the General Assembly, for instance—and this is merely illustrative—vote that Yugoslavia has attacked Greece, all of the nations would regard an attack upon Greece as an attack upon them and would take action under the Charter, as they are pledged to under the Charter, but which may be stopped by the Russian veto or anybody else's veto. The proposal would move the final power of security sanctions from Security Council to the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you get it there when the Security Council votes "no"?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Any matter may be taken off the Security Council agenda by a procedure vote not open to veto, and that can be done by seven members of the Council.

Senator GREEN. Is it your idea that you can overcome the Soviet veto in that fashion?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. We do believe that this protocol would demonstrate to the world that security does not go only so far as the Russian veto, and that should there be a Soviet veto the obligations under the Charter will still be met.

Senator GREEN. I simply want to get your idea. It seems to me it is a very unconvincing argument.

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not want to start an argument but I would like to tell you that I substantially agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

You have proposed a plan with very far-reaching implications. If you can destroy or impair or limit the action of the Security Council under the United Nations, to which we are all parties, you have undertaken a very great deal.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. We do think it is a practical plan that can work.
PROCEDURE UNDER ARMSTRONG PROPOSAL

The CHAIRMAN. It would work if it worked, but our trouble in the United Nations has been the veto of the Soviet Union and its satellites. If you can eliminate that, that's fine.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. We believe this plan would do that, in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe it would effectively eliminate the veto.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. The Soviet Union could veto first on the issue. Thereupon the other members of the Council would vote to take the issue off the agenda of the Security Council and put it on the agenda of the General Assembly, and the Assembly would vote on the issue, and if two-thirds of the Assembly voted to take action on it, all the states signatory to the proposal would take action.

The CHAIRMAN. What university do you represent?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I am from Harvard University.

The CHAIRMAN. What class?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I am a junior at Harvard.

The CHAIRMAN. This is your third year? How old are you?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Twenty years of age.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you majoring in?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. International law and relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were.

Senator VANDENBERG. As I said, I substantially agree with the witness, because I think he is really presenting the so-called Armstrong plan in one phase, at least. I think it is entirely possible as an ultimate evolution, if there is no better way found, to create within a broadened concept of an almost universal regional arrangement, which includes everybody except the Soviets and their satellites, and instrumentality with which to fight armed aggression inside the Charter and outside of the veto.

The CHAIRMAN. That would take some time to do all those things; would it not?

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not questioning you. Is that true, young man? Do you want to postpone action on this matter until we do all those things?

RATIFICATION WITH UNDERSTANDINGS

Mr. SCHWEBEL. No. We believe that the Senate should ratify the North Atlantic Pact as soon as possible, but concurrent with its ratification that it adopt a resolution advising the President that it is the sense of the Senate that we should undertake negotiations immediately.

Senator GREEN. That is giving the authority to the Senate, or the United States Government, to a violation of the Charter of the United Nations; is it not?

Senator VANDENBERG. No.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I do not believe so, sir; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Armstrong will be here in a few days and will probably give a complete exposition of his views.

Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness whether or not his proposal, his second proposal, which Senator Green has been talking about, would not in effect be the establishment of a new United Nations with the exclusion, let us say, of one country and its satellites. I rather approach the North Atlantic Pact from the idea that it is a small group with a common regional problem that is attempting to work within the United Nations, and that its ultimate result is not to have the Atlantic Pact be the final authority on these things, but to work it into the authority of the United Nations eventually, with the hope that the United Nations can somehow take over.

It seems to me that the second proposal that you have made is, in effect, the setting up of another United Nations—whatever its terms may be is immaterial—but it is setting up another United Nations to be the all-powerful group, with the exclusion of Russia and its satellites, who did not come in, which would be a different step in its eventual result than the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. Schwebel. There certainly is much to what you say, sir. In reply, may I say that as for the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the two moves, I think it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet would have less reason to be antagonized by a pact which is open to her, and in which she may join, than by a pact such as the Atlantic Treaty which, from the outset, is restricted and exclusive.

Senator Hickenlooper. If I may interrupt there, it seems to me that we have one pact that has been universally signed, and that is the United Nations Charter. That has been open to all nations to come in, with some exceptions, the reason for which I still do not fully understand, but it is a universal pact and these nations have come in.

Now, the proposal to set up another universal pact, which in effect takes everybody in that is already in the United Nations if they want to come in, with the exception of one country, would seem to me pretty destructive of the United Nations as an organization. Maybe we will have to come to that. I do not say that we will not. But I vision the North Atlantic Pact as only one step or one procedure within the United Nations, in other words taking care of our own affairs that we think ought to be taken care of in this region within the United Nations, with the hope that it will fit itself in the United Nations structure by some lucky or fortunate happening in the future.

**THE UNITED NATIONS AND A MULTILATERAL PACT**

And at this moment, without further thought about the thing, I would hate to support, or I would dislike very much to support, the idea at this moment of another universal pact, because of what it might do. It just might make the United Nations archaic, that is all.

Mr. Schwebel. The reason we propose another universal pact, even though there is one in existence, as you so correctly say, is that the
initial one is not working in the way it should work, and the main reason it is not working, of course, is apparent to us all—the obstruction and vetoes of the Soviet Union. We believe the second universal multilateral pact would repair that key defect in the present United Nations structure and would have the extreme virtue of doing so without the necessity of any formal amendment to the Charter, which is impossible under the present situation, since the Soviet can veto any amendments.

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not want to pursue this too far this morning, but if you had a second universal pact would you not virtually be taking a cleaver and chopping out a great portion, or a substantial portion, of the United Nations machinery, at least, and cooperating nations, at the moment? Again I say we may have to do it; I don't know. But in effect another universal pact would do just that, in my opinion.

Mr. Schwebel. I would quite agree with you, sir, if we did not envisage provision for the use of the present machinery of the United Nations in the working out of this plan. It is the present General Assembly of the United Nations which would take the two-thirds vote, which would make operative the multilateral accord.

Senator Hickenlooper. The second proposal of another universal pact—does that not presuppose that the United Nations has failed?

Mr. Schwebel. No.

Senator Hickenlooper. Is there any other major objective of the United Nations than universal collective security?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes. I think we can narrow it down further and say it would be a failure of the United Nations to effect universal collective security up to the sanction state. Certainly the United Nations is doing an excellent job in mediation and conciliation, as Palestine, Kashmir, and Indonesia indicate, but so far as the point of the ability of the UN to take action against aggression, particularly by any major power or by a small power backed by a major power, to throw an international police force against the aggressor, the United Nations has not evolved to that hoped-for point of counsel in the United Nations and in its various committees, and we feel that if the final power of determining whether the weight of the nations of the world which do take their Charter obligations seriously would be shifted from the Security Council, where the Russians are now in a position to legally block the employment of that weight, to the Assembly, where they cannot block it, then we will have vitalized the concept of collective security which is very explicit in the Charter.
Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps, but would it also be an admission of the futility of trying to get the United Nations together, the setting up of another universal pact? We have, in one way or another, admitted that it was futile to try to get the United Nations to function as we want.

Now, do you think there might be some logic in that argument?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes; I do so. I think it is logical to say it is an admission of futility.

REGIONAL AND UNIVERSAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Senator Hickenlooper. Then let me ask you this: If the North Atlantic Pact is adopted and goes into effect, being a regional pact of at least a small area in the world, and if the strength of that pact does develop to the point where perhaps nations all will come in and begin to function properly in the United Nations, would that not be a better procedure than to set up another universal pact?

Mr. Schwebel. Do you mean actually become parties to the Atlantic agreement?

Senator Hickenlooper. No; I mean if the strength of the Atlantic Pact is such that nations that are not now cooperating in the United Nations—for instance Russia; I merely use this as an illustration—would lift the blockade in the United Nations, as she has lifted the blockade in Berlin, whether that means cooperation or not I don't know, but if she would do it as a result of the unity of the North Atlantic Pact, would that not be a better procedure than for us to go on record now as at least admitting the futility of the United Nations at the moment and setting up another universal pact leaving out Russia? It may be a chance we are taking; I do not know.

Mr. Schwebel. It is certainly to be hoped, and I am sure it is the prime hope of the United States in effecting the Atlantic Treaty, that it will create a balance of power or something to that effect which will bring the Russians to their senses in a way, but we feel that this multilateral accord, at least in the short run, would give to the nations of the world, outside of the Atlantic community, the security of insurance which they have a right to. We do not feel that Holland or Belgium has any more right to security, particularly, than India or Iran, and we believe there are dangers in taking the approach that one nation's security is of a higher value than another's.

Senator Hickenlooper. We have already taken the approach in the United Nations that the security of one nation is as great as another's.

Mr. Schwebel. And we feel that the Atlantic Pact is a deviation from that in some sense, but that the deviation can be corrected by the initiation of negotiations and the conclusion of this universal protocol.

Now, should the Soviet Union, either through the force of the Atlantic Pact or the European recovery program or the whole policy in a group, shift its policy and become cooperative in the United Nations, then there would be absolutely no need for this multilateral accord. Then it would never come into effect, because if an issue came up before the Security Council and the Soviet Union did not block it, the Security Council would take action and the application of the multilateral accord would never come into question, but there would always be this second insurance behind the Soviet Union which would perhaps
make her think twice and say "Let's be a little more cooperative, because if we are not, the rest of the nations will take action anyway."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was going to ask you whether you thought there would be any greater inducement for Russia to come in after the formation of the second universal pact than in the present circumstances.

Senator VANDENBERG. Will the Senator yield?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to suggest to him that I am totally in agreement with him that this is not the time to proceed with such alternative. The thought I suggest is in the ultimate, if all other recourses fail, this is a way in which one can proceed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said a moment ago we may have to come to that.

Senator VANDENBERG. This is no time to do it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I agree we would be far better off leaving the second universal pact out of consideration and taking one bite of the apple at a time. We may have to come to that. I don't know.

Senator VANDENBERG. I entirely agree.

The CHAIRMAN. You are for the ratification of the treaty?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your favoring the ratification is not dependent upon us adopting this resolution? Is it or not? Would you be for it without the resolution if the Senate does not see fit to pass it?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; that's fine.

Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. I have not had an opportunity to read your statement or to hear your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we let Senator Donnell go on, and you can come in later.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Schwebel, I thought perhaps you intended to amplify just a little your answer.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may interrupt, I was in error when I said Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong would be here on Friday. I got confused over a telegram from Mr. Hamilton Fish, without the "Armstrong." He is not scheduled.

Go ahead, Senator.

RATIFICATION WITHOUT RESOLUTION

Senator DONNELL. I was just saying, Mr. Schwebel, that I thought perhaps you intended to amplify just a little your answer to the question of Senator Connally as to whether you would favor the pact, the North Atlantic Pact, without the adoption of your two resolutions. Would you be kind enough, if you were intending to amplify that a little, just to do so at this moment?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to do so. We do not propose these resolutions in any sense as reservations to the treaty. We hope for Senate ratification of the treaty without reservations, but we would be elated, and we feel it a matter of real importance that these resolutions be adopted now, concurrently with the ratification by the Senate of the North Atlantic Treaty, because
we believe the states of the world other than those of the Atlantic community now deserve and perhaps demand the security reinsurance which they merit as well as the members of the Atlantic community, and therefore we feel it the best possible thing under the circumstances to have these resolutions adopted concurrently with ratification. We do not put them forth as reservations.

However, if we are pressed to the wall and we must say whether we would favor ratification or not favor ratification, with or without the reservations, although we would be extremely sorry to see the resolutions not adopted, pressed to the wall at that point we would say "Yes, ratification."

Senator Donnell. In other words, as I understand from the last sentence of your statement, and I quote it, "We believe that the Atlantic Treaty will be a pillar of peace if the rest of the structure is correspondingly strengthened." Is that correct?

Mr. Schwebel. That is right.

Senator Donnell. I judge by that, the language of your statement, "correspondingly strengthened," you mean by the adoption of the proposals set forth in your two resolutions?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And you condition your belief that the Atlantic Treaty will be a pillar of peace on the proposal that "if the rest of the structure is correspondingly strengthened," meaning thereby the adoption of the two plans set forth in your resolutions. Is that correct?

Mr. Schwebel. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. I take it from the fact that you have conditioned your opinion that the Atlantic Treaty will be a pillar of peace on this corresponding strengthening that you are not so sure that the North Atlantic Treaty is going to be such a pillar of peace unless the contents of your two resolutions are adopted. Am I correct in that understanding?

Mr. Schwebel. Quite so.

Senator Donnell. You have some doubts as to whether the North Atlantic Pact will be a pillar of peace unless the proposals in your resolutions are adopted?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes, sir.

MEMBERSHIP OF COLLEGIATE COUNCIL FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Schwebel, I was very much interested in noting the broad extent of your organization, and I wanted to ask you about it. You say that it is a national federation of student associations of 170 American colleges and universities. I am not going to ask you for the list of them, but could you tell us, please, how widely distributed those institutions of learning are over the country?

Mr. Schwebel. They are in over 40 States, sir.

Senator Donnell. Are there any State universities included among the number?

Mr. Schwebel. Oh, yes; quite a number.

Senator Donnell. I am wondering whether you happen to recall whether that of my own State of Missouri is included?

Mr. Schwebel. I believe it is; yes.

Senator Donnell. You are the national president of that organization?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right.
Senator DONNELL. Has your organization met and expressed itself to the effect set forth in your testimony?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes; to the extent of perhaps what might be called an outline stage at our national convention last June, and in the actual preparation of this testimony our national board of directors was consulted on a very close basis, and our texts were exchanged in great detail.
Senator DONNELL. So the statement does represent the opinion of your national board of directors?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right.
Senator DONNELL. Do you mind telling us how many members there are on that board?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. Seven; one for each region of the country.
Senator DONNELL. Do you mind just telling us, please, what those regions are? What is region No. 1?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. New England is No. 1; Middle Atlantic, Southeast, Southwest, Far West, Midwest, and North Central.
Senator DONNELL. Are you able to tell us approximately the total membership of the 170-student organizations which constitute your organization?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. Well, the average chapter runs in membership between 50 and 300 members.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Schwebel, I don’t know whether you were asked anything about yourself or not, other than where you are attending the university at this time. I understood you to say you were a junior in Harvard University. Is that in the collegiate department or in the law department?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. In the college, sir.
Senator DONNELL. And you have specialized along the line of international law and obviously devoted a great amount of study to that subject, is that correct?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes, sir.
Senator DONNELL. Are you intending to teach, if I may ask, or is it your expectation to engage in the practice of law, perhaps, or something of that kind?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. I am really not quite sure. I am tentatively planning a career in the State Department or the United Nations or something of that sort.
Senator DONNELL. Have you thus far been associated in any way with any organization as that, in the capacity of any employee or anything of that sort?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. No; I have not.
Senator DONNELL. Where is your home, Mr. Schwebel?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. In New York City.
Senator DONNELL. What is your street address, please?
Mr. SCHWEBEL. 2506.

THE TREATY AS A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT

Senator DONNELL. You speak in a number of instances in this statement of yours of a regional pact. You say that you fear a regional pact of its very nature may tend to emphasize regional security obli-

```
gations; you speak of your reservations about the North Atlantic Treaty, and I take it you are making reservations by your statement, as you have indicated.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Your reservations fall into two categories, the first in the form of a brief exposition of the weaknesses of the regional approach to security. You speak a little further down of "regional arrangements"; you speak elsewhere of the "regional concept of security," and then on page 3 of a "regional pact." Am I correct, therefore, in understanding that you consider that in fact the North Atlantic Treaty is a regional arrangement or a regional pact?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. A rather tortured version of one; yes.

Senator DONNELL. It is, however, in your judgment, a regional arrangement, is that correct?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes. Certainly the parties seem to regard it as such, and though in our judgment it is not a regional arrangement as the United Nations Charter thought of regional arrangements, it seems that grammatically it is fair enough to apply that term.

Senator DONNELL. I am curious to know why, Mr. Schwebel, if you consider that it is a regional pact, you have stated that the legal basis for the Atlantic Treaty is article 51 and not article 52. Where is it you find that in the proposed North Atlantic Treaty, if you do so find it?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Because article 52, as we understand it, though it most certainly discusses regional arrangements, gives the clear implication that regional arrangements are to be for the settlement of disputes within the region, and it does not seem to adumbrate a regional accord which would be a defensive pact against a violation of the peace from outside the region against a member or members of the region. Therefore we see no legal basis in article 52 for the treaty, but only in article 51, which speaks of individual or collective arrangements for self-defense.

Senator DONNELL. Yet you do still feel, as your statement says in numerous places in substance, or at least refers in numerous places, that this is a regional pact and a regional arrangement, is that correct?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right. We believe, though, that it is out of the spirit of the Charter insofar as the Charter envisaged regional pacts.

**NATURE OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTEMPLATED BY CHARTER**

Senator DONNELL. Article 52 opens with this sentence [reading]:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

There is nothing there that restricts the operation of regional arrangements to matters within the region itself, is there, Mr. Schwebel?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. No, not in that article itself, but I believe in the chapter, the tone of the chapter clearly does have that implication. If you will bear with me a moment I will drag out a text of the Charter.
In point 2 it speaks of pacific settlement of local disputes. In point 3 [reading]:

The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through * * * regional arrangements.

Therefore, we find the emphasis of chapter VIII is upon the regional arrangements, such as the Pan American Union, settling a dispute between Bolivia and Peru, but it does not seem to us that the tone of that article thinks of what would now be the Rio de Janeiro Pact, taking action against an attack from Australia.

Senator DONNELL. Article 54 of chapter VIII, which chapter is entitled "Regional Arrangements," reads:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Does that broaden in your judgment the meaning of chapter VIII so as to include, perhaps, regional arrangements that pertain to more than purely local matters?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. It could, and it could not. I will concede the point that it could, but "international," of course, can refer to matters dealing with just two countries, as well as many.

Senator DONNELL. There is nothing in the North Atlantic Pact, itself, except in article 5, is there. Mr. Schwebel, that mentions article 51 of the United Nations Charter?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I do not believe there is; no.

Senator DONNELL. So that there is nothing in the North Atlantic treaty itself, except in article 5, is there. Mr. Schwebel, that mentions article 51 of the United Nations Charter?

Mr. SCHEWEBEL. I do not believe there is; no.

Senator DONNELL. That is correct. I do not believe there is anything that says it is, either; is there, sir?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is correct. I do not believe there is anything that says it is, either; is there, sir?

Senator DONNELL. I understand that, but the only mention of article 51 is in article 5, and there is nothing in the treaty that says that the treaty is formed under article 51; is there? I am correct in that; am I not?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes, but may I qualify my answer by saying that it is my impression that in the rationale given out by the State Department of the treaty, the State Department, though at first it put some emphasis on articles 52 and 53, later shifted that.

THE TREATY AS A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT

Senator DONNELL. Precisely the point that I was getting to. Did not the State Department start out with the idea that this was a regional arrangement, and was it not called the North Atlantic treaty, signifying that it was a regional arrangement? Then, as you have indicated, the rationale as given out by the State Department, as you perhaps have appropriately mentioned, has indicated a shifting on the part of the State Department. Am I not correct in my understanding?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I believe the State Department found it was in error, as all human beings may be, and therefore shifted its emphasis to article 51, which we believe is certainly an ample legal basis for the treaty. The treaty is legal, we feel, definitely.

Senator DONNELL. The point to which I direct your attention is the one you have anticipated me on, namely, that there was a shifting
of position, if I understand your view, by the State Department, from the original concept that this was a regional treaty, a regional pact, over to the concept that it was formed under the provisions of article 51 in recognition of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. You are in accord with that general observation, are you not?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right, though of course I have no access to the processes of the State Department. Exteriorly that seems to be the case.

**GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF TREATY**

**Senator DONNELL.** Do you know why it is called North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Well, it would seem that the reason is that the bulk of states parties to the treaty border on the North Atlantic.

**Senator DONNELL.** The bulk of them do?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes.

**Senator DONNELL.** I have not counted them or taken the seacoasts of them, but Italy does not front on the North Atlantic, does it?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. No, it hardly does.

**Senator DONNELL.** And was Italy originally contemplated as being a party to this treaty, so far as you have ever heard or observed?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. It was, of course, not included in the original negotiations, but so far as I recall, mention of Italy was made early in the procedures of negotiation.

**Senator DONNELL.** However, the negotiations as made, and the initial steps taken in this matter as recited in the letter of the Secretary of State of April 7, 1949, to the President, included not Italy at all, but the Brussels Pact parties and the United States and Canada. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. I believe that it is, sir; yes, sir.

**Senator DONNELL.** Mr. Schwebel, you have read Mr. Dulles' testimony, I judge, from your comments?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes, I have, sir.

**DANGER OF WORLD DIVISION**

**Senator DONNELL.** You feel, am I correct in understanding, that there is, as he pointed out, a danger in that the North Atlantic Treaty may be considered as splitting the world into two camps, and the very danger to which you refer in your statement here this morning along that line. You concur in Mr. Dulles' observations to that effect, do you not?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Entirely, and we believe that our multilateral accord would obviate that danger.

**Senator DONNELL.** That is all, Mr. Schwebel. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

**Senator PEPPER.** Mr. Schwebel, I don't know whether you were asked this question earlier or not. Are you a veteran of World War II?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. No; I am not. I was underage.

**Senator PEPPER.** I think it is quite within the prerogative of the college people of the country, who are primarily the ones who would serve...
in war, to come here to express to this committee and to the country their opinion about the future, which, after all, is more theirs than it is that of their elders.

I have read your statement, and it looks to me like it has a lot of far-sighted merit and value in it.

DANGER OF REGIONALISM

What you are afraid of is that this is setting up, if it is pursued to a possible conclusion, a series of regional arrangements in the world. I am not talking about regional within the meaning of article 52 of the Charter, but I mean geographically regional arrangements which are likely to, or which might if pursued ever farther, take the place of the national rivalries of the past. That is to say, if we formed one regional entity which became more or less self-sufficient and became a new international organism, and if another one were formed in another part of the earth and another one in still a third part of the world, that you might supplant the old national rivalries which have led to the wars of the past with regional rivalries which might lead to the regional wars of the future. Is that one of the fears that you have entertained?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes, certainly. I think that is a very reasonable fear.

Senator Pepper. And you also have some concern for the "numerosity," which may be a questionable word, of the various organizations which are outside, directly, the United Nations Charter. You have some concern lest the total effect, although unintended, of those various circumlocutions or collateral arrangements may be to weaken confidence and support upon the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Schwebel. Exactly, sir; yes.

Senator Pepper. Now, first, if there were no article 3 in the North Atlantic Treaty, and no article 9, would you find in that treaty anything contradictory to the obligations which the members of the United Nations have already assumed? If articles 3 and 9 were not in the treaty, would you find anything in it that in any way appears out of harmony or in any way out of accord with the obligations that the members of the United Nations Organization have already assumed?

Mr. Schwebel. Well, we see something of a danger in article 4, which states [reading]:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

The danger is that the scope of their consultations is not restricted.

NEW OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THE TREATY

Senator Pepper. Include, then, articles 3, 4, and 9. In other words, is it not already an obligation assumed by the members of the United Nations that they will aid in the preservation of the independence and security of all members of that organization?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes, sir; it definitely is.

Senator Pepper. If any nation in the world by armed force were to invade another nation, at least a nation that is a member of the
United Nations Organization, do you not regard it as the obligation of all the members of the United Nations Organization to go to the defense of that victim of aggression by arms?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes; I think it is a definite obligation.

Senator PEPPER. And you think that is what the Secretary of State and the President said, and intended to say, in the statements that you have quoted in your statement?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. So that if we merely say that we of the North Atlantic community will agree that an attack upon one member of that community is an attack upon the security of all, and the ones not directly attacked will go to the defense of the victim of the aggression, that is no new obligation that we are assuming.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. No new obligation, but an obligation more explicitly defined.

Senator PEPPER. More explicitly, no doubt, and having possibly a psychological effect, in the general opinion that it will be in the interest of peace.

THE TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

But your fear is that the degree to which articles 3 and 4 and 9 are implemented may carry this obligation we already have to the point of creating a new entity which will take on a new character and, in effect, if not by design, be out of harmony with, if not in opposition to, the scheme and intention and effect of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes. I am in total agreement with that.

Senator PEPPER. As Senator Austin said, as you quoted in your statement, the way we carry out the treaty will determine what it shall become. If overemphasis is not put upon articles 3, 4, and 9, it is possible, is it not, that the existence of this firm and additional agreement or accord to the Atlantic community may create the equilibrium of force, may create the sense of security, that may make it possible again for the United Nations Organization to resume the role that it was intended to occupy in keeping with peace and promoting the welfare of the world, may it not?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. That is our hope, and we think there is a real chance of that.

Senator PEPPER. In the one case, if it be regarded that there are those who are potential aggressors, their aggression might be thwarted, and if there be those overly excited, their concerns might be allayed, so that there might come about that general reestablishment of equilibrium which might permit the United Nations to go ahead again as the real hope of the world for peace and for profit.

So your admonition to us and to the Government, if this treaty is ratified, is to be overzealous in not taking advantage of the technical authority that articles 3, 4, and 9 may give them, to create something which in fact and in substance will undermine and weaken the United Nations Organization?

Mr. SCHWEBEL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. One last question: If we set up these regional organizations, and again I am using them separately as a geographical group of nations in the same geographical area, would you not regard
it that somewhere in the distant future, after perhaps going through another valley of travail, we would have to come right back again to where we were at San Francisco in 1945, and set up again, or reestablish, an international organization designed to prevent the aggression and to keep peace through collective security? In other words, have we not got to rely eventually upon collective security and not regional pacts or national strength for a lawful and an orderly world?

Mr. Schwebel. Yes, absolutely.

Senator Pepper. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator McMahon?

Senior Mcmahon. I have no questions.

The Chairman. We thank you very much, Mr. Schwebel.

Mr. James P. Warburg, of New York City.

STATEMENT OF JAMES P. WARBURG, NEW YORK CITY

Mr. Warburg. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to express my grateful appreciation to you and to the members of this committee for the opportunity to testify on the important and far-reaching proposal now before you. I speak for no group or organization, but merely as one citizen anxious for the safety and welfare of our country. I am neither a lawyer nor a military expert. Such competence as I may possess derives merely from practical experience in international affairs—as a banker, as a public servant, and as a free-lance observer and reporter. I can say that I have for many years diligently studied the problems of American foreign policy, and that I have given particular attention to the twofold proposal now under consideration, ever since its outlines first emerged into public view. Your own far greater knowledge and experience will enable you to detect any fallacies which may underlie the opinions I shall venture to express.

The Atlantic Security Pact and the program to rearm western Europe must, I think, be considered together. The forthright testimony of the Secretary of State has made it clear that the treaty is the consequence rather than the cause of the rearmament program launched by the Brussels Treaty Powers on March 14, 1948, and endorsed on the same day by President Truman.

CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA

I should like first to say a word about the context of this twofold proposal. It springs from a policy which should, in my opinion, go down in history as the Churchill doctrine, instead of being associated with the name of our President. This policy rests upon the theory, advanced by Mr. Churchill at Fulton, Mo., in March 1946 that the Soviet Union alone is responsible for the world crisis and that the Soviet threat to peace is essentially a threat of physical conquest. From this theory derived the policy of seeking to contain the Soviet threat within a physical frontier manned by physical force. This essentially negative approach to peace has become one of the two major trends in our present foreign policy. The other positive trend is the plan developed by President Truman and Secretary Marshall to attack the causes of mass discontent which invite communist exploitation.
My own belief has been that the present world crisis derives from a number of factors, some of which are the products of the time in which we live and have nothing whatever to do with the nature or intentions of the Soviet Union; that, in addition to these non-Russian factors, there has been, and is, a very definite Soviet threat to peace; but that this Soviet threat has been, and still is, primarily a threat of Communist penetration or subversion and only secondarily a threat of military conquest.

Holding this belief, I have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Marshall Plan and a persistent critic of the doctrine of physical containment. For the past two years, I have viewed with increasing misgivings the ever greater preemption of our energies and resources by the negative and not very successful policy of strategic containment and the consequent slow strangulation of our positive program.

In terms of dollars the ratio now stands at about three and a half to one. We are now spending less than $6,000,000,000 a year on our constructive program for peace. At the same time we are insuring ourselves against the failure of that program to the tune of more than $18,000,000,000.

This anomaly results, I think, from two basic misconceptions: First, the oversimplified scapegoat analysis of the world crisis; and, second, the widespread acceptance of a very dubious analogy to the Nazi design of military conquest. Our obsession with these two misconceptions blinds us to those aspects of the world crisis which have nothing to do with Russia or communism, and, at the same time, prevents us from seeing the true nature of the Russian or communist menace.

**POSITIVE APPROACH TO RUSSIA**

If we could shake off this obsession, I believe that two things might happen.

First, we might recognize that the way to stop Russian is to stop letting Russia make our foreign policy; in other words, we might see that Soviet expansionism can best be halted as the by-products of a constructive American policy for peace.

Second, we might change our attitude about the United Nations. Instead of sadly shaking our heads over an impotent debating society and consoling ourselves with the easy notion that the United Nations would work. If only the Russians would let it work, we might set out to make the United Nations into an organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law. Were we to set out to do this, we should, of course, encounter Soviet opposition. But it would be Soviet opposition to a constructive program of peacefully uniting a divided world, in which we should enjoy far greater and more effective support from the peoples of the world than we can ever hope to muster in the present sterile and highly dangerous power struggle.

So much for the context of the Atlantic security program. I am prepared to amplify these few remarks, if time permits and the committee so desires. Given this context, which cannot be changed overnight, it seems to me that the twofold North Atlantic security program must be examined from the point of view of its efficacy as an instrument in our present policy. I shall now state my position from this narrower point of view as quickly and as precisely as I can.
So long as we live in a world of international anarchy dominated by a power struggle between the two halves of a divided world, I am in favor of any declaration which makes it clear to ourselves and to others that a physical attack upon western Europe is an attack upon us, and will be so regarded by us. I have spent most of my adult life fighting the isolationist illusion. I supported our entrance into the League of Nations and opposed the neutrality acts. When western Europe was faced by the threat of Nazi conquest, I was horrified by our connivance in the so-called peace of Munich and, shortly thereafter, publicly advocated an open military alliance with Britain, France, and the Low Countries as the only hope of preventing the outbreak of World War II. I do not object to such an alliance now, provided that it does not take our eyes off the real danger—which is now not military but political—and provided that we do not fool either ourselves or our friends about what we are doing.

Pretenses in Treaty

We are fooling ourselves, I think, when we try to clothe this treaty in moral garments. To say that all the signatories are united by a common heritage of ethical belief and democratic conviction seems to me a dubious statement about large segments of the French, Dutch, Belgian, and Italian populations which willingly collaborated with and lived quite contentedly under fascism. It seems a dubious statement about any country in which 25 percent of the people are today Communists, or about any country whose government seeks to deny democratic freedom to colonial peoples. This moral pretense becomes a complete mockery when Portugal is one of the signatories and when flirtatious eyes are cast at Franco Spain.

Likewise I think we are fooling ourselves when we maintain that we are undertaking this program in order to strengthen the United Nations, when it is clear that we are trying to find a means of filling the gap left by the failure of the United Nations.

These two polite hypocrisies seem to me to weaken our undertaking. I do not think they are vitally important because I do not believe that the American people take either pretense very seriously. There is, however, one respect in which I am afraid that some one is being seriously and dangerously led astray. In what is perhaps the most important aspect of the twofold proposal, I believe that either the American people do not realize what is afoot, or else our friends abroad are under a most regrettable misapprehension.

Securing Western Europe From Attack

From what I myself heard in Europe recently and from the published utterances of foreign officials, it seems clear that our friends abroad expect the new program to secure the frontiers of western Europe against invasion by the Soviet Union. They are not interested in the promise of another liberation from enemy occupation. "Next time," said Premier Queuille of France, "you would be liberating a corpse."

To secure the frontiers of western Europe means to hold an invading Russian army at the Oder, or the Elbe, or—at the very worst—
at the Rhine. Being no military expert, I have tried to find out what military experts think this undertaking would require. The impression I have gathered, here and abroad, is that there would have to be created in western Europe a ground force of at least 40 fully equipped and highly mobile divisions and that such a ground army would have to be supported by great tactical and strategic air power by fully functioning services of supply and by adequately protected sea communications with the Western Hemisphere. To say that it would take at least $10,000,000,000 and a million men under arms to secure the frontiers of western Europe against invasion is probably a gross understatement.

Assuming that we were to supply all the money and equipment—assuming that, in the event of war, we undertook to provide much of the needed air power and the protection of the sea lanes—there would still remain the question of trained and mobilized manpower to secure the west European frontier. So far as I know, there are only three sources from which this manpower can be drawn: Western Europe itself, western Germany, or the United States.

**Sources of Manpower Needed to Secure Europe**

Western Europe as a whole is suffering from a shortage of manpower, which at present is one of the chief obstacles to recovery. Italy is the only country which has a manpower surplus, but Italy cannot be rearmed without violating the Italian peace treaty. If a million men are withdrawn for military service from the farms and factories of France and the other European signatories, the recovery effort will come to a standstill and the door will be opened wide to Communist subversion or penetration.

If military manpower were to be recruited in western Germany, it is clear, I think, that two things would happen: Russian retaliation would be provoked, and the already dubious morale of any potential French Army would be destroyed. I say "the already dubious morale" because we cannot ignore the fact that, with 25 percent of France voting Communist, the Russians have a far more dangerous fifth column in France today than the Nazis had in 1940.

That leaves the United States, and perhaps Canada, as a source of the necessary manpower. A former French Prime Minister has been making speeches in this country recently urging that we send a large American force to Europe now to stand guard over its frontier. However, even if we were prepared to do that, it is necessary to bear in mind that, in spite of our huge military budget of $15,000,000,000 a year, we have at present a combat force of only about 10 divisions.

**Military Assistance or European Recovery**

It would seem clear, then, that if the Atlantic security program means what our European friends think it means, either western European recovery will have to be halted in its tracks, or else the United States will have to undertake a vastly greater commitment than the American people realize today. Halting the European recovery program means that we shall have to face the necessity of increased and indefinitely prolonged Marshall plan assistance, or else throw open the door to Communist penetration at the very moment when it has been almost locked by patient and costly effort.
If the Atlantic security program is intended to mean that we are to secure the frontiers of western Europe against invasion, then the presently proposed $1,130,000,000 is merely the first bite at a very much larger commitment. It costs something like $250,000,000 to equip one armored division. I do not know what it would cost to create a force of 40 divisions—either European or American—in Europe. But, whatever it costs, this would again be only the beginning, because we could hardly assume that the Russians would sit still on their side of the iron curtain while we proceed in a leisurely manner to build up a defense capable of holding their presently available striking force. Actually, all the Russians would have to do to double their present immediate striking power would be to bring up another 50 existing divisions from wherever they are at present stationed in the Soviet Union. If they did that, our defense force would again have to be proportionately strengthened. And even this sort of calculation would work out satisfactorily, only if the Russians did not hit upon the bright idea that maybe they had better get the whole thing over with before we had built up any defense at all.

These seem to me the facts to be faced, if we are talking about securing the west European frontier against invasion.

If, on the other hand, we are not undertaking to do what our friends think we are doing, what is the point of diverting European manpower and resources from recovery to rearmament? What good will it do to build half a defense force? Twenty divisions are no better than the 10 or 12 which exist in western Europe today, if it takes 40 to do the job. Surely, it is folly to think that the French, or the Dutch, or the Belgians would fight a delaying action for the benefit of Britain and the United States, if they knew in advance that their countries would be overrun and occupied. Surely it is folly to weaken our own military strength by putting some of our stock of weapons in the hands of troops who—in the event of war—would be forced to surrender them to the invader.

NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF COMMITMENT UNDER TREATY

Before the treaty is ratified, Mr. Chairman, I think the American people have a right to know what it means. I think our friends abroad have a right to know what it means. Either we are, or we are not, undertaking to defend western Europe against invasion. If we are, let us not deceive ourselves about the costs or the risks involved. If we are not—if we are merely undertaking to deter invasion—let us not permit our friends to be deceived. Let us make clear to them what it is that we are promising to do.

Shortly after the treaty was signed, our Chief of Staff, General Bradley, made a speech, which I understand was cleared with the State Department, and in which I thought he clearly implied that our European friends were right in assuming that the frontiers of western Europe are now to be secured against invasion in the event of war. On April 27, the Secretary of State himself said to this committee [reading]:

It is understandable that the free nations of western Europe cannot look forward with equanimity to invasion and occupation in the event of war, even if we guarantee subsequently to liberate them. Nor is it to our own interest to permit
them to be occupied with the consequent necessity of the costly liberation of these areas.

CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS

On the same day, according to the New York Times, the Secretary of State told this committee in response to a question that "there was absolutely no intention to send substantial numbers of American troops to Europe in any eventuality short of war." In response to another question he is reported to have said that "there was no thought of bringing western Germany into the alliance." And, finally, speaking of the proposed American subsidy of $1,130,000,000 to west European rearmament, Mr. Acheson is reported to have stated that "the countries to be aided would themselves put up from six to seven times what the United States provided."

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that these statements add up to the conclusion that the western European signatories are to provide all the manpower and roughly 85 percent of the material resources required to secure the frontiers of western Europe against invasion. I am unable to reconcile this conclusion with the repeated assurance given by the State Department that rearmament is not to take precedence over or interfere with west European recovery. I fear that the Secretary of State for whose integrity, wisdom, skill, and courage I have the greatest respect and admiration, has fallen heir to an unclear position not of his own making and is, to a certain extent, its prisoner.

CLARIFICATION OF TREATY BY SENATE

In these circumstances it seems to me that precisely the sort of occasion has arisen when the Senate, in the fulfillment of its constitutional duties and prerogatives, is in a position to help the President and the Secretary of State in their patient pursuit of peace, by bringing about a clarification of the proposal.

Two kinds of clarification are possible.

The first would establish that the twofold program means our participation in a determined effort to defend western Europe's frontiers in the event of war.

The second would establish that we are undertaking to make our utmost effort to deter a would-be aggressor from attacking western Europe, but that, if this effort should fail, we are committed to avenge and liberate, but not necessarily to prevent invasion.

In the event of the first alternative, I would feel compelled—if I had a vote—to cast it against the ratification of the treaty. I would do so most reluctantly, knowing that, in the present circumstances, our failure to ratify would involve grave risks. Yet I would feel that these risks were not as serious as those involved in the attempt to erect a dubious defense against what I conceive to be the secondary danger of military attack, at the price of weakening western Europe's defenses against what I conceive to be the primary danger—namely, the threat of Communist penetration through exploitation of economic distress and political instability.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the wisdom of the Senate will lead to a clarification of the twofold program in the opposite sense. Such a clarification would rest upon the recognition that the only effective
way to protect western Europe against military invasion is to prevent the outbreak of war. Were this premise accepted, a clarifying statement might take approximately the following form [reading]:

1. The treaty means that the United States recognizes that it has a vital interest in the security of western Europe and that it will fight, if necessary, to maintain that security.

2. The treaty means that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with the United States.

3. The treaty implies that, so long as no effective supranational peace-enforcement machinery is established, the United States will do its utmost to maintain sufficient military power to make it apparent to a potential aggressor that any attempt at military conquest of western Europe is foredoomed to failure.

4. If, in spite of the foregoing deterrents to aggression provided by the United States, an aggressor should nevertheless embark upon military adventure, the United States preserves full freedom of action to fight the aggressor in whatever manner, by whatever means, and in whatever theater or theaters of action it may deem expedient, in order to restore as rapidly as possible the security and freedom of the North Atlantic area.

If the treaty were thus clarified, I should be in favor of its ratification. I should even be in favor of a limited amount of military aid, designed primarily to enable the freely elected governments in western Europe to deal effectively with possible internal threats of violence, and to promote a greater feeling of self-respect and security. But I should stipulate that such military aid must not be given to governments which are not freely elected, and that it must not assume dimensions which would divert any of the nations of western Europe from their primary task for achieving economic health and political stability.

**GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF TREATY**

In voting for a program thus clarified, I should be well aware of certain defects in the treaty which, I am afraid, is now too late to remedy. By including Norway, the treaty pushes the declared area of our vital interest right up against the Soviet frontier at its northern extremity. At the same time, the treaty limits our commitment to certain countries of western Europe, leaving others—notably Finland, Sweden, Turkey, and Iran—unprotected. This seems to me inconsistent and unwise. In spite of these now probably irremediable defects, I would consider that the treaty has two offsetting virtues, provided that the whole program is clarified as suggested. These virtues are: First, that the treaty makes explicit to every American citizen a commitment which has long been implicit in our whole foreign policy; and, second, that it makes this commitment unequivocally clear as a warning to any would-be aggressor and as an encouragement to our friends.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that my recommendation is at least precise and clear. I am grateful for the opportunity to present it for the consideration of your committee.

Should you find merit in the suggestion I have ventured to place before you, you will, I believe, have cured the Atlantic security program of its most dangerous defect. This program may then well become a most useful stopgap device to buy the time in which a positive, constructive American program for peace may be developed. Its ultimate effectiveness as such a device will then be determined by what we
do with the time gained, in Europe and in Asia—more specifically, in Germany and in the southeastern rim of the Asiatic Continent.

NECESSITY FOR CLARIFICATION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Warburg, you condition your approval of the treaty upon the adoption of these suggestions which you advance as being clarifications; is that true?

Mr. WARBURG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless they are adopted you are not for the treaty?

Mr. WARBURG. Unless the treaty is clarified I think it is a highly dangerous instrument.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean clarified in the way you want to clarify it?

Mr. WARBURG. I do not mean it has to be in those particular words. I think it has to be made clear whether we are or are not undertaking to secure the frontiers of Europe against invasion.

The CHAIRMAN. In your first clarification you say [reading]:

The treaty means that the United States recognizes that it has a vital interest in the security of western Europe and that it will fight, if necessary, to maintain that security.

Does not the treaty do that?

Mr. WARBURG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why any clarification?

Mr. WARBURG. Because the impression abroad, and given I think with reason abroad because of the statements made here, is that it means more than that. It means we are undertaking to secure the frontiers of western Europe against invasion in the event of war.

The CHAIRMAN. You are for the treaty if they adopt this clarification, and the clarification to my mind is clearly expressed in the treaty already, so why clarify something that is already clear?

Mr. WARBURG. If it is in the treaty, sir, I do not know where to find it. I do not believe the treaty says anything about whether we defend or do not defend the frontiers of western Europe against invasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Your reservation does not even say that. You say [reading]:

It has a vital interest in the security of western Europe and that it will fight, if necessary, to maintain that security.

Mr. WARBURG. That is correct, but the essential part of my clarification is point 4.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just taking them one at a time. You have disposed of that satisfactorily. The second clarification is that the United States [reading]:

serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with the United States.

Doesn't the treaty say that already?

Mr. WARBURG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why add a condition? We can't get your vote, now, unless we adopt section 2, which you say is already in the treaty.
Mr. Warburg. Sections 1 and 2 are explicit in the treaty; section 3 is implicit in it. I did not want to state section 4 without putting in the context of the things we are doing.

The Chairman. We have not got to 4 yet. We cannot clarify it all according to your program with just one line. [Reading]:

3. The treaty implies that, so long as no effective, supranational peace-enforcement machinery is established, the United States will do its utmost to maintain sufficient military power to make it apparent to a potential aggressor that any attempt at military conquest of western Europe is foredoomed to failure.

Does not our program of national defense over here, of $15,000,000,-000, and the language of that treaty, mean what you say in section 3?

Mr. Warburg. Right.

The Chairman. Then why the necessity for section 3?

Now [reading]:

4. If, in spite of the foregoing deterrents to aggression provided by the United States, an aggressor should nevertheless embark upon military adventure, the United States preserves full freedom of action to fight the aggressor in whatever manner, by whatever means, and in whatever theater or theaters of action it may deem expedient, in order to restore as rapidly as possible the security and freedom of the North Atlantic area.

Is there anything in the treaty that limits our rights to fight the war with any kind of weapons, whatever we may determine to, if we do enter war?

Mr. Warburg. The whole point of my testimony, sir, is to emphasize the ambiguity which exists as to the meaning of the twofold program, the treaty and the rearmament of western Europe.

The Chairman. You have agreed that your first three clarifications have already been clarified. What is there in the treaty that conflicts at all with your condition No. 4?

Mr. Warburg. Senator, it is not in the treaty at all. May I explain the reason for the first three clarifying statements? The essential point is point 4. If you pick out point 4 without the first three points, it could be interpreted as backing out of something we have said. I do not want to back out of the underlying commitment of the treaty at all, and in order to say 4, I think you have to say 1, 2, and 3.

The Chairman. You have said 1, 2, and 3. That is already in the treaty. What is there in your point 4 that is contrary to what the treaty says?

Mr. Warburg. There is nothing that is contrary to what the treaty says.

The Chairman. That is what we are dealing with. We are dealing with the treaty, are we not?

Mr. Warburg. We are dealing with what people think the treaty means here and abroad.

The Chairman. We are dealing with the treaty. We do not go out on the street and ask every fellow we meet what he thinks of the treaty.

Mr. Warburg. May I document the point by giving you some quotations from testimony made here?

The Chairman. We know what testimony has been made. I can’t see the strength of your No. 4, when you are negatively saying that we are going to fight, if we do fight, with all the means that we may employ. That goes without saying. If we have a war, we are going to fight with the weapons we have and can get.
Mr. WARBURG. It makes it clear that we are not necessarily undertaking to defend the frontiers of western Europe against invasion. That is not now clear, and the Secretary of State testified to this committee in almost the same words as those of the French Prime Minister, saying that liberation was not good enough.

The CHAIRMAN. You have read the treaty?
Mr. WARBURG. Yes, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that not make it clear?
Mr. WARBURG. It says we regard an attack on western Europe as an attack upon us. It does not say whether we will or will not do what the French think it does mean.

The CHAIRMAN. It is specifically provided in the treaty that in that event we do whatever we deem necessary, whatever we deem necessary to restore the security of the North Atlantic area. That is in the treaty, is it not?

Mr. WARBURG. If that is your interpretation, then I should not think you would object to my clarifying statement, because that is exactly what I think it should mean.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is already in the treaty, and clear, I do not see why we should adopt as a condition of ratification another bite at the same cherry.

All right, Senator Vandenberg. Take the witness.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Warburg, I find myself confronting something of a conundrum, as I think the chairman's questions have suggested in a preliminary way. It seems to me I can substantially accept your thesis. Certainly I agree with you that the only effective way to protect western Europe against military invasion is to prevent the outbreak of war, to stop it before it starts at all. I certainly agree with you, if I understand you correctly, that you think the great and real operative power of this treaty cannot be forces in being, but must be the potential force of the combined invincible resources of those who notify prospective aggressors of what they are up against.

Mr. WARBURG. Yes, sir.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, we are in complete agreement in that thesis. And I am wondering whether the trouble we find ourselves in in understanding each other does not attach almost directly to the proposed military implementation program. If there was no military implementation program pending, would you find in the pact itself any of the fears you express?

Mr. WARBURG. No, I don't think I would, sir; but the fears I express arise from the sort of thing which has been said by General Bradley, and if you will pardon me for quoting this again, here is what Mr. Acheson said in response to a question from Senator Wiley [reading]:

They—
speaking of the European signatories—say, "If there were a really serious all-out attack, we know that in the long run probably the great strength of the United States would in the end defeat the
aggressor, but in the meantime we would be overrun. Most of us," they say, "would be dead. Our civilization would be pretty well destroyed. The final outcome would be that the United States would be liberating a corpse."

That is the Secretary of State to this committee. It is almost identical with a statement made by Premier Queuille when the treaty was under consideration. He used the same phrase, "You would be liberating a corpse."

Senator Vandenberg. I understand there have been statements of interpretation abroad which do justify many of your comments, and interpretations with which, so far as I am concerned, I do not agree. I certainly concur in your thought that we must not permit our friends to be deceived. That would be the last possible crime we could commit.

But, Mr. Warburg, isn't about the only way we have left to test the reality of the hazards to which you refer to look at the actual military implementation program which is being suggested? And I ask you these questions with no commitment whatever to the military program myself. I reserve my own judgment in connection with it. But as you have clearly indicated in your statement, a military program of $1,000,000,000 could not possibly be any sort of a defense against invasion. Isn't that true?

Mr. Warburg. Certainly.

Senator Vandenberg. Well, then, why doesn't it follow that our program isn't one to prevent war, instead of one to prevent invasion?

Mr. Warburg. Well, I think that in the absence of the other statements that would be a reasonable inference, but the statement I have just quoted, made by the Secretary of State, and the one I quoted earlier—those two statements mean to me that we recognize, as General Bradley said before, that it is not good enough to deter invasion, that it is not good enough to reliberate, that the next time we would be liberating a corpse. I can only read that to mean what the French think it means, namely, that we are undertaking to secure their frontiers against invasion in the event of war.

Senator Vandenberg. If all of our treaty friends sit in together and agree tentatively on a military-aid program of $1,000,000,000, isn't it inevitable that they must understand that they are agreeing to a program which does not contemplate any attempted Maginot Line, or something of the sort? Must they not know at the very moment they confront that program? I am not arguing with you.

Mr. Warburg. I do not know how much they know about what comes next after this first step in the program. So far as I know, there has been no public testimony of any sort on how the program develops.

Senator Vandenberg. So far as I know, there is no information available. At any rate, I have no more than you have at that point. But I do have the general information that the preliminary implementation does not even contemplate any substantial increase in the numbers of their own troops. It merely apparently contemplates the effective, the more effective, arming of existing units and gearing them together on some sort of a basis which creates the united value instead of the divisive value.

Now, I cannot say to you that that is the program, because I do not know that it is. But assuming that that is the program, for the sake of the argument, would you not find that program substantially in
line, even with your own asserted willingness to provide "a limited amount of military aid"?

Mr. Warburg. For internal security?

Senator Vandenberg. Yes.

Mr. Warburg. Yes; I would. Actually I believe, insofar as one can guess at the answer to an ambiguity, that the clarification I am suggesting merely states clearly what is intended, and if that is true, I think we should not take the risk of having a lot of people, particularly our friends, think it means something different.

Senator Vandenberg. I think there is a great deal to be said for the importance of eliminating ambiguity.

In your fourth point, I assume that when you say "the United States preserves full freedom of action to fight the aggressor in whatever manner, by whatever means," and so forth, you are not undertaking to reserve any right not to do anything about it. You are merely preserving the right of the choice and time and method of doing it.

Mr. Warburg. That is correct.

Senator Vandenberg. Which, as I understand it, is precisely what we already do in the treaty. So that in the final analysis, unless the implementation program discloses something far different than the prospectus has indicated, it looks to me as though you and the committee were in substantial agreement.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Warburg, one other question before I turn you over to Senator Pepper.

PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Is not the chief value of the implement program, about which the details are not yet available, to give assurance to the European countries associated in the treaty of a sort of an earnest money payment, that we mean what we say in the treaty and that we show our good faith by granting this limited, very limited, aid, of $1,130,000,000? Is that not true?

Mr. Warburg. I would not so interpret it, and I would not like to. I do not like to say that when we do something we have to put something on the table to prove that we mean it.

The Chairman. You do not object to reaffirming what you have already promised to do?

Mr. Warburg. It depends on what I have promised to do.

The Chairman. Do you favor giving them a dollar or not?

Mr. Warburg. What dollar?

The Chairman. Any dollar. Do you favor giving any military aid as implementation, or not?

Mr. Warburg. In the first place, I think it is extremely dangerous to divert them from recovery to rearmament; with the proviso that that does not happen and with the proviso that such military aid as is given is primarily for the purpose of maintaining internal security on the part of freely elected governments, in which I do not include Portugal, then I see no harm in such a program.

The Chairman. You want to limit it to "internal." You do not want to fight the invader or repel the invader?

Mr. Warburg. I did not say I did not want to fight the invader.
The Chairman. You said you wanted military aid limited to domestic purposes.

Mr. Warburg. So long as we make it clear that what we are giving them military aid for is to stabilize their situation at home, and not to put them in a position to hold the Oder or the Elbe or the Rhine, I see no harm in it. But if we intend to put them in a position to hold the Oder or the Elbe or the Rhine, then by all means let's do what it takes to hold those lines. We are not going to do that with the present plans.

The Chairman. Your plan is to regulate their internal difficulties, and let the foreign situation take care of itself.

Mr. Warburg. No, it is not to let the foreign situation take care of itself, sir. I think our job is to do two things. One is to deter aggression by making it clear that if any aggressor attacks our friends in western Europe, they are dealing with us at the start. I am for doing that. The second thing is, to help Europe lock the door against the primary danger, which is Communist penetration or subversion, by means of the Marshall plan.

The Chairman. Does not the treaty make clear your first point, that if there is an armed attack on any one of the nations signatory, we are in the picture from then on?

Mr. Warburg. Yes, but it is not clear whether or not we are in the picture with a commitment to defend the Oder line, or the Elbe, or the Rhine.

The Chairman. It does not go into detail. It does not tell whether we will shout them with a particular kind of weapon or whether we will drop a bomb on them. That is a detail.

Mr. Warburg. I do not think it is a detail from the point of view of a Frenchman whether his country is invaded and overrun or whether it is not.

The Chairman. The Frenchmen are parties to this treaty. They signed it and they accept it as it is written, and we accept it as it is written. And I think the French understand it very thoroughly. I remember when they were here and signed it, a lot of us had conversations with Mr. Schuman and others. They know what it is all about. As already suggested, one of the primary purposes of the arms proposition is not to vastly increase their armed forces, not for the purpose of diverting anybody from productive activities under the Marshall plan, but to modernize their equipment of arms and things of that kind. That is what we are told is the purpose, and I think it is the purpose. And the fact that you made some statement about the Europeans spending five or six or seven times as much money as we do, that does not mean new money. It means they have a normal military budget. They may add to it—I do not know—but it is stated by the Secretary of State that their entire budgets for defense and military preparations would be about six or seven times as much as that of the United States contribution. Is that true?

Mr. Warburg. Yes.

The Chairman. All right, Senator Pepper.

NEW COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY

Senator Pepper. Mr. Warburg, I will be interested to get your view as to what are the new elements which this proposed treaty brings
into being, at the same time commending your desire to let everybody know what ye are doing. Looking at article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty [reading]:

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

That is simply a reaffirmation of an obligation that all the members of the United Nations have assumed, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. Surely.

Senator Pepper. So there is nothing new in that. Article 2 [reading]:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Those are substantially and essentially also the general obligations of the nations who are members of the United Nations organization as particularly, for example, set forth in chapter IX of the United Nations Charter, and more specifically in article 56 of chapter IX, where [reading]:

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55—which are the general principles of a higher standard of living, full employment, conditions of economic and social progress and development, solution of international economic, social, health, and related problems, international cultural and educational cooperation, and universal respect for and observation of human rights, and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. So there is nothing substantially new in article 2.

Now, article 3 [reading]:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Do you regard that as imposing a new obligation upon the members? Did they in the United Nations Charter assume the obligation separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack?

Mr. Warburg. I am no lawyer, but I should think not. I should think this was new.

Senator Pepper. I agree with you. In the United Nations Charter there is a machinery, there is a technique, provided for resisting armed aggression. There is a general obligation imposed upon the members to resist armed aggression. But I do not know of any affirmative obligation upon the members other than through the United Nations Organization to give continuous mutual aid and assistance to develop individual and collective capacity to resist attack.
Article 4 [reading]:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Do you know of any such obligation to consult among themselves in the United Nations under the Charter?

Mr. WARBURG. No; I do not.

Senator PEPPER. Article 5 [reading]:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Do you regard that as imposing any substantially new obligation upon the members of the United Nations?

Mr. WARBURG. I do not consider myself competent to have a useful opinion on that, Senator. My feeling is that what we are proposing to do there is pretty much what was intended by the United Nations Charter. As to whether it comes under one paragraph or another I would not venture to express an opinion.

Senator PEPPER. It may reemphasize, and it may have certain practical advantages, but do you not regard it that if any members of the United Nations were attacked by armed force, by an aggressor nation, it would be the duty of the others to come to the aid of that party in the way they deem best?

Mr. WARBURG. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. And so on with the other provisions. I only read article 9 [reading]:

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the Implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 3 is the article on mutual aid; article 5 on collective resistance to an armed attack upon any member or members of the group.

Mr. WARBURG. That would seem to me something new which is made necessary by the failure of the United Nations.

SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID FOR SECURITY

Senator PEPPER. Your thought is that what we are establishing here is something in the nature of a vigilante until forces of law and order in the world can be substantially established in this getting together to resist any attack upon any member of the community.

Mr. WARBURG. If I may put it just a bit differently, I would say it is a resort to old-fashioned military alliances in a period in which the world is run on that kind of power politics.
Senator Pepper. In other words, although you say you are not a lawyer, it is general knowledge that the citizen was entitled to the privilege of self-help until law and order came to the community to give him public protection and security.

Mr. Warburg. Yes.

Senator Pepper. And then, when we got public protection and security, we made it unlawful for men to carry pistols around in their pockets.

Mr. Warburg. But the important point is that I think it does not follow that when you have this vigilante kind of protection, you necessarily come to law and order afterwards. You sometimes do and you sometimes do not.

Senator Pepper. But the new matter is setting up a new organization with a solemn treaty obligation for continuing mutual aid, and with the establishment of a council to make recommendations as to how articles 3 and 5 shall be implemented.

COMMITMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 3

You say that language in the treaty, together with all that has been said or assumed, has given the impression to the other nations, at least to the European members of this community, that for all practical purposes we are taking over the responsibility of giving them a great volume of arms and military aid, and of becoming an integral part of a military organizations, a military defense?

Mr. Warburg. I do not know whether they think it involves our giving them great quantities of arms or not. I think what they do think is that either by giving them great quantities of arms or by sending American troops over to do the job we are undertaking to secure them against a possible invasion.

Senator Pepper. The Senate has been asked to vote upon the ratification. We are asked by the President to give our advice and consent to a proposed and recommended treaty, and we are primarily, of course, voting upon the treaty, which is written in the English language. And the instrument obviously is supposed to mean what it says. But I think it is wise to make it very clear that under articles 3 and 5 we do not propose to furnish either troops or an adequate amount of equipment to stop any potential aggressor at the borders of the European members of this Atlantic community that are parties to this treaty.

Mr. Warburg. That is substantially correct. I would not put it in just those words, because I think that arouses unnecessary fear that we would not even try to do it. We might try to do it. All I am concerned with is that we do not promise to do it.

DECLARATION OF WAR

Senator Pepper. It is clear to everybody that if anybody attacks with armed force any member of this group that we call the North Atlantic Treaty group, the United States of America, for all practical purposes, declares war against that aggressor, if it is an all-out armed attack?
Mr. Warburg. That is correct.

Senator Pepper. And that we here in Congress will vote for war?

Mr. Warburg. Yes.

Senator Pepper. That is clear to everybody. As a matter of fact we do it anyway, regardless of this treaty. We would do it because we did it once in 1917 and we did it again in 1941. We would do it again—

Mr. Warburg. Except this time we do not wait for a couple of years to do it.

Senator Pepper. That is right, and we are obligated to do it, in the opinion of most of us, under the obligations we have already assumed, and most of us do not regard that this treaty imposes any new obligation insofar as giving all-out aid to resist a war that might be started against any member of this community or any other members of the world community, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. Warburg. So far as I am concerned, Senator, the substance of this treaty is merely an honest affirmation of what has been our policy for a long time.

ARTICLE 3 AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Pepper. I thoroughly agree, except in article 3, and there is a possible point of ambiguity that allows these people to have a difference, an honest difference, of opinion as to what they may expect from it.

If we are the ones that are expected to give the arms aid, and it is supposed to be in great volume, obviously we will have to be the one to determine the distribution of it, will we not?

Mr. Warburg. I suppose so; yes.

Senator Pepper. And in the final analysis, if we are the strongest member of the community, and the one furnishing the great volume of new equipment for all practical purposes, we would more or less be regarded as at the head of the table in this defense combination, would we not?

Mr. Warburg. I should think so.

Senator Pepper. And a military organization of necessity has to take on a certain degree of rigidity. I mean, you have to have planes somewhere, one type of plane somewhere, another type of plane somewhere; you have to have ships of various types at different places; you have to have different kinds of weapons at different places, manned by personnel. In other words, it of necessity, if a comprehensive military plan for the defense of the European members of this community is to be worked out, has got to have a pattern about it, and naturally somebody has got to be the one that forms the pattern, and somebody has to implement it.

Is it not almost necessary that the matter grow into something of quite large proportions if we do start out with the assumption that we are to set up a single military force for all practical purposes to defend this Atlantic community against potential attack?

Mr. Warburg. Well now, just as you put it, Senator, again, "defend it against potential attack" can mean two things.

Senator Pepper. I do not mean in the sense of being right there at the border. I mean to join them in resistance to attack.
Mr. Warburg. Yes. It is essential to have a pattern. It is essential to have a plan. But it is even more essential for our own security that we do not fool ourselves about what that plan is. If, for example, we did mean—which I do not think we do, and all I am saying is that we should make it clear that we do not—that we were going to attempt to hold the frontiers of western Europe, then unless we made sure we could hold them we would be embarking on a gigantic Dunkirk. We would be starting off with a guaranteed initial defeat.

Senator Pepper. I think it is very obvious that if we intended to make anything like an effective resistance at the borders of the European members of this community it would take a very advanced military plan which would involve the placement of both matériel and manpower.

Mr. Warburg. Over there now, before any war starts.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 3

Senator Pepper. However, again going back to what we are actually doing here, and I think you make a valuable contribution to give further occasion for the clarification of the possible ambiguity that might be in article 3 of this treaty, is that we are passing upon a document. Now, the Secretary of State appeared before this committee and, in response to the inquiry of the chairman, he was asked what Senators, and of course that would include members of the House, what Members of Congress, should feel, or must feel, to be their duty in respect to article 3 if we gave the necessary advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty.

The Secretary of State said, as I recall it, that a Senator could not hereafter say that we owed no obligation to give aid and assistance to the other members of this community, but the degree and the volume and the kind of aid given, as I construe it, under article 3, would be in the sound judgment and confidence of the individual Senator or Member of the House of Representatives. Do you recall that?

Mr. Warburg. I thought his testimony was very forthright and very clear.

Senator Pepper. So that we who are Members have a perfect right to make it clear that we look very skeptically, speaking only for myself, upon article 3, and I regard myself as having the right to exercise, so long as I am here, exactly the prerogative that the Secretary of State so clearly, and so courageously defined; that we are willing, individually, to help with further economic assistance, if it be required and help certainly these countries to provide for their internal security, and to help them also to regain their confidence, but that we reserve just exactly what the Secretary of State said we might, if we vote for the ratification of this treaty, the right to exercise our own individual judgment.

When anybody proposes to do something affirmatively as to the volume or the character and the timing of the aid that is proposed to be given, we reserve the right to exercise our own individual judgment.

Mr. Warburg. That is substantially all I would like to see made clear to our friends abroad.
Senator Pepper. That is substantially, as I understand it, what you are suggesting here.

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Warburg, I want to be sure I do not misunderstand you. Again I say that I agree with about 99 percent of your thesis.

INTERPRETATIONS HERE AND ABROAD OF UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS

Are we not making it clear as to the pattern contemplated under article 3 when, as a result of conference among the treaty powers, the arms program under article 3 is limited to one billion dollars? If that is a permanent pattern, it cannot be the type of aid against which your fears run, could it?

Mr. Warburg. No, it could not, sir, in the absence of statements by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army and the Secretary of State, which to me imply the opposite, and which seem to imply the opposite to people abroad. Why is ex-Premier Reynaud in this country now making speeches saying we ought to send a lot of American troops over now? What did Premier Queuille say? "The next time you liberate us it will be too late. You will be liberating a corpse."

Senator Vandenberg. I can understand those statements, and I can also understand that if the representative of the French Government has agreed to such a limited program as it is apparently limited, we do not yet know, it seems to me that there is pretty universal consent to the present system of interpretation for which you contend, and with which I substantially agree.

So that on the basis of any such hypothesis as exists up to date, our only task, as I listened to your very able presentation, is to make it perfectly sure that the facts as they exist are not misunderstood.

Mr. Warburg. Yes.

The Chairman. Well, the best way to not let them be misunderstood is to put in the treaty what we mean, and we have done that, and I do not think you have challenged anything that we have said in the treaty, have you?

Mr. Warburg. I do not challenge anything you have said in the treaty, sir, I think Senator Pepper brought out a point that there are possible interpretations.

The Chairman. Of course, there are possible interpretations. A man looks at a horse and one says he is a dun and another says he is a sorrel.

Mr. Warburg. I am concerned with whether the horse has three or four legs, not what his color is. I think the Europeans are. I think they are concerned with whether they are getting a horse they can ride.

The Chairman. Of course they are concerned with it, but when they are concerned they need only to turn to this treaty to see what we promise to do and what we do not promise.

Mr. Warburg. I do not think they can, with all due respect, with the statements that are on the record.

The Chairman. How can we hunt them all up individually and tell them what we mean by this treaty? Their leaders have come here to Washington. They have negotiated this treaty to start with. They had a great ceremony here in which they signed it, and the presumption is that they agreed to what is in the treaty, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. My point is—
The CHAIRMAN. I know. Answer that question, please. Is not the assumption that they know what is in the treaty and what they have agreed to?

Mr. WARBURG. The assumption is that they know what is in the treaty and they also know what is in the arms program for the first year, and I agree with Senator Vandenberg that every indication from that point of view means they are not going to be put in a position to secure their frontiers against invasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Not immediately, no. The treaty does not contemplate the sending of an army now to string along the Rhine. It only means that when they are the victims of an armed attack, we act.

Mr. WARBURG. When they are the victims of an armed attack the Russians will be at the Channel before anything can happen, unless something is done before they are the victims of an armed attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you favor sending an army over there now and keeping it there to protect their borders?

Mr. WARBURG. That depends on military judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. You have testified militarily. You have submitted yourself to this committee. I want to know what your wishes are. Do you want the United States to send an overwhelming army to the Rhine and maintain it there?

Mr. WARBURG. Speaking as a lay citizen, I would say that would be a very foolish thing to do, because I think that is the way to provoke a war we are trying to prevent.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we are not going to do. We do not plan to do that. But I judge from some of your statements that you thought that was what we ought to do.

Mr. WARBURG. I do not think I made any statement that could be so interpreted?

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize. I am being fair by bringing it to your attention.

Senator McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. As a resident of Connecticut, I have had a very lengthy correspondence with Mr. Warburg about this treaty and about the proposed implementation, and I want to compliment you, Mr. Warburg, on making what I think is a very definite contribution to the thinking on this situation.

Mr. WARBURG. Thank you, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. As I understand it, Mr. Warburg, you are enthusiastically for the Marshall program.

Mr. WARBURG. Yes.

FORCES NECESSARY TO SECURE EUROPE

Senator McMAHON. You are fearful that we cannot, or we are not able to, put the kind of an armed force or might into Europe without seriously impairing our ability to carry on the Marshall plan.

Mr. WARBURG. I do not think we can create a force in Europe capable of holding the frontiers of western Europe against invasion without halting the entire recovery program.

Senator McMAHON. I take it, since you are for the pact, that your difficulty arises out of the fact that you do not believe that we can implement it by a force in being to the tune of 40 divisions completely armed.
Mr. Warburg. Force in being in Europe, yes.

Senator McMahon. That is your difficulty.

I realize you have disclaimed a military expertness on the subject, but have you any confidence in our ability to deter aggression by the Soviet Union or anyone else by simply citing the pact and relying on our own armed forces to be thrown into action if the aggression should occur?

Mr. Warburg. Yes. I think there is a good deal of evidence to support that that is not a wild dream. In the first place, the Red Army could have overrun western Europe at any time in the last 2 years. One fact.

The second fact is that it has not done it. It has been deterred by something.

Senator McMahon. And what it has been deterred by has been our strength and our own armament, has it not?

Mr. Warburg. Assuming that the Russians want to conquer western Europe, which may or may not be the correct assumption, but it is the only safe assumption we can make, then I think it is fair to say that they have been deterred from doing it by the knowledge that they would be in a war with us which they could not hope to win.

Senator McMahon. Yes. So really what it boils down to is that you are for the Marshall program for rebuilding Europe, you are for the pact, and you agree that any invasion or aggression must be combated by this country in its own interests, but that you believe that that invasion will not start if the United States maintains an armed might and an armed establishment here of sufficient caliber and quality to deter the Russians, and you do not believe that they can be deterred by the kind of, shall I say, token armed force that we might assist in establishing in western Europe.

Mr. Warburg. That is correct.

Senator McMahon. And that token armed force, plus what the Europeans are able to do for themselves, in addition to not being conclusive on the Russians, would in addition to that tend to deter European recovery.

Mr. Warburg. Correct.

Senator McMahon. By the Europeans, because they have not the substance with which to reconstruct or rearm and build a new military establishment.

Mr. Warburg. And especially not the manpower.

Senator McMahon. Especially—of course that goes with it—not the manpower.

NATURE OF COMMITMENT UNDER ARTICLE III

Senator McMahon. So that really your appearance here endorses the pact and endorses the Marshall program, but you are in disagreement with the proposition of sending $1,130,000,000 worth of aid to Europe, as I understand it.

Mr. Warburg. No.

Senator McMahon. Although you do approve of sending enough to maintain their internal security.

Mr. Warburg. And I do not know whether the amount proposed is too big or too little for that. I am only concerned with one thing, Senator, and that is what we make it clear to ourselves and clear to
our friends what the commitment is that we are undertaking. Then it is up to the military people to decide what the necessary implementation of that commitment is.

Senator McMahon. And the only commitment that you personally are willing to make to western Europe at this time is that we now, out of our own continental force, our own forces in the United States, our own Air Force, suitable instruments, suitable weapons with which they might be equipped, should be relied on by the Europeans to deter the Russians from aggression, rather than to rely upon us to furnish the equipment, to say nothing of any manpower, for 40 ground divisions.

Mr. Warburg. That is, I think, what we are really saying, but we have not made it clear, and I think we should make it clear.

Senator McMahon. That really is your whole position, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. Right.

Senator McMahon. You are not alone in that. That is a close question. And there are many factors—the morale of the peoples of western Europe. There is a very grave consideration. It may be that the size of the revolver the man might have in his house might not be sufficient to destroy anybody that invades him. On the other hand, the possession of the revolver might give him enough comfort so that at least he could go about improving his ground and raising the food in his adjoining farm. That is possible too.

Mr. Warburg. I do not deny the value of this psychological argument. To my mind it is the only argument that makes any sense for any kind of rearmament.

Senator McMahon. And I might add that that is the only argument that makes any sense to me.

Mr. Warburg. I will go with it so long as it does not do two things: So long as it does not cause us to fool those fellows over there as to what we really are doing and promising to do, and so long as it does not take their eye off the real danger, which is still the danger of Communist penetration and subversion. If you can give them a little sense of security by giving them some popguns and not make them think they are getting 105-millimeter howitzers, when they are getting the popguns, I am all for it, but we will lose every friend we have in the world if we undertake a commitment that they think means one thing and then turns out to mean another.

Senator McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do you think that the doubt in the minds of the foreign nations may be clarified if we refused to ratify the treaty?

They would know where we stood then.

Mr. Warburg. I think they would know in a very unfortunate way where we stood. I am not suggesting that, sir.

Clarification of the Commitment

The Chairman. Do you favor the treaty or not? Do you favor the ratification of the treaty as it stands?

Mr. Warburg. I do not favor the ratification of the treaty and the arms program, which I take as one, as it stands, or as they stand, because I do not think it is clear to the American people or to the people abroad what the sum total of the two means. I think it is very easy to clarify it. I think that what we have been discussing here
shows pretty clearly that we all do understand it to mean pretty much the same thing, but it is also quite clear that that is not what the people abroad think it means.

The Chairman. How can we legislate for the people abroad, except here in our own language, and not on what some other fellow on the street may think about it?

Mr. Warburg. I have taken the liberty of suggesting a way to do it.

The Chairman. Their officials came here and signed the treaty and agreed to it. Now, because you say some man in France does not understand it, we ought to modify it and put in a reservation of your particular brand. Did you not agree with me a while ago that your three reservations were all in the treaty already?

Mr. Warburg. The four paragraphs are one clarification. I would not call it a reservation.

The Chairman. A clarification, which is a reservation, by the way, if it changes in any way the treaty; and if it does not change the treaty there is no use for it and no occasion for adopting it.

Senator McMahon. I think, Mr. Chairman, if I can say this, that Mr. Warburg is simply taking the position that the pact in itself is all right. What he is disturbed about is the fact that the implementation is not, in the way it is proposed going to be militarily effective. He is in effect expressing a military judgment, despite the fact that he has disclaimed military expertness. With that I do not quarrel, because I think that we here have to exercise some judgment on military things. If we do not, then we have abandoned our constitutional prerogatives, and I certainly intend, when the arms implementation bill comes before this committee and before the Senate, to examine it very closely on the basis of the evidence that is presented as to its military effectiveness. However, one element of military effectiveness, a great element, is the psychological effect it has on the people whom you are trying to help.

I, like Senator Vandenberg, reserve explicitly my opinion as to what I am going to do when the arms implementation thing comes here. I have been much more convinced of the effectiveness of this guarantee without the arms proposal than most people. Certainly if you regard it as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, as the drawing of a line which recognizes what we know factually are our interests, we know that the people in South America that are protected by the Monroe Doctrine, now revised in the Rio Pact, haven't any arms from us, yet they are under no illusions as to our willingness and readiness to back up the guarantees that we have given them.

So with this matter here, I do not think the Europeans have any illusions at all that we mean what we say. They may have some differences of opinion in their own minds as to how it is best to do that.

Mr. Warburg. They have no illusion that we mean what we say, but they have some doubt as to what it is that we mean.

Senator McMahon. I think maybe you are correct about that. Of course, that is a difficulty.

Mr. Warburg. And I must say again, I think the doubt is entirely legitimate. When you take the statements that have been made about the futility of engaging upon an enterprise which involves letting them be overrun and reliberating them—
Senator McMahon. The implementation bill as it goes through the committee and through the Congress, as it goes through the debate on the floor and finally comes out, will undoubtedly do a great deal to clarify the whole situation.

Mr. Warburg. I do not know if it is proper for me to make this perhaps as a query, but it seems to me that if you are going to clarify the thing only when you come to the implementation you may have a worse psychological effect. If you do not do it when you sign the treaty—and the treaty is the commitment the man abroad knows about and looks to—and if you then do something with the implementation program which seems to him different than what you have said in the treaty, he is going to feel let down; whereas, if you say the same thing at the time you ratify the treaty he will say: "Well, this is not what I thought you meant, but if this is what you mean, O.K. Then I won’t expect something I am not going to get."

Senator McMahon. Undoubtedly in the debate on the treaty there will be talk about the implementation. There is no question about it.

Mr. Warburg. That is why I suggested the clarification of the treaty.

Senator McMahon. It would have been desirable, perhaps, to keep them separate and distinct and apart, to ratify the pact and then some time later go out and take up the other matter, but it is pretty hard to keep them apart.

The Chairman. Mr. Warburg, you said awhile ago you would not favor the treaty unless it was also combined with the military implementation, is that right?

Mr. Warburg. I said I could not express a judgment on one without the other. I consider the two things are one, and I would not be in favor of ratifying the treaty because it is one-half of a twofold program, unless it is clarified.

CLARITY OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. We cannot very well act on both of them at the same time, because there is only one before us. The other has not yet been submitted to the Congress.

Is it not true that one of the chief values of this treaty is the assurance that it gives to the western European powers of its terms, the protection, and also an assurance to any aggressor who might contemplate an armed attack that we are going to the rescue of these western European nations?

Mr. Warburg. Right.

The Chairman. Those psychological appeals are implicit in the treaty.

You speak about clarifying the treaty. I don’t think I ever read a treaty that is as plain and as clear in its terms and its implications, if you want to stretch it that far, as this particular treaty is. Anybody that can read the English language, I think, can understand it. You say some man in France doesn’t think that way so your idea would be to give him a resolution or reservation to satisfy him. Then you go across the line and in Belgium you find a Belgian who thinks something else. You would adopt a resolution or a statement something like yours to satisfy him. Then you go over to England and you find
a crabbed old Scotchman who thought something different, and you would introduce a resolution to clarify the matter for him. Is that your kind of program?

Mr. Warburg. No, sir.

The Chairman. I think you ought to broaden it. You ought not to limit it just to that one Frenchman. You have brought up the Frenchman, saying that he doesn’t understand it, and it looks to me that the Englishman is inclined to have the same consideration.

Mr. Warburg. I am inclined to think the American people are entitled to the same consideration.

The Chairman. They are, and they have it right here and they can read it and also understand it.

Mr. Warburg. They can also read what the Secretary of State said and what General Bradley said, and they do not mean the same thing.

The Chairman. I think you need clarifying, instead of the treaty, because your views are so nebulous on those points that I do not understand them. You have agreed that all four of your points are covered by the treaty, by its plain and explicit language. Why clarify something that is already clarified?

Mr. Warburg. I do not believe, Senator, if I have not made my point clear to you, that I can make it clear.

The Chairman. I am not critical. I just want to examine, I want to probe, your views and your suggestions, and try to get the facts.

Senator Donnell, you are free now.

Senator Donnell. Very well, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Warburg, this treaty is a treaty for 20 years, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. Yes, sir.

DURATION, WITHDRAWAL, AND EXPULSION

Senator Donnell. And there is no provision for withdrawal from it or for expulsion from it?

Mr. Warburg. I read the testimony, and I would have said there isn’t any, but some people seem to think there is.

Senator Donnell. I think you would agree that there is nothing in the language of the treaty that says that anybody can withdraw or be expelled.

Mr. Warburg. No.

Senator Donnell. So when we go into this treaty it does become of some importance as to whether it is ambiguous or not, when we are going to go into it for 20 long years?

Mr. Warburg. It is important if it is only for 1 year.

Senator Donnell. I think so too, and it is decidedly important if we are going into it with all the possible changes over a period as long as the time from the beginning of the depression of 1929 up to now. It is tremendously important that we should remove all ambiguities if we can.

Mr. Warburg. I should think so.

Senator Donnell. That is your thought?

Mr. Warburg. Yes.

GENERAL BRADLEY’S STATEMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III

Senator Donnell. Mr. Warburg, you have talked here about the fact that different interpretations and statements have been made by
responsible officials in the different contracting countries. You have referred to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army in some speech that he made. Was that his Army Day speech?

Mr. Warburg. Two speeches, Senator. In his speech before the Jewish War Veterans on April 5, in New York, he said this [reading]:

It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with the promise of later liberation. It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies.

On the second occasion, which was his testimony here, he said [reading]:

Geographically, many of these member nations are already in positions where any aggression into western Europe would be a conquest of their homelands. I assure you that our frontiers of collective defense lie in common with theirs in the heart of Europe.

Then he talked about the difficulties of an amphibious invasion, and concluded by saying:

I hope that the occasion shall never arise when I might again be called upon to participate in such a hazardous and costly operation.

Senator Donnell. I think the first speech, an excerpt from which you read, is his Army Day speech, and has been previously placed in this record, or part of it, by myself. There is one very significant sentence that I think ought to go in in addition to what you read, and if you do not mind I would like to read it. Perhaps it is two sentences. As I have it, General Bradley said this, and he is Chief of Staff of the United States Army, is he not?

Mr. Warburg. Yes.

Senator Donnell. He said [reading]:

At present the balance of military power is centered in the United States, 3,000 miles from the heart of Europe. It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with the promise of later liberation.

You read that. Am I correct in understanding that you think the implication there is that we cannot count on friends in western Europe if what we are going to do is to abandon them to be run over and conquered by Russia, and then we come along with a slow process of liberation to get the country back. That is what you meant?

Mr. Warburg. Right.

Senator Donnell. That is the interpretation of what he said?

Mr. Warburg. That may not be what he meant. That certainly is the way one is entitled to interpret it.

Senator Donnell. At any rate, that is the way you interpreted it, and it certainly would appear to you to be a reasonable interpretation.

Mr. Warburg. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Does not the next sentence seem to fortify the reasonableness of your interpretation? He says [reading]:

Yet—

that is to say, this policy of first abandoning western Europe to the enemy with a promise of later liberation—

that is the only strategy that can prevail if the military balance of power in Europe is to be counted on the wings of our bombers and deposited in reserves this side of the ocean.
You would think that that would tend to fortify the validity of your interpretation, would you not?

Mr. Warburg. I should think so; yes.

Senator Donnell. And then that final sentence that you read from General Bradley [reading]:

It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies in the event of war.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Now, may I ask you also, Mr. Warburg, if you do not think it reasonable, in view of the circumstances and the observations of General Bradley, to think that when the President of the United States, in his inaugural address, said, on January 20 of this year [reading]:

If we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur. I hope soon to send—
says he—
to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan—
would you not have in mind, Mr. Warburg, that it is certainly reasonable to conclude that what the President had in mind there was that there should be placed over in Europe, perhaps by the Europeans themselves, perhaps by the United States, without discussing who is to place it, in order that Russia should be deterred from attacking she should have the assurance and knowledge that she would be met with overwhelming force, so that she could not get into Europe? Is that not a reasonable interpretation?

Mr. Warburg. It is a possible interpretation. It seems to me precisely the kind of statement one should make; namely, that an attack will be met by overwhelming force. You do not say where.

EXTENT OF OUR COMMITMENT UNDER ARTICLE III

Senator Donnell. I am not asserting it is the only interpretation. But the point I am making is, as I understand you to make it, that by the observations certainly of General Bradley, and I will leave out the President for the moment, plus the reaction that the Europeans, as, for instance, former Prime Minister Reynaud has stated in this country, certainly somebody has been left with the impression that by this treaty we are obligating ourselves to use such force and help and aid as will prevent the overrunning of Europe and this slow process of liberation from being the only salvation of Europe.

Mr. Warburg. Yes; and I think the two statements I quoted from the Secretary of State are open to similar interpretation.

Senator Donnell. And perhaps the one from the President may not be as strong as occurred to me. You may be quite right on that. Yet I think it is subject to an interpretation along the line that I have indicated.

Now, Mr. Warburg, you have heard here this afternoon, have you not. Senator Connally say, “Why, we have here this treaty. All they have to come and do, if the question arises as to what it means, is to go read it. It is just as clear as the nose on your face and everybody can understand it,” or words to that effect.
Let me just ask you, did you read, in the course of the testimony from which you previously read, the assurance that we were given by Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg a few days ago, that in treaties that have been made in the past, treaties of alliance, you cannot look solely into the text; that you have to look to the background to see what the meaning of them was. Did you read that in their statements?

Mr. Warburg. I did not see that.

Senator Donnell. You have read considerable of the testimony, I judge?

Mr. Warburg. I have read what has been reported in the newspapers, and I have also read the full testimony of the Secretary of State from the transcript.

**AMBIGUITY OF THE TREATY**

Senator Donnell. Mr. Warburg, one other point. You are speaking about this ambiguity under the treaty itself. You read, perhaps, or rather you heard Senator Connally today, in commenting on your own statement, did you not, point out, as he said, and I think I quote him in haec verba, that—

*The treaty means that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with the United States.*

You heard him say, did you not, in substance, that the treaty said that?

Mr. Warburg. I believe so; yes.

Senator Donnell. And he takes the position the treaty covers the first three, and I think he thinks covers the fourth, of your points. That is what you understood his questioning to indicate?

Mr. Warburg. I was not clear what he thought about section 4.

Senator Donnell. We will leave four out. Certainly the first three you understood he thought were clear in the treaty.

Mr. Warburg. That they were unnecessary because they were in the treaty.

Senator Donnell. He was looking at it or had it in his mind when he was talking that the treaty means that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with the United States. That is what your point No. 2 is.

Mr. Warburg. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. That is what he was referring to when he was pointing out point No. 2?

Mr. Warburg. I think so.

**SENATE DEBATE OF FEBRUARY 14, 1949**

Senator Donnell. It is very interesting to note in that connection, is it not, that back here only a few weeks ago, when Senator Connally was interrogated about what he was going to favor in this treaty, he said this (from the Congressional Record, 1189–1190):

> I do not, of course, approve of any language which may be adopted which could be construed as automatically inviting the United States in war—
and then a question to him—

Or as a moral commitment to fight?

and his answer:

Of course. In the case of governments I do not know the difference between moral commitments and legal commitments. I certainly would not desire the adoption of any language which would morally commit us to fight. I think our morality is worth something in the world, and we would not want to play with a moral commitment even though we might not be legally bound. But there are many people, and we have found them in government and elsewhere, who would favor automatically going to war, which would mean letting European nations declare war and let us fight.

Then the question:

Which would of course be entirely contrary to the Constitution, would it not?

His answer:

Certainly. Congress alone has the power to declare war.

**AUTOMATIC DECLARATION OF WAR**

Are you not interested, Mr. Warburg, to observe that today, notwithstanding that observation on February 14 of this year by the chairman of this committee, he now asserts and argues that this statement in the treaty means that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with the United States? Are you not interested to note those respective comments of the distinguished Senator from Texas?

Mr. Warburg. I will confine my comment to saying I was very pleased when the Senator said that that paragraph was inherent in the treaty.

Senator Donnell. He did say it?

Mr. Warburg. So I understood him to say.

Senator Donnell. I noticed the Senator from Florida likewise today said substantially the same thing, that everybody concedes that in the event of a material attack, or words to that effect, our Nation will go to war.

Mr. Warburg, you are not a lawyer. I know that. But you certainly have studied this question, and you refer to having been a public servant. Do you mind telling us very briefly what public service you have had?

Mr. Warburg. It was short and minor, sir. I was financial adviser for the American delegation to the World Economic Conference in London in 1933, and then I was Deputy Director of the Office of War Information in charge of European propaganda during the war.

Senator Donnell. And you are a banker and have been for many years; have you not?

Mr. Warburg. I am no longer a banker. I was one for 15 years.

Senator Donnell. What was the name of the firm with which you were associated?

Mr. Warburg. Bank of Manhattan Co.

Senator Donnell. In what capacity were you there?

Mr. Warburg. I started as a clerk in one of the banks that became part of it and I ended up as vice chairman of the board.

Senator Donnell. That is one of the largest banks in New York City?

Mr. Warburg. That is correct.
Senator DONNELL. You have read the Constitution of the United States, or at least are familiar with it?

MR. WARBURG. That is correct.

Senator DONNELL. Do you recall in whom the power of declaring war is vested in the Constitution of the United States?

MR. WARBURG. As I recall, that is in the Congress.

Senator DONNELL. And the Congress—and I remember Senator Pepper a few moments ago spoke of Congress—means both Houses of Congress; does it not?

MR. WARBURG. I should think so.

Senator DONNELL. If it be true, as your clarification would make it and as the Senator from Texas now understands the treaty to mean, that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with the United States, then it is true, is it not, Mr. Warburg, that by going into this treaty we would be placing ourselves in a situation that when an armed attack of any material nature, like, we will say, 200,000 or 500,000 troops, is made upon any one of the signatories, we go to war—that is what it means. It means, therefore, does it not, that the Senate and the President of the United States, by going into this treaty, without the House of Representatives having any power about it, have successfully bypassed the participation of the House of Representatives in determining whether we shall go to war?

MR. WARBURG. It sounds correct. I do not know. I am not a constitutional lawyer.

PRETENSES IN THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. It sounds correct, though, you say?

You say at page 4 of your statement, "These two polite hypocrisies seem to me to weaken our undertaking." I assume that by "hypocrisies" you mean something that is not true; do you not?

MR. WARBURG. Yes; I mean a pretense.

Senator DONNELL. In what document are those two pretenses or polite hypocrisies found?

MR. WARBURG. Well, the first one is in the treaty itself.

Senator DONNELL. The North Atlantic Treaty?

MR. WARBURG. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Where is the second one?

MR. WARBURG. I haven't the treaty here. I lent my copy to the preceding witness and he walked off with it.

In the preamble of the treaty, in the second paragraph [reading]:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

Senator DONNELL. That is one of the two hypocrisies?

MR. WARBURG. That seems to me so, when you include Portugal.

Senator DONNELL. I was just going to ask you about that. You mention Portugal, and the subject of Portugal has arisen two or three times in the testimony and, as indicating that this matter of Portugal is one which is not a mere afterthought on your part, you mention it in your statement here this morning:

This moral pretense—
that is to say the moral pretense of trying to clothe this treaty in moral
garments—

becomes a complete mockery when Portugal is one of the signatories and when
jealous eyes are cast at Franco Spain.

You mean that to be true—that that is a hypocrisy?
Mr. Warburg. Yes; I consider it a hypocrisy.

Senator Donnell. The second of the hypocrisies to which you refer
is the maintaining of the position that we are undertaking this pro-
gram in order to strengthen the United Nations when, as you say, it
is clear that we are trying to find a means of filling the gap left by
the failure of the United Nations. You regard that as a second
hypocrisy?
Mr. Warburg. Yes. I do not believe that is in the treaty.

Senator Donnell. But that is one of the arguments of certain of
the proponents of the treaty; is it not?
Mr. Warburg. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. So that the treaty itself then contains what you
consider as one false pretense, and the proponents, in part at any
rate, are using what you consider another hypocrisy or false pretense
in advocacy of it? Am I correct in that?
Mr. Warburg. Yes. I mention those two things because I think
they weaken our whole position.

Senator Donnell. I note you do, and I would certainly concur in
your view that any hypocrisy or untrue statement or pretense would
weaken our position.

EUROPEAN INTERPRETATION OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENT

Mr. Warburg, you have told us now about what you consider
ambiguities. Senator Connally does not consider them such. Maybe
others do not consider them such. But incidentally, by the way, in
connection with what the Senator has previously considered as not
being in the treaty, as I understood it, back on February 14, or at any
rate he was not going to affirm such a treaty as that, you read about
Mr. Rasmussen, did you not, of Denmark? His statement some few
weeks ago as to what the treaty means in its obligations—did you
read that?
Mr. Warburg. I think I did, but I do not recall the words.

Senator Donnell. It is his observation, made on March 22, which
appeared in the United Press of March 23, in the Washington Post:

Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen told Parliament today that under the
proposed North Atlantic Treaty the United States "would go to war" if any
one of the signatory nations is attacked. To the Danish Government, he said,
there is no doubt that the United States will consider herself pledged to assist
an attacked nation with all her force.

"If armed force is necessary to reestablish security, it is evident that the mem-
ber countries possessing such force are obliged to use it. That means that if
an armed attack occurred on one of the member countries, it could have only
one answer: The United States would go to war."

That is thoroughly in line with the observation Senator Connally
made, is it not, in agreeing, or stating that point No. 2 of yours, "The
treaty means that the United States serves notice upon any potential
aggressor that military attack upon western Europe means war with
the United States" means just what it says, and the understanding of
Mr. Rasmussen is thoroughly consistent with that view?
Mr. Warburg. It would seem so to me, but Senator Connally is the judge of that.

Senator Donnell. Very well. You have pointed out what you say you consider ambiguities. Maybe somebody else does not consider them that.

DANGER OF A COMMUNIST COUP

Let me ask you this point: You have read here from the preamble the language that [reading]:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

I call your attention to article 2, also, which states [reading]:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

Do you see any mention there of the Communist Party, or of undertaking to provide for the contingency that one of these 12 signatories should become Communist?

Mr. Warburg. No.

Senator Donnell. Certainly there is no language in this agreement, this treaty, from end to end, that states that if one of the signatory states became a Communist state, it shall thereby be expelled from the treaty; is there?

Mr. Warburg. I do not see any such language.

Senator Donnell. Yet you feel, do you not, Mr. Warburg, from what you have said in your statement, that this matter of Communist infiltration and the possibility of a nation becoming Communist is by no means an impossibility. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. No; I think that is the primary danger.

Senator Donnell. You think that is the primary danger, you say?

Mr. Warburg. That is right.

Senator Donnell. And you are talking about the primary danger in some of the signatory countries, countries signatory to this agreement?

Mr. Warburg. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And you mention in that the already dubious moral:

Because we cannot ignore the fact that with 25 percent of France voting Communist, theRussians have a far more dangerous fifth column in France today than the Nazis had in 1940.

You have seen, have you not, Mr. Warburg, as a banker and as a public man and as a citizen, rapid changes take place in these countries like France, for instance, and in Italy, with respect to their political complexion?

Mr. Warburg. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And it is entirely possible, is it not, that within a period of 20 long years either of these two countries, or perhaps some other countries signatory, might become a Communist country? That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. I should think it is quite possible.
Senator Donnell. I do not know whether you interpret this an ambiguity or an omission. I would say an omission. Perhaps you would agree with that. But is there not therefore a very interesting omission in this treaty, namely, the omission to provide means by which a party signatory could be expelled if the political history of that country should become repugnant to the desires of the other signers?

Mr. Warburg. That raises another question, Senator, on which I do not feel competent. It did not seem to me the main issue. That is why I confined myself to what does seem to me the main issue. There is a question as to whether, if there were a Communist coup, such as happened in Czechoslovakia, the treaty would become operative, and that question seems to me to precede the other, because if you are going to take action under the treaty to prevent the coup, the question of what happens if a country goes Communist does not arise.

EVENTS IN THE OCCURRENCE OF A COMMUNIST COUP

Senator Donnell. I am glad you brought that up, because precisely the same point has been suggested here several times during the testimony, namely this, if I may just amplify it and ask you this question: In the opinion of some, it is rather unlikely that Russia, if she could, through a coup engineered from without but consummated from within, would take over a country like she has some of these countries. It is somewhat improbable that she would waste her treasure and men and guns in an armed attack. Now, the question arises, does this treaty cover at all that situation, so as to become effective in the type of situation in which Russia is perhaps most likely to seek to overcome some of these countries that we are told she should not pick off?

Mr. Warburg. I read the testimony of the Secretary of State, and I think it was your questions, as a matter of fact, Senator, that elicited his testimony, and I came to the conclusion that what we think this treaty means in this regard is that we will have to regard each event by itself and make up our minds whether we do or whether we do not act, and if so, how. I should say the treaty did not clearly state we would do one thing or the other. I do not see how it could.

Senator Donnell. Possibly not. I am not saying that it could. But the treaty may arise in the minds of many people the idea that it is going to be an effective treaty against Russia in all contingencies, yet fail to have any effect whatsoever in such an instance as I have recited, namely, the instance of the coup. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. Yes; although I think there is less reason to even think the treaty operates in such a case than there is to think that it means we are securing the frontiers of western Europe.

Senator Donnell. Unless it could be demonstrated that Russia had directed and influenced interior forces to attack a government and take it over by force, in which event it might be called an armed attack. Is that not correct?

Mr. Warburg. Yes.
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Warburg, are there not other ambiguities in this treaty which you may have regarded as more or less subsidiary, but still ambiguities?

Mr. WARBURG. There may be. My trouble is with the one I testified on. That seems to me basic.

CONSULTATION UNDER ARTICLE IV

Senator DONNELL. For instance [reading]:

The Parties will consult together whenever, In the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Is that clear as to whether or not it would obligate a consultation with respect to a threatened attack against some of the colonial possessions of one of the signatories? Is that clear to anybody?

Mr. WARBURG. I should have thought that was clear. I should have thought the treaty only included the specified names areas in the North Atlantic area.

Senator DONNELL. If you will just refresh your memory by looking at articles 5 and 6, which are the ones that refer to the limitation of territory, namely, article 5, "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America," and article 6, defining the territory to include as well the territory in the Algerian Department of France—

Mr. WARBURG. That is not a colony.

Senator DONNELL. I am not saying it is a colony. But those two are the only provisions in the treaty that refer to the territorial extent of the treaty; is that correct?

Mr. WARBURG. So far as I know; yes. And they seem to me quite precise and clear.

Senator DONNELL. I think so.

Article 4, however, does not refer to how far or where the obligation of that article may extend. For instance [reading]:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Suppose that one of these signatories has certain territory south of the Tropic of Cancer, so that it is not within the North Atlantic area. Are you able to tell, or can anyone tell, whether the territorial integrity as defined here would refer to the colonies which are south of the Tropic of Cancer?

Mr. WARBURG. I do not feel competent to express an opinion. That is a legal question, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Very well.

DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC CONFLICTS UNDER ARTICLE II

You have noted, I have no doubt, the provision of Article 2, that the signatories [reading]:

will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Are you able to tell, Mr. Warburg, what, if any, conflicts in international economic policies between any of these signatories exist, or what is meant by that term here?

Mr. Warburg. I should think what was meant was the perfectly normal conflict of any two nations, or any one or more nations, which are trying to sell in the same markets or buy the same raw materials. It is inherent in competitive national economies.

The Chairman. It is the purpose of the committee to recess at 1:30, and Mr. Warburg may return and you may return if you like.

Senator Donnell. I would like to interrogate him, not so very long but a little longer than 5 minutes more, Mr. Chairman. I would dislike to have you come back, but I did not get started until pretty late.

Mr. Warburg. I am at your service.

Senator Donnell. Is it your understanding, then, from article 2, the sentence that I have read, that it is the contract of the 12 signatory parties that they will seek to eliminate all competitive disagreement between one another so they will no longer be competitors for the trade of the world?

Mr. Warburg. I would say that in the first place the agreement is to seek to eliminate, and not to eliminate. That means they will use their best efforts to cooperate rather than compete.

Senator Donnell. But then you understand that to mean, as I understand it—if I am wrong, please correct me—that they are contracting that they will use reasonable efforts to seek to eliminate the competition existing between their respective countries, is that right?

Mr. Warburg. I should think so.

Senator Donnell. So that if this treaty is signed, then, there should be made, in order that that article can be complied with, an honest, genuine effort to remove all competition between Great Britain and the United States, all competition between France and the United States, all competition between the United States and all other signatory countries?

Mr. Warburg. I think that the use of the word “all” goes perhaps too far. I should think it meant the use of the best efforts on the part of each signatory to cooperate with all other signatories rather than to compete. When you say “to eliminate” you are stating an unattainable goal.

Senator Donnell. It may be an unattainable goal, but there is no limitation here. The language is, “They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them,” and there is no provision that this shall mean only partial elimination. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Warburg. To the extent possible they agree to eliminate competition.

Senator Donnell. In article 3 of the treaty there is the provision that “by means of continuous aid and effective self-help” the parties “will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”
I think you referred in your statement, did you not, to the fact that a violation of the Italian peace treaty would result if Italy were to be rearmed?

Mr. WARBURG. Correct.

Senator DONNELL. Is there any provision in the North Atlantic Treaty to eliminate Italy from the provisions of article 3, which I have just read?

Mr. WARBURG. I am not aware of any such provision, Senator.

Senator DONNELL. In fact you are quite certain, are you not, Mr. Warburg, that there is no such provision?

Mr. WARBURG. Is there not in the treaty a provision that it shall not be in conflict with any other treaties signed by the signatories?

Senator DONNELL. Yes; there is this provision [reading]:

Each Party declares that none of the International engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

There is that provision. Do you think, Mr. Warburg, that that is clear in determining that we are not to send any arms to Italy?

Mr. WARBURG. That is again a legal question. I should think it could be clarified to advantage.

Senator DONNELL. It is certainly not as clear as it could be made, is it?

Mr. WARBURG. I should think not.

Senator DONNELL. And your own judgment is, as I understand it, that in view of the provisions of the peace treaty with Italy, we cannot rearm Italy or assist in it without violating the Italian peace treaty?

Mr. WARBURG. Within the limits of the armed forces permitted under the treaty we could. Beyond that I should think we could not.

Senator DONNELL. Do you recall whether there are any signatories to the Italian peace treaty other than those who are in the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. WARBURG. The Soviet Union, as I remember.

Senator DONNELL. So that in order for us to rearm to any extent beyond the provisions of that treaty we would have to obtain the consent of the Soviet Union, would we not, or else put ourselves in the position of violating a contract to which it was a party?

Mr. WARBURG. I am not sure, but I think Yugoslavia was also a party.

Senator DONNELL. And it would be likewise true that if we go ahead and rearm Italy under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty beyond the provisions of the Italian peace treaty, we would be violating the obligations to Russia and Yugoslavia unless we secure their consent to rearmament of Italy?

Mr. WARBURG. I should think that would be correct.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to think that I will not ask Mr. Warburg any further questions.

I appreciate very much both the courtesy of the committee and that of Mr. Warburg, and at this point I shall desist.
The CHAIRMAN. We will take a recess until 2:45. We thank you very much, Mr. Warburg, for your views and your testimony. (Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:45 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:45 p.m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will be in order.

We are under tremendous pressure. That is the reason I was suggesting the witnesses be as brief as possible. If you care to not read all of your statement we can put it all in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us who you are, whom you represent, and where you come from.

STATEMENT OF REV. DUDLEY H. BURR, CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLES PARTY OF CONNECTICUT


The CHAIRMAN. What is the Peoples Party of Connecticut?

Reverend Burr. That is the Connecticut branch of the Progressive Party.

The CHAIRMAN. From Connecticut?

Reverend Burr. Yes, sir; from the people of Connecticut.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead. We may have to stop you if you go too long.

Reverend Burr. I am opposed to the Atlantic Military Pact as a clergyman, a veteran of World War II, and a political leader of many thousands of people in the State of Connecticut.

MILITARY ALLIANCES AND REARMAMENT

As a minister, I am committed for the basic principle of Christianity and all religions, peace among nations, and brotherhood among men. The Atlantic Pact is a military alliance clearly based on the rearmament of one-half of the world against the other, and as such it can only result in leading those nations it is aimed against to take countermeasures and launch a full-scale armaments race.

History proves that such military alliances and such arms program as this entails lead only to war and never to peace. But the international situation has been discussed very frequently here in these hearings and has been generally broadcast. Opinions are varied as to just what would happen in case the Atlantic Pact is ratified. I personally believe that it will bring war instead of peace because it is basically founded on a war philosophy, and not on a peace philosophy.
One does not establish military pacts on the basis of a peace philosophy.

I believe that it undermines the whole system and the whole philosophy of the United Nations, as well as undermining the constitutional provisions in the American Constitution for making war.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE COLD WAR

But I am more than ever concerned with what it will do to us here internally in our own Nation, here in these United States. I do not think it is a matter of opinion as to the growth of unemployment in our country today. Connecticut is especially an industrial State. Our industries are devoted largely to consumer needs and to producing for consumer needs. During the war we produced war materials, as the other plants throughout the Nation went to work and produced war materials. But in times of peace we expect to produce for consumer needs. That is why at the present time we have a large element of unemployment there in Connecticut, because consumer needs are bogging down.

Since the start of the cold war and the beginning of the Truman doctrine, more and more markets throughout the world have been closed against us. As these markets in the world have been closed against us, causing unemployment at home, this very unemployment has closed other markets against us so that we find Connecticut industries with huge surpluses on their hands.

I have it from reliable information that the price of brass at the 1st of June will take a decided plunge downward, that it will reach a new rock-bottom. Just last evening in a report from our public welfare commission in the city of Hartford they reported that at this season of the year, since 1932 welfare has dropped off due to the seasonal activity of tobacco farming. This year welfare has increased 37 percent, instead of dropping off as it usually does.

I believe that this unemployment is largely due to the cold war and the situation that has been engendered through the buying of the Marshall plan. It seems to me that this North Atlantic Pact, being an extension of the cold war and the Marshall plan, will breed more and more unemployment throughout the land. At least it will restrict employment and labor within certain given areas.

COST OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

We do not know how much money it is going to take to implement this pact. We have heard about a billion and a half dollars. But the pact is very much like a marriage, it is not the initial cost, it is the upkeep that is going to be rather terrific, and once we start on the upkeep of this pact, I don't think you know, nor does anyone else know, how much it is going to cost us in supplies and in men, if we choose to protect the military supplies that we send over to the European nations.

As a consequence, this may mean going back to a war economy utterly and completely throughout the land, which could very readily get into the thorough regimentation of all labor. It will certainly reduce our civil rights because in times of war or national emergency
civil rights are reduced and the country gets on an entirely different basis. That we understand.

The North Atlantic Pact, it seems to me, is bound to bring to us a state of national emergency, the cause of which I do not see existing in our world today, for I do not think there is any nation in the world today that willfully wants to start a war. I do not believe the people of our country want to start a war. I do not believe the people of any other country want to start a war. The last one was too utterly devastating for anyone to think in terms of a new war, especially with the United States in possession of the atomic bomb, a weapon that we can use for total destruction.

ANTI-COMMUNIST HYSTERIA

Another aspect of what it is doing to the United States is the effect that this whole upheaval and turmoil, connected with the hysteria against Russia and communism, is developing in the minds of the young people of the United States. Discipline is very difficult to get today among them. They have very little outlook. Their reply, whenever anyone talks to them about that is, “What is the sense of talking about the future or looking toward the future, we are going to be in another war.” This comes from the young people. Of course, they are too young to vote and as a consequence I suppose they are not of great importance, so far as the political situation in our land is concerned, but they are of tremendous importance to me. This is one thing I do not like to see developing in our Nation, because ultimately they are going to be able to vote.

If this pact is intended as a defense pact, and intended to bring peace in the world, I believe that it is on the wrong footing, for it is founded on war. If this pact is intended to stop the spread of socialism through the world, then why are we supporting such governments as Britain, Denmark, and Norway, which are almost thoroughly Socialist in concept?

If this pact is intended to stop communism, or at least to contain communism, it seems to me the way to contain it would be to build a satisfying way of life and standard of living here in our United States rather than to be spending huge sums of money on an armament program that goes right down the drain and pouring huge sums of money into Europe.

Sunday’s New York Herald Tribune carried an article from the United Nations Economic Commission saying that the Marshall plan, the whole system of the ERP, was hurting the economy of those nations that were participating in the ERP and that it would seriously delay their recovery for years to come. More and more money has to be poured down that empty—and I say empty—drain, for it appears it is not ever likely to fill up as long as we are willing to pour out the money in huge quantities.

LESSENING OF TENSIONS NEEDED

As we look at the situation in the world today, it seems to me the best thing we could do would be to lessen the tensions that exist, as tension is being lessened today in the Berlin blockade. The Russians have withdrawn the blockade, for which we are very happy. That to me proves that we can get together, that we can talk over these ten-
sions and that they can be solved without military pacts, or without threats of force.

And I do not believe that the threat of the military pact had anything to do with the lifting of the blockade in Berlin. I believe that it was the willingness of both sides to sit down and talk together about a matter that existed in great tension. This tension exists not only in the national headquarters of these nations, but it likewise exists among the people of this particular nation, for this tension is wreaking havoc throughout our land, in every institution that we call social among us, in our schools, our churches, and our families.

NEGLECT OF SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION

We are spending tremendous amounts of money that could be spent for public housing. We are spending tremendous amounts of money that could be spent for health insurance, that could be spent for unemployment compensation insurance extending the time and increasing the amounts of money to be paid to those who are unemployed.

Our public welfare rolls are increasing today by people who have extended beyond their limit their unemployment compensation and cannot find jobs.

I am here today not only to ask for peace, but likewise to ask for jobs. It seems to me that if we go on with the ratification of this North Atlantic Pact we deny to our people both of these things.

THREAT TO CIVIL RIGHTS

There is one price that Americans will pay and will always gladly pay and have begun to pay for this war program, a price that cannot be measured even in billions of dollars that is the heritage of personal liberty, our rights of freedom of speech, thought, and press. These rights have been diminishing rapidly all around us, especially up there in Connecticut where for 300 years we have known the rights of free speech and the rights of citizens to declare what authority the Government shall have.

The inevitable end of this antirights crusade will be the same as that of Hitler's anti-Communist crusade, not the destruction of communism in our country which, as an idea, cannot be destroyed by guns or by dollars, or even contained by force, but the destruction of all of our democratic institutions, all popular welfare, all social progress, and all national honor and integrity of the nation who perpetrates it. "He who lives by the sword shall die by the sword."

The people of Connecticut are a skilled people in a rich land. They want jobs, producing for a better life for all. They have always been ready to defend their freedom and their homes, but they will not sacrifice everything for a useless, disastrous war program. They want to build plowshares. They want neither to live nor to die by the sword.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are minister of the Gospel, are you?
Reverend Burr. Yes, sir; Congregational.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a veteran of World War II, are you?
Reverend Burr. Yes, sir; 5 years in the service, 3 of them overseas in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that?
Reverend Burr. Five years in the service, three of them in the Pacific with Infantry battalions.

The Chairman. What branch of the service were you in?

Reverend Burr. Chaplains' Corps.

The Chairman. You spoke of housing, that you desired to have housing. The Congress recently passed a housing bill, did it not?

Reverend Burr. I look on that bill as rather inadequate.

The Chairman. But it shows a disposition, does it not, to meet that problem?

Reverend Burr. True, and if we were not spending so much money on war preparedness we could build a lot more houses, could we not?

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Chairman. You are against the budget for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Corps, are you?

Reverend Burr. I did not get your question, sir.

The Chairman. I say, Are you against the budget for the military, the Air Force, the Navy, and so on?

Reverend Burr. Yes, sir; I am. I think this money can be applied to better ends than to containing communism.

The Chairman. Then you are not for our remaining in a position to defend ourselves in the event of another war?

Reverend Burr. I am for peace, sir.

The Chairman. Well, we are all for peace.

Reverend Burr. Well, I saw too much of war. I am for thinking in terms of peace, not thinking in terms of war.

The Chairman. But suppose no matter how much you want peace your country is attacked by a foreign power, don't you want to resist?

Reverend Burr. Who is going to attack us?

The Chairman. I didn't ask you that. I asked you if we should be attacked. I don't know who would attack us. You would want to resist, wouldn't you?

Reverend Burr. You are presenting a hypothetical question, aren't you, without saying who is likely to attack us? I can't think of anybody who would attack us.

The Chairman. If you don't want to answer the question, all right, just let it go.

Reverend Burr. I can't think of anybody who would attack us.

The Chairman. I know, but if we should be attacked, wouldn't you want to resist?

Reverend Burr. My experiences in the last war show me that resistance, even resistance, is futile.

The Chairman. Futile?

Reverend Burr. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. We can have peace by just letting the totalitarians, the despots, and the dictators do what they want to and just say, "All right, go ahead"? Is that the kind of a peace you would want?

Reverend Burr. I want peace.

The Chairman. All right. Take the witness, Senator.

Senator Donnell. I do not care to ask any questions.

The Chairman. Very well.

Reverend Burr. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mrs. Broy. Just a minute, Mrs. Broy. Is Mr. Imbrie here?

Mr. Imbrie. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. How long will it take you, Mr. Imbrie?

Mr. Imbrie. Twelve or fifteen minutes.

The Chairman. The reason I ask is that Mrs. Broy is a resident here and you are from a distance. If it is going to take you any length of time we will hear Mrs. Broy first. She has been here all day. I recognize you, Mrs. Broy.

**STATEMENT OF MRS. CECIL NORTON BROY, ARLINGTON, VA.**

The Chairman. Mrs. Broy, tell the reporter who you are, where you live, your business, and so on.

Mrs. Broy. My name is Mrs. Cecil Norton Broy. My address is 524 North Monroe Street, Arlington, Va. I was born in Texas and I am very proud of it. I am the widow of United States consul, Charles Broy, and lived nearly 10 years with him in Europe while he was serving as United States consul for this country. We were stationed in Brussels and London during those years.

During that time I traveled widely in 14 European countries because I am interested in good government, and I wanted to find out all I could while I was living over there about the political and social conditions in Europe.

Before I married Mr. Broy I was married to the late Congressman Sisson, of Mississippi, who for some years was a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives. From him I learned what I know about fundamental American Government.

**DANGER OF WORLD GOVERNMENT**

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the Atlantic Pact should not be ratified. We should go no further down the road toward world government. It is a broad road leading to the destruction of our Republic. Two forces in the world are working toward world government—communism and some international bankers. At times these two groups have worked together. For example, the money to finance the propaganda for the Russian revolution was given by a New York banker, a member of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the international banking house.

The New York Times of March 24, 1917, relates in detail the story of a meeting in Carnegie Hall, New York City, celebrating the Russian revolution. I read only one short paragraph from this photostat of the New York Times of that date:

An authority on Russian affairs, George Kennan, told of how a movement by the Society of the Friends of Russian Freedom financed by Jacob H. Schiff, had at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, spread among Russian officers and men in Japanese prison camps, the gospel of the Russian revolutionists.

The Chairman. That was when?


The Chairman. You said the Russo-Japanese War.

Mrs. Broy. These men were in prison camps following the Russo-Japanese War, and while they were in the prison camps of Japan——
The Chairman. The Russo-Japanese War occurred in 1904, did it not?

Mrs. Brox. Yes, sir; but these men, many of them, were still in prison camps in Japan.

The Chairman. From 1904 to 1917?

Mrs. Brox. I thought it was in 1906. Anyway, the literature was sent to them and that is where they had inculcated into them the doctrine of communism.

The Chairman. Therefore you are against the treaty?

Mrs. Brox. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. On account of that?

Mrs. Brox. There is one thing further. I want to bring to your attention one other reference. This is from the Sisson report, whom Woodrow Wilson sent as his personal representative to Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution.

I read the appendix, Document 64:

Stockholm, September 21, 1917.

Dear Comrade: The office of the banking house of M. Warburg has opened in accordance with telegram from President of President of Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate an account of undertaking of Comrade Trotsky. The attorney (agent) purchased arms and has organized their transportation and delivery to Luleo and party named to the office of Esmond & Son in Luleo, receivers, and the person authorized to receive the money demanded by Comrade Trotsky.

J. Furstenberg.

The Chairman. Mrs. Brox, that is all very interesting, but we are not passing on those matters now.

Mrs. Brox. That is all I am going to say about that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We have a treaty before us, and I would be glad to have any views of yours as to the treaty.

Mrs. Brox. I take it, the Atlantic Pact had in mind Russia as a potential enemy, and I just wanted to give a little background very briefly on how it started, of how communism was helped, I mean.

The Chairman. All right.

FINANCIERS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mrs. Brox. Our foreign policy does not make sense from the viewpoint of the American taxpayer. In recent months we arranged for a large loan to Great Britain. Following this a few weeks ago only, Great Britain loaned Russia $36,000,000. This loan was made after the Atlantic Pact had been proposed with Russia as a potential enemy. According to Walter Trohan's article in the Washington Times-Herald of April 20, 1947, entitled, "Foreign Policy Really Shaped by the Financiers," I shall read just one or two excerpts:

The nimble fingers of Wall Street and the long arm of London counting houses are widely regarded on Capitol Hill as the real moulders of the so-called American bipartisan policy. The New York financial interests and various elements profiting in foreign trade are now considered as having shaped American foreign policy for the last decade.

Through two world wars, Mr. Chairman, we have lost over a million men and billions of dollars. All thinking people know that one way to get a country down is through one war after another. The members of our Republic know that.
Our taxes and our cost of living are entirely too high. The Atlantic Pact would greatly increase both. It is common knowledge that the dollar is worth only about 40 cents.

DANGER OF ENTANGLING ALLIANCES

If we do not heed the warning of the founding fathers and enter into entangling alliances, the world will become an armed camp, Mr. Chairman. Should the United States of America attempt to finance a world military program, our people's backs will be broken through economic burdens and physical exhaustion. We must not endanger our own well-being through any such program.

The Russian Frankenstein has been set up and has grown strong through the work of many different kinds of persons, but the United States of America is the last free great country on the face of the earth. Let us keep her so. Let her be an example to those countries of the world who want to establish stable governments patterned after ours.

We have fed and clothed the starving people of Europe. Surely we should now be in a position to retire gracefully from the scene. Let us work for Western Hemisphere solidarity through strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. Let us keep ourselves strong, then should another war come, we would not have been weakened by spreading ourselves too thin.

UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, I now respectfully submit, as I close, a recommendation which I believe to be constructive and for the good of ourselves and the other peoples of the world. I suggest that you gentlemen of this committee recommend that Mr. Churchill organize a united states of Europe. This course would have several benefits. First, it would give the nations of Europe a chance to learn to work together, a chance they have never had before. This united states of Europe could be patterned after our own United States. Those nations could learn the value of democratic government and cooperation in working together.

The second benefit is that it would take the financial burden of Europe off the shoulders of our American taxpayers. If those certain international bankers who helped to bring on the Russian revolution have seen the light and no longer believe in the glories of communistic government, let them put some of the billions which they control at the disposal of Mr. Churchill for this suggested united states of Europe. In this way they can make amends for the trouble they have caused by their ill-advised actions in the past. What we must watch out for is this great Republic of ours. We must not be maneuvered into a position, Mr. Chairman, where through some incident in Europe we could automatically be brought into a third world war.

This Atlantic Pact, in my opinion, would make possible just such an incident.

Then after a third World War, when we are so weakened through loss of blood and resources, any would-be world dictators could then more easily take us over, especially if there were large standing armies available for the use of this purpose. Let us not fall into this trap.
Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee, the future of this republic is in your hands. You must be as wise and firm as the founding fathers and so protect our Government and our people. May God guide you to that end.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. I don't believe I would care to ask any questions.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mrs. Broy, we were very glad to have you.

Mr. Imbrie.

STATEMENT OF JAMES IMBRIE, CHAIRMAN, PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

The Chairman. Mr. Imbrie, give the reporter your name, residence, and so on.

Mr. Imbrie. My name is James Imbrie. My residence is just outside of Princeton, N. J. I happen to be a retired Wall Street banker, and spent all my business life as an international banker. I also, perhaps, should add that I am chairman of the Progressive Party in the State of New Jersey at the present time, and also chairman of the New Jersey Independent Citizens League, which is a continuation of an organization called the New Jersey Independent Voters League for Roosevelt, which was formed in 1944, and which I formed and led at that time.

The Chairman. Is there any conflict between these two parties you are heading, the Progressive group and the other one?

Mr. Imbrie. No; the majority of the New Jersey Independent Citizens League, after supporting Governor Driscoll in 1946, by vote in convention, decided to support Wallace in 1948 on the question of peace, the question which made him leave the Democratic Party, sir.

If I may proceed, I would like to read a very short letter which came to me last week in the mail, signed by five outstanding citizens of the Nation and which expresses the general over-all objection to the pact, which are my personal sentiments and perhaps expresses it better than myself.

The Chairman. You endorse the letter, in other words?

Mr. Imbrie. I do, sir.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Imbrie. May I read it?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

LETTER ON ATLANTIC TREATY

Mr. Imbrie (reading):

Four years ago the United Nations was founded as the basis for a stable and enduring peace. Today mankind is threatened with the catastrophe of atomic war.

The diplomat sign the Atlantic Pact in the name of peace and in the guise of strengthening the United Nations. But the Wall Street Journal more realistically describes the pact as “the triumph of jungle law over international cooperation.”

We who send you this letter are not willing to believe that brute force is a substitute for human reason. We are not willing to replace the one world of the United Nations with the two worlds of the Atlantic Pact. We are not willing to stake America’s security solely upon military power.
We know that you, and men and women of influence like you throughout the Nation, are deeply concerned lest our Government take a false step that may cost us our freedom and plunge our country into a catastrophe which is still possible to avoid. We believe you share with us the desire to do everything possible to safeguard the American people from the terrible indictment that, through our Government's action, we might become responsible for the destruction of civilized man. We are certain you would welcome an opportunity to meet with others like yourself to discuss the war danger, to make your opposition to the pact manifest and to decide upon constructive alternative proposals for peace. With Americans everywhere sensing the danger of our current foreign policy, it is surely our obligation to make articulate this opinion.

We therefore invite you to join with us the week end of May 20 and 21 in Washington, D. C., in a nondelegated meeting of leaders of civic, church, labor, and community organizations. No responsibility seems as urgent as the need for all of us to find common ground upon which to make our stand for real and lasting peace.

It is signed by Emily Greene Balch, Rev. Edwin T. Dahlberg, who I think is president of the Northern Baptist Convention a week or two ago, Dr. Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, and Bishop W. J. Walls.

FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE TREATY

I personally would like to speak for a few moments on my objective as a conservative businessman and international banker all my life. I want to start from the very drab premise that it is impossible for our country or the world to afford what the obligations are as incurred by this Atlantic Pact.

I want to also say, if I may, that I feel your committee should not feel that because I am one of a minority, perhaps, in appearing before you, that therefore our opinions should not weigh.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no, we are glad to have your view.

Mr. IMBRIE. No, because Cassandras are always in the minority, and I am here basically because I feel—

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say about who is always in the minority?

Mr. IMBRIE. I say Cassandras, those who warn of coming destruc­tion.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, now you are getting back to my language.

Mr. IMBRIE. I am pointing to the fact that in 1927, '28, and '29, a period through which I lived and was active as a Wall Street banker, at that time when we were clearly driving toward economic disintegration, there was only a handful of even Wall Street leadership to speak out and tell the truth, Mr. Mitchell, president of the Illinois Trust Co., and a few others.

I say that today if this pact is backed by military armament of Europe, in my opinion we are certain to have economic chaos.

I am talking then to the third paragraph of the pact in which we as a Nation pledge ourselves individually and collectively to maintain and exploit—

The CHAIRMAN. Establish.

Mr. IMBRIE. "Exploit" will do. Well, "exploit" will do well enough, but that is not the word used.

The CHAIRMAN. "Will maintain and develop."

Mr. IMBRIE. "Will maintain and develop" our capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. "Their individual and collective capacity."
Mr. Imbrie. That is right. Maintain our individual capacity to protect ourselves against aggression.

DANGER OF ECONOMIC DEPRESSION

This being a 20-year pact, I hope that if we maintain and increase that capacity which will be called upon and which we pledge ourselves to do, that must mean that we will maintain for more or less a period of 20 years our present armament race. It could be at least so interpreted.

I recall, and we all do very well, when the 1932 situation broke; the New Deal was proposed by Roosevelt and the expenditures of money that were proposed under it. The Republicans held at that time that any large increase in the public debt beyond the debt at that time, which was approximately 40 billions, could not be withstood economically by our country. We now have a debt of $252,000,000,000. I think it is clear that businessmen feel, and even the economic advisers to the President seem to feel that additional taxes in any large measure are beyond the point of reasonable ability of business to withstand in this period of present recession, let alone if we kick ourselves into a period of real depression.

I therefore plead that your committee recommend to Congress in its report this whole matter of the Atlantic Pact be put over until after the meeting in Paris on the 23d. I think that all business people are aware, are alive to the difficulties of the present situation and what is the best thing to do. But clearly, this Atlantic Pact was negotiated at a time when the cold war had reached its height.

In the last few days there certainly has been some relief from that and the possibilities are that some real progress can be made toward the elimination of the cold war at the Paris conference.

One cannot be didactic, but I only express this thought that to a Wall Street banker negotiation is the breath of his life. It is my conviction—if you care to, those who are proponents of this pact, if you care to call it holding it as a threat—I will say in any event that it seems to me that to put through this pact before the meeting on the 23d would be disaster from the point of view of the meeting in Paris on the 23d.

I therefore plead with you that you take at least that viewpoint into consideration before coming through with the recommendation that the Atlantic Pact should go into effect.

The Chairman. Very well, we thank you very much for your view. Senator Donnell, any questions?

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator Donnell. What house were you with on Wall Street, Mr. Imbrie?

Mr. Imbrie. I was head of the old investment banking firm of Imbrie & Co. I had large business interests in South America and from 1914 to 1920, my firm originated and handled jointly with the Equitable Trust Co. all the financing that was done by this country in South America; we controlled a bank in Brazil in 1920; we controlled an investment banking firm in joint account with the Darm
stedter Bank, which is the fourth largest German bank. I have had large foreign businesses in Swiss banks for many years, the old Rotterdamser Bank at Rotterdam, and so on.

Senator DONNELL. What was the street address in Wall Street of Imbrie & Co.?

Mr. IMBRIE. The address was 61 Broadway, sir, and afterwards 150 Broadway. We were members of the New York Stock Exchange, but I was the head of the firm for 25 consecutive years. We never did any margin business, but we were members of the stock exchange and did business for cash. We also came under the New York State Banking Department.

Senator DONNELL. During your experience, did you have occasion to be abroad from time to time, either in Europe or South America?

Mr. IMBRIE. I always went abroad twice a year. I had an apartment in Paris from 1918 to 1932, and always went abroad at least twice a year.

Senator DONNELL. When was your last trip to Europe, Mr. Imbrie?

Mr. IMBRIE. In the late summer of 1931.

Senator DONNELL. And you have been retired for several years?

Mr. IMBRIE. I have been retired since 1935. I have been in very bad health.

Senator DONNELL. You are living in New Jersey at this time?

Mr. IMBRIE. I am living in Princeton, just outside of Princeton, yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We were very glad to hear you, Mr. Imbrie. As I understand it, you made your money in Wall Street, but when you wanted peace and quiet and culture you moved down to Princeton.

Mr. IMBRIE. Yes; I moved to Princeton. I happen to be a Princeton graduate, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I assumed there was some connection there.

That is all, and thank you very much.

Mr. IMBRIE. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the representative of the organization known as Religion and Labor Foundation here?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. We very reluctantly have to announce that the hearing will be recessed now until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

Mr. WHATLEY. Mr. Chairman, would you prefer to hear me now or later in the week?

The CHAIRMAN. Who are you?

Mr. WHATLEY. I am David Whatley. I have a request in.

The CHAIRMAN. You just put it in today, did you not?

Mr. WHATLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you live here in the city you can come any time.

Mr. WHATLEY. I just thought it might be more convenient for you at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. WHATLEY. I can be very brief, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, have a seat.
STATEMENT OF DAVID WHATLEY, CABIN JOHN PARK, MD.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you live, sir?

Mr. WHATLEY. David Whatley. I live at Cabin John Park, Md.

I am a member of the District of Columbia bar and engaged in the real estate brokerage business.

I am very diffident in taking the time of the committee since you have given so much devotion and time to this controversial question. But frankly, Mr. Chairman, I could not find anyone in authority who is considered an expert on matters of this nature who would express my point of view. Therefore I asked permission to state it briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement here you say, "I promise not to duplicate ground already covered."

Mr. WHATLEY. I will not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have something new, is that right?

Mr. WHATLEY. I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, go ahead and let us hear it.

Mr. WHATLEY. I should like to question, first, the constitutionality of the—

The CHAIRMAN. You were here before this committee on another occasion, were you not?

Mr. WHATLEY. On the occasion of the ratification of the United Nations Charter.

The CHAIRMAN. You were against that?

Mr. WHATLEY. I was not against it, Mr. Chairman. I proposed that the Government adopt the Charter by a constitutional process, by a constitutional amendment in order to afford undoubted constitutional authority for our implementation of the security sections under the military arrangement whereby we would delegate contingents of our armed services to the United Nations. I believe that the Congress would never have permitted that.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is water over the wheel. What universities are you a graduate of?

Mr. WHATLEY. Columbus University, and post-graduate work at National University.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a local university here in Washington?

Mr. WHATLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other one is what?

Mr. WHATLEY. National University. They are both local law schools.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your office here?

Mr. WHATLEY. 2127 Lee Highway at the present.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in Virginia?

Mr. WHATLEY. Yes, sir. I have a business called Better Homes Sales and Service. I am engaged in real estate.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not practicing law, then?

Mr. WHATLEY. Only occasionally.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, a great many lawyers will practice only occasionally, but it is part of your business to be a lawyer, is it not?

Mr. WHATLEY. Yes; I find very little interest in it except on con-
stitutional grounds. I am not enough of an authority to command any compensation in that respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, go ahead.

AREA OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Mr. WHATLEY. I should like to say that the original Constitution founders never, of course, envisioned an extension of the doctrine of national defense to include the defense of western Europe. They would, of course, have turned over in their graves at the mere thought of such a thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us see if they did. In 1778 didn’t the United States enter into a treaty with France, a defensive treaty, for both France and the United States? And did not France in compliance with that treaty send an army and navy here that helped us in the Revolutionary War? You are aware of that, are you not?

Mr. WHATLEY. That action by the French Government in sending forces over here, of course, was not unconstitutional.

The CHAIRMAN. But we signed the agreement. The treaty was a written treaty between the United Colonies. They had not obtained their independence; they made their declaration of independence.

Mr. WHATLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman; I am aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. We signed that, did we not?

Mr. WHATLEY. You will agree that treaty was directed toward the military situation in North America and not in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in North America and in Europe because the treaty specified that if as a result of the former treaty of amity and friendship between the United Colonies and France, that should France be involved in war, we would join her, defend her against an attack from Great Britain.

Mr. WHATLEY. But when the Constitution was drafted you may recall there was debate in convention as to whether to include therein the West Indies as part of our defense system. It was decided that we would not so include them as part of the Colonies.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not included.

Mr. WHATLEY. Because of the difficulty of defense of those areas. Our frontier at that time extended only to Winchester, Va., you may recall. The mere thought of extending it even to the Pacific was very fantastic. It was never, of course, envisaged that we would consider the defense of any area outside of the Atlantic seaboard as included in the words “common defense.”

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREATY

Mr. WHATLEY. I should like to say that the treaty itself, of course, may be thoroughly constitutional, in spite of these objections I have raised. But, at the implementation of the treaty, which Mr. James Reston predicts may very well occur next year, in his article of February 17 in the New York Times, whereby we would delegate to this Central Control Military Council contingents of our armed services which would be stationed in Europe—

The CHAIRMAN. Who said they would be stationed in Europe?
Mr. Whatley. Mr. Reston predicted that.
The Chairman. What Mr. Reston predicts and what we do are quite different things.

Mr. Whatley. I know, but he has information from the Congress.
The Chairman. If you want to testify about the treaty go ahead and do it. I do not care about your quoting somebody who does not have accurate information, because none of us have accurate information about what the implementation is going to be. We have a general statement. You appeared here, so you said, to argue against the constitutionality of this treaty, and we are ready to hear you.

Mr. Whatley. May I close my argument on constitutionality, sir, and extend it in the record, if I may, to save you time in order to make a further point?
The Chairman. We would like to see it before it goes in the record. We will receive your statement and if it fits the bill we will put it in the record.

Mr. Whatley. Thank you, sir.

Internal Security of Western Europe

I am disturbed less by the constitutionality of the treaty, Mr. Chairman, than I am by the premise on which our doctrines of military and foreign policy seem to be based. That is the premise that we must prepare for war on the continent of Europe against Russia within the next 2 years, along the lines suggested in the first treaty, the internal protection of those countries.
The Chairman. You don’t mean the internal security, you mean the external security.

Mr. Whatley. The internal security is all that could be envisaged by it.
The Chairman. The treaty does not say anything about internal security, does it? It says “security against an armed attack by another nation.”

Mr. Whatley. True.
The Chairman. Then why do you drag in internal security? It is not in the treaty at all.

Mr. Whatley. It is my conviction, sir, that the plan proposes and contemplates that we will export sufficient arms in the first year of the military assistance program, merely sufficient to provide for internal security against armed attack within the country, or another Czechoslovakian coup. That in the succeeding years we will begin to build up to where in the third year we will approach a situation whereby the forces of western Europe could actually retain the forces of Russia at a predetermined frontier.

Readiness for War

I think we do not have time for that and I feel very strongly that that doctrine does not take into account the new type of warfare that I believe will be waged with weapons of mass destruction other than the atomic bomb. And it does not take into account the fact that Russia now has these weapons: that we are now ready to go to
war with Russia, without the military assistance program, without the pact. As was said by Admiral Zacharias last May—

The CHAIRMAN. You say we are ready to go to war with Russia? Is that what you are testifying now? Or are you talking about Mr. Zacharias?

Mr. WHATLEY. I am quoting Mr. Zacharias because he is a military authority and I agree with his statement that we are ready to go to war with Russia now; that we have three weapons more powerful than the atomic bomb.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know who gives you any authority to say that we are now ready for war with Russia. Nobody else has said it. Where do you get that authority to speak for the United States?

Mr. WHATLEY. I have no authority and maintain no authority, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying that we are now ready to go to war with Russia.

Mr. WHATLEY. I am a mere lay citizen expressing an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but that is what you said. You said we are now ready to go to war with Russia. I want to know by what authority you say that.

Mr. WHATLEY. I say I agree with the statement of Admiral Zacharias, whom many people consider to be a military expert, one of our military experts, even though he is now retired; that he makes the point that the controversy over conscription and matters of that nature are extraneous. I will quote him in quotations, if I may. That is in his article of November 1947.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a World War veteran, and you know that talk about conscription is not pertinent; do you not? You are a World War veteran; are you not?

Mr. WHATLEY. I am not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in World War II?

Mr. WHATLEY. No, sir; I was a IV-F in the war sir. My brother gave his life in the war and I am very glad to know that he was not merely maimed, in which case he would be back here today to see the situation we are in vis-à-vis Russia, which is exactly the same position we were in before.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead and finish your statement.

Mr. WHATLEY. I wish merely, Mr. Chairman, at the expense of trespassing on your time, to make this brief point: That Russia now has weapons which can completely devastate the civilian populations of most of our urban centers; that such weapons may be already infiltrated and hidden in our major cities; that we may even now be breathing the tabun gas which was described in detail by an expert on military matters in the United Nations World, February 1948. Such gas, of course, can be breathed for 3 or 4 hours without detection, but is fatal in most instances.

I wish to point this out because it seems to be implicit in the statements of every military man and every foreign policy leader in the country, that we are invulnerable, virtually, relatively invulnerable to attack from Russia until she gets the atomic bomb; that we must take these policies before she gets the atomic bomb.
I agree that Russia is a menace, but I also agree that any nation is a menace in the light of these weapons of mass destruction.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

I can only appeal to you, sir, that the Congress set up a Joint Legislative-Executive Council on National Security which would complement the work and research of the National Security Council and provide more than a mere token representation on that Council, as was contemplated under an amendment proposed to be made by Senator Tydings to the Armed Services Unification Act which would place the Vice President on that board; that such an agency could then get the independent judgment of any official, independently, on matters of high importance of this nature. That independent judgment is not now available under any of the procedures that are in existence at the present time before Congress. You only have to read the hearings before the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate to be struck by the fact that they simply never get into questions of basic military policy of this character; that no committee on Capitol Hill is staffed with experts who could get any independent research done on matters of this nature; that it is a question of life and death for millions of our American citizens.

I do not propose to have the right answer. I am merely quoting the conclusions of a few men who have done a great deal of research on the subject and whose ability and patriotism I think are highly respected.

I am profoundly convinced that our whole trend of foreign policy and the security system would probably be changed and that many provocative statements and policies would be changed if the policy makers were aware of the fact that a war with Russia tomorrow, next week, or next month would mean the death of perhaps a third or a fourth of the population of this country.

RESERVATION TO THE TREATY

As regards the pact, I would probably do as 95 percent of the Members of the Senate would do, and vote for the pact, in spite of the fact that it is probably unconstitutional, since it will undoubtedly take away from the Congress its ability to pass upon a declaration of war. The President, as you well know, can put the armed services into immediate action without any opposition from the Congress. It is just as Mr. Roosevelt in his wisdom did. And as Senator Lodge pointed out in radio debate with Senator Watkins 2 weeks ago, we were actually at war with Germany a year before the Congress declared war.

So I can only appeal to you that you propose as a reservation to ratification that no military action can be undertaken without the consent of the Congress, both Houses, as was intended by the Constitution, even though that provision has been violated perhaps 20 times in our history. That still does not affect the basic validity of our constitutional doctrine.

I think that would perhaps alleviate the fears of the men in the Kremlin that we will provoke war with them in somewhat the same nature that Dr. Charles A. Beard and other historians pointed out
that we provoked war with Japan in 1941, in pursuance of some promise or secret agreement that may have been made similar to the agreement between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt on the occasion of the Atlantic Pact, about which Mr. Churchill said on the floor of the House of Commons in January 1946, "Mr. Roosevelt promised to go to war with Japan, whether or not we were attacked." The American people did not know that. The American people do not know what commitments have been made in the 6 months of long negotiation on this pact. Certainly all that time was not spent on working out the facile and beautiful wording that finally went into the pact.

The American people are entitled to an assurance that we will not be drawn into war without their being able to pass on it at least through their representatives in the Congress, as provided in the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you very much.

Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused.

I think that exhausts our witnesses for this afternoon, unless the representatives of this organization known as the Religion and Labor Foundation of New Haven, Conn., are here.

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Then they have lost their day in court if they are not here.

The committee will take a recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30 a.m., right here in this room.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., a recess was taken until 10:30 a.m. of the following day, Wednesday, May 11, 1949.)
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on May 10, 1949, at 10:30 a.m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Green, Vandenberg, Wiley and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Senator Donnell.

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Muriel Draper.

Miss Draper, I understand you have a very short statement. I make that reference because we have scheduled another witness for this morning and, until he arrives, we will go ahead and hear some of the rest of you. Have you a short statement?

Miss DRAPER. Yes, it is. You requested one.

The CHAIRMAN. You requested to appear.

Miss DRAPER. Yes; and you requested me to make it short, and I am trying to comply.

I am the president of the Congress of American Women, and as such I bring you the statement made by the Congress of American Women.

The CHAIRMAN. Just what kind of congress is that? You do not mean that all American women belong to it.

Miss DRAPER. No, sir. The Congress of American Women is an organization in the United States of America. It does not include all women, any more than the Congress of the United States includes all men and women.

I will go ahead with my statement.

STATEMENT OF MISS MURIEL DRAFER, CONGRESS OF AMERICAN WOMEN

Miss DRAPER. The Congress of American Women completed on Sunday night a national convention in which representatives of 300,000 women all over the country participated. The convention unanimously voted, after considerable discussion, the adoption of a resolution opposing the North Atlantic Pact.

It is our firm belief that as the Berlin blockade problem was resolved through negotiation, so all problems now disturbing international relationships can be brought to a peaceful settlement. There must be, however, a will to make peace. There must not be a determination to prepare for war on the highly dangerous theory that
military alliances and armaments races can lead to peace. We must not root our economy in arms production and sales. We must not develop such a political and economic stake in war and its preliminaries that we will fear peace more than we do war.

OPPOSITION TO ATLANTIC TREATY

The Congress of American Women is opposed to the North Atlantic Pact because it will promote—as it has already promoted—a “Peace Is Dreadful” atmosphere. The governing parties of the signatory nations have gambled their political futures on the continuation and intensification of the cold war. They fear peace. The rearmament commitment implicit in the pact will gear our economy and the economies of western Europe to arms production. Jobs will seem to depend upon the cold war. Efforts will be made to spread a fear of peace.

There should be no doubt about the fact that the pact and the rearmament program go together. In spite of double talk calculated to appease political misgivings on both sides of the ocean, the pact makes clear American obligation to finance rearmament. In this connection, it is absurd to accept the one-billion-dollar estimate of the cost as other than partial. One billion cannot rearm the signatories. The first billion will lead to many more billions. If this committee approves the pact, it is accepting the full, unpredictably enormous financial commitment of the rearmament program.

As women, we are dismayed at an American financed arms race. An arms race may lead to war. If we have not succeeded in working out an effective plan for arms reduction that is surely no reason for stimulating arms expansion. We oppose the arms program and the pact which initiates it.

Nothing, however, is quite as alarming as the ease with which, under the pact, we can find ourselves and the rest of the world at war. Congress theoretically retains its power to declare war, but Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, has made it perfectly clear that a congressional declaration will simply acknowledge military action which has already been ordered by a Defense Council. This Defense Council will decide when “armed attack” or its equivalent has taken place, and it is by its decision, not Congress, that the pact is to be invoked. The Defense Council will not, it is clear, consider the Dutch aggression in Indonesia, for example, or the French aggression in Indochina an “armed attack.”

PEACE AND WAR

Our organization’s devotion to the cause of peace has made it an ardent champion of the United Nations. We are troubled now by the pact’s complete disregard of the United Nations. The pact is the antithesis in both letter and spirit of the United Nations. It puts the Security Council’s power to act against aggression into the hands of the Defense Council.

Most of all, the pact comes at a time when peace seems more possible than ever before in the last 3 years. With the lifting of the Berlin blockade and the pending meeting of the foreign ministers, it would
seem particularly imperative that no step be taken which might interfere with a peaceful solution of international differences.

American women do not want to send their brothers, sons, and husbands into another war. We do not want to see our sisters all over the world send their brothers, sons, and husbands into another war. Is there anything that the people want that this pact provides? The people want better homes and schools and a better standard of living. This pact will give them bigger and better bombs and bigger and better bombers. The people's will is for peace. And the pact would inevitably lead them to war. It is because we are convinced that the whole spirit of the North Atlantic Pact is contrary to the needs and the will of the American people that we, of the Congress of American Women, oppose it. And it is for this reason that we will fight it with all our strength—and with all our hearts.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?
Senator Vandenberg. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

POWERS OF COUNCIL UNDER TREATY

Senator Donnell. Only two questions. One is, Miss Draper, would you tell us, please on what you base your view that the Defense Council makes the decision when armed attack is taking place? I do not find anything in the North Atlantic Treaty that says the Defense Council has that power.
Miss Draper. As I understand the treaty, it is not, of course, put in the clearest language, which we hope to arrive at by the end of these hearings, but as I understand it, there can be an Atlantic Council which is a Defense Council which can be called into existence at the request of the signatories of the Atlantic Pact to maintain and develop the resistance of the signatory countries to armed attack, and therefore it would seem as if, under those circumstances, they can decide their own action, though we know in the North Atlantic Pact that it is suggested that the Security Council of the United Nations would be informed after this decision had been arrived at.
Senator Donnell. That is the basis of your view?
Miss Draper. Yes.

MEMBERSHIP OF CONGRESS OF AMERICAN WOMEN

Senator Donnell. The only other question is this: Senator Connally inquired as to the Congress of American Women. How large an organization is that, and where is its membership geographically?

Miss Draper. Its membership is in about 14 different States. The number is 300,000, including our affiliated representation, and I have just come back from a tour of 10 States where I have spoken in churches, in schools, in girls' colleges, in universities and in many organizations of men and women, including the Congress of American Women, and the opinion of the majority of those people is against the North Atlantic Pact.

Senator Donnell. Finally, where was the national convention held to which you refer? How many delegates were present at it?
Miss Draper. It was held in New York City and 197 delegates, guests, and observers, officially elected, were present.

Senator Donnell. How many of those were members of the Congress of American Women?

Miss Draper. They were all members of the Congress of American Women or affiliated groups, with the exception of 11 guests who came as friends of the group to listen but not as official members.

Senator Donnell. Thank you.

Miss Draper. You're welcome.

The Chairman. Is your organization listed on the Attorney General's subversive list?

Miss Draper. Indeed it is, as most organizations that are fighting for peace are.

The Chairman. We have the pleasure this morning of hearing Mr. Norman Thomas, a man of wide information and considered views.

Mr. Thomas. It is very nice of you not to say, as most people do, "the man most often defeated in the United States."

The Chairman. That is no discredit, to be defeated.

Mr. Thomas. I am glad you think so. Anyway, I am just expressing appreciation of your omitting that usual part of that introduction.

The Chairman. I never introduce anybody with any strings to it.

Mr. Thomas. By the way, I want to express my special thanks to you gentlemen for the trouble you have taken for allowing me to appear on short notice. Only because of several other obligations, including jury duty, did I request that consideration, because I could appear at no other time.

The Chairman. Jury duty is a very laudable responsibility.

Mr. Thomas. For lack of time, I have written out only an outline, which I shall elaborate briefly.

**STATEMENT OF NORMAN THOMAS, NEW YORK CITY**

Mr. Thomas. May I make it clear that I am not committing the Socialist Party or the Post-War World Council by what I say? In both organizations there is division of opinion, but I think virtual unanimity on the safeguards which I shall stress.

As matters stand, I favor ratification of the pact for reasons somewhat similar to those given by John Foster Dulles. To refuse now to ratify the pact in which our Government took the initiative might be a tremendous jolt to governments and parties in Europe on which the hope of democracy depends.

I always believed that the negotiation of the pact was motivated by a sincere desire only for defense and not aggression. Nevertheless, I thought there were better ways for the United States to assure the nations of the world of all practicable support against military aggression. Neither under the pact nor without it is it possible or desirable to say that any aggression means that the United States will formally go to war, but there are other supports that can be given. I feared that for the United States to seem to give special aid to some nations, members of the United Nations but not of the pact, would tend to encourage aggression against nations outside the pact.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

UN AND THE TREATY

In some quarters it is argued that the pact may be a step to a North Atlantic Union which I think would virtually junk the UN. For that we are not ready and I hope will not be ready. Weak as the United Nations is in many ways, I do not want it junked or further weakened under any circumstances now. We want to move toward a world federation of the right sort in which better balance will be achieved if there is a United States of Europe along with the United States of America, the Pan American Union, and the U. S. S. R., rather than if the nations of Europe are divided permanently in the orbits of Moscow and Washington. I do not want the pact to hinder the growth of sentiment and organization for the United States of Europe.

ARMS NEEDED TO SECURE EUROPE

There has still been no answer at all to my insistent question whether responsible military men really believe that by any pact or any feasible expenditure under it we can make western Europe invulnerable if the Russian high command should decide that the hour had come to attack, even in the fact of risk of world war. Unless Germany should be rearmed, which no one dares so far to suggest, it is estimated that our allies could make available about 12 divisions for defense along the Rhine while the job would require 40 divisions with appropriate air support. I have heard earnest and intelligent advocates of the pact and military appropriations under it admit that what they are after is a psychological rather than logical effect on the nations; that actions in themselves inadequate or irrational may yet convince the world of our sincere intention to act against aggressors and thus strengthen the morale of our friends and weaken our potential enemies.

Along that line of argument lie dangers: the danger of raising false hope; the danger of building up a whole network of national military machines insatiably crying for more; the danger of aggravating rather than minimizing the armament race without compensating guaranty of that precarious thing, military security.

I want to say that even on the military side we do not reckon just with the military strength of Russia and the satellite states, but with the probable fact that in the very military forces of France and Italy there would be a fairly high percent of Communists whose first loyalty would be to the Communist cause, not the most certain of allies, therefore. I noticed with regret a dispatch in this morning's paper showing some increase of the Communist vote in Sardinia, and of the Left Socialists, the so-called Left Socialists. Actually they are not left. And I think that has to be borne in mind in any computation of military affairs.

To guard against these dangers that I have referred to briefly many things should be done, some of them possibly by reservations to the pact or by action parallel to it. I stress the most important:

FRANCO SPAIN AND THE TREATY

1. It must be made absolutely plain that the United States will steadfastly oppose the inclusion of Franco's Spain in the pact. I am
not too happy about Salazar and Portugal, nor am I inclined to think there is much strength from his membership. It is nonsense to think that in a military sense the poverty-stricken, tired Spaniards, many of whom hate Franco, would be an asset. The only use for Spain would be as a possible bastion behind the Pyrenees for American troops after the rest of Europe had been overrun by Communist forces. That is a grim outlook for American boys which can scarcely be tolerable to our allies. They want to be defended, not liberated once more after a horrible atomic war. To take Spain into the pact would be cynically to flout any contention of concern for democracy or regard for the moral character of government. Cruelty and intolerance in Spain parallel cruelty and intolerance in Communist countries. Franco cannot cleanse his hands of blood by wringing them in frantic protestations of hatred of communism. Cruelty and injustice are cruelty and injustice no matter under what flag they are committed or under what slogan they are sanctified.

COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE PACT

2. Steps must be taken so far as possible in conjunction with the United Nations to make it clear that the pact will not furnish moral or economic aid, directly or indirectly, to the wretched colonial wars which have been waged by the Netherlands and France in Indonesia and Indochina. These wars create a situation made to order for racist and communist exploitation against the United States. From Asia may yet come a greater peril to us than from Europe. The news of another agreement in Indonesia is good. This time it must be carried through to a fair and just peace with the satisfaction of Indonesian desires for independence, and we must not be blackmailed by the Netherlands or France into a support of their colonial policies on the ground that they are necessary to us in western Europe. We are necessary to them.

DISARMAMENT

3. The third provision which must accompany the ratification of the pact is the declaration that the effect of the pact must be to reduce and not increase total armament expenditures; that is, ours and theirs. It is clear that no practicable expenditure of itself will guarantee perfect safety. The steady increase of expenditure jeopardizes our own economy and tends to build up the military everywhere. It is appalling to think that we will be expected to help finance the European equivalent of our brass hats who, according to the Hoover Commission, do not know the meaning of proper budgeting, in Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, France, Britain, and possibly Salazar’s Portugal. Think of all of them clamoring for more. It is fantastic to expect American taxpayers to accept so great a burden, and we would not get, as I think Senator Vandenberg is quoted as saying yesterday, and we would not be building, a sound Maginot line by any conceivable appropriation of that sort.

4. Most of all I want to urge that, preceding the ratification of the pact or accompanying it, there will be a mighty appeal by the United States for an end of the armament race under effective international controls which would make the pact unnecessary. The end of the armament race requires the universal abolition of peacetime military
conscription, the demilitarization of narrow waterways and island bases, the liquidation of weapons of mass destruction, and the international control of atomic energy for peace, and the general reduction of national military forces down to a police level. These things will, of course, require a strengthening of the UN and provision for an international security force probably on a quota principle.

I do not think that the men in the Kremlin would accept the necessary controls, certainly not at first proposal. Nevertheless, an American appeal might be a beginning which would bear fruit sooner than we think. A continuance of the present armament race dooms mankind to poverty and war. It is quite true that you can preserve peace by overwhelming military superiority. You can preserve peace by fear, for a time, and somewhat precariously, but it is not conceivable that for the next generation there will be such a complete preponderance of force on our side that we will win the way a bulldog wins against a rabbit, because the rabbit knows he hasn’t got a chance; and in this race, everything we know about history, everything we know about logic and psychology, make it entirely certain that after 30 more years of an armament race we will go to war. You get what you prepare for. In the meantime, Shaw’s famous statement that “If the other planets are inhabited, the earth must be their lunatic asylum,” is verified by what happens, for in every land less fortunate than our own not compulsorily disarmed, every night’s sun goes down on children crying themselves to sleep for lack of bread, although every government is spending from 25 to 50 percent of its budget on arms and not getting security out of it. Economically it is the greatest boondoggling in the world, and I do not see a successful war against poverty anywhere, or on the food problem.

Dangers of Armament Race

If there has to be this stress on arms, and inevitably the hate, the fear, the hysteria, that are necessary to support so great a burden everywhere, the continuance of the kind of cold war even on a less aggravated plane than now, inevitably that kind of thing will give rise to incidents that will bring war.

I do not think that there can be an end of conflict in the world so long as you are dealing with aggressive totalitarianism, but I think that the time may come when somebody will have the sense even on that side to realize that mankind is doomed so far as decent civilization, possibility ultimately that the human race is doomed, if we are to go on and on with this armament race, and that it is universally desirable to take it out of the realm of atomic war. To a certain extent we have done it in civil life. There are immense conflicts, even in America, that no one dreams will bring us to war, because there has been a change of attitude and in plans. There can’t be a change of attitude and in plans while you have to maintain the attitudes and the economic burdens of the present armaments race. There are no logical limits that can easily be fixed to it. It is always more and more, and the Hoover Commission made it unnecessary for me to comment on the way the military budgets, even in America, are compiled.

That is why I wish with all my heart—I think something dramatic ought to be done—that Secretary Acheson, while this Assembly of the United Nations was still in session, would go before it and say, “We
want nothing so much, we Americans, as a reasonable arrangement for stopping this thing that hurts the world so terribly." Now I know that that requires arrangements. I am not advocating unilateral disarmament. But I think we have made a psychological error in stressing that first such and such arrangements must be made and then we can talk about disarmament.

APPEAL FOR DISARMAMENT

I think that our President, our Secretary of State, should say to the world, "We know, we Americans, the desperate cost. We are temporarily the strongest of nations, but we know how this thing hurts and how terrible will be the effect of another war by reason of the improved methods of destruction which have been discovered and are going to be discovered so long as in every great country the leading brains in your physical laboratories and chemical laboratories are harnessed to the business of finding better ways to kill more people. We know it, and therefore we Americans tell you that we will hold up pacts and everything else until we can get a clear answer from the nations. Will you come into a plan, properly set up, with provision for international security? We won't dictate the plan. We have ideas; we want you to negotiate."

Sooner or later that has got to be done, because in the Atlantic Pact—I am not talking about my lifetime but the lifetime of my children and certainly my grandchildren will see an atomic war if this kind of armament race goes on, pact or no pact, and therefore I want now that appeal. It will do certain things even if it is rejected.

It will make the American people stop, look, and listen in their frantic and largely unconscious rush into militarism in the name of defense.

It will prove to the nations of the world our real and urgent desire for peace. If it is Stalin who refuses so beneficial a thing to mankind as transfer of conflict from the realm of atomic war and preparation for it, let him clearly be made to take the blame.

No iron curtain can keep from the peoples behind it all news of our proposal. Today we are making it easy for Stalin to regiment his people under the false but plausible pretext of our militarism, which he says is aggressive. We can, by the kind of appeal I urge, if it is properly made, greatly increase the difficulties of the dictators' tasks in Russia and in the satellite nations.

This appeal, accompanied by a standing and often repeated invitation for all nations to come in, could give to the North Atlantic Pact an obviously moral quality as purely a defense pact, which in no other way can it acquire in the minds of the peoples of the world. In any case, the appeal would launch a great idea, and ideas have a way of winning sometimes sooner than we think. For this proposal there is no rational substitute.

Our Congress should say that the money we would save on arms we shall use for the works of peace; among other things, to implement President Truman's offer of economic help that backward nations need the most. It is only by such economic help that large areas in Asia and Africa can be brought to a level on which healthy democracy is possible. We are blind if we do not see that in the long run the gravest dangers to the next generation are more likely to arise from an over-
crowded Asia than even from Europe. Our foreign policy must never forget this fact. And in meeting that fact the North Atlantic Pact is more likely to be a hindrance than a help unless at least it is safeguarded along the lines of my proposal.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas, as I understand it from the first part of your statement, you are for the ratification of the Atlantic Pact if it contains your suggestions.

Mr. THOMAS. I am for the ratification if, by reservation or more probably by parallel action, the things that I have suggested can be done, right.

PROPOSALS FOR ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN THE UN

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of disarmament, which is, of course, a very laudable enterprise. Is it not true that the United States endeavored to get a limitation and control of atomic energy, but Russia would not agree?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes; that is true, and it is also true that that is why I say that I do not expect immediate agreement from Russia, but still I think it is important to, as I say, sow the seeds of the idea.

May I say very respectfully that I was always rather critical of the way in which the very admirable Baruch plan was presented. It seems to me that what was actually happening was that we were saying we were going to do a wise and very generous thing about the weapons on which we held temporarily a monopoly, but without even in principle a consideration of the general issue of disarmament.

Now, as everybody admits, even if our plan for atomic energy had gone through, as I still hope it may some time, even if that plan, as revised by the committees of the UN, had gone through, it is generally admitted that in the event of war any nation having knowledge of atomic energy would use it in war, and you would have still had all the pressures and tensions of the arms race.

I think, therefore, that our proposal should have been a greater stress on disarmament, saying that the immediate problem was atomic energy, but that we were by no means stopping there. In other words, I do not think we were sufficiently clear or dramatic in presenting it.

If I may say so, I think that that has been a fault of our foreign policy right along with plain people. I haven’t been in Europe. I haven’t been in Asia since the war. But from time to time, through my Socialist connections, for instance, I see a good many people who come from those countries to the UN and so on, and the people I see are on our side. They are not advocates of Russian or Communist totalitarianism. But there is always the lurking suspicion, the lurking fear, often groundless if you like, or comparatively groundless, we Americans would say, and I think that in public affairs, especially with the world in its present mood, there is a tremendous necessity for a simple but dramatic appeal to get ideas launched.

Now, what Mr. Acheson did, and did rather brilliantly, was to make debaters’ points against Stalin’s insincere peace offensive. They are admirable debaters’ points, but I have won, if I may say so, lots of debates and not an election, and it is possible to win debates and make next to no impression on the popular mind, especially the mind in...
Asia, for instance, which is already prejudiced because of race and other factors.

I feel very strongly on this point, and hence I am urging this appeal, even with the full knowledge of the difficulties of communism.

Senator, if I may say so, I was better aware of the nature of Communist obstruction than most Members of the United States Senate, quite a while before most Members. It isn't just a matter of Russia, it is a matter of communism, and I was warning against peace by appeasement and getting abused for it as far back as 1944, at least. So don't think I have an optimistic view. Only time marches on. There are evolutionary factors. Stalin isn't immortal. There is a chance for a split in the monolithic structure. The three great props of the Russian regime are the terrible secret police, the Army, and the rising class of industrial managers. And there is a lot of evidence that they don't love each other. I don't see how they can. Stalin's enormous prestige holds them together, and I am not predicting anything so fortunate as a good revolution in Russia. Our regard for revolution depends on the locale, and against whom.

But I am saying that there may be cracks in the monolithic structure, and that ideas can get in. I am saying that I think there is a terrific exaggeration of the degree to which Russians and certainly other people behind the iron curtain can be kept from some knowledge of what we are after. It is along those lines that I make my plea for this sort of an appeal. Why not? Nothing lost—much gained!

RELATIONSHIP OF ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The Chairman. Mr. Thomas, in regard to the control and regulation of atomic energy is it not true that our motive was that that question was the most imminent and dangerous, and therefore if we could bring about an arrangement of that kind it would contribute to disarmament?

Mr. Thomas. I understood that, and I want you to know that to the best of my ability I always supported the Baruch plan. But if I may use a rather hasty and crude illustration, which I don't doubt you can find flaws in when thinking it over, when you are dealing with a tiger you do not say, "Look, tiger, your teeth are your most dangerous point, and if you will kindly come down we will file them down." It seems to me when you are dealing with the arms race you are dealing with a total problem, and while you may have to act in detail in order to get results, and the most important detail was atomic energy, nevertheless the thing that mattered was the idea, and the idea that seems to me important was that nations could not afford war any more and could not afford victory under the circumstances of modern weapons. Neither Russia nor we could afford a victory in another war. Look what it has cost us to try to rehabilitate what we have now. Suppose after victory, weakened by losses, torn somewhat by internal dissension, we had to rehabilitate a world with hunger and hate rampant. Stalin would have an equal difficulty. I have no desire to talk to Stalin, nor do I believe that anybody's just talking to Stalin would work miracles, but I would like for somebody to say to Stalin that as a professed infallible Marxist he believes that the weapons, the tools, one uses shape the culture one has. Certainly the
weapons that war is going to use will make war no longer a midwife for a Leninist revolution. It will be a midwife for death.

That is just a suggestion to the State Department. Get some of their ex-Marxists to tell it to Brother Stalin—and they have still got ex-Marxists around, don't forget.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it not, however, be true, that if we could approach this matter on the atomic level that would be a great contribution to the general problem?

Mr. THOMAS. That would have, and that is why I always supported it, at the same time saying that I doubted it would work as an isolated thing. I even told that to Mr. Baruch, who, if I may quote him—he did not say it in confidence—said that was his original idea, but it wasn't the State Department's.

The CHAIRMAN. My thought was that every step that we can accomplish along the line would bring a nearer approach to the general problem of disarmament which you have in mind.

Mr. THOMAS. I think you are right, Senator, but it is like this: If you are having to go on a very hard journey, the important thing is not to concentrate on the importance of this step on the road. The important thing is to hold up to people a vision of the desirability, even the necessity, of arriving at the goal, and the goal at which we have got to arrive to be reasonably safe is, as I say, the end of the arms race and the transfer of conflict from the realm of atomic war, and I think that our statesmen—and I do not mistrust their motives—have made a mistake in their lack of holding up the goal. Great things are done by vision. The verse in the Bible which says "Where there is no vision the people perish" is a very practical verse, and if you have the vision you can find ways to do things, and if there isn't the vision clearly stated in a dull and oppressed and often horror-ridden world, it is hard to get people to do the next things they ought to do.

The CHAIRMAN. But in order to get total disarmament we would have to have seven or eight—

Mr. THOMAS. In order to get it you have to get what you haven't got. The way to get it is by pointing out its enormous desirability. I have said "total disarmament down to the police level in the States," and I recognize the necessity of strengthening the United Nations and of probably erecting an international security force. I do not minimize the difficulties, but I think that the thing that I look forward with most horror to is a world in which we go on sincerely desiring something better because we do not know how to do it and do not even therefore proclaim passionately what we want to do, and point out how logical is our proposal. What I say very briefly here is even from a Russian standpoint logical, except that Stalin is afraid of any inspection behind the iron curtain. It is logical to say to any nation, "No matter how you differ, we can't afford what modern war costs. We can't afford atomic and bacteriological devices and all the things scientists are constantly discovering."

Conflict? Yes. There are differences in interest, and so on. But it has to be lifted out of the realm of atomic war if there is to be a hope for civilization and democracy.

I suppose men would survive an atomic war. I know the present tendency is to diminish the absolute quality of the atomic weapon.
I notice we are now writing nice little essays on “How to Live With the Atom Bomb,” and all you need to do is to make each city look like a doughnut and be sure you are in the right part of the doughnut when the bomb comes.

Granted there has been an exaggeration of the atomic bomb as a weapon, nobody knows what other weapons will be, and it is still bad enough to make what has always been a very terrible method of achieving good ends more futile, more frustrating, more self-defeating, and I think that for the United States, just because we are in our preeminent position, to say that loudly and clearly would not get immediate conversion, but it would get results and it would have the other effects I talk about in connection with the North Atlantic Pact, as a guaranty of the genuineness of our desire for defense.

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas, allow me to say that so far as your views about strengthening the United Nations, we have no opposition. In fact, I am sure the whole committee, and for that matter the Congress and the Government, are strongly in favor of strengthening the United Nations and trying to so modify it or amend it as to remove the delays and procrastinations and the confusion and opposition with which it has met in its workings. At San Francisco we had great hopes, and our hopes were based on the theory that the great nations would cooperate and would undertake to carry out the purposes and the ideals of the United Nations. In that hope we have been disappointed. But I still think that through the United Nations we will have a stronger hope, even, than before, that we may ultimately so improve it or modify it as to make it a more effective agency for the maintenance of world peace.

I think already, with its defects and with its obstructions, it has performed a great service in many respects.

Mr. THOMAS. I agree, Senator. I may say that I was critical of the UN. I still am, of its constitution, which probably may have been the best that was then possible. I still think we want to move toward a fuller type of world government, but I do not think you can get that tomorrow, and therefore I want not to weaken the UN. I want, in the administration of the Atlantic Pact, to strengthen the UN. But I do believe the UN would be stronger if a great idea could be preached through it and around it.

I want to acknowledge the fact. I think too much neglected in America, that the UN made, not a total contribution, but a real contribution, to a much more satisfactory settlement in the Middle East than we thought likely a year ago. I think the UN probably, even somewhat weakly, has nevertheless contributed to the desirability of renewed negotiations in Indonesia, and this time I hope they stick. I assure you that I want to defend the UN.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will observe that in the treaty before us now there are a number of references to the United Nations, and in each instance the treaty recognizes the overriding authority of the United Nations and a desire to cooperate and not to hinder the United Nations.

Mr. THOMAS. I think that desire is genuine. I think circumstances sometimes make it difficult, and I must confess that I do not exactly
think that the terms of the pact fit into what would be an ordinary construction of the convenant, but the times are extraordinary and I am not inclined to press that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is very little I want to talk with Mr. Thomas about. He always intrigues me because he gets so much sense into his presentation of Socialist views, and I think he has done that again.

Mr. Thomas. It is native to Socialist views, Senator. The importation is much easier than if you are a Republican.

Senator Vandenberg. That, of course, depends upon the point of view. Perhaps I could not expect you to be as generous as I am.

Mr. Thomas. No. You can afford to be generous. You sit there.

NO IMPERIALIST OR AGGRESSIVE MOTIVES BEHIND PACT

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Thomas, in view of your willingness to see the pact ratified, I take it that it would be fair to summarize your attitude perhaps as follows: That you do not suspect any aggressive or imperialistic motives on the part of your own Government in proposing the North Atlantic Pact, but that you want to make it obviously and unmistakably plain to the world that our lack of aggressive and militaristic objectives can never be misunderstood by anybody.

Mr. Thomas. That is entirely true. I have never said, and do not think, that the United States Government or people have imperialist ambitions. I have argued to the contrary. I think we can acquire them by the things we do in time. I think there are probably people that may have them. But the European notion that what we do is for our selfish advantage is rather fantastic; or that any great group thinks it is for our selfish advantage is, I think, somewhat fantastic.

Nevertheless, you have to deal with abnormal psychology among peoples, and the history of militarism warrants suspicion, and the means you use sometimes lead to ends that you do not originally calculate.

I will say about the North Atlantic Pact that the fact that it has Norway and Denmark in it I think means that there will be a considerable caution about any aggression, because they would be so easily the victims of it.

Senator Vandenberg. And in the final analysis, you would look upon continued and insistent American leadership in behalf of universal disarmament under adequate disciplines as the maximum demonstration we would make of good faith?

Mr. Thomas. As the maximum, Senator. You will notice that I also said things about not wanting Franco Spain in, and about my worry about the indirect effects of the pact on the Asiatic situation. I think they should be looked into. And I also think the test of the success of the pact will be whether, in the comparatively short time, it decreases rather than increases the total military burden. Otherwise it does not make sense. If every time you add more people officially to your side it costs you more, you are out of luck.

Senator Vandenberg. I think that is all I have.

Mr. Thomas. You will like to hear that I believe in reducing taxes when possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of taxes?
Mr. Thomas. That is another subject—reducing it, not increasing it—just for the fun of increasing it, and the way to reduce it best would be along this military line if and when it becomes possible, and I profoundly hope that the Hoover report won't be in vain in that connection.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley, you are next.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Thomas, I am sorry I was not here when you gave your statement. I follow through with Senator Vandenberg, that I never hear you but what you intrigue me.

Penetrating the Iron Curtain

I just want to ask you one or two questions. How are we going to get behind the iron curtain of the Marxists? I am not talking about the physical curtain; I am talking about the iron curtain of the mind. How are we going to penetrate that?

Mr. Thomas. You are not going to penetrate it with the convinced and fanatic. I would prefer, Leninists. But I do not believe myself that the hold of fanatical communism on masses of people, the conscious hold, is great, and I think that we can make it much harder for the fanatical Leninist, the fanatical Communist, to manipulate by propaganda, coercion, force, the popular mind and the popular action, by rather dramatic displays of the excellence of our intentions.

I say that with some reason. I knew a correspondent, an Australian correspondent, who was in Russia during the war, and he very much impressed me by his own belief in the rather lukewarm support. You remember that contrary to what we were told at the time, there were more potential Quislings in Russia than anywhere else. Ukrainia was profoundly disaffected, and several people, including this reporter, told me that if the Germans had not been so bestially cruel, they could have got it.

Now, I think from the Russians I have met, who have got out, and from people that I know from the satellite countries, that we greatly exaggerate the degree to which the Soviet has created the Soviet man, completely at the mercy of the propaganda departments of the Kremlin, and I think that we want to take extraordinary care to make it as hard and not as easy as possible for Stalin to do that job of controlling the mind.

I repeat, I am not thinking you will convert Molotov. Senators here know better than I, but my reading of the papers would indicate that he is not a likely candidate for conversion.

Senator Wiley. Is it true that in your judgment probably five or six million people only constitute what you might call the hierarchy of the Marxist movement in Russia, and the other 195,000,000 folks are just ordinary folks of different nationalities? I think it has been said there are 70 different tongues in Russia.

Mr. Thomas. There are more than that. I have seen in Russia translations of over 100 languages used in some of their texts.

Senator Wiley. Considering that fact, considering the fact that there are only 5,000,000 folks who provide what you might call the police of this mind of Russia, of this 195,000,000 in the mass. I do not know but what you had some ideas of how we are going to penetrate that and bring, as I see it, to them the antidote to what Stalin is
constantly apparently feeding them, and that is that they have to be fearful of us, fearful of the democratic processes.

Mr. Thomas. The propaganda of the deed is the best, but I have been long the advocate of a kind of unofficial organization of Friends of Freedom, who would be concerned with getting in the truth, with helping refugees to get out. I happen to be one of those who believe that such an organization, which is now possibly under way, could play a very useful auxiliary role in the matter. I am a great believer in the possibility of the Voice of America, which is apparently well heard in the satellite states.

But when all is said and done, I think we have to have the propaganda of the deed. We have to show the working of our democracy in race relations and in economics. I have just been over to talk about that to the House. I also believe that we have got to be mighty careful, if I may say so, not to repeat the kind of speeches that were made in the House when the military bill was passed. The reaction was shocking, and deservedly so, to Representative Cannon. What Cannon said, in effect, was “We shall carry on a war of annihilation by superior weapons from the air while we ask the last Frenchman to do the dirty work on the ground for us,” and that kind of speech can do incalculable harm.

Those are the things we have to take into account.

Senator Wiley. Have you any other suggestions?

Mr. Thomas. I wish I did. I assure you this haunts me. If we get rid of this business of the cold war, I think not perfectly perhaps in a blundering fashion, we would solve our domestic problems. But this is a shadow over everything.

**ENDING THE COLD WAR**

Senator Wiley. It has been suggested here by some folks that another convention, another great call for the nations of earth, an appeal to Russia through the State Department and through other agencies, might be successful. What is your idea about that?

Mr. Thomas. I am very sympathetic with the notion and with the people who make it, but cannot convince myself that just a general call, “Come on, let’s have a great convention!” will get very far. You see, in years gone by I have had my experiences with kindness, and you do not get further by handling the kind of fights that you have just on general principles. I think if you can say “Even you Stalin, cannot afford victory in war, much less defeat; your people can’t afford this arms race,” then you might have something practical to set up a properly organized conference through UN auspices for the strengthening of the UN. But I do not believe that just a general go-to, now, “Let us have a better world government,” or “Let us have more friendship,” would at the moment work.

I emphasize “at the moment,” because I repeat that time marches on for others than Henry Luce, and that things change.

Senator Wiley. Then your conclusion, as in your answer to Senator Vandenberg, is that for the time being the pact, in your judgment, should become a reality, and that supplementing that we should take every human way that we can conceive of to try to bring about a meeting of minds between the peoples and the leaders of earth?
Mr. Thomas. Yes, that is right. I think it is the lesser evil. I have already said that I was a critic of the approach of the pact. I still am. My criticisms have not been removed. But I think that now our refusal to ratify it would play into the hands in France, for instance, of De Gaullists and possibly of Communists themselves, by still further weakening the none-too-strong democratic forces in France. I fear a similar thing would happen in Italy, and possibly in the smaller countries, and for that reason, things having gone to that point, I favor ratification with the accompanying actions which we have discussed.

Senator Wiley. Does that imply that you thought before steps were taken to put the pact into reality there was an alternative?

Mr. Thomas. Oh, yes.

Senator Wiley. What was that?

ALTERNATIVES BEFORE SIGNATURE OF PACT

Mr. Thomas. The real thing we are anxious to do, as I take it, is to give the assurance to the peoples of western Europe that they are not going to stand alone, that we are back of them, to give assurance to other decent people that we are back of them. I think a way could have been found by the same patience and ingenuity that went into the pact for America to give that assurance within the United Nations and without the formalities of this pact, and the doubts that it raises concerning relationships with the UN. In no case are we promising automatically to go to war, not even under the pact, as several Senators have made plain and they have to make plain.

Senator Wiley. That is just your belief. Have you anything to base that on, that the pact is, well, let's say, out of time, that it was not necessary to have it?

Mr. Thomas. Well, look. If we had time, you have no idea how many debates I would like to have as to what might have been, and if we were now arguing, "Shall we proceed along the line of this pact or shall we proceed through other devices to give assurance to the nations that we will regard aggression against them as aggression against us?" and at the same time to strengthen the movement toward a United States of Europe, as I think in general we are, I think it would have been much preferable.

Senator Wiley. Is not the analogy you used a little while ago, that you do not argue with a tiger, you do not just try and fix his teeth, the situation we face in the world, that the human mind in many senses is berserk?

Mr. Thomas. If that is the case, neither the North Atlantic Pact nor anything else will do you much good, because no one believes the North Atlantic Pact of itself is so overwhelming as to make war out of the question. If the mind has gone completely berserk, we are lost. I personally do not think so. I think there are evidences of some recovery of the mind. Anyway, that is what we have to gamble on, and I believe that the North Atlantic Pact ought to be appraised primarily in that setting: as of now, I think it had better be ratified, with the accompanying things I have spoken about.

Senator Wiley. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Thomas, I am sorry that I did not get to hear all of your statement, because I have been very interested in your views, but I gather that you feel that under present circumstances, at this moment, everything that is done and by, that the adoption of the North Atlantic Pact will be of assistance in reorienting or re-strengthening the common mind of those who have a will to peace, such as you were talking about to Senator Wiley.

Mr. Thomas. Possibly, but that is not what I was affirming. I was affirming that it would be much less dangerous than the rejection of the pact. We are, in my judgment, in a difficult world, where we often have to make choices of relative evil. Nobody would have desired, even the best friends of the North Atlantic Pact would not have desired, at the time of the framing of the San Francisco Charter, that it should come into being. We are dealing with choices of evils, and on that I think it is better to ratify the pact, with the accompanying provisions that I have discussed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was not attempting to suggest that your basic idea was that, necessarily, but I have tried to preface my question on the statement that, considering everything that has gone before, and the situation that we find confronting us here with the pact either up for ratification or for refusal—

Mr. THOMAS. I am not too happy about it, but that is how it looks to me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that under all those circumstances, as we presently find them now, a ratification of the pact would contribute more to the reorientation of our composite picture.

Mr. Thomas. If by parallel action some of these other things I have discussed are done.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I, again prefacing my question upon the fact that it exists, and not as theory as it might have been existing before the pact was signed. I take it that you believe that ratification of the pact will be on the plus side rather than on the minus side in our struggle for future peace?

Mr. Thomas. Yes; but I can imagine that I might say "No" if, for example, there should happen what I do not think will happen; if there should be a few more speeches in favor of the pact on the order of Representative Cannon's, I would say that the ratification was a mistake. If there should be an open invitation to Franco Spain to come in, I would say ratification of the pact was a mistake. If anybody should say secretly or openly to the Dutch or the French, "This gives you a better chance to clean up those people over in Asia or Indonesia," I would say the ratification is a mistake.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas, we have present Senator Donnell, by courtesy of the committee, and he would like to ask you some questions.

Mr. Thomas. I shall be very happy to answer Senator Donnell as best I can.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Thomas, I want to call to the attention of the committee, and also of yourself, the concluding three sentences of your prepared statement, and to ask you a question based on them.

Mr. Thomas. Surely.
Senator DONNELL. They read:

We are blind if we do not see that in the long run the gravest dangers to the next generation are more likely to arise from an overcrowded Asia than even from Europe. Our foreign policy must never forget this fact.

And then, Mr. Thomas, finally, this sentence in your statement:

And in meeting that fact the North Atlantic Pact is more likely to be a hindrance than a help unless at least it is safeguarded along the lines of my proposal.

That is your belief, is it not?

Mr. THOMAS. That is my belief.

Senator DONNELL. Now, am I correct or incorrect in understanding, Mr. Thomas, that it is your belief that the North Atlantic Pact is more likely to be a hindrance than a help unless at least it is safeguarded along the lines of your proposal?

Mr. THOMAS. That is my belief; and I refer there in particular to the delicate but very important task of conveying unmistakably to the French and Dutch Governments that they cannot virtually blackmail us into indefinite support of their colonial wars. I hope the Dutch are already on the road to peace.

As I remember the figures, we have given the Netherlands just about the help that it has cost them to have won their expedition in Indonesia. Harold Isaacs, just back from Indonesia, in one of the most eloquent and impressive of short speeches—he is a correspondent of Newsweek—that I have heard, told about the terrible impression of Indonesia on the plain men and women of Indonesia because Dutch troops looked like Americans, so completely do they wear our equipment.

DANGERS OF THE ATLANTIC PACT

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Thomas, I want to ask you, so there will be no misunderstanding on the part of either myself or anyone else, this question, without any qualification whatsoever in my question. I want to ask you, Do you believe this morning, as you sit here in this chair, that the North Atlantic Pact is more likely to be a hindrance than a help unless at least it is safeguarded along the lines of your proposal?

Mr. THOMAS. Most emphatically. I have a habit of writing what I believe and sticking to it to the best of my ability.

Senator DONNELL. And what do you mean by saying that "it is more likely to be a hindrance than a help"? Would you be kind enough to define that clause?

Mr. THOMAS. In several ways. I have suggested one of them. It might encourage the, I think, very stupid Dutch and French policies in southeast Asia. I think, unless safeguarded, with Salazar keeping on asking for Franco in, it might encourage and strengthen Franco's position, which I do not want strengthened. I am not asking intervention against Franco. But I think we are in an intolerable position in the all-important business of capturing the imagination and loyalty of peoples, unless we take a stand against cruelty, and if it were time and appropriate, I could tell you things that have happened in Spain that are exactly parallel to what we complain of justly in the Communist countries.

Senator DONNELL. Now, Mr. Thomas, I have been greatly interested in both the questions that have been presented to you by the com-
RATIFICATION WITH ACCOMPANYING PROPOSALS

Senator Donnell. I have noticed with great interest the fact that there has been repeated questioning by the members of the committee, and certain of them particularly, to bring out from you that under all the existing present circumstances you would be in favor of the ratification of the pact, but I have noticed with equal interest the fact that in each time, I believe—maybe one time just solely in the context—you have said in substance, "Yes," with the concurrent inclusion or passing, enactment, or whatever the term may be, of your proposal. Am I right in that?

Mr. Thomas. You are entirely right. It would be presumptuous for me to dictate the way in which these supplementary things could be done. I dream about a reservation saying that the pact will not go into operation until this appeal for the end of the armament race under the proper sanctions has been made and rejected. But I can imagine other ways of accomplishing the same result. I am not dictating the tactics. But I am saying that the moral effect unmistakably must be made of the proposals that I have advanced if the North Atlantic Pact is to be potentially useful.

Senator Donnell. Rather than a menace?

Mr. Thomas. Rather than a menace; right.

Senator Donnell. You think it is essential that there be adopted practically simultaneously with the ratification of the pact the proposal you make in your statement this morning?

Mr. Thomas. That is entirely correct.

Senator Donnell. And I have noticed also that in your response to these numerous questions designed to put you here on record that you are in favor of the ratification of this pact you have each time, with possibly the one exception which I think may be explained by the context, either used the expression "Yes, ratification with my proposal" or the equal words "If my proposal be adopted." Am I correct in my interpretation?

Mr. Thomas. You are entirely correct, but you see I do not want the implication to go out that I think these proposals are so unacceptable to the State Department and to the supporters of the pact that they cannot be carried out. I believe they ought to be acceptable to the supporters of the pact and should be carried out. I want to emphasize that.

Senator Donnell. And I take it that you believe that your proposals are entirely in harmony with the expressed desire of the State Department?

Mr. Thomas. If the State Department means what it says, and I see no reason to doubt it, then the State Department ought to be more eager than I for some dramatic proof. If the State Department means what Mr. Jessup has said at time about Indonesia, it ought to accept wholeheartedly what I propose.

About Spain we get all kinds of confused reports, but I do not think that Eric Johnston and I are in the State Department yet.
Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Thomas, you mentioned a few minutes ago that you are not too happy about this pact, or words to that effect. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Thomas. You are right.

Senator Donnell. And you also said in your printed statement [reading]:

I thought there were better ways for the United States to assure the nations of the world of all practicable support against military aggression.

Do you still believe that?

Mr. Thomas. As of the past, yes, but now that the pact is negotiated, no.

Senator Donnell. I am coming to that point in just a few minutes, about the negotiation of the pact and the effect of it. Therefore, and if I am wrong you want to correct me, what you are advising is the ratification of the pact with your proposal.

Mr. Thomas. Right.

Senator Donnell. And I am not clear whether you are here advising the ratification of the pact if your proposal be discarded.

Mr. Thomas. No; I am not. If my proposals are discarded I am not advising ratification of the pact.

Senator Donnell. That is perfectly clear.

Mr. Thomas. There is a time. It is conceivable that it would take some time to carry out these proposals, but I would have to be assured of a very genuine and effective will to carry them out before I would favor it.

Senator Donnell. And if you are not given that assurance, and that assurance is not based on reasonable probability that it will be carried out, you are not here advising that that be ratified?

Mr. Thomas. That is right, because I think if these things are now carried out I could explain to my friends in Europe that we weren't letting them down, that we were insisting on certain provisions which ought to accompany it. But I do not want the pact turned down or these provisions lost sight of.

Senator Donnell. In other words, you want them both adopted, and you are not here advising ratification of the pact unless both of them are adopted, or you are given reasonable assurances that they will be.

Mr. Thomas. I am for both, and therefore I can conceivably be no 100-percent friend of either side in the debate.

Senator Donnell. I understand you are here advocating the adoption of the pact plus either the adoption of your proposal or assurance it will be adopted, and you are not here arguing the ratification of the pact unless that assurance or adoption of your proposal be given to you; is that right?

Mr. Thomas. That is correct.

Senator Vandenberg. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Donnell. Surely.

IMPLEMENTATION OF MR. THOMAS' PROPOSALS

Senator Vandenberg. The Senator spent a great deal of time nailing this thing down very categorically. Let us be sure now that we do all understand you as anxiously as the able Senator from Missouri.
You have also said repeatedly that there are different ways of implementing the objectives.

Mr. Thomas. That is correct.

Senator Vandenberg. And you are not submitting as a categorical requirement that the memorandum submitted by you this morning must show up in similar form in connection with the action of Congress?

Mr. Thomas. Of course not, because the amendment isn't based on a form. For instance, to make it explicit, there is a rule that I think would have validity for our cosigners in the adoption of law. The Supreme Court considers the debate, does it not, in the interpretation of law? The nature of the debate will be extremely helpful. The statements already made by both of you gentlemen have been, I think, definitely helpful.

Senator Vandenberg. The committee report could be particularly authentic.

Mr. Thomas. The committee report could make an immense difference. I think in connection with Asia, the statement carefully worked out by the State Department concerning our attitude on Asia might fill the bill. A statement to the effect that, a kind of underscored statement since there are continual references to it, Franco Spain will not be eligible to the pact, could be made in half a dozen ways, and the more of them the better.

May I say that I am discussing the pact. I am not necessarily discussing the question of ambassador, more or less. I am discussing the administration of the pact.

Senator Vandenberg. I beg your pardon.

Senator Donnell. That's all right.

The Chairman. May I intervene just a moment?

INCLUSION OF SPAIN

Mr. Thomas, of course Spain is not a member of the pact at present, and would it not require the unanimous consent of all the members of the pact to admit Spain?

Mr. Thomas. Yes, I believe so.

The Chairman. Isn't that wholly improbable?

Mr. Thomas. It is improbable, but I do not want us to be urging it or seem to other nations to be urging it or that it shall be thought that will urge it.

I remember shortly after the publication of the pact somebody published an interview with Salazar already raising the question of Spain's admission, and so great is our power that, to put it rather brutally, we could probably bulldoze other nations into saying yes. I don't want any hint of that.

The Chairman. That would have probably come up in the negotiations, if there had been anything of that kind.

Mr. Thomas. No, because if I were what I am not, if I were an advocate of the admission of Spain, as I think some people in high office are, I would go slow. You know, the way you get things done is to say you aren't going to do them until the last minute.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Thomas, in connection with Spain, I was not on the floor of the Senate yesterday, but I was on for a few min-
utes while the distinguished chairman of this very committee, Senator Connally, was discussing Spain, not at all with respect to entry into the pact, so far as I heard, and I am quite confident he was not. But I would like the record at this time, in this proceeding, to show the fact that the subject of Spain and the recognition by this country of Spain, and the appointment of diplomatic representatives, was under discussion in the Senate on the floor yesterday, and participated in, I think I am understanding and inferring correctly, with the general idea of approval by the chairman of this committee of the appointment of diplomatic representatives from one nation to the other.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may intervene right there, the Senator from Texas was not taking part in any debate. He was busy here on the committee and walked into the Senate. Senator Brewster, of Maine, was advocating diplomatic representatives to Spain, and he propounded the question to me which perforce I answered. I told him that I thought we should have diplomatic representation in Spain, not for Spain's benefit but for our own benefit. We send ambassadors abroad to serve this country and to keep posted as to all transactions. But I in no sense, and I specifically stated that I did not, approve of the Government of Spain or her institutions, but said that we had diplomatic representatives in Russia, we have diplomatic representatives in all of the satellite countries, and I saw no logical reason why we should not have a diplomatic representative in Spain. That is all there is to that.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, may I say on that, since it has come up, that I am on record years ago as having said that I thought the business of expressing disapproval by withdrawing ambassadors was very dubious.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

SPANISH QUESTION BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. THOMAS. The more difficult your relations, the more truly you need a good guy, I mean a good statesman, to represent you; and so even back in the days of our dealings with Germany I did not think the way to express disapproval was to withdraw an ambassador. I am still of that opinion on the general issue.

Here you have a special issue. Contrary to what I would have thought were the wisest tactics, it became a sort of a matter of United Nations action to express disapproval of Spain through lack of diplomatic representatives. By the way, there is not a complete lack of diplomatic representatives; it is just the top that you take off. In other words, I believe that usually if you want something done you send the boss and not the office boy, but diplomacy is wonderful!

Now, having got started this way, I think that to change it now, and under the pressures now, would be a mistake, or for us to urge it would be a mistake, because in politics, as you well know, actions cannot be judged with simple, cold logic. They have to be judged in their psychological setting and in their psychological effect. Hence I am not for the immediate sending of an ambassador to Spain, although I want to be on record for about the tenth time in discussions of this sort as objecting from the beginning to the notion that you make effective progress by recalling an ambassador.
CRUELIES IN SPAIN

I would like to give you an illustration about Spain, if I may take time. Last summer I wrote a letter to the President, or the State Department, asking if we could get authentic information about the horrible atrocity that was reported in the Asturias, you may recall, when 22 men, allegedly for no offense that was announced except trying to form a union, were arrested by Spanish gendarmes, dynamite sticks tied between their legs, and thrown down a dry well, and to make sure the dynamite would go off they poured burning kerosene over them. I asked for an inquiry and I got from the State Department assurance that it would be made.

I never got any report, although later, through the British Government indirectly, I did get a report, giving the names and family histories of 9 of the victims. There were 22 in all.

I don’t think our policy has helped much, when we could not more effectively speak out against that outrageous atrocity.

Recently, as you know, 8 or 9 or 10—we get very little real information from Spain—men were convicted and 2 or 3 were given death sentences and the others life sentences for trying to form unions in the Asturias. One of them was a man named Nadau, who had made a very heroic record of resistance in France, in which country he was a refugee from Franco, and had been decorated after the liberation of France by both the French and British. He went back to his own country and was trying to form a union. That is the only charge against him. He was arrested and sentenced to death. A little dispatch said that the Pope had intervened, in this case through the papal nuncio, and Franco graciously gave him 30 years. I am not sure what I would have taken death, and I reckon the Pope asked for something less than 30 years. That is too much like Cardinal Mindszenty’s sentence.

It is that kind of thing that is continually going on in Spain, along with all the intolerances for which we ought not to apologize, and there is no consideration of expediency which will strengthen us in the minds of the world in defending democracy by condoning the horrible brutality and the cruelty of this unilateral one-party Government headed by Franco, and of that I want to make an emphatic declaration.

Senator Donnell. I want it clear, Mr. Thomas, that I am not discussing the question of Spain, the matter of ambassadors, or placing ambassadors in Spain. The point I desired the record to show was that the subject of the relations between this country and Spain was on the floor of the Senate yesterday.

Now, Mr. Thomas, what was it you said in regard to the possible future effect of an address similar to that delivered by Congressman Cannon recently? Should it be repeated? What did you say about that?

Mr. Thomas. I said, if it should happen, and I am reasonably sure it will not, that an address in support of the pact should be made in the terms that Mr. Cannon used in support of his military appropriations, it would be disastrous, and would go far to make us appear as genuinely and rather callously willing to be militarists at other people’s expense.
Senator Donnell. Mr. Thomas, 20 years is a long time. You referred to 30 years. You know the term of this treaty is 20 years, do you not?

Mr. Thomas. Yes.

INCLUSION OF PORTUGAL

Senator Donnell. And it is impossible, I take it, is it not, Mr. Thomas, to anticipate either the vagaries of individuals or the contingencies that may arise between countries over a period of 20 years. That is correct, of course, is it not?

Mr. Thomas. Right.

Senator Donnell. You mentioned in the course of your testimony, and since have, Portugal. I call to your attention this language in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, referring to the parties to this treaty:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

May I ask you, Mr. Thomas, whether you think Portugal, which I believe is one of the signatories—I know it is—comes within the definition of a country, as it is presently being administered, whose common heritage and civilization are founded on principles of democracy?

Mr. Thomas. Emphatically not.

Senator Donnell. You do know that Portugal’s representative was here and made an address and signed the treaty on behalf of Portugal, with the consent of the other 11? That is right, is it not?

Mr. Thomas. That is right.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Thomas, at one point in your original testimony there was a very short expression which I think might be ambiguous unless it were explained. I think in substance you did make it perfectly clear a little later, but at one point you said something about “It will make the American people stop, look, and listen in their frantic, and largely unconscious, rush into militarism in the name of defense.” My recollection is that that sentence was not preceded, as it is in your written statement, by what I think you meant, namely. “An American appeal, properly made” will do so and so.

Mr. Thomas. That is right.

Senator Donnell. So the by-term “It” you are not referring to the North Atlantic Treaty, but you are referring to an American appeal properly made.

Mr. Thomas. Absolutely. Thank you for making that 1,000 percent clear.

Senator Donnell. I think I want to ask, if I may, just one question on this point. Senator Vandenberg a few minutes ago said that you are not insisting on the form of the appeal which is set forth in your statement this morning.

Mr. Thomas. That is right.

Senator Donnell. I take it that you are not insisting, am I not correct, on the language of it or the form of it, but that you are insisting on the substance of it.

Mr. Thomas. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. You have read the North Atlantic treaty. I assume?
Mr. THOMAS. Indeed.

Senator DONNELL. And you have studied it with care?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Thomas, I do not know your background. What was your profession or business before you became active in public life?

Mr. THOMAS. I was a clergyman, and after that I was an editor.

Senator DONNELL. Where was your editorial work?

Mr. THOMAS. At various publications. I was at one time associate editor of the Nation. I have been connected with other publications. I was also secretary of an organization known as the League for Industrial Democracy, and various other jobs.

Senator DONNELL. And as a clergyman, of what denomination?

Mr. THOMAS. Presbyterian.

Senator DONNELL. Where did you practice your profession of the ministry?

Mr. THOMAS. In New York.

Senator DONNELL. New York City?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. I think, being from Missouri, you would agree that that being a wicked place, it was a proper place to go, would you not?

Senator DONNELL. I will make no commitment along that line. I might get into serious trouble with some of my New York friends.

PROVISIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL AND EXPULSION

But, Mr. Thomas, referring to the matter of Communists, have you in your study of this treaty found anything from beginning to end in it which says that if a country, one of these 12 signatories, should become a Communist country during the 20 years that it could either voluntarily withdraw or be expelled? Is there any such thing in this treaty?

Mr. THOMAS. No; I did not see it there. I should imagine that on just plain common sense it would withdraw or be expelled. I do not think this lack of specific certification to that effect would make too much difficulty.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Thomas, I think that your point as to the common sense that you would expect to be evidenced here in the treaty—I am not quoting your language; I am putting it in my language—that the common sense of providing some means for withdrawal or expulsion is very impressive, but what I am asking you is if you have found anything in this treaty which makes provision for either withdrawal or expulsion.

Mr. THOMAS. There I want to say a word for the State Department. If you are negotiating a treaty with your friends, now, if you do something very bad, it is all over. At least you try to avoid that. It is assumed, I imagine.

I am not a lawyer, and I may be wrong. That would be my assumption.

Senator DONNELL. May I inquire of Senator Connally, please, from his experience and knowledge, is there any provision in the Charter of the United Nations for withdrawal?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

90614 - 49 - pt. 2 - 27
Senator DONNELL. There is a provision in the Charter of the United Nations?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a resolution, but no express provision in the Charter.

Senator DONNELL. There is a resolution?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know of any similar resolution that has been adopted by the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. THOMAS. No; I do not, Senator.

COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN EUROPE

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Thomas, yesterday we had the privilege of hearing Mr. James P. Warburg. In the course of his testimony he stated, and I will quote the sentence without the context; perhaps I ought to read two sentences to make it clear [reading]:

If military manpower were to be recruited in western Germany, it is clear, I think, that two things could happen. Russian retaliation would be provoked, and the already dubious morale of any potential French Army would be destroyed. I say "the already dubious morale" because we cannot ignore the fact that with 25 percent of France voting Communist, the Russians have a far more dangerous fifth column in France today than the Nazis had in 1940.

Do you agree with the statement of fact as contained in what I have read, that there is 25 percent of France today voting Communist?

Mr. THOMAS. That would seem to be shown by the polls. There is some encouragement to believe that communism is progressively weakening, and that men would act as Frenchmen rather than as Communists, but I regard as very serious the Communist strength in both Italy and France. It is one of the factors we have to contend with, and as I understand the sentences you read from Mr. Warburg, I should fully agree with him.

For instance, I should certainly agree that were we to rearm western Germany, the Russians would rearm eastern Germany, and the French would have a fit.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know, Mr. Thomas, speaking of Italy, how far the parties signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty could go toward rearming Italy without a violation of the peace treaties?

Mr. THOMAS. No. I know they could not go too far under the peace treaty.

Senator DONNELL. You have mentioned something to the effect that no one believes that this treaty will provide—you used the term, I think—"overwhelming" force, or words to that effect. Did you use that?

Mr. THOMAS. What I said was, looking down the vista of the years, say 20 or 30 years, no one believes that this treaty will indefinitely provide such completely overwhelming superiority to an eastern Russian bloc which may make use in time of Chinese manpower so that we can win simply the way the bulldog wins on the rabbit, that there is no use fighting.

Senator DONNELL. Are you familiar with these two sentences in the President’s inaugural address:

...it we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur. I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan.
Do you recall that as appearing in the President's address?
Mr. THOMAS. Very well.
Senator DONELLY. That is all, Mr. Thomas. I thank you and the
committee very much.
Mr. THOMAS. May I say to you, Senator Connally and Senator
Vandenberg, that I appreciate the courtesy you showed in making
it possible for me to come a little out of order at this time. It was
the only time I could come, and I am very grateful.
The CHAIRMAN. We are very grateful to you. We thank you very
much, Mr. Thomas, for a very enlightening and able presentation of
your views.
Dr. Phillips Elliott.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHILLIPS ELLIOTT, FELLOWSHIP OF
RECONCILIATION

Dr. ELLIOTT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on
Good Friday, April 15, a statement signed by 31 clergymen was
released to the press. This statement expressed concern regarding the
Atlantic Pact and attempted to sound a warning against its adoption.
I am appearing today on behalf of this group of clergymen to express
in spoken words the convictions which that statement made on that
earlier date. A copy of this statement has, I think, been placed in your
hands, and with your permission will be inserted in the record.
(The statement referred to, entitled "Statement on Atlantic Pact," reads as follows:)

STATEMENT ON ATLANTIC PACT

During this Lenten season in the year of our Lord, 1949, the thoughts of
Christian people in the United States, as elsewhere, are necessarily often oc-
cupied with consideration of the North Atlantic Pact. A study conference under
the auspices of the department of international justice and good will of the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, recently held, was unable
to decide either to support or to reject this proposal. It is appropriate in these
circumstances that individual Christians and groups should share with each
other their thinking about a step which is generally recognized as the most im-
portant in American foreign policy since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.
The Atlantic Pact provides for bringing the nations of western Europe and the
United States into a military alliance. Some advocates of this step hold that
it must not be regarded as anything but a highly dubious and a temporary ex-
pedient. They desire that it should be so used and so represented that it may
not be a manifestly and aggressively hostile policy but one to be developed or
superseded in a constant pursuit of world concord and cooperation. It is the
contention of these advocates that under such conditions Europe's fear of a
new retreat into isolationism on the part of the United
States would be allayed.
They believe that building up and pooling the military might of the countries
involved and putting Russia on notice that an armed attack on any one of them
will be regarded as an act of war against all, will deter Russia from attempting
further to extend her power sphere. Thus the countries of western Europe will
be saved from Communist domination, and economic recovery and stabiliza-
tion, based on what may yet be accomplished by an increasing exchange of
goods between east and west under the Marshall plan, will become possible in
the democratic world generally. It is furthermore suggested that there are forces
at work in Russia and in countries of the Soviet bloc, which will before long
result in the drastic alteration of the present Soviet policy, provided that a firm
and united attitude on the part of the democratic nations against further Russian
aggression makes it clear that the men in the Kremlin are not all-powerful and
must substantially moderate their course.
Admittedly this is a gamble. It also admittedly means continuance at present
of the policy of the cold war in a divided world. This is the cruel and
ominous fact, even if we assume that the policy of which the North Atlantic
Pact is a part, is purely "defensive," which of course Americans would find it impossible to believe if conditions were reversed and Russians were entering into a military pact with Latin-American nations.

It is hoped—sincerely hoped by many who are as deeply troubled as we are—that this threat of possible resort to war against Russia will end the danger of war; but we need to face unflinchingly and honestly what are the instrumentalities with which the cold war is being waged. The adoption of the Atlantic Pact means continued stock piling of atomic and biological weapons, continuation of peacetime conscription, increase in the already colossal arms budget, building a world-wide spy network, maintenance of military bases around the world, and relaxation in military influence of education, science, industry, and commerce, to say nothing of the periodic waves of national hysteria without which none of these measures could be maintained.

The United States has already gone a long way down this road, and there is ominous likelihood that ultimately it will prove to be a disastrous road. We cannot believe that peace and righteousness will be found at the end if we keep traveling it. Mankind has tried these methods of military alliances and armament rivalries for many centuries. They have led to disaster in the past. Humbly we submit that to depend upon them for deliverance now, after two world wars and in face of the nature of modern war and the character of the weapons which it employs, reveals that men are no longer behaving rationally and have become morally calloused about the diabolical nature of the weapons which nations use today in the defense of their interests and in the pursuit of the values they cherish.

The dilemma in which thoughtful citizens, and especially Christians, now find themselves becomes more complicated and painful with each fresh crisis. It is always impossible to find a satisfying answer to the crisis of the moment taken in isolation. The next step toward ruin can always be made to seem inevitable in the light of the one preceding it; while each time the hope is held out that this will be the last such step and—desparingly—men grasp at that hope. For that very reason it will be a catastrophe of the first order if the American people and their leaders now allow themselves to be content with this one more step on the old road of power politics, armament rivalry, and cold war.

The hour is already very late. It is time to make a decisive turn, to take another and a better road. This means that the American people, as well as people everywhere, need a new sense of direction, a greater moral sensitiveness, a new faith and dynamic to drive out the feeling of helplessness which now holds them in thrall. Preeminently it is the Christian church upon which the responsibility rests to summon men and nations to cast away their self-righteousness and complacency; to call them to deep moral repentance; to allay the fears which are driving them to deeds of madness; and to release spiritual springs for cooperative attitudes and actions. It is for the Christian church, especially during this Lenten season, to speak the word of peace and reconciliation in the midst of strife, suspicion, fear, and hate.

Were the Christian church to utter such a distinctive word, and instead of supinely underwriting national policy set about creating a new spiritual climate, new political possibilities might very well. In God's providence, open up. The American people might give new expression to their generous impulses and turn to feeding and helping foe as well as friend; for so Jesus taught. Quietly and persistently they might practice righteousness and establish equality among all races in their own land, that the democratic way of life might become a shining reality and an example which all peoples might be enger to follow. The American people might then make clear to their Government their desire that American foreign policy should be based upon:

(1) Loyal support and consistent use of the United Nations and its instrumentalities.

(2) A ringing and persistent call therefore for the resumption of serious efforts to secure universal abolition of national military establishments at the earliest possible moment, as an evidence of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to dispel the dense fog of suspicion which now blocks all movement on the road to disarmament.

(3) Unremitting efforts to explore the possibilities of negotiating peace with the Soviet Government; and the use to that end, not of fear inspired by our arsenal of atomic weapons, which can only lead to counterarming, desperation, or a temporary sullen retreat, but of a resolute good will.

Penitently those who sign this statement confess that no less than others they have failed so to surrender themselves to the will of God and so to venture on
faith in the power of Christ as to enable the church, which is the body of that Christ, to speak peace to this weary and troubled age.

Men and women from various parts of the land, however, seeing to what extent human wisdom is frustrated and human power, turned upon itself, has been brought to naught, have asked us to call on Christian leaders and people to set apart a time for prayer and fasting, that our minds and hearts may be purified and wisdom may be given to our people and their Government in this critical hour. We are certain that these requests reflect a deep-seated feeling in the hearts of multitudes; and so we heed this exhortation to turn anew to the eternal source of wisdom and peace and to ask all our fellows to do likewise.

We trust that many churches and groups will be moved to set apart special periods for prayer and fasting, individual and corporate. All to whom this message comes will, we feel sure, wish to devote increasing time to daily prayer.

Charles F. Boss, Jr., executive secretary, World Peace Commission, Methodist Church; W. Russell Bowie, Union Theological Seminary, New York City; Henry J. Cadbury, Harvard University Divinity School, and Chairman American Friends Service Committee; Allan Knight Chalmers, Boston University School of Theology; Glenn Clark, author, Minnesota; Henry Hitt Crane, Minister of Central Methodist Church, Detroit, Mich.; Edwin T. Dahlberg, Minister of First Baptist Church, Syracuse, N. Y., recently Moderator of Northern Baptist Convention; Albert E. Day, Minister of Mount Vernon Place Methodist Church, Baltimore, Md.; Phillips P. Elliott, Minister of First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y.; E. A. Frindell, Foreign Secretary, American Baptist Foreign Missions Board; Georgia Harkness, Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill.; John Haynes Holmes, Minister of Community Church, New York; Charles W. Iglehart, Union Theological Seminary, New York; Paul S. Johnson, Boston University School of Theology; William E. Lampe, Secretary, Evangelical and Reformed Church (Philadelphia); John Howland Latrop, Minister of Church of the Savior, Brooklyn, N. Y.; D. P. McGenchy, Minister of First Presbyterian Church (U. S.) Clearwater, Fla.; Walter Mitchell, Retired Bishop of Arizona (Episcopal); Walter G. Muelder, Dean, Boston University School of Theology; William Stuart Nelson, Dean of Divinity School, Howard University, Washington, D. C.; Albert W. Palmer, Radio Preacher, Los Angeles, Calif., and former Moderator, Congregational-Christian Churches; Edwin McMullin Powell, Minister of First Baptist Church, Raleigh, N. C.; Paul Roberts, Dean of Christ Cathedral (Episcopal), Denver, Colo.; Paul Scherer, Union Theological Seminary, New York City; Glenn R. Phillips, Bishop (Methodist) of Denver, Colo.; Ernest Fremont Tittle, Minister of First Methodist Church, Evanston, Ill.; Gilbert Bowles, Allen Hackett, Leonard Oechsl, Phillip A. Solbjor, Edward L. Whittemore, Ministers in Honolulu, T. H.

The signers of this statement were acting as individuals in signing it. Their official connections are given merely for purposes of identification.

Dr. Elliott. Our chief concern—I am speaking now of the 31 men whose names are appended to this statement, all of them clergymen of various denominations, some of them teachers in theological seminaries—

Senator Donnell. Is it the intention of the gentleman to put the list of names in too?

Dr. Elliott. They are right with the statement.

The Chairman. That will be all right.

WORLD DIVISION

Dr. Elliott. Our chief concern, speaking of this group now that issued this statement on Good Friday, regarding the contemplated pact is that it accepts the principle of a divided world. Already people are talking of "our allies" and "our enemies." The great
conflict in economic and political philosophies of which the United States and the Soviet Union are the spokesmen is allowed by the pact to harden into a permanent pattern of division. Frontiers of thought become frontiers of armaments. The world is not one world but two, and never the twain shall meet.

Any statements regarding the defensive nature of the pact do not alter the hard, sordid truth that by it we are accepting for a long time to come a humanity which is broken and divided. Such a state of apartness creates the climate in which suspicion grows, small overt acts are greatly magnified, and war becomes increasingly conceivable. This is the more serious because of the hope which has been inspired by the United Nations. We all recognize its inadequacies, yet all have watched with eagerness its progress during these hard years of infancy. The name itself is appealing: “United.”

We know that for all groups of men it is true that “United we stand, divided we fall.” No amount of military implementation for a divided world can give to mankind the security which comes through even the simplest enterprises projected and accomplished on a world-wide united scale.

No phrases can be clever enough to obscure the fact that the principle of nations divided conflicts seriously and perhaps fatally with the principle of nations united in which the postwar world has been placing its greatest hope.

Many arguments have been and will be heard which reveal the dangers of this essentially military alliance, such as the danger that the power to declare war will, if not theoretically, at least practically, be taken out of the hands of Congress and given to those who are capable of swiftly moving military instrumentalities, the danger of the heavy outlay for arming the nations of Europe added to the already excessive budget for military purposes in our country, and constituting an almost unbearable economic burden; the increasing tendency to think and plan in military categories regarding world problems capable of eventual solution only on the basis of war. That is another danger in the pact.

LOSS OF WORLD LEADERSHIP

But the chief peril, and this is my concluding page in this statement, would seem to me to be the fact that such an alliance turns the thoughts and energies of our Nation away from the opportunity of its great leadership.

There are two Americas known throughout the world, as anyone who travels in Europe or Asia will testify. One is the America which is conscious of its power and conceited over its prestige and determined to use any means, however ruthless, to have its way. The Atlantic Pact is part of the program of such an America, vigorous, aggressive, and unyielding. The other America, known and loved throughout the world, is the generous America pouring out its bounty to those in any form of need in Europe or Asia, asking no return or reward for the sharing of the blessings which God has bestowed upon our Nation’s life.

We cannot permanently be both kinds of a country. We cannot lead both by force and by friendship. The issue which this pact presents.
to us will to a considerable degree determine the kind of America the world will know for decades, and perhaps for centuries, to come.

We can be proud of our economic and military power, but that pride will come at the cost of the affection of the peoples of the world. Or we can try to find our pride and our power, which lies in the spiritual leadership. We can propose and sponsor movements for steady disarmament among the nations. We can grasp every opportunity for dealing with the nations of eastern Europe as a man talks with a man, yielding no sacred convictions of our own but recognizing that the most sacred conviction which men can have is human brotherhood.

Nor need we wait until other nations take the lead before such overtures of peace are made. Many people talk as though our ethics could be no higher than the ethics of communism or of Russia. We say we will talk only the language that they will understand, so we talk the language of bombs and troops. Well, we have our own language. We need wait for no example of leadership to be set for us that we may timidly follow. Our country can lead. It has led in the past, and it must lead now, not in its great military capabilities but in its passion for unity, not in its skill in waging war but in its tenacity in waging peace; not in its power to arm half the world against the other half, but in the breadth of spirit which refuses to let any member of the family of nations be permanently outside the area of understanding and good will.

Such an attitude and such leadership by our Nation would be the greatest possible means and contribution which we could make toward lifting up the heart of the world today and giving it a confidence that men can live in abiding peace.

SUGGESTIONS FOR BASIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion let me call attention, on page 2, to the first paragraph and three practical suggestions:

The dilemma in which thoughtful citizens, and especially Christians, now find themselves becomes more complicated and painful with each fresh crisis. It is always impossible to find a satisfying answer to the crisis of the moment taken in isolation. The next step toward ruin can always be made to seem inevitable in the light of the one preceding it, while each time the hope is held out that this will be the last such step and—despairingly—men grasp at that hope. For that very reason it will be a catastrophe of the first order if the American people and their leaders now allow themselves to be content with this one more step on the old road of power politics, armament rivalry, and cold war.

The American people should make clear to their Government their desire that American foreign policy should be based upon:

(1) Loyal support and consistent use of the United Nations and its instrumentalities.

(2) A ringing and persistent call therefore for the resumption of serious efforts to secure universal abolition of national military establishments at the earliest possible moment, as an evidence of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to dispel the dense fog of suspicion which now blocks all movement on the road to disarmament.

(3) Unremitting efforts to explore the possibilities of negotiating peace with the Soviet Government; and the use to that end, not of fear inspired by our arsenal of atomic weapons, which can only lead to counterarming, desperation, or a temporary sullen retreat, but of a resolute good will.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask the witness this question: Being confronted as we are with a proposal to either sign or refuse to sign, that is, approve or refuse to approve, the North Atlantic Pact, what is your position? Are you advocating that the Senate approve the North Atlantic Pact or disapprove it?

Dr. ELLIOTT. Disapprove it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. Dr. Elliott, I assume you are the same gentleman, Dr. Phillips P. Elliott, Minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y.?

Dr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Senator DONNELL. And you have offered for the record the entire mimeographed statement on the Atlantic Pact which is signed by these various gentlemen, listed at the conclusion of it?

Dr. ELLIOTT. That is true.

Senator DONNELL. And as I understand, Mr. Chairman, that has been admitted, together with the names, into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you, Doctor.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Cadbury, how long will it take you?

Dr. CADBURY. Mr. Chairman, I will shorten my statement considerably—10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be very satisfactory. Go right ahead.

Dr. CADBURY. May I accept the assumption that the whole statement will be printed?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we will print your whole statement, and we are not pressing you to unnecessarily reduce it, but we are pressed for time.

Dr. CADBURY. I would rather read, and then, if there is time, make some further oral statements or answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY J. CADBURY, HOLLIS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, IN BEHALF OF THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

(Dr. Cadbury read excerpts from his prepared statement, but received permission to include complete statement, which reads as follows:)

STATEMENT BY HENRY J. CADBURY, HOLLIS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

My name is Henry J. Cadbury. I live in Cambridge, Mass. While I serve as chairman of the American Friends Service Committee, this morning I appear on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

No one can disagree with the objectives actually intended by the proponents of the North Atlantic Pact. They are the prevention of war between the western nations and Russia, and the increase of a sense of security in Europe that will enable the nations to accelerate their economic recovery.

The questions that every thoughtful American must ask are these: Is the pact likely to prevent war and increase confidence, or will it do precisely the reverse?
What other effects will it have—especially unfavorable effects? Are there not other important lines of foreign policy to be recommended as alternatives?

In his address before this committee on April 27, Secretary Acheson quite rightly declared that “while everyone wants peace, not everyone is prepared to work for it.” One might well add the question whether all those who are prepared to work for peace will work for it in the best way. Nations often stumble into war when they little want war.

Let me say briefly from what angle I approach this question. I am no professional strategist and I speak for no powerful organization. But the Religious Society of Friends (called also Quakers) has with a special detachment from the military philosophy watched for 300 years the recurrent failure of all political devices that aimed for lasting peace by relying upon military alliances, threats of preponderant force, and the accumulation of new and more deadly weapons.

On the other hand, as Quakers, we have observed and have tried to promote the decrease of tension. For on decrease of tension rather than on increase of armed might security really depends. That is because it means security for both sides and not for only one. Collective power that is unilateral, whatever its strategic assurance, tends always to create even in the minds of those who control it a psychological insecurity.

A second experience that I represent is the direct contact on the part of our relief workers, with the victims of war, in a person-to-person relationship after two world wars, in Europe both east and west and in Asia, both the Near East and Far East. We know something of their tragedy and hopelessness, of their genuine wish for peace. We know also the fears of many Europeans which, beside a fear of Russia, include a fear of America in spite of their natural gratitude and admiration for us. They find themselves caught between two great powers. They fear that rearming will replace recovery and that their limited manpower and slender resources will be directed from butter to guns due to unwise handling of the situation by the insensitivity of larger or smaller governments.

Obviously, there is no single nor simple step that will resolve the present power struggle that will give the world security from the expansive threat of totalitarianism and communism, or that will assure peace for a war-ravaged world.

The world must choose whether it is going to put its faith in military force and arms or in the processes of reason, of reconciliation, of government, of law. The basic question before the world now is whether military measures such as the North Atlantic Pact and the accompanying arms program can advance the security of peoples, can lead in the direction of one world, can overcome the threat of communism, and can preserve democracy.

We are pleading for an attitude of mind and a determination to make an alternative program work, which will give men more hope and security than subscribing to the outworn idea of military pacts. This process was described recently by one of America’s most thoughtful columnists, Thomas L. Stokes:

“The aim of the projected alliances is to preserve peace by arming ourselves all over the world. It is defensive, negative, and old as man, and has proved futile for centuries.”

We call instead for the most heroic efforts ever to be made by our country and the most dynamic leadership to be exerted by our Government for:

1. Seeking a series of settlements to end the cold war with the Soviet Union.
2. Pressing persistently and vigorously for universal reduction and limitation of armaments.
4. The development of universalism instead of military regionalism.
5. The use of American resources for healing and reconciliation rather than increasing reliance upon military power at home and abroad.

Let me speak briefly to each of these five points.

1. The United States should persistently seek a series of settlements to end the cold war with Russia.

I am sure all of us hope that the Berlin blockades will be lifted after all the delays and difficulties. That would be an auspicious beginning for further efforts to end disagreements on many matters between the east and the west. I do not underestimate the difficulties involved. They are due in part to a long series of moves and countermoves for many years past, to possible mistakes on both sides, and to deep and genuine ideological differences. Whatever else the
American Government does, it would be a mistake to build a policy solely upon distrust and to neglect a persistent and continuous effort in season and out to find solutions for situations which otherwise might tempt to aggression.

Again and again, in our work of relief and reconciliation, we Quakers have watched hostility yield to friendship—even on the part of those who with or without reason seemed least amenable to friendliness. We have had extraordinary experience also with cantankerous governments and with hard-boiled officials.

With all due precautions against deceptions and exceptions, we still believe that by and large among nations as between individuals there is, if we are skillful enough to find it, a language beside force that is understood, and an ultimate capacity for response to straightforward, patient, tolerant attempts at mutual understanding.

II. The United States should press for universal reduction of armaments

Historically military alliances have been neither effective nor successful ways of providing peace and security. They usually lead to counteralliances and countermeasures, with increasing insecurity. There can be no genuine security for the world with each side straining to achieve a preponderance of power. If we want a fundamental solution to the problem of security, it must be security not only for us and for our friends but for Germany and Russia as well.

The eighth paragraph of the Atlantic Charter signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill declared:

"They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

The United States has made what in many respects was a very generous offer in the Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy. Experts still argue over whether those proposals were adequate and whether the negotiations were carried on with the flexibility necessary for securing agreements. It is tragic for the world that on this matter negotiations have not yet succeeded. However, the United States has made no comparable proposals on the whole field of conventional armaments, nor a comprehensive counterproposai to the suggestion of one-third reduction made last fall by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Should not the United States campaign for an over-all disarmament program year in and year out as energetic and as unremitting as the State Department effort in behalf of the reciprocal trade agreements over a period of 15 years, or the campaign for the International Trade Organization over the past 3 years? Just because the achievement of disarmament is so difficult and complex the dedication and determination to achieve it is all the more imperative.

Let me call your attention to article 3 of the Atlantic Pact. It says:

"The parties * * will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Am I mistaken in thinking that the plain result of this is to forbid reduction in armaments for 20 years (art. 13), or at least for 10 years (art. 12)? I have known other treaties that failed to provide or encourage reduction in armaments. Does this one solemnly bind the members individually and collectively against reduction? Can this Foreign Relations Committee show me that article 3 is not susceptible to such interpretation?

III. The United States should give full support to the United Nations and the principle and practice of third party judgment

Is the North Atlantic Treaty, consistent with the United Nations—its Charter, its purposes, its budget, and its influence? In spite of repeated claims that the North Atlantic Treaty is consistent with the purposes and Charter of the United Nations, the treaty tends to overshadow and circumvent the UN in its procedures, expenditures, the sacrifices it asks and the loyalty it expects from its signatory nations. It enlarges the doctrine and possibilities of automatic war without advancing the authority of third party judgment and the certain jurisdiction of the United Nations. Is such a regional military alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty, negotiated entirely outside of the UN, really authorized in the Charter? Is the North Atlantic Treaty really consistent with article 1, article 55, and article 54 of the Charter?
However, the question which disturbs us most is this. Does the pact, in fact, deny UN jurisdiction on action regarding aggression?

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty binds each nation to assist any country attacked “by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert ***, such action as it deems necessary,” and requires that such measures will be reported to the Security Council and will be “terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

The signatories thus become the judges in their own case, decide when there is aggression and who is the aggressor, without any standards being laid down or any procedures defined. The so-called Atlantic Nations are free to act without mediation, and become the judges of the adequacy of the United Nations Security Council actions. Does not this destroy both the principle of third party judgment and the real jurisdiction of the United Nations?

As Alexander Stewart points out in Zion’s Herald, it is important to restrict rather than extend the area of conflict. He writes—

“An example of the successful use of the UN is the Palestine situation. A war in Palestine has recently been ended by negotiation. No one has suggested that we should have aviation or to have other nations enter the war and extend the area of conflict. Yet, under the proposed North Atlantic Pact, an attack on any signatory nation would be considered an attack on all of them and might involve them in war.”

The size and importance of the nations signing this agreement causes it to overshadow the United Nations, because the pact includes three of the five permanent members of the Security Council, all of the major colonial powers, and represents more than 50 percent of the world’s industrial capacity.

**UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES ON INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES**

Compare the proposed figures of $1,130,000,000 cash plus an undefined amount of equipment for armament abroad under the Atlantic Pact with the pathetically small investments which the United States makes in agencies of the United Nations. The following figures are budget requests for the next fiscal year from President Truman in his annual budget message to Congress; they have not yet been appropriated. Among these budget requests are:

- United Nations, including United States expenses: $18,115,200
- UNESCO, world education for understanding and peace: $3,720,400
- World Health Organization, fighting epidemics and disease: $1,320,000
- International Labor Organization, for all who labor: $848,000
- Food and Agriculture Organization, overcoming world hunger: $1,260,000
- Pan American Union, political and economic cooperation: $1,536,352
- Western Hemisphere

**WORLD EXPENDITURES ON UN AGENCIES**

The budget for the UN agencies for the year 1949 from 56 member governments adopted at the Paris Assembly last fall is as follows:

- Total budget for the United Nations: $83,499,587
- Additional for specialized agencies, International Labor Organization: $5,215,539
- Food and Agriculture Organization: $5,000,000
- UNESCO: $8,473,550
- International Civil Aviation Organization: $2,002,660
- World Health Organization: $5,000,000

**IV. The United States should promote universalism rather than military regionalism**

Just as one example, the United States is proposing to spend in 1 day on arming Europe as much as this country spends in 1 year on both the World Health Organization in a world-wide program for combating disease and epidemics and on the Food and Agriculture Organization designed to work out global solutions to hunger, malnutrition, and the equitable distribution of what the earth produces as food.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has been asked by various member governments or its conference or its council to undertake more than 300 projects in the field of its operations, but because of the lack of funds it can undertake only a fraction of them. This is only one example of the trickle of funds for the constructive purposes of building a world community and solving the basic
problems which cause war as over against the flood of money used for military purposes. When will the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Committees really take seriously their opportunity to provide more adequate support of international efforts through international agencies—financial, moral, and political?

I. The United States should use its resources for healing and reconciliation

Will not the military implementation of the treaty divert needed funds, resources, manpower, and scarce materials from recovery at home and abroad? At the present time it is said that the United States has embarked on the European recovery program designed to overcome some of the wholesale bombing and devastation and disruption of the war. There is no assurance yet that European economy will be soundly restored by 1952, since so much of their financial planning is based on more exports and less imports, and Europe cannot fully recover unless there is more mutual trade both within western Europe and between western Europe and eastern Europe, and between Europe and the United States.

While American taxpayers are striving themselves to pay the taxes for the European recovery program which was designed to overcome widespread undernutrition and to promote economic conditions essential to democracy, the Atlantic Pact program creates major competition in American foreign policy by setting up rearmament in order to recovery, and makes our foreign policy increasingly subservient to military policy. By implication the American people are asked to assume an unstated economic burden for an undetermined number of years in order to underwrite an economically unproductive arms race.

It is difficult enough to promote friendship through economic aid to other nations. Military alliances are more likely to create jealousy among nations included and enmity among those excluded than to build progressively closer the ties that really last.

It is a wide-open question whether the shipment of arms to Europe will endear us to the peoples of Europe. Can it be seriously argued that it has endeared us to the common people in Greece, Turkey, or China?

In regard to Norway, for example, the Worldover Press on April 15, 1949, reported from two sources in Norway that “although the Storting decided by a large majority that Norway should join the nations in the North Atlantic Pact, it is improbable that the people would support this action by anything like the same vote. Some observers even doubt there would be a majority at all.” This report goes on to cite various forms of opposition to the pact: (1) Opposition to the manner in which it has been put through without a more popular consultation; (2) opposition to present and future American bases in Norway by those who cannot believe this will not be a logical later step; (3) opposition to rearmament as a deterrent to a more real and permanent defense—economic recovery. The conclusion of the report reads: “Whether the elements opposing the pact constitute a majority, or a substantial minority, these are questions that the signing of the pact has not resolved. Norwegians in goodly number will watch developments with an anxiety not foreseen by those who find in the pact nothing but greater security for the people.”

In the American Friends Service Committee Newsletter for April 8, 1949, are some excerpts from a French article about the plight of some of the university students in France:

“You often hear, when you talk to French people, this startling remark. ‘The war was bad enough, my friend, but it was nothing compared to the years of peace we must pull through’ * * * Among those whose situation has become trule under the pressure of inflation are the university students, whose family income rarely goes above 30,000 and 40,000 francs a month * * * For students, even more than for other citizens, the struggle for daily life is a constant problem. A monthly allowance of 7,000 francs constitutes a complete scholarship; the so-called ‘minimum vital’ has been estimated at 14,500 francs. Very few families can provide that amount, which just covers one decent but cheap meal a day, rent, registration fees, a few books, and transportation * * *

“No one can wonder at the story told of a student who, at a dance, had for his partner the wife of a member of the American embassy. She mentioned dreams, by way of small talk. He said, ‘I often dream, but it is the same dream. I dream that I am no longer hungry.’”

And yet these students belong to the generation upon which the real future of Europe depends. Suppose this proposed billion and more a year were spent on the hungry minds and bodies of the youth of Europe upon whose strength and wisdom much of the fate of the world ultimately rests. What Europe needs more than any other one thing is healing and reconciliation.
Now let me turn from these five phases of an alternate program and raise briefly only a few of the questions regarding the implications of the pact itself. I cannot conceal my feeling that there are several ambiguous elements in the proposed pact coupled with its military sequel. It is recommended as having two purposes, both of them defended as desirable. We should not look upon either of them lightly. It is said that it will either prevent war, or give us and our friends a better chance to win a war. Any war, even if we win, will be a universal tragedy. Let us not acquiesce in a policy that talks with equanimity about another world war. The people of Europe do not do so. We have won two such wars already, and they have proved even with our victory colossal disasters. The only adequate program for the world today is the abolition of war itself.

The policy of attempting to prevent war primarily by deterring others through force is questionable practically and dubious morally. This we know not only from the study of international history but from experience in personal life. Wars apparently thus delayed by a show of force have frequently broken out in later fury. Or the threatened party has desisted from one enterprise in one area only to throw himself into another more subtle enterprise elsewhere. He is rarely enlightened or reformed by the process. Rather the reverse. The attack on war must be much more fundamental than an attack on attack.

There are also inevitable difficulties in any scheme which regards the prevention of war as merely the prevention of aggression. It has the moral difficulty of seeming to condone the same acts that it condemns if the latter merely precede in time the former. This scheme has the legal difficulty that it does not set up some neutral and authoritative judge who will pronounce with persuasiveness to all parties just when and by whom the aggression occurs. It has the psychological difficulty that what seems defense to one party is bound to seem aggression to another. There has never been found a way in which, with all the professions of innocence in the world, a military pact of any kind—call it defense, nonaggression, or collective security, or whatever you will—could convince an excluded party that it contained no menace.

For example, President Roosevelt once defined our attitude thus: "An attack becomes imminent as any base has been occupied from which our security has been threatened." No doubt we shall be judged in this matter by others as we judge them.

The present pact has all these difficulties and there is another purely military factor—that actual initiative and the prior use of aggressive weapons is coming to be so regarded by some military men and others as justifiable defense that the whole distinction between sheer aggression and deliberate forestalling of an expected attack dwindles away. Only so can America's defensive and nonaggressive professions be squared with the stock-piling of long-range and aggressive weapons. Permanent peace depends on the common intention of possible rivals to renounce both forms of military procedure—the initiative or aggression and the initiative of anticipatory defense.

To justify the treaty involves some versatility in argument. Let us take Norway. I happen to know that many Norwegians regard their membership in the pact as a danger and even those who reluctantly voted for it brought themselves to do so with the assurance that the United States will come to their rescue. But if one turns to the United States, we must assure them that the military defense of Norway is by no means categorically promised. No careful use of words can overcome the possible contradiction inherent in trying to satisfy always both of these parties. Insofar as the United States keeps itself uncommitted, Norway is running an uncompensated risk. Insofar as Norway's defense is legally or even morally assured by the pact, the United States is committed to engage in any war that involves Norway, no matter what irresponsible citizen of whatever nation on either side of the Iron Curtain might light the fatal fuse.

Again the treaty is declared both to be in accordance with the United Nations Charter as a regional arrangement (ch. VIII) and also to be necessary because the Security Council cannot operate against Russia vetoes. But article 53 of the same Charter says that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council." Hence, when it comes to enforcement, either article 53 of the United Nations Charter must be ignored, or the same action could have been taken through the United Nations, and much of the reason for bypassing the more inclusive organization disappears.

Another dilemma of the present situation is illustrated by the United States News of May 13, which speaks of Dean Acheson as a Secretary of State without
a crisis, comments: "He must talk peace to the Russians and, at the same

time, try to convince Congress that the Russians remain a menace, that ef- 

tective foreign policy still requires big appropriations."

While most of the speculation about the pact concerns its effect on Russia

and her satellites, let us consider its effect upon other nations. I may suggest 

some of these effects in a single sentence each:

Taking the world as a whole, the pact tends to accentuate and perhaps solidify

the present unfortunate though not quite concealed cleavage into two armed

camps.

Taking the members in the pact, it may give some cohesive value. But the very lack of real geographical or ideological unity—considering Italy as Atlantic, Algiers as noncolonial, and Portugal as democratic—weaken its rationale and its durability in the eyes of all concerned. As the Chinese proverb says:

"You can put two men in the same bed, but you can't make them dream the

same dream."

The tendency of the pact on neutral nations may well be to compel them to

choose one side or the other instead of encouraging them to exercise mediation

as a potential bridge between opposing blocs.

The tendency of the pact on colonial peoples may well be to substitute for

the respect which they may have had for American colonial policy a new

suspicion that we are arming and supporting imperialist mother countries and

thus permitting exploitation and subjection of other dark-skinned people than

our own.

The tendency of the pact on ourselves may well be to allow us to trust unduly

such a precarious instrument and to relax our effort along sounder lines—

political, economic, and cultural—to create in spirit as in name the United

Nations of the world.

In many ways, this last is the most serious objection to the treaty—and

includes them all. The treaty is only another move in the cold war when some-
th ing quite different is urgently needed. What is needed is a move in a com-
pletely different direction. I do not mean surrender or appeasement; I mean

energetic and imaginative and creative enterprise, something as new and as

ambitions in the field of statecraft as the Manhattan project was in the field

of warcraft. The ultimate and inclusive objectives cannot be reached all at once,

but the steps toward them must be much more consistent with them than is the

proposed policy of alliance against alliance, power against power.

No intelligent, no patriotic, no humane American can look with real satis-
faction upon the choice of the inferior alternative as embodied in the pact and

the arms program. Having repeatedly been lured into the game of power politics by the analogy of innocent police force or by its claim of lesser evil, he must inevitably have some uneasy doubts about those features of the pact which perpetuate these claims. The assurance to ourselves of our good inten-
tions and the axiomatic way in which military assumptions are uncritically

accepted should not, if we have learned anything from history, allay these doubts.

Instead I plead with you not to take the pact as though it were a fait accompli

or even the best under the circumstances. The Senate can still reject it, or

can amend its military menace with reservations, or can bring it closer in line

with true internationalism, or can replace it, in collaboration with our own

executive departments and other governments, by not one but many alternative

undertakings that will better commend themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. By "Friends" do you mean the Quakers?

Dr. CADBURY. I mean the Quakers; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On page 4 of your statement; what do you mean by "third party," somebody other than members of the group?

Dr. CADBURY. I mean where, when a person believes he is attacked by another person, to have the matter decided by a third party.
Dr. Cadbury. It does.

The Chairman. You would prefer to go along as we are going now?

Dr. Cadbury. No.

The Chairman. Rather than to undertake to do anything under the treaty?

Dr. Cadbury. It would be a mistake to adopt the treaty. It would be a mistake not to adopt the treaty and to do nothing very constructive, spectacular, and emphatic of a more constructive kind. It is possible to make two mistakes, and both of those would be mistakes.

The Chairman. Then we wouldn't do anything.

Dr. Cadbury. No, no. Reject the treaty and do a great deal.

The Chairman. We haven't the great deal at present before the committee. We are just dealing with the treaty. So your judgment is that we ought to reject the treaty.

Dr. Cadbury. And get going as fast as possible, so far as your particular committee can implement in the more constructive methods of not continuing but ending the cold war.

The Chairman. The Friends are against war, of course, are they not? The Quakers are traditionally against war?

Dr. Cadbury. And we have had 300 years to test our theory.

The Chairman. I say, you are traditionally against war?

Dr. Cadbury. The answer is “yes.”

The Chairman. For any purposes?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

The Chairman. Take the witness, Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Dr. Cadbury, I notice in the second paragraph of your mimeographed statement— which you did not read—

Dr. Cadbury. I am perfectly willing to be questioned about it.

Senator Hickenlooper. You used these words [reading]:

No one can disagree with the objectives actually intended by the proponents of the North Atlantic Pact. They are the prevention of war between the western nations and Russia, and the increase of a sense of security in Europe that will enable the nations to accelerate their economic recovery.

If those are the objectives of the pact, and if, as you say, no one can disagree with the objectives of the pact, then I take it that your objection to the pact is not the pact itself, or its adoption, but what you believe to be the possible implementation of the pact later, and its results, the results of the implementation.

Dr. Cadbury. Like the Secretary of State and others, members of this committee, I believe the two things go together, and my objection, as I say, is not to the purposes of the pact but it is because I frankly believe the pact will not promote those purposes.

Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask you this: If the pact were standing completely alone, and there was no proposal or no suggestion of any implementation of the pact, what would your attitude be toward the approval of the pact? I am assuming that it was just standing alone, as the pact now reads.

Dr. Cadbury. As the pact reads, it requires the parties to take forthwith such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore you would be against it?
Dr. CADBURY. I would be against the pact.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Even though you state that no one can disagree with the objectives actually intended?
Dr. CADBURY. Yes. I repeat that. I believe that the purposes of those who framed it were genuine, sincere, and desirable. I just do not think it will work.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have been trying to get your attitude where there was a division of attitude as between the two separate categories.
Dr. CADBURY. I do not think we can separate them.

SETTLEMENT WITH RUSSIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On page 2 you set out five steps. One is [reading]:

Seeking a series of settlements to end the cold war with the Soviet Union.

Do you contend that this country has not taken or made great efforts to bring about peaceful settlements of the peace treaties in Europe, peaceful settlements of disputes of territorial aggression, and Communist coups in various places of the world? Do you feel that we have not done much along that line?
Dr. CADBURY. I think we have done a good deal along that line. I think we have neutralized it by some other things we have done.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have in mind at the moment those other things that we have done that have neutralized it?
Dr. CADBURY. Yes. I think the cold war is a series of moves on both sides, not on one side alone.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you recall at the moment any original or affirmative move in the cold war that we have taken that has blocked peace; in other words a move that has not been taken to counter some other definite and positive move that Russia has previously made?
Dr. CADBURY. It may be that some of our sins are sins of omission.

DISARMAMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Your second classification or suggestion is [reading]:

Pressing persistently and vigorously for universal reduction and limitation of armaments.

Do you believe the United States has been less zealous along that line than other nations in the world in the past good many years, and even after World War II?
Dr. CADBURY. I think there have been several occurrences in the last 30 years when the United States has not joined heartily in such moves. You may be asking whether we have been more remiss than others. I do not think it is a question of whether we are more remiss, but whether we have been as active and earnest as we should have been.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Certainly you remember our program after World War I, and our destruction of naval units and our reduction of our armed forces down to somewhere in the neighborhood of only 100,000 in the whole United States jurisdiction.
Dr. CADBURY. I also recall the whole cold war.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I presume you recall also that after this war we recalled the overwhelming bulk of our troops back from foreign countries and discharged them back into civilian life, and we put away our guns and put our ships in moth balls, and things of that sort. Do you consider that not to be important steps toward disarmament and the direct reduction of armed forces?

Dr. CADBURY. If that were the whole story, that would make a good record.

**ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL**

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you recall without doubt our very strenuous efforts over more than 2 years' time to bring about a universal solution of the control of atomic weapons?

Dr. CADBURY. Yes. There was a short reference to it in my statement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In which we have offered to do what no other nation in the world has ever done so far as I know in history. We have offered to give up to an international control group this most powerful of all destructive weapons that has been developed up to date.

Dr. CADBURY. Yes; on our own terms we have offered that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But would you not agree that our terms are terms that safeguard the use of that weapon against being used for destructive purposes?

Dr. CADBURY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that is the only basis upon which we put it, that we must be sure, and the whole world must be sure, in giving up this weapon and this control, that the safeguards are ample to prevent its being used for destruction.

Dr. CADBURY. I agree with that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And would you also agree that we have made no progress whatsoever, apparently, in getting such assurances from Russia that will safeguard its use against destructive purposes?

Dr. CADBURY. That is where we have reached an impasse, an impasse that is not based on a difference in principle but on certain minor matters where both we and Russia have not gotten together.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you call "minor matters," Doctor?

Dr. CADBURY. Questions of timing, questions of inclusion of exclusion, questions as to the exact manner of inspection. Some of those are minor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I suggest to you that there are three elements in our proposal, three major elements? One is the creation of an international group which can take this over. The second phase is inspection of the resources and potential possibilities of each nation of the world, to which we have openly and freely repeatedly offered to accede, and the third phase is the ability of swift and adequate punishment or retaliation against any nation that attempts to violate the agreement on atomic energy.

I may call your attention to the first part, that so far as I know Russia is willing to agree to join a group and receive the information on atomic energy, but Russia will not and has—that is, up to this time—been adamant in refusing any kind of reliable inspection within Russia or her territories by the international group, a thing which
we are willing and ready to concede and to give. But she has ad­
amantly refused that inspection, and she has not accepted the principle of punishment or restraint, if you please, against those who would viol­
ate the terms of that agreement, and we are still maintaining our posi­
tion along that line. We have never withdrawn. Our proposition is still there.
So I wonder if you do not believe that we have made some most un­
usual gestures along that line in the interest of world peace and the reduction of armaments and the taking out of possible use the greatest de­structive weapon that has been developed up to this time.
Mr. CADBURY. I said in my statement [reading]:
The United States has made what in many respects was a very generous effort in the Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy. Experts will argue whether those proposals were adequate, and whether those negotiations were carried on with the flexibility necessary to securing agreements. It is tragic for the world that on this matter negotiations have not yet succeeded. However, the United States has made no comparable proposals on the whole field of conven­
tional armaments, nor a comprehensive counterproposal to the suggestion of one-third reduction made last fall by the representative of the Soviet Union.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any question in your mind but what the United States will gladly enter into arms reduction, depend­
ent only upon the assurance and the proof that the other nations are doing likewise?
Dr. CADBURY. No. I think they will. I am urging that they should continue to make even more earnest efforts in that direction.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you advocate the United States giving up substantially all of its armaments before any other nation does likewise, as a gesture of good will?
Dr. CADBURY. I think we can afford to go ahead of other nations, and I would only recommend the more radical proposal if I thought the United States had the spiritual backing behind it which that would require. I wish it had.

SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No. 3 in your classification refers to
[reading]:
Is it possible that you are minimizing the tremendous leadership that the United States gave toward the formation of a United Na­
tions, without which there could have been no United Nations?
Dr. CADBURY. No. At each point you are quite right. I am not minimiz­ing. I am asking for a maximum.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it a small contribution when the United States is contributing some approximately—well, better than 40 per­
cent of all of the cost and expenditures of the United Nations and its various specialized organizations?
Dr. CADBURY. Perhaps it is not very much out of proportion to our advantages.

USE OF VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The question of third-party judgment that has been set up within the United Nations has been agreed to by the
United States. But I think you are well aware that 30 times Russia has used the veto in the Security Council against every substantial effort to preserve peace or to settle the affairs of the world, the international affairs of the world peacefully. Do you defend the Russian use of the veto 30 times in the United Nations?

Dr. CADBURY. The Russian use of the veto is entirely legal. The use of majority is another legal method. When we are in the majority we use the majority method. If we were in the minority, we would use the minority method, just like the President of the United States. He has the use of the veto. When does he use it? He uses it when he is in the minority. He does not use it when he is in the majority, when he has enough to go with him. The use of the veto, therefore, is no indication of morality. The President does not change his morals when he loses the majority and starts using the veto.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think probably I could agree with the general philosophy about the veto, that the use of the veto per se designates nothing immoral. But the continuous and repeated use of the veto by Russia 30 times since the formation of the United Nations and its operation, 30 times against the efforts that evidently have been made toward settling the affairs of the world peacefully, would seem to me to be accumulative evidence that good will called for some criticism.

Dr. CADBURY. I cannot quote the figures, but isn’t it true that nearly half of those refusals had nothing to do with war or peace, but had to do with the admission of this friend or that friend?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that the admission of nations into the United Nations Organization might have a great deal to do with war or peace.

Dr. CADBURY. It might.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I think it certainly has a great deal to do with the philosophy of the United Nations, and the inclusion of people who would band together to add greater strength to an international organization.

I merely mention that because it seems to me that your statement is replete with the criticism of the shortcomings of the United States and you are casting a great deal of blame for the world situation upon what you believe to be our failure in taking steps to encourage the peace of the world. [Reading:]

4. The development of universalism instead of military regionalism.

UNIVERSALISM VERSUS REGIONALISM

Is it your belief, Doctor, that anybody in the Congress of the United States—I am speaking comparatively, and there might be one or two, I don’t know, out of 500-some Members—I am speaking of the practically universal opinion and desire of the Members of the Congress of the United States that we have war, that the country be plunged into war. Do you believe that that is the opinion of the overwhelming number of the Members of the Congress?

Dr. CADBURY. I am sorry; I did not get one word in your statement.

Plunged into—

Senator HICKENLOOPER (reading):

The development of universalism instead of military regionalism.
I am asking you, or do you not believe—perhaps I should put it in a leading way of that kind—that to all intents and purposes the universal desire of the Members of Congress of the United States is to keep this country out of war?

Dr. Cadbury. Certainly.

Senator Hickenlooper. And therefore that these regional arrangements probably have been developed in desperation because other means of peaceful settlement just have not been successful in settling these great issues?

Dr. Cadbury. Do you mean the Russian use of the veto?

Senator Hickenlooper. The Russian use of the veto, the Berlin blockade, the Communist coups in the Balkans, and the items of coercion and control that communism has in its expansion in those areas saddled upon people and that we have tried to prevent as much as we could. Would you believe that we feel that this way may be a step that is indicated because other steps such as argument and persuasion and principles of morality and attitudes of morality have failed?

Dr. Cadbury. I think that is the intention, but I think it is a very unwise step. Do you want me to give an illustration?

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Dr. Cadbury. A friend of mine's wife had a minor infection. She went to a doctor. The doctor gave her a drug. The result of the drug was it gave her a very serious over-all disease. She went back to the same doctor. He gave her another drug. In each case the drug cured the thing that they went for, but it produced, finally, in her, a complete nervous break-down. Now, by that time, having tried the military method once or twice, I think I would change doctors.

Senator Hickenlooper. Of course, I do not question your illustration, but I question the value of its use because it is so palpably, as someone used the other day, a miniscule occasion in the great field of medicine, where the overwhelming, almost universal use of specifics has proven so successful that it is beyond argument, so I do not agree with your condemnation of just one drug.

MILITARISM AND THE TREATY

But you say we have tried militarism. May I go back to World War I? Germany was known to be a growing, building aggressor under the Kaiser. Isn't that true, prior to World War I?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. England did not have a strong military establishment.

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. France did not have a strong military establishment.

Dr. Cadbury. England had a fleet.

Senator Hickenlooper. And France did not have a fleet, and yet their failure to arm themselves to a proper degree to meet this known and growing aggression was almost disastrous.

Dr. Cadbury. I remember that the President, in dealing with this pact, called attention in these words [reading]:

It is a simple document, but if it had existed in 1914 and in 1939, supported by the nations which are represented here today, I believe it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led us into two world wars.
There was a pact, a defense pact, with Belgium. Hitler attacked Belgium—an "armed attack," using the words of this text here. Was that any good, that pact? Isn't it characteristic of aggressors that promises to go to the defense of an armed attack are ignored by aggressors?

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But is it not well known that at the time Hitler attacked neither Great Britain nor France nor any other country touching Hitler's Germany at that time was in any reasonable degree prepared to resist Hitler's attack for even a short period of time, and so he felt perfectly free and safe to commit his depredations? Do you think that had he known that he would have met in his aggression a tremendous force that might defeat him and stop him that he would have jumped so quickly?

Dr. CADBURY. I haven't much respect for the intelligence of would-be aggressors. I do not believe they are easily deterred by that sort of thing. Every act of aggression in recent years has been the same.

I see behind you on the board a place where all the Atlantic countries are blacked out. Didn't Japan know at the time of Pearl Harbor that practically all those countries would come in against her, not to mention some which do not show on the map—Australia, India, and China? Did that restrain attack?

This philosophy that the threats of force prevent aggressors does not reckon with the psychological facts about aggressors.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At the time I don't like to get into the philosophy of that, because I do not know what Japan thought at the time. I am not qualified to speak about what went on in the Japanese mind. But certainly Japan knew at the time of Pearl Harbor that we had nothing in the Pacific that could stop her expansion in the Pacific, and later events showed that we had no sufficient force in the Pacific or any other place to adequately cope with Japan. We had to build it and we had to create it out of our resources and our industry, so Japan felt for at least a long period, I am sure, reasonably safe and immune from retaliation, during which she could consolidate her positions out there, and I think events showed that.

Dr. CADBURY. May I go back to your statement about 1914, and the pact with Belgium. It was Sir Edward Grey, Premier of Great Britain, who appealed to this pact to resist the attack of Germany upon Belgium. Now, Sir Edward Grey later said this about the cause of that war. He did not say anything about England's being disarmed. What he said is this [reading]:

More than one true thing may be said about the causes of the war. But the statement that comprises most truth is that militarism and the armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable. Armaments were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation. That was the justification put forward in defense of that. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred. It is hardly too much to say that between nations it stimulates all that is bad and it depresses all that is good. One nation increases its armament and makes strategic railways toward the frontiers. The next nation increases its armaments. The first nation says it is only precaution, only very reasonable. The second nation says its preparations also were only precautions, and points out with some cogency that the first nation began the competition. And so it goes until the whole continent is an armed camp covered with strategic railways and munition preparation.
The lesson of European history is so plain. It is that no enduring security can be found in competing armaments and in separate alliances. There is no security from any power unless it be a security in which its neighbors have an equal share.

For the sake of the record, that is from Twenty-five Years: 1892 to 1929. Viscount Grey is the author.

ARMAMENTS AND SECURITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are two conditions of security, reasonable security, in which each side can have an equal share. One would be the security of completely no armaments at all on the part of any nation. I think that would give a reasonable degree of security, as much as you could have, in which each nation would share, because they would both equally be unarmed. Another degree of security, whether it resulted in security or war or not, but a feeling of security, would be where both nations were armed equally well. I mean each nation that was equally armed with the others would have a sense of security. It might result in war; I don’t know.

But we face the situation today where one nation is tremendously armed—Russia. I do not know whether anyone knows how many troops they have under arms and on the borders and through the Balkans, but they are in the millions. We know that they have not stopped their war preparations. We know from their declarations that world domination is their goal, and we know that war is their means, if necessary, to attain that world domination, and while I think none of us, or all of us, share equal zeal for peace, yet what kind of a situation faces us where we have a declared aggressor who is tremendously armed and who is maintaining his armed strength, and we, on the other side, are watching that aggression grow and its purposes develop without any ability to meet it and without any strength to meet it unless we get to the point where we can say to the aggressor, “You will be met with force, the combined force, moral, physical, and otherwise, of the freedom-loving nations if you complete armed attack.”

We seem to find ourselves in that position today. We have tried peaceful means, certainly. We have offered to give and we are giving: I think we have given some $24,000,000,000 toward the humanitarian and economic readjustment of Europe. I do not think we have been cheap about it. But we have come to the point where we must unite our strength, I believe, to assure any aggressor that we are going to maintain the principles for which we think we have made great sacrifices.

I do not know what the answer is. I think we have tried turning the other cheek, repeatedly, and we have lost ground.

Dr. CADBURY. Senator, it would take me a good while to express the points at which I agree and the many points with which I disagree with your analysis, and even if your analysis were completely correct, the problem we have to deal with is whether it seems that way to Russia. Does Russia think we are completely disarmed, that we have a very feeble fleet, that we have no stock pile of weapons, that we are not spending much money on our military equipment? I take it from you that we are not. You ought to know whether we are or not. But I do not believe Russia has the same opinion.

Our problem is not a problem of facts but of psychological reactions.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. How would you break through the iron curtain to get the Russian people to follow humanitarian philosophies?

Dr. CADBURY. That is a tough question, and the reason it is tough is not what is happening today but what has happened for the last 30 years.

Our committee, the Quakers, were in Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution. We stayed in Russia longer than any foreign agency. We have been trying to get into Russia ever since the end of the war. We have succeeded in getting into the satellite countries—Finland, Poland, and Hungary. We are working and have been working for years in China. And if you ask me on which side of the line we are working, I will have to say that the line moves and we stay still. The center of our work, Chunglu, has changed hands five times. We have had some experience, then, behind the iron curtain. And we would like to increase that experience. We think that, as we deal with the common people and as we are known not to be of a menacing character because of our beliefs, we can make contacts with Russian officials, that we can at least make a little headway toward piercing the iron curtain.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dr. Cadbury, I want to say this in all sincerity, and I am not trying to get into any philosophical discussion with you here, necessarily, because you probably would beat me all to pieces on that kind of an argument. I have vast respect for your ideas.

Dr. CADBURY. I have no desire to make points in debate, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to say this, that there is no organization for whom I have a higher regard for its self-sacrifice, for its idealism, than the Friends organization. I believe that no organization has written a finer record of contribution to the relief of human suffering going into all parts of the world and doing a great humanitarian job than your organization. I have nothing but the highest respect for it.

But we are dealing in a pretty practical world, where the logic of men’s minds doesn’t always rule the physical action of their bodies or of communities. Now here is your great organization which, as much as any organization, has proved its selflessness; that is, so far as doing things for other people are concerned. As you say, you have been behind the iron curtain, your group. You have been in China. But after thirty-some years of proof of your good offices and your good work you cannot get behind the iron curtain again today, when I am safe in saying, I am sure, that there is no evidence that anybody could remotely produce that your organization has ever done anything ill to anyone behind the iron curtain, and on the contrary has done much good to human beings behind the iron curtain. Yet you can’t get back there as you would, and you can’t have the entree to reach men’s minds back there and get them to see what you and I probably commonly agree would be the sound philosophy of humanity.

Dr. CADBURY. It is tragic that we cannot get through.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And therefore I say that so far as I am concerned, I think every member of this committee and of the Senate is as earnestly and zealously looking for peace as the rest of the American people. But I think it is a point that when a great organi-
zation such as yours, with a tremendously fine record of unselfish contribution and sacrifice on the part of not only your organization but the people who make it up in foreign lands, when your long and splendid record of humanitarian conduct right on the ground itself, among the people, where they can see you every day; when your organization cannot receive the acceptance and those things behind the iron curtain I wonder if it is not just infinitely more difficult for nations that move in great matters and not always with the same particular approach to settle these questions almost overnight by peaceful philosophy, and I wonder if it isn't sound that we will have to take the next best method of assuring the preservation of peace as nearly as we can, and that is to say, "Well, we will have peace if we have to fight for it. We will have principles of right retained in this world if we have to fight for it. We don't want to, but we will if we have to, and we have tried."

Dr. Cadbury. May I make a reply to that, sir?

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, indeed.

EFFORTS TO PIERCE THE IRON CURTAIN

Dr. Cadbury. One reason why our organization finds it difficult to get behind the iron curtain is that we are identified, in spite of ourselves, with an American foreign policy which is regarded in Russia as hostile. They believe that America is trying to spy in Russia.

Now, then, we are not entirely unsuccessful. Such moves as we have made with the consent of the State Department to send people into Russia have met with a good deal of encouragement from the Russian side. But as has happened two or three times in recent years, when we felt that we were making some headway, I know it takes patience and I know it is not a matter of turning the cheek once but of probably turning it 77 times, and then some act on the part of the American Government, some irresponsible statement by a statesman, comes to the ears of the Russian Government, and you can be sure that nothing is said that they don't know. They know what the Quakers think of the Atlantic Pact. They knew it before you knew it, though you both might have guessed alike. And therefore we are handicapped.

All I am suggesting is that some parallel action on a spectacularly generous scale be made by the American Government.

Now, just one instance; I had the pleasure a year and a half ago of going to Oslo to receive, on behalf of the American Friends Service Committee, our share of the Nobel peace prize. When I went there I said to the people of Norway, "We would like to use this money as a gift to the needy in Russia, as a gesture of good will from the American people to the people of Russia." And the committee that awarded the prize, to whom I spoke privately, said, "That would suit us excellently."

Well, I came home. We had a talk with the Russian Government and we said to them, "Is there anything you would like to have as a gift?"

They thought a while, and they said, "We find it almost impossible to get streptomycin for the tubercular children in our children's homes."

We said, "We will try to get it."
They said, "We cannot get an export license for it ourselves."

We went to our Government here. We asked for $25,000 worth of streptomycin to be sent by us as a gift to Russia. We got the permission. We sent the streptomycin. It was distributed where they said they would distribute it, among the children, tubercular children, in their children's hospitals. We received a very friendly letter of acknowledgment from the Russian Red Cross.

That money was not the Nobel prize money. We are now in negotiation with the Russian Government, asking them whether they would be willing to receive a second such gift. And we hope that that will come through also.

Now, I find it difficult to think of parallel gestures to that, ridiculously small considering the need in Russia, that have been made either by private non-Communist organizations or by the American officials, officials of Government, of a similar character.

I do not boast about this. I merely suggest it as an indication that there may be some things that we are not doing, or not doing on the scale that ought to be done; and also I am suggesting that we ought to be very careful that this policy of attempted friendship is accompanied by this policy of attempted friendship for Russia.

LEND-LEASE CONTRIBUTION

Senator Hickenlooper. I also recall the United States furnishing $11,000,000,000 worth of lend-lease materials, some of them munitions of war, a great deal of it food, and considerable clothing and medicine, to Russia over some years, for which we received no credit in Russia and no understanding by the Russian people of the American intentions and good offices and good wishes toward their success. I will say practically none. I guess some information may have percolated.

Dr. Cadbury. I also recall that the brunt, a good deal of Hitler's campaign, was borne by the Russian people; that, according to General Marshall, the Russian people lost more in housing, in manpower, both civilian and military, in proportion to their number than any one of the belligerent nations.

Senator Hickenlooper. I recall that they lost a good deal in life and property in the war. I was not referring to that, nor was I attempting to discuss their contribution to the war in one way or the other. I merely mentioned that we had given them $11,000,000,000 in lend-lease material for which even the $11,000,000,000 that I personally believe was the weight in the scales that tipped them toward victory, for which there was no acknowledgment.

Dr. Cadbury. We gave money and they gave their lives and their own homes. We both were contributing to a common cause and I am not prepared to make comparisons.

Senator Hickenlooper. The only thing I am saying is that the tremendous contribution that we made to them in medicine, clothing, munitions, and things that they needed to win their end of it, to win their end of the battle over there, those things, we have not been given any general credit for in Russia, and I think that the contributions which we might make have to be realized and appreciated by the people of Russia in order to orient their minds in the direction of cooperation with the people that they do not believe are going to fight them. But if we cannot get that down to the Russian people, if we cannot get it in
their minds, in some degree, we are treading a very dangerous path meanwhile, if the policies of the Politburo are permitted to go on as they have already declared their policy to be.

I think, Doctor, we could probably argue this thing all day and probably agree on a good deal of it and disagree on procedures. I think the end result we could thoroughly agree on. The road down which we should travel to get to that result we might disagree on.

I certainly have appreciated your contributions this morning and I appreciate the great sacrificial efforts you are making to relieve suffering over the world. But I again say it is significant that with all the great deeds you and your people have done in those countries the evident difficulty that you have in getting acceptance by those countries now ought to indicate the difficulties that we have to face.

Dr. Cadbury. We are aware of the difficulties perhaps better than you are, from first-hand contact. I am not wanting praise.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have taken such a long time here. I have enjoyed visiting with the doctor. I suppose I should confine myself to a few questions and quit visiting with him.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

PREVENTION OF WAR AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator Donnell. Professor Cadbury, Senator Hickenlooper called to your attention the second paragraph on the first page of your mimeographed copy, which reads [reading]:

No one can disagree with the objectives actually intended by the proponents of the North Atlantic Pact. They are the prevention of war between the western nations and Russia, and the increase of a sense of security in Europe that will enable the nations to accelerate their economic recovery.

I ask you, Professor Cadbury, whether or not the next paragraph, which is short, of your mimeographed statement reads as follows:

The questions that every thoughtful American must ask are these: Is the pact likely to prevent war and increase confidence, or will it do precisely the reverse? What other effects will it have, especially unfavorable effects? Are there not other important lines of foreign policy to be recommended as alternatives?

That was the next paragraph of your statement?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Professor, you were asked by Senator Hickenlooper whether or not in view of your non-disagreement with the objectives intended by the proponents of the North Atlantic Pact you would be favorable to the pact if it stood alone, without implementation. I ask you, Professor, is it not true that the North Atlantic Pact in at least three places contemplates implementation; first, article 5, to which you referred; second, article 3, which reads:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack—

and third, the concluding sentence of article 9, which sentence reads:

The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Am I not correct in my statement?
Dr. Cadbury. I believe it is in the text.

NORWAY'S INCLUSION IN THE PACT

Senator Donnell. Now, professor, you did not read all of your text. You spoke about being in Norway. Would you be kind enough to turn to page 6 of your statement, in which you refer as follows, to an article in the Worldover Press which appeared 11 days after the signature here in Washington of the pact. You say [reading]:

In regard to Norway, for example, the Worldover Press on April 15, 1949, reported from two sources in Norway that “Although the Storting decided by a large majority that Norway should join the nations in the North Atlantic Pact, it is improbable that the people would support this action by anything like the same vote. Some observers even doubt there would be a majority at all.

This report goes on to cite various forms of opposition to the pact [reading]:

(1) opposition to the manner in which it was put through without a more popular consultation; (2) opposition to present and future American bases in Norway by those who cannot believe this will not be a logical later step; (3) opposition to rearmament as a deterrent to a more real and permanent defense—economic recovery. The conclusion of the report reads: “Whether the elements opposing the pact constitute a majority, or a substantial minority, these are questions that the signing of the pact has not resolved. Norwegians in goodly number will watch developments with an anxiety not foreseen by those who find in the pact nothing but greater security for the people.”

You have given us that as a quotation from the Worldover Press. That is correct, is it?
Dr. Cadbury. That is right.
Senator Donnell. What is the Worldover Press?
Dr. Cadbury. It is an international news agency.
Senator Donnell. Do you regard it as of a reliable nature?
Dr. Cadbury. Yes; and furthermore, in this particular case I am in constant correspondence with people in Norway, members of the Society of Friends or Quakers and others, so that I quoted it because it stated well what I could have said in my own words.

Senator Donnell. In other words, you concur with the statements of fact and the views expressed in this quotation from the Worldover Press issued 11 days after the signature of the fact here in Washington?
Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

RESTRICTING THE AREA OF CONFLICT

Senator Donnell. I call to your attention one further quotation which appears at page 4 of your mimeographed statement, and which portion you did not read [reading]:

As Alexander Stewart points out in Zion’s Herald, it is important to restrict rather than extend the area of conflict. He writes, “An example of the successful use of the UN is the Palestine situation. A war in Palestine has recently been ended by negotiation. No one has suggested that it would have been better to have other nations enter the war and extend the area of conflict. Yet, under the proposed North Atlantic Pact, an attack on any signatory nation would be considered an attack on all of them and might involve them in war.”
Do you concur with the observations made by the writer, Alexander Stewart?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

Senator Donnell. What is Zion’s Herald?

Dr. Cadbury. It is an interdenominational newspaper published in Boston.

Senator Donnell. Do you regard it as of a reliable nature?

Dr. Cadbury. It is as reliable as the individual author. I regard Mr. Stewart as a competent observer of international affairs; and furthermore, our committee happens to be involved in the relief of refugees in Palestine, and had considerable knowledge of the situation in Palestine; although they were there in a purely nonpolitical way, we cannot help but observe the movement of political forces and the effectiveness of the UN agencies, and other factors.

Senator Donnell. And you agree with the general point that he makes, that in Palestine there was a situation in which war existed, yet it was ended by negotiation, and in the further point which he makes, that under the North Atlantic Pact, an attack on any signatory nation would be considered an attack on all of them and might involve all of them in war. You concur with that observation?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

Senator Donnell. So you believe that the statement made by Mr. Stewart in Zion’s Herald is well founded both in fact and in argument; is that correct?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes.

MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Senator Donnell. Professor, you spoke of your committee. Has your Committee on National Legislation, for which I understand you to appear, authorized your appearance here today?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes. They invited me to appear on their behalf.

Senator Donnell. Do you mind telling us very briefly approximately how many persons are on that committee and how widely distributed they are?

Dr. Cadbury. It is the organization representing the Society of Friends in America in the field of national legislation. The Society of Friends in America is organized into about 30 yearly meetings. Each yearly meeting appoints representatives to the committee.

Senator Donnell. And the Friends Committee on National Legislation is how large a body and how widely distributed?

Dr. Cadbury. I will ask the secretary to answer that accurately.

Mr. E. Raymond Wilson (executive secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation). The membership of the general committee is about 135 individuals from coast to coast. Its constituency is about 100,000 in the Society of Friends. We have distributed nearly 30,000 copies of this pact. There has been one member of our committee that has expressed his support of the pact; the others have either indicated their strong disapproval or have not notified us of any dissent.

Senator Donnell. That is one member out of how many?

Mr. Wilson. One hundred and thirty-five.

Senator Donnell. Now, professor, I want to ask you also this question, just about yourself.
ATTITUDE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

The Chairman. You do not mean to say that all the other 134 are against the pact? You simply mean that one man indicated he was for it. How many indicated they were against it?

Mr. Wilson. We discussed the theory in principle of regional pacts for nearly 3 months when we adopted our annual statement of policy in January, and went on record then opposed to the general principle of regional military alliances.

The Chairman. Before this treaty was submitted?

Mr. Wilson. Before the final text was available.

The Chairman. You said a minute ago you wrote all 135 of them and one said he was for it. How many said they were against it?

Mr. Wilson. There has been no further dissent, either on our general committee or on our executive committee, in the opposition of the committee to the pact.

The Chairman. I know. You said you wrote all 135. One wrote in that he was for it. How many wrote in that they were against it?

Mr. Wilson. I can't give the exact number, sir.

The Chairman. You have given the others. Why can't you give that?

Mr. Wilson. I do not recall. We have discussed this.

The Chairman. I am not talking about discussing it. You said you had written all 135. One man was for it, but you made no response as to how many wrote in saying they were against it, and you do not know now.

Mr. Wilson. I should say the majority.

The Chairman. Wrote in and said they were against it? I wish you would check that. I think it is a little peculiar that you should know so accurately one side and not have accurate information on the other side.

Mr. Wilson. I guess the Senate has the experience that oftentimes people express opposition to a measure when they do not express their support of a measure.

Senator Donnell. Would you be kind enough, as Senator Connally suggested, to check into that and furnish to this committee, if it meets the approval of Senator Connally, which I assume it does, the information as to how many, in response to your inquiry, voted for it, how many voted against it, and how many were silent? Will you do that?

Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION,


Senator Tom Connally,

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

United States Capitol, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Connally: In response to your request at the hearings on the North Atlantic Pact for details regarding the attitude of members of the Friends Committee on National Legislation on the pact, I am sending for the record the information for which you asked.

The annual statement on legislative policy of the committee, adopted January 6, 1949, contained the following paragraph on the North Atlantic Pact:

"We oppose (1) attempts to form a North Atlantic Security Pact and other proposals for armed alliances in the guise of regional arrangements under the United Nations, because these, we believe, will further solidify the existing divisions in the world instead of reducing these divisions and fostering the unity
necessary for peaceful cooperation; (2) establishment of bases in, or a military alliance with, Spain; (3) efforts to misdirect the Benelux agreements into a military alliance; (4) the building of military bases in former mandated and colonial areas; (5) the policy of attempting the containment of Russia by military pressure, because it bypasses the United Nations and retards the development of security through truly international action.

The entire statement had been circulated in advance to the 120 members of the general and executive committees which make up the Friends Committee on National Legislation for their comments and criticism.

The annual statement as finally adopted tried to take into account suggestions and dissent so far as possible so that it might represent as closely as possible the thinking of the committee. The statement was then discussed in detail at the annual meeting and adopted with some dissent on a few items.

As you know, the Quaker business procedure is to seek as far as possible general concurrence and not to adopt statements by majority vote or coercion of a minority.

Unfortunately, due to our extremely limited filing space, the correspondence on this statement was destroyed after the document was finally edited by the editing committee and printed for distribution. We do not have a record of the exact number who wrote in approving the statement or expressing dissent, but I recall no objection at that time to the section quoted above.

On April 12, the executive committee met and discussed the implications of the pact as published. There was no opposition expressed to the position taken at the annual meeting.

In order to give you as accurate a picture of the present thinking of the committee as possible, in response to your question, I sent a letter on May 12 to each member of the executive and general committees, asking them to let us know their present attitudes on the pact and the accompanying arms program, since the text of the pact had been published and the discussion is now underway in the country.

The committee is scattered from Maine to California, so that there has not been time for complete and full response, but of the replies received to date, out of 120 members, the following tabulation summarizes the replies received from 76 members:

Opposed to the North Atlantic Pact, 69; opposed to accompanying arms program, 76; in favor of the North Atlantic Pact, 7; in favor of accompanying arms program (with some reservations), 1.

Sincerely yours,

E. Raymond Wilson.

Senator Donnell. Now, Professor Cadbury, will you tell us, please, whether or not there has been any authorization for you to appear, which authorization was granted after the signature of the pact was effected, April 4.

Dr. Cadbury. The committee asked me to appear in case it was signed.

Senator Donnell. When did the committee so ask you to do that?

Dr. Cadbury. There was a shift. Mr. Pickett was asked to speak and then the doctors said his health did not permit it, and they came back to me and asked me again after it was signed.

Senator Donnell. So after it was signed this committee you are talking about now, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, requested you to appear in opposition to the pact?

Dr. Cadbury. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. Have you given us today what you understand to be the substance of the views of the Friends Committee on National Legislation with respect to the pact?

Dr. Cadbury. Yes, and not only so, but since that is a partly delegated committee, as representing the views of the Society of Friends throughout America.
I may say that of these 28 annual meetings, 4 have been held in the last month or two, only 4, and all 4 of those independently and without prodding or urging from any central committee have gone on record as opposed, completely opposed, without any reservations opposed to the Atlantic Pact.

I am not sure I can lay my hands on it, but I will be perfectly glad to put in the record a sample of one of those resolutions.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman, may I have leave to request Professor Cadbury to furnish to the committee within the next 5 days—can you do it that quickly—copies of all official actions that have been taken since, we will say, the 1st of October of 1948 up until and including the present date, by your organization or any department or committee of it with respect to the Atlantic Pact?

The Chairman. Let me say to the Senator that I do not object to putting some of it in, but I think it would encumber the record and be rather a burden to put in all transactions.

Dr. Cadbury. There are only two short statements. They are joint statements.

(The statements referred to are as follows:)

Baltimore Yearly Meeting of Friends, April 2, 1949.

Statement on the North Atlantic Pact

From its earliest days the Society of Friends has held that war is contrary to the spirit, the life, and the teachings of Jesus, who renounced the weapons of worldly passion and replaced them by methods of love and self-sacrifice.

We reaffirm our conviction that no plea of necessity or policy, however urgent, can release either individuals or nations from their duty to follow the law of love. If war is to be abolished, the spirit from which war proceeds must be eliminated and the beginnings of strife must be as carefully guarded against between nations as between individuals. To give occasions of offense or jealousy to people or governments of other countries, whether by the accumulation of armaments or by a hostile attitude, is not only a violation of this law of love but contrary to the best interest of all nations.

History has shown that military preparedness, rather than preventing war, is actually conducive to it.

The spirit and the letter of the North Atlantic Pact is contrary to our Quaker principles and beliefs. We feel it will not end the cold war. Rather, we are convinced it will intensify it and arouse fear and suspicion in those against whom it is directed.

We feel it will reduce and undermine the authority of the United Nations Organization by its attempt to form its own union of security.

The North Atlantic Pact provides for rearmament at a time when world recovery is dependent upon constructive economic rehabilitation and aid.

It encourages the concept of regionalism, a concept which can only continue divisions and increase tensions.

We recognize that this trend toward reliance on material and military might is but a symptom of a sickness more grave and fundamental. This fear and greed and lust for power which has overtaken us all can be overcome only by a complete reversal of this present trend.

We call upon the President, Congress, and the American people to recognize in this hour their opportunity and responsibility for assuming moral leadership. We urge our leaders, supported by the American people, to take courageous steps in this new direction.

We recommend as constructive alternatives to military alliances the following:

1. Strengthen the United Nations by giving it greater support.
2. Support and encourage universalism rather than regionalism in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship throughout the world. Only as we replace fear by faith can we end the cold war.
3. Launch a positive program of world disarmament and remove from a war-weary world not only the heavy burden of armaments but the fear and the suspicion which they foster. These are bold but not unrealistic measures. Nothing less will be sufficient. Upon the nation with the greatest strength and resources is laid the responsibility for proving its sincerity by taking the lead. We call upon the American people to renounce all forms of violence and oppression and turn to those moral and spiritual values which alone can make a nation great.

In the words of William Penn, "A good end cannot sanctify evil means, nor must we ever do evil that good may come of it. They must first judge themselves that presume to censure others. We are too ready to retaliate rather than forgive or gain by love and information. * * * Let us then try what love will do, for if men did once see we love them, we should soon find they would not harm us. * * * Force may subdue, but love gains; and he that forgives first, wins the laurel."

On behalf of the two yearly meetings of Baltimore, meeting in joint session, fourth month, second, 1949.

J. Harold Passmore,
Clerk, Baltimore Yearly Meeting of Friends, Stony Run.
Edward F. Raford,
Clerk, Baltimore Yearly Meeting of Friends, Homewood.

THE ATLANTIC DEFENSE TREATY

A CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE

In the present world of fear and force, we of the Philadelphia Yearly Meetings of the Religious Society of Friends feel compelled to reaffirm our faith in the processes of cooperation based on Christian principles. We believe that the Christian concept of universal brotherhood means that all peoples of the human family must come to understand each other and to act with good will toward one another.

The crucial issue before the American people now is whether we shall seek peace and security through military power or by building a world community on the foundations of Christian faith and good will.

We oppose the North Atlantic Treaty because it intensifies the division of the world into two competing power areas. It implies further large-scale rearmament. It promotes regionalism when universalism is needed.

We urge upon our Government unremitting efforts to find a basis of ending the cold war with the Soviet Union.

We ask our Government to recognize and strengthen the moral authority of the United Nations over all nations.

We call upon our Nation to cooperate with other nations to halt the arms race which threatens to bankrupt civilization, which increases the danger of war, and which undermines the one-world concept of the United Nations. As a step in this direction we urge our Government to begin immediately the reduction of all categories of armaments, and to proceed through the United Nations toward world disarmament.

We heartily support every effort to develop the world's resources through the United Nations for the welfare of all peoples.

Our country should meet the tragic needs of this hour with a fresh dedication to the fulfillment of the divine purpose for a world of order and peace.

(Adopted by the Philadelphia Yearly Meetings of the Religious Society of Friends, March 28 and 29, 1949.)

Senator DONNELL. May I ask the professor, if he finds that there are other statements, without encumbering the record by any detail, if he would be kind enough to give a very brief synopsis of the actions so taken, and when and where they were taken?

Dr. Cadbury. There are only four of these groups that have met in annual democratic assembly since the issue has come before us, and these are the four here.

Senator DONNELL. Where were they held?
Dr. CADBURY. Two of them in Philadelphia and two of them in Baltimore.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator DONNELL. One last question, and that is this: You are described at the top of your statement as "Hollis Professor of Divinity, Harvard University." Tell us, please, what is that professorship, how long have you been there, what are your general duties, and what is, generally speaking, your background in the way of education and experience?

Dr. CADBURY. I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not appearing on behalf of Harvard University.

Senator DONNELL. I understand that. It has bearing on your own individual education, background, and experience.

Dr. CADBURY. The chair I hold is the oldest academic chair in America, founded in 1721. I have been incumbent of that chair since 1934. The field in which I teach is the New Testament. My own education you can check in Who's Who. I hold a graduate degree from Harvard, honorary degrees from Glasgow. My undergraduate life was at Haverford College, and I hold an honorary degree from there also.

Senator DONNELL. May I ask leave to have the reporter insert at this point the Who's Who in America description of the witness?

(The matter referred to is as follows:)


Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, finally, is the entire mimeographed statement to be set forth in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you, gentlemen, very much; both you and the chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We have greatly enjoyed having you here, Doctor. We know you are a man of culture, education, and refinement, and of high ideals.

You are excused.

Mr. Howard Johnson wants to appear and present Mr. Eugene Dennis' statement. Is he here?

Mr. HOWARD JOHNSON. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will state that the committee has already decided that it would not hear a statement of this character read, because there is no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, but we are willing to put it in the record, which I think will give every member of the committee an opportunity to examine into it.

You, Mr. Johnson, are representing Mr. Eugene Dennis?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Why can't Mr. Dennis be here?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Dennis requested—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking what he requested. I am asking you why he is not here.

Mr. Johnson. I am explaining that. He requested from the judge in the Federal court in the southern district, where there is now some litigation current, that he be allowed to appear, to give testimony. The judge refused, and that is why he is not here. I was chosen and authorized by Mr. Dennis to deliver this statement to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have you deliver it, but we cannot have it read at this time. I am not acting on my own. I consulted the members of the committee before they departed. It was their view that it could not be helpful to have a statement introduced here with no opportunity of the committee members to cross-examine, but we would let you put it in the record.

Mr. Dennis, I believe, is the executive secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, is that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not exactly. He is the general secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. I will change it. So he is the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you very much.

Mr. Johnson. I would like to say this, that Mr. Dennis will be very interested, because of the importance of the views of the Communist Party and the question of elaborating on his statement itself, that this committee would use its influence to have him appear here.

The CHAIRMAN. We cannot interfere with the courts. That is not our business. We did not get him into court and we are not supposed to get him out of court.

That is all. Thank you very much.

The committee will take a recess until 2:45. We want to admonish the witnesses that expect to appear this afternoon that they must be brief, because we have a large number of witnesses, and we cannot give each one all the time that he might desire. We want to be considerate, we want to be courteous, but there are physical limitations upon this committee.

(Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the hearing was recessed until 2:45 p.m. of the same day.)

(The statement of Eugene Dennis reads as follows:)

(The text is not transcribed due to the limit of the text length.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

STATEMENT OPPOSING THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Submitted by Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U. S. A.

The Communist Party is opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty and calls on the Senate to reject the proposal that it be ratified. With a great and growing body of Americans, we Communists hold that this is an aggressive military alliance which jeopardizes the true interests of our Nation and the welfare and security of the American people.

The brutal reality of this treaty was bluntly stated in an editorial that appeared in the Wall Street Journal of April 5, 1949:

"The fact that the west believes right underlies its might does not make the Atlantic Pact any less a substitution of brute force for the human quality of reason."

Throughout the west, and not least in the United States, men and women who retain the human quality of reason reject this new proclamation that might makes right. In growing numbers, the forces of labor and the people see that Wall Street's adoption of brute force as a media reveals the end to be world domination, conquest, and, ultimately, atomic world war.

The first anti-Communist pact, signed by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and militarist Japan in November 1936, also announced itself as a defensive alliance, aimed at the maintenance of peace and the preservation of western civilization. With a notable lack of originality, the bipartisan proponents of the Atlantic Pact repeat almost verbatim the arguments advanced by Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo to justify their preparations for World War II.

Like Hitler's Axis, the Atlantic Treaty is directed not only against the Soviet Union, but against all democratic nations and peoples.

Like Hitler's Axis, Wall Street's Atlantic Treaty climaxes a whole series of war preparations. If ratified, it will advance us further on the disastrous road to world war 3.

First the Truman doctrine, and then the Marshall plan, prepared the way for the Atlantic Treaty. These precursors of the treaty were also falsely labeled as defense measures whose adoption would assure peace.

But the Truman doctrine, at heavy cost to the American people, keeps Greece embroiled in a disastrous war. The heroic Greek people continue their ever more effective resistance to the Monarchist-Fascist Athens forces, armed and commanded by the American militarists.

In fact, if not in name, the Truman doctrine was also the essence of American policy for aid to the corrupt and reactionary Chiang Kai-shek regime, and for the containment of Chinese democracy and progress. Now peace is coming to China as a result of the total defeat of this imperialist interventionism. Peace and freedom march with the victorious people's armies of liberation, led by the great Chinese Communist Party.

In an attempt to overcome growing popular opposition to the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan was put forward as a humanitarian program. It was announced as a program that would stabilize peace by contributing to the peaceful reconstruction and recovery of the Marshallized countries. We were also told that it would avert a new crisis of overproduction in the United States, and provide full employment for the American workers.

The Atlantic Treaty is itself proof that the Marshall plan has not stabilized the peace. With its ratification, ERP would drop all pretense of being anything but a measure for putting the economies of the Marshall plan countries on a war footing, and making western Europe an armed camp under Wall Street domination. And mounting unemployment at home demonstrates the Marshall plan's failure to avert the growing economic crisis.

Other military alliances, like those binding the Latin-American and Benelux countries to the United States Wehrmacht, also preceded and paved the way for the Atlantic Treaty. Preparation for this third world war axis included the establishment of far-flung American bases and other military establishments, the institution of the peace-time draft, vast increases in arms appropriations, the stock piling of atomic bombs, and moves toward the creation of a satellite west German state.

Not only the forerunners of the Atlantic Pact, but also its projected successors, reveal its aggressive war aims. We are already being told that this peace
measure is to be followed by still other military alliances in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.

Looking at the Atlantic Treaty in the context of the foreign policy of which it is an instrument—who can any longer doubt that this is an imperialist war alliance? It repudiates the policy of American-Soviet cooperation on which Roosevelt based his great design for lasting peace. It commits the United States to a policy of hostility to the Soviet Union and the eastern European democracies to aggressive war preparations which in the end can only lead to world war 3.

The Atlantic Pact undoes the long work to which the late President Roosevelt devoted so much time and effort. It undermines the United Nations and violates its purpose.

Article 29 of the Charter vests exclusively in the Security Council the function of maintaining peace by protecting all nations from aggression or the threat of aggression. The pact eviscerates the Security Council, and arrogates to one group of powers the authority to make war without consulting the Security Council.

The pretense that articles 51, 52, and 53 of the Charter permit regional arrangements for the collective self-defense of any group of nations, and hence sanction the Atlantic treaty, does not stand up under examination.

Article 52 permits the formation of regional arrangements to deal with those aspects of maintaining peace and security appropriate for regional action. But the Atlantic Pact is not a regional arrangement. It includes such widely separated nations as Norway and Italy. It extends to colonial possessions and bases from the Azores to the Belgian Congo.

Article 53 of the Charter, which permits the UN Security Council to "utilize" regional arrangements in order to maintain peace and security, also specifies that no enforcement action shall be taken by regional bodies "without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures against an enemy state * * * ."

But, unlike the defensive treaties concluded among the eastern European nations and the Soviet Union, the Atlantic Treaty is not directed against a possible rewarmer aggression on the part of the former enemy countries, Germany and Japan. On the contrary, it envisages the admission of a western German state in which the spirit of aggression, as well as the industrial potential of war, have been resurrected. It embraces fascist Portugal and plans the Inclusion of the Axis Ally, Spain. This treaty is not directed against the World War II enemies, with whom we are still officially at war. It is directed primarily against our allies in the anti-Axis war—against the Soviet Union and against those forces in eastern Europe which gave resistance to the Nazis, and now head the governments of their countries.

Article 51 of the Charter permits individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN. But the crux of this article is its provision specifying that such self-defense is permissible "only in case of attack" and only "until the Security Council" has taken the appropriate measures. In setting aside these conditions, the Atlantic Treaty nullifies the authority of the Security Council.

Hailing the Atlantic Pact on March 18, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in effect, told the House of Commons that the United Nations is no more. "Frankly," Mr. Bevin said, "just as the League of Nations did not fulfill its purpose, neither has the United Nations."

It cannot be denied that if this defeatist estimate of the United Nations were before the Senate for ratification, the American people would rise to demand that it be rejected.

The Communist Party opposes the Atlantic Pact on principle, as a menace to our own Nation and to world peace. No pretense of "demilitarising" the pact could alter its war character. It is and must remain an aggressive war alliance—regardless of whether or not it is implemented by an arms-appropriation program—large or small.

Nevertheless, the cost of the pact, and its effect on the economic life of our own Nation and of western Europe must be assessed.

On April 21, Secretary of State Acheson assured this committee that the first year's armament bill would amount to "only" $1,000,000,000. This assurance was designed to allay the fears aroused by Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, who warned on April 5, that the rearmament of western Europe would face the United States with bankruptcy.
But Secretary Acheson's figure is only a fraction of our huge arms burden, which is already having a crushing effect on the living standards of America's working people.

Percentage-wise, another billion dollars for arms is no more than a 7 or 8 percent increase in the current war budget. But that 7 or 8 percent is not small potatoes when we consider that the present war budget is taking 50 cents out of every dollar spent by the Government. It is placing an enormous tax on every worker's pay check, and unbalancing the family budget of the working farmers, the middle class and the professionals. Four years after the end of World War II, the American people are paying taxes as high as those they carried at the war's peak. This war tax is drastically reducing the amount the American people can spend on food, rent, and clothing. It is depriving them of needed social services and essential Government aid—of adequate housing, education, health and medical care, of a higher minimum wage and expanded and more adequate social security benefits.

The figure of something over a billion dollars is only a first down-payment. No limit has been set to the billions required for the arming of the Atlantic Pact countries, already staggering under the burden of their present huge war budgets.

An additional billion-dollar outlay for arms means an increase of at least 20 percent on the dollar value of the western European armament program. No wonder that the conservative British Economist reported on January 8: "There is no means by which the Marshall plan countries can, even with the present scale of American aid, prevent a serious fall in their standard of living in 1952."

This deterioration of the economic situation in western Europe must inevitably increase the suffering with which the developing economic crisis threatens the people of the United States.

Moreover, the stimulation of rearmament in western Europe presupposes the revival of western German war industry. In anticipation of this, Gen. Lucius Clay, on April 25, already called for the integration of western Germany into the so-called European Union—that is for the rebuilding of its war potential as an arsenal and base for military operations against the Soviet Union and the democracies of eastern Europe.

The American people and those of all other countries are suspicious of the Atlantic Pact, and fearful of its ratification. That is the very reason it was rushed to signature, and presented to them as an accomplished fact.

The main selling point of the big business interests behind this treaty, and of their bipartisan hucksters, is the myth that an invented threat of Soviet aggression threatens our country and western Europe.

All the facts totally debunk this fabrication, as even some supporters of the treaty admit. Thus, the New York Times of February 27 said editorially that a Soviet attack on the United States is "fantastically improbable." On April 20, the Times' rabidly anti-Soviet columnist. Anne O'Hare McCormick, declared: "It is absurd to believe that the Soviet Union contemplates sending an army across Europe or starting a shooting war against the United States."

But it is no secret that powerful forces in the United States do contemplate starting a shooting war against the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe. The bipartisan supporters of the "cold war" in which the treaty is an ominous new development boldly advocate "preventive" war. Congressman Cannon was the latest of many public figures to urge the atomic pulverization of Soviet cities and the mass murder of the peoples now rebuilding homelands ruined by the Nazi invaders.

Because it is a Socialist state, the Soviet Union does not need profits wrung from conquest and colonial exploitation. It needs neither to dominate the economies nor to annex the territory of other lands. Consequently, the Soviet Union pursues a resolute policy for world peace. It is not, and cannot be, an aggressor.

Unable to point to a single act of aggression or threatened aggression on the part of the Soviet Union, the proponents of the Atlantic Treaty argue that a war alliance is needed to protect other nations against the invented danger of "indirect aggression" emanating from Moscow.

Article 4 of the pact specifies consultation by the signatories for the purpose of taking armed action "whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security" of any member of the alliance is threatened.
But the threat to territorial integrity, political independence, and national security comes from the dominant power within the alliance—from the United States. The Atlantic Treaty itself, like the Marshall plan, is an instrument of intervention against the peoples and nations of western Europe and threatens their territorial integrity, political independence, and security.

American imperialist intervention is not only a threat, but a recorded fact. It can scarcely be claimed that because the intervention of the United States in China failed of its purpose, it did not take place. Or that because it is meeting stubborn resistance in Greece it is not being ruthlessly carried on. The road to the Atlantic Treaty was paved by Wall Street’s political and economic interventions in the internal affairs of the signatory countries, particularly France and Italy.

“Indirect aggression” is the treaty’s transparent excuse for the repression of labor and of any movement for social change or national liberation which the rulers of the existing social order consider a threat to their profits and power.

Article 4 reveals that the treaty is a holy alliance for the repression of the labor and Communist movements of western Europe. This is admitted by James Reston, in the New York Times of March 1: “The executive branch of the Government is convinced that some of the western European nations must have military aid not only to defend themselves against external aggression but primarily to bolster their police powers against their own Communists.”

And Secretary of State Acheson, explaining the treaty on March 18, confessed that while a purely internal revolution would not be regarded as an armed attack, “an uprising, inspired, armed, and directed from the outside would be a different thing.”

This statement is reminiscent of those habitually made by big business, which professes to respect the right of workers to organize and strike—but defends its use of antilabor violence on the ground that the workers are being “misled by outside agitators.”

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, all popular movements against feudalism and monarchy were denounced as inspired by American or French revolutionaries. Today every movement for the improvement of the people’s living standards, for national liberation, or social advance is denounced as “Moscow inspired.” The Atlantic Pact commits the United States to the forcible suppression of all popular movements, and thus makes a mockery of the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the aims for which the peoples fought the Second World War.

Article 4 is not only an instrument for intervention against any people which defends its national independence, rejects reaction and fascism, or decides that capitalism has outlived its social usefulness. Article 4 is also designed to continue the suppression of all the colonies of the imperialist powers associated in the new alliance.

This was made plain enough by Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak when on March 18 he declared in Brussels that “consultations between the signatories could also take place in case of an incident occurring outside the geographical area of the pact if one of the signatories considered its security involved.”

Thus Spaak admits that the treaty is intended to keep a handful of imperialist rulers in effective domination over much of Asia and Africa. He also strips the Pact of its last claim to be a purely regional arrangement, confined to Atlantic powers.

Some Senators have indicated that they oppose ERP aid for the Netherlands if that country continues to defy the United Nations with respect to Indonesia. It will be interesting to see what stand they take on the Atlantic Pact, which is designed to give the American monopolists a greater chance to muscle in on the empires the pact seeks to maintain by force.

This committee has heard both charges and denials that the Atlantic Treaty violates the Constitution of the United States. The plain fact is that the treaty arrogates to the executive branch of the Government unresisted power to make war.

It would leave Congress only the power to make formal declaration that a war is being waged.

But the treaty invites and promotes other violations of the Constitution and would advance the process of nullifying the Bill of Rights already going on. In advancing the military preparation for a third world war, the treaty accelerates the growth of fascism—and particularly the adoption of measures aimed at the total suppression of every force that struggles against the war makers.
The current political heresy trial of the 12 Communist leaders, as well as the police-state legislation adopted by a number of States and pending in the Congress, are war measures auxiliary to the Atlantic Treaty. So are the witch hunts and book burnings, the mounting antisemitism and increasing violence against the Negro people, the growing attacks against labor and Americans of foreign birth—all of which have accompanied the preparation for the Atlantic Treaty.

It is inherent in the logic of the treaty that its bipartisan proponents filibuster against antilynch and antipoll-tax legislation, and retain the Taft-Hartley Act while this war measure is being rushed to ratification. The attempt to brand as treason the patriotic struggle for peace threatens the suppression of all movements in defense of the people's living standards and democratic rights.

The signing of the North Atlantic Pact has increased, rather than diminished, the growing opposition to it in all parts of the world. This treaty is opposed not only by the nations and peoples against whom it is most obviously directed, but by the majority of the people in the signatory countries—including the United States.

The working class and its Communist vanguard in western Europe is a serious force for peace. But the Communists and their allies, particularly in the key countries of France and Italy, are by no means the only forces opposing the treaty. It is whole peoples, including the masses in all political parties, who are demonstrating their determination to repudiate the war commitment made by the governments of the signatory countries, and who voice the people's refusal to fight for the gain and glory of Wall Street.

The great world peace conference recently held in Paris spoke not only for the Communists and the left. It spoke for the hundreds of millions of plain people everywhere in the world who are rallying in united action against the imperialist war schemes of the United States monopolists.

Nor is it only the left, including the Communists, in the United States who oppose this war alliance. The committee must have considerable evidence of the far wider organized, and unorganized, opposition which is already substantial and grows rapidly. Strong opposition to the treaty has been voiced by major church groups in this country, and by the outstanding cultural leaders. Among the rank and file of the trade-unions, the Negro people, and the farm organizations sentiment against the treaty is increasing and becoming more vocal.

In view of the temper of the people, and taking into account the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, further consideration of the Atlantic Treaty should be halted. To cut these hearings, in an attempt to rush ratification before the people have made themselves heard, would reveal that the United States approaches the Foreign Ministers' Conference in bad faith. Our Government cannot even pretend to good faith in negotiations for a peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviet Union, if in advance of negotiations it concludes this aggressive military alliance.

The masses of the American workers and people recoil with horror from the prospect of the atomic war which the Atlantic Treaty in effect assumes to be inevitable.

In accord with the desires and needs of the American people, we Communists call for a pact of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union, and for the repudiation of the aggressive Atlantic war alliance.

We call for universal disarmament, and for a policy that will make the United Nations work for peace.

We call for implementation of the UN resolution on curbing the warmongers for the destruction of all atomic bombs and the outlawing of their manufacture.

We call on our Government to negotiate with the Soviet Union a settlement of the German question along the lines of the Potsdam agreement, and for American-Soviet cooperation such as the Roosevelt policies made possible.

We call for the establishment of friendly relations with the new, liberated, China.

We call for normal foreign trade relations without interference in the affairs of other nations, and for an expansion of Government expenditures to meet the American people's peacetime need for homes, education, health, and social security.

The Communist Party, declaring that World War III is not inevitable, proclaims the inevitability of the people's continuing struggle for peace.

We are confident that the American people, refusing to be intimidated or stumped, will organize and unite to defeat this infamous war alliance. But Atlantic Treaty or no Atlantic Treaty, we believe that our people will strengthen the effectiveness of their struggle for peace. We Communists are and will remain
an integral part of the American people's movement of resistance to the imperialist and war-breeding policies of Wall Street. We are confident that the workers and people of our country and of the world will enforce their will to peace.

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:45 p.m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. Rev. Kenneth Ripley Forbes. All right, sir, tell the reporter your name and your business and whom you represent.


Reverend Forbes. I represent the Philadelphia Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. I am pinch-hitting for somebody else. I have no documents or manuscript to hand you, but I want to present the following things.

I am not going to try to analyze the past. I am not able to, and I would not if I were. There are others far better qualified that will do a job of that sort.

There is just one thing I would like to present to this committee, and that is the fact of the very considerable volume of opposition to the ratification of the pact as it stands today. I think people in general take for granted that this thing is going through, perhaps is; but I doubt whether it is generally recognized how much widespread opposition there is to the pact.

OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY

I would like to give these few concrete examples for whatever they may be worth. On the 13th of last month there were 16 Midwest union leaders of the CIO, the A. F. of L., and the railroad brotherhoods, who took a position in opposition to the pact. On the same day—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean by a resolution or what? Was there any written—

Reverend Forbes. By a resolution, I suppose. I have not seen the thing in writing. I have just seen the facts stated in the press. I have not seen the statement, that is, the resolution.

But on the same day I understand 267 New York leaders of the CIO and the AFL ran a good-sized advertisement in the New York Times—that, of course, is generally known, and is on record—in opposition to the pact.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware that the American Federation of Labor and the CIO have both indorsed ratification of the pact.

Reverend Forbes. So I understand; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Reverend Forbes. I am just trying to point out that in the lower echelons of both these organizations there appears to be considerable organized opposition to the pact in various of their local units. The same is true of the CIO farm equipment workers, who, on the 27th of March, opposed the ratification of the pact.

On the 16th of March, 70 leaders of farm trade-unions, religious, veterans, and business people, expressed themselves also in opposition
to the pact. Then, as was presented by somebody earlier today; a well-known fact that on the 4th of last month was the open letter of 300 distinguished religious and educational leaders, including the president of the Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church, who put themselves on record in opposition to the pact.

The Farmers' Union, who, I suppose, represents several million Americans, in a statement passed unanimously by its national board, said, among other things, these words, according to the records in the press [reading]:

There continue to be certain very disturbing elements in our Government's foreign policy. Of these, the most alarming is the proposal for a North Atlantic Security Treaty, obviously to be followed by extensive arms aid to Europe.

We cannot prove such, of course. We believe it to be directly contrary to American precedent and history, and to be a futile gesture. We deplore the sponsorship by the United States or by Russia or, or participation in, regional or bilateral defense agreements, and believe such efforts will weaken the United Nations.

Those are samples of what seems to be a fairly extensive and important section of public opinion in the lower echelons of organization against this pact. My only point, except to mention those, is to maintain that it is a very dubious wisdom, if American opinion is divided even by a representative substantial minority, to enter into something that will be an entirely new departure in American policy.

The pact, as I understand it, is not even reviewable for 10 years. It is not denounceable for 20 years. And if the opposition that we are starting with today grows from any sort of motives or reasons, such as one might imagine—taxation, for instance—it would put us in a very weak and embarrassing position.

That is my only contribution to your committee, that we face a more or less divided opinion in America about this pact. Therefore it seems to me that we ought to go pretty slow before we ratify what is so very widely opposed in so very many quarters. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Any questions, Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question. You appear for the Philadelphia Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. We have another witness here. He represents the National Council of—

Reverend FORBES. He represents the national council.

The CHAIRMAN. So the two of you really are representing the same organization. Is that not true?

Reverend FORBES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is padding things up pretty badly. We have got a great list of witnesses.

Reverend FORBES. I have not consumed much of your time.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but I just wanted to observe that we cannot hear two or three different people from the same organization.

Senator GREEN. May I ask a question? It has occurred to me since I said I did not care to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CHOICE BETWEEN RATIFICATION AND NONRATIFICATION

Senator GREEN. You realize, do you not, when you state there are objections to this, that most of the choices in the world today are choices between two evils. The choice is: Which is the least objectionable!
Reverend Forbes. Quite so.

Senator Green. Do you regard this as the least objectionable or the more objectionable?

Reverend Forbes. I do not know that I quite get your last question.

Senator Green. The alternative to doing this is doing nothing.

Reverend Forbes. A choice of evils—

Senator Green. That seems to be the choice.

Reverend Forbes. Quite so.

Senator Green. They both have objections, and both are possibly fraught with misfortune or evil results. Which is your choice?

Reverend Forbes. I am not quite clear what your alternative is. One is the ratification of the treaty. Is that it?

Senator Green. And the other is doing nothing.

Reverend Forbes. And the other is the refusal to ratify. I think the greater of the two evils is to ratify.

Senator Green. I wanted to find out which you chose.

The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Anna Steelman Eicke, representing American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association, who states that she will be very brief.

STATEMENT OF MRS. ANNA STEELMAN EICKE, REPRESENTING AMERICAN LITHUANIAN WORKERS LITERARY ASSOCIATION, BROOKLYN, N. Y.

Mrs. Eicke. I certainly shall. You can take my word for it. It is less than 5 minutes.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. Are you an American citizen?

Mrs. Eicke. I certainly am.

The Chairman. Why do you say you are originally from Lithuania?

Mrs. Eicke. I am not. I am an American, but I belong to a Lithuanian-American society.

The Chairman. Where is your allegiance? To the United States?

Mrs. Eicke. Certainly, always.

The Chairman. Lithuania is no more, anyway, is it?

Mrs. Eicke. We still have our parents there, and we still like their culture. We think it is educational.

The Chairman. I did not ask you that. I said Lithuania itself has passed out of the picture as a government, has it not? Russia absorbed it.

Mrs. Eicke. If you refer to the World Almanac, you will find that Lithuania was voted into the U. S. S. R. in 1940.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Mrs. Eicke. I am appearing in behalf of American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association, an organization of 7,000 Lithuanian-Americans interested in cultural and educational activities.

WEAKENING OF UNITED NATIONS

I am here to urge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to disapprove the North Atlantic Pact on the grounds that:

1. It would weaken the United Nations, the one hope for peace.

The pact is contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. It supersedes the United Nations. It has nothing to do with the regional pacts, agreements, or agencies provided in articles
52 and 53 of the Charter. No stretch of the imagination could call a regional agreement a pact which takes in the United States, Great Britain and its colonies, France and its colonies, Norway, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal.

WORLD SPLIT

2. It would split and divide the world into two armed camps. It is an alliance for war and it is aimed against one of our great allies in the great war against fascism. We agree with Henry Wallace when he says [reading]:

Stripped of legal verbiage, the North Atlantic Military Pact gives the United States Army bases up to the very borders of the Soviet Union. If we apply Christian principles and try for a moment to put ourselves in their position, the true meaning of the Atlantic Pact will be clear to us. Supposing the Soviets had military bases on the Mexican border? The Canadian border? On Cuba? Could the treaty which puts guns in our faces be called a pact of peace?

We fully agree with the Federal Council of Churches of Christ when it says [reading]:

No defensive alliance should be entered into which might validly appear as aggressive to Russia, as a Russian alliance with Latin America would undoubtedly appear to us.

ARMAMENT EXPENDITURES

3. The pact would require additional billions of dollars from us for the armament of Europe. We are already spending more than half of our budget on arms and cold war. The Government has a request for an appropriation of about $1,300,000,000 for one implementation of the North Atlantic Pact.

But this is only the beginning. It is estimated that the western European nations would demand from us to equip and maintain anywhere up to 70 divisions. This would add up to tens of billions of dollars. At the same time we claim that we have no money for building houses, schools, and hospitals; for clearing slums and for improving the health of the Nation.

4. The pact would bring us into an entangling European alliance against which George Washington warned us. We do not need it. No one threatens to attack us.

5. The pact commits us without the right of deciding for ourselves, to another war. It negates our Constitution which states that only Congress has the power to declare war. The pact sets up an Atlantic council and a military staff committee in Europe with more power than the United Nation’s Security Council.

Therefore, we urge the Senate not to ratify the North Atlantic Pact or at least suspend it while the Big Four confer and create for the meeting as peaceful and friendly an atmosphere as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a native-born American, are you?

Mrs. EICKE. I was.

The CHAIRMAN. Your husband was from Lithuania?

Mrs. EICKE. No, my husband was also an American.

The CHAIRMAN. You realize that Russia absorbed Lithuania, took it over?

Mrs. EICKE. We do not understand it that way. We understand that it voted into the USSR.
The Chairman. Well, I do not know how you understand it, but it is now a part of Russia; and you seem to have a great sympathy and affection for Russia.

You say you agree with Mr. Wallace and his attitude and statements. Now, that is what I meant a while ago. We cannot have everybody that belongs to a group to appear here individually. Mr. Wallace has been here and some of his followers have been here and testified, and now you are here representing the Wallace cult.

I just want to warn other witnesses. We cannot have half a dozen people representing a single group because we have got a long string of witnesses and our time is very much filled. I just throw that out for what it is worth.

Mrs. Eicke. I represent the Lithuanian American Literary Association, and that is how we understand it.

The Chairman. All right, we thank you for coming.

Mrs. Eicke. Thank you.

The Chairman. I think I will possibly have to go to the floor. All the other Senators are going over for a vote.

Prof. Colston E. Warne, the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions. How long will it take you? You have had one representative here today.

STATEMENT OF PROF. COLSTON E. WARNE, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE ARTS, SCIENCES AND PROFESSIONS

Professor Warne. It will take me about 15 minutes.

The Chairman. All right.

Professor Warne. My name is Colston Warne. I am a professor of Economics at Amherst College. I am testifying today on behalf of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, a political and cultural organization of which I am a member. I offer for the record a list of the officers of that organization.

(The above-mentioned list of the officers of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions reads as follows:)

Honorary Chairman: Jo Davidson
Chairman: Harlow Shapley
Treasurer: Michael Nisselson
Regional chairman:
  John J. De Boer
  Olin Downes
  Clark Foreman
  Linus Pauling
Vice chairman:
  Dr. Allan M. Butler
  Norman Corwin
  Ernest Grunfeld

Vice chairman—Continued
  Pearl M. Hart
  Lillian Hellman
  Robert W. Kenney
  Howard Koch
  John Howard Lawson
  Paul Robeson
  Dr. Maud Slye
  Max Weber

Chairman of the Executive Committee: O. John Rogge

SUBVERSION OF U. N.

Professor Warne. We are opposed to the ratification of the North Atlantic Pact as we have been opposed to the Truman doctrine and Marshall plan. All of these measures are integral parts of a foreign policy which subverts the United Nations and advances us further on the road to war. What is happening in China today exposes the speciousness of that policy. So do the growing numbers of partisan
fighters in Greece. So does the report casting doubt upon the success of the Marshall plan report issued last week by the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations. The Truman doctrine has not stopped the civil war in Greece. The Marshall plan has not fostered genuine long-run recovery in Europe. And in our judgment the North Atlantic Pact will not assure peace.

The United Nations was conceived by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and created by the Allied Powers of World War II as the instrumentality through which the nations of the world could establish and maintain peace. It is based on the concept of unanimity among the great powers, and it provides all the necessary machinery for airing and settling differences among nations by peaceful means. In it are embodied the hopes of humanity.

In the past 2 years, this Government has consistently followed a policy which undermines the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations. First we substituted the Marshall plan for UNRRA and now we substitute a military alliance for the conference table and the Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. I will have to ask you to suspend because I am summoned to the floor, and there is no other member of the committee present to conduct the hearing. I will have to ask you to wait until 3:30, and I will return.

Professor Warne. Indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not care to just put your statement in the record? You are not content with that?

Professor Warne. I would much rather finish it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We want to accommodate you.

(Thereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the committee recessed until 3:30 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. You had already proceeded quite a little ways, had you not?

Professor Warne. I had proceeded through about one page.

RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE ON WORLD PEACE

On March 25 through 27 of this year, a Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace, of which you have undoubtedly heard, was held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel under the auspices of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. I should like to submit for the record a copy of the general resolution unanimously adopted by the 2,800 delegates at the plenary session of that conference.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Put it in.

(The above-mentioned document reads as follows:)

TEXT OF RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED AT PLENARY SESSION, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE FOR WORLD PEACE, SUNDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 27, HOTEL WALDORF-ASTORIA

To create an environment in which our lives prosper; to discover a process whereby man's fruitful aspirations may find a future in the atomic age; to contribute to the establishment of an environment in which reason may operate as a scourge of fear and hatred; to take from the shoulders of the creators of the earth's wealth, its people, the dead burden of armies and their armaments and to remove from their minds the rending shocks of insecurity; to reaffirm the duty of artists, scientists, and workers in the professions to toll for a society of nations
founded on justice for all; the cultural and scientific conference for world peace has been held and does herewith affirm:

The hour is late to unite for peace but there is yet time to save the peace if we truly unite. Humanity does not want another war. Peace is necessary and peace is possible. The maintenance of peace is the responsibility of all peoples. If the American people recognize their solemn duty and affirm their will, they can do their share to maintain peace.

The peril of the times has united us who are gathered here. The deliberations of this conference have strengthened our unity. On the issue of peace, irrespective of differences on other subjects, we propose to take our stand.

This is our stand:

1. To do everything possible to strengthen the United Nations, as the best hope for peace.

2. To express our greetings and pledge our cooperation to other movements for peace throughout the world, conscious as we are that cultural and religious and labor groups, and many others are affirming the will of the world for a peaceful resolution of the present deadlock.

3. To continue the work begun here so that our countrymen may be roused to protect the peace; to instruct the sponsors of this conference to constitute themselves as the cultural and scientific committee for world peace of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, and to increase their numbers from among the men and women in the arts, sciences, and professions, to take appropriate measures to bring the decisions of this conference to the attention of the American Government and the United Nations, and to undertake an active campaign in the cause of peace.

We are an Independent American movement. We are but one voice in the crescendo of the American and world will for peace. We will not cease our efforts until peace has been secured. In this endeavor, we serve our culture and our country. Only thus can our country and men and women of culture help serve the world.
Professor Warne. I would like to read to you two sentences which pertain to this question. [Reading:]

We will measure all plans, pacts, and budgets by this test. Will they bring us closer to peace or do they rest on the false and dangerous premise of inevitable war? Judged by this criterion, programs of rearmament and of military alliances from any source or for any purpose, gravely intensify the danger of war.

It is our opinion that the North Atlantic Pact is such a military alliance as it imperils the peace.

OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY

The NCASP is opposed to ratification of the North Atlantic Military Pact for the following reasons: Because it contradicts both the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter, rejecting the concept of one world at peace for a return to the discredited system of power politics which divides the world into two armed camps and inevitably leads to war.

Because it is based on the false thesis that the Soviet Union wants war and is threatening military aggressions, a thesis which has been given the lie by such statesmen as John Foster Dulles, who, on March 9, speaking before the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America said [reading]:

So far as it is humanly possible to judge, the Soviet Government * * * does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy.

I do not know any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this Government or any government, who believe that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. You quote Mr. Dulles. Do you approve of Mr. Dulles' attitude on public questions?

Professor Warne. There are really two Mr. Dulles.

The CHAIRMAN. John Foster Dulles.

Professor Warne. Yes, there is the Mr. Dulles who made this statement in reference to Russia; and one also, I understand, who has made an inconsistent—

The CHAIRMAN. You ought to make it clear in your record, because John Foster Dulles is one man, and some other kind of Dulles is someone else.

Professor Warne. I am speaking of the same John Foster Dulles, but I am speaking of the attitude which he takes on this particular issue, his attitude on the Atlantic Pact.

The CHAIRMAN. You are quoting him with approval, and yet he is for this pact, is he not?

Professor Warne. He is for this pact; you are right. But he has stated specifically, and I have not seen any indication since March 9 that he has altered his stand on this, that the Soviet Union does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy, and I think that that is highly pertinent.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles was here before this committee a few days ago. Did you read his testimony?

Professor Warne. I have read his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. He said he was for this treaty, did he not?

Professor Warne. He did, and his testimony runs in contradiction to this basic statement which I think is very forceful.
The Chairman. If you feel that way, I would not call him as a witness.

Professor Warne. I call him as a witness on this one specific point.

The Chairman. You say it is contradictory, and you just call him on that part. That is your way, is that it?

Professor Warne. I call him on the specific attitude that he denies that the Soviet State is today planning military aggression.

The Chairman. Are you here as an advocate of the Russian State?

Professor Warne. I am not.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

reasons for opposition to treaty

Professor Warne. Because it will further distort the economics of western Europe by sacrificing even more of their funds to an increased military budget, by diverting sorely needed manpower to armaments production, by crippling still further the efforts of those countries to rebuild their peacetime industries.

Because it will create a similar imbalance in our own economy, increasing the arms budget and expanding munitions production at the expense of the social and economic needs of the country.

Above all, we oppose the North Atlantic Pact because we believe it to represent not a peace pact nor even a defensive alliance, but rather deliberate and organized preparation for war. And we firmly reject any idea that such war is inevitable or necessary.

It is our considered opinion that the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States may be resolved around the conference table, and we look forward to the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers as an important step toward such peaceful discussions. Once these high-level conversations have been instituted, it will then be possible to strengthen the United Nations as the chief instrumentality for maintaining world peace.

Haste for ratification

Before analyzing further the reasons I have just stated for our opposition to the pact, I should like to state that I am greatly disturbed by the statement of Senator Connally, as reported in yesterday’s Times, that—

It would be very helpful if the Foreign Relations Committee would conclude its hearing on the treaty before the Foreign Ministers Conference started. Indeed, it would be desirable if we could get Senate ratification of the treaty before then.

Leaving aside for the moment the effect that any decisive action on the pact might have on the potential success of the Foreign Ministers Conference—and I will come back to that—I should like to consider the basic implications of trying to speed up the hearings of this committee.

Such indecent haste could be construed in no other way than as a contravention of the basic purpose of public hearings—that is, to permit every citizen and group which indicates a desire to speak, the opportunity to be heard. Limitations on such testimony would, at any time, represent a dangerous curtailment of the democratic process.

The Chairman. Do you consider we have been unduly hasty?
today? Have we not been patient? We have been in session—tomorrow will be 2 weeks—and I suppose we will be in session for 2 or 3 more weeks.

Is that undue haste? Do you regard that as undue haste?

Professor Warne. Not if you are in session two or three more weeks. I think that is excellent.

The Chairman. We have been courteous to you. We have given you your chance to speak your piece and give us your views. What complaint have you got against this committee, except that you are not the committee?

Professor Warne. I have no point with respect to that. I merely suggested that the haste reflected in that quotation of trying to get this matter disposed of before the Foreign Ministers Conference is the--

The Chairman. My view in that was it would be an encouragement to the foreign ministers to let them know something about what is happening in the world. Go ahead, though.

AUTOMATIC DECLARATION OF WAR

Professor Warne. It is particularly appalling when attempted in relation to the North Atlantic Pact, which, if ratified, would commit the American people to a possible war at the discretion of the military without any necessity for Senate approval.

The Chairman. Why do you say that? That is not so, and you ought to know it is not so, because it is specified in the treaty that it has to be approved by the constitutional processes, which means declaration of war by the Senate.

Professor Warne. Well, the question there involved is--

The Chairman. You are a professor of arts and sciences.

Professor Warne. I am a professor of economics.

The Chairman. Are you artful enough and scientific enough to read the Charter and know what it means? That is what it says, no automatic declaration of war.

Professor Warne. No automatic declaration of war, but there is a real--

The Chairman. No declaration of war, except by Congress, where the Constitution puts it.

Professor Warne. There is a pledge to restore and maintain security in there, which pledge has to be implemented, if words mean anything.

The Chairman. By true constitutional processes. Now, you know what that means, do you not?

Professor Warne. But this in a sense should be farming out--

The Chairman. No; it is not farming out anything. Go ahead.

Professor Warne. We disagree, I think, markedly there.

The Chairman. All right. Go ahead.

Professor Warne. To steamroller a proposal so foreign to the historic policies of this Nation to a vote without the fullest and freest possible discussion from proponents of all viewpoints would negate the very fundamentals of our democratic tradition in the eyes of our own citizenry and of the world.
Moreover, so far as we have been able to ascertain, unlimited time has been granted to those representatives of the administration who testified in favor of the pact. It is only the opponents of the pact who, as in the case of many of the State councils of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, have been refused any opportunity to testify or, as in my own case, have been requested to limit the length of my statement. There would seem to be a deliberate attempt on the part of this committee to prevent opponents of this measure from testifying fully, if at all.

FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE AND THE PACT

The news of the lifting of the Berlin blockade and of the impending conference of the Big Four foreign ministers has raised the hope of statesmen and citizens that the world war is on the verge of being melted away. I cannot believe that anyone who wishes peace would want to preclude that conference to disaster. And yet, that is just what any definitive action taken between now and the time of the Paris meeting would do.

How could we possibly convince the world that we were coming to that meeting with a will to agreement and settlement of differences if we had just ratified a military alliance with two of the other participants which is clearly directed against the fourth conferee?

Can it be that the adherents of this pact are fearful lest the successful outcome of the Big Four conference would demonstrate to the Members of the Senate and many citizens that even the supposed reasons for this measure do not exist? Are they afraid that the American people will not want to be defended from peace by a war pact?

I can find no other explanation for this unseemly rush to conclude hearings, although I would think that, professing peace, this committee would want to consider the outcome of that conference most carefully before making any recommendations to the Senate.

The only inference to be drawn from speedy conclusions to the hearings and possible quick ratification of the pact prior to the foreign ministers' meeting is that once again the administration will force the forthcoming conference into lines already crystallized by the workings of the pact.

This can only serve to limit the possible areas of agreement among the foreign ministers, cutting down the usefulness of their discussions and thereby perpetuating the illusions upon which the cold war is based. We have tried to stack the cards this way before; but international politics cannot be manipulated like a poker hand.

COST OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY

Our successive adventures in foreign policy, from the Truman doctrine down, wherein we stacked the cards always on the side of military power, committing the United States to a policy of arming reaction and violence, have not once produced the expected result—that the alleged enemy would cower in fear and therefore yield to our position.

What have these cards, stacked by the administration, cost the American taxpayer? As taxpayers and consumers, we are paying for it directly in higher prices, high taxes, and inflation. As our taxes
siphon through our Government Treasury and are placed at the disposal of a combine, which includes a generous quota of the armaments producers, they take the form of \( \$625,000,000 \) for military expenses in the Greek-Turkish aid program; \( \$17,000,000,000 \) for the Marshall plan for 4 years; \( \$2,000,000,000 \) for occupation costs in Germany, Japan, and Korea; \( \$1,500,000,000 \) to provide the first year's arms under the North Atlantic Pact.

Over \( \$22,000,000,000 \), plus a few more billion for Chiang Kai-shek. That is the bill so far. In the next few years, it will jump billions more because a combat division costs \( \$400,000,000 \); and, according to the military men who plot their campaigns, win their wars in advance—36 such divisions must be prepared in Europe alone within the next 2 years—nor do these figures include an air force. It is anybody's guess what the final cost of the cold war will come to. The administration is too shy to give us exact figures on this score.

To these billions of dollars we must add costs which cannot be estimated in money. Fear of war is costly. So far has this gone that, to fight the war danger, to object to red baiting, to propose public works like schools, and housing is to turn the proponent into a foreign agent.

Even the most unwary consumer still believes he should get his money's worth. This bill, so far, is over \( \$22,000,000,000 \). And what have we bought? The right, nay the necessity, under the terms of our present foreign policy, to buy more and more of the same, with no end to the cycle. For, it is implied that after the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the North Atlantic Pact, will come a Mediterranean Pact, and a southeast Asia Pact. Ours is only one country on this earth, with only a small proportion of the world's population, and with the proud privilege of having developed its resources to the point where it can supply 60 percent of the world's goods.

The National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, which I have the honor to represent, holds to the opinion that this privilege, growing out of our advanced technology and great natural resources, confers upon us all the responsibility of using these goods for the benefit of our own people and those of the world.

**STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY**

Even at high prices, \( \$22,000,000,000 \) would provide millions of homes, thousands of schools and road, scientific medical research, and the incalculable benefits of a free citizenry, unfettered by political restrictions in its ideas and researches. Lifting of the armaments burden from our own country, as well as from the peoples of western Europe, who are now being forced to add to the cost of war devastation the cost of a new arms race, would free us all and bring to the forefront those democratic precepts which were truly involved in the building of American democracy.

Twenty-two billion dollars, or even a part of \( \$22,000,000,000 \) expended to provide for that one-third of our Nation which is ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clothed would place the United States in the forefront of the United Nations as the proponent of those values and practical expenditures, principles of national independence which would fulfill the purpose of the United Nations. Such a policy of fostering democracy and giving relief through the United Nations would allow
the people of Greece to decide for themselves whether they want a king or a president.

Such a policy would by now have strangled the Franco regime and would have allowed the Spaniards to set up their own republic. Such a policy would allow Indonesia to be controlled by the Indonesians. Such is the policy which the people of China have taken into their own hands.

In so doing, they prove that the greater the amount of money we spend for armaments to influence their politics, the greater their determination and ability to manage their own affairs. The history of the United States from its inception, through the War for Independence, the War of 1812, and the American Civil War, is living proof that the aspirations of any people determined to make their own destiny cannot be diverted by bullets.

The news of the lifting of the Berlin blockade and of the impending conference of the Big Four Foreign Ministers has raised the hopes of statesmen and citizens that the cold war is on the verge of being melted away. I cannot believe that anyone who wishes peace would want to preclude that conference to disaster. And yet, that is just what any definitive action taken between now and the time of the Paris meeting would do.

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

This conception that freemen will fight against tyranny helped found the United Nations, which grew out of the victorious fight against a fascism which believed guns and airplanes and concentration camps could mold the world to its desires. The establishment of the United Nations based on the concept of unanimity and the recognition of the rights of sovereignty, laid the groundwork for mutual assistance and the domination of no country by another. The perversion of this policy in the hands of our present administration is rapidly disorganizing the functions of the United Nations and its ability to maintain the peace.

The North Atlantic Pact supersedes the United Nations by a military council. It places force above reason and peaceful negotiation; it paves the way for war, not peace.

It is for these reasons that we ask this body—the Senate of the United States—not to ratify the pact. It is for these reasons that we implore the use of negotiation through such peaceful means as the forthcoming Ministers' Conference; it is for these reasons that we must have a truly strong United Nations which, supported in true harmony by the principal nations, can guarantee the peaceful economic and political development of the peoples of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. You want to strengthen the United Nations?
Professor WARNE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that 30 Russian vetoes on important matters since the beginning of the Charter has tended to strengthen it?
Professor WARNE. I have no brief whatever—

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask you about brief. I asked you that plain question.
Professor WARNE. I do not think that indiscriminate use of the veto by any nation strengthens the United Nations.
The CHAIRMAN. Why are you dodging Russia? She is the one that has imposed the 30 vetoes, and I asked you that plain question. Then you shot off on a general statement, because you are afraid someone will think you are in sympathy with Russia.

I do not charge you with being in sympathy with Russia. I just asked you if 30 vetoes by Russia tended to strengthen the United Nations.

Professor WARNE. I think the answer given earlier this afternoon was very appropriate, and that is, it is a question of what they veto and the question of a majority versus a minority in an organization. I do not think that has a strict bearing upon this immediate issue.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you refuse to answer the question?

That is what you do?

Professor WARNE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think 30 vetoes strengthened the United Nations?

Professor WARNE. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Or weakened the United Nations?

Professor WARNE. I think the tendency to overuse the veto definitely weakens the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not state that instead of making a sermon on the subject?

Professor WARNE. I stated it in the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. You were against the Greek proposition, the Greek assistance.

Professor WARNE. I am against our policies in Greece.

The CHAIRMAN. You are against giving them any money, giving them any armaments, giving them anything?

Professor WARNE. I would give relief to Greece through the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. The United Nations has no relief funds.

Professor WARNE. It does not, and that is where the trouble begins.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. It has none, so you want to have it done through the United Nations when they have no relief funds. You were against the Turkey bill, of course, against the aid to Turkey?

Professor WARNE. Of course.

Professor WARNE. I am against the use of Marshall plan funds in the way in which they are used, rather than through the United Nations. I am not against the use of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are against all these plans because you want to do them some other way. Is that it? You have got a plan of your own?

REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Professor WARNE. I am against our policy of regionalism associated with the employment of countries and political governments as instruments of a political policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know that in the charter of the United Nations, it provides for regional arrangements? Answer that, please. I am not going to ask you any more questions unless you can answer them.

You are not fooling anybody. You are smart enough to know what we ask you. You are a professor of what?
Professor Warne. Economics.
The Chairman. Economics. Well, economics, I thought, taught something about the plainness of a thing. You know what I am asking you. I do not care to ask you any more questions if you are going to dodge them all.
Is that all?
Professor Warne. That is all I have.
The Chairman. All right. We thank you very much.
Professor Warne. You are welcome.
Professor Warne. I did; I said "Yes."
The Chairman. You were talking about the United Nations. Why do you not approve of that?
Professor Warne. I very thoroughly approve of the United Nations.
The Chairman. I know, but of that clause about regional action?
Professor Warne. I think there is an appropriate scope for regional action, and that scope does not involve international relief commitments in the military field, which commitments must always under the charter be subject to the scrutiny of the United Nations.
The Chairman. Are you the president of this National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions?
Professor Warne. I am not. Harlow Shapley is the president. I am merely a representative.
The Chairman. You were merely delegated to come down here?
Professor Warne. That is right.
The Chairman. All right. That is all. Thank you very much.
Mr. Morford.

Statement of Richard Morford, Executive Director, National Council of American-Soviet Friendship

Mr. Morford. I am Richard Morford, executive director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship since January of 1946.
The Chairman. Before that, what were you?
Mr. Morford. I am a Presbyterian clergyman; and I was the executive of the United Christian Council for Democracy before that. Before that, I was minister of the House of Friendship in Albany, and secretary of the Federation of Churches. Before that, I was a Presbyterian minister in Morristown, N. J.
The Chairman. Have you abandoned the pulpit for this organization of Soviet Friendship?
Mr. Morford. No, sir, I count this a part of my ministry still. I am not an active minister in a church at this point, but I hold regular standing as a clergyman.
The Chairman. All right, go right ahead.
Mr. Morford. I think that we have reached a turning point in American foreign policy in the consideration of the North Atlantic Pact. The United States Senate is required to make a decision determining the life and destiny of the American people for years to come. Not only the people of America, but the people of the Soviet Union and of the entire world will learn whether we place major reliance
on peaceful negotiations to settle world problems or are determined to employ the threat of war and preparation for war as an instrument of national policy. We are about to declare either that we want to live in the one world with our differences but in peace, or that we choose to divide the world into two armed camps awaiting the call to war.

THREAT OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

The Chairman. May I interrupt you right there. Do you think that the Congress or the President or anybody else is determined to employ the threat of war and preparations for war as an instrument of our national policy?

Mr. Morford. In the attempt to prepare for the resistance to an armed attack, this indicates a threat of war in conditions which we decide are not met. I do not see how you could call it other, sir, than a threat of war.

The Chairman. In other words, if we do not lie down and just let them walk over us, we are employing threats of war and preparation for war?

Mr. Morford. No; that I did not say.

The Chairman. You did not say it, but that is what you meant, was it not?

Mr. Morford. There is a choice of major reliance whether upon a peaceful negotiation or whether we want to build up a defense, as we indicate, against armed attack, which has behind it the threat of war and is supported by armaments. This is a part of the implementation.

The Chairman. You think that a nation which acts in defense of its soil and its territory and its people, if it resists an armed attack, is the one that is guilty by having determined to employ the threat of war and preparation for war? Is that your attitude?

Mr. Morford. No. My attitude would be that I think in the implications of this pact and building up resistance for attack, we will in effect be establishing a very tangible threat of war by the rearmament of Europe; and that in itself constitutes an aggressive act.

The Chairman. What would you do in case of an armed attack? What would you have the nation do? Just sit down and do nothing, let their armed attackers run over them?

Mr. Morford. No, that is exactly the practical problem, sir, that I find reflected by the American people, wondering what actually would constitute an adequate defense; and these practical considerations I would like to have an opportunity to present here.

The Chairman. Go ahead. I will not interrupt you any more. I have long since learned that when a fellow has an obsession, there is no use to interfere with him.

Mr. Morford. It is the conviction of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, which I represent, that ratification of the North Atlantic Defense Pact would be a gigantic leap in the direction of total and disastrous hot war. And we are convinced that a leap backward later even to our present untenable cold war position would be all but impossible.

This military alliance is called a defense pact. But it is a war pact directed toward the Soviet Union as the alleged aggressor nation.
We believe, however, that the nation most ravaged by World War II—both its people and its Government—fervently desires peace.

It is not accidental that Dr. Warne and others turned to Mr. John Foster Dulles in his statement to the American churchmen in Cleveland, and I have repeated it here, that no responsible official in our own or in any other government believes that the Soviet Union plans military aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. John Foster Dulles testified here before this committee that he is for ratification of this pact.

Mr. MORFORD. That is quite true, sir. But you see, what Mr. Dulles went on to say that I have here quoted was, that it was in his judgment quite unwise at this time to rearm Europe and to continue to establish bases in Europe for these could hardly be regarded by the other side as an act of aggression; and it would be too much to ask, said Mr. Dulles, that they restrain themselves in the event of such a situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the last time Mr. Dulles spoke on this thing he said he was for the pact.

Mr. MORFORD. That is correct, sir. But he is afraid of the armament that goes with it, and this is the thing I want to attest to here.

Yet it is proposed that 12 nations, including the United States, shall band together for the primary purpose of preparing for war against the Soviet Union and any friendly countries which may choose to cast their lot with the Soviet Union.

Other leaders who have spoken before me in this room and many other Americans in wider public forums have said that to create such an alliance is to sacrifice the future of the United Nations by undermining it now.

Others have pointed out that under pact provisions the traditional and exclusive right of our Congress to decide upon war as set forth in our Constitution is taken away. Others have expressed the belief that this country becomes automatically involved in war the day an attack breaks out at any point in the world where a signatory power may allege that aggression has taken place.

If this is not so by literal interpretation of the pact, it should be so practically, said Mr. Walter Lippmann in his Herald Tribune column on May 4. With these interpretations of the implications of the pact, barring Mr. Lippmann’s cynical wish, the National Council has publicly expressed its agreement before this time.

DANGER OF ARMAMENT RACE

But in addition to these points, we believe that it is important to emphasize before this committee again today our conviction that to undertake to fulfill the obligations of this pact is to initiate a worldwide armament race.

Whatever arms and men for Europe are required in the first year of operation is one question. The first staggering stories we were told by military spokesmen have been put on the shelf, and a modest appropriation of $1,000,000,000 plus for arms for Europe for the initial period is now proposed.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. Let me interrupt you. Do you know how big an army Russia has now?

Mr. MORFORD. I do not, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You ought to know. This organization of Russian friendship is saying that she wants peace. Do you not know that Russia today has the largest army on the globe?

Mr. MORFORD. That may well be possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not possible? Is it not so?

Mr. MORFORD. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think if you are going to testify before this committee on Russia's desire for peace and on military expenditures and all that, it looks to me as if you ought to post yourself on that before you come down here to tell us about it.

Go ahead. I will not press you on that.

Mr. MORFORD. I could talk on it, but I could not talk with authority concerning the actual armed forces of the Soviet Union. I do not think that information is available. It might well be, but it is not, and there are a whole line of reasons behind that.

As Secretary Johnson has already explained to you, the large amount of arms for western Europe will be surplus, provided at 10 to 15 percent of original value. In other words, western Europe is to receive at least $5,000,000,000 worth of American war material during the initial period. All this cost to be added to our own near $16,000,000,000 arms program, without speaking about millions for Greece and Turkey.

Earlier talk about manpower to go to Europe with the guns has been silenced in official quarters. The American people are entitled to know the true intentions of the proponents of this alliance and the cost in lives and fortune that is contemplated.

Sooner or later—and western Europe statesmen say it must be sooner—we shall have to invest from 20 to 30 billions of dollars in arming Europe and support the armament with as many as 100 divisions of men. This is the judgment of the well-known military analyst, Max Werner. I judge that the overwhelming bulk of the armament for western Europe, America will pay for, and that at least a quarter of the manpower we shall ultimately have to provide.

And will the defenses of western Europe then be impregnable? I am not convinced by the testimony of the military leadership of our own country. I do not think they are convinced themselves, if one can judge by the fight going on among the armed services as to where military superiority is to be found.

The CHAIRMAN. Your prediction of these dire results is based on your theory that there will be an armed attack on somebody in this treaty by an outside power. Is that not true?

Mr. MORFORD. It is based upon the proposition put forward here that it is necessary to build up defenses in order to resist a potential armed attack.

DANGERS OF REARMAMENT

A primary reason for our being here today to register our opposition to the pact is that we believe the results of a world-wide armament race are bound to be disastrous to the United States and its people.

We will ruin the economy of the United States in the process of arming Europe and ourselves. The families of this Nation are not going to be able to pay the bill in taxes over any extended period.
The President's chief economic adviser, Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, warned recently that additional spending for the rearmament of Europe would mean "additional taxes or * * * a budget deficit." Whatever the bankers say, when the families of the Nation are without money to buy the goods they need, the entire economic structure stands in peril. There have been collapses before.

The rearmament and preparation for war required by the pact would take us on a military adventure which, besides being economically ruinous, is in itself a form of aggression which both invites and justifies equal rearmament and preparation for war on the other side. Two armed camps will face each other. Has it not been said that the best defense is an offense, to move before the other fellow moves? This is the way war starts.

We do well to ponder the words of Sir Edward Gray following the First World War:

Great armaments lead inevitably to war * * * The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects.

On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts * * * it was these that made war (in 1914) inevitable.

In this kind of business the original objective of our foreign policy will be superseded by the objectives of massing superior military strength—beating the other fellow to the draw and winning the military victory—even though civilization may be destroyed.

For it is difficult to see how communism is to be contained or beaten or destroyed the world around by war. Is the result of a third world war to be different than the results of the first two? The New Statesman and Nation, conservative British weekly, concluded its recent editorial in opposition to the North Atlantic Pact with the warning that 200,000,000 people belonged to Communist regimes at the close of the First World War, that the total had risen to 600,000,000 at the end of World War II, and that it can be expected that communism will continue to advance wherever, as in China, the old order breaks down. If the defeat of communism is our goal, it should appeal to the sense of most Americans that neither the threat of war nor war itself will achieve it.

But now the things that are more peculiarly the things you would expect from me today.

SOVIET-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES

But what about the major differences which divide our country and the Soviet Union, you ask. Is not her system a threat to ours? Let me make answer. The Soviet Union about whom we speak today is the same socialist country that fought a war of liberation against Hitler side by side with us and our western allies.

The CHAIRMAN. But which was allied with Hitler and signed a treaty of alliance—

Mr. MORFORD. That was a treaty of expediency, sir, when it was not at all clear that the rest of Europe, and certainly not that America, was prepared to do battle with Hitler.

The CHAIRMAN. Signed it in the middle of the war, did they not?
Mr. Morford. They signed it at a point when Britain and France—
The Chairman. You know what I am asking you. Did they not sign it during the war?
Mr. Morford. Right.
The Chairman. Hitler and Ribbentrop?
Mr. Morford. Right.
The Chairman. And Hitler was then conquering all the other nations that he could conquer, and Russia joined with Hitler in a treaty; and it was only when Hitler broke the treaty and attacked Russia that she fought.
Mr. Morford. Britain gave way at Munich, as you recall, sir.
The Chairman. I am not talking about Britain. I am talking about Russia and Germany. What about it?
Mr. Morford. I am talking about the treaty of expediency that Russia made with Germany when she found that Britain was going to play Germany off against the Soviet Union because Britain wanted to defeat bolshevism.
The Chairman. All right. It seems to me you are apologizing for Russia all along the line. You say you want Russian and American friendship. I want to say my view is that we want Russian friendship. This committee wants Russian friendship. The whole Government of the United States wants Russian and American friendship, but we do not want it to be a one-way street. We want some friendship on their part.
Mr. Morford. That is correct.
The Chairman. Every day they are filling the air and the papers with abuse and denunciation and hatred of the United States. That is not a soil that generates friendship, is it?
Mr. Morford. No, sir; but my practical question is that I think neither is a business of rearming Europe a way to accomplish it either. I think it is impracticable and unsound. It is only on that basis I come, not as an apologist.
The Soviet Socialist system was no barrier to our joint fight for victory. Our system was no barrier to Soviet cooperation. The difference in systems is no greater today.
The sound and sensible conclusion we are constrained to draw is that two major systems exist in our world. Both will continue to live, each evoking the loyalty of tens of millions of people. They will not give way one to the other, no matter what the threat. They can live in peace with their differing economies and politics. They can cooperate to their mutual advantage.
Even yesterday a Russian spokesman declared on the Moscow radio heard in this country that “It is certainly natural that if two different systems could collaborate in war, even more can they collaborate in peacetime” and then he concluded that such collaboration is desirable in the interests of maintaining a stable peace.

EAST-WEST TRADE IN EUROPE

Yet we have chosen under conditions imposed through the Marshall plan to dam the flow of an East-West trade which would, in truth, advance European recovery on a permanent basis and save American money now going into the Marshall plan for productive purposes here at home, benefiting the American people. It is the American
businessman and financier who will attest to the profitable trade relations in the past with the Soviet Union whose capacity and willingness to purchase our goods is enormous and whose credit has been proved A-1.

The Chairman. Now, wait a minute. Let me interrupt you. You say that we have chosen conditions imposed through the Marshall plan to dam the flow of an East-West trade, and so on.

Mr. Morford. Right.

The Chairman. Do you not know that the ECA or the Marshall plan has been encouraging trade between the European nations and the Soviet satellites?

Mr. Morford. This, I am not clear about, Senator. I would like to—

The Chairman. If you are not clear on it, why do you make this bald statement which is not true?

Mr. Morford. Because I am not sure of the alleged truth that we have not attempted to curtail East-West trade.

The Chairman. Did you read the testimony before this committee on the ECA bill by Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Harriman and others, that they were encouraging trade between the East and satellite nations in western Europe?

Mr. Morford. But it is witness of the eastern countries, and it has been documented in the same international trade meetings, that they have not been able to gain export licenses for their materials, nor have the other countries been able to ship them the goods that they wanted. This has been true, sir, with regard to the trade treaty that stands between Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Chairman. I am not talking about Britain. I am talking about ECA and the Marshall plan.

Mr. Morford. Britain is a part of it, sir.

The Chairman. I know, but she is not running it. Mr. Hoffman is the Director. And as between the testimony of Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Harriman, and others here in this committee, you prefer to take the testimony of some of the countries of the satellite nations?

Mr. Morford. I do not, sir. I am trying to take the testimony of Britain, and at the moment Britain's testimony—

The Chairman. You said the representative—

Mr. Morford. Through the Board of Trade has been to the fact that she has been able to receive the food that the Soviet Union promised under trade agreement, and has not been able to ship the machinery because of the political bottleneck imposed by Bevin.

The Chairman. By whom?

Mr. Morford. By Mr. Bevin.

The Chairman. Bevin is not the ECA; I am talking about the Marshall plan now.

Mr. Morford. I am talking about the Marshall plan, as we take that Marshall plan and put the influence and the pressure upon Britain to prevent her from a full and free flow of trade.

The Chairman. Go ahead. I do not want to interrupt you any more. Go ahead and get through with your statement.

Mr. Morford. The Soviet Union has signed treaties of friendship with France and Britain. The Soviet Union concluded trade treaties with Britain and with other western European countries before the
Marshall plan crack-down on East-West trade. We are leading nations who presently depend upon us economically into an untenable position of enmity with the Soviet Union.

SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES

Why does not the United States undertake a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union? Such a treaty has been offered by the Soviet Union, and I judge that the Soviet Union would be willing to make cooperation concrete by a trade agreement also. Why should we enter a war pact against a nation that has offered us a pact of peace?

It is acknowledged there are difficult problems unsolved upon which friendly relations have broken in the past. Nobody denies the gravity of the problems; nobody will say that these can be settled without some compromise on both sides. But neither do we think that the price of settlement need be the sacrifice of principle or of legitimate interests and security needs on either side. Once again the Soviet Union is meeting us half way in an effort to settle one of those difficult problems left by World War II which, because of double intransigence, has raised a serious barrier between us. The Berlin blockade on both sides is to be lifted tomorrow.

Nothing would contribute more to the easing of world tensions and establish wholesome conditions for a fruitful meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the German peace settlement than the postponement on your part, gentlemen of the Senate, of decision on the North Atlantic Pact. It would demonstrate that we are not yet irrevocably committed to preparation for war; that our meeting at the conference table is in good faith.

HASTE IN RATIFICATION

I would like to establish this disagreement which you have already had with Professor Warne on this point, for we do feel that unnecessary haste toward ratification of a war pact at the time of a meeting—

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want it ever to be ratified. Of course you do not want any haste because you do not want it ever to be ratified.

Mr. MORFORD. This is the position of the council. The plea that I come to you with in the last sentence of this is a plea, sir, at least that you withhold while you are trying out the full possibilities of the peaceful negotiations which have again been resumed after this long break—

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you the question, though. You stated in your testimony that you are against ratification. That means you never want it ratified, and, of course, you complain of anything that looks toward ratifying it, whether it is haste or whether it is deliberations or what it is; you are against it.

Mr. MORFORD. I was not questioning here the haste. I was questioning here a relationship of attempting to ratify this completely new move in American foreign policy at a time when you are able to resume peaceful negotiations and see what can be accomplished at the council table.
The Chairman. We are going to have peaceful negotiations in the Foreign Ministers Conference on the 23d. I am perfectly willing to wait and see what they do. If Russia is there and has a veto in her pocket, it will not amount to anything.

Go ahead.

Mr. Morford. We are compelled to disagree strongly with the chairman of this committee the honorable Senator from Texas, Mr. Tom Connally, who was reported by the New York Herald Tribune to have stated last Sunday that the pact ought to be ratified in time to impress the Big Four Foreign Ministers when they meet in Paris on May 23.

Senator Connally was said to have warned that unnecessary delays "might be misunderstood and misrepresented" by the Russians. We feel, on the contrary, that unnecessary haste toward ratification of a war pact at the time of a meeting to find common ground for a peaceful settlement can only be understood by Russia as well as by other nations as an American demonstration against peace.

I come here today to say that the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship is not cynical about international relations. Some Americans see much to criticize in the actions of the Soviet Union. Some Americans have been critical of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. Nevertheless we believe that amity will be the reward of an honest effort of our two countries to face each other at the conference table as equal nations, feeling equal concern and responsibility for preserving both their own interests and world peace.

We shall not succeed in advancing the peace at the council table beginning May 23 if we suspend a sword above the chairs of the Soviet representatives. Nor will we succeed in subsequent peace conferences—indeed, it is hard to see how there can be any—if we go through now with an alliance which puts one sword in the hands of the western European nations, two swords in our own, and points them in the direction of the Soviet Union.

Not only will the peace be lost by such action. Not only will the so-called enemy nations suffer in war. We will do well to reckon coldly with the ancient Scriptural warning, "They that take the sword will perish by the sword."

For the sake of our own country and its people we ought to withhold approval of the North Atlantic Pact at this time. For the sake of mankind let us consider this matter further, gentlemen of the Senate. We do not want history to convict America of the crime of being ringleader among the nations which brought disaster and ruin to civilization. No amount of negotiation, however difficult and prolonged, can be as bad as one day of atomic war.

Let us stick to the ways of peace.

National Defense

The Chairman. All right. That is fine. If a nation should arm itself and make an armed attack on another nation, what would you want to do about it? Have peace and just let them come on in and take it?

Mr. Morford. No; that would be the time to decide whether it should be resisted.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you favor now? Suppose a nation arms itself and makes an attack on another nation. What do you want to do about it? What would you favor?

Mr. MORFORD. I would want to know what the nature of the attack is. I do not want to make a generalization, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any kind of an attack. That is the nature, any kind. Would you favor just lying down and letting them walk over you? That is the way to have peace, just to let the other fellow do what he pleases to you and do nothing about it, and you have got peace. But you have got slavery with it.

Mr. MORFORD. But if there is an armed attack, sir, that does not necessarily mean that you want to assemble all of the forces which already have been assembled to throw the world into war because of an attack that may take place at any one point where any nation alleges there has been aggression.

There are too many complications in that kind of a business for me to make an answer at this point that is reasonable.

The CHAIRMAN. You decline to answer, then? Is that right?

Mr. MORFORD. On the basis that I have just indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You seem to think that nearly every-thing Russia does is right and nearly everything your country does is wrong.

Mr. MORFORD. I have not said so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you have not said so, but is that not the upshot of your testimony?

Mr. MORFORD. I do not think that is the implication. The only thing I am saying is what we are finding among the people, that even though the objectives may be accepted, this is not the practicable way. In fact, this is the ruinous way to try to meet even the objectives which have been the basis of our foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, namely, to contain communism the world around.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you very much. I am sorry the other members of the committee are not present to interrogate you further.

Mr. MORFORD. You have been very patient.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. I want to warn all further wit-nesses that you had better come with your written statements because the chances are that we will not be able to hear you all at length on every imaginable question unless you put it in a written statement, that we can incorporate in the record and allow you about 5 minutes to then explain what the written statement means.

We will recess until tomorrow at 10:30 a.m.

(Thereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee recessed until Thursday morning, at 10:30 a.m., May 12, 1949.)

(The following statement was submitted for the record:)

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. DAY, COUNSEL OF WE, THE PEOPLE, INC., BEFORE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES SENATE, MAY 11, 1949

The pending treaty marks a violent departure from the time-honored position of the United States in foreign affairs. It also marks a violent departure from the Constitution of the United States. There must be strong justification for such a step and the record discloses no such justification. We are forced to con-side that the pending treaty does not stand alone; that it is but a link in a chain of events most of which are secret and unknown to the American people.
No one can believe that this treaty is not aimed at any particular nation. We all know that the Soviet Union is the aggressor expected to make the "armed attack" set forth in article 5. If Congress should declare war in the constitutional manner against the Soviet Union for reasons deemed sufficient, we would have no objection. But we do object to a betrayal of the birthright of every American citizen by an underhanded and sneaking approach which is unparalleled in our history.

Take for instance the report to the Security Council of the United Nations that an armed attack has been made against one of the signatories and that armed force "shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." What a travesty is involved in these words when we know that the Soviet Union is a member of the Security Council, possesses the veto power over its decisions, and at the same time is the aggressor. Furthermore, we all know that the United Nations and its Security Council have no police force and could not possibly "restore and maintain international peace and security." Such provisions do not do credit to a great Nation like the United States.

Britain and France already have treaties with the Soviet Union which are in exact contradiction with the pending treaty. These nations would have to decide which of the two treaties they should honor. In fact, a leading official in France has indicated that France will examine any given situation to determine which nation is the aggressor, the United States or the Soviet Union, and then France will aid that nation which in her opinion is not the aggressor. What will become of the munitions of war provided by the United States to France? Will they be used against us? We all know that there are millions of Communists in France who have openly stated through their leaders that they will never fight against the Soviet Union.

It has been argued that this treaty will prevent World War III; when it is known in advance that the United States is committed to come to the aid of the nation upon which an aggression has been made, the Soviet Union will not fight. It is pointed out that we could have avoided participation in World War I and World War II if we had taken similar action before those wars. This is mere wishful thinking.

Under the Constitution of the United States the people are sovereign. Our Supreme Court has held that a treaty cannot change the character of the Government. We cannot permit any authority to exercise powers superior to the sovereign people of the United States. It is quite conceivable that under this treaty with its military alliances, the ruling authority of the North Atlantic Pact could carry on a state of war for the indefinite future and the character of our Government would of necessity be changed. This ruling authority of the pact would give only a small voice to the United States and our destiny as a free republic would be lost. The price is entirely too high.

From our commitments in the Marshall plan and the other international obligations we have assumed, the Soviet Union is well aware of our attitude should it be so misguided as to extend the iron curtain further into Europe. We alone possess the atom bombs and a great fleet of B-36 land-based bombers to carry them. We now have sufficient bases from which to laugh them without the entanglement of this treaty. In fact, our best defense depends on our freedom of action and we must remain unfettered by any ruling authority of the pact which could disagree with our own board of strategy. Certainly, the wording of the pending treaty falls far short of protecting the United States which is the only Nation with sufficient power to offset the Soviet Union. This is a highly dangerous leap in the dark and not too well considered.

When it comes to implementing the treaty with vast supplies of armament, and the treaty and the arms are intertwined to such a degree that they are inseparable, the difficulty of decision is simplified. For it is out of the question that we can for a moment build up a vast arsenal on foreign shores to last perhaps forever. Our domestic needs are already reaching gigantic proportions, our national debt is colossal, there is developing in the United States a feeling of indifference and complacency that does not augur well for the continuation of a strong and healthy republic. Let us refrain from ratifying this treaty until we know more about it and where we are going. In justice to the sovereign people of the United States, we can do no other.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE L, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

PART 3
PRIVATE WITNESSES
MAY 12, 13, 16, 17, AND 18, 1949

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE L, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

PART 3
PRIVATE WITNESSES
MAY 12, 13, 16, 17, AND 18, 1949

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1949
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EXECUTIVE L, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

PART 3

PRIVATE WITNESSES

MAY 12, 13, 16, 17, AND 18, 1949

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1949
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

TOM CONNALLY, Texas, Chairman

WALTER F. GEORGE, Georgia
ELBERT D. THOMAS, Utah
MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Maryland
CLAUDE PEPPER, Florida
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, Rhode Island
BRIEN McMAHON, Connecticut
J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Arkansas

ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, Michigan
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, New Jersey
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr., Massachusetts

FRANCIS O. WILCOX, Chief of Staff
C. C. O’DAY, Clerk
RICHARD H. HEINDEL, Staff Associate
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements by</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Oliver S., vice chairman, Progressive Party of Massachusetts</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bender, Mrs. Clifford A., Women's Division of Christian Service, the Methodist Church</td>
<td>1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boss, Charles F., Jr., executive secretary, Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford, Joseph L.</td>
<td>1062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brickjilf, John</td>
<td>1071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Harvey W., international president, International Association of Machinists</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candfield, Cass, chairman of the executive committee, United World Federalists</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cockrell, Ewing, president, United States Federation of Justice</td>
<td>1015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton, Rev. J. Paul</td>
<td>1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culbertson, Ely, chairman of the Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform, Inc.</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curry, A. Stauffer, Brethren Service Commission, Church of the Brethren</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'Aquino, Carl</td>
<td>1107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durr, Clifford, president, National Lawyers Guild</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerson, E. A., Middletown Citizens Committee</td>
<td>1063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulsey, Mrs. Loretta, national legislative chairman, American War Mothers</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, Fyke</td>
<td>1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish, Hamilton</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffith, Dr. H. M., vice president, National Economic Council</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, Gilbert A., national chairman, American Veterans Committee</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, Mrs. Robert R.</td>
<td>1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayford, Mrs. Jane L., director of World Organization of Mothers of All Nations</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson, Donald, president, Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union, CIO</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howe, Rev. Lee A., president of the Baptist Pacifist Fellowship</td>
<td>1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunton, W. A., secretary of the Council on African Affairs</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyes, Scott</td>
<td>1102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohlberg, Alfred, chairman, American China Policy Association</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaFollette, Charles M., Americans for Democratic Action</td>
<td>939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laird, George R.</td>
<td>1182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libby, Frederick J., executive secretary, National Council for Prevention of War</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindfield, Seymour, executive director, Young Progressives of America</td>
<td>1028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallory, Lawrence R., Jr.</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDaniel, Winston, Dane County chapter, Progressive Party of Wisconsin</td>
<td>1185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nettels, Curtis P., professor, Cornell University</td>
<td>1107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcomb, Elliott H., national executive director, American Veterans of World War II</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowak, Stanley</td>
<td>1063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordower, Sidney L., Progressive Party of Illinois</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oswalt, Miss Grace</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parshall, G. Burton, Friends Social Order Committee of Philadelphia</td>
<td>1072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peters, Robert H., Peace-makers</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirinsky, George, executive secretary, American Slav Congress</td>
<td>1049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reardon, Thomas J., United States Constitutional Defense Committee</td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhoads, Paul L., secretary, Progressive Party of Central Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards, Edwar C. M., War Resisters League</td>
<td>1081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richle, David S.</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogge, O. John</td>
<td>1131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scherbak, H</td>
<td>1154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smedley, Frederick C.</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart, Mrs. Alexander, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
<td>928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart, Mrs. Carolyn Hill</td>
<td>1048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CONTENTS

**Statements by—Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Dr. Joe T., president, United Congo Improvement Association, Inc.</td>
<td>1163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tittman, A. O.</td>
<td>1165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topping, Nicholas</td>
<td>1165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyler, Aieott L., Local No. 121, Chemical Workers of America, CIO</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernon, Miss Mabel, director, Peoples Mandate Committee</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahlgren, Edward M., Detroit Peace Council</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wals, Mrs. Agnes</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls, Bishop William J., African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weltz, Bernard, national legislative representative, Jewish War Veterans of the United States</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Don, American Legion</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Letters, resolutions, telegrams, and statements submitted for the record by—**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert MacBeth, associate professor of English, Villanova College</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. C. Dickerson, executive vice president, American Cotton Shippers Association</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. D. Douglas</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker McCollester</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. D. Youkum, City Club of Chicago</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Harlee Bordeaux, the American Council of Christian Churches</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George M. Harrison, grand president, Brotherhood of Railway Clerks</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Educational Center for the United Nations, Trinity College</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irving M. Engel, Willard Straight Post, the American Legion</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clare Purcell, the Methodist Church, Birmingham, Ala</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of Jewish Women</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rita Schaefer, the Catholic Association for International Peace</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max F. Stockner, Powell-Martin-Barrett Post, American Legion</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Wall, international labor relations committee, the American Federation of Labor</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Green, president, American Federation of Labor</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip R. White, Institute for Cancer Research</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Scarlett, chairman, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Inc.</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James M. Youngdale</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles E. Sands, International representative, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willard Uphaus, executive secretary, National Religion and Labor Foundation</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. D. Oaklander, secretary, Furriers Joint Council of New York</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James G. Patton, president, National Farmers Union</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth and Merle Shipman</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen S. Mangold, president, Social Service Employees' Union, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Rendelro</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifford R. Johnson</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Pierce Corson, bishop, Philadelphia annual conference of the Methodist Church</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe Skolnick, chairman, Ladies Garment Center, American Labor Party</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph H. Stecher, secretary, American Bar Association</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester Wood, secretary, New York State Bar Association</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Bjorn Bjornson</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gilman</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. Abt, general counsel, Progressive Party</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Buckley, Commissioner of Administration, Commonwealth of Massachusetts</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Dean Acheson</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Scott, national president, American League for An Undivided Ireland</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Dean Acheson</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Index of witnesses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summtary index of parts 2 and 3</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment on Wednesday, May 11, 1949, in the room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Connally (chairman) and Vandenberg.
Also present: Senator Donnell.
Senator Vandenberg (acting chairman). The committee will come to order.
Senator Connally is temporarily detained in a meeting of the Finance Committee, and will be here shortly. He has asked me to make the record until he arrives.
On the list that is handed me the first witness is Mr. Oliver S. Allen, vice chairman, Progressive Party of Massachusetts. Mr. Allen, will you have a seat? We will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF OLIVER S. ALLEN, VICE CHAIRMAN, PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Allen. My name is Oliver S. Allen. I am appearing against ratification of the Atlantic Pact as vice president of the Progressive Party of Massachusetts, as a former Democratic nominee for Congress in Massachusetts, and also as one who served in Europe as a United States naval officer for 2½ years in World War II.

On Tuesday, I received a telegram from the clerk of your committee saying that the committee would be "willing to allot me 5 minutes." Then I picked up the New York Times and read "Senators to Speed Ratification to Aid Paris Talks." Senator, I have nothing against speed in the proper places, but I know I express the conviction of most New Englanders when I say that no considerations can warrant precipitate action upon a proposal which, for the first time in our history, commits us to a peacetime military alliance.

REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY

I oppose the pact for the following reasons:

First. It strikes at the heart of the United Nations no matter how artful the language employed to conceal that fact. It is the climax to our policy of killing UNRRA, proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, launching the Marshall plan outside the UN, and retaining potential war industry in unrepentant Nazi Germany. Beyond the pact lies
an inevitable arms race and beyond that, as history tells, us, war. No informed historian can conscientiously advocate the pact as a promoter of peace.

Second. The pact is based upon the theory that you can't do business with the Russians but the Russians have repeatedly expressed a desire to negotiate outstanding differences and have lifted the Berlin blockade without the condition that we give up our plans for western Germany, plans which we will ultimately have to forego if we are to avoid world war III. Much is said about Russian aggression, but John Foster Dulles tells us that no responsible high official believes the Russians plan conquest by military aggression. And if you mean ideological aggression, the only way to meet that is to raise living standards to the point where communism will lose its appeal. The pact will interfere with that job.

Third. The advocates of the pact assume that you get agreement in international affairs by means of a get-tough policy so ardently espoused by military men. Franklin Roosevelt knew better. You may get a temporary armed truce that way but never a settlement. Settlement is going to require that we provide security against a renascent German militarism, that we support long overdue industrial and agricultural reform, and a world program for abundance under the United Nations without strings of political ideology attached.

Fourth. The financial outlay morally committed by the pact to police the world with arms, in the long run, will leave us weaker than the Russians. It will mean lower living standards and neglect of human welfare. It will mean shackled labor, further invasion of civil liberty and increasing military control of our lives. And temporary employment in arms production would be provided at the expense of a catastrophic depression with radical social change later on.

Fifth. By ultimately channeling western European manpower into military pursuits, the prospects of European recovery would be destroyed and western Europe would be on a permanent American dole.

Sixth. As the obligations of the pact have been defined by the Secretary of State, we might well find ourselves involved in domestic and colonial uprisings against exploitation all over the globe. The common people would hate us as many of them now undoubtedly do in China. We cannot prosper or even survive if we lose the affection of the common people.

Seventh. The pact means military arrangements with countries right up to the borders of the Soviet Union. The suspicious Russians might well believe that they were going to be attacked as they have been so many times and that belief alone could produce war.

Eighth. As a practical matter, the pact much reduces Congress' power to declare war. A President, strongly influenced by the military, could feel much less restrained by our Constitution if he had the pact.

Ninth. From a military point of view, there would be little sense in sending the arms without the men. Europe does not have the available manpower to handle the arms and what manpower it has will have little taste for arms for a long time. Therefore, you will have to draft American boys.
For these reasons, I respectfully urge rejection of the pact, and I urge that caution be followed at this time in taking precipitate action.

I close with a quotation from an editorial in the Boston Globe of yesterday, entitled "Undue Haste": Senator Connally seeks to justify his sudden dedication to haste by explaining this speedy ratification will impress Russia. The need in this tremendously important matter is not to worry about the viewpoint of the Russians, but to emphasize the importance of giving thorough and complete information to Americans.

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Allen, I simply want to suggest to you my own complete agreement with the thesis that this pact must be totally explored before there is any action upon it, and I feel that the chairman of the committee is also quite anxious to pursue that policy. If there have been any suggestions with respect to limitation of time, it is simply a reflection of the fact that we have a terrifically long list of applications to testify, and there is obvious duplication and repetition in much of the list.

I think you can be sure that at least so far as one member of this committee is concerned it is his opinion that this pact if adopted, is of no greater use than is measured by the conscious acceptance of it by American public opinion.

Mr. Allen. I am sure those remarks will reassure the country.

Senator Donnell. Just a few.

Declaration of War

The eighth point which you make is "As a practical matter, the pact much reduces Congress' power to declare war." Am I correct in understanding by that statement that you do not mean that the pact would alter the fact that Congress under the Constitution is the only body that has power to declare war, but that you do mean that under the operation of the pact it would be easily possible that through Executive action in going ahead with war preparations and actual participation in war there would be no practical alternative left to Congress except to declare war?

Mr. Allen. That is what I mean, Senator. Of course, as matters now stand, the President has authority as the Chief Executive to move our armed forces about. The power to declare war is in the Congress. The effect of this pact, as I see it, would be to encourage a President who might be at some time strongly influenced by the military to take action without feeling the restraint of the Constitution.

Senator Donnell. And would you agree with this, that although the President does have power today as Commander in Chief of the Army to move our forces under some circumstances, at any rate there is today no contractual obligation between this country and 11 other countries obligating us to consider an attack on one of them as an attack on us.

Mr. Allen. I feel that is true, and I feel that the pact here, no matter how artful the explanation, is a contractual commitment on our part to do certain things which will lead to war.
Senator DoNNELL. There is no doubt in your mind that the pact is a contractual obligation and puts us under some type of obligation under which we presently are not?

Mr. ALLEN. In my opinion.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator DoNNELL. Mr. Allen, just a word in regard to your own experience and profession. I observe your service in Europe as a United States naval officer. Would you tell us, please, just what is your own business or profession, and just a little of your educational background?

Mr. ALLEN. I am a lawyer, Senator, a graduate of Dartmouth College and Harvard Law School, and have practiced law in the city of Boston apart from my service in the Second World War.

Senator DoNNELL. Are you related to J. Weston Allen, of Boston?

Mr. ALLEN. I am no relation. My family is all stanch Republican as he was, but I am Progressive.

Senator DoNNELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Lawrence R. Mallery, Jr.

Mr. MALLERY. Thank you, Senator.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE R. MALLERY, JR., MALVERN, PA.

Mr. MALLERY. I am Lawrence R. Mallery, Jr., of Philadelphia and Malvern. I did serve with the American Friends Service Committee for 14 months, but I am testifying today as an individual.

Senator VANDENBERG. You have that right.

Mr. MALLERY. Thank you, Senator.

MILITARY INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

As a member of the American Friends Service Committee for 14 months, I was given the opportunity and time to examine and accumulate considerable factual material on the role which our military has and is playing in our economy, politics, and in our thinking in general, as well as its influence on our international behavior. I respect the sincerity of the interest of our military leaders in preventing war, and protecting our national security. We have supplied them with more funds and influence than they have ever before enjoyed in our peacetime history. Military men have held key positions in our Government, and have served as our ambassadors to foreign governments.

During the past 4 years we have appropriated more than $50,000,-000,000 for their use to build up a stock pile of atom bombs, maintain an Air Force to deliver the bombs in large quantity anywhere on the globe, maintain the largest military force of manpower in our peacetime history, finance peacetime military conscription in this country, and build military bases all over the world. No military machine is worth a nickel without an enemy, and the avowed enemy of military leaders is communism. I contend that despite the almost unlimited resources at their disposal our military leaders have failed to achieve their avowed purpose, and for two basic reasons:
1. Communism, like democracy or Christianity, is an ideology against which no military machine or threat of force can be successfully pitted.

2. Economic poverty breeds communism, and by voting UNRRA out of existence and by diverting our resources to enormous military preparation we are indirectly responsible for the very conditions in which communism is flourishing in the war-ravaged nations of the world.

DANGERS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

Psychologically, a military alliance such as the proposed North Atlantic Pact will serve to increase the ardor of the despairing Eurasian who is more readily enticed by promises of a subsistence level. Furthermore, such a military alliance will further the fallacious concept that military strength, and possibly war, offers a solution to mankind’s basic problems.

We cannot blame our military leaders for our slow progress in eliminating the causes of war. We must blame ourselves, and specifically our statesmen, for having accepted the oversimplification of our military leaders that we can prevent war by arming for it, and that Russia is responsible for the current threat of war. Accepting such an oversimplification has narcotized us to the awful realization that our problems are infinitely more complex, that war will further intensify them, and that unless we begin to solve our problems by means other than war the very survival of civilization is unlikely.

The gap between our technological progress and our sociological incompetence has grown so broad that what is required of us is a revolutionary abandonment of the framework of old ideas and the substitution of the concept that our fate is not inexorably linked with that of all of the peoples of the world, for our present concepts of nationalism. Security is no longer possible on a national level, and the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect in which a benevolent global community can be achieved will not take place until our statesmen rededicate themselves to the fundamental moral principles that so competently guide our lives on a community level.

To blame Russia for our military preparation, for the existent fear in this country, and for the heart sick despair of the peoples of many of the rest of the countries of the world is to indulge in neurotic escapism. We must, instead, confess that we have so far failed to display an intellectual, moral, and practical courage sufficient to convince even our own citizenry that we have and are exploring with untiring diligence the means of creating a mutually acceptable world order. Nothing short of an herculean effort, unprecedented in human history, is required of us if we are to reverse our fateful direction and declare our faith in the fundamental goodness of mankind. The North Atlantic Pact would constitute still another instrument of fear, with the practical effect of accomplishing the very opposite of what we must unequivocally strive to achieve, a world united for the common good of all mankind. We are, in fact, dealing not with nations but with 2,000,000,000 human beings. The dignity of the human being is our divine mission, not his destruction. Because of our in-
comparable material, political, and sociological superiority over any other nation, leadership must inevitably come from us. We must substitute an ever-increasing demonstration of good faith for our present attitude of distrust, and we must substitute self-criticism and conciliation for our present critical attitude toward Russia. Russia, and all of the other relatively undeveloped countries of the world, need our help, not our hate. Not only our security, but our very survival, depends upon our ability to reconcile our differences. The North Atlantic Pact is not a pact of reconciliation, but a commitment to old techniques which are no longer valid. Modern society finds itself in the dilemma in which its salvation lies in a power in which it apparently has no faith—the spirit of love as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount.

I plead that you gentlemen dedicate yourselves to the conviction that the American people and our democratic government have the moral strength to meet the appalling crisis in which our immoral society finds itself.

Senator Vandenberg, I have a few excerpts that I would appreciate it if I could insert them in the record. I was told you were short of time.

Senator Vandenberg. Very well.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

[From the Fellowship, May 1949]

THE NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY ALLIANCE, CALLED A FORCE FOR PEACE, THREATENS REALLY TO BE A PACT WITH DEATH

(By Alfred Hassler)

By the time this issue of Fellowship reaches its readers, the North Atlantic Security Alliance, whose actual provisions were first made public on March 19, may have been signed by the participating countries and ratified by the United States Senate. If it is, that will be one of the more ominous indications of how completely this fear-ridden country has abandoned faith in itself and in every democratic value in favor of reliance on military power.

The pact is a military alliance. It commits the United States more directly to participation in war than any previous move in our history except for actual congressional declarations of war. It undermines, probably fatally, the one hesitant approach the nations have made toward a permanent world organization. It writes finis, for the time at least, to the so-recent dreams of "one world," and chooses instead a two-world division that contains the ominous possibility of becoming no world at all.

The published draft of the North Atlantic Security Alliance provides that the parties "consult together" when any of them is "threatened"; and regard an armed attack on any one of them "in Europe or North America" as an attack on all, to be resisted by action including the use of armed force.

Actually, the wording of the document is relatively unimportant. Nations that insist on unlimited sovereignty reserve automatically the right to default on the most sacred treaties if they consider it in their "national interest" to do so. The evil of the pact lies not so much in what it says as in the fact that it was written at all.

With the world political scene what it is, no one can seriously doubt that the United States would resist militarily any armed attack on western Europe by Russia. The depressing importance of this treaty lies in its tacit assumption that hope for a peaceful solution to our world problems is dead and that for the indefinite future all mankind must be divided between two armed camps.

Despite the pact's pious protestations that it is purely defensive and not directed against any specific nation, the motivation behind it on the part of its moving spirit and indispensable participant—the United States—is obviously:
1. To win the cold war with Russia and preserve peace by a policy of "containment";
2. To prepare strategically to fight and win a war against Russia if the policy of containment does not work.

American architects of the pact expect it to accomplish these purposes in three principal ways:

1. By encouraging the free democracies of western Europe (which will probably include totalitarian Portugal and may later include Fascist Spain) to resist Soviet pressure on the more or less explicit promise of American armed aid in the event of war;

2. By arranging to supply the armies of these same free democracies with American arms, to create a buffer force that can take the first shock of an attack and perhaps slow it down long enough for the United States to launch atomic bombing raids and other countermeasures;

3. By acquiring, in exchange for these arms and promises, American military and air bases in Europe, thus furnishing evidence to the Kremlin of American determination, and at the same time making available a beachhead for operations when war comes.

NO CHANGE IN POLICY

The pact does not represent any sudden reversal in official American thinking. On the contrary, it follows logically from the Truman doctrine, our policy of toughness in Germany, and the anti-Communist refinements of the Marshall plan. So the opposition to it is not essentially new, but grows out of a conviction that the American Government has grossly misconstrued the nature of the world conflict, and is taking countermeasures more likely to heighten the danger than avert it.

One of the most important aspects of the pact, from the point of view of the United States, is that it effectually bypasses the constitutional right of Congress to declare war. This will be true no matter what legalistic phrases may be incorporated to save face for Congress. Unless the pact is so radically altered as to become a totally new document, the decisions for war or peace will in fact be made on the military level, by a joint western European-American staff dominated by United States military personnel and policies, and a minor incident set off by someone relatively obscure could plunge us into war.

Diplomatic and trade relations between East and West and policy decisions in all matters will be regulated by their effect on the military situation. Censorship will be widely extended and political retraction encouraged in the name of security. This process is already well begun, but there has been hope that increased attention to trade and functional cooperation might gradually shift the balance the other way. With the signing of the pact, which means total commitment to the idea of a two-power division of the world heading for eventual military conflict, that hope will virtually disappear.

There is a parallel to this situation in modern penology that was observed by most CO's who did time in prison during the last war. Theoretically, what is called custody—the business of walls, guns, guards, and punishment—is only a part, and a minor part, of the prison picture. Custody is the necessary framework within which the reform and rehabilitation techniques are supposed to operate. That is the theory. In practice, custody dominates everything. The necessity of keeping men confined against their passionate desire to be free requires such a concentration of attention and effort on the part of both keepers and convicts, that there is neither the time nor the psychological climate for rehabilitation to operate. The result is that the rates for both crime and recidivism continue to climb even while penology becomes more enlightened and effective.

So it will inevitably be with the pact. Decisions as to allocations of rearmament funds will, of course, be made on a military basis, but so will the distribution of so-called reconstruction money of the ERP. ERP money increasingly will go where it can most effectively build the war potential of western Europe, rather than where it can stimulate peacetime production and a stable economy. The signing of the pact will have been our confession that we now have thrown our full reliance for security on the military; they would be more than human if they did not emphasize the inevitable corollary, that military considerations therefore become preeminent and unchallengeable.
Some recipients of ERP aid spend more on arms and armies than they receive from ERP, and the United States is urging them to spend more. Here are the figures, in millions of dollars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ERP</th>
<th>Arms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium-Luxembourg</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,374</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fallacy of guaranteeing peace or security by signing military alliances becomes clear when the supposed logic of the method is examined. Here are two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, at which world military and industrial power is polarized. To one or the other of the two the other, weaker powers are gravitating, with varying degrees of reluctance, drawn by considerations of economic or geographic dependence and literally unable to remain aloof in a world where a neutral is suspect by both sides.

These two great powers are now almost pathologically fearful and suspicious of each other. Neither, it may be safely presumed, actually wants war—certainly their peoples do not. Yet each, driven by its fears, not only continues to increase its preparations for war but, in order to make palatable the enormous sacrifices that such preparations entail for its citizens, constantly works at the task of heightening, rather than lessening, the fear and suspicion.

This task is made infinitely simpler by the aggressive-looking, suspicion-motivated actions that each of the two powers takes periodically: increased arms appropriations, extension of military conscription, establishment of military or political beachheads beyond the power's own boundaries, and so on.

Each of these actions, justified to the home population as defensive, is inspired by a previous act of the enemy power, and in turn is the inspiration for his next countermove.

With that kind of pattern for a guide, what is the thesis of the North Atlantic Pact? Reduced to its simplest terms, it is that by uniting western Europe militarily with the United States, thus bringing American power literally and physically to the very borders of the Soviet Union, present Russian suspicions will not be materially increased, but the Russian threat will be effectively countered.

FACT WILL INCREASE FEAR

Logically, the proposition is absurd. The signing of the pact inevitably will heighten Russian fears and simultaneously provide the Politburo with invaluable propaganda ammunition for use both in Russia and in the rest of the uneasy world. Militarily, Russia will counter with increased armaments, increased pressure on her satellite nations, and increased efforts to strengthen native Communist movements in the western nations. These moves will turn the security gained from the pact to ashes in our mouths, and stimulate us to new and more expensive measures, and so on and on. The history of militarism has shown impressively what the ultimate end of that kind of action-reaction chain will be.

Without a doubt the pact is the death sentence of the United Nations. The disingenuous attempts of the State Department to bring the pact under the UN mantle by citing article 51 will deceive no one; the pact is the culmination of a succession of crippling blows that, on the part of the United States, began at San Francisco with the insistence on the veto power, and progressed through the sabotage of UNRRA, the bypassing of the UN in the Greek-Turkish Truman doctrine affair, and the decision to keep the Marshall plan reins of ERP in the nationalistic hands of the United States rather than turning them over to the UN.

THE NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE

What is most disheartening is the almost complete failure of the American Government and press alike to comprehend either the real outline of the world struggle or the real nature of world communism. In the face of instance after
instance of the sacrificial devotion of individual men and women to communism, going to the extent of a willingness to suffer prison or martyrdom, most of us persist in regarding communism as a wholly cynical quest for power on the part of a greedy and unscrupulous group of politicians.

The fact is that communism's world strength is a form of religious fervor surpassing that exhibited on a large scale by any of the other world religions today. Communism's appeal is the masses is the promise to hungry people of a world in which there will be enough to eat; to exploited people of a world free of exploitation; to minorities of a world free of discrimination; to the insecure of a world of security. In their despair, hungry, homeless men will close their eyes to the brutality of communism's methods and embrace it as their only hope in a bitter world.

There was a time, not very many years ago, when democracy had that kind of appeal and aroused that kind of fervor. That was the time when democracy meant freedom from tyranny to the tyrannized, freedom of opportunity to the enslaved, freedom of speech to the terrorized.

But America's great reservoir of good will around the world has almost disappeared. In the sight of millions of the world's people the United States now is the principal defender of the status quo, the fabulously rich nation whose charity is doled out only to the deserving poor, the democracy whose fine professions are belied by undemocratic actions at home and abroad.

Many non-Communist Europeans already are fearful of the tremendous added strain to their shaky economies that the Atlantic Pact's emphasis on military strength will mean, as many Americans are afraid of what the cost of arming western Europe, estimated at four to five billions a year, will do even to our prosperous country. If the pact means, as it will, the slackening of progress in rebuilding peacetime production, and the sentencing again of millions of men to the empty waste of military service, the result may well be the very conditions of despair in which communism recruits its new millions of adherents. So that from a coldly practical viewpoint, the consequences of the pact are likely to be a heightened tension between the governments in the east and west reaching its breaking point at the time when the fears and privations of the masses of the people result in a world-wide strengthening of the Communist movement.

There still is an alternative way we could travel. The real oppressors of the world's people today are poverty and exploitation and war. Democracy could quickly recapture its appeal for all the world if it made an all-out attack on these. If the United States were to concentrate its efforts on the kind of constructive activities suggested by President Truman's proposal to develop the backward parts of the world (but free from its imperialistic implications) the effect would be electrifying. If the United States were to appeal for universal disarmament, agreeing at the start to dismantle its atomic bombs and bomb plants, a thrill of hope would run through the world that no propaganda ministry could effectively distort.

That kind of program would be an idea, a creative, dynamic idea that could capture the enthusiastic allegiance of millions—the idea of a world of abundance and peace without the repressive political machinery that communism deems necessary. That kind of idea would take the appeal out of the Communist idea and the sting from the Communist threat. Military alliances will not.

MILTON MAYER WARNS ABOUT JOHN FOSTER DULLES

John Foster Dulles was in Cleveland the other week to address the Third National Study Conference of the Churches and World Order, under the auspices of the Federal Council of Churches. The Christian Century, which tries harder than I do to cherish the institutional churches as the repositories of salvation, asserted that "the Cleveland conference leaned heavily on John Foster Dulles, who spoke more frequently on the variety of subjects which were before it than any other person." If the Century speaks truly, and I suppose it does, the conclusion is irresistible that Mr. Dulles is an ever-weakening reed.

Under the editorial title "Cleveland Strikes Out!" the Century reported that the delegates' "actions in the conference and the statements with which they concluded what they had to say on the floor were in most cases cautious and equivocal, secularistic and confused. If this is the best the churches can do, it is to be hoped that the third national study conference will be better." The Century's whole report was a blister, but what fixed my attention in connection with Mr. Dulles, was the Century's documented assertion that "the conference
voted against the principle of the Atlantic Pact, it voted for the principle, and it voted that it could take no position upon the pact."

Now if Mr. Dulles is to be judged as a burgeoning Christian, it must be in connection with such phenomena as the institutional church's attitude toward Atlantic pacts and the like, since Mr. Dulles affects to study of its national statesman as well as something of its connexion with such phenomena as the Institutional church's attitude toward it. Mr. Dulles, as key man of the United States military arrangements with an Atlantic pact, was as well as you and I did. He knew that the pact was a military alliance for a declaration of war by its signatories on the occasion of an aggression by unnamed parties on any one of them. Knowing this, he knew that the pact was the death warrant for the United Nations, whose article 53 says that "no enforcement shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." The pact violates the UN Charter and destroys the UN and if Mr. Dulles didn't know it he didn't know what the American newspaper readers knew.

But Mr. Dulles was being disingenuous. He said at Cleveland that "the people of western Europe, and particularly of Scandinavia, ought not to seem to be starting United States military might directly to Russia's border." I urge you to pipe. In passing, this Christian statesman's emphasis on seeing, and then I go on to quote Mr. Dulles: "It would, indeed, involve a high tribute to Soviet leaders to assume that, under these circumstances, they would exercise more self-control than would our people under comparable circumstances, as, for example, if the Soviet Union had military arrangements with a country at our border."

Mr. Dulles was saying that the Atlantic Pact was a declaration of war and that Stalin was crazy if he didn't attack us now. But Mr. Dulles was trying to say it the unintelligible way because, first, he intended to support the pact and to commit the institutional church to compliance with it, and, second, he intended to return to Cleveland some day, after Russia had been goaded into war and the United States (as well as Russia) was defeated, and remind the Institutional church that he had warned them.

Having run his errand in Cleveland, Mr. Dulles then returned to the pure air of the temporal world and proceeded to support the pact, saying, "It does mean that if an attack occurs within the North Atlantic area, and the Security Council cannot handle it, then the United States has a duty to act to repel the attack and to restore peace." This is, of course, mere gobbledygook, concealing, but not too well, the statement that the United States will violate article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which specifies that the Security Council, and no one else, can and must handle attacks.

Says the Century, "The conference never did decide whether the reality with which it was most concerned lay in guns and goods or in God as He is revealed in Jesus Christ. * * * The statements generally lacked the note of Christian
love. The discussion of justice and human rights consistently dealt with these in terms of expediency, as a means to curb Russia rather than to express Christian brotherhood. Amazing blind spots averted the conference from the use in war of atomic and other methods of mass destruction, the continuance of peacetime conscription, the reduction of our colossal arms budget, the curbing of our worldwide spy network, the threat of universal military training, the reduction of the number of military bases around the world, or the relaxation of military domination of education, industry, commerce, and science." The Christian Century is amazed because figs do not grow from thistles, because the Christian ministry does not preach Jesus Christ crucified.

I submit that the Christian ministry, if it wanted to perform the Christian mission, would keep away from John Foster Dulles, who wants to be a Christian without performing the Christian mission. Mr. Dulles is a worldly man, who does not yet understand the dreadful circularity of the Christian commitment, namely that the only way to try to be a Christian is to be one. If he wants to try to be one, he will have to stop building power alliances like the UN and stop tearing them down for new power alliances like the Atlantic Pact. He will have to get down off the platform, all the way down to the prie-dieu, and ask to be lifted up. He is a weak reed, but a heavy burden, too heavy to be lifted by mortal man. And if I misjudge him, may he say so and say why, in this or some other place, and God forgive me my intemperance.

---

**History Repeats**

"* * * More than one true thing may be said about the causes of the war, but the statement that comprises most truth is that militarism and the armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable. Armaments were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation—that was the justification put forward in defense of them. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred; it is hardly too much to say that, between nations, it stimulates all that is bad and depresses all that is good.

"One nation increases its army and makes strategic railways toward the frontiers of neighboring countries. The second nation makes counter-strategic railways and increases its army in reply. The first nation says this is very unreasonable, because its own military preparations were only precautions; the second nation says that its preparations also were only precautions, and points out, with some cogency, that the first nation began the competition; and so it goes on, until the whole continent is an armed camp covered by strategic railways. * * *

"The lesson of European history is so plain. It is that no enduring security can be found in competing armaments and in separate alliances; there is no security for any power unless it be a security in which its neighbors have an equal share."

---

**Excerpts From Source Book, Military Trends in the United States**

(Compiled by Lawrence R. Mallery, Jr., for the American Friends Service Committee (peace section), Philadelphia, Pa.)

1. THE NATURE OF WORLD WAR III ACCORDING TO LEADING AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND MILITARY EXPERTS

*The scientists*

"Antiaircraft defense guided by radar eventually reached such efficiency that 80 to 90 percent of the V-1's aimed at the London area were shot down. But if the remaining 10 to 20 percent had carried atomic war heads there would be no London today."—W. A. Higginbotham, chairman of Federation of American Scientists, New York Times, November 3, 1946.

Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer testified before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in October 1945 that an enemy nation could destroy all United States principal cities and kill 40,000,000 people in 1 night with the atom bomb.

"Six atomic bombs of the present known design, strategically dropped on New York, would efface this vast, sprawling city. And, if one of the six were dropped in the bay, with the 'right' wind blowing, the city would be made uninhabitable for 100 years, so great would be the resultant radioactive contamination."—INS release, New York (appeared in Philadelphia Inquirer, February 8, 1948) (interview with W. E. Kelley, manager of operations for the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission).
"Victory for an aggressor nation can be assured in a few terrible hours in an atom war of the future."—Dr. Morris Perlman, Washington Times-Herald, October 28, 1945.

"1. Atomic bombs can now be made cheaply and in large numbers. They will become more destructive.

"2. There is no military defense against the atomic bomb and none can be expected.

"3. Other nations can rediscover our secret processes by themselves.

"4. Preparedness against atomic warfare is futile, and if attempted will ruin the structure of our social order.

"5. If war breaks out, atomic bombs will be used and they will surely destroy our civilization.

"6. There is no solution to this problem except the international control of atomic energy, and ultimately, the elimination of war."—Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, Inc., November 17, 1946; statement announced by Dr. Albert Einstein.

"Scientists are weighing the possibility of exploding an atomic bomb in the midst of storm clouds to create a literal rain of death. Rain falling from the clouds would be poisoned with the deadly byproducts of the bomb explosion."—New York Sun, May 28, 1947.

"Scientists who ought to know what they are talking about' predicted an atomic bomb capable of 'killing every living thing on the American continent.' 'There never would be a defense against this 'satisfaction weapon,' a bomb 1,000 times more powerful than any yet used.'—UP dispatch, London, November 5, 1947, quoting Dr. Harold C. Urey, vice chairman, Emergency Committee, American Atomic Scientists, Inc.

"No corner of this planet is safe against sudden destruction. Technical development favors aggression, and has made defense on the basis of national armaments ineffective."—Dr. Albert Einstein, Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, November 1947.

"Today we have weapons which could not only paralyze but destroy all of the world's cities. Against older weapons no defense is perfect. Against atomic bombs a defense would have to be perfect or it would be no defense at all. Our Government is spending millions on technical research and atomic countermeasures, but the answer will remain the same: a perfect defense against atomic attack is humanly impossible."—Dr. W. A. Higginbotham, New York Times, November 3, 1947.

"Agents have already been perfected and produced in quantity that can kill man, beast, or crops."—Hanson Baldwin, on germ warfare, New York Times, September 27, 1946.

Dr. Albert Einstein describes our dilemma as a "vicious circle which threatens the continued existence of mankind as no other situation in human history has ever done. He continues, 'The progress of technological development has actually contributed to the dangers which threaten peace and the very existence of mankind. However strong national armaments may be, they do not create military security for any nation nor do they guarantee the maintenance of peace. There is no compromise possible between preparation for war, on the one hand, and preparation of a world society based on law and order on the other.'—United Nations World, October 1947.

"Never, since the beginning of recorded history, has mankind been faced by so terrible a problem. Either we must, within the space of a few years, unlearn ancient beliefs and prejudices, and consent to an entirely novel form of political and military organization or, if we fail in this, we must expect a world-wide disaster, surpassing in its horror all that past misfortunes enable us to imagine."—Bertrand Russell, British Broadcasting Corp. address, reprinted in the Sun Life Review.

The military

"It is no longer a secret that the bombs dropped at Nagasaki and Hiroshima were of a primitive type already obsolete when they were used. We now have bombs 50 times more powerful than today in the arsenals of several great powers other weapons ever more devastating than the atom. They are capable of exterminating the last vestige of human, animal, and even vegetable life from the face of the earth. This is not a prediction of horrors to come. These weapons exist. They are being manufactured right now, while you are reading these words."—Rear Adm. Ellis M. Zacharias, wartime Deputy Chief of United States Naval Intelligence, United Nations World, November 1947.

"the next war probably will not last 6 months."—Admiral William
3. MILITARY CHARACTER OF UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AND POLICY

"If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances. Neither of them think anything of their pledged word."—Senator Harry S. Truman, New York Times, June 24, 1941, quoted by the Times, November 12, 1947.

"The President, an artillery captain in the last war, has never gotten over his awe of generals. * * * Some of Truman's civilian advisers are complaining that General Marshall can overrun them on almost any issue. They point out that when on the atomic bomb and on military training—Truman has accepted the general's views against strenuous cabinet opposition."—Drew Pearson, New York Times, June 24, 1941, quoted by the Times.


New York Times, January 8, 1947, reported that if General Marshall were sent to the Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow (March 1947), "the United States would have three top generals in its representation there" (General Marshall, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador to Russia, and Gen. Mark Clark, Austrian treaty negotiations deputy).

"If man does find the solution for world peace it will be the most revolutionary reversal of his record we have ever known."—Gen. George C. Marshall, Report to the Nation, 1945.

"The terms of the final peace settlement * * * cannot in my opinion alter the necessity for a system of universal military training."—General Marshall, Report to the Nation, 1945.

"The world does not seriously regard the desires of the weak * * * we must enforce our will for peace with strength. * * *—General Marshall, Report to the Nation, 1945.

"* * * It is desired to obtain authorization of the Congress to detail military and naval missions to any foreign government whenever in the discretion of the President the public interest renders such a course advisable. * * * It is a traditional policy of the United States to aid friendly nations and to achieve and to maintain their independence and to support the system of the 'open door.' From the viewpoint of maintenance of international peace as well as from that of strictly American interests in the field of economic development and general security, it is obvious that the policies mentioned in the preceding paragraph should be vigorously supported and put into execution."—Gen. George C. Marshall, memorandum to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, February 25, 1947.

"The United States now relies on military and naval strength in achieving the aims of its foreign policy to a greater degree than ever before in its peace-time history."—Foreign Policy Association, October 3, 1946, Washington, D.C.

"In the entire 8 weeks of the Moscow Conference * * * General Marshall apparently did not unbend. He was as rigid as the Washington Monument * * * though there were many outstanding questions between the United States and Russia and the United States and Britain, he apparently made no effort to talk out these problems. * * *"—New York Times, April 30, 1947.

"The next war, the first 7 days will be decisive."—Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Look Magazine, July 8, 1947.

"Arthur Mayer has just completed a tour for the Red Cross. In Tokyo he asked General MacArthur. * * * 'What I would like to find out is how the Red Cross can do a better job in the event of another war.' 'There won't be time for the Red Cross to do a better job in the event of another war,' General MacArthur replied. 'The next war won't last long enough for that.'"—St. Louis Globe-Democrat, February 28, 1946.

"For the foreseeable future there can be no adequate military defense against atomic weapons."—United States State Department, in a report published January 1947, The International Control of Atomic Energy.

"We won the last war. And it's the last war we'll ever win. If we have another, this Nation will lose.

"We'll lose, and the enemy we fight will lose, because victory in atomic warfare is no longer possible. One nation cannot defeat another nation today. That concept died with Hiroshima."—Gen. H. H. Arnold, This Week, January 11, 1948.
"The President still has Admiral William D. Leahy as his personal Chief of Staff. * * * Confidential reports and estimates of the daily situation in the world, which are placed on Mr. Truman’s desk each morning * * * are the product of Central Intelligence Agency, largely staffed by military men and so far directed (in its brief existence) by two admirals and one general. George C. Marshall, General of the Army, is Secretary of State. The Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas was Maj. Gen. John H. Hildring, and is now Charles E. Saltzman, a former brigadier general. Japan is governed almost unilaterally by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. * * * Korea is under a military man. Germany is the domain of Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay; Austria, of Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Kouses. * * * In the Foreign Service Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith is our Ambassador to Moscow; Admiral Alan G. Kirk is our Ambassador to Belgium; Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer just headed a special mission to China. In South Africa and Panama retired generals head the legation and embassy, and throughout South America some 13 American military missions wield not only military but political power. * * * Of course there is nothing insidious in this, per se. * * * Most of the men mentioned are good public servants; many of them are exceptional. Collectively, however, they represent a pattern; they have in common the habit of command and discipline and the mental outlook of years of military training—a tendency to apply in their thinking the yardstick of physical power. * * *—Hanson Baldwin, The Military Move In, Harper’s magazine, December 1947.

The following quotes and editorial comments were first published in the pamphlet, "The Militarization of America," issued by Dr. Albert Einstein and 20 other leading Americans: "Never before have the Army and Navy been so powerfully placed in Government controls. And never before has the United States adopted so stern a foreign policy. * * * The group as a whole have been operating as a team."—United States News, March 21, 1947.

When Gen. John H. Hildring was made an Assistant Secretary of State, "He brought with him to the State Department 28 of his assistants in the War Department."—New York Times, May 8, 1947.

A number of other key positions in the State Department are occupied by military men who 'served during World War II as General Staff secretaries or assistants at the War Department here or at Army headquarters overseas."—Washington Star, February 2, 1947.

Col. Carlisle H. Hummelsine, Director of the Office of Departmental Administration, described by the New York Times of August 17, 1947, as head of the executive secretariat in the State Department, was formerly in the office of the Army’s General Staff. Lt. Col. W. J. McWilliams, who was secretary of the General Staff of the Sixth Army group, is Col. Hummelsine’s executive officer in the State Department. W. W. Chapman, Jr., executive assistant to Assistant Secretary of State John E. Puehrfeid, was deputy assistant secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Walter K. Scott, chief of the Division of Communications and Records, is a lieutenant colonel who was secretary of the General Staff of Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe.

Capt. Richard Weigle, executive officer of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was secretary of the General Staff of the Chinese Combat Command. Col. Ira W. Porter, a West Point graduate and secretary of the General Staff of the Fifth Army, is administrative officer on the Division of Foreign Service Administration.

Capt. L. W. Parke, an Annapolis graduate, is Chief of the Cryptography Division in the State Department. Seiden Chapin, Director General of the Foreign Service, is a Naval Academy graduate. Haywood P. Martin, the Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Service Planning, was a Navy lieutenant who formerly served in the Navy Department. Charles E. Mills, Associate Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Planning, was a Navy lieutenant in the Navy Department.

John M. Hayes, a retired rear admiral, is senior Assistant Chief of Foreign Service Administration.

The Washington Star of February 2, 1947, lists still other positions in the State Department held by military men. It says:

"Ten of the twenty men ranking as executive officers in the State Department have been brought in during recent months from the military services."

The Under Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, who served 5 years as Assistant Secretary of War for Air, was a naval aviator in the First World War. He was described by Arthur Krock in the May 15, 1947, New York Times as having worked closely with General Marshall during the war and as being one of those who
feel that General Marshall’s “wish thereafter they would seek to carry out as a national duty.”

“Today the Army has virtual control of foreign affairs, commencing on the home front with General Marshall as Secretary of State, and his Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, who directs the military commanders controlling our foreign policy in occupied Europe and Asia. The chain of control in diplomatic hot spots both in the execution of basic policy and in the formulation of ad hoc arrangements, lies almost totally in the hands of the military authorities.”—Army and Navy Bulletin, January 18, 1947.

Bernard Brodie, who has been a resident civilian member of the War College faculty, and who generally espouses the Army’s point of view, is the author of studies on the atom bomb, universal military training, etc., for the Legislative Bureau of the Library of Congress.

Military influence has been extended to the United Nations. For example, Warren Austin, the UN delegate who was the military’s enthusiastic supporter while in Congress, has as his deputy representative on the United States Atomic Energy Commission Frederick Osborn, a former major general in the Army. Ralph A. Bard, former Under Secretary of the Navy, is the deputy representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Arms. The State Department’s Director of United Nations Affairs Is Col. Dean Rusk. The New York Times of May 7, 1947, stated that two of the three advisers to the “American atomic delegation to the United Nations are military men: Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves and Maj. Gen. Thomas Farrell. Col. Kenneth Nichols, West Point engineering professor, was also added to the American staff.

“Instead of being starved and ignored as the Army always is in peacetime America, our War Department is going to be one of the most important and influential branches of our Government, and the question of military control will confront us not only in war but in peace. The lesson taught by these recent war years is clear: Our whole economic and social system will be in peril if it is controlled by the military men.”—Donald Nelson, in his book Arsenal of Democracy.

** * * If Congress passes any piece of legislation drawn up by the military without carefully looking it over, the military are, in effect, writing the laws. National emergency can be used time and time again to insist that the budget, the money, or the bills proposed by the armed forces are required in the defense of the Nation, that unless they are passed our national security will be endangered.”—Brig. Gen. Merritt A. Edson, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 1944.

** * * men in uniform are no different than other people * * * Given the opportunity, men in uniform will grasp the same power that men do in the fields of labor and industry * * *.” When asked by Senator Saltostall, “If I did not place faith and intelligence in the people of this country,” the reply was, “I do not overlook the power of propaganda.”—Brig. Gen. Merritt A. Edson, June 14, 1947.

4. MILITARY PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES

“Heaviest spender for advertising space in United States newspapers in 1946 was the War Assets Administration * * *.”—Washington Post, May 8, 1947, which then went on to list the Army recruiting services as third. The Post quoted Printer’s Ink magazine as saying, “It is interesting to note that the first and third of the leaders are Government agencies.”

The Army and Navy Journal, January 12, 1947, announced that the Army had “initiated peacetime program intended to train and maintain large staffs of uniformed public relations specialists. The Army is now operating an information school at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., headed by a general officer at which officers are being trained in newspaper and radio techniques and a monthly magazine issued. The Navy plans the commissioning of public information specialists in its permanent Regular officer corps, and is now indoctrinating officers through tours of temporary duty at the Navy Department.”

“As of December 31, 1946, 1,313 military personnel held full-time positions in public-relations activities which represents an annual sum of $2,855,827 and 626 military personnel held part-time positions in public-relations activities which represents an annual sum of $314,289. As of the same date, the War Department had 735 civilian employees doing full-time public-relations work which represented an annual sum of $2,275,375, and 306 part-time civilian per-
sonnel engaged in public-relations work representing an annual sum of $235,963."  
(This totals nearly 30,000,000.)—Quote from a letter by Lt. Col. L. D. Perry, to 
Representative E. H. Hedricks, West Virginia, March 14, 1947.  
The February 1, 1947, Army and Navy Journal, reporting on a luncheon and 
conference held by the War Department on January 30, 1947, for members of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, "The presentation made by 
General Staff heads was similar to those which the Army has been making 
to outstanding civilian groups * * * throughout the country * * * during 
the past few months. These presentations included an outline of the postwar 
Military Establishment and its manpower problems * * * Top-level speak-
ers have presented these programs in several cities and before diverse civilian 
groups. These tours have been supplemented by other Army speakers appearing 
throughout the country."

12. U. S. S. R.

"In 1945 the profits tax, the Minister said, yielded only 4,000,000,000 rubles, less 
than one-fifth of budgetary expectations, chiefly because production got out of 
hand, notably in coal mining. In heavy industries costs were swollen to nearly 
three times the prewar cost of the state and private industrial plants. But 
the government sales market was the same as it has been in the past. The dis-
tribution of steel was made to the home market in about the same proportion as 
before the war. The value of the output of the state and collective farms was 
about the same as in 1940. The output of timber and food crops showed a 
transient increase. The output of salt and potash was about the same as in 1940. 

The effects of the new order were a reduction in the output of timber, oil, and 
food crops. The output of the state and collective farms was about the same as 
in 1940. The output of salt and potash was about the same as in 1940. The output of 
miscellaneous goods was about the same as in 1940. The output of machinery 
was about the same as in 1940. The output of steel and metals was about the 
same as in 1940. The output of machinery and transport equipment in the first half of 1946, ex-
ceeded 120,000,000 rubles. Not only was Russian production as a whole far be-
hind the schedule of the 5-year plan, but the output of many items was de-
creasing * * * the yearly petroleum deficit in the Soviet Union was set at 
more than 25,000,000 tons."—New York Times, November 4, 1946.

Look magazine in its February 4, 1947, edition carried an account by Elliot 
Roosevelt of an interview with Stalin in which Stalin said, "Not a single great 
power, even if its government were anxious to do so, could now raise a large army 
to fight another Allied power, another great power, because now one cannot 
possibly fight without one's people—and the people are unwilling to fight."

On February 6, 1947, because of what is said to be the worst famine in Russia 
since 1922, the Soviet announced, according to the New York Times of February 
6, 1947, the demobilization of six new age groups in order to help in the "bat-
tle for a good harvest and the abolition of rationing." The Washington Post of 
February 6, 1947, commented, "Informed sources said there will be very few 
soldiers over 22 in the Russian Army when the new demobilization order is 
carried out."

"Another overlooked point in Stalin's speech (in February 1946) was from a 
practical viewpoint more important than the first. The Soviet Union hopes, he 
said, eventually to produce 60,000,000 tons of steel annually. Only then, he 
decided, could the homeland be considered 'guaranteed against all possible 
eventualities'—that is to say, wars. But that will take three 5-year plans, 
if not more." In other words, by the hardest kind of toll, Russia aspires to make, 
in 1961, two-thirds as much steel as the present capacity of the United States. 
Stalin would be 82 by then. But he probably does not expect to live long enough 
to see Russia guaranteed against all 'eventualities'—and be able to live long enough 
to be able to launch an aggressive war against the United States, even if he so 
desired."

"More than 7,000,000 Red Army soldiers were killed by the Germans and their 
allies and 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 civilians. * * * More than 800,000 square 
miles of Russia were occupied by the Germans and their allies. It was only a 
tenth of the U. S. S. R. but it held a third of Russia’s population, and its devast-
ation meant the loss of half the Soviet coal mines, half the electric power, three-
fifths of the iron mines, and half the steel and machinery industry. What 
the Russians liberated was for the most part a desert of worthless rubble with 
its great cities from 30 to 90 percent destroyed. * * * Four million people 
in the Ukraine alone would have to live in caves or lean-tos made of wreckage 
for another 2 years. All together 6,000,000 dwellings and buildings which pro-
vided what was very poor housing to 25,000,000 people were 'consumed by fas-
cism' as the Russians say."—Why We Don't Understand Russia, by Edgar Snow, 
Saturday Evening Post, February 15, 22, 1947.

"Aggressive war by the Soviet Union is not probable for at least a decade, 
considering the present condition of industry, agriculture, reconstruction, and 
national morale. * * * Reconstruction has been slow, granted its great ex-
tent. In 1946, in parts of the Donets Basin, the great industrial area laid waste 
by the Germans, it appeared as though the Germans had been gone for 3 days 
instead of 3 years."—Drew Middleton, former New York Times Moscow corre-
Ernest C. Hopes, recently retired Director of the U. S. S. R. Division of the United States Department of Commerce, sees no immediate threat from Russia. He declared that, for economic reasons, Russia was in no position to launch an "aggressive war" in less than 25 years. — The Washington Post, September 19, 1947.

"The Soviet Union is in no position to support a global war, and no other nation in the world is in a position to support one, either." — General Eisenhower, addressing the National Press Club, February 5, 1948.

"In accordance with article 11 of the United Nations Charter, the Soviet delegation submits for the consideration of the General Assembly the following proposal:

"(1) In the interests of consolidating international peace and security and in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Organization, the General Assembly considers a general reduction of armaments necessary.

"(2) The implementation of the decision on the reduction of armaments should include as a primary objective the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes.


"(4) The General Assembly calls upon the governments of all States to render every possible assistance to the Security Council in this responsible undertaking, the accomplishment of which conforms to the establishment of stable peace and international security and also serves the interests of the people by lightening their heavy economic burden caused by excessive expenditures for armaments which do not correspond to peaceful postwar conditions.

"The adoption of the decision on a general reduction of armaments and the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes will, indeed respond, to the pacifist strivings of our peoples and will contribute to the development of international cooperation. In conclusion, permit me to express confidence that this proposal of the Soviet delegation will have the support of all the United Nations." — V. M. Molotov, in the United Nations, October 29, 1946.

"... general disarmament is essential in order to reduce military budgets * * * without which it is impossible to lighten the burdens of taxation borne by populations who will be unable to carry the load for long without complaint. * * * A general reduction of armaments should embrace all countries and cover all forms of armaments. * * * The opinion was expressed at the General Assembly that the initiative of the Soviet Union, in the matter of reduction of armaments, was appropriate, since she had a powerful army. * * * It is also a matter of reducing naval and air armaments, the size of which is now in certain cases quite inappropriate to peace conditions. * * * The Soviet Government has proposed that the General Assembly should pass a resolution recognizing the necessity of a general reduction of armaments. We do not think that the General Assembly could at this moment take a detailed decision on this question. It should, in our opinion, recommend the Security Council to work out appropriate concrete instructions. The passing of a recommendation by the General Assembly should be the starting point. * * *

"If we agree in principle with the necessity for strict international control, we should also be able to reach an agreement on the concrete matters relating to control over the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for purposes of war, and over the implementation of the decision which will be taken on the general reduction of armaments.

"The Soviet delegation accordingly submits a supplement to the proposal on the general reduction of armaments:

"To insure the adoption of measures for the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council * * * international control operating on the basis of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection for which purpose there shall be formed —

"(a) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments.

"(b) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

"The Soviet delegation thinks that this proposal provides a basis for the solution of the problem of control and inspection." — Molotov, in the United Nations, November 28, 1946.
14. BRIEF SUMMARY—EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II AND WORLD PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR III

"The 57 Allied and Axis Nations involved in the Second World War lost more than 15,000,000 soldiers and sailors and other military personnel, according to a report by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, released today.

"* * * Marshall stated that the full cost of the war 'either in intrinsic values or in intangibles' would never be known.

"Among the losses difficult to appraise, he stated, are casualties among civilians, losses caused by the displacement of populations; 'the long-term effects of devoting the major portion of the world's over-all capabilities for a period of years to the objectives of destruction,' and loss in the destruction of homes, industries, and means of livelihood of millions of people, which 'probably represented a greater monetary cost factor than the support of armed forces.'"

"The total cost to the principal belligerents in military personnel 'killed and missing in battle exceeded 15,000,000. * * *. The very considerable costs to the smaller countries, particularly Poland and the nations in southeastern Europe, added hundreds of thousands more to the total.'"—Article by Gen. George C. Marshall for the Encyclopedia Britannica, reported in the New York Herald Tribune, November 3, 1947.

The New York Times, on May 12, 1947, published a survey by Hanson Baldwin of the world's military strength.

United States: "The budget being discussed in Congress includes $11,256,000,000 for arms," or 34 percent of the total budget.

Russia: Military budget is '67,000,000,000 rubles, about 18 percent of the total budget. The unofficial rate of exchange, 12 rubles to a dollar, which represents fairly accurately the purchasing power of the dollar in Moscow, would reduce the Soviet military budget for this year to $5,561,000,000.'

Naval strength: The world's total tonnage in the five principal categories is 6,680,000 tons. The United States possesses (in active and reserve fleets) 3,800,000 tons, or well over half. * * * not even Britain is a close second. The United Kingdom, with more than 1,500,000 standard displacement tons of battleships, battle cruisers, aircraft carriers of all types, destroyers, and submarines, is the second sea power of the world.

Russia: Russia has between 386,000 and 487,000 tons, including conquered German and Italian vessels.

Air Force: The United States has approximately 37,000 military planes of all types. * * * "The United States has a clear and major lead in the air and, so far as can be learned, a smaller technological advantage in missiles and other new weapons, an advantage greatly aided by the superiority of our industries."—Hansen Baldwin, New York Times, March 21, 1947.

Military expenditures by all of the nations of the world for 1947 total more than $27,000,000,000.

15. SENTIMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT

A group headed by Senator Elbert Thomas, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, on November 28, 1946, called upon President Truman, Premier Stalin, and Prime Minister Atlee, "effect and maintain a disarmament pro rata, simultaneously and progressively, of all war weapons except those needed by internal police."

The group pointed out that the United States military budget of $18,300,000 for that year alone is 27 times the appropriations for TVA during the 10 years of its existence.

Among the group issuing the statement were Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; William Green, president of the AFL; Senator Millard Tydings; Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, former Minister to Norway; William Draper Lewis, director of the American Law Institute; Philip Murray, President of the CIO; Mrs. Gifford Pinchot; Evelyn Cockrell, president of the United States Federation of Justice; William A. Higginbotham, president of the Federation of American Scientists.

"Out of one side of our mouths we talk of world disarmament and out of the other we start a world armament race." Congress is "almost equally divided on the advisability of military conscription."—Letter by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Colorado, to the President's Commission on Universal Training, December 23, 1946.
The Federal Council of Churches, representing most of American Protestant churches, issued an excellent plan for peace with Russia which appeared in the newspapers of October 10, 1946. John Foster Dulles joined with prominent clergymen of various churches in signing the statement. Among other things the statement said:

"The armament race must be ended. The United States for the first time in its history plans to maintain a large standing army. Our Government seems committed to having a Navy and Air Force which will surpass those of any other nations. It is continuing to manufacture atomic weapons and to develop new scientific methods of mass destruction. The latter activities it shrouds with secrecy.

"The Soviet Union maintains a standing army which no other nation matches. It is inferior to the United States as regards Navy, Air Force, and modern scientific weapons, notably the atomic bomb. Its leaders are striving to make good such deficiencies. They cloak their military establishment with great secrecy.

"The present armament race between the United States and the Soviet Union will, if continued, probably lead to the destruction of both. Such secret competition breeds the suspicion, fear, and hostility which make war inevitable.

"We believe that every effort should be made to apply the provisions of the United Nations Charter for the regulation and multilateral reduction of national armaments. The proposal for an Atomic Development Authority is a good start in that direction. The Authority would provide true world government within a defined area. That functional approach seems practical and susceptible of enlargement to deal with other means of mass destruction besides atomic energy. Our Nation should persist in this course."

The statement also said: "Security is no longer geographic. Soviet and American military strategists seem still to be seeking security in terms of geography. In an effort to catch up with the increasing range and speed of missiles, they would extend further and further the areas over which their nation has military control. Thus, large areas of the world fall within overlapping strategic orbits. Islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific, Germany, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Far East and Near East areas are looked upon by one or another as needed for a defense, which to others seem to carry an offensive threat."

"The sharply increased offensive capabilities of modern warfare are such that it is not possible to reconcile a friendly and neighborly policy with such strategic defense as from a military standpoint might seem most effective. Therefore, no nation should allow its action in these matters to be determined by military factors alone. The United States should set an example by renouncing the acquisition of new military bases so far distant from the continental United States and so close to the Soviet Union that the offensive threat is both disproportionate to the defensive value to the United States and also incompatible with a policy designed to dissipate distrust and to increase good will. This principle applies to all nations."

The Chicago Sun, November 14, 1946, quoting a current magazine's statement that "To many people it looks like a choice between disarmament and an atomic war of extinction," editorialized, "Is there really a 'choice' between a war of extinction and anything else? The very fact that the alternatives can be stated in that way is an indictment of our leadership and our popular thinking. For it is the function of leadership to show and of popular thinking to understand that in any decision between disarmament and race suicide the only rational course lies in disarmament."

"A system in which each step to increase one's security threatens that of his neighbor is a system which makes security impossible and war inevitable. Security cannot be attained through national military power."—Father W. J. Miller, Society of Jesus, president of the University of Detroit, in the March 1947 Association of American Colleges Bulletin.

General Eisenhower, testifying before the President's Air Policy Commission on November 11, 1947, said he foresaw no immediate threat of war, "not in the next 2, 3, or 4 years.

"No nation in the world today is in a position to undertake a war of global proportions," he declared.

"The governments of the world will find some way to substitute the council table for the battlefield or within the measurable future civilization as we know it will cease to exist."—Reported in The New York Times, November 12, 1947.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commenting on the assassination of Gandhi, said, "That he should die through violence is one of those bitter anachronisms that seems to refute all logic.

"In the evolution of civilization, if it is to survive, all men cannot fail to eventually adopt the belief that the process of mass application of force to resolve contentious issues is fundamentally not only wrong and useless, but within itself contains the germs of self-destruction. Gandhi was one of those prophets who lived far ahead of the times."—AP dispatch from Tokyo, January 31, 1948.

"Many of us who have thought the situation through have concluded that our only salvation lies in the establishment of international morality, a mutual acceptance of the futility of further warfare and a mutual avowal to keep the peace. Three years ago I would have considered such a thought absurd. human nature being what it is. Today I believe it is the only chance for the survival of humankind. Unfortunately this conviction seems not to be shared by the rulers of nations.

"I would have said before the accomplishment of the atomic fission that we might have a world government within the next 500 years. Today I am convinced that we must try to attain it within the next 5 years. That's about all the time we have left."—The Bomb Secret Is Out, by Dr. Robert M. Hutchins, chancellor of the University of Chicago, In the American magazine, December 1947.

Senator DONNElL. May I ask you just a word about your own educational background and your profession? Would you be kind enough to tell us briefly about that?

Mr. MALLERY. I haven't had any college education except for 1 year. I have been working in the pharmaceutical industry as a medical copy writer prior to the war. I was a conscientious objector and served as a guinea pig in a starvation diet research project. and now I am back in professional life as a medical copy writer.

Senator DONNElL. Where is your present address?

Mr. MALLERY. I live in Malvern, Chester County, Pa.

Senator DONNElL. What was the college at which you attended?

Mr. MALLERY. One semester at Hobart College, Geneva, N., and one semester at Temple University.

Senator VANDENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Mallery.

Mr. A. Stauffer Curry.

STATEMENT OF A. STAUFFER CURRY, BRETHREN SERVICE COMMISSION, CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN

Mr. Curry. Senator, my name is A. Stauffer Curry. I am a minister of the Church of the Brethren, a religious body of 183,000 constituents, and appear here today at the request of Harold Row, executive secretary of the Brethren Service Commission, the agency of this religious group which administers a widespread foreign relief program and in general is deeply interested in matters relating to international brotherhood and good will. This interest grows out of a religious background of opposition to hatred, bitterness, and conflict between persons or groups of persons whether they be racial, class, religious, national, or international in character. Because of this deep and historical interest in human relations our commission is grateful for this opportunity to make a brief statement on the North Atlantic Treaty inasmuch as we believe there are elements involved which will vitally affect the relations of millions of human beings for decades and perhaps generations to come.

I should like to point out further, in order that our point of view on the treaty may be reflected properly in its total setting, that the
Brethren Service Commission has been and is currently administering a widespread relief and rehabilitation program in war-torn countries. At the instigation of one of our subcommittees, the heifers-for-relief program was developed which resulted in the outright donation and shipment abroad to undernourished and starving families in 14 countries of at least 7,700 dairy heifers, goats, and other livestock. At least 5,000 livestock attendants were procured to facilitate shipment of these and other livestock to foreign ports. Over 3,000,000 pounds of clothing, in addition to vast quantities of food were dispensed through our relief centers in nine countries. Agricultural rehabilitation projects were established in China, Poland, and other countries. Personnel was loaned to various agencies for war-prisoner work. We are currently active in the displaced-persons program. We are presently developing other projects as needs arise, and follow with great interest unfolding developments such as the President’s point 4 program. Our mission fields include, in addition to the above-mentioned relief centers, India, China, Africa, and South America where presumably phases of this program may be put into operation.

We are very anxious to emphasize that our point of view on the pact is based upon religious and religious-humanitarian considerations and in no way is remotely associated with political influences either domestic or international. Also, while certain technical factors are referred to in this statement, our reasons for not favoring the pact are basically and fundamentally religious.

DANGER OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

The Brethren Service Commission feels great concern lest the North Atlantic Treaty be a means of stimulating aggression and attack on the part of other nations rather than deterring and discouraging attack. Inasmuch as an extensive arms program has been proposed, our country is functionally entering upon a military alliance of major proportions. Historically, military alliances have served to stimulate counteralliances with resultant arms races and ultimate wars. The history of events preceding previous wars demonstrates that in no way do military alliances offer effective guaranties against war.

Recent major wars were all preceded with systems of military alliances which were incapable of preserving the peace. Very recent history in the Orient indicates that arms assistance programs may be accompanied by, or even be the cause of aggression upon the countries being assisted. At the very time our Nation was sending billions of dollars worth of military aid to the largest oriental nation, it was being attacked by hostile forces. There is direct evidence that the attack was stimulated or at least hastened by our vast shipments of armaments to that nation.

This situation tends to confirm the premise of the group I represent that the threat of the use of force will only encourage aggression. We hold that the pact, with its accompanying arms program, regardless how small the latter, will serve only to arouse fears and suspicions throughout the world, and in the end serve as a stimulant to further strife and bloodshed. Instead of the pact with its military assistance program, we feel that a positive program of international cooperation among all nations should be pursued by our Nation more vigorously than ever before. We believe that the equivalent of the cost of the
military assistance programs from year to year should be applied to the expansion of both public and private rehabilitation and reconstruction projects around the world.

RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION

The spread of certain ideologies across the world is greatly feared by many people of this country. Our commission believes that the best and the only ultimately successful method to stop this spread is through satisfying fully the basic physical, economic, personality, and spiritual needs of war-devastated and other underprivileged peoples. We believe the North Atlantic Treaty not only fails to give these basic satisfactions, but also tends to hamper and retard present efforts in the direction of reconstruction.

WEAKENING OF UNITED NATIONS

Another factor which enters into the point of view of the group I represent is, as we look at it, the obvious weakening and tendency toward undermining of the United Nations by the pact. While technically the Charter of the United Nations allows for certain regional arrangements, functionally the pact is in violation of the underlying spirit of the United Nations. The pact provides for the establishment of an Atlantic Council with a defense committee to implement articles 3 and 5 of the pact. This Atlantic Council would have power to determine when joint action should be taken by signatory nations against an alleged aggressor: the Atlantic Council would also determine presumably when the United Nations Security Council has taken “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security” after an aggression has occurred. In other words, the Council created by the North Atlantic Treaty would in effect sit in judgment upon the United Nations. This would materially reduce the strength and weaken the effectiveness of the United Nations. Other considerations tending to weaken this international organization could be pointed out, should time permit.

The church body I represent looks with great hopefulness upon the possibilities of world brotherhood through the United Nations. This world organization has had little time to develop fully its possibilities for resolving international difficulties. To do now that which involves even the slightest risk of discrediting or weakening the United Nations is to set the stage for further break-down and perhaps ultimate dissolution of this great organization. We are very strongly in favor of an expanded program for strengthening the United Nations, as a substitute for the pact, by use of the following means: Expansion of the various functional agencies of the United Nations such as WHO, FAO, UNESCO, and the like; the reduction of national armaments under United Nations supervision; more adequate financial contributions by all members to the United Nations; continued effort to remove the factors responsible for the veto; and efforts toward greater acceptance of the International Court of Justice.

MILITARY INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Another, a third consideration in the point of view of those I represent, is the possibility that the pact will intensify the military dom-
ination of American life and thought. We would tend to agree with the essence of a pre-Lenten statement issued by 22 nationally known clergymen:

The adoption of the Atlantic Pact means continued stock-piling of atomic and biological weapons, continuance of peacetime conscription, increase of the already colossal arms budget, building a new world spy network, maintenance of military bases around the world, no relaxation in military influence of education, science, industry, and commerce.

Especially are we concerned about the growing military influence in education, science and commerce. No stones should be left unturned in the effort to arrest this trend in American life.

In summary, the Brethren Service Commission believes the objective of arresting the world-wide spread of certain ideologies at which the pact is aimed and the objective of preserving world peace can be achieved by other means than a military alliance. We believe that the pact is not in accord with certain basic tenets of the Christian faith calling for methods of goodwill and brotherhood. We believe in expanding our governmental and private efforts for increased rehabilitation and reconstruction programs; we commend our Government for the economic recovery program already established. We believe that greatly intensified efforts to de-emphasize our armament program toward the objective of complete world disarmament offers the only satisfactory solution of the problem of world peace. We commend the successful negotiations which have just led to the lifting of the Berlin blockade; we commend the plans for the forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers and favor the increased use of the method of direct discussion and negotiation. We favor the inauguration of new methods to strengthen the United Nations. As a religious body, we believe finally that the objective of building a permanently peaceful world lies not in the use of military means, but through the encouragement by peaceful means of a way of life whereby mankind can exercise full freedom of his beliefs regarding what to him is his correct relationship to the Supreme Being of the universe.

Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Curry, the committee is very glad to have your obviously earnest and sincere sentiments.

Senator Donnell, have you any questions?

Senator Donnell. You speak of your organization being a religious body of 183,000 constituents. Are they spread geographically throughout the United States or just in one section of the country?

Mr. Curry. We have churches in, I suppose, all but four or five States. I am not sure of the exact number at the present moment. They are concentrated in Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Kansas.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator Donnell. You are a minister of the gospel in that religious body?

Mr. Curry. That is right.

Senator Donnell. Would you tell us very briefly your educational background?

Mr. Curry. I am one of these fellows who went to school most of his lifetime. I went to Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania; then I went to the Methodist Seminary at Westminster, Md., and took a
master's degree at Catholic University, and a Ph. D. at the New
York College of Education.
Senator DONNELL. Would you mind stating your age for the
record?
Mr. CURRY. Thirty-six.
Senator DONNELL. What is your residence at the present time?
Mr. CURRY. I am registered in the State of Illinois. I served on the
staff of our church out there until recently.
Senator DONNELL. You referred on page 3 of your statement to a
pre-Lenten statement issued by 22 nationally known clergymen. Did
you see the testimony or hear the testimony made by Rev. Phillips
Elliott, who placed in the record a statement made by quite a number
of clergymen?
Mr. CURRY. I had to be out of town yesterday and I have been
unable to read that testimony.
Senator DONNELL. I am not certain whether the statement to which
you refer was the one he placed in the record. Do you recall whether
the statement to which you refer was one on which Dr. Tittle, of
Evanston, Ill., is one of the signers?
Mr. CURRY. It is my impression that it is the same.
Senator DONNELL. Would you say that the gentlemen whose names
appear upon the statement to which you refer are favorably regarded
among the clergymen of the country as being outstanding members
of the profession?
Mr. CURRY. Yes: I think very definitely so.
Senator DONNELL. Reverend Curry, do you have a copy of that
statement that you would be kind enough, if the chairman is agreeable,
to present to the clerk of this committee, not for duplication but if it
happens that the pre-Lenten statement to which you refer is a different
one, that it might be incorporated in the record?
Mr. CURRY. I will be glad to see that the committee receives a copy.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DRAFT OF STATEMENT ON ATLANTIC PACT

During this Lenten season in the year of our Lord 1949, the thoughts of
Christian people in the United States, as elsewhere, are necessarily often oc-
cupied with considerations of the North Atlantic Pact. A study conference under
the auspices of the department of international justice and good will of the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, recently held, was unable
to decide either to support or to reject this proposal. It is appropriate in these
circumstances that individual Christians and groups should share with each other
their thinking about a step which is generally recognized as the most important
in American foreign policy since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Atlantic Pact provides for bringing the nations of western Europe and the
United States into a military alliance. Some advocates of this step hold that it
must not be regarded as anything but a highly dubious and a temporary expedi-
ten. They desire that it should be so used and so represented that it may
not be a manifestly and aggressively hostile policy but one to be developed
or superseded in a constant pursuit of world concord and cooperation. It is the
contention of those advocates that under such conditions Europe's fear of a new
retreat into isolationism on the part of the United States would be allayed. They
believe that building up and pooling the military might of the countries involved
and putting Russia on notice that an armed attack on any one of them will be
regarded as an act of war against all, will deter Russia from attempting further
to extend her power sphere. Thus the countries of western Europe will be saved
from Communist domination, and economic recovery and stabilization, based on
what may yet be accomplished by an increasing exchange of goods between East
and West under the Marshall plan, will become possible in the democratic world
Admittedly this is a gamble. It also admittedly means continuation at present of the policy of the cold war in a divided world. This is the crucial and ominous fact, even if we assume that the policy of which the North Atlantic Pact is a part, is purely "defensive", which of course Americans would find it impossible to believe if conditions were reversed and Russians were entering into a military pact with Latin-American nations.

It is hoped, sincerely hoped by many who are as deeply troubled as we are, that this threat of possible resort to war against Russia will end the danger of war; but we need to face unflinchingly and honestly what are the instrumentalities with which the cold war is being waged. The adoption of the Atlantic Pact means continued stock piling of atomic and biological weapons, continuation of peacetime conscription, increase in the already colossal arms budget, building a world-wide spy network, maintenance of military bases around the world, no relaxation in military influence of education, science, industry, and commerce, to say nothing of the periodic waves of national hysteria without which none of these measures could be maintained.

The United States has already gone a long way down this road, and there is ominous likelihood that ultimately it will prove to be a disastrous road. We cannot believe that peace and righteousness will be found at the end if we keep traveling it. Mankind has tried these methods of military alliances and armament rivalries for many centuries. They have led to disaster in the past. Humbly we submit that to depend upon them for deliverance now, after two world wars and in face of the nature of modern war and the character of the weapons which it employs, reveals that men are no longer behaving rationally and have become morally calloused about the diabolical nature of the weapons which nations use today in the defense of their interests and in the pursuit of that peace which they cherish.

The dilemma in which thoughtful citizens, and especially Christians, now find themselves becomes more complicated and painful with each fresh crisis. It is always impossible to find a satisfying answer to the crisis of the moment taken in isolation. The next step toward ruin can always be made to seem inevitable in the light of the one preceding it, while each time the hope is held out that this will be the last such step and—despairingly—men grasp at that hope. For that very reason it will be a catastrophe of the first order if the American people and their leaders now allow themselves to be content with this one more step on the old road of power politics, armament rivalry, and cold war.

The hour is already very late. It is time to make a decisive turn, to take another and a better road. This means that the American people, as well as people everywhere, need a new sense of direction, a greater moral sensitivity, a new faith and dynamic to drive out the feeling of helplessness which now holds them in thrall. Preeminent it is the Christian Church upon which the responsibility rests to summon men and nations to cast away their self-righteousness and complacency; to call them to deep moral repentance; to allay the fears which are driving them to deeds of madness; and to release spiritual springs for cooperative attitudes and actions. It is for the Christian Church, especially during this Lenten season, to speak the word of peace and reconciliation in the midst of strife, suspicion, fear, and hate.

Were the Christian Church to utter such a distinctive word, and instead of supplementing national policy set about creating a new spiritual climate, new political possibilities might very well in God's providence open up. The American people might give new expression to their generous impulses and turn to feeding and helping foe as well as friend; for so Jesus taught. Quietly and persistently they might practice righteousness and establish equality among all races in their own land, that the democratic way of life might become a shining reality and an example which all peoples might be eager to follow. The American people might then make clear to their Government their desire that American foreign policy should be based upon:

1. Loyal support and consistent use of the United Nations and its instruments.
2. A ringing and persistent call therefore for the resumption of serious efforts to secure universal abolition of national military establishments at the earliest
possible moment, as an evidence of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to dispel the dense fog of suspicion which now blocks all movement on the road to disarmament.

(3) Unremitting efforts to explore the possibilities of negotiating peace with the Soviet government; and the use to that end, not of fear inspired by our arsenal of atomic weapons, which can only lead to counter-arming, desperation, or a temporary sullen retreat, but of a resolute good will.

Penitently those who sign this statement confess that no less than others they have failed so to surrender themselves to the will of God and so to venture on faith in the power of Christ as to enable the Church, which is the body of that Christ, to speak peace to this weary and troubled age.

Men and women from various parts of the land, however, seeing to what extent human wisdom is frustrated and human power, turned upon itself, has been brought to naught, have asked us to call on Christian leaders and people to set apart a time for prayer and fasting, that our minds and hearts may be purified and wisdom may be given to our people and their government in this critical hour. We are certain that these requests reflect a deep-seated feeling in the hearts of multitudes; and so we heed this exhortation to turn anew to the eternal source of wisdom and peace and to ask all our fellows to do likewise.

We trust that many churches and groups will be moved to set apart special periods for prayer and fasting, individual and corporate. All to whom this message comes will, we feel sure, wish to devote increasing time to daily prayer.

Charles F. Boss, Jr., Executive Secretary, World Peace Commission; Methodist Church; W. Russell Bowle, Union Theological Seminary, New York City; Henry J. Cadbury, Harvard University Divinity School, and Chairman, American Friends Service Committee; Allan Knight Chalmers, Boston University School of Theology; Henry Hitt Crane, Minister of Central Methodist Church, Detroit, Mich.; Edwin T. Dahlberg, Minister of First Baptist Church, Syracuse, N. Y., and recently Moderator of North Baptist Convention; Albert E. Day, Minister of Mount Vernon Place Methodist Church, Baltimore, Md.; Phillips E. Elliott, Minister of First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y.; Georgia Harkness, Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill.; John Haynes Holmes, Minister of Community Church, New York; Charles W. Iglehart, Union Theological Seminary, New York; Paul S. Johnson, Boston University School of Theology; William E. Lampe, Secretary, Evangelical and Reformed Church, Philadelphia; John Howland Lathrop, Minister of Church of the Saviour, Brooklyn, N. Y.; D. P. McCreary, Minister of First Presbyterian Church (United States), Clearwater, Fla.; Walter Mitchell, Retired Bishop of Arizona (Episcopal); Albert W. Palmer, Radio preacher, Los Angeles, Calif., and former Moderator, Congregational-Christian Churches; Edwin McNell Potter, Minister of First Baptist Church, Raleigh, N. C.; Paul Roberts, Dean of Christ Cathedral (Episcopal), Denver, Colo.; Paul Scherer, Union Theological Seminary, New York City; Ernest Fremont Tittle, Minister of First Methodist Church, Evanston, Ill.; E. A. Fridell, Foreign Secretary, American Baptist Foreign Missions Board.

Senator DONNELL. One other point and I am finished. That is this: You make one statement that I am not inclined to think I can agree with you on, and I wanted to ask you your basis for it. You say, on page 2 of your statement, that the pact provides for the establishment of an Atlantic council with a defense committee to implement articles 3 and 5 of the pact. Are you not in error in stating that that defense committee has the power of implementation? In that connection I call to your attention the fact that the concluding sentence of article 9 reads:

The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of articles 3 and 5.

It is power purely of a recommendatory nature rather than implementatory nature.
Mr. CURRY. I suppose that is correct, obviously.
Senator DONNELL. That is the section of the treaty to which you refer, at any rate?
Mr. CURRY. That is right.
Senator DONNELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator VANDENBERG. Thank you very much. I turn the hearing back to the chairman, who has returned from his meeting with the Finance Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I desire to express my deep appreciation to Senator Vandenberg, who can continue the hearing for the whole day, so far as I am concerned, because I know it would be done in an efficient, able, and satisfactory manner.

You are excused, sir. Thank you very much.

Mr. Cass Canfield, give the reporter your name and business, and whom you represent, and so on.

STATEMENT OF CASS CANFIELD, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHING CO., CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS

Mr. CANFIELD. My name is Cass Canfield, chairman of the board of Harper & Brothers, publishers. I am appearing before you as chairman of the executive committee of United World Federalists, a national organization working for the strengthening of the United Nations and its transformation into a federation of nations.

I feel sure that the committee will agree with me that this is not the time to develop and defend the full position of United World Federalists. Since these are hearings specifically on the North Atlantic treaty, in this statement I shall confine myself to setting forth our views with reference to the treaty. I will be happy to answer any questions members of the committee may choose to ask about the overall position of United World Federalists.

A difference exists between those who support the Atlantic treaty as a program to insure permanent peace and those supporting it as a temporary measure necessary for the defense of this country. I belong to the latter group.

BALANCE OF POWER

It is my opinion that many people delude themselves into thinking that if the Atlantic nations make themselves sufficiently strong, an armed truce between the West and the East can be maintained indefinitely. They place reliance in the long run upon the balance-of-power system.

Such reliance is, I believe, mistaken. The balance-of-power system has never led to a secure peace and, whereas in the nineteenth century a certain elasticity was achieved in the shifting relations between the nations of Europe, a world permanently divided into East and West blocs would be politically more rigid and consequently even more dangerous. Besides, we must bring ourselves to face the unpleasant fact that in the past, when two aggregations of power have continued to arm against each other, and have been unable to settle outstanding issues between them, war has almost invariably resulted.

In testifying here it is surely unnecessary to labor the point of what an atomic war would mean to this country, to civilization and to the
people of the entire world. The destruction of life and of real wealth would be beyond calculation. It is generally agreed that democratic government might not survive such a war and that even a modern armaments race, maintained long enough, might lead to a garrison state and endanger both our institutions and our financial stability.

I do not believe there is a difference between us on these points; the great problem confronting us is how we are to preserve the kind of society we cherish and how we are to achieve the indispensable requisite to that end, a just and enduring peace.

WORLD FEDERATION

The organization I represent believes that the answer lies in the institution we have developed ourselves, in Federal Government, which has given the United States economic strength and has proved itself effective in settling disputes arising within the confines of this country. Our Federal Government was achieved only after many difficulties had been overcome and I have no doubt that the development of the United Nations into a world federal system with powers limited but adequate to preserve peace will be even more difficult. However, the task in my opinion is far from impossible and the stakes are so enormous that we cannot afford to abandon the effort.

I hope I have not given the impression of attempting to side track the importance of the treaty and advocate world government as a substitute. In the present state of the world I am convinced that we must be prepared to defend ourselves. And with our strategic frontiers far beyond our geographical ones, the treaty is without doubt essential to our defense. Nothing more needs to be said; this is simply a question of survival.

THE PACT--AN EMERGENCY MEASURE

However, there is, it seems to me, one great hazard in the treaty and in the other elements of the preparedness program. It is that expedients will be confused with objectives; that emergency measures necessary in a time of crisis will be mistaken for long-range policy goals. I hope that the committee will agree that there must be no ambiguity as between expedients and objectives. The pact is more than what is written on the paper which has been signed by the high contracting parties. It is also the frame of reference in which it is understood by the peoples and the governments of the world. I urge that the committee take measures to make it quite clear that the pact is an emergency measure; that the long-range objectives of the United States are to develop and greatly strengthen the institutions of the United Nations that in all good common sense we can depend on the United Nations for that security which we now seek through competitive armaments, alliances, and the other measures of power politics.

SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES WITH RUSSIA

Therefore I urge that we recognize the necessity of attempting simultaneously with the implementation of the pact, a realistic, general settlement of outstanding issues with the Russians and the simultaneous amendment of the United Nations Charter so as to transform the United Nations into a limited world government. Neither of these processes should involve a policy of appeasement.
The obvious objection to an attempt at amendment of the United Nations Charter is the likelihood of the Russian objection which could block revision. (This we cannot be sure of until the Russians are approached on the subject.) Another objection is that we might, in the process of trying to change the United Nations, bring about its dissolution and thus wreck the only existing international agency that has accomplished a number of useful things.

Now I want to make entirely clear my strong conviction as to the importance of preserving the United Nations. In the event that the Russians could not be persuaded, after every effort had been made in that direction, to strengthen the organization by amendment, I believe that the next great step should be the formation of a federation of those nations willing to join within the structure of the United Nations. Such a federation would be granted powers limited but adequate to preserve the peace, or at least to do so away beyond the power of the United Nations as now constituted. A partial solution of the problem of war along these lines would be an immense stride forward and it is entirely possible that sometime in the future Russia, out of self-interest, if nothing else, would join a partial federation under proper safeguards and make it global.

It would be absurd to minimize the patience, vigilance, persistence, and intelligence required to carry out the kind of program I have broadly outlined. It would be dangerous to ignore the current unpleasant realities by failing to approve the Atlantic Pact and thus provide for our immediate security. At the same time we can not escape the truth that disaster lies ahead unless world law can be established and made effective through the backing of force. Eventually it is a question of one world or none and we must take the risks inherent in an attempt to achieve safety rather than allow the balance of power system to lead us into another war as it has never failed in history to do.

The Chairman. I have tried to follow you closely. You favor the ratification at this time of the Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Canfield. I do.

The Chairman. You think it is necessary for our defense and so on and so forth?

Mr. Canfield. I do.

The Chairman. We are all devoted to the United Nations. Does not the Treaty in several particulars recognize the over-riding authority of the United Nations?

Mr. Canfield. I think it does.

The Chairman. And does it not express a desire to promote and cooperate with the United Nations?

Mr. Canfield. I would agree.

The Chairman. Most of us agree with you, that it needs modification and amendment, which we will certainly strive to bring about, but you no doubt are aware that there are many difficulties in the way of that procedure.

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Canfield, I notice, Mr. Canfield, in your very interesting statement that you refer to a difference existing between those who support the Atlantic Treaty as a
program to insure permanent peace and those supporting it as a temporary measure, and then later in your statement you say:

I urge that the committee take measures to make it quite clear that the pact is an emergency measure—

and then finally you speak of it being—

dangerous to ignore the current unpleasant realities by failing to approve the Atlantic Pact and thus provide for our immediate security.

You have studied the pact, I assume, personally, have you not?

Mr. CANFIELD. I have, to a certain extent.

Senator DONNELL. I beg your pardon?

Mr. CANFIELD. I have to a degree.

Senator DONNELL. Have you read the entire Treaty?

Mr. CANFIELD. Yes, I have.

Senator DONNELL. Would you say, Mr. Canfield, that you have given it thorough and careful study?

Mr. CANFIELD. I would say that in relation to the average private citizen I had, sir.

DURATION OF TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Canfield, with reference to your designating your support as being in the category of support of the Atlantic Treaty "as a temporary measure," are you aware, I assume, that the period of the Treaty is 20 years?

Mr. CANFIELD. Yes. Isn't there a provision for revision after 10 years?

Senator DONNELL. Have you studied the Treaty yourself?

Mr. CANFIELD. I have only read it. I can not claim to be an expert on it.

Senator DONNELL. You say you have only read it. Have you read it more than once?

Mr. CANFIELD. No.

Senator DONNELL. Just once?

Mr. CANFIELD. That is right.

Senator DONNELL. How long ago since you read it?

Mr. CANFIELD. A few days.

Senator DONNELL. Before you prepared this statement or afterwards?

Mr. CANFIELD. That's right.

Senator DONNELL. Which?

Senator DONNELL. Before I prepared this statement.

Senator DONNELL. There is a provision in the treaty, Mr. Canfield, that [reading]:

After the treaty has been in force for 10 years, or at any time thereafter, the parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal, as well as regional, arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

There is not, however, in the treaty any provision for the termination of the treaty until the conclusion of 20 years. Do you recall that?

Mr. CANFIELD. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Do you regard that period of 20 years as a mere temporary period within the meaning of your statement here?
Mr. CANFIELD. Senator, 20 years is a long time. However, in the present world situation it seems to me that you have to provide security for quite a period ahead. I am not particularly bothered about this period so long—and I touched on the principal point I am anxious to emphasize—as we make it clear that the pact is an expedient to meet a situation that confronts us, and that we will not let up on the long-term objective of amending the United Nations with a view to establishing world law, effective world law, backed by force. That, we think, is of enormous importance, and it is a matter of emphasis so that both things will be presented at the same time with equal force.

Senator DONNELL. You do agree, however, that a period of 20 years is a period within which many unforeseen events may occur, things that we cannot at this time foresee? That is correct, is it not?

Mr. CANFIELD. That is undoubtedly true.

Senator DONNELL. And the 20-year period is only 1 year less than the period between the termination of the First World War and the beginning of the Second World War; I believe I am right in that, am I not, from 1918 to 1939?

Mr. CANFIELD. That is right.

MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Canfield, you say also in your statement that—

we must bring ourselves—

I am quoting—

to face the unpleasant fact that in the past when two aggregations of power have continued to arm against each other and have been unable to settle outstanding issues between them, war has almost invariably resulted.

Have you considered carefully article 3 of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty, which provides:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack?

Mr. CANFIELD. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. Is it your understanding that that involves any idea or contemplation of the arming of these various nations in order to make themselves possess the individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack?

Mr. CANFIELD. I think that is possible.

Senator DONNELL. That is really the only way they could resist armed attack, by preparing by force of arms to resist it, is it not?

Mr. CANFIELD. Yes, Senator; but it seems to me the main emphasis on armament is armament of this country.

Senator DONNELL. Do you think that there is any emphasis on the fact that this country is going to assist the European nations to arm themselves?

Mr. CANFIELD. It is certainly being discussed and debated.

Senator DONNELL. And it has been suggested, has it not, already, that as the first appropriation $1,130,000,000 shall be appropriated for purposes of that general type? Am I not correct in that?

Mr. CANFIELD. That is correct.
Senator Donnell. And are you also aware, Mr. Canfield, that the $1,130,000,000 does not at all necessarily represent the actual value of what is going to be sent, but that what will be sent over there may be very much undervalued, and that the $1,130,000,000 may include transportation and rehabilitation costs only instead of the actual valuation of the material itself? You are aware of that fact?

Mr. Canfield. I am aware of that, and I would agree with what I would presume would be your point of view, that no diminution should be made in the amount of Marshall plan aid we are now giving for peaceful purposes, peaceful development.

Senator Donnell. And also you would agree, would you not, that if we enter into this treaty we should comply with every term of it in the letter and the spirit? You would agree with that?

Mr. Canfield. I should think that would be the policy of this Government.

Senator Donnell. And you do agree that the maintenance and development of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack includes among the measures necessary to be taken the provision of adequate military force with which to resist such armed attack, do you not?

Mr. Canfield. Yes, Senator. I think you would agree that you would then get into the very difficult area of determining where the attack would be resisted, whether it is possible to arm Europe, the western European nations, effectively enough so that you would maintain a front in western Europe. Those are questions, it seems to me, that should and will be discussed in great detail by military experts. I do not feel competent to pass judgment on that.

OBLIGATIONS TO REARM EUROPE

Senator Donnell. I appreciate that. But you do feel that any citizen, including yourself, or any such citizen who has carefully considered these matters, is entitled to draw the conclusion, and must inevitably draw the conclusion, that among the means designed to maintain and develop this individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack is the military strengthening of these various signatory countries. You would agree with that, would you not?

Mr. Canfield. No; I would not. I would say that that is not necessarily true, that the pact could be made effective by close military consultation between the various countries by integration of staff work and so on.

I am not at the same time saying that giving arms aid to the western European countries to a limited degree is not advisable.

Senator Donnell. You would be inclined to think, would you not, Mr. Canfield, that the giving of armed aid to some extent to western European countries would be advisable and would be contemplated by the provisions of article 3 which I have read from this treaty, would you not?

Mr. Canfield. I should think so, but personally I would oppose it if that meant any diminution of Marshall plan aid for peaceful purposes.

Senator Donnell. I am not entering into the Marshall plan question; I am entering into the question of our obligations under the treaty.
Mr. Canfield. It is a question of men and money.

Senator Donnell. You mean if it came to a choice of reducing military assistance and continuing with Marshall aid, you would favor keeping Marshall aid at what it is?

Mr. Canfield. Keeping Marshall aid where it is now.

Senator Donnell. You are chairman of the board of a great organization, Harper & Brothers Publishing Co. How long have you been with that company?

Mr. Canfield. Twenty-five years.

Senator Donnell. What was your educational background behind that, if you do not mind telling us?

Mr. Canfield. Harvard University.

Senator Donnell. When did you receive your degree there?

Mr. Canfield. 1919.

Senator Donnell. And what degree do you hold?

Mr. Canfield. Not much: A. B. But I went to Oxford, which puts me in a better class.

Senator Donnell. Were you a Rhodes scholar?

Mr. Canfield. No; I was not.

Senator Donnell. How long did you attend Oxford?

Mr. Canfield. One year.

Senator Donnell. Did you travel on the Continent in recent years?

Mr. Canfield. Yes.

Senator Donnell. How recently have you traveled over there?

Mr. Canfield. Last year.

Senator Donnell. Did you get into Norway?

Mr. Canfield. No; I did not.

Senator Donnell. That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. Alfred Kohlberg.

STATEMENT OF ALFRED KOHLBERG, CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN CHINA POLICY ASSOCIATION

Mr. Kohlberg. Mr. Chairman, my name is Alfred Kohlberg. My address is 1 West Thirty-seventh Street, New York City. I am appearing here today as chairman of the board of the American China Policy Association. This association was set up a little over 3 years ago to investigate and study our policy in China particularly.

The first president of our association and its founder was Mr. J. B. Powell, a distinguished foreign correspondent, of Mr. Donnell's State, Missouri, who, unfortunately, passed away 2 years ago, and I believe Mr. Donnell paid a tribute to him in the Senate at the time.

Senator Donnell. He died under very tragic circumstances at a Missouri University luncheon.

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct, Senator.

The Chairman. Have you a short statement?

Mr. Kohlberg. I have no written statement.

Our second president was the Honorable Clare Boothe Luce, of Connecticut, and our present president is Mr. William Loeb, Jr., of New Hampshire and Vermont.
I am also national chairman of the American Jewish League Against Communism, and while I cannot speak for them, I represent their point of view in my statement.

Before stating our position on the Atlantic alliance, I would like to read two sentences from a letter from the Secretary of State to the chairman of this committee. These sentences are [reading]:

The study which has been made of the Bolshevik movement, some of the results of which are furnished herewith, shows conclusively that the purpose of the Bolsheviks is to subvert the existing principles of government and society the world over, including those countries in which democratic institutions are already established. They have built up a political machine which, by the concentration of power in the hands of a few, and the ruthlessness of its methods, suggests the Asiatic despotism of the early Tsars.

That letter, sir, is dated October 27, 1919, from Secretary of State Robert Lansing to the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate—30 years ago October.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your testimony on the China situation?
Mr. KOHLBERG. No; it is on the Atlantic alliance.

I read those sentences, sir, because we favor the confirmation of the Atlantic alliance by your body, and we favor it because it is a step in the restraint of this Asiatic despotism that threatens to over­flood the whole world.

DANGER OF OVEREMPHASIZING EUROPE

We think, however, sir, that it is only a step, and that other steps must follow, such as a Pacific alliance, for example; that we cannot hold back the Red tide only in western Europe. It must be held back from the rest of the world until the day when it may be overthrown, possibly by the peoples who suffer under it.

We, however, feel that there are certain aspects of this Atlantic Alliance that should be further considered. It is the breaking of a 152-year tradition of American foreign policy based on the Farewell Address of President Washington, who advised that we make no permanent alliances with European powers, but should rely on temporary alliances when needed.

We favor this, but we think the reasons for this permanent change in policy should be fully understood by the country, and we think that a full understanding of that would require that we go on further, as we say, to further strengthening of the powers and forces that are holding back this Red tide of Asiatic tyranny, as the Secretary of State called it.

We feel also, Senator, that the Monroe Doctrine and the open-door policy should be considered at the same time, because a change in one section of our traditional foreign policy calls for reconsideration of the other two traditional sections of our foreign policy.

The CHAIRMAN. We have handled the Monroe Doctrine pretty well in the Rio Pact, have we not?

Mr. KOHLBERG. We think that it has been modified in the Rio Pact. It has become a consultative pact, whereas, when stated by President Monroe, he rejected British cooperation in his statement and made it a unilateral statement, and we think the reasons for making it a consultative pact should be more fully explained.
The CHAIRMAN. Have not all the governments of the world acknowledged the strength of the Monroe Doctrine, with the exception of a few intended violations which the United States resisted and wiped out of the way, such as Maximilian in Mexico and the Venezuela claims, and things of that kind? I was under the impression that the Rio Pact was putting into treaty form practically all of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. We do not relax any. We still adhere to the Monroe Doctrine.

Mr. KOHLBERG. That is correct, sir; but there are two parts to the Monroe Doctrine. The first part is the prohibition of extension of territorial possessions by European powers. The second part is the prohibition of extension of any of the systems of government of any European powers. And the Soviet Union is attempting the extension of its system of government in every country of the Western Hemisphere.

The CHAIRMAN. We are resisting that always, are we not?

EXTENSION OF ATLANTIC PACT TO OTHER AREAS

Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes. That is why I say I think the whole subject needs to be covered, rather than just the Atlantic Pact. We are completely for the ratification of the Atlantic Alliance, but we think that we stop too soon in only looking at that; that the rest of the world must be considered all in the same framework.

I appeared before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate last June. At that time I made a statement for our association covering what I have referred to now. In order not to take your time reading it, I wonder if I could put it in the record. It is a six-step program covering the world.

(The paper referred to reads as follows:)

While it is true that the conduct of our foreign relations is the constitutional prerogative of the President, the power of the purse remains with Congress. The signers of the Constitution probably never expected that it would cost $10,000,000,000 a year to conduct our foreign relations. It is my humble opinion that when you appropriate the cash you assume responsibility for results.

What we face is an ideology plus a force. This ideology promises socialism, economic democracy, miraculous medicine, free education, no more exploitation, racial equality and every variety of "pie in the sky." These ideas are for export only. Behind the iron curtain it delivers poverty, the police state, terror, and slavery.

The force is the Communist International, which includes the ever-expanding Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and musters 450,000,000 subjects and slaves, and millions of spies and agents all over the world.

It will destroy us or we will destroy it.

Force can be destroyed by force, but an ideology cannot be destroyed by force alone. It must be destroyed by a better ideology.

We have that better ideology. It is freedom — political freedom, religious freedom, and economic freedom.

I believe that every one of the steps which I am going to suggest is inevitable; that every one of them will in any case be taken the day after war comes; but that, if taken now or in the very near future, war may be avoided.

Step 1.—Congress must declare that world communism has proclaimed the United States its enemy, and itself our enemy. This declaration the Communist hierarchy has officially made a number of times, most particularly in section 1, paragraph 1 of the constitution of the Communist International which proclaims its objectives to be to fight "for the establishment of a World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics," that is, for the conquest of the entire world. In accordance with this declaration, "adhering to, giving aid, and comfort to" world communism would fall under the constitutional definition of treason.
Step 2.—Unrestricted trade relations shall be permitted only with nations entering the alliance outlined in step 3. Trade relations with Communist-controlled nations and areas shall be prohibited. Trade relations with other nations and areas shall be controlled so that no materials which may directly or indirectly promote the war potential of the Communist areas may thereby reach such areas.

Step 3.—American armed aid in case of attack by armed Communists shall be promised to every nation taking the above action on condition that each such nation agrees to extend armed aid under the same circumstances to each of the others so qualifying. No question of the form of government of nations entering such an alliance, whether free enterprise, democratic, monarchical, dictatorial, socialistic, or otherwise shall be given consideration. When thinking of military alliances, we should remember that Russia signed a treaty of military alliance during the war with Great Britain to run 20 years. Since the war she has signed treaties of military alliance with the following former allies: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and France; also with the following enemy nations: Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, all not long since, described as fascists, beasts. The alliance I envision would be independent of the UN which we would permit to continue in the hope of a happier day in the dim and distant future, at which time it could be reorganized to fit.

Step 4.—American economic, charitable, relief, or reconstruction aid shall be permitted only to nations entering the alliance provided for in step 3.

Step 5.—Direct military and other aid shall be supplied to dissident elements within the Communist world, exactly in the manner that Russia now supplies such aid to Communist and other dissidents in the free world, as for example in China, Korea, Greece, Trieste, Austria, Germany, Italy, Iran, Finland, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

Step 6.—Diplomatic relations shall be immediately broken with all nations and areas within the Communist world. Such diplomatic relations in the past were presumed to smooth the course of international relations but as now practiced by the Communist nations, only serve to aggravate such relations. Only last April I returned from Japan where the Soviet Union has several hundred employees in its Tokyo Embassy. A few dozen are engaged in diplomatic work. The balance are busy at espionage, propaganda, agitation and intrigue.

All these steps can be taken at once. No one of them is warlike, nor does any one of them (except the rupture of diplomatic relations) go beyond the steps already taken by Soviet communism in its “cold war” on us. Those who think we are now at peace with Russia must consider all these steps to peace—they exactly duplicate Russia’s peaceful approaches to us. Those who think we are engaged in a “cold war” with Russia will applaud retaliation confined to the “cold” level. Every one of the above steps, except step 6, is already being carried out in part by our Government, or has been in part proposed, either by the Administration or by Republican leaders of the Senate.

It is a world-wide Monroe Doctrine in a shrunked world. It says, “Stop” to the only Eurasian power able to “extend its territories or political system” in the free world.

If all these measures are taken at once, we will be able to confront the Soviet world with an alliance of free people having at least triple its industrial power and more than double its manpower. Confronted with such an alliance, the Soviet Union will probably not dare to make war and we can rely on time, and the growing dissatisfaction of the 400,000,000 slaves of communism, for the eventual destruction of the Communist dictatorship.

If, in spite of all odds, the Soviet Union, nevertheless, attacked the free world, we would have overwhelming forces on our side not now available to us. This, I believe, is a plan to make World War III nearly impossible; to bring us victory, instead of stalemate or defeat, if it comes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg!
Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

OTHER FACTS

Senator DONNEL. I understand from your statement you favor a Pacific alliance, and I judge you mean of a character similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Senator DONNEL. I understand from your statement you favor a Pacific alliance, and I judge you mean of a character similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Mr. Kohlberg. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Do you favor a Mediterranean Pact of like nature?

Mr. Kohlberg. I would say that eventually yes.

Senator Donnell. Are there any other pacts that you would favor in addition to the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific?

Mr. Kohlberg. In this statement that I put in here, yes. I would say that I do not favor paper alliances. I think that each country that comes into the alliance should clean up its fifth column, so that we would know that no change of prime ministers or change of government could come about that would vitiate it.

Senator Donnell. With respect to the Monroe Doctrine, that is purely a unilateral doctrine, is it not?

Mr. Kohlberg. It was.

Senator Donnell. It does not create on the part of the United States any contractual obligation whatsoever between it and any other nation, is that correct?

Mr. Kohlberg. That was its original form, but it has been somewhat changed by the Pact of Chapultepec.

Senator Donnell. The Monroe Doctrine itself did not create any contractual obligation.

That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Is Dr. Griffith here?

STATEMENT OF DR. H. M. GRIFFITH, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Dr. Griffith. My name is H. M. Griffith. I am vice president of the National Economic Council, with headquarters in the Empire State Building, New York.

In correspondence with the clerk of your committee we understood that we would be given the privilege of making a short statement and then filing a longer statement to supplement it, so I have here a brief statement which I would like to read, and a longer statement which I would like to have inserted in the record.

The Chairman. Is there any duplication?

Dr. Griffith. Not very much, sir.

The Chairman. All right; go ahead.

What is the National Economic Council? What is it composed of?

Dr. Griffith. The National Economic Council is a citizens' organization with members I think in every State in the United States, with a board of directors elected by the members.

I will put into the record a little leaflet which gives the names of our directors and also the purposes of the organization, according to its charter.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, INC.

Established 1930

WHAT IT IS—WHAT IT DOES

What it is

The National Economic Council, Inc., is an organization dedicated to the preservation of human liberty, including maintenance and invigorating of private enterprise, rights of property, and American independence.
The purposes stated in its charter are:
To stimulate and develop the economic life of the United States and of the several States.
To encourage government, Federal, State, and local, to practice wise economy in public spending.
To urge all persons versed in practical affairs, as well as in other fields of endeavor, to take an active part in public affairs, thereby contributing to the people the benefit of their experience and judgment.
To aid in developing an informed public opinion on the major political, social, and economic problems of the Nation and an understanding by public officials of the importance and needs of private enterprise under our system of government.
To encourage a balanced economy within the United States in conformity with the principles of constitutional liberty.
To stimulate respect for the Constitution and the country's laws.
To stand at all times for the freedom and independence of the United States.
The National Economic Council seeks to protect the interests of taxpayers, to free the individual from unwarranted Government interference, and to guard the American way of life by resolute opposition to all forms of collectivism, including communism, fascism, or any other alien ideology.

What it does
The National Economic Council employs every tested and available modern method to reach actual and potential leaders of public thought, as well as the American people as a whole:
The Economic Council Letter, semimonthly, furnishes fresh, often exclusive information and ideas to thousands of readers, including individuals, corporations, libraries, churches, and colleges and universities.
The Economic Council Review of Books, monthly, keeps defenders of human freedom succinctly and accurately informed of trends in the world of books. These often foreshadow, or cause, public trends. It is brilliantly edited by Rose Wilder Lane.
Action Report, occasionally, to inform readers of council activities and other spot news in the battle for liberty.
Through appearances before congressional committees the council's representatives present persuasively and forcefully, in specific instances, the case for the American system.
Through publication of additional timely pamphlets and books, the council analyzes current problems and exposes unsound situations.
The NEC speakers bureau furnishes, by arrangement, able and informed speakers for pro-American groups and organizations.
The council seeks to do more than to confirm those already persuaded: through its effort many, thousands have been awakened to the choice America must make between collectivism and freedom.

Officers: Merwin K. Hart, president; Constance G. Dall, assistant to the president; Ora A. Taylor, vice president; A. Margaret Schmid, vice president and assistant treasurer; McKay Twombly, secretary; Sibylla Schilling, assistant secretary; Glenn G. Munn, treasurer; Helen M. O'Connor, assistant treasurer.


The council is supported by dues and contributions. Contributors include both individuals and corporations.

Dr. Griffith. The National Economic Council opposes ratification of this treaty. It does so, first, upon peculiarly American grounds; second, upon grounds of stark realism; and, third, because there is a practical alternative.
First: We oppose abandonment of the historic American foreign policy against permanent alliances. That policy, first commended by George Washington, was born of clear insight into the nature of political relationships and awareness of the lessons of human history. If you ratify this treaty, you rescind the Declaration of Independence. American freedom of action will be gone. Surrender of freedom of action may well lead to our death as a Nation.

For the third time in a generation a group of hopelessly confused people is leading the United States into war, step by step, while claiming at each step that the goal is peace. If the goal is peace, this treaty virtually guarantees that it can be reached only after long and bloody war. However sincerely the framers of this alliance may desire peace, the treaty itself, if ratified, makes war inevitable. War is not in the interest of the people of the United States. Popular support for this pact is derived only from the belief that it will avert war. The American people deserve to know the truth as to where they are being led.

BALANCE OF POWER

Second: America stands today at a supreme moment of decision. We dare not deal in phrases and slogans. Unless we achieve stark realism, we may perish.

This treaty abandons both the concepts of collective security and of sturdy national independence. In their place it embraces the philosophy of balances of power. Balances of power are among the oldest of political devices known to history, and of all perhaps most discredited. They do not avert wars. They create an atmosphere in which wars become certain. Only persons ignorant of history will assert otherwise. "Those who are ignorant of the past are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past." Those now in charge of American foreign policy should not blindly lead us into an ancient folly.

This particular balance-of-power arrangement is folly compounded. It would be of advantage to us in any future conflict only if it added to our own strength such additional strength as to give us overwhelming preponderance of power. It does not do this. It does the opposite. It obliges us to agree to defend what we have not the power to defend. It obliges us to military, economic, and financial burdens which are too heavy for our economy to carry. It involves, in a word, support of "allies" who are liabilities not assets, and consequent fatal overextension of our resources. If we have a will to perish, this is the way to do it.

War, like politics—of which war is only the extension—is "the art of the possible." This treaty commits us to attempting the impossible. It supposes that it is possible for America to be: (1) Policeman to the world; (2) armorer to half the world; (3) financier to half the world. We simply do not have the resources to do these things, and you cannot create such resources by voting to ratify this treaty. They do not exist. If we act as if they do exist when they do not, then we are headed for final oblivion.

It has been argued that since the rulers of the Soviet Union ostensibly oppose this treaty, they fear it. I suggest the opposite. Nothing could be so well calculated to advance their global plans as
fatal overextension of our own resources. I suggest that their opposition is designed to push us into the treaty by psychological reaction, not to keep us out. We should not fall for this entrapment.

It has been suggested that the treaty be ratified but that only moderate supplies of arms be given our new allies. This folly would be as great as the folly of overextension. It would awe no potential enemy. It would, rather, mean that the countries of western Europe, one by one, would adapt themselves realistically to the actualities of power politics. Seeing that we are not prepared to give them the minimum necessary for their defense, they would make the best deal possible with the nearest center of preponderant power. All our billions in gifts would then have been wasted. Nor should we be so naive as to imagine this impossible: Human nature being what it is, we cannot buy love or future favor. Mature nations act only from self-interest.

This, then, is our inexorable dilemma: If we ratify the pact and supply less aid than is necessary, in the decisive moment we will find we have no allies. If we try to supply all that is necessary for our allies and their possessions, we overextend ourselves into disaster. Either way, we lose.

ALTERNATIVE TO ATLANTIC TREATY

Third: There is a practical alternative to this treaty. It is not perfect. There is no guaranty of absolute safety in our predatory world. But it is infinitely more intelligent than bankrupting ourselves to create a balance of power which, instead of averting war, will insure war.

(1) Preserve American freedom of action.

(2) Root out every Communist and Communist sympathizer from our Government and its agencies, under heavy penalties.

(3) Make a real Western Hemisphere defense zone. Its outposts should be as far-flung as geography and politics will allow. Bases should be secured at least in Spain. The Iberian Peninsula is probably the only area on the Continent capable of sustained defense. A Western Hemisphere defense zone can be created without the alliance, without national bankruptcy or socialization of our own economy. Such defense is within our means.

(4) Strip our own economic decks for action by reducing our own Government expense and rejecting the whole Truman program for a socialized, welfare state.

(5) Recognize that it is not in our power to defend everybody. We do not, with or without the treaty, have power to prevent the U. S. S. R. from occupying most of western Europe if it decides to do so. Even if the U. S. S. R. should occupy western Europe without a general war, the tragedy will not be so great as the alternatives that would follow adoption of the Atlantic Pact. Soviet occupation would not be permanent. Conquerors are normally beaten, not by external force, but by the weaknesses and internal contradictions of their own system. In attempting to engorge both Asia and western Europe, the U. S. S. R. will be trying to digest too much. It will be doing precisely what we are in danger of doing in the Atlantic Pact—overextending itself. Within a few years this will become apparent. It will be the U. S. S. R. rather than the U. S. A. which will be weakening by overexten-
sion. And when freedom-loving peoples at last revolt, their case will be infinitely more hopeful than if the Continent had first been blasted by atomic war.

If this strategy is followed, it is probable that we will never have to fight the U.S.S.R. at all. Doubtless they expect and want to rule the world. But they do not have the resources required to conquer and rule the world, unless America first exhausts its power to resist, then falls from within. With a Europe and an Asia in ferment behind them, with their own people restive, the men of the Kremlin would think long before assaulting a unified, homogeneous core of armed power such as we can create in the Western Hemisphere.

If we ratify the treaty, war is inevitable and ruin almost certain. If we reject the treaty and follow the program just outlined, war is not inevitable and may be averted altogether. If it comes nevertheless, we shall be ready, not overextended and weakened by adventures beyond our power. Such a war we could win.

America is earth's last great island of freedom. In this moment of decision we should preserve its freedom, husband its resources, see to its defenses, and humble ourselves in dependence upon Almighty God who "hath made and preserved us a nation."

The CHAIRMAN. You take the place of Mr. Hart, I believe; Mr. Merwin Hart?

Dr. Griffith. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. One or two questions.

Is Mr. Charles G. Dawes, a member of the board of directors, a former Vice President of the United States?

Dr. Griffith. That is correct.

Senator Donnell. And is Mr. Ernest L. Conant a lawyer in New York City, or a professor in one of the universities?

Dr. Griffith. No. You are thinking of the president of Harvard.

Senator Donnell. No, I am not thinking of him. There was an Ernest L. Conant who practiced law in New York for some years, and specialized among matters related to Cuba and Central American matters.

Dr. Griffith. I cannot answer that with certainty. I think he is retired.

Senator Donnell. With regard to Mr. Merwin K. Hart, would you tell us very briefly what is his background and education and experience?

Dr. Griffith. He is the president of our Economic Council. His educational background is that he attended the St. Paul School and Harvard University.

Senator Donnell. What has been his experience?

Dr. Griffith. He has been a lawyer and also in the insurance business and, since 1930, the president of this organization.

Senator Donnell. Where is he located now?

Dr. Griffith. New York City.

Senator Donnell. Does he put in all of his time as president of the organization?

Dr. Griffith. Oh, yes.
Senator Donnell. And yourself, Dr. Griffith. I notice you have the title of “Doctor.” What is that, a doctor of medicine or a doctor of what?

Dr. Griffith. No.

Senator Donnell. Just give us briefly your educational background and experience.

Dr. Griffith. I have attended the University of California, University of California Law School, Princeton Theological Seminary; I hold the degrees, since you want to know them, of A. B., LL. B., Ph. D., and D. D.

Senator Donnell. Have you practiced the profession of the ministry?

Dr. Griffith. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. What denomination?

Dr. Griffith. Presbyterian.

Senator Donnell. Where and for how long a time did you practice the profession?

Dr. Griffith. For about 15 years in Canada and also in Pennsylvania.

Senator Donnell. Thank you.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, INC., BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE ATLANTIC PACT, THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1949

THE ATLANTIC PACT

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

“Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?—Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?—Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?” (Washington’s Farewell Address.)

To the People of the United States: We have arrived at a decisive moment in American history. The question involved in ratification of the North Atlantic Pact is this: Shall we, by interweaving our destiny with that of western Europe, surrender American sovereignty? Or, shall the pact be rejected and our independence be maintained?

Let our choice be clear. We can have the pact and surrender American independence. We can keep our independence and reject the pact. We cannot have both.

No matter how skillfully it may be denied, adoption of the pact means we surrender our own right to decide, ourselves, the destiny of the United States. Like most questions raised by the internationalists, this question is purposely clouded. They do not frankly say now that ratification of the pact will mean the die is cast. But at some future time, they will contend that America is already committed.

ARE YOU TOLD THE TRUTH?

Few news writers will tell the American people the stark nature of this decision. Already you, the people, are in process of being utterly misinformed, as when you are told by men who ought to know better that the pact exists, not to wage war, but to wage peace, which is meaningless.

The pact is a show of force, wherein the gage of battle is flung upon the doorstep of the Kremlin. That peace may be the object of those who fling it down does not alter the nature of the act. In throwing down that gage, we liquidate the experiment in independence begun July 4, 1776. Ratification of the alliance will
be the act of repeal of the Declaration of Independence. Our destiny will then depend upon others.

That is the real issue. Let the battle be fought out upon it, not with phony slogans, and phony, misleading issues. Let the maintenance or surrender of American independence be decided on the merits of the case. But let us not surrender our American independence upon the supposition that the alliance will preserve it. If we must walk to the block, let us not go blindfolded.

Now, if ever, the future of the American Republic depends upon achievement of utter realism. And our Nation is today as never before the ark of freedom's foundation in the all-but-universal deluge of our century. If America fails, freedom fails.

If this alliance would help preserve America, we should be for it even if it involved a break with tradition. But it will not help preserve America. Its effect will be the very opposite: it will mean the destruction of America. The pact is a measure neither of intelligence nor necessity, but another crowning evidence of the incompetence and culpable ignorance of those in charge of American policy at the very top level.

WHERE IS THE INTELLIGENCE?

First, let's clear away some underbrush. The good intentions of some supporters of the pact are immaterial. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. Sincerity is no substitute for intelligence. The noblest of men can be killed if he steers his car over a cliff in the naive belief he is on the highway. Mere good intent is no evidence the good intending is a realist.

The Atlantic Pact is a final repudiation of the basic concepts of the United Nations. With this step, America abandons the philosophy of collective security and embraces the philosophy of balance-of-power alliances. No words of UN employees, delegates or anybody else can obscure this fact. All the pious talk about the pact being within the framework of the charter is eyewash, and every informed person knows it.

The National Economic Council has never had faith in the two attempts of our times to guarantee peace through collective security. It was never really collective, and it brought more danger than security. The League of Nations was always more of a net irritant in world affairs than an emollient. The fiction that its failure was due to the absence of the United States from its membership is palpably absurd. Its failure was due simply to the fact that the vital interests of its members were not identical but divergent, and each nation acted to serve what it believed to be its own vital interests—as anybody but an imbecile should have been able to predict.

The same situation developed in the UN, only much more quickly. Collective security is a dangerous illusion so long as divergent interests persist. So-called statesmen who ignore this primary fact are barely competent to be village selectmen. Today, statesmen of this or smaller caliber who happen to have charge of the fate of millions of people, find these facts pressing in upon them. But they refuse to admit their miscalculation, even while abandoning the whole stupid mess. They have talked about collective security so loud and so long that in the very act of burying it, they tell us that the new pact is within the framework of the charter.

Nor has the National Economic Council any faith in the new balance of power. It is a bankrupt solution offered by bankrupts to conceal their failures. Alliances to create power balances are about the oldest device known to history. Millennia ago, Egypt and the various great powers that succeeded each other in the East, habitually built up balance-of-power combinations against each other. They were all designed to preserve peace, and they invariably resulted in war. The balance-of-power philosophy has dogged rulers of nations from the beginning of time, and of all the devices of statecraft it is perhaps the most discredited. The nearest it ever came to success was when in the latter half of the nineteenth and the first fourteen years of the twentieth century, Britain kept the continent of Europe in uneasy balance. But even that apparent success turned into the greatest disaster of recorded history. It gave us the two world wars. So now we are going to try it again!

HOW BALANCE UNBALANCES

The reasons why the balance-of-power theory always fails are simple. It exacerbates irritations between nations by inventing every dispute with a graver possible consequence. Each side of the balance grows more suspicious of the
other. General wars are made easier to start because, if a nation on one side gets into a dispute with a nation on the other, all nations of both combinations are automatically drawn in. Conflicts, instead of being localized, become universalized. Gasoline, not water, is thrown on the fire. Small nations belonging to one combination, emboldened by their alliance with more powerful nations, become turbulent. Human nature being what it is, combined with the fact that disputes always arise, makes the final result mathematically predictable. The perfect example of this is how the units were drawn one by one into World War I over a local dispute between Austria and Serbia. Had Serbia not been under the protection of Russia, and had Austria not been allied with Germany, there would have been no world war in 1914.

Knowledge of such facts by Washington and the other Founding Fathers prompted them to urge their own generation, and their posterity (ourselves) not to enter entangling alliances. Their views were not parochial. They were the result of profound insight into the lessons of history. Nor were they in any essential sense based upon the existence of the Atlantic barrier, as has so often been falsely represented. Washington knew that the Atlantic was no barrier, but a naval highway. Had he not just led a victorious war against an enemy from the other shore? The reason why Washington’s advice is different from that of our current statesmen is that those who control our destiny now, are ignoring history. Those who ignore the past are doomed to repeat the errors of the past. But it may be asked, “If you are against ‘collective security’ and also against a balance-of-power alliance, what are you for?”

Theodore Roosevelt once said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Give no provocation you can avoid but be prepared to fight if you must.

The so-called North Atlantic alliance exactly reverses this sound counsel. We are not walking softly. We are marching to rolling drums. Nor do we have a big stick, though we are talking about getting one.

The atomic bomb, contrary to popular superstition, is not the kind of big stick which military planners need for the alliance. The atomic bomb is a terrifying weapon, and a major factor in all military calculations. But it is a commonplace of present-day military thinking that if the nations of western Europe are to resist the Soviet Union in case of war, and thus be profitable members of the Alliance, they must be “re-armed.” That is, entirely apart from the bomb, the armies of our European partners might as well not exist unless they are adequately equipped to offer real resistance to the Russians in the field. For the atom bomb could not be decisive against armies deployed for action.

What degree of rearmament would prevent Russia from rolling to the Atlantic in a fortnight? Military experts say that it would take at least 15 armored divisions and 50 divisions of other types to hold off the Red Army for any considerable time. That is about the minimum, and more would be better.

Equipment for a lesser force would be 100 percent wasted—would be like trying to span a 100-foot chasm with a 40-foot bridge.

NOW, LOOK AT THE BUDGET

What would such adequate rearmament cost? That is a vital question, because there are limits to what the American economy can stand. Even if the idea were sound, we would still have to inquire first whether we have the means to carry it out. Unless we are ready to surrender our liberties to a slave state of our own.

The present cost of equipping one armored division is about $250,000,000. So 15 would cost us $3,750,000,000. That does not include the cost of training personnel, pay and maintenance of men and machines, or ammunition and gasoline. There is a plan in Washington that our Allies might supply these items—but we had better forget that. Only our Marshall-plan money now keeps the budgets of the Socialist countries of western Europe in anything resembling balance. How could they shoulder the cost of rearmament?

Yet the armored divisions are only the beginning. Fifty other divisions must be equipped, too. We must provide them with vast quantities of materials whose cost to us in dollars would be perhaps $15,000,000,000, but whose cost in exhaustion of our own material resources could be disastrous. Most of the equipment would have to come from the United States, because western Europe cannot manufacture such items in quantity. Marshall-plan and rearmament requirements for Europe could easily cost $30 to 50 billions during the next 4 years.

This does not take account of the military budget of the United States of America itself, now running above 16 billions a year. If the Atlantic Pact is ratified, with rearmament following on its heels, and if any important part
of Mr. Truman's social-welfare program is adopted, the Federal peacetime budget could average 60 billions a year for the next 4 years.

Two urgent questions arise.
First, can our economy support such expenditures?
In our considered judgment, it cannot. Such sums will place a fatal strain on the American economy—which is precisely what Soviet Russia would like to see.

It is true that we spent more during the late war. But the strain of that effort is still being carried by the economy. The new expenditures will merely be added to the strain and depletion of resources resulting from the old effort.

"WE'LL TAX AND TAX"

To get such sums, we must either increase taxes above the point of diminishing returns, or else we must resort to vast deficit financing—confiscation by inflation. Either course would destroy the American Republic. The only way in which the economic machine could function would be by harsh bureaucratic control and operation of industry. That would bring us socialism overnight. We would become, like Soviet Russia or Hitler's Germany, a one-party country. For with 1 to 2 million carefully placed Federal employees added to the more than 2 million already in office, who is so foolish as to imagine the Republican Party or any other party could wrest control from the gang in power in the administration today? Then, by aid of the pending Economic Stability Act, the American people would have become veritably enslaved.

The controls would simply be the use of force to hide the fact that the whole economy is running at a ruinous deficit—a deficit which at some day of reckoning must be paid either in diluted money or in the ruin of Americans who have savings upon which they depend. Control of a deficit-operated economy means only expropriation (that is, stealing) of goods that others have accumulated. The politicians may control, but they will not pay. The people will pay with impoverishment.

Ratification of the North Atlantic Pact, then, followed by the minimum appropriations necessary to give it any chance of being militarily successful, will be beyond the means of our economy. It will also lead straight to state socialism in America. And state socialism will mean an end to liberty for everybody except the bureaucrats.

But let us ask a further question: Will Congress appropriate the money? Almost certainly it will not appropriate the huge sums mentioned above. It will probably compromise. And if Congress compromises, what will be the result?

Compromise will be disaster compounded. If we give western Europe less than the minimum necessary to hold off the Red Army, we guarantee that at some future date, to be decided by the Politburo alone, western Europe can be occupied. Then, if we have anything left, we shall face the task of again organizing vast armies to retake the Continent for our allies.

But this is precisely what the alliance is supposed and intended to prevent. The peoples of western Europe are not interested in that kind of war, even if victorious. They do not want to be occupied, then liberated. They want not to be occupied. The only reason this alliance interests them at all is that in it they see a hope of avoiding Soviet occupation.

Yet, if we give them less than the minimum that they now request—or demand—they cannot resist occupation.

The leaders of the western European governments may be fogy social theorists, but as to occupation they can be counted upon to be stark realists. The great majority of their people wish to avoid occupation. What will happen if they see that, after all the fanfare and oratory, America does not give them enough to defend themselves? They are almost certain to try to get the best terms they can from the Soviet Union.

To ratify the alliance, then, but not to implement it with vast armament, will infallibly result in throwing western Europe into the embrace of the Soviets. All Marshall plan funds will have been wasted. Whatever armament we have sent will be under the control of those who have entered the Soviet orbit.

WE'D BETTER FACE IT NOW

The alternatives we have set forth are real, and we had better learn to live with them. We can bankrupt our economy to provide western Europe with the minimum necessary, and thereby plunge ourselves irremediably into state so-
cialism. Or, we can give western Europe less than the minimum, and insure that those nations will presently make terms with Soviet Russia.

But the first alternative is not so simple as it sounds. Even if we should make the sacrifices necessary to arm western Europe, we could not be sure of stopping the Soviet Union.

Communist infiltration in western Europe has gone too far for us to count upon an undivided effort from our allies in case of war should begin even after they have been adequately armed. There is no guaranty that both Italy and France would not be rent by civil war of such a nature as to paralyze their armies and render them impotent to protect their frontiers. Indeed, such civil war is highly probable.

Even what would happen in Britain is clouded with doubt. The Labor Government there is still supplying both Russia and Poland with implements and machinery essential for war. Infiltration of Communists and Communist sympathizers within the Labor Government is much greater than commonly understood. There is grave reason to believe that in Great Britain, Communist agents could seize or destroy vital communications and power centers and take other action to prevent any effective war effort being launched from Britain.

Who, then, would march against the Soviet Union on the Continent? Would the Red tide be stemmed by the armies of Luxemburg, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Portugal?

Another fact that complicates the rearming of western Europe lies in the power of the Soviet Union itself. Are we so naive as to imagine that the masters of the Kremlin will sit by idle if they see us actually building up preponderant military power in the West?

And it deserves note that in the framing of the Atlantic Pact, Spain has been left out. Yet Spain is potentially the strongest anti-Communist country on the Continent of Europe. The leaving out of Spain is a clear indication that Marxist influences had a powerful say in the framing of the Atlantic Pact, just as they have had in our public affairs, foreign and domestic, for many years past.

TO BOMB—OR NOT TO BOMB

Doubtless Russian cities, in the event of war, would disappear under atomic attack—but what strategic effect would that have? It could not destroy the Red Army in the field. It could not prevent or even slow the occupation. And, after the occupation, would we bomb Paris, Rome, the Hague, Brussels, Copenhagen, or Oslo with atomic weapons? Or London?

There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union has deliberately counted the cost of atomic warfare and decided that its great cities are expendable. But even if we should bomb every important city both in the Soviet Union and in western Europe, we would still have to land and occupy a continent in which frustration, privation, and hatred of us for atom bombing our friends would be obstacles perhaps more formidable than the Red Army. Nor is there any guaranty that the great cities of the United States would escape atomic bombing—which in our case would be infinitely more serious for us than the destruction of Russian cities for the Soviets.

THE AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE

The alternative we propose is not perfect. It is not guaranteed to win in any struggle between us and the U. S. S. R. But in this world there can be no absolute guaranty of safety. We must intelligently do the best we can, keep alert, and place our cause in God's hand.

First, we should preserve America's own freedom of action. The Atlantic Pact should be rejected, no matter how much loss of face some of our bureaucrats in the State Department may suffer.

Second, we should at once and with drastic thoroughness proceed to root out every Communist and Communist fellow traveler from Government service. They should be given a week to resign, and after that should be subject to the death penalty if they have not declared themselves. We should immediately outlaw the Communist Party, take its key personnel into custody, and keep strict watch upon the others. Nothing else will so convince the Soviet leadership we mean business. The former we are with Communists and their sympathizers in America, the more respect will the U. S. S. R. have for us.

Third, we should take steps to make real a Western Hemisphere defense zone. Its outposts should be as far-flung as geography and politics will allow. Bases should be secured, at least in Spain, which is probably (with Portugal) the only
area in western Europe capable of sustained defense. A sound military defense can be made for the Western Hemisphere without the North Atlantic Alliance, and it will be within our capacity and means. Nor need it result in the socialization of our own economy.

Fourth. We should drastically cut the bureaucracy in our own Government, thus releasing large numbers of persons for productive economic activities as well as reducing Federal expense. We should reject once and for all the whole Truman program for a socialized welfare state. This will be stripping our decks for action.

Fifth. While not being indifferent to the fate of free peoples anywhere, we should become reconciled to the reality that it does not lie within our means or power to see to the defense of everybody. If the U. S. S. R. occupies western Europe, it will be a tragedy. But the tragedy will not be as great for them or for us as the alternatives that would follow adoption of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Nor would Soviet conquest of Europe be permanent. Students of the history of empires know well that the conqueror is normally beaten, not by external force, but by the weaknesses and internal contradictions of the system he himself sets up. In our opinion the U. S. S. R., in taking over Europe and Asia, will be attempting far too much. Within a few years this will become apparent. And when freedom-loving peoples at last revolt against bondage, their case will be much more hopeful than if the Continent had first been blasted by bitter, atomic war.

THE OVERSTUFFED GIANT

Indeed we think that if this strategy is followed, we may never have to fight the U. S. S. R. at all. Doubtless they expect and want to rule the world. But with more than they can digest in Europe and Asia, their conquests will weaken rather than strengthen them. The very rigidity of the Soviet leaders in not permitting the smallest variation from their own blueprints among satellites, can be their undoing. And the existence of a unified, homogeneous core of armed power in our own hemisphere will dissuade them from attacking us if they have two fermenting continents to hold down.

American participation in two World Wars has, on balance, multiplied the evil results of both wars. While we went into the first with the best of motives, and were slyly and deceitfully maneuvered into the second, if we permit alien influence to shape our course now, then America is doomed.

She will have been reconquered by those tyrannies from which our ancestors fled the Old World to escape.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Libby, how short is your statement going to be?
Mr. FREDERICK J. LIBBY. I would like 30 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot have 30 minutes. We will talk it over with you at the recess.

Mr. Ordower?

STATEMENT OF SIDNEY L. ORDOWER ON BEHALF OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Ordower. I have a statement which will take just about 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. We want you to make it short. We have had four or five representatives of the Progressive Party here. We cannot have all the membership. We have had most of them here already. But I do not want to have all of them.

Mr. Ordower. I would like to also testify, if I may, as an individual veteran.

The CHAIRMAN. Can't you file your statement and then make a brief oral statement?

Mr. Ordower. It won't take long. Couldn't I read it? I came all the way from Chicago, sir. I would appreciate it.
The CHAIRMAN. We want to confirm to the authorities of the Progressive Party that we cannot have every one of their members here to testify. We have had three or four already.

Mr. Ordower. It is the first chance I have had to come to Washington in a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you came to Washington, of course, but this is not a pleasure trip. This is a business enterprise at the moment. Whom do you represent?

Mr. Ordower. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, my name is Sidney L. Ordower. I reside at 3446 West Thirteenth Place in Chicago, Ill. By profession I am a radio commentator and I represent the Progressive Party in Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you authorized to represent them and designated to represent them?

Mr. Ordower. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the president of the Progressive Party in Illinois?

Mr. Ordower. The chairman of the Cook County Central Committee is Mr. George Cermack, and I am the official representative of that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. Ordower. In addition to testifying for that organization against the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, I should also like to speak as an individual veteran of World War II.

Perhaps it would be well for me to describe briefly my service during the recent war. In 1940, I volunteered as a private in the Army the first day of the draft and served for more than 5 years in the Infantry, finally being discharged as a captain.

For more than 3½ years I served overseas in England, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, and North Africa, and was commissioned in Europe. I participated in five major battles and held a number of decorations.

I tell you this, not because I look for any special praise for this service to my country, but to point out that I have seen the horror of war first hand. Both my wife and child were killed during the war by a V-2 rocket in England and I tell you, gentlemen, that I want no part of another holocaust, one which will mean misery, suffering, and devastation far greater than anything witnessed in the past.

If this has not happened already, you probably will have official representatives of veterans' organizations testifying in behalf of the North Atlantic Pact. They will tell you that we must prepare for any possible contingency—for war, if necessary, with the Soviet Union.

I do not represent a veterans' organization, but I tell you that the veterans of World War II did not fight the last war merely to waste their lives in world war III. No matter what their political opinions might be, the vast majority of veterans fought for decent homes, jobs, and the opportunity to raise their families in peace, without worrying about an atom bomb falling on their head.

THE ATLANTIC PACT AS A WAR PACT

The Atlantic Pact, gentlemen, is a war pact, not a peace pact. It will create an armaments race which can only result in war. No military alliance in history has stopped war. Its very purpose is to prepare for war.
But let us examine the arguments that the Atlantic Pact is a defense treaty, designed to stop aggression. If this is so, why is it that Norway, which borders the Soviet Union, is a signatory to the pact? If it is a defense pact, how do we account for the inclusion of Portugal, which is not a member of the United Nations and which is headed by a Fascist dictator, Salazar? If it is a defense pact, why is it that even now efforts are being made to bring Fascist Spain into the treaty?

General Omar Bradley gave the answer not long ago. It is a military answer. And Representative Clarence Cannon, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, also gave the answer on the floor of the House on April 13 when he stated, according to the New York Times of April 14:

Moscow and every center in Russia, we must hit within 1 week after the war starts, and it can be done only by land-based planes such as we now have.

With the signing of the North Atlantic Pact we would have ample land bases. We will absolutely demoralize the enemy. We will destroy all his lines of communications. We will blast at the centers of operation, and then let our allies send the army in—other boys, not our boys—to hold the ground we win.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom are you quoting?

Mr. Ordower. Representative Cannon.

The CHAIRMAN. Make that clear. Don't confuse that with General Bradley's speech.

Mr. Ordower. I am not. This is Representative Cannon's statement.

INCLUSION OF SPAIN

And gentlemen, I must protest the statements made by Senator Connally, chairman of this committee, and by Senator Vandenberg, calling for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain. As one who fought in the recent war, I say that it is unspeakable to think of allying ourselves with Fascist Spain or to give aid and comfort to Franco by resuming diplomatic relations with his Government.

Let us remember that Spain assisted our enemy in the last war. Spain provided a Blue Division to Nazi Germany to fight against our wartime ally, the U. S. S. R.

No matter what our differences with the Soviet Union, only by establishing a firm friendship based on mutual understanding with our wartime allies, and not by negotiating with countries like Portugal and Spain, can we secure the peace of the world.

During the recent war we were taught many things in the Army. In addition to the use of physical weapons, we were also told how to arm ourselves with ideas. We were told, for example, that the only possible way to defeat the enemy was through the unity of the Big Three: The United States, Great Britain, and the U. S. S. R. We were told that by building a strong United Nations with the unity of the big powers as its core, could we establish an enduring peace. We were told that we must denazify and decartelize Germany if we were to prevent future aggression by that country.

We were told that it was possible to get along with the Soviet Union and other countries with whom we fought, despite such political and economic differences as might exist. We were told that those
nations which united against the common enemy during the war could and must unite to preserve the peace of the world. We were told also that the war was fought to defend our democratic way of life and that when we returned home we would have the opportunity of extending democracy.

I contend that these policies of the Army and of our Government during the war were honorable and democratic ones. What has happened to them?

**POLICY IN GERMANY**

Even while the war was going on there were American officers in high places who talked of the next war with Russia. Even before the end of the war our present policy in Germany was being applied. Instead of denazifying and decartelizing Germany we were putting important Nazis back into power and preventing the breaking up of the huge cartels which were even then envisioned for use in a future war with Russia. The recent report issued by the Ferguson Commission should prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that instead of democratizing Germany and destroying its military potential, we are giving comfort to those same forces who were in great measure responsible for World War II.

Since the end of the war we have been supporting reactionary governments in China, Greece, and Turkey. We have influenced the elections in France and Italy. Through Marshall-plan aid we are making the countries of western Europe dance to our tune instead of giving them genuine aid through the United Nations.

The Chairman. You are against the Marshall plan?

Mr. Ordower. I am. I am for aid through the United Nations.

The Chairman. Has the United Nations any aid they can give?

Mr. Ordower. I think if we all pooled our resources we could do it. There is a Commission in the UN, the United Nations Commission for Europe, of which Russia is a member and where there is no veto power, and perhaps that might be the place to discuss the aid. I do not say it is an easy job, but we did not even discuss the granting of aid on a nonpolitical basis in the United Nations, and we now are attempting to create a military alliance which could kill the United Nations and guarantee war.

**CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES**

The best way to judge the futility and madness of our post-war foreign policy is to examine its effects on our everyday needs. Where are the homes that we were promised would be built after the war? Millions of veterans and nonveterans alike virtually walk the streets in search of roofs over their heads. And even today, 3 years after the war is over, we talk of building a paltry number of homes compared to the millions we need to house our families.

What about the millions who are unemployed in America today and can't find work? You probably know that approximately 750,000 veterans and nonveterans alike virtually walk the streets in search of roofs over their heads. And even today, 3 years after the war is over, we talk of building a paltry number of homes compared to the millions we need to house our families.

What about the millions who are unemployed in America today and can't find work? You probably know that approximately 750,000 veterans and nonveterans alike virtually walk the streets in search of roofs over their heads. And even today, 3 years after the war is over, we talk of building a paltry number of homes compared to the millions we need to house our families.

What about the millions who are unemployed in America today and can't find work? You probably know that approximately 750,000 veterans and nonveterans alike virtually walk the streets in search of roofs over their heads. And even today, 3 years after the war is over, we talk of building a paltry number of homes compared to the millions we need to house our families.
is due to end this July, not only for those who have received it but even for those who have not received any benefits.

Since the end of the war, we have seen unprecedented attacks on the Negro people. Isaac Woodard, a Negro veteran who served his country honorably, had his eyes gouged out shortly after the war, and his case is but one example of the lynchings, beatings, and general denial of fundamental rights which the Negro people have suffered. I wish we had as much concern for guaranteeing human rights for all the people of our country as we claim to have for those who live in eastern Europe.

Instead of fulfilling the mandate given to Congress by the people, we have seen the emasculation of rent control, the sell-out on civil rights, and the betrayal of labor. But also important is the fact that while we pursue this kind of foreign policy, our civil liberties are slowly but surely being taken from us. Bills designed to control our thoughts and to kill our most fundamental rights are today lodged in congressional committees and have been introduced in State legislatures throughout our Nation.

I might point out that this was the pattern in Nazi Germany—first to establish a police state and then to go to war—with Russia. Are we to follow that pattern here in America? Are we to take this leaf from the tragic book of Germany, Italy, and Japan? I don’t believe the people of America want Mundt-Nixon bills, Mundt-Ferguson bills or Broyles bills as they are called in my own State.

POLICY OF COOPERATION

But if we are to stop the militarization of America, the loss of our civil liberties, the tightening of our belts, we’re going to have to adopt a different kind of foreign policy, the kind of a policy which will permit us to use the billions we are now spending for military purposes, to say nothing of the additional billions if this pact is ratified, for social welfare programs.

I say we must reject the Atlantic Pact and return to the legacy given us by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This is what he said [reading]:

We either work with the other great nations or we might some day have to fight them, and I’m against that.

Today we are faced with a preeminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same world, in peace.

The work, my friends, is peace. an end to the beginnings of all wars; yes, an end, forever, to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of the differences between government by the mass killing of peoples.

As Roosevelt stated so eloquently, wars are no solutions for the problems of mankind. Military pacts will not provide housing and the other fundamental needs of the people. We must reestablish peaceful, friendly relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R. Then let each nation compete in the most democratic tradition. Let us see which nation can prove the most homes for its people, the finest health and education programs, the fullest employment, the most democratic social, political and economic well-being. Let us build a strong United Nations which will eliminate war and guarantee to the peoples of the world a chance to build a better life for themselves,
Gentlemen, the people yearn for peace. You bear a great responsibility. I urge you to reject this warlike military alliance and to use your influence to start negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union at the highest level. Stalin has offered to sit down with President Truman and discuss our differences. We should accept this offer.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he offer to do that?
Mr. ORDOWER. He did that through Kingsbury Smith.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Kingsbury Smith representing anyone except his newspaper?
Mr. ORDOWER. I recall President Truman made a statement during the election campaign that he would make—

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask you that. I asked you if Kingsbury Smith represented anybody besides his newspaper.
Mr. ORDOWER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is the right way, if Mr. Stalin wants a conference, to tell Kingsbury Smith about it, instead of addressing a communication to the President of the United States?
Mr. ORDOWER. I say, sir, that as a veteran of World War II, if Mr. Truman is sincere in his desire to meet with Mr. Stalin, I do not think protocol is the thing that should be considered. I do not say there should be a loss of face. President Truman does not wish to go to Russia. Let them sit down in a neutral capital, Berlin. I do not say we have to accede to everything Stalin says with respect to sitting down, but at least let us meet the offer in some other way.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.
Mr. ORDOWER. I also urge, gentlemen, that these hearings be extended indefinitely in order to allow the most exhaustive testimony to be presented from all sides, and I strongly recommend support of Mr. Wallace's suggestion in that no action be taken until after the May 23 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers has been completed.

If we can even begin to secure an agreement on the fundamental problem of Germany, there will be no need for the move now under consideration by your committee.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my statement. I thank you for the opportunity of testifying.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Did you deliver substantially these same statements and remarks over the radio?
Mr. ORDOWER. Yes, at one time or another, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That's what I thought.

Did you take an active part stumpin and speaking over the radio in the last Presidential campaign?

PROGRESSIVE PARTY PROGRAM

Mr. ORDOWER. I ran for Congress in my own district. I will say this, sir: I have not made this a political statement. I could come here and make a diatribe against the Republican and Democratic Parties. You have already heard political statements. I am speaking not just as one who feels the Progressive Party is the answer to many of the problems we have, but I am speaking as an ordinary citizen as well, as I mentioned once before. I don't wear the ribbons on my
breast. That is not my purpose in coming here. But I did participate in it. Yes; I do support Mr. Wallace. I do believe his program is the best kind of program for America.

But I also realize this: That it isn't just the Progressive Party or the people who belong to the Progressive Party who are involved. There are many people who differ, perhaps, as to how we shall achieve the best economic, social, and political living for America. But I think most of the people do not want war, and that is what I am pleading with you for. I believe this is a step in that direction. I hope that perhaps I have tried to get that point of view across, and that I am not just considered as a politician, because, frankly, I am not that. I never participated in politics in my life until after I came home from the Army. The only reason I have is because I think it is one of the ways we may be able to right some of the wrongs in America.

The Chairman. We applaud your distinguished record, and we applaud your statement that you are against war. We do not want any more war.

Mr. Ordower. The question is how to stop it.

Senator Vandenberg. There can be an honest difference of opinion as to the ways to maintain peace, can there not?

Mr. Ordower. Oh, I dare say. If there were not an honest difference of opinion you would not be here and I would not be here in that sense.

Senator Vandenberg. I mean that those who feel that the Atlantic Pact is the best means of arriving at precisely the result you seek may be just as conscientious about it as you are. You would concede that, would you not?

Mr. Ordower. I would like to answer that, Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. Sure.

Mr. Ordower. I believe that there are many people, and I won't make definitions as to who proposed and who initiated it, who believe that perhaps this is necessary, that maybe this is the way to peace. But I also think that there are many people, and I don't care to name names, but I think from reading the press and hearing statements made in the Halls of Congress and by private individuals that there are many people who feel that war is inevitable, and this is the step toward that.

POSSIBILITY OF WAR

The point that I made before, that military alliances have never stopped war, if we believe that a war is justified, as we believe to a certain extent—many of us did; I did. That is why I volunteered for the Army, that it was necessary to go to war with Germany, Italy, and Japan—then you prepare for war, and even the critics of Roosevelt's foreign policy are correct in saying that Roosevelt prepared for what he thought was inevitable.

I do not believe that a war is necessary with the Soviet Union, as I pointed out, despite the differences between our two countries which must be ironed out in an amicable way, in an honorable way, in a peaceful way. I say there is no need for it, particularly when we fought together, and I think that what has happened and will happen, too, is that we will be dividing the world so completely that war will
eventually be inevitable, and that we are in a sense resigning ourselves to that kind of fate.

Just to end up on that, when we instituted the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan we talked of containing communism. That was our philosophy. I do not agree with that particular philosophy, because I think after you get that you get other things. Then what happened? In the inaugural address made by President Truman he pointed out we were not just going to "contain" communism, we were going to fight communism. I do not mean to take his remarks completely out of context, but he did say that.

Even though you talk about developing the backward areas of the world, which I do not believe is a genuine program because it must be administered through the United Nations, it means that eventually you must use military weapons. You ratify the treaty. You have to implement the treaty with arms later on. You implement the treaty with arms and you are going to get a reaction from the Soviet Union. We will start an arms race, and where will it stop? That is the point I am making, and I think the crux of the whole issue, sir, is that there is a difference today as compared to going to war with Germany, with Italy, and with Japan, emphasizing that there are differences between the United States and Russia. I use those two countries in the main, but that we can, we have to try to, iron out those differences.

I do not believe this is the way. Particularly, I do not mean that I am taking Russia's side, but Russia looks upon this as an aggressive move. Well, if Russia is going to look upon this as an aggressive move, we are going to get other reactions to this kind of policy from her.

POSSIBILITY OF HONEST DIFFERENCE OF OPINION

Senator Vandenberg. I think I understand your point of view. The question I asked you was quite simple and did not involve a complete reiteration of your argument. I have no disposition in the world to argue with you, because this is not the proper forum for it. I was simply suggesting to you that in your main objectives I would substantially agree. I do not think war is inevitable. I believe in a live and let live world. But I happen to think that there are substantial reasons for believing that the process of the proposed North Atlantic Pact is the surest and safest and simplest way of arriving at those results. I was only asking you whether you would concede to those who held that view the possibility of being conscientious about it.

Mr. Ordower. Oh, of course. Obviously there are many people who do, and I did say before, however, that I believed that perhaps some do not.

Senator Vandenberg. I understand. And I only want to make this further comment on your reference to the restoration of the exchange of Ambassadors with Spain.

SPAIN AND THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Anything I have said on that subject is predicated on the fact that I do not believe that the withdrawal of ambassadors and the maintenance of all other diplomatic relationships is at all conclusive with respect to anything, and that it is rather a handicap to us. I do not
think we would have been making any progress at all in Moscow if Ambassador Smith had not been there for the last 2 or 3 years. I think we have made some progress as a result of it. I am not in favor of the entry of Spain into the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. Ordower. I am glad to hear it.

Senator Vandenberg. So I hope you can find some consolation in your criticism of the Senator from Michigan with respect to that aspect.

Mr. Ordower. I realize, and I hope I did not mean to imply, that you were for Spain coming into the pact. As a matter of fact I read your statement very carefully, and I realized you pointed out that this did not necessarily mean we agreed with the Government. I would have this difference, sir, that there is a difference between having an Ambassador in the Soviet Union and having an Ambassador in Spain. Perhaps the difference may not be so acute as I see it. The difference goes back to the original argument I made, which I believe must be emphasized.

Senator Vandenberg. I do not think you need to repeat it because I remember it very very well.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator Donnell. What were your education and other experiences before World War II?

Mr. Ordower. Before World War II, so far as schools are concerned, I was a graduate from Trinity College in Hartford, Conn., and also studied dramatics and received my master's in economics from Syracuse University. Before the war I worked in radio and the theater, specialized in documentary works, education, and the presentation of ideas.

Senator Donnell. Would you tell us, please, over what radio stations you have been serving?

Mr. Ordower. Before the war I did broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System, NBC both in New York and Syracuse, WSBL; out West, in Los Angeles, over the Don Lee studios. Since the war I have been to a great extent a radio commentator, although for a time I was executive secretary of the American Veterans Committee in Chicago. I want to emphasize that I do not represent that organization here, in case anybody gets down my neck. There is a difference of opinion between my position and that organization, of which I am a member. For the most part I have been a radio commentator on WJJD, which is an independent radio station in Chicago, and WAIT. I have broadcast from others individual programs, but the longest stretches have been on both those particular stations.

Senator Donnell. Will you tell us, please, for the record, your age?

Mr. Ordower. I am 31.

Senator Donnell. That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you.

I may say just one word, supplementing what Senator Vandenberg said about the Ambassador to Spain.

AMBASSADOR TO SPAIN

We do not send ambassadors to foreign countries for their benefit. We send ambassadors there to represent the interests of the United
States, to keep abreast of what is transpiring in that particular field, and that particular government, and to represent our business people who are trying to do business there. In no sense is the sending of an ambassador to a country an approval of its government. We had ambassadors in Japan when it was an imperialistic kingdom; we have had ambassadors in Russia under the Czars and under the present regime. We are not sending them over there as compliments, or to make nice courtesy calls. We are sending them over there to represent the United States and to serve the United States, and, as pointed out so well by Senator Vandenberg, we would not have had the relationship that we now have with Russia had it not been for our ambassadors there, including General Smith. He has accomplished a great deal toward adjusting the relationships.

So that my belief that we ought to have an ambassador in Spain is in no sense an approval of the Spanish Government. I do not approve of it. I do not approve of it at all, any more than I approve of a lot of governments to whom we have sent ambassadors. I have made no expression of any desire that it should be included in the Atlantic Pact. It is not in the pact. That is pretty good proof that they did not want it in the pact.

I wanted to submit that for the record.

All right; thank you very much.

Mr. Durr, how long is your statement?

Mr. Durr. It will take me about 30 minutes.

The Chairman. We are pressed for time, and we are trying to cut short the hearings as much as we can, consistent with a full development of all sides. I notice Mr. Libby beaming over there. We will hear you, Mr. Libby. We hear you every time we have a hearing, so I suppose we have to hear you again.

Mr. Durr. I think we have a presentation of the kind that has not been made here before.

The Chairman. I was wondering if you could not put your statement in the record and you discuss it orally within a shorter period.

Mr. Durr. I will try to cut it down as much as I can, but I think to have a logical presentation I will have to follow it pretty closely.

The Chairman. Where do you live, Mr. Durr?

STATEMENT OF CLIFFORD DURR, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH CROWN

Mr. Durr. I now live at a place called Seminary Hill, in Alexandria, Va. I am a member of the bar, now practicing here in Washington. Until June 30, 1948, I was a member of the Federal Communications Commission, and before that I was assistant general counsel of the RFC and general counsel of Defense Plant Corporation.

The Chairman. Were you reappointed as a member of the Federal Communications Commission?

Mr. Durr. I was tendered a reappointment, but I declined.

The Chairman. All right. We will go along and see how far we get.

Mr. Durr. I am appearing here as president of the National Lawyers Guild and appear here on behalf of that association.

The views I shall express on questions of policy were approved at the national convention of the guild in February 1949. The views I
express on legal questions are based upon a memorandum of law prepared by our committee on international law and relations, copies of which I will now hand up to your committee and ask that it be incorporated in the record of this hearing.

The National Lawyers Guild has given its active support to the United Nations from the time of its organization. Our consultants were at the San Francisco Conference, which gave birth to the United Nations. We have been constant in our belief that, whatever its limitations, it is the best instrument yet devised to help in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in the maintenance of peace. We have supported those measures we believed would serve to strengthen the United Nations, and opposed those measures which seemed to us to move in the opposite direction.

CONSISTENCY OF PACT WITH CHARTER

We were glad to find in the text of the North Atlantic Pact, and the supporting statements which have been issued, assurances that all provisions of the proposed treaty are in accordance with and in furtherance of the provisions of the Charter. However, as a bar association, we felt that, in view of the grave importance of the pact to the peace of the world, we should study the question whether in fact and in law, the pact was consistent with the Charter and the basic legal principles which are its foundation.

Our careful study of that question has led us to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the assertions made to the contrary, the pact, in fundamental respects, violates salient provisions of the Charter. It is my purpose now to summarize the argument which is made in greater detail in our memorandum of law.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL

Under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace. By article 24 the member states agreed to this. By article 39 the Security Council is vested with authority [reading]:

to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

By articles 46 to 48 the Security Council is endowed with authority to take enforcement measures to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Article 53 expressly provides that [reading]:

no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without authorization of the Security Council.

Since a regional arrangement may not take enforcement action without prior authorization of the Security Council, obviously no individual state or any group of states may take enforcement action. Otherwise the restriction of article 53 would be meaningless.

The CHAIRMAN. You are quoting article 53. That does not include the provisions of article 51, does it?

MR. DURR. Those are different provisions. I will discuss article 51, too.
In our view, the conclusion is, therefore, indisputable that if the measures contemplated by the North Atlantic Pact involves enforcement action, the pact cannot be squared with the provisions of the Charter. The central question is whether the action contemplated under the pact is in fact enforcement action, or something else.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact reads in part as follows [reading]:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, • • • will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides [reading]:

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

In the foregoing quotation of article 5 of the pact, we have omitted certain words. These words characterize the action contemplated thereunder as being [reading]:

in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations—

Article 51 provides [reading]:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Manifestly the inherent right of self-defense recognized in article 51, cannot be created by agreement or treaty. Senator Connally, in the Senate debate in June 1948, on the Vandenberg resolution declared that [reading]:

the right of self-defense is not derived from something on paper; the right of self-defense is inherent.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree to that, do you not?

Mr. DURR. Yes, sir; I agree to that absolutely.

Characterizing the contemplated activity as falling within article 51 does not make it so. Whether such action does fall within the contemplation of article 51 is the main legal question with which we are here concerned.

Having in mind the Security Council’s paramount responsibility for maintaining international peace, it seems clear to us that article 51 merely recognizes that a member state which is subjected to an actual armed attack will resort to arms to the extent necessary to defend itself. Even in such a case while the state attacked may have to decide initially the action to take, its decision must be submitted to review by the Security Council. In the Legal Basis of International Relations, published in Annals of the American Academy of Political
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

and Social Science, Volume 255, January 1948. Yuen-li Lian, Director of the Division on the Development and Codification of International Law, United Nations said [reading]:

It is granted that in the first instance a state attacked by an aggressor may have to decide whether or in what measure the occasion calls for self-defense. But the initial decision must be submitted to review by the criteria of international law.

Article 51 also recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense.

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE LIMITED TO ACTUAL ATTACK

In our view this right, recognized in article 51, must be so near in content to the resistance by a state to an actual attack upon itself as to be almost indistinguishable. To be characterized as an "inherent right" of "self-defense," there must, in our view, exist the situation of an actual armed attack upon a member state which has such a relationship to another state that it is reasonably apparent and inevitable that the attack upon the second state will follow immediately or almost immediately after the armed attack upon the first state.

To apply any other meaning to the terms "inherent right of collective self-defense" is to nullify to obvious intent of these words and to destroy the paramount authority of the Security Council in matters of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. We believe that the kind of situation contemplated is quite clear. France, for instance, would have the inherent right of collective self-defense in the case of an armed invasion in force by a powerful state in Belgium. In the case of a similar invasion upon Mexico or Canada by a powerful state, the United States would undoubtedly have the inherent right of collective self-defense.

The reason why an inherent right of collective self-defense is recognized in the Charter in such situations is that the second member state, although not attacked, stands in immediate danger of armed attack growing out of an armed invasion of a neighbor state, and there would not be time for the Security Council to consider the matter or to take appropriate action.

COMPARISON OF ARTICLE 51 TO ARTICLE I (10) (4) OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The concept of the inherent right of collective self-defense has its counterpart in article I (10) (4) of the Constitution of the United States authorizing a State of the Union, without the consent of Congress, to engage in war in case of actual invasion or in case of "imminent danger as will not admit of delay." This provision declares [reading]:

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress * * * enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

In case of actual invasion, a State of the Union is authorized, without the authorization of Congress, to engage in war. It seems to us that this parallels the inherent right of individual self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter. In case of imminent danger not admitting of delay, a State of the Union can enter into an agreement
with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, without authorization of the Congress. This provision of our Constitution has now become pretty much obsolete because of the arrangement of our society, but it did have very great application in the early days when the States were scattered and communication and transportation facilities were quite limited. The latter parallels the inherent right-of collective self-defense. But article 51 does not permit the use of armed force under the pretext of acting in self-defense, or in cases where it does not clearly appear that an attack on the State concerned is so imminent as to permit no delay.

Sometimes in murder cases you have the plea of self-defense with the story that the deceased was reaching for his hip pocket when the defendant pulled out his gun and shot. Sometimes the deceased did have a gun in his hip pocket, sometimes it is found that he has nothing there but a wallet. It is a pretty dangerous thing to let an individual determine whether he is acting in self-defense. That is a matter to be adjudicated.

**RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE LIMITED TO CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK**

To say that application of armed force by the United States in the case of every armed attack on the territory of any signatory or its vessels or aircraft anywhere in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, is justified by inherent right, under article 51, or, in fact, constitutes self-defense, is wholly untenable. Unless it can be shown that attacks of such a nature will actually or almost certainly, be followed immediately and inevitably by an attack upon the United States, no logical or valid reason appears why, in such a situation, the alleged threat of aggression should not be brought immediately to the attention of the Security Council for appropriate enforcement action. Otherwise, to permit the second state or a group of states to act without the authority of the Security Council, would undermine totally its paramount authority to deal with threats to the peace and acts of aggression, and obliterate the distinction which the Charter makes between "enforcement action" and "self-defense."

In our view, the concept advanced by the pact that the United States has the legal right to apply armed force if, for example, a Norwegian vessel should be fired upon in the Arctic Ocean, or a Portuguese plane should be attacked by Spain, is fraught with the greatest danger. If the inherent right of collective self-defense recognized by article 51 extends across the Atlantic Ocean, from the United States to the Mediterranean and the Arctic Ocean, or can be expanded to such lengths by agreements between individual states giving them the legal right to decide individually that an armed attack has occurred, and that the application of armed force is legally justified, then a European state could legally and with full justification under international law make the same decision with respect to an armed attack on the territory, or aircraft, or ships of any state in the Near East, the Far East, or even in the Americas. Thus the whole world could be staked out for individual armed action. We cannot see what significant authority is left to the Security Council in such a situation to deal with threats to the peace and acts of aggression. Moreover, the entire foundation of the new international law created by the Charter of the United Nations would be nullified.
Before the Security Council was created, the traditional tendency in international law was to define aggression by formula, and without regard to the total historical and factual situation. Hence even Germany, which started the Second World War, claimed that its activity was not aggressive, but defensive. By the Charter it became the mission of the Security Council, not to "define" aggression, but to determine the existence of aggression in accordance with a legal method based on the concreteness of the background and circumstances surrounding each particular situation. The legal method of the Security Council thus represents a new development, responding to the failure or absence of preexisting legal methods for determining aggression.

It is significant that the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference opposed amendments which sought to define aggression. The report of former Secretary of State Stettinius on the results of the San Francisco Conference stated [reading]:

One of the most significant lines upon which debate concerning the liberty of action of the Council proceeded, was that which concerned the proposed inclusion in the Charter of provisions with respect to determination of acts of aggression. * * * The United States delegation believing that the acceptance of such a concept was most undesirable played an active part in opposing the amendments. The Conference finally agreed that even the most simple and obvious cases of aggression might fall outside any of the formulas suggested, and, conversely, that a nation which according to a formula strictly interpreted could be deemed the offender in any particular instance might actually—when all circumstances were considered—be found to be the victim of intolerable provocation.

The significance of this advance will be appreciated when it is recognized that if the signatory states can validly define an armed attack against a state, as they do in the North Atlantic Pact, other states must acquire the same legal right of supplying their own definition.

The definition of "armed attack" contained in article 6 of the pact includes an attack on vessels and aircraft, and "an armed attack * * * on the occupation forces of any party in Europe." A minor incident could thus be made the legal basis for plunging the world into another war. A zonal border fracas in Berlin for instance, involving a shooting by a trigger-happy border guard, could thus provide a "valid legal basis" for world conflict, under the terms of the pact.

Vesting exclusive authority in the Security Council to determine whether a breach of the peace or an act of aggression had occurred, was responsible therefor, and what kind of action should be taken to remedy the wrong, was intended to avoid just such senseless situations as this. But the pact would vest in each of the signatories the right to go to war in precisely such a situation. This result would set back incalculably the cause of peace and the rule of law in international relations.

There are other respects in which the pact violates provisions of the Charter.

NONMEMBERS OF UNITED NATIONS IN THE PACT

A mere reference to the contents of article 51 of the Charter quoted above shows that, in any case, the inherent right of an individual or collective self-defense arises only "if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations." Portugal and Italy are not mem-
bers of the United Nations. They are signatories to the North Atlantic Pact. Yet under article 5 of the pact, if an armed attack occurs against these states, the United States undertakes to take military action if it deems this advisable. This is claimed to be justified by the provisions of article 51, which by its express terms, applies only to an attack on a member of the United Nations.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE CHARTER

It is our understanding that the North Atlantic Pact is alleged to be such a “regional arrangement” as is recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter imposes certain restrictions upon the existence of regional arrangements as set forth in article 52. That article recognizes that such regional arrangements may be established “for dealing with such matters * * * as are appropriate for regional action,” and further provides that such arrangements and their activity shall be “consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”

In a discussion on the Vandenberg resolution you cited article 52 of the Charter and then said, “I wish to stress the words ‘as are appropriate for regional action.’ I do not wish to see regional groups formed which may weaken a parent body, the United Nations, but if there are matters which are local, which are peculiar to the particular region, there is no reason why the nations in that region should not form a regional arrangement, because in a sense the overriding authority is still there, and it would probably have the right to determine whether or not the action proposed was appropriate to regional action.”

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that that is wholly aside and apart from article 51? Article 51 recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defense; now, the article you are speaking of discusses the settlement of local matters within a particular region.

Mr. Dunn. Article 51 and article 52 are, of course, entirely different provisions. Article 51 relates to the collective right of self-defense, but this pact has been referred to as a regional arrangement, and it is our contention that if it is regarded as a regional arrangement, it does not seem to us to fit within the definition of regional arrangements contained in article 52.

Article 54 of the Charter provides that [reading]:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Yet, under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, provision is made only that—

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.

The North Atlantic Treaty does not provide that all “activities in contemplation” shall be reported to the Security Council.

SECURITY COUNCIL AND ATLANTIC DEFENSE COUNCIL

The pact, under article 9 thereof, establishes a council to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty; and the council—shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of articles 3 and 5.
The activities and decisions so contemplated which may seriously affect international peace are not required to be reported to the Security Council under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty although article 54 of the Charter requires that the Security Council—
be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements.

The Chairman. That simply refers to matters of local character, that they are subsidiary to the United Nations, but still vested with authority to undertake to adjust them, and as they progress along they are supposed to report them from time to time to the United Nations.

Mr. Durr. Yes, sir; under the regional provisions. The United Nations Council is supposed to be informed, as I understand it, of all arrangements or activities in contemplation by the regions, whether they are moving immediately or whether they merely contemplate moving.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Durr. Article 51 of the Charter likewise provides that all measures taken by members:

in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.

Nonetheless, the North Atlantic Pact limits the reporting to the Security Council solely to measures taken as a result of an armed attack, and not to reporting measures anything short of an armed attack.

THE PACT--A VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The Charter is the supreme law governing international relations. The Charter expressly provides, under article 103, that:

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

All members of the United Nations are required, under article 2 (2) of the Charter to:

fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

Hence, no member of the United Nations can properly enter into an international agreement whose obligations conflict with those under the Charter. The Senate of the United States should, therefore, not ratify the North Atlantic Treaty which conflicts with and is not in accord with the Charter of the United Nations. That is our legal interpretation.

The members of the National Lawyers Guild as lawyers are concerned with the legal questions raised by the North Atlantic Pact. As citizens they are, like all other people, concerned with the questions of policy it raises, for they are vitally interested in the maintenance of peace.

We believe that effectuation of the pact will not contribute toward the establishment of a durable peace. On the contrary, we have the firm conviction that adherence to the Charter and its underlying principles affords the best assurance of a lasting peace.
DANGER OF MILITARY ALLIANCES AND REARMAMENT

In founding the United Nations, the old practice of military alliances among the great powers and of erecting powerful blocks of states confronting each other in armed hostility, was decisively rejected in favor of an international security system. Former Secretary of State Stettinius made this very clear in his report to the President on the results of the San Francisco Conference. A quotation from the report is contained in our present memorandum, which we have handed you.

The North Atlantic Pact reverts to the old method of military alliance which heretofore has always led to fierce world hostility, armaments races, and ultimately, to war. As Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, President of the General Assembly of the United Nations recently said before the Foreign Press Association [reading]:

"The League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War solely because some of the governments which belonged to it let down the League of Nations and preferred to resume the great game of power politics. This must not happen to the United Nations. The peoples of the world have faith in the United Nations. It is their chief instrument in the struggles to create a world based upon justice. Nothing else is a substitute for it; nothing else can be a substitute for it."

I would refer you also to the report, The Security of the United States and Western Europe, prepared by the drafting committee of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, which is the research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations, wherein it is said, with respect to the proposed "union of the Atlantic community" [reading]:

"An Atlantic union with the United States, Great Britain, and France, at its core even if confined to the North Atlantic would in fact be so large a part of the world that the Soviet Union might counter by the utmost preparations on its part, thus increasing the tension in the bipolar world. The instability of the world and the insecurity of the nations might be increased and a new chain of events might be initiated which would result in world war III. The emphasis upon more limited guarantees and the centering of discussions of security matters in more limited institutions would weaken the world's interest in universal procedures for maintaining international peace and security for all under the Charter."

Even John Foster Dulles, who now supports the pact, said as recently as March 8, 1949, referring to the proposal to include Norway as a signatory to the pact [reading]:

"It would indeed involve a high tribute to Soviet leaders to assume that under these circumstances they would exercise more self-control than would our people under comparable circumstances, as for example, if the Soviet Union had military arrangements with a country at our border."

And Secretary-General Trygve Lie of the United Nations warned [reading]:

"No regional arrangement can ever be a satisfactory substitute for the United Nations. If people generally began to accept alliances as substitute for genuine, world-wide collective security, then the hope of a lasting peace would be greatly endangered."

In our view, the hope for peace cannot rest upon mere accumulations of military power. This road has almost invariably led to war. Why should we now suddenly believe that it will contribute to the maintenance of peace?"
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

We firmly believe that the best hope for peace lies in support for and strengthening of the United Nations and its principles and purposes. What is necessary is to wage a fierce and ceaseless effort to resolve the differences which now divide the world. This is a difficult road, but the alternatives at best involve an exhausting armaments race which will impair the economic well-being of the world, and at worst, lead to war with consequent immeasurable human suffering and destruction.

It is fitting to recall the words of Secretary of State Byrnes, in his book, Speaking Frankly, pages 313, 315, 316 [reading]:

There is too much talk of war and too little of peace. * * * Too much is at stake for us to lose our patience. Negotiating with the Soviets may affect the nerves of a few statesmen but another world war would more seriously affect the lives of millions of people. We must continue our efforts to develop through the United Nations a common law of nations to provide definite and agreed standards of conduct. It must rest upon something more than rules, something more than force, and something more than fear. It must be made to rest upon the growth of a common fellowship, common interests, and common ideas among the peoples of the world. * * * I remain confident that we can achieve a just peace through cooperative effort.

RESOLUTION OF NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The National Lawyers Guild on February 21, 1949, at its recent convention held in Detroit, unanimously adopted a resolution which declared in part as follows [reading]:

The revitalization of cooperative relations among the great powers and especially between the United States and the Soviet Union, points the path to peace. This is the will of all peace-loving humanity. It was voiced in the resolution adopted (unanimously) at the Paris session of the General Assembly where, on the initiative of Mexico, the Assembly made an appeal to the great powers to compose their differences and "to redouble their efforts in a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding to secure in the briefest possible time a final settlement of the war and a conclusion of all peace settlement."

The guild resolution stated [reading]:

This approach will afford the most effective assurance of a durable peace and a vigorous United Nations organization and obviate resort to military alliances, avoid the heavy impact of armament expenditures, and make possible the advance of the living standards and social welfare of our people and of all peoples throughout the world.

The validity of this approach, it seems to us, is attested to by the recent accord reached on the lifting of the Berlin blockade. The road to this vital result was paved by discussion between representatives of our country and the Soviet Union, leading to the agreement to convene the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the entire German situation. Such negotiations are in accord with the obligations assumed by member states under article 33 of the Charter. If accord can be reached on so difficult a situation as the Berlin blockade, we believe it should be equally possible on the other issues confronting the great powers.

EFFECT OF TREATY ON UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that in the Atlantic Pact there are several declarations that we support the United Nations and are in conformity with the views of the United Nations?
Mr. Durr. It is our contention that those are self-serving declarations and that the declarations themselves are in conflict with the United Nations Charter.

The Chairman. This committee wholeheartedly favors the United Nations Charter. We ratified it overwhelmingly in the Senate. We are for it, and we continue to support it and to improve it. However, you know of the difficulties and the hazards that have already taken place in international affairs with respect to the modification of the Charter; do you not?

Mr. Durr. Yes; I am totally aware of the difficulties. But it is our contention that the difficulties will be increased rather than minimized if we begin to start a pattern of what amounts to alliances outside of the United Nations; that we will merely create blocs which will work without the United Nations or even in the United Nations. The blocs will already be formed and will make negotiation and objective consideration of the problems far more difficult.

The Chairman. It is the attitude of the Lawyers Guild that you are opposed to ratification?

Mr. Durr. That is right.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

RIO TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Vandenberg. I simply want to ask you, Mr. Durr, whether you would make the same legal argument against the Rio Pact?

Mr. Durr. No, sir; I would not. I think the Rio Pact does extend the idea of the regional organization considerably, but nevertheless here we have an area which historically has been treated as having common interests and recognized as such since the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, when you come to the Rio Treaty you also have a recognition of article 51, which is a recognition of the inherent right of collective self-defense. I am not sure if, in the exercise of that right of collective self-defense, the United States, even under the Rio Treaty, would be warranted in deeming an attack upon the extreme southern part of Argentina as an attack upon the United States calling for immediate action on our part. The question is still there: Is this an exercise of the right of self-defense? That is inherent.

It seems to us that article 51 is merely recognizing what was already inherent, and making it clear that the nations were not surrendering this inherent right. The right of self-defense, as we contend, means that there must be an immediate and very probable danger to the country invoking that right unless it is attacked itself.

Senator Vandenberg. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. Mr. Durr, you refer in your statement to the fact that the views which you express therein on questions of policy were approved at the national convention of the Lawyers Guild, which I understand was held at Detroit, Mich., on or about February 21 of this year.

Mr. Durr. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. You state further that the National Lawyers Guild at its recent convention unanimously adopted the resolution you have read.
Mr. Durr. That is part of their action.

Senator Donnell. I wanted to ask you if you could tell us, please, whether that resolution was framed and presented to the convention by one of the regular committees of the National Lawyers Guild.

Mr. Durr. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator Donnell. Was it a large committee? Do you have the membership right there before you? Will you insert that in the record? May Mr. Durr do that, please?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Membership of committee on international law is as follows:)

**National Lawyers Guild National Committee on International Law and Relations**

Mitchell Franklin, 604 West One Hundredth and Fifteenth Street, Apartment 7C, New York, N. Y.


Bernard Jaffe, 52 Broadway, Bronx, New York, N. Y.

Chase Kimball, 137 Hinckley Road, Milton 87, Mass.

Howard Meyer, 100 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

J. Julius Rosenberg, 410 Central Park West, New York, N. Y.

Seymour Tilewin, 2309 Barium Tower, Detroit, Mich.

Ira Gallaher, 212 West Seventy-sixth Street, New York, N. Y.

Joseph H. Crown, 321 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Mrs. Esther S. Frankel, 282 Main Street, Patterson 1, N. J.

Solomon Jesner, 100 North La Salle Street, Chicago 4, Ill.

Harry Lamberton, 3312 Macomb Street NW., Washington, D. C.

MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTEE

Mr. Durr. There are about 35 members. Here are some: Mr. Joseph Crown, who is here with me, a lawyer from New York; Prof. Alexander N. Sack, formerly with the Academy of International Law at The Hague, professor at New York University; Osmond K. Fraenkel and Benjamin Algase, New York lawyers; Martin Popper of New York; Mitchell Franklin of the Law School of Tulane University; Carey McWilliams of Los Angeles; G. Leslie Field of Detroit, Chase Kimball of Boston, and Harry Lamberton of Washington. That is only some. There are about 35 on the committee.

Senator Donnell. You will insert the entire list in the record?

Mr. Durr. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Will you tell us when the resolution was presented to the convention whether there was a discussion by the members of the convention on the floor?

Mr. Durr. It was presented. I was not present at the time of the discussion. I will ask Mr. Crown, who was there.
Mr. Joseph Crown. Our ordinary procedure is, on any matter of this kind, for the original statement to be prepared by the committee on international law. It was circulated to every member of the committee, and on the basis of comments and suggestions was then submitted to the convention. It then went before the resolutions committee. There there was debate, and I should say that there were extended hours, as this was one of the high points in the actual convention.

Then came finally, after extensive revision, but I should say unanimous accord on the ultimate formulation, submission to the delegates of the convention. There was a preliminary paper which consumed an hour and the discussion on the subject consumed more than an hour. And so it was ultimately adopted.

Senator Donnell. First there was the formulation of the resolution by the Committee on international law and relations, which resolution in turn was submitted after having been offered in the convention to the resolutions committee for its consideration. Before the resolutions committee there was extended debate. Thereafter, subsequent to material changes in the resolution, or at least changes—how material I do not know—the resolution was submitted back on the floor of the convention, is that correct?

Mr. Crown. That is true.

Senator Donnell. And at the time of its submission on the floor of the convention, are you able to state from personal knowledge approximately how many delegates were present?

Mr. Crown. I would say that the debate at that point was about after 10 in the evening, on Sunday night, and I should judge there would be more than 100, maybe 125, delegates at least at that point.

Senator Donnell. Was the resolution actually debated on the floor that evening?

Mr. Crown. Yes, it was seriously debated. There were diverse opinions and points of view presented. There were only some few dissents.

Senator Donnell. I note Mr. Durr's statement said the resolution was unanimously adopted. Should that be amended, in view of your statement that there was some dissent?

Mr. Crown. We are referring there to the resolution by the general assembly.

Senator Donnell. I am talking now about the resolution that gives the policy which you state, which Mr. Durr states was approved at the national convention, and on which his views herein expressed this morning are based.

Mr. Durr. To avoid confusion, I might point out that there is a quotation contained within the Lawyers Guild resolution adopted at the general assembly. This resolution which we quote was adopted unanimously at the general assembly.

Senator Donnell. I do not want to prolong this unnecessarily, but I want to be clear and have the record clear. You say the views you express on questions of policy were approved at the national convention of the guild in February 1949?

Mr. Durr. That is right.
Senator DONNELL. How was the action of that national convention on those questions of policy initiated? Was that the committee on international law and regulations?

Mr. Durr. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator DONNELL. And then the process occurred that you have described, namely, that it was considered first by that committee which formulated a preliminary resolution. That in turn was submitted to the convention, which referred it to the committee on resolutions.

Mr. Durr. That's right.

Senator DONNELL. The committee on resolutions then reconsidered the matter, made changes in it after extensive debate, and approved for recommendation to the convention the resolution so changed, and then on the floor of the convention the resolution came up and was acted upon with only a few dissenting votes. Is that correct?

Mr. Durr. That is correct.

Of course, this statement of mine has not been approved by the convention, but it is within the policy.

Senator DONNELL. You believe the statement correctly represents the policy enunciated by the national convention through the process indicated?

Mr. Durr. Yes, it does.

Senator DONNELL. In the second place you say that the views you express on legal questions are based on a memorandum of law prepared by your committee on international law and relations. That is the same committee?

Mr. Durr. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. And it is the one that consists of about 35 members?

Mr. Durr. That is right.

Senator DONNELL. And I got from your statement that copies of that memorandum of law you will hand to the committee, and that will be incorporated in the record of this hearing.

Mr. Durr. That has been done.

Senator DONNELL. Has it been ordered to be incorporated in the record of the hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. Is it along the lines of your testimony?

Mr. Durr. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as I am concerned, it may go into the record.

(Document entitled “Memorandum of Law” reads as follows:)

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, In the Matter of the Legality of the North Atlantic Treaty Under the Charter of the United Nations

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

(Prepared by the Committee on International Law and Relations, National Lawyers Guild, Clifford J. Durr, president, Washington 6, D. C.)

THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT: ITS LEGALITY UNDER THE UN CHARTER AND ITS IMPACT ON PEACE

The North Atlantic Pact poses issues of grave importance to the peace of the world and the fate of the United Nations. As a bar association we are deeply concerned with the maintenance of the rule of law in international relations and the strengthening of the new international law created by the Charter of the United Nations. As citizens we are vitally concerned with contributing our utmost toward the maintenance of peace.
Our examination of the North Atlantic Pact has led us to the conclusion that, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, the Pact in fundamental respects violates the salient provisions of the Charter, and will not contribute toward the establishment of a durable peace. The National Lawyers Guild is of the firm conviction that adherence to the Charter and its underlying principles of negotiation, concurrence, and cooperation afford the most effective assurance of a lasting peace.

I. THE LEGALITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT UNDER THE UN CHARTER

1. The Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace, under the Charter agreed to by all members of the United Nations.

The general security system established under the Charter vests paramount authority in the Security Council in matters of international peace and security. Article 24 of the Charter provides:

"1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." 1

Enforcement action is within the exclusive authority of the Security Council. The Security Council may utilize appropriate regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority. But, expressly prescribes Article 53 of the Charter, "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." 1 Since a regional arrangement may not take enforcement action without prior authorization of the Security Council, obviously no individual State or any group of individual States may take enforcement action, for otherwise the restriction of Article 53 would be meaningless.

2. The Pact fails to recognize the supremacy of the Security Council in enforcement action

Despite the express prohibition against the taking of enforcement action by a regional arrangement without the prior authorization of the Security Council, each party to the North Atlantic Pact undertakes to take on its own initiative whatever measures, including the use of armed force, it decides upon, if an armed attack occurs on any one of the parties.

---

1 Article 53 of the Charter reads:

"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter."

The sole exception from the rule that enforcement action is within the exclusive authority of the Security Council applies to measures which may be taken against former enemy states, such as Germany or Japan. Individual governments or regional arrangements can take individual or collective measures against Germany or Japan without the prior authorization of the Security Council. The North Atlantic Pact is not directed primarily against renewal of German aggression, nor is any specific reference made thereto. Hence, in the event of a threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression by a state other than an enemy state, the measures to be taken to restore or maintain international security can be determined only by the Security Council and not by the parties of the North Atlantic Pact (even if the Pact is qualified as an appropriate regional arrangement).

The Security Council could prevent the parties to the North Atlantic Pact from taking military measures. As was said by Dunward V. Sandifer of the State Department:

"The provision that no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without authorization of the Security Council would permit the Security Council to prevent action before taken by such agencies on their own initiative" (Jan. 27, 1945, Dept. of State Bulletin, p. 147).
Under the Pact, the parties thereto undertake the following commitments:

a. To "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Art. 2);

b. To consult if "the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened" (Art. 4);

c. To consider an armed attack on any one of the parties as an attack against all and to take such individual and collective action, including the use of armed force, as each party considers necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (Art. 5).

Since the essence of the North Atlantic Pact is the asserted right of its signatories to undertake military and other measures without the prior authorization of the Security Council, the Pact does not conform with and, in fact, violates the Charter of the United Nations. The supremacy of the United Nations is fundamental. As was stated in Secretary of State Stettinlus' Report on the San Francisco Conference:

the Security Council could utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action, provided that such enforcement action should be undertaken only when authorized by the Council and that the latter should be kept fully informed of all action taken or contemplated under regional arrangements or by regional agencies. It was recognized that the Council must have a general authority over regional security machinery in order to prevent such arrangements from developing independently and thus possibly pursuing different ends. In other words, this provision was intended to coordinate the function of a regional grouping with those of a general organization and at the same time establish the final authority of the latter." (Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 96-97 (July 1945.).)

5. The inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter, does not authorize the United States to use armed force in the event of an actual armed attack against a European state; a priori, the inherent right of self-defense cannot be invoked where no armed attack has occurred.

The Pact endeavors to escape the obvious inconsistency between the commitments undertaken thereunder and the paramount authority of the Security Council in matters of enforcement action by characterizing the contemplated action as coming within the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 provides:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

Manifestly the inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51, cannot be created by agreement or treaty. Mindful of the Security Council's paramount responsibility for maintaining international peace, Article 51 merely recognizes a provisional right of self-defense inherent in cases of actual armed attack. The exercise of the right of self-defense must be confined to legitimate use and

---

* Apropos the rearmament program envisaged thereunder is the statement of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary at the time of World War I, who summed up the lesson of that war in these terms:

Great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on the other side. * * *

"The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable. This, it seems to me is the truest reading of history, and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interest of future peace."

** Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact provides:

"The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Secretary Acheson has stated that if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack, "we would be bound to take promptly the action which we deemed necessary to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic area."
is subject to review by the Security Council as to whether the acts claimed to be in "self-defense" were justified."

Article 51 recognizes that if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, it has the inherent right of individual self-defense.

Article 51 also recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense. Thus France would have had the inherent right of collective self-defense with Belgium in case of an armed attack by Nazi Germany on Belgium. In case of an armed attack upon Mexico or Canada by a powerful State, the United States would have the inherent right of collective self-defense where the United States was in imminent danger of immediate attack. The inherent right of collective self-defense arises where a State, although not attacked, stands in immediate imminent danger of attack growing out of an armed attack upon a neighbor State. To apply any other meaning to the term "inherent right of collective self-defense" is to nullify the obvious intent of these words, and to destroy the paramount authority of the Security Council in matters of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

To say that application of armed force by the United States in the case of an armed attack on the territory of a signatory or its vessels or aircraft anywhere in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer \(^{28}\) is justified by inherent right (under Art. 51) or, in fact, constitutes self-defense is wholly untenable. Manifestly it cannot be shown that attacks of such a nature will actually be followed immediately and inevitably with an attack upon the United States.

If the inherent right of collective self-defense could be expanded by written agreements, the application of the same logic should give rise to the legal right of a state—neither signatory to the North Atlantic Pact—to use armed force in the Near East or Far East or even in the Americas in the case of an attack by any state upon another state or its vessels or aircraft in those areas, merely by executing an agreement to that effect. Thus, the entire foundation of the new international law created by the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal which tried the Nazi war criminals would be nullified.

The concept of the inherent right of collective self-defense has its counterpart in Article 1 (10) (4) of the Constitution of the United States authorizing a state of the Union, without the consent of Congress, to engage in war in case of actual invasion or in case of "imminent danger as will not admit of delay." Said provision declares:

"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, **enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."

In case of actual invasion, a state of the Union is authorized, without the authorization of Congress, to engage in war. This parallels the inherent right of individual self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter. In case of imminent danger not admitting of delay, a state of the Union can enter into an agreement with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war without authorization of the Congress. The latter parallels the inherent right of collective self-defense. But Article 51 does not permit the use of armed force under the pretext of acting in self-defense.

Prof. Hans Kelsen, dealing with this point, has noted: "The action on the part of the States which are not attacked but only assist the attacked State against its aggressor is not exactly "self-defense" (55 Yale Law Journal 1008). Thus:

\(^{28}\) The concept of self-defense under Article 51 has been analyzed by Yuen-li Liang, director of the Division on Development and Codification of International Law, United Nations, in a draft:

**\(\text{** unless self-defense is confined to legitimate use—as the French term 'leitmic uruence' necessarily imports—it is most liable to abuse, and history furnishes innumerable instances where an aggressor has attempted to justify its aggression in the name of self-defense. Instead of contributing to the clarification of the concept of self-defense, international lawyers have increased its nebulous character by identifying it with the so-called right of self-preservation and sanctifying it by appealing to natural law. This concept is further confused by the claim that each state is its own judge in the determination of the legitimacy and the justifiable extent of its action taken in self-defense.**

It is granted that in the first instance a state attacked by an aggressor may have to decide whether or in what measure the occasion calls for self-defense. But the initial decision must be submitted to review by the criteria of international law" (Yuen-li Liang, "The Legal Basis of International Relations," Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 255 (Jan. 1948), pp. 29-30).

\(^{29}\) See footnote 6, infra.
assuming an armed attack on a Latin-American republic, the Soviet Union, a
great power located in another hemisphere, would not have the inherent right
of collective self-defense.

Assuming, hypothetically, an armed attack against Luxembourg or the Nether-
lands or Norway, the United States would not possess an inherent right of collec-
tive self-defense. The use of armed force, in such a situation, would constitute
not an exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defense, but rather an
enforcement action (which under the Charter cannot be undertaken without
authorization of the Security Council). Nor is this affected by the provision of
the North Atlantic Pact (Art. 5) that "an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."
The inherent right of self-defense arises from realities and cannot be created
(noninherent) by agreements or stipulations. Senator Connally, in the Senate
debate in June 1948 on the Vandenberg Resolution (S. Res. 239) (which the
North Atlantic Pact implements) declared that "the right of self-defense is
inherent; it does not depend upon any constitution or statute or international
agreement ** the right of self-defense is not derived from something on
paper: the right of self-defense is inherent (Cong. Rec., Vol. 94, Part 6, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7821).

Moreover, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense is in no
way enlarged or changed by the creation of an appropriate regional arrangement.
Senator Vandenberg in the Senate debate on the Vandenberg Resolution so
conceded: "I do not think the self-defense right asserted in Article 51 is changed in any
aspect as a result of the organization of the regional group. I do not
conclude that the powers and privileges of Article 51 are changed or enlarged in the
slightest" (Cong. Rec., cited, p. 7803).

The "inherent" right of self-defense cannot be established by a "premeditated,
preconceived, formally entered into regional military alliance."

"It is hardly possible to consider the right or the duty of a non-attacked state
to assist an attacked state as an 'inherent' right ** " (Kelsen, 55 Yale Law
Journal, p. 1009). It is clear, therefore, that the "long-range, premeditated, preconceived, formally
entered into regional military alliance" embodied in the North Atlantic Pact
does not sanction the use of armed force by the United States in case an armed
attack occurs against a European State, notwithstanding the purported attempt
to do so by the terms of the Pact under the guise of the inherent right of
self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter. As this is the core of the
North Atlantic Pact, the Pact is manifestly inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, contravening the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security and undermining the
general security system established under the Charter.

4. The North Atlantic Pact usurps the power of the Security Council and fails to
conform to salient provisions of the Charter

Article 51 of the Charter provides that "The Security Council shall at all
times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security." Yet, under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
provision is made only that "Any such armed attack and all measures taken as
a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council." The
North Atlantic Treaty does not provide that all "activities in contemplation"
shall be reported to the Security Council.

The Pact, under Article 9 thereof, establishes a "council" to consider matters
concerning the implementation of the treaty; and the council "shall establish
immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the
implementation of Articles 3 and 5." The activities and decisions so contemplated

* Cf. Statement of Senator Pepper made during senate debate on Vandenberg Resolution:
Under article 51 the right of self-defense is asserted simply as an inherent right which
may be asserted by those who are the victims of the attack. But certainly the Senator from
Florida had not contemplated that the recognition of the inherent right of self-defense
which, according to the context of article 51, suggests something like a sudden and emergent
attack which may involve the element of surprise and the necessity of an immediate
response before access could be had, possibly to the Security Council, and before the Security
Council could act—ever envisioned a long-range, premeditated, preconceived, formally
entered into regional military alliance **" (Cong. Rec., cited p. 7803, June 11,
1948).
which may seriously affect international peace are not required to be reported to the Security Council under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty although Article 54 of the Charter requires that the Security Council "be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements."

Article 51 of the Charter likewise provides that all measures taken by members "in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council." Nonetheless, the North Atlantic Pact limits the reporting to the Security Council solely to measures taken as a result of an armed attack. No such limitation is intended in Article 51 of the Charter.

The North Atlantic Pact presupposes the validity of a unilateral determination by the members of the alliance that a particular state is an aggressor, potential or actual. But such "unilateral" determination would usurp the power of the Security Council. In permitting individual or collective self-defense against "an armed attack," Article 51 does not at all derogate the exclusive power of the Security Council under Article 39 to declare "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression."

The North Atlantic Pact not only seizes the power of the Security Council, but also repudiates the legal method of the Security Council. Before the Security Council was created, the traditional tendency in international law was to define aggression by formula, and without regard to the total historical and factual situation. Hence even the fascist aggressors, who initiated the Second World War, claimed that their activity was not aggressive, but defensive. By the Charter it became the mission of the Security Council, not to "define" aggression, but to determine the existence of aggression in accordance with legal method based on the concreteness of the background and circumstances surrounding each particular situation. The Security Council determines the existence of aggression concretely on the basis of the entire factual situation, much as a jury gives concreteness to the concept of due care or fault on the basis of the entire factual situation. The legal method of the Security Council thus represents a remarkable development, responding to the failure of preexisting legal method for determining aggression.

The significance of this advance will be appreciated when it is recognized that if the signatory states can validly define an armed attack against a state, as they do in the North Atlantic Treaty, other states must acquire the same legal right of supplying their own definition. Since the definition of "armed attack" contained in Article 6 of the Pact includes "an armed attack ... on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe," a zonal border fracas in Berlin, involving a shooting by a trigger-happy border guard, would purport to provide a "valid legal basis" for a world conflict, under the terms of the Pact. Vesting exclusive authority in the Security Council to determine whether a breach of the peace or an act of aggression had occurred and who was responsible therefore was intended to avoid situations such as this. But the Pact purports to vest in the signatories

1 Cf. Statement of James Reston in New York Times, April 22, 1949 (p. 10, cols. 4-5):

"The Administration's request for armaments for the North Atlantic nations, the formation of a joint plan of defense for the North Atlantic region, decisions about the supply and exchange of weapons—all these are, according to some members of the Foreign Relations Committee, measures taken by members in exercise of this right of self-defense.

"Therefore, they assert, the United States should either report them to the Security Council under Article 51 of the U. N. Charter, or stop arguing that this treaty is abiding by the letter and spirit of the Charter.

"Moreover, this argument continues. Article 54 of the U. N. Charter is also relevant. This article states: 'The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.'

"Thus, the Secretary of State is being asked, are the North Atlantic pact nations not obliged to report to the Security Council when they consult with one another under Article 4 of the North Atlantic treaty?

"Since the purpose of the pact is officially stated to be one of maintaining peace and security in this region, are its members not obliged by both articles 51 and 54 to report all activities undertaken or in contemplation to the Security Council?"

2 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides:

"For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties."
the right to go to war in such a situation. This result would set back inestimably
the cause of peace and the rule of law in international relations!

5. As the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter applies
only in the case of an armed attack against a member of the United Nations, the
Pact violates the Charter since it applies to Portugal and Italy which are not
members of the United Nations

This point is self-evident from a mere recital of Article 51 of the Charter, which
declares:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."

Portugal and Italy, which are not members of the United Nations, are, however,
signatories of the North Atlantic Pact. Yet, under Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Pact the United States, as a signatory, agrees that if an armed attack occurs
against any of the signatories (including Portugal and Italy), it will take action
(military or otherwise) "in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." But,
under no circumstances can Article 51 be invoked in the case of an attack upon
nonmembers of the United Nations. This underscores the fundamental inconsist-
sistency between the North Atlantic Pact and the Charter of the United Nations.
It demonstrates the clearest violation of the Charter.

6. Since the signatories to the Pact embrace countries in two hemispheres sepa-
rated by the Atlantic Ocean, there is a grave question whether it qualifies as
a "regional arrangement" under the Charter. The propriety of the Pact
should be submitted to the Security Council

Specific limitations are imposed upon the existence of regional arrangements
as set forth in Article 52 of the Charter, which provides:

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the

It will be noted that the Charter does not authorize all arrangements between
nations. A regional arrangement must be one which is, in fact, "appropriate for
regional action" and such regional arrangement and its activities must be "con-
sistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." Senator Connally,
present chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who now
supports the North Atlantic Pact, last year argued against the formation of
regional organizations which might weaken the United Nations and alluded to
the point that the United Nations had the right to determine whether a proposed
organization was appropriate for regional action. In the Senate debate on June
11, 1948, on the Vandenberg Resolution, after citing Article 52 of the Charter,
Senator Connally said:

"I wish to stress the words 'as are appropriate for regional action.' I do not
wish to see regional groups formed which may weaken the parent body, the
United Nations. But if there are matters which are local, which are peculiar
to the particular region, there is no reason why the nations in that region should
not form a regional arrangement, because in a sense the overriding authority is

---

1 It is significant that the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference opposed amendments which sought to define aggression. The Report of former Secretary of State Stettinius on the results of the San Francisco Conference stated:

"One of the most significant lines upon which debate concerning the liberty of action of the Council proceeded was that which concerned the proposed inclusion in the Charter of provisions with respect to determination of acts of aggression. Various amendments pro-
posed on the subject, including those of Bolivia and the Philippine Commonwealth, offered a list of sharply defined eventualities (such as invasion of, or attack on, another state, interfering with its internal affairs, etc.), in which the Council would be bound to determine by formula not only the existence of aggression but also the identity of the ag-
gressor. ** The United States Delegation, believing that the acceptance of such a concept was most undesirable, played an active part in opposing the amendments. The Conference finally agreed that even the most simple and obvious cases of aggression might fall outside any of the formulaes suggested, and, conversely, that a nation which, according to a formula strictly interpreted, could be deemed the offender in any particular instance
might actually—when all circumstances were considered—be found to be the victim of intolerable provocation." (See Hearings on the United Nations Charter, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 89 [July 1945].)
still there, and it would probably have the right to determine whether or not the action proposed was appropriate for regional action. * * * I would not want to encourage the formation of regional organizations which might weaken or sap the energies of the United Nations itself, because our objective in establishing the United Nations was to establish a strong, purposeful, and wise central body to preserve the peace of the world" (Cong. Rec., Vol. 94, Part 6, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7821).

Since the Charter limits the existence of regional arrangements to those which are "appropriate for regional action" (*local," in the words of Senator Connally), there is a grave question whether the North Atlantic Pact—associating the United States with countries stretching across the Atlantic Ocean, and embracing Norway, which has a common border with the Soviet Union on the Arctic Sea, and Italy, located in the Mediterranean—is "appropriate for regional action."* In view of the grave question presented, the North Atlantic Pact should be submitted to the Security Council for its decision as to whether the Pact is "appropriate for regional action" and its provisions and contemplated activities "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." The Pact should not be undertaken unless approval thereof has been secured by the Security Council.

It is important that the Pact actually conform "in every particular with the Charter of the United Nations."**

7. Since the North Atlantic Pact violates the Charter which is the supreme law, the Senate should not ratify the Pact

The Charter is the supreme law governing international relations. The Charter expressly provides, under Article 103, that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". As was recently stated by Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs and President of the United Nations General Assembly, in opening the spring session of the Assembly:

"The Charter provides, as you all know, that all other obligations which individual nations or groups of nations may accept must be subordinated to and must be in accordance with those set forth in the Charter of the United Nations."*

All members of the United Nations are required, under Article 2 (2) of the Charter, to "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." Hence, no member of the United Nations can properly enter into an international agreement whose obligations conflict with those under the Charter. The Senate of the United States should, therefore, not ratify the North Atlantic Treaty which conflicts with and is not in accord with the Charter of the United Nations.

II. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WILL UNDERMINE THE UNITED NATIONS AND NOT CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DURABLE PEACE

In founding the United Nations, the method of military alliance among the great powers was rejected and an international security system was chosen as the means of maintaining peace. It is fitting to recall the following passage from the Report by Secretary of State Stettinius to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference which evolved the Charter of the United Nations:

"We realize, in short, that peace is a world-wide problem and that the maintenance of peace, and not merely its restoration, depends primarily upon the unity of the great powers.

"There were theoretically two alternative means of preserving this unity. The first was through the formation of a permanent alliance among the great

* Senator Malone, of Nevada, observed during the Senate debate on the Vandenberg Resolution:

"At the time this part of the Charter was adopted, it was generally believed—and there was no other explanation ever given—that regional agreements would apply only to nations in close proximity one to another, or to nations in the same hemisphere. The only one ever mentioned at San Francisco in which the United States would participate was the Chapultepec Agreement for the security of the Western Hemisphere. * * * Now the administration * * * is to extend the meaning of the phrase 'regional agreement' to cross the Atlantic Ocean and bring Europe and the United States into the same region. This is factually untrue."

"The effect will be to make the Rhine the frontier of the United States" (Cong. Rec., clops of the Senate Trial).

** Secretary of State Acheson, in his radio address of March 18, 1949, stated that the Pact was "carefully and conscientiously designed to conform in every particular with the Charter of the United Nations."

powers. This method might have been justified on narrow strategic grounds, but it would have been repugnant to our traditional policy. It also would have contained elements of danger because it might well have been interpreted as a menace by nations not party to it. Accordingly, this method was rejected.

"The second method was through the establishment of a general security system based upon the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and upon the recognition of the predominant responsibility of the great powers in matters relating to peace and security." 10

The North Atlantic Pact reverts to the method of alliance which was rejected by the United States in favor of the establishment of a general security system as created in the United Nations organization. It is well to recall that the Locarno alliance and similar compacts contributed to the undermining of the League of Nations. 11

In opposing the Vandenberg Resolution (S. Res. 239) calling for the progressive development of regional arrangements, Senator Pepper, in a Senate debate on June 11, 1948, pointed out that regional military arrangements would lead to the reestablishment of military alliances incompatible with the United Nations, peace and collective security. Senator Pepper observed that the Chapultepec Treaty involving the Inter-American states "suggests a pattern for setting up in the world regional arrangements which would mean that the world would be divided into three military alliances, one in the Soviet sphere, one in western Europe, and one in the Western Hemisphere. Then, instead of having a dynamic and dangerous and rampant nationalism, it is proposed that we progress to the same sort of thing in the United States. We might be initiated which would result to the Soviet Union and Scandinavia, and the United States in its core even if confined to the North Atlantic excluding the distant dominions and the Latin American countries still it would include most of the military power outside the Soviet bloc it would in fact be so large a part of the world that the Soviet Union might counter by the utmost preparations on its part, thus increasing the tension in the bi-polar world. 10

The instability of the world and the insecurity of the nations might be increased and a new chain of events might be initiated which would result in World War III.


10 Cf. Statement of Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, President of the United Nations General Assembly, before Foreign Press Association:

"The League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War solely because some of the governments which belonged to it let down the League of Nations and preferred to resume the great game of power politics. This must not happen to the United Nations. The peoples of the world have faith in the United Nations. It is their chief instrument in the struggles to create a world based upon justice. Nothing else is a substitute for it; nothing else can be a substitute for it" (New York Times, April 6, 1949).

11 The Drafting Committee consists of Clark M. Eichelberger, Chairman; Malcolm W. Davis, Clyde Eagleton, Arthur N. Holcombe, and Quincy Wright.

Cf. Statement of John Foster Dulles made before the third National Conference on Churches and the World Order on March 8, 1949:

"So far as it is humanly possible to judge, the Soviet government, under conditions now prevailing, does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy. I do not know any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this government or any government, who believes that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

It can be assumed that the Soviet state would use the Red Army if its leaders felt that their homeland was imminent and seriously menaced. That is why in our statement on Soviet-American relations made two and one-half years ago we (the churchmen) said that the United States should not seek military bases so close to the Soviet Union as to carry an offensive character, and that this is disproportionate to defensive value.

That is why our fellowship with the peoples of Western Europe, and particularly of Scandinavia, ought not to seem to bring United States military might directly to Russia's border.

It would indeed involve a high tribute to Soviet leaders to assume that under these circumstances they would exercise more self-control than would our people under comparable circumstances, as, for example, if the Soviet Union had military arrangements with a country at our border" (New York Herald Tribune, March 9, 1949, p. 10).
"Either a simple guaranty of Western Europe or American entry into a North Atlantic Union would tend to weaken the United Nations. The emphasis upon more limited guaranties and the centering of discussions of security matters in more limited institutions would weaken the world's interest in universal procedures for maintaining international peace and security for all under the Charter. Even if the terms of the Charter were observed and the machinery of the United Nations were utilized for giving effect to commitments under such an arrangement, the focus of world attention would be turned toward the relative power of the competing groups and away from the general obligations of the Charter and the machinery of the United Nations."

This report concluded that "an exclusive guarantee, alliance, or regional arrangement which is so powerful as to be, in fact, beyond control of the United Nations * * * is contrary to the spirit of Chapter 8 of the Charter" (Chapter 8 deals with Regional Arrangements).

The Charter of the United Nations, in rejecting the method of military alliance, did not sanction the creation of rival organizations of states hostily confronting each other. The Charter manifestly does not offer the legal means for its own destruction.

On February 11, 1940, Secretary General Trygve Lie warned: "No regional arrangement can ever be a satisfactory substitute for the United Nations. If people generally began to accept alliances as substitute for genuine, world-wide collective security, then the hope of a lasting peace would be greatly endangered."

**CONCLUSION**

**ADHERENCE TO THE CHARTER AND ITS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATION, CONCURRENCE AD COOPERATION AFFORD THE MOST EFFECTIVE ASSURANCE OF A LASTING PEACE**

The United Nations remains the best hope for peace. We must make a reality of the determination of the peoples of the United Nations, expressed in the preamble of the Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."

War is not inevitable. The trend to war must be arrested. It is fitting to recall the words of former Secretary of State Byrnes, in his book "Speaking Frankly" (pp. 313, 315, 316):

"There is too much talk of war and too little of peace. * * * Too much is at stake for us to lose our patience. Negotiating with the Soviets may affect the nerves of a few statesmen but another world war would more seriously affect the lives of millions of people. We must continue our efforts to develop through the United Nations a common law of nations to provide definite and agreed standards of conduct. It must rest upon something more than rules, something more than force, and something more than fear. It must be made to rest upon the growth of a common fellowship, common interests and common ideals among the peoples of the world. * * * I remain confident that we can achieve a just peace through co-operative effort * * *.*"

The National Lawyers Guild on February 21, 1940, at its recent convention held in Detroit, unanimously adopted a resolution which declared:

"The revitalization of cooperative relations among the great powers and especially between the United States and the Soviet Union, points the path to peace."

"This is the will of all peace-loving humanity. It was voiced in the resolution adopted [unanimously] at the Paris session of the Geneva Assembly where, on the initiative of Mexico, the Assembly made an appeal to the great powers to compose their differences and 'to redouble their efforts in a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding to secure in the briefest possible time a final settlement of the war and a conclusion of all peace settlements.'"

The Guild resolution stated:

"This approach will afford the most effective assurance of a durable peace and a vigorous United Nations organization and obviate resort to military alliances, avoid the heavy impact of armament expenditures, and make possible the advance of standards and social welfare of our people and of all peoples throughout the world."

The course thus proposed undoubtedly reflects the will of the American people. It is the course our Government should follow in the interests of peace and of the United Nations.

Respectfully submitted,

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
CLIFFORD J. DUBE, President.
Senator DONNELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Durr.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We are very much obliged to you.

Was the resolution adopted by the Guild after the treaty had been made known to the country?

Mr. CROWN. The statement which was the basis of the report here was prepared after the text of the North Atlantic Treaty was published to the public. The convention of the Guild which dealt with the principles as had been declared in the North Atlantic Treaty took place at the end of February.

The CHAIRMAN. That was before the treaty was signed.

Mr. CROWN. Before the treaty was signed, but where we discussed the basic principles. Thereafter, when the State Department released the text of the proposed treaty, at that point an analysis was made of it, and it was that analysis of the actual text which was submitted to all the members of the International Law Committee and, I should add, also submitted to each member of the National Board of the Lawyers Guild for his consideration on the basis of the actual text, which was, of course, signed on April 4.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after your convention had adjourned?

Mr. CROWN. That is true.

Senator DONNELL. Has there been action taken by any official committee of the Lawyers Guild on the subject matter of the North Atlantic Treaty since the text of it was made public?

Mr. CROWN. Yes.

Senator DONNELL. What action has been so taken?

Mr. CROWN. After the text had been released to the public an analysis was made, and that analysis, which was the core of the memorandum of law and the statement that Mr. Durr presented, was then circularized to each member of the International Law Committee and to each member of the National Board, so the action was taken on the basis of the actual text of the treaty.

Senator DONNELL. So this memorandum of law, consisting of some 20 or 21 pages, prepared by the Committee on International Law and Relations, was prepared after the text of the treaty had been submitted to the members of the Committee on International Law and Relations?

Mr. CROWN. Yes. As you will see, citations are made from the actual text and actual provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Libby, come around.

We are glad to note your presence, as we have so many times before. Mr. Libby, we are very much pressed for time. I was wondering if you could not insert your statement in the record and comment on it orally. It will save us much time.

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. LIBBY, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR

Mr. Libby. I will do that. I have been sitting there thinking how glad I am that this legal evidence that the North Atlantic Pact is illegal under international law was presented fully. I would much rather you would hear that than hear my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. We have heard that.

Mr. Libby. I hope you will take it to heart, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We will give it consideration.
Mr. LIBBY. I will summarize my statement. I will trust you to read it at your leisure afterward.

REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO TREATY

First, I urge you not to ratify the Atlantic Pact, and for three reasons:
1. Because it is a war pact and not a peace pact.
2. Because it does not increase the security of the United States, as is claimed, but lessens our security without giving security to Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Is one of your complaints that we ought to give Europe more security than the treaty provides?
Mr. LIBBY. I am complaining that we are taking away our security without giving security to Europe. I am thinking of our security first, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You complain that it does not give enough security to Europe. Do you favor giving more?
Mr. LIBBY. I am in favor of taking a different approach to Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you represent, Mr. Libby?
Mr. LIBBY. I state it at the top there, and I thought that was one thing where I could cut, because you have already said that I have been here frequently. My name is Frederick J. Libby. I am executive secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a salaried man, I suppose?
Mr. LIBBY. Modestly.

The CHAIRMAN. You give all your time to this purpose?
Mr. LIBBY. I give all my time to it, and have for 28 years.

The CHAIRMAN. We applaud your desire to prevent war.
Mr. LIBBY. And you share it, I know.

I had a letter from you recently which I greatly appreciated, but it was not quite along the line you will find at the top of page 2 of my statement.

DANGER OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

When Senator Vandenberg was debating with you and others the lend-lease bill, which you supported on the ground that it would lead us toward peace, Senator Vandenberg said [reading]:

My greatest fundamental objection to it is that it invites and authorizes the President of the United States to enter the continental arena of "power politics," which has been the curse of the Old World and the cradle of its incessant wars for a thousand years; invites and authorizes him to become power politician No. 1 of this whole, mad world. * * * I am opposed to any of these politics, Mr. President, which would needlessly threaten to drag us into war, when we are still officially saying that we intend to stop "short of war" and when this very legislation is being labeled "peace." I freely concede that our whole status today is precarious, but that is no reason why we should make it more so.

The CHAIRMAN. That was said some years ago. That was said by Senator Vandenberg many years ago, and the world has progressed and changed and developed so radically since that time.

Mr. LIBBY. For the worse.

The CHAIRMAN. You can insert "for the worse" if you want to, but I do not see that that is pertinent to this inquiry.
Mr. Libby. Well, what he said with regard to the Lend-Lease Act can be said with still greater force in condemnation of the Atlantic Pact, except for one very important qualification. Once you commit our country irrevocably to the military alliance, the President ceases to have the control he now has of our foreign policy. We give up our independence of action. The military capital of our half of the world moves from Washington to Fontainebleau or somewhere else.

Now, then, I will not go over the whole case here.

The Chairman. I hope not.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMAMENT RACE

Mr. Libby. But I would like to call your attention to the dates at the bottom of page 2, indicating that Russia is not solely responsible for the arms race in which we are involved:

May 1945: President Truman announced that the United States will maintain air and naval bases anywhere in the world that suits our interest.

The Chairman. We were still at war at that time, were we not?

Mr. Libby. Yes. Then I will give you October.

October 1945: President Truman in his Navy Day speech announced that the United States proposes to maintain "supremacy on land, on sea, and in the air." The war was over then, Mr. Chairman.

In March 1947, President Truman proclaimed the "Truman doctrine" to "contain" communism, declaring that we would aid any country with our economic and military resources in preventing the spread of communism, whether the country is threatened from within or from without.

Then, last summer, there were synthetic war scares and a budget for the Armed Services of unprecedented magnitude in peacetime.

Confronted with this record, no fair-minded man would say that our Government is without any responsibility for the arms race in which we find ourselves and of which the Atlantic Pact is the latest development.

The latest slogan on which the pact and the foreign policy of the past 4 years are based is "Peace through strength." Formerly it was "The Russians will recognize nothing but force." David Lawrence described our policy last year in the United States News as "to scare Russia or prepare to fight Russia." Mr. Louis Johnson, our new Secretary of Defense, in addressing your committee a few days ago, said much the same thing when he declared that—

From the military viewpoint, the basic objectives of the treaty are to deter war and to attain maximum military effectiveness in war, if war cannot be prevented.

Senator Vandenberg. May I interrupt you? In your chronology you very carefully omit all of the repeated efforts that the Government of the United States has made in the United Nations and through its instrumentalities to seek universal disarmament and to control international traffic in arms, do you not?

Mr. Libby. I come to that later.

Senator Vandenberg. Oh, all right.

The Chairman. Referring to Secretary Johnson's statement, you are for that, are you not? Are you not for that?
Mr. LIBBY. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Talking about that statement, don't you want to prevent war if you can?
Mr. LIBBY. That half of it, but the second half, no.
The CHAIRMAN. If it comes, though—if war was to come—don't you want to be ready for it?
Mr. LIBBY. The second half of that statement is what tends to bring on the war, as I shall show.
The CHAIRMAN. All right; hurry along.

DANGERS OF ARMS RACE

Mr. LIBBY. Now, gentlemen, an arms race is not the road to peace. At best it can result in the unconditional surrender of one of the contestants or in a prolonged armed truce while both sides prepare for war, as we seem to be doing now. At worst it results in the war which it has made virtually inevitable.

Here at this point I will not read the whole statement of Earl Grey of Falledon, the former British Foreign Secretary, which you will find in his memoirs entitled "Twenty-Five Years (1892-1916)," in which he gives his interpretation of how World War I came about. [Reading:]

More than one thing may be said about the causes of the war, but the statement that compromises most truth is that militarism and the armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable. Armaments were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation—that was the justification put forward in defense of them. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred; it is hardly too much to say that, between nations, it stimulates all that is bad and depresses all that is good.

I will skip the rest, and go on to the next page.

Dr. Rudin pointed out that there were two safety valves that were operative in Europe during this period and that the British navy played only a minor role and during only a part of this long period. The safety valves were the free movement of peoples and the relatively free movement of goods. Sixty million people, Dr. Rudin said, emigrated from Europe during this century. This was one safety valve. The other was the free trade policy which Britain introduced and popularized. Coupled with the industrial revolution which came conveniently to prevent unemployment, conditions of misery and want were prevented from becoming causes of war.

Summing up this point, the Atlantic pact is a war pact because it heightens the tension between the United States and Russia, and relies upon winning an arms race with Russia as the foundations of peace. History is strewn with the pitiful wrecks of nations that have followed this will-o’-the-wisp of "Peace through strength," and you, who are now guiding our destiny, should ponder the record.

WEAKNESSES OF THE TREATY

It would be superfluous for me to rehearse the arguments that have been offered you by Secretary Acheson and Gen. Omar Bradley, and repeated in varying forms by other witnesses. Briefly, they are that we add to our population, for a possible war against Russia, the populations and resources of the western European nations and their
colonies; assure to ourselves air bases not far from Russia's borders; and assure also, what seems very important to General Bradley, a bridgehead where we can land our troops without the losses suffered on the beaches of Normandy.

Superficially these points would seem to be valid, but when you examine them serious doubts will trouble your minds.

First will be your doubt about the part which the Communist Parties of France, Italy, and perhaps Belgium are going to play in a possible war with Russia. They constitute a quarter of the population of France, and being largely workingmen from the cities, will constitute at least a quarter of the French Army. They permeate the French Government, as we were reminded recently, when we learned that M. Joliot-Curie, a man in the strategic position of membership in the French Atomic Energy Commission, is a Communist. You can't help wondering whether, in putting our new weapons into the hands of the French armed forces, you are arming our allies, or as has happened so recently in China, our enemies.

A similar situation faces you in Italy, where the powerful influence of the Pope and the Catholic religion has been unable to prevent the spread of communism. Togliatti, the Communist leader, has become one of the most powerful forces in the nation. Aided by widespread unemployment and consequent misery and want, the Communist Party, although it has lost some ground lately as the result of the Marshall plan, confidently expects millions of recruits if ever a depression hits the United States, cutting off our economic aid.

Under the peace treaty, Italy is forbidden to rearm beyond a negligible figure. Yet Italy is one of the nations with whose security our security is to be indissolubly linked.

EXTENSION OF UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITIES

General Bradley alluded before your committee to the fact that in future “our frontiers of collective defense lie in common with theirs in the heart of Europe.” An attack on any of them, from Norway in the north to Italy in the south, will be an attack on the United States. Will Russia know whether the French Communists and the Italian Communists mean what they say when they declare that they will not fight against Russia? When the pinch comes will they fight loyally under our banner? You don't know, and this is one of the points at which doubts assail you.

Nor can you forget what a troublesome salient Berlin has been. You wonder whether Norway may not prove to be equally dangerous as the eastern border of our area of commitment. They tell us that the pact changes nothing in our real commitments, but you can't help wondering whether, without the pact, you would feel obliged to plunge the world into its final war with bacteria and atom bombs, without even taking time for consultation, if a Russian airplane were shot down over Norway or if a band of Russian soldiers crossed the Norwegian border.

As you sit of an evening pondering whether you are justified in extending the border of our responsibility to the heart of Europe, you must wonder also whether the prime ministers of the 11 countries that are to be associated with us in this military alliance will be wise and
responsible men without exception during the almost infinite period of the next 20 years of turmoil. I say “without exception,” because it will take only one of them, who is irresponsible, or stupid, cocky, with a chip on his shoulder, to plunge us into a fatal war.

You are proposing nothing less than to give our blank check to each of 11 quarrelsome, bankrupt governments, pledging our honor that we will come to their aid with all our resources and our manpower, if they are attacked.

When we remember that Britain's blank check to Poland in 1939, in the form of a pledge just like this, that if Poland resisted Hitler, Britain would come to Poland's aid with all its resources, led Joseph Beck to refuse to negotiate with Germany over the controversial Polish Corridor and on that issue brought ruin to the world. Such reflections, I should think, would be disquieting to you who carry this great responsibility.

You can't help remembering also, because it is recent history, that nations sometimes welch on their treaties, as Britain and France welched in 1938 on their treaty with Czechoslovakia and as all the signatories of the Atlantic Charter, including ourselves, have welched on its political and economic obligations. Will this pact be kept when so many pacts are falling by the wayside?

**ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REARMAMENT**

Still another doubt would be justified. Since communism is already mighty in France and Italy, how do you make France and Italy secure from communism? What will the guns you are going to furnish, to Communists and non-Communists alike, do to ward off communism from these badly divided countries? President Truman, in the appendix to his announcement of the Truman Doctrine, used a sentence which should have been its text but wasn't. He said: “Communism thrives in misery and want.” Should not our attack be, then, on misery and want?

Secretary Acheson and General Bradley agree that the European nations will furnish “between 6 and 7 for each dollar this country puts into the military aid program.” Were you aware that the European nations have such abundant resources that they can match us 6 to 1? To be sure, we are told that our $1 in military aid will in reality pay for $10 worth, since this is a bargain-counter arrangement, with costly equipment marked down to 10 cents on the dollar. But how long will the European nations be able to keep up this expenditure at 6 to 1? And where has their sudden wealth been hidden? And where is their manpower to come from, if it is not to come from their factories and farms, which are essential to the continued production of their wealth?

**DEFENSE LINE IN EUROPE**

I saw in yesterday's papers that you, Mr. Chairman, assured Mr. James Warburg that you have no intention of “stringing any army along the Rhine, the Oder or the Elbe.” Senator Vandenberg indicates that he thinks the program “does not contemplate any Maginot Line defense”; and that it “does not contemplate any substantial increase in troops.”
Gen. Omar Bradley, however, in his testimony before your committee said [reading]:

Plans for the common defense of the existing free world must provide for the security of western Europe without abandoning these countries to the terrors of another enemy occupation. Only upon that premise can nations closest to the frontiers be expected to stake their fortunes with ours in the command defense.

That General Bradley is interpreting correctly the expectations of our prospective allies has been made very plain in the press. The French, in particular, have warned us that they fear American liberation almost as much as they do Russian occupation. In other words, they expect from the pact precisely what General Bradley expects, namely, that an impregnable line will be established somewhere to the east of France.

One can't help asking your committee, in view of this conflict between your two most influential members and the Army Chief of Staff, which is the correct interpretation of the pact? Will you guarantee that General Bradley is mistaken? And if he is correct in saying that the eastern border of the extended United States must be made impregnable to protect the border peoples and prevent the necessity of later liberating the survivors of a Russian occupation, what is it going to cost us in equipment and manpower?

WEAKENING EFFECT OF TREATY

Summing up our second point, this military alliance does not increase the security of the United States but lessens our security, because it admits to our allied fortress and even to our allied army a large percentage of Communists who have pledged themselves not to fight on our side against Russia; because Norway is a dangerous salient which we cannot defend; and because the pact is a blank check, a guaranty for 20 years that, regardless of the stupidity or the cockiness of the foreign ministers of eleven governments, we will protect them from the consequences of their folly if they are attacked, without even asking for consultation.

The pact gives no security to Europe from communism because misery and want will increase under the pact. It will not guard Europe's frontiers from Russian invasion unless the United States is prepared to pay an impossible price.

THE ALLIANCE WILL COST US FAR MORE THAN WE CAN AFFORD, AND IT THREATENS US WITH ECONOMIC RUIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have gathered from newspaper reports that the Senate and even your committee, which has usually been unanimous in recent years, are divided on the question of whether our country can afford, on top of its other financial obligations, to “implement” the pact for the coming year with the military equipment it calls for. The value of this equipment is estimated at somewhat over $1,000,000,000, but with the understanding that the same equipment has cost us ten times as much, and with the further understanding that the army insists that it be replaced, which would cost us even more than the figure at which it was originally bought.
It is no wonder, gentlemen, that this problem is giving you a bad headache. If you ratify the pact and fail to implement it, it will be merely one more scrap of paper and western Europe will feel badly let down. But if you implement it, you will either have to raise our taxes in the teeth of diminishing incomes or launch our country on a new era of deficit spending, which you know would be economically dangerous.

PEACE PROGRAM AS ALTERNATIVE

An alternative policy that I would call adequate must meet the three tests by which the North Atlantic military pact stands condemned:

1. It must be a peace pact and not a war pact.
2. It must increase the security of the United States and at the same time increase the security of Europe.
3. It must strengthen our economy and, as far as possible, the economy of all nations.

Any program that will pass these three tests must be built upon the principle of "peace through international cooperation," not "peace through strength." While the United Nations as now constituted is an attempt to combine power politics with peace, as I testified before your committee when the UN Charter was under consideration, it will necessarily be our starting point, because it is all we have. In developing it, our aim must be to strengthen its Assembly at the expense of the Security Council and implement adequately its many agencies for "peaceful change," always remembering that "peaceful change" and not the maintenance of any status quo is peace.

The second absolute in a true peace program will make progressive world disarmament rather than progressive world rearmament its clear and sincere objective. I have not been satisfied with our Government's use of the rigid Baruch plan, for international ownership and control of the sources of atomic energy, to prevent progress toward world disarmament. The Baruch plan, if it had been presented by Russia, would not, I think, have been accepted by the Senate. American insistence upon that or nothing has prevented negotiation of a disarmament program such as Russia has proposed.

The third essential of an adequate alternative policy is provision for world reconstruction, with a united Germany serving as our bridge for trade between the east and the west instead of being used as a bone to be picked and fought over by both east and west.

Finally, since my purpose is only to be suggestive rather than comprehensive in this brief statement, not only Russia but the United States must get out of its head the fixed idea that the other nation is solely to blame for our failure to get on together. Our Government has been trying "either to scare Russia or to prepare to fight Russia." It is time we outgrew this puerile and hopeless policy, and the equally puerile fear of Russia which our armed services have deliberately created in their own interest.

"One world or none" is no figure of speech. The supreme enemy of mankind is not Soviet Russia but war. Peace is the only security for all nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?
Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?
Senator DONNELL. No questions.
Mr. Libby. May I add two quotations from Peace Action that I will append to the record?
(Quotations referred to are as follows:)

[From Peace Action of the National Council for Prevention of War, February 1949]

40 FAULTS FLAW ATLANTIC PACT
(By James Finucane)

PROPOSED ALLIANCE COULD NOT DELIVER PEACE OR SECURITY

The proposed North Atlantic Military Pact would be another blunder in American foreign policy because:
1. It would globalize the discredited Truman Doctrine, which has broken down in China and Greece.
2. It would bypass our proper role as a heavily contributing partner in peaceful world affairs, and recast us as a gun-toting Caesar, imposing a Pax Americana.
3. It would make us accomplices of the four leading colonial powers at a time when three of them should be under world-wide moral condemnation for their performances in Indonesia, Malaya, and Indochina.
4. It would supply us and the Russians with easily available pretexts for interventions and counterinterventions all over the world.
5. It would alienate from us the plain people of Europe and Asia, who are sick of the army way.
6. It would fatten the military caste here and abroad and enable them to batten upon their fellow citizens for years longer.
7. It would set up a virtual boycott of traditional neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland, whose wisdom has been demonstrated in the two recent World Wars.
8. Making the Rhine the first line of defense would sacrifice Germany, including the Ruhr, to Russia.
9. It would commit United States energies to freezing the status quo, however unjust, all over the world.
10. It would make it possible for Bevin, Queville, or even Queen Juliana, to fumble United States troops into another international blood bath.

WOULD FURTHER DESTROY EUROPEAN HOPE OF UNITY

11. The pact would increase the disunity of Europe, subdividing the split-off western half into pact and nonpact splinters.
12. The alliance would be politically unreliable, as Britain and France are already formally allied with Russia.
   Britain could igably return to her traditional policy of playing two powers against each other, to our disadvantage.
13. Subconsciously, the French would fear that the Americans and British would fail to send planes as they did in 1940. And repeat Oran.
14. Subconsciously, the British would feel the French, with millions of Communists, might surrender too soon, as they did in 1940.
   Wouldn't the Communists in France and Italy turn our weapons against us?
15. It would make it unmistakable that Russia is being encircled by enemies.

PACT DOES NOT HOLD WATER AS MILITARY PLAN

16. The pact would expose us to the mistakes and vulnerability of our allies. Luxembourg, with a population the size of Jersey City, is a charter member of the proposed pact.
17. The pact proposes to arm 45 miscellaneous western European divisions, to do a job which Hitler failed to do with 240 divisions.
18. To be more than a proper shield, these troops would need to be backed up with a huge American conscript force.
   No wonder the Army is asking Congress for 837,000 men in H. R. 1437. And is readying UMT up its sleeve.
19. This would add the danger of “hollow shell” overdeployment to our existing peril of overcommitment.

20. Our quest for air bases as near the Russian border as possible reveals our purpose to launch, at the outset of hostilities, an immoral strategic bombardment of Russian cities with weapons of mass destruction.

RUSSIANS VIEW PACT AS ATTACK ON THEIR COUNTRY

21. The pact could not be counted on to deter the feared Russian aggression. Rather it might invite it, in defense against our threat. Norway and Finland already feel the cold breath of intensified Russian interest.

22. Feeding, clothing, and drilling 2,000,000 “cheap infantrymen” would put a terrific unproductive drain on food and fabrics, and deprive needy civilians of those same items. (We use the word “division” for a division-unit, including supply and overhead through all the rear echelons, totaling 50,000 men.)

23. Equipping the European air force with its first contingent of 4,500 jet fighters and 4,000 jet bombers would aggravate existing shortages of metals and fuels.

ECONOMIC COSTS NULLIFY MARSHALL PLAN PROSPECTS

24. What this will mean to the impoverished peoples of Europe in increasing tax burdens is seen by the Netherlands budgeting 100,000,000 guilders for western military union in 1949.

25. With all these military emphases, the proposed pact would disillusion Europe about United States economic aid. Europeans would feel they are being used instead of helped.

26. The pact would discourage new nonmilitary business enterprises, and precipitate a flight of capital to the United States. Bankers don’t invest in a haberdashery on a battlefield.

27. The pact obviously knocks the Marshall plan schedule for European recovery by 1952 into a cocked hat.

28. The pact would mean another complete whirl in the viciously ascending spiral of armaments competition.

29. At home, the pact might be a shot-in-the-arm for United States business now, but it would principally benefit our still bloated war industries which must face a peacetime economy eventually—unless *

30. This would make the inevitable business adjustment worse when it comes, unless war is invoked to use up the accumulated arms inventory.

VIOLATES SPIRIT AND INTENT OF UN CHARTER

31. The proposed pact would mock the spirit of the United Nations Charter, while paying lip-service to the letter. It would ignore the basic purpose of the UN, expressed in article 1, section 1: “to bring about by peaceful means * * adjustment * * of international disputes.”

32. Instead, it would take advantage of the exceptional conditions of Article 51 to undermine the world’s hopes.

33. The Alliance would attempt to give by indirection a moral commitment that could not legally be given under the Constitution.

34. Starting with any border incident, the pact could make automatic national suicide for the signers a matter of honor. Modern war is now suicide.

35. The pact would attempt to treat the symptoms of world disorder by repression, rather than to remove the causes by negotiation.

36. The pact, as advertised, would have two objectives: To scare the Russians into not fighting; or, should the Russians choose to fight anyway, to “win” the next war. The stakes are too heavy.

NEGLECTS THE MORE EXCELLENT WAY STILL OPEN TO US

37. The pact is, in short, the tragically distraught stratagem of policy-makers who have either misconceived, or shut their eyes to, most of the basic problems confronting America. Russia is only one of our problems. An overcrowded Germany, an obsolescent Europe, an awakening Far East, and a universal social ferment, would still confront us if Russia ceased to exist tomorrow.

38. Even if it worked as its missionary proponents fondly hope, the pact would launch America on a barracks century, and condemn our coming generations to universal sentry duty.
39. It would stifle the creative activity of spiritually free civilian minds and fix our souls from infancy at bayonet point against the other half of the world.

[From Peace Action of the National Council for Prevention of War, February 1949]

PAX AMERICANA—HATE, RUIN, AND WAR

(By Frederick J. Libby)

A Pax Americana, to take over the role of the defunct Pax Britannica, is fast emerging as the administration's idea of "peace, freedom, and plenty." For 100 years, from 1815 to 1914, after seven wars with France, the British Navy "ruled the waves" almost unchallenged. No major wars disturbed this British peace.

Why shouldn't our country now have its turn and maintain an American peace for the next century? Peace rests on power—so the argument runs—and we have it. Our planes can rule the air. Our Navy rules the seas. And when we have forged the North Atlantic Military Alliance, and have armed our allies with American weapons and established American air bases at strategic points throughout their territory, we shall be dominant on land also, because as long as our resources last, our productive capacity will continue to be incomparable.

POWER THE TRUMAN DREAM, PEACE AS BYPRODUCT

So we shall be secure, and able to bestow "peace, freedom, and prosperity" on the smaller nations that are amenable to our beneficent will. Ultimately, of course, the UN will assume responsibility; but that is a long way off.

If this is not the dream which President Truman has cherished ever since he told the world on October 23, 1945, that the United States intended to maintain supremacy "on land, on sea, and in the air," it would be difficult to interpret his policies since that decisive speech. Power, dominant power, is obviously the goal of our "bipartisan" foreign policy, with peace as a desirable but incidental byproduct.

Remembering that President Truman and Dean Acheson, and even that mighty man, Secretary Forrestal, are our servants and not our masters, that they have no power except what the American people choose to lend them for their brief periods in office, let us scrutinize their program with the same care that we would give the work of any other employees, to see whether this is what we want.

NAVY PLAYED SUPERFICIAL PART IN 100-YEAR PAX BRITANNICA

The alluring hope of a Pax Americana, based on our military power, goes back to a misinterpretation of the Pax Britannica. Historians say that the British Navy is given too much credit.

Dr. Harry R. Rudin, professor of History at Yale University, in a recent address in New York pointed out that the relatively free movement of peoples and of goods that prevailed during that century of industrial revolution was mainly responsible for the long peace.

FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLES MADE PEACE POSSIBLE

On the one hand, there was Britain's free-trade policy which stimulated freedom of trade between nations. On the other hand, we had the two Americas wide open to immigrants. Sixty million people emigrated from Europe during this period, Dr. Rudin said, the majority going to North and South America.

Since "peaceful change" is the sine qua non of peace, it was these two safety valves that made this long era of peace possible. Our militarists, who imagine that American guns and American planes can give the world what British free trade and the hospitality of the Americas produced, are terribly wrong; and they are misleading the President.

Nor will the "bold" Fourth Point of the President's Inaugural Address, which looks to the exploitation of backward areas in Africa and elsewhere, furnish a sufficient outlet for the overflowing exports and populations of Europe, unless a fundamental change takes place in the prevailing attitudes of men. A world divided and subdivided by hates and fears will never achieve peace or freedom or prosperity.
BOOTS OF REVOLUTION UNTouched IN LATIN AMERICA

To illustrate how fundamental is the difference between what we are doing now and the building of a durable peace, suppose we take a look at Latin America. The conservative quarterly review, Foreign Affairs, for January 1948, contains an article entitled "Boots of Revolution in Latin America" by Donald Marquand Dozer, which pictures what the writer calls "factors making for a violent change."

"Almost everywhere opulent minorities flaunt their riches before a melancholy sea of illiterates." * * * It is difficult to name other areas of the world in which so few have so much and so many have so little. * * *

NATIONAL WEALTH IN FEW HANDS

"Approximately 90 percent of the national wealth of Colombia is controlled by 3 percent of the population. In Argentina, 15 families own one-tenth of the entire land area of Buenos Aires province; and the same families have landholdings throughout the nation amounting to 7,000,000 acres. In Chile 0.3 percent of the total number of landed proprietors own more than 52 percent of all the farm land of the nation. In Venezuela, fewer than 3 percent of the landed proprietors own more than 70 percent of the land.

"In Mexico, a similar concentration of landownership, under which in 1910 only 1 percent of the Mexican people owned 70 percent of the country's arable land, was a powerful factor in causing the epochal revolution which broke out in the year.

AGRICULTURAL LABORERS REVOLTING RISK ONLY A DAY'S POOR WAGE

"The overwhelming majority of agricultural laborers in the 20 countries of Latin America, all of them agricultural, live under oppressive conditions of peonage, sharecropping, and in some cases even unconditional slavery. As the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, said recently: 'There are millions of inhabitants without a home or an organized family life, without schools, without land, without even personal belongings. Their only risk in joining a revolutionary movement is the loss of the following day's wages.'"

GUNS FOR LATIN AMERICAN ARMIES NO CURE FOR HUNGRY BELLIES

President Truman is supporting the demand of our brass hats that we strengthen the military arm in each country of Latin America as a safeguard against the spread of communism! The alternative policy which we are advocating would be to include Latin America in the benefits of the Marshall plan, with a view to industrialization and the consequent raising of the living standards of the underprivileged masses.

The inevitable result of the brass-hat program has already been a succession of revolutions in country after country, with more to follow.

Don't forget that "communism thrives in misery and want." American guns only accentuate the misery and want.

DURABLE PEACE REQUIRES REMOVING CAUSES OF WAR

Just as our arming of Latin America instead of industrializing it is intensifying the pressure for revolutionary communism in 20 countries, so Morgenhauism in Germany and the Cairo agreement concerning Japan have laid the foundations for future wars in Europe and Asia. The silly notion that prewar nationalism in Germany was due to our failure to make the Germans realize that they had lost World War I and that the nationalism of Japan could be "contained" in future by driving the Japanese back to their four islands and disarming them there, without removing the economic causes of their Nationalist movements, is still cherished in influential quarters. They will be taught their mistake in due course of events unless we correct it.

JAPAN OVERFLOWED FOLLOWING EUROPE'S LEAD

Japan overflowed on to the continent of Asia because her four islands are incapable of giving a decent living to her growing population, which increases at the rate of 700,000 a year.
Her militarists unfortunately were able to point to the way Britain and other European countries had met the same problem by imperialist expansion and conquest. As our New England secretary, Mark Shaw, pointed out in Peace Action for September 1945, Great Britain had added to itself an area 140 times its own size; Belgium an area 80 times its size; Holland, one 80 times its size; France, 20 times its size; Portugal, 22 times its size. Was it strange that the militarists of Japan were able to convince the Japanese people that they should emulate the example of their "betters"?

**WORLD DOMINATION BRINGS HATE, RUIN, AND WAR**

What will be the fruits of a Pax Americana? Can we reasonably expect peace, freedom, and prosperity to grow on this tree?

The first fruits already are mutual recrimination, suspicion, and fear. Our Government is "setting the Scandinavian countries against one another." The Senate is "welching," "The French fight?"

How about freedom? The President has already given us fair warning that, to carry out his program, we must forfeit freedom and become what I would call a police state. UMT for our youth, price and wage controls for industry and labor, "work or fight" laws to be automatically imposed in the first emergency, and even the tapping of our telephone wires by any Government agency that wants to spy on their fellow citizens—this is not freedom. For free-born Americans it would be slavery.

But if the program brings peace? It will not bring peace. An armed truce between two blocs of nations is the opposite of peace. A state of increasing tension, which our Government is "setting the Scandinavian countries against one another." The Senate is "welching," "The French fight?"

**TO IGNORE SPIRITUAL FORCES IS UNREALISTIC, SAYS DE JOUVENEL**

A French writer, Bertrand de Jouvenel, in the European supplement to Human Events for January 19, 1949, after a brilliant diagnosis of the state of Europe today, concludes with certain reflections which we are not accustomed to expect from a popular French journalist:

"From country to country and within the same country, the continental Europeans detest each other for past evils, real or imaginary. To many Europeans, the German is an invader and the oppressor of yesterday. But also one’s own compatriot is possibly an ‘informer,’ either of the occupation period or of the epuration period, or again an informer in posse under the coming dispensation of communism or reaction."

After speaking feelingly of the King of England’s broadcast on Christmas Day and the “reign of love” in England which it revealed, M. de Jouvenel continues: “It is this reign of love which must be extended to all western Europe and which must prevail over the disruptive forces of hatred if the new political formation is to take shape. A constitutional body is futile if it has no soul.

“Whoever speaks of spiritual forces risks classification as unrealistic. But in truth nothing can be more unrealistic than to expect western union to be achieved by political means and under the motivation of a common interest. * * * Our interests rather oppose than unite us. We compete for the grant of American dollars; we compete for the procurement of raw materials.

**CONVERSION A TASK FOR THE CHURCHES**

"Nor will even the most vital interest unite us: that of common defense. For if Soviet attack is feared by a majority, it is hoped for by a strong minority in both France and Italy. And this minority sees national defense as a plot to destroy the fatherland of all workers. Reason by itself is powerless to overcome the resistance of prejudices and vested interests. There must be a sense of fellowship.

“The problem then is far less a problem in constitutional adjustment than it is a problem in conversion. And that seems to be a matter for the churches and the intellectuals. * * * A major failing of our times is an exaggerated belief in historical trends, which blinds us to the power of a good man."
THUMB-NAIL ANSWERS TO PACT SUPPORTERS

(By Frederick J. Libby)

The Government clique is literally "getting away with murder" in its arguments in behalf of what we regard as the crowning folly of this postwar period, the North Atlantic Military Alliance. President Truman himself is leading the pack with the calm assurance of "world peace within 2 years," as the fruit of the Truman doctrine and this its latest development. Frankly, this smacks too much of the assurance given the American people by President Roosevelt "again, again, and again" that our sons would "not be sent to fight on foreign soil."

Brief and concise answers to the specious arguments that are being circulated in support of the pact are here brought together. They are stated with "thumb-nail" brevity.

1. THAT ITS PURPOSE IS "PEACE"

When in history did an arms race bring peace? Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Britain's Foreign Secretary in the period when World War I was hatching, relates in his autobiography Twenty-Five Years (1892-1916), volume II, chapter XIX, page 53, how an armament race in search for security made World War I "inevitable."

"More than one thing may be said about the causes of the war, but the statement that comprises most truth is that militarism and the armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable." (Send to us for the full text of the quotation.)

2. THAT THE PACT WILL GIVE WESTERN EUROPE SECURITY FROM INVASION

No more than the Maginot Line gave France security! And for the next two years, not even that. What security can the piling up of armaments ever give from epidemics caused by bacteria or from atom bombs?

Which individual country will be made more secure by this intensification of Russia's insecurity? Will Norway sleep better nights if it harbors provocative American air bases always threatening Leningrad and Moscow? Will Germany be rearmed in contemptuous defiance of all our recent agreements? Or will the inhabitants of the Ruhr feel safer perhaps with the neutrality which Norway scorned?

Will the peoples of western Europe really expect to be protected from invasion by Russia and her satellites at every point in that long border that runs from Norway's North Cape to Italy's Achilles Heel, and is there some magic secret in a military alliance that will protect nations like France and Italy from Communists within?

3. THAT THE PACT ADDS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Every military alliance is a blank check given by each participant to each of the others, which can be cashed by any of them virtually at will. Twelve poverty-stricken, jealous nations, some of them, like France and Italy, with big Communist minorities in every phase of the national life including the Army, will get from us just such a blank check as Austria had from Germany in 1914, which a pugnacious minister cashed and started World War I. More recently, Joseph Beck, of Poland, had a similar blank check from Britain, under the supposed protection of which he defied Hitler over the disputed Polish Corridor and precipitated World War II.

This pact is a 20-year contract, which pretends to give stability to a period of unpredictable political and economic upheaval. No sane businessman would sign a private contract committing him for 5 years, pact or no pact. Who knows how many pig-headed warmongers are going to occupy responsible posts in the 12 governments that will have in their pockets a key to America's security?

No, If this pact is ratified by the Senate, you and I will not know security again.

4. THAT THE PACT IS "PURELY DEFENSIVE"

Will Russia know? And are we ourselves sure, after all the big talk that leaks out of the Pentagon as to the advantage that will come to the nation that strikes first?
Is there not grave danger that a minor incident on the long border between east and west would press the button that would wipe out our civilization?

The Kremlin has good reason to remember what we like to forget, that the United States, Britain, France, and Japan united in the invasion of Russia immediately after World War I. Would it be surprising if there lingers in Moscow enough suspicion of our noble motives in arming the east possibly to tempt the masters of Russia not to risk waiting too long?

5. THAT IT IS "ALL RUSSIA'S FAULT"

The prevailing propaganda line is that our misdeeds are "all Russia's fault." It is hard to see how Russia could have been more provocative than it has been, but our provocativeness has fully matched Russia's since the promulgation of the aggressive Truman doctrine.

The USSR and the United States of America are engaged in a furious game of power politics, with world domination for either capitalism or communism as the prize. The United States relies on its military and economic superiority. Russia relies on its fifth columns to win by exploiting the universal misery and want, now causing unrest in a score of countries and bound to become intense if we "go broke.

Our Government must accept major responsibility for the dangerous arms race of the past 4 years, since Russia is militarily weak. The strategy of the Truman doctrine and the Atlantic Pact plays into Russia's hands in the long run, since it increases the misery and want in which communism thrives.

6. THAT THERE IS "NO ALTERNATIVE"

We touch here upon the fatal weakness of a militarized government, such as ours is today. It thinks only in terms of force. "The Russians recognize nothing but force" is military thinking, and when it becomes the mainspring of our foreign policy, it leads automatically to an arms race and ultimately to war.

Our readers would gather from the newspapers the impression that Secretary Acheson determines our foreign policy and is responsible for the Atlantic Pact; but such is not the case. Our foreign policy is determined by the National Security Council, in which four secretaries from the Department of Defense heavily outnumber the Secretary of State.

TWO ALTERNATIVES

There are two alternative lines of policy, both of which avoid the provocative ness of the Atlantic Pact:

First, to halt the arms race and stabilize war expenditures by agreement at the present figure, enormousy excessive though it is.

Second, accept in substance Russia's proposal that we work out together a plan for world-wide reduction of armaments.

Simultaneously with the lessening of tension which either of these policies would bring about, the practicality of a Big Four conference to settle our most burning differences should be persistently explored.

Wouldn't it be risky, you ask, to trust Russia without a system of inspection? Yes; both countries would be taking risks. But it would not be so risky as the mounting tension occasioned by the present arms race. Both countries are now adding to the tension by maintaining expensive spy systems. Even these could serve the purpose of preventing false alarms by keeping their governments informed of the same facts which would be learned through inspectors.

7. THAT EUROPEAN RECOVERY REQUIRES INCREASED MILITARY PROTECTION

Protection from whom? Russia is not preparing to overrun western Europe. If it were, the Atlantic Pact would be 2 years too late. Winston Churchill says that America's possession of atom bomb has been the protection of western Europe since the war. Have Europe's military leaders lost their faith in it?

As for ourselves, we think the evidence is conclusive that the diversion of effort from reconstruction to armaments, from butter to guns, in Greece and Turkey and the Middle East and Latin America and China has been the fatal blunder of the Truman administration, a transfer which the pact is bound to accentuate. Our fundamental rivalry with Russia is in the economic field; and we can't afford to waste our limited resources in huge unproductive expenditures.

90614—49—pt. 2—7
If arming the North against the South would have strengthened the United States of America in its period of ideological conflict in the 1860's, then it can be argued that arming the west against the east now will strengthen the United Nations. It is preposterous.

9. THAT THE COST OF THE PACT IS LESS THAN THE COST OF ANOTHER WAR

Obviously. So what? The cost may be less than our annual bill for chewing gum, which is one of the Army's favorite comparisons. But since this military alliance against Russia makes war more probable and perhaps "inevitable," the comparison is without point.

The real question is whether our economy can carry the cost of arming western Europe in addition to our other burdens, a question which Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, President Truman's chief economic adviser, answers in the negative.

In an off-the-record speech in the Pentagon on April 6, Dr. Nourse declared to an audience of industrialists, publishers, labor leaders, and others that the arming of Europe, if undertaken, must be at the expense of our own military machine. More than that, since the present international tension may continue for a long period, Dr. Nourse cautioned his hearers against sacrificing our economic preparedness to the military and thereby giving "fuel to the development of a fifth column in our midst." France alone is said to want $15,000,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until tomorrow at 10:30 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 10:30 a. m., Friday, May 13, 1949.)
The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment on May 12, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Green, Vandenberg.
Also present: Senator Donnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Bernard Weitzer, national legislative representative, Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, before the first witness starts I want to clear up a matter in the record yesterday.

Dr. H. M. Griffith, the vice president of the National Economic Council, testified, saying that the National Economic Council opposes ratification of this treaty. He also presented the personnel of his council and its board of directors.

CHARLES G. DAWES’ POSITION ON ATLANTIC TREATY

At page 855 of the record Senator Donnell asked Dr. Griffith [reading]:

Is Mr. Charles G. Dawes, a member of the board of directors, former Vice President of the United States?

Dr. GRIFFITH. That is correct.

The implication of this context is obviously that former Vice President Dawes joins the National Economic Council in its opposition to the pact.

In order to be quite sure of Mr. Dawes’ attitude I wired him. His reply is as follows:

I favor the North Atlantic Pact.

Senator DONNELL. I may say no implication was made or intended to the effect indicated by Senator Vandenberg. I had no knowledge of the attitude indicated by Mr. Dawes, but I had in mind that inasmuch as he was listed as one of the members it was perfectly proper to inquire whether or not he was the former Vice President of the United States.

Senator VANDENBERG. There is nothing that I have said that carries any such implication. I am very glad the Senator from Missouri emphasized the name. I think the Senator from Missouri was totally justified in believing that when the witness presented his board of
directors and said that his organization was opposed to the pact. I think
the implication obviously was that General Dawes was opposed to the
pact, and my correction is not a correction of the Senator from
Missouri, but it is a correction of the implication left by the answer
of the witness.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you, Senator.

I may state, however, that while it is entirely possible that the con­
clusion might be drawn from the membership of an individual on
the board that he is for the statement presented by a member of a
particular organization, I think it does not follow that each individual
member of a board of directors may favor the action taken by the
council. It is entirely possible. There may be a difference of opinion
on the board. At any rate I do not in any sense mean to indicate
that I had any knowledge or thought as to what the position of Mr.
Dawes was. I did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think when a witness presents a state­
ment and says his organization is for it and gives the board of directors
that he ought to tell the committee those who are for it, in fairness,
and keep clear the issues? I am not attaching any blame to the Senator
from Missouri. It was perfectly plain that the introduction of the
board of directors and all of the implications of the statement indi­
cated that the members of the board were supporting his view, and
that he was representing the board in the view that he had expressed.
I think it is entirely proper for the Senator to introduce this state­
ment and make it clear. I am surprised at Dr. Griffith leaving a gap
that wide open in his testimony.

Senator DONNELL. I think Senator Vandenberg's action in com­
municating with Mr. Dawes is highly commendable, and I am very
glad he did so, for two reasons.

In the first place, I think the Senator is quite correct that an impli­
cation could be very well drawn, and I am not so sure, on reflecting
back into my own mental processes yesterday but what I probably did.
in my own mind at least, have presumptions placed that every member
of that board was favorable to the testimony given. I do not know
that I consciously analyzed the situation as fully perhaps as I am right
now. I remember that when I saw his name it instantly occurred to
me to inquire whether or not it was the former Vice President of the
United States.

May I conclude this statement by observing further, as I have in
substance already done this morning, that I do not think it would
have been proper for me or anyone else to make a statement or to
draw a conclusion as to the attitude of Mr. Dawes individually merely
because he was on that board, because he might have been upon the
minority or there might have been differentiations in his opinion.
Nevertheless I think the implications to which Senator Vandenberg
refers not only could be drawn but perhaps were in my own mind to
some extent, and I think his inquiry was proper.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there was a clear implication in the minds
of all the committee members present that Mr. Dawes opposed the
treaty. But that has been cleared up, and I am glad of it.

(The following statement was made by Senator Donnell at the
beginning of the afternoon session, with the request that it be placed
at the point of similar discussion in the record of the morning session.)
Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, may I have the indulgence of the committee for a very short statement?

Mr. Chairman, this morning Senator Vandenberg made reference to that portion of the testimony yesterday on page 1706, which related to Mr. Charles G. Dawes. I asked the question, "Is Mr. Charles G. Dawes, a member of the board of directors, a former Vice President of the United States?", to which Dr. Griffith replied, "That is correct."

I made a statement this morning, and in fact made two statements, Mr. Chairman. I have been somewhat disturbed over that matter, and I have been trying to think back as best I can what my own motives were in asking that question, and I considered it in my judgment, I think, as I now see it, that they were twofold, and I wanted them in the record: To ascertain if the Charles G. Dawes who is mentioned in the leaflet which Dr. Griffith presented is the Charles G. Dawes who was Vice President of the United States; second, that if he is the same, to emphasize by my question in the record the fact that he is a member of the board of directors of an organization whose representative opposes ratification of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I think that from that fact the inference could be reasonably drawn, and I think I was conscious of it at the time and am yet, that Mr. Dawes opposed ratification.

I do not, however, think, Mr. Chairman, that his membership on the Board is at all conclusive, and I think that Mr. Vandenberg has rendered a very real service in apprising Mr. Dawes of the question which was presented to him and presenting here his response.

I wanted this to go on the record, because I did not feel satisfied with the condition of the record this morning. I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator. That will be printed in the record.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF BERNARD WEITZER, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WEITZER. On behalf of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America I am happy to express our appreciation to your committee for the privilege of presenting the reasons for our support of the North Atlantic Pact which you are considering to protect peace and our security.

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING ATLANTIC TREATY

The authorization for our support is carried in a resolution voted unanimously by our national executive committee, March 27, 1949, at its meeting in Atlanta, Ga., as follows [reading]:

Whereas, as an earnest of its intention to preserve the peace of the world and the security of our own and other nations, who, twice in this century have been engulfed in war on a global scale, our Government has proposed the adoption of a measure to insure the mutual security of the governments and peoples of the North Atlantic region; and

Whereas, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, an organization of American veterans bound by its constitution to strive, in peace
and war, for the extension of freedom, justice, and political and human rights to all peoples everywhere, considers the proposed North Atlantic Pact to be essential to the maintenance of peace and security of the United States of America, and those freedom-loving nations who have signified a desire to Join with our Government in a mutual stand against any potential encroachment on the liberties all hold dear: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, on the basis of a unanimous recommendation by its national executive committee, to memorialize the Congress of the United States of America to vote its approval of the proposed North Atlantic Pact without delay, thereby reaffirming decisively our country's determination to challenge any possible threat to the peace of the world and the security and dignity of our own country and those who adhere to the principles we cherish.

As a veterans' organization, we believe that we have a special interest in peace. Our members have had first hand experience of war. Our membership includes veterans of wars dating back to the Spanish-American War. The last surviving member of our organization who served in the War Between the States, died only 4 years ago. Our members know war. They want no more wars, for themselves nor for their children. And above all, they desire that the destruction of war be kept away from our country.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE TREATY

The North Atlantic Pact now before you will serve as a deterrent to war and we believe that it will prevent war and safeguard our country from war. Essentially, it is a pact for peace, a pact in which twelve peace-loving nations have joined to deter aggression. And so long as an aggressor is deterred, there is opportunity to prevent war.

Had there been such a treaty as this, prior to World War I and World War II, it is likely that the aggressors would not have dared war, and if war had come, the aggressor's defeat could have been achieved in less time and a lower cost in lives and in treasure.

As its text shows clearly, this treaty to protect peace envisages military action only if an aggressor has already launched an armed attack upon one of its member nations. These nations, except militarily weak Portugal, are democracies and hence are incapable of preparing and launching an aggressive war. Such preparations, as Hitler demonstrated, now require a major national effort lasting many years and including rapidly expanding armaments and extensive restrictions and controls, guns instead of butter, and tanks instead of automobiles. Unlike dictatorships, democracies cannot take such steps without the consent of their peoples.

This pact is no synthetic, artificial structure, but a natural outgrowth of community interest and generated by a pressing need. It demonstrates that democratic peoples can learn the bitter lessons of history and can translate that knowledge into provident action. Neither World War I nor World War II would have engulfed humanity if the nations joining this pact had accepted similar agreements before 1914 and 1939. Those two wars began because the aggressors hoped that Great Britain would not actually risk her life to assist their initial victims and because they felt confident that the United States would remain neutral, even at a heavy sacrifice of our national security. Our country has paid a terrible price for its past unwillingness to cooperate effectively for peace and the consequent necessity to cooperate with all its power in war. The American people
are showing now, by the support of this pact, that they have too much sense to follow that road again.

NEED FOR TREATY

This treaty would not have been negotiated if there had not been a pressing need. That need has been made clear to all thinking people by the events of the last 4 years, by the actions and threats of Communist leaders, by the westward surge of Communist power toward the Atlantic, and by the fears which have gripped the western peoples most immediately exposed to attack.

Your committee saw the danger and foresaw the action necessary to meet it and to preserve peace when it approved the Vandenberg resolution, adopted by an overwhelming vote of the Senate on June 11, 1948. The North Atlantic Pact is the flowering of that resolution. Not only the American people but also the peoples of the entire North Atlantic area are indebted to this committee for that resolution—and I might add that the peoples of Soviet Russia and its satellites will some day realize that they, too, are indebted to your committee for this resolution.

It is no less clear now than it was last June that the peaceful peoples must stand together if they expect to deter aggression. We Americans learned in our earliest years as a nation that in union there is strength. Dictators know that as well as democracies. However extensive their ambitions may be, totalitarian leaders will draw back from war when they know that to embark upon it means to confront superior power and thereby incur not only defeat but their own destruction.

Without this pact, we and our children would face a much dimmer prospect of peace. Arm as we might, our country could not expect alone to attain a power position equivalent to that of the entire North Atlantic area. By a huge expansion of military appropriations which would place a crippling burden on our economic system, we might, perhaps, attain an equivalent position in terms of planes and divisions. But, even then, we could not achieve alone the strategic situation which the nations joining in this pact together possess, a situation which permits defense in depth, which provides a means of bringing our striking power to bear effectively against aggression, and which furnishes an assurance that if war should come, victory will be won more surely and more cheaply than it could be by the United States alone.

RISKS OF ACCEPTANCE

There may be some risk in accepting this pact, as there was a risk in adopting the Marshall plan and as there is a risk in any action taken in the dangerous world of today. But that risk is small indeed compared to the risk entailed in rejection of the pact. Even delay may be costly.

If, in spite of all, an aggressor should launch an armed attack and we deem it necessary to use "armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area," the joint action of the member nations will shield each member including ourselves. With the pact, we can feel more confident that we will never again have to face another D-day and the horrors of a Normandy Beach.
With or without the pact, our occupation responsibilities in Germany and the existence of American forces there would involve us automatically, for many years to come, in any war launched by an aggressor on western Europe. Without the pact, such a war would be much more likely. Failure to accept the pact now would actually promote such a war. If it developed while Western Europe was still weak and while our defense and theirs were not coordinated, Western Europe might be overrun by the aggressor. We know from very recent experience both the cost in blood and treasure of repairing such a catastrophe and the cost to our future security of failing to repair it. The pact is a direct and very practical means by which the peace-loving peoples of North America and western Europe can avert such dangers, disasters, and costs.

**COMPLEMENT TO ERP**

The North Atlantic Pact is an essential complement to the European recovery program, essential because recovery cannot proceed effectively in an atmosphere of lack of confidence and paralyzing fear. The European recovery program, for which we testified, has been in progress only one short year, but it has already more than paid its way. In that year the tide has turned throughout the western world. The Communist threat inside Western European countries has decisively decreased. These countries are already stronger, more stable and tempting targets for direct or indirect aggression. One striking result of this favorable tide is the lifting of the blockade of Berlin. In continuance of this favorable movement lies our best hope of attaining the peace sought by all men of good will. The ratification of the pact will give this favorable movement new and powerful impetus, will insure that it shall not be interrupted and reversed. Its continuance promises to bring us, within a relatively short time, relief from our present burden of armament costs as Western Europe becomes able, through our help, to make a greater contribution to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The pact will make more certain that the resources of Western Europe will be available for the defense of our security instead of having those resources at the disposal of an aggressor as they were during Hitler's war on the world. The national security is always of primary concern to veterans' organizations, not only our country's security today but also its security in the years to come. It seems evident that the North Atlantic Pact will be a powerful safeguard of the future security of the United States.

**INCREASING UNITED STATES SECURITY**

Our great cities are already exposed to one-way air attacks across the North Atlantic or Arctic Oceans. But few Americans lose sleep from fear of such attacks today because we all know they could inflict only limited destruction with bombs similar to those used in the recent war. Authoritative estimates, such as that of the President's Air Policy Commission of January 1948, indicate that a potential enemy may possess atomic bombs in quantity by perhaps as early as 1952.
that time comes, an enemy will be in a position to inflict exceedingly serious destruction upon our cities and industrial centers by surprise, one-way air attacks. If the United States had then to confront such an enemy alone, the ever-present threat to our principal eastern and middle western cities and to the millions of Americans who live in them would be one such as American families have never experienced before.

A government bent on world domination might then see an alluring road to its objective through the crippling, at a propitious moment, of vital elements of our war capacity by a sudden atomic attack. It would know, as we all know, that American industry proved to be a decisive factor in both World Wars. It might decide to concentrate on its most dangerous enemy first, as we decided in the recent war to defeat Germany first.

When this pact was ratified and the nations of the North Atlantic area stand together in collective defense, such an aggressor government will know that it cannot seek to cripple one of them without involvement in war with the others. It will know that it cannot concentrate upon one but must engage all. It will know that it cannot choose to fight only a long-range air war, but must also fight a short-range air war and a large-scale land war. Thus the North Atlantic Pact will serve directly to deter atomic aggression, to circumscribe the atomic menace which looms a few years ahead and to safeguard our cities and our country from atomic attack.

Although this pact is so clearly defensive, it is by no means a purely negative instrument. For its members and for the greater part of the world, its results promise to be both positive and constructive. For its members it will promote peace, security, confidence, hope and prosperity. Because of the place they hold and the role they play in our world today, these beneficial results will extend widely, across every ocean and to every continent.

For many centuries the signatories of this pact have between them played the foremost role in the creation of our modern civilization, in the development of free institutions, democratic government and modern industry, and in the elevation of the ethical and material standards of humanity. Today they possess most of the world's industry and conduct most of the world's international trade. This pact, by contributing so directly to the peace, security, and collective action of so important a part of the world, will give powerful impetus to the forward progress of all mankind. As Americans, we are proud that so provident and constructive a step had its beginning in your committee and has been initiated by our State Department.

The Chairman. The committee thanks you very much for your very able and splendid contribution. We want to thank also your organization, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States, for its strong position in this resolution.

Mr. Weitzer. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Green?

Senator Green. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?
SENATE RESOLUTION 239 AND THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Weitzer, I notice that you state that this committee saw the danger and foresaw the action necessary to meet it and to preserve peace when it approved the Vandenberg resolution adopted by an overwhelming vote of the Senate on June 11, 1948. You are not under the impression, are you, Mr. Weitzer, that by the adoption of that resolution in 1948 the Senate was binding itself in any sense to adopt or ratify a treaty of the type which is here presented to the Senate?

Mr. WEITZER. Oh, no. I think that Senator Vandenberg had in mind the possible need for regional agreements within the United Nations, and proposed at that time that such a thing might be possible, but I do not consider that there was any specific agreement that was in mind at that time—certainly not this one. I do not think that this particular agreement had yet come into anybody's mind.

Senator DONNELL. And do you not feel that the Senate should be in any sense estopped from acting negatively upon this treaty by reason of its approval of the Vandenberg resolution of last year?

Mr. WEITZER. Oh, no; not at all. I just simply considered that a very fine idea which Senator Vandenberg proposed to the Senate and the Senate adopted, but I don't believe that by adopting that resolution they in any way foreclosed the possibility of giving very careful consideration to any agreement which might be proposed that happened to be in harmony with the general tenor of that resolution.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

Senator DONNELL. Do you regard the implementation of this treaty by sending arms and other military material to Europe as essential to the success of the treaty?

Mr. WEITZER. I am not enough of a military man to say that it is essential, but it seems desirable to me that we should aid in the defense of those countries, and I think that the General Staff and the Senate, the law-making bodies of the country, will decide that. I will say it is desirable. I am not enough of a strategic expert to say that it is absolutely essential.

I think what is needed should be done. What is needed in order to assure the defense of those countries should be done. I think the lessons particularly of World War II, where Hitler was able to seize all of the resources of western Europe and control the coast of Europe, imposed on us a military burden that we ought to try to avoid if some other aggressor should similarly get the idea that he could conquer the world.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

Senator DONNELL. You say that the North Atlantic Pact now before this committee will serve as a deterrent to war, and that your organization believes that it will prevent war and safeguard our country from war. Is it your thought, Mr. Weitzer, that Russia will, if we may use that specific illustration, realize that it would be impossible if this treaty were effected or ratified, for it to successfully overrun Europe again?
Mr. Weitzer. I believe they will realize it. That does not mean that in some moment they might not make a mistake.

Senator Donnell. By the term "again" I am not meaning that Russia has overrun Europe before; but would they realize that Europe could not be successfully overrun?

Mr. Weitzer. I think the experience of the last war should certainly convince anybody that if the nations in this group were prepared to move jointly when such a danger threatened, and immediately when such danger threatened, the opportunity to overrun Europe would be a costly one to attempt to seize, and probably could be stopped.

Senator Donnell. You used the word "immediately." I take it that that same thought as to the importance of immediate action is illustrated by article 5 of the pact, which obligates the parties "forthwith" to take action therein mentioned.

Mr. Weitzer. That is exactly what I mean.

Senator Donnell. Do you consider, Mr. Weitzer, that Russia would be very seriously deterred from this war unless there were sufficient military force in Europe organized and ready to meet her which would repel her and make it impossible for her to overcome the country and simply leave the country subject to future slow liberation?

Mr. Weitzer. I do not think that she would be deterred today or tomorrow. But unless war should come within the next year or so, which I believe nobody expects, over a very short period of time the military strength of Europe would grow to a degree that Russia would recognize that with what we did in the Berlin airlift we could probably put enough force over there to halt a rapid march across Europe.

Senator Donnell. And the military strength of Europe, you think, would require implementation to some extent, at any rate, by this country, in order to bring it up to the point that it would act as an effective deterrent?

Mr. Weitzer. I think so, for the next 2 or 3 years, at any rate.

Senator Donnell. Very well. That is all.

The Chairman. Are you a lawyer, sir?

Mr. Weitzer. No, sir.

The Chairman. You talk like a lawyer, and talk like a good one.

Mr. Gilbert A. Harrison, national chairman, American Veterans Committee.

STATEMENT OF GILBERT A. HARRISON, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE

The Chairman. You are the regular representative of the American Veterans Committee, are you?

Mr. Harrison. Senator Connally, I am the national chairman of the American Veterans Committee, elected by the members of our organization at our last convention in November 1948.

The Chairman. Is that a paid position or just an honorary position?

Mr. Harrison. It is a full-time paid position for just 1 year. I am Gilbert Harrison, chairman of the American Veterans Committee, an organization consisting of members in every State who are honorably discharged veterans of the Second World War.
Delegates to the last annual convention of AVC, held in Cleveland, Ohio, during the last week of November 1948, approved the following statement:

American economic supplies are supporting the joint planning of western Europe in the organization for European recovery. American military supplies must be extended on lend-lease principles to support the joint planning of western Europe for its defense. The defense of western Europe should be further secured by American participation in a North Atlantic Alliance formed solely for defensive purposes and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter for regional agreements. America is already committed by resolution of the Senate to this program. It should be promptly implemented.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

The accent of AVC's statement is on defense. In our judgment that is the accent of the North Atlantic Defense Treaty. It follows the pattern developed by the 20 nations which signed a treaty of alliance in 1947 at Rio de Janeiro. The purpose and form of both these regional agreements are consistent with the United Nations Charter.

Article 5 of the pact establishes the solidarity of the Atlantic community and serves notice to any would-be aggressor that an armed attack on any one of the nations, regardless of its size, will be an attack upon all.

Article 4 serves warning that the signatory powers will consult and consider retaliatory action in the event that the Soviet Union interferes militarily in the internal affairs of the non-Communist west.

The pact, if implemented, can insure that nations which have aggressive Communist minorities shall not lack police power adequate to protect the security of the state against possible insurrection by that minority.

These provisions, and others in the pact, seem to us to be justifiable defense measures which have their risks but which are made necessary by recent world events. No effort to create security for the west is without risks.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY

The pact has been the object of severe criticism from several directions, and we are certain the committee has taken note of these criticisms.

It has been denounced as a "threat to peace." On the face of it, however, the pact is clearly a threat to the peace of no power except one which might foolishly initiate a war. The alliance, it is true, could become a "threat to peace" if the foreign affairs of the western nations were in the hands of men who had abandoned all hope of ever reaching working agreement with the U. S. S. R. or who were positively planning an aggressive war against the U. S. S. R. Such is not the case. This pact cannot be fairly described as a "threat to peace" unless one believes that any obstacle placed in the path of Russian ambition is a "threat to peace."

Skepticism of the North Atlantic alliance has also been expressed by our isolationists who seem to prefer that America once more defer until the last and worst possible minute whatever collective, defensive action may unhappily be required. Their view of security is as un-
realistic as that of a child who runs into a closet and locks himself in at the first warning of fire in the house.

AVC is further aware of the criticism of some who suggest that no effort to maintain peace can be successful, and that any expenditure which may be required to reinforce this pact is money thrown down the drain.

But an inspection of past policies and predictions of the Soviet leaders does not, to our way of thinking, present convincing evidence that the U.S.S.R. plans to impose its will on the world by force. It seems reasonable to assume that the Russian leaders will be especially reluctant to engage in military adventures if they know that any such action will lead to an immediate, head-on collision with a determined, coordinated and well-equipped opposition.

A final class of critics of this treaty believe that America’s only effective answer to the Communists lies in economic aid to impoverished people, and that a defensive military alliance is therefore unnecessary and even provocative.

NEED FOR SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE

This plausible but only partly accurate argument that economic stability is the only defense against Soviet communism leaves out of account the genuine political insecurity which is felt by nations of western Europe within striking distance of Russian military power. How can we expect the people of western Europe to work diligently on the establishment of stable economies, on the construction of factories, power plants, homes, if these same people are living in fear that an aggressive attack from the east may soon destroy all they have built?

The current policy of our country, including the pact now before you, expresses our recognition that non-Communist Europe must gain confidence that not only can it solve, with our aid, its economic problems, but that it need not relinquish its self-esteem and traditional independence because of its proximity to the Soviet Union.

If the North Atlantic Pact is ratified, the Congress will be asked to appropriate funds with which to bolster the military defenses of friendly nations. It may be that funds invested in this line of defense should enable us to reduce expenditures for defense on other fronts. But I wish to emphasize that if we withhold material aid which can be spared for a common-defense program, we shall have misled our friends. We cannot overlook the fact that the pact has already been approved by nations much closer to the Soviet Union than is the United States, and that their willingness to cooperate with us in the search for limited, defensive security involves as great, if not greater, risks for them as for us. These nations could not, as Mr. Marquis Childs has pointed out—

politically speaking, have taken those risks without the hope and even the assurance of tangible help toward greater security.

THE ATLANTIC PACT—NOT THE WHOLE ANSWER

In conclusion, AVC is not suggesting that the Atlantic Pact or the military aid program are America’s only, or even primary line of defense. The fundamental Communist, and therefore Russian, challenge to our security is still the Communist confidence that we are
incapable of maintaining high production and employment. If we fail to refute that theory, neither the Atlantic Pact nor any other military measure can give us security. Our strategy in foreign policy must therefore, and does, include an attack on those economic and social ills which weaken the resistance of free peoples and leave them helpless before the Communist onslaught.

We wish further to emphasize that the military-aid program like the pact, must not be permitted to serve aggressive purposes. We regard it as self-evident that no arms should be supplied any nation which uses its military power, as have the Dutch in Indonesia, to flaunt the authority of the United Nations and aspirations of colonial peoples for self-government.

In our opinion the Atlantic Pact buys time—time that can be used to renew our efforts to strengthen the United Nations and to work through that organization toward the ultimate security of some form of world government with limited but adequate power to prevent aggression. The pact may have the effect of increasing the real fears of the Soviet leaders, but such fears can and must be dissipated by policies which scrupulously avoid provocative actions which might finally persuade the Soviet that it is in immediate danger of attack.

The American Veterans Committee approves of this pact and would favorably regard additional measures by which our Nation can help establish a peace throughout the world from which freemen have nothing to fear.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you very much for your able and clear statement.

You refer to the fact that several of the other Nations have ratified the pact. You refer, no doubt, to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and France, particularly?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And possibly others?

Mr. Harrison. I believe it has been ratified by others.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so too.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?


SENATE RESOLUTION 239 THE TREATY

Mr. Harrison, in the resolution you set forth as having been adopted in the last week of November 1948, at your last annual convention, occur these two sentences [reading]:

The defense of western Europe should be further secured by American participation in a North Atlantic Alliance formed solely for defensive purposes, and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter for regional agreements. America is already committed by resolution of the Senate to this program.

What resolution is that to which you refer?

Mr. Harrison. I believe that the delegates were referring to the Vandenberg resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think this is an accurate statement in your testimony, that America is already committed by resolution of the
Senate to the program of participation in the North Atlantic alliance of the type mentioned in the resolution?

Mr. Harrison. There, Senator, it would be a question of personal judgment, and I am sure honest men would disagree. I believe most of the delegates there did assume that the implication of the Vandenberg resolution was in line with the North Atlantic Defense Treaty, but I am also sure that one could say, and defend the position, that the two are quite separate. In our judgment they are part of the same, however.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Harrison, I am not at all attempting to contradict the conclusion which you have drawn as to the Vandenberg resolution and what it says, but I do recall, if I might, to your attention, and ask whether or not I am correct in this, that the clear, unmistakable statement of Senator Vandenberg, particularly in response to inquiries by Senator Malone of Nevada at the time the resolution to which you refer was being debated, and then confirmed later on the 14th of February of this year by Senator Vandenberg, is to the effect that the Senate is entirely free to take any action it desires on this treaty, and is not in any sense committed by the resolution to the program of participation in the North Atlantic alliance. I am correctly stating it, am I not, so far as your best understanding goes?

Mr. Harrison. Of course, Senator, I am perfectly happy to take the interpretation of you men as to the relationship between these two things. My only thought would be that the very serious tragic needs of the present are their own justification for the North Atlantic Defense Treaty had there been no previous resolution.

Senator Donnell. If I have misstated Senator Vandenberg’s position I am sure he will correct me immediately on it, and I want him to do so. I pause for any correction that he may desire to make, if I have mistaken his position.

Senator Vandenberg. There isn’t any doubt about the position we all took in connection with the Senate resolution, which I am happy to say the Senator from Missouri supported.

Senator Donnell. I did.

Senator Vandenberg. It was the outlining of a philosophy of action, and it was clearly stated that every man who voted for it was completely free to decide for himself ultimately how he wanted to implement the philosophy of action.

Senator Donnell. And I take it that I am correct, am I not, Senator, in saying that America is not committed by the Vandenberg resolution to American participation in a North Atlantic alliance of the type mentioned in the resolution quoted by Mr. Harrison here this morning.

Senator Vandenberg. I think the witness himself answered that question with complete accuracy when he said that it is up to the conscience and judgment of each Senator, and any Senator who would think that he had no commitment is certainly entitled to stand upon that position.

Senator Donnell. If I am not mistaken, the Senator, in response to an inquiry from myself on the 14th of February, of this year, very clearly indicated that it is still his [Senator Vandenberg’s] opinion that no Senator is bound by the Vandenberg resolution to vote in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Senator Vandenberg. The Senator is entirely correct, and I depend, so far as I am concerned, upon the current wisdom of the Senate, and I still have hopes that my friend from Missouri, whose wisdom usually is so sound, will justify my expectations.

Senator Donnell. I thank the Senator for his pleasing statement.

The Chairman. May I say that I regard the Vandenberg resolution as a statement of principle, a statement of philosophy, which did not directly commit any Senator to any particular pact or any particular action, but that it was a clear implication that the Senate subscribed to the principles therein stated, and would bear those principles in mind in considering any future action.

Senator Donnell. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. I want to join in the hope of Senator Vandenberg that the Senator from Missouri will at last see the great white light and will yield to it and go along with us.

Senator Donnell. I appreciate very greatly the solitude and very kindly expressions of my good friends who have just spoken.

Comparison with Rio Treaty

Mr. Harrison, you mention just a little in your statement that the North Atlantic Defense Treaty follows the pattern developed by the 20 nations which signed a treaty of alliance in 1947 at Rio de Janeiro. Have you examined that treaty yourself?

Mr. Harrison. I have, sir, although I cannot claim to be an expert on that treaty.

Senator Donnell. Do you recall that article 20 of that treaty contains this language [reading]:

Decisions which require the application of measures specified in Article 8—and I may interpolate that among the measures specified in Article 8 is use of armed force—shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

Do you recall that provision in the Rio pact?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir.

Deterrent Effect of Treaty

Senator Donnell. Mr. Harrison, you speak about the importance, or rather the reasonableness, of assuming that the Russian leaders will be especially reluctant to engage in military adventures if they know that any such action will lead to an immediate head-on collision with a determined, coordinated and well-equipped opposition. Am I correct in understanding that the immediacy of the collision, the immediacy of the opposition, is a very important element in constituting a deterrent against Russia?

Mr. Harrison. I would say, sir, not only the immediacy, but the fact that the Russians would be under no illusions as to whether they could get away with something without going to war. They would be deterred. I think particularly by the knowledge that there is a commitment on the part of the west to resist, in a total way, any attempts once again to impose the will of any large nation on smaller nations.
Senator Donnell. I was particular directing your attention to the language in your statement, "immediate, head-on collision," et cetera, and you do regard the fact that Russia would realize that she would be confronted with an immediate collision is of very great importance in determining whether or not the North Atlantic Treaty would be a deterrent to war or would not.

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir. Then we would have to decide what we meant by the word "immediate." I mean very simply, if my understanding of this treaty is correct, the nations all have agreed to institute a collective defensive action. I, of course, understand that the declaration of war is, under our Constitution, a matter for determination by the Congress of the United States. However, I would assume that the Russians would understand that the Congress of the United States would have bound itself to make such a declaration in the event that the Soviet Union showed that it was engaged upon aggressive action.

Senator Donnell. In what manner would the Congress of the United States have so bound itself?

Mr. Harrison. I would have assumed, sir, through the alliance of the United States with the other nations of western Europe in this North Atlantic Defense Treaty.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE IN RATIFICATION

Senator Donnell. Do you understand that the House of Representatives takes any part in the ratification of this treaty?

Mr. Harrison. That is not my understanding, but they would, I assume, take part in any program of military aid.

Senator Donnell. This treaty, however, will go into effect so far as the United States is concerned upon its ratification by the Senate without any necessity of action by the House of Representatives. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Harrison. I believe so, sir. The same course would apply to implementing the treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro, and I have not heard any criticism of the agreement made there.

Senator Donnell. So by your statement that you understand Congress will have bound itself you do not mean that the House of Representatives will have taken any action in approving this treaty?

Mr. Harrison. Other than through the action taken in support of the military aid program, I would assume not.

Senator Donnell. I am not talking about the military aid program. I mean to say this, that this treaty will go into effect upon ratification by the Senate, will it not?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. And it is not necessary to secure any action by the House of Representatives in order that the treaty shall be ratified. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir. I would only say that I would also assume, as Senator Vandenberg did, not only the collective wisdom of the United States Senate in carrying out what had been established as American policy, but also the collective wisdom of the House of Representatives.

Senator Donnell. I am not sure that I understand quite the applicability of the remark that you have made, but the point I was ad-
addressing myself to was this: You said that you understood that Congress would have bound itself, and then you said in response to a further question that you understood that that binding would have been effected by the ratification of this treaty, and I was simply pointing out, as I understand you and I agree, that the ratification of the treaty is by one branch of the Congress and not the two branches of the Congress. I am correct in that, am I not?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir; but I have always assumed from the limited knowledge that I have of American Government that where the Constitution provides for American policy being determined by only one branch, that is American policy, not the policy of the United States Senate.

Senator Donnell. Perhaps you may have had that assumption but I return again to the question as to whether or not you understand that this treaty will go into effect when the Senate ratifies it.

Mr. Harrison. Yes, I do understand that, sir.

Senator Donnell. And you do not understand that the House of Representatives has any part or parcel in the ratification of the treaty. I am correct in my understanding?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, that is correct, according to our Constitution.

ACTION IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK

Senator Donnell. Mr. Harrison, in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it provides that each of the parties agrees that it will assist the party or parties attacked by taking forthwith such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.

May I present this illustration to you: Suppose that some military action of a very pronounced aggressive character should occur; we will say for illustration that Russia should send a large force, hundreds of thousands of men, into Norway, we will say, and at the time that that action was taken Congress was not in session, and it would take several days before the session should occur, and in the meantime the President would be advised by his military counselors that instant, or, to adopt the language in your statement here, immediate, action would be necessary and advisable in order to prevent Russia just pouring over Europe and taking charge of her within a few days. Is there any doubt in your mind as to the power of the President to go right ahead and take action before Congress comes back here?

Mr. Harrison. There is very great doubt in my mind, sir. I say once again that I am not an expert, but I believe it is correct to say that, regardless of any provisions of this treaty, the power to declare war is a congressional power. When I refer to immediate action I am talking about the reality that moves the Soviet Union, which is not a foolish, impulsive, or deluded nation, but which is very much impressed by power and the threat of power, and my point of view is that if the Germans had been aware in 1938 that there would be concerted military opposition to any move of aggression, I do not think the question of a day or two or three which it would take to assemble the Congress would have mattered. I am talking about delays and evasions that would convince the Soviet Union that it could have its way without war, and this says you cannot have your way without war. Aggression is banned.
Senator Donnell. Of course, the question that I asked you was simply as to whether there was any doubt as to the power of the President to go ahead under the circumstances I have cited without Congress coming together, and I understood you to say that there is serious doubt on that.

Mr. Harrison. There is serious doubt as to whether the President could declare war without the Congress, if that is what you mean.

Senator Donnell. I did not mean that, and that is not what I asked. Nobody can declare war except the Congress. That is the Constitution, and it is perfectly clear. The question I asked was whether there was any doubt in your mind as to the power of the President, under the circumstances I have cited, to take immediate action by sending bombers or whatever he thinks is necessary over there to repel that attack, or whether he has to wait until Congress comes together and debates the question as to whether war should be declared or declares war without any debate.

Mr. Harrison. That certainly is a subject to which I would not give a definitive answer, and I think the answer ought to come from those who would be responsible for making the decisions at the time.

Senator Donnell. Do you remember, Mr. Harrison, at the time of the First World War, as I recall it, Belgium was overrun within a very few days. Do you recall that?

Mr. Harrison. I do, sir.

Senator Donnell. And the atomic-bomb situation might, in your judgment, might it not, necessitate much more rapid, quick, and immediate action on the part of this country to prevent onslaught and overrunning of Europe than the situation which existed before the atomic bomb was in existence. Is that not correct?

Mr. Harrison. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir, for your very fine statement.

Mr. Elliott Newcomb, national executive director, AMVETS.

STATEMENT OF ELLIOTT H. NEWCOMB, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF AMVETS

Mr. Newcomb. AMVETS, American Veterans of World War II, was incorporated by act of Congress July 23, 1947, and since its earliest days has held that world peace is its first major objective.

At our national convention in 1948 the following resolution was passed [reading]:

Continued support of the Marshall plan and encourage the 16 Marshall-plan European nations which have completed an economic pact to join the military pact completed by five of these nations, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Britain, and France, and enter into a defensive military arrangement with the United States.
It was further resolved:

To encourage the development of regional pacts for collective self-defense in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter and as contemplated by the Vandenberg resolution adopted by the United States Senate on June 11, 1948 (S. Res. 259).

The above resolutions clearly indicate the wholehearted support by AMVETS of the North Atlantic Treaty and all that it envisions in the way of military commitments and provisions of arms to implement it.

It is also clear as we look back through the resolutions of AMVETS from its inception that the World War II veterans as represented by AMVETS realize it is their primary responsibility to make certain that their every effort shall be behind proposals to keep this country from repeating the mistakes of history and especially those following the First World War. History has demonstrated that the United States cannot ever again hope to remain aloof from the march of events in other lands; that when human freedom is threatened by aggressor nations, the United States must help defend those freedoms. For to paraphrase one of your greatest Americans, the world cannot exist half slave and half free.

It is therefore a matter only of practical reality to proclaim our support and commitments in advance. The nations bent on enslaving human beings may think twice before embarking on evil enterprises and will be under no illusions as to the position of the most powerful country in the world will take.

**NEED FOR PACIFIC PACT**

But the Atlantic pact is not enough. Once before we looked on Europe as our far most important problem and as a result suffered an almost disastrous attack in the Pacific. We had to spend billions of dollars and thousands of American lives as a terrible penalty for our lack of alertness and perspective in the Pacific.

The veterans of World War II who fought their way from Pearl Harbor across the jungle islands of the Pacific to the mainland of Japan, who saw their comrades fall at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal and in the Philippine Islands and myriads of other jungle hells cannot sit idly by and feel that Europe is our only problem.

The results of an intelligent aggressive foreign policy in Europe are clearly evident. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, the Atlantic Pact, these are already producing practical results. Communism has been contained in western Europe and is being forced even to retreat, as witness the collapse of the blockade of Berlin.

The same firm policy in the Pacific should logically produce similar constructive results.

AMVETS asks that the United States speedily enact and implement the North Atlantic Treaty and then proceed immediately to a Pacific pact with those nations of the Pacific who see the wisdom of mutual security pledges similar to those which have already made the North Atlantic Pact a new beacon of hope for permanent peace.

It may be true that countries in the Pacific have less to offer than European nations as a quid pro quo in the establishment of regional defense. But we also know that the march of the aggressor nation
across the Pacific must ultimately mean that the United States will have to fight again for freedom. Let these aggressors know in advance that we stand behind the rights of free nations everywhere in the world. The Pacific nations will be able to resist the pressures of slave ideologies with greater courage and knowledge under the circumstances no less in the Pacific than in the Atlantic.

As the red tide sweeps across China, as ships are fired on in the Yangtze River, as slavery once again begins to engulf a great nation, we must see the deadly parallel—the very same danger that only a few years ago ignited world conflict. Only by a consistent policy of firmness can we now contain the same threat.

We know that this hearing is held to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty, but we think that it should be discussed and ratified with full knowledge that it is only part of the problem, that a similar regional pact for collective self-defense must be applied to the rest of the free world in the Pacific before we can settle down safely to the long-range task of permanent peace.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, the committee does, for your statement.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused, and thank you, sir.

Is Mrs. Loretta Falsey, national legislative chairman of the American War Mothers, present?

MRS. FALSEY. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF MRS. LORETTA FALSEY, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN WAR MOTHERS

MRS. FALSEY. We are a group, a large group, chartered by Congress in, I believe, 1923, and the World War II mothers were admitted in 1943. I am their national legislative chairman. We are affiliated with the Women's Patriotic Conference for National Defense, which is composed of 35 organizations. Once a year we come to be instructed by the Congressmen and Senators, and what we say we get from you, in a way.

I was not going to make any statement on the North Atlantic Pact because its need seemed so self-evident, but when reading of the projected letting down of the Berlin blockade I felt that it was a maneuver, so to speak, to stymie or at least delete some of the force from the North Atlantic Pact. I was afraid they would get the American people saying, "Well, why bother? And it costs so much." And you know that can go on for days and days until the correct moment is past.

So, well vested with all my people's approval and carte blanche, I wish to put our organization on record as being for the North Atlantic Pact, wherever it may lead, through the wisdom of our Senate, and if any future events should bring it into Congress, where naturally they will have to raise the money for this, I assume that they will understand that they have our fullest support.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN WAR MOTHERS

I have 550 active legislative chairmen under me, and I have so much writing to do that I have it printed and put in a magazine which is mailed all over the United States.

We are much opposed to pressuring our good Congress. That we wish understood from the very start. We deplore the fact that the Nation's business has so much of a back-door gossipy thing to it. I think it depletes the dignity of our great national policies to have so much paltry, paltry opinion given. We have in our National Capital gentlemen from the States who come to Washington, and gradually they have become the core and heart of the entire universe, and with that in mind I come here with a great deal of temerity and a great deal of respect, and all of my women were thrilled to death to think that I could come to speak before men who are truly trying to lead the world out of its self-made morass. It actually has brought on its own troubles.

Just in little Connecticut we have among our membership two mothers with eight sons in the war. That will give you an idea of how our total suffering was. You go through travail of that kind, and, our country being nonempire building, we came home. The only way we can make our influence felt in the world is to make it like our country in this way: We are so strong nobody dares attack us, not through love of us, not through fear of us, perhaps, but because they think it is pretty unwise, and if we make it unwise to attack small nations in Europe, and later small nations in Asia, I think we will have succeeded and put an end to thousands of years of inevitable wars.

The American War Mothers are waiting to change their title from American War Mothers to something else, and we hope this is the very dawn of such a hope. We are definitely on record as being in favor of it, and we hope there won't be too much talk about how much it costs, because it cost American mothers more than anyone could compute.

I thank you gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you. Your organization is for the ratification of this treaty?

MRS. FALSEY. Definitely; unqualifiedly.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your very fine statement.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Alexander Stewart, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

STATEMENT OF MRS. ALEXANDER STEWART, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

MRS. STEWART. My name is Mrs. Alexander Stewart, 625 Fulerton Parkway, Chicago. During the congressional session I am in Washington most of the time following legislation of concern to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. As president of the United States section of the WILPF, I represent one national section of an international organization having sections and members in 34 countries. The Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom is one of the nongovernmental organizations given consultative status by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

In order that you may have in the record a statement of the principles and policies of this organization, I am including the statement adopted at our annual meeting in Hartford, Conn., just last week:

PRINCIPLES

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was founded in 1915 in the midst of the First World War. Jane Addams became its first international president and held this office until her death. Throughout its history the league has maintained a policy and a program consistent with the ideas of its founders. As an international and an interracial organization, its aim is to work by non-violent means for the establishment of those political, economic, and psychological conditions both at home and abroad which can assure peace and freedom.

POLICIES

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, United States Section, believes in the cooperation of all groups and nations in establishing just law and social well-being as a foundation for international and domestic peace. We believe that the most effective means by which free people may maintain free institutions lie in a positive program which will safeguard human rights, enrich human living, and utilize material resources for peace.

STATEMENT ON ATLANTIC PACT

As an international organization, many questions arise in our minds concerning the North Atlantic Pact. One of the important questions is, "What will be the effect of the pact on the United Nations?"

At the annual meeting we adopted this statement:[reading]:

Throughout the 34 years of its existence, the League has stood for a strong international organization, functioning democratically within the framework of law, as essential to lasting peace. We hope that the UN represents the first stage of such an organization and as such we give it our full support. We believe that the present weakness and inadequacy of the UN is due in large part to the climate of fear and distrust within which the member states struggled for their national objectives. The urgent task of today is to create the climate in which the states will cooperate to strengthen international organization, and as rapidly as possible, transform the UN into a world government.

Loyalty to the UN demands acceptance and implementation of its decisions by the member states. The record of the United States in this regard is unsatisfactory. The European recovery plan almost entirely by-passed the UN. The Atlantic pact is a further blow to the health of the UN, among other reasons because it deepens the chasm between the West and the Soviet Union and involves a return to balance of power, instead of collective security within the framework of the UN. Urgent attention should be given to securing UN control of arms and the provision of a UN constabulary, so that the community of nations may not become the victim of national policy.

The League has long supported international cooperation on both a regional and world basis, but has maintained that regional unions should be structures for economic and political cooperation and not military alliances. They should grow from within and not be imposed from without so that their character would represent the views and trends of their constituent parts. We therefore oppose
the direction that has been given to European Union by the North Atlantic Pact and the arms bill.

We believe that the North Atlantic Military Alliance will interfere with the constructive work of the European recovery program and by diverting men, money and strategic materials necessary for economic recovery to military purposes will delay, if not prevent entirely, the coming of the day when Europe will be back on its feet. Adequate reconstruction and rearmament cannot coexist. Judging by past experience, when the choice has to be made between allocating strategic materials to the necessities of daily life or to the needs of a military alliance, the latter stands to gain at the expense of the former.

MEETINGS OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE

It has been my privilege to go to Europe twice since the end of World War II, and it is my plan to go again this summer. Our organization held its tenth international congress in Luxemburg in 1946 when our women came together for the first time since 1937 when they met in Czechoslovakia. This was a deeply moving experience that I shall never forget, when these women met for the first time after 9 years during which many of them had been in prison or concentration camps, or had lost families and personal possessions. Still they met united by the theme, "A new world order." They were challenged by the words of our honorary international president, Emily Greene Balch, Nobel Peace Award winner, who said:

This is a new chapter in the history of the Women's International League in which the members would continue to be pioneers as long as it is needed.

Last summer in Geneva, I served as one of two consultative members of the United States section to the international executive committee. The opening day, July 7, 1948, I clipped from the front page of the Paris edition of the New York Herald-Tribune an article by James M. Minifie, the headline of which read, "Europeans, United States, confer on defense. Major move is due in the cold war. Western union meeting on Vandenberg plan studies America's role." The article went on to describe the Vandenberg resolution, which passed the Senate on June 11, 1948, and suggested the beginnings of what we now call the North Atlantic Pact. This article implied that we were asking: how many millions of dollars the Western Powers could put into the rearming of Europe, and were suggesting that the United States would foot the rest of the bill, which we are now discovering will probably be several billions of dollars over a period of years.

The last three sentences of the article are especially revealing:

This would almost certainly take into account the practicability of the United States furnishing lend-lease materials and equipment to build up the military forces of the western alliance. The proposals ultimately worked out are scheduled to come up for decision about the time the next Congress assembles in January. They would then be a leading "must" on the agenda of the Eighty-first Congress.

COST OF REARMAMENT

I wish I could adequately portray, Mr. Chairman, the reactions of the women present. Remember that many of them had spent months or years in prisons and concentration camps, or had lived under occupation. I believe our organization was the first organization to speak out against the North Atlantic Pact and the accompanying arms bill. They spoke as women to women out of the agony of seeing so much
of what they had struggled to try to create, a world of peace and freedom, destroyed. They said in effect to us, “Are you in America insane? Do you think that Europe can put millions of dollars (it is now estimated in billions) into a rearmament program when we still do not have enough to eat, when we still do not have sufficient clothing, and when we have not begun to rebuild the millions of homes, hospitals, schools, and churches destroyed during the war? We will go back to our governments and say to our leaders that together we must find another way to solve our problems. * * * We believe that this plan means increasing the tensions between east and west, and that it will weaken, if not ultimately destroy, the United Nations, because it means the arming of nations within the United Nations against each other. We believe that it was never the real intent of the UN Charter to arm nations within the UN against each other. We fear Russia, but we fear also the day when our manpower, money, and resources will be taken from the European recovery program, which has just begun, and used for rearmament.

Gentlemen, you have had many distinguished witnesses before your committee—high governmental officials, military experts, leaders of many organizations—whose experience has been wide and whose sincerity I do not question. Some of them have been proponents, some have been opponents, of the North Atlantic Pact. However, as I have listened to them or read their testimony, I have been struck again and again with the emphasis so often put upon military weapons, rather than the processes of reason, understanding, reconciliation, government, and law, as a solution, stop-gap or long-run.

**NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE TREATY**

The Chairman. If a nation makes an armed attack on you with arms in its hands, how are you going to argue with it?

Mrs. Stewart. We have a period now when there is choice, isn’t there, Senator? I think both Russia and we have a tendency to put all the blame on the other nation. Each side blames the other, and makes it more or less solely responsible. Actually there is an area of freedom of choice left to work for peace on other than military lines.

The Chairman. There is no freedom of choice if a nation has an armed attack made on it by another nation. What choice has it, except to lie down or fight? I am talking about the event of an armed attack, and that is the only time this treaty is effective, when a nation makes an armed attack on you. What are you going to do, say, “Wait a minute; I want to argue about this”?

Mrs. Stewart. I would have to answer in two ways: Whether you have attacks or not, if some major nation of Europe is involved, or our interests are involved in some country, whether it is a small or large country, the chances are that we would go to war. But we do have a period now.

The Chairman. We are meeting in Paris, trying to iron out these things in peace. They are going to meet on the 23d.

Mrs. Stewart. I approve of that. Our organization has always urged a meeting at top levels, and also at the nongovernmental level between people, leaders of church, education, farm, business, labor,
and so on. We would say that would be one of the processes to use now.

The CHAIRMAN. We are using it now.

Go ahead, though, with your statement. I won't interrupt you any more.

Mrs. STEWART. It seems to me that we have not squarely faced the fact that the primary problems of Europe are economic, psychological, and political, and not military. We are in danger of trying to solve them by military procedures which cannot answer the need.

UNIVERSAL DESIRE FOR PEACE

May I illustrate? I should like to record some of the reactions I got in Europe as I visited several countries and talked to the common people—teachers, ministers, youth, mothers, social workers, some officials—about their hopes and fears. I was as far east as Czechoslovakia both in 1946 and 1948.

As an ordained Methodist minister myself, I preached in several churches in Prague in 1946 and went back to visit them in August 1948. A meeting was arranged in Prague sponsored by the Methodist women, YWCA, and WILPF, so that my husband, the Reverend Alexander Stewart, and I might speak. We discussed our common problems and discovered many areas of agreement and understanding. Questions were asked and even criticisms offered of some of their Government's policies. But the significant thing was that there was an earnest expression of a desire to keep in touch with us. The chairman, who is a very responsible person and whom I have known for a number of years, said:

You are doves of peace who have come from America. We want you to carry back our good wishes to the American people. Tell them we believe we can find ways of working together. Tell them that we want to be a bridge of understanding between east and west, not a battleground for a futile war. Tell them we believe that, given time, and if Russia and the United States can ease the tension between themselves, we can work out satisfactory solutions to our problems.

As our international summer school in Schiers, Switzerland, where young people and adults joined to study the meaning of democracy, peace, and freedom, we had long and searching discussions. One day a Danish youth, distressed by the bitterness and futility of his World War II experiences, expressed his despair over creating the will to peace in the midst of so much preparation for war. Now I can bear disillusionment among adults, but it is hard to see it so wide-spread among youth—(though I can understand why it might be so). I appealed to these young people to go back to their countries and help create the conditions for peace and freedom, citing things we were doing in America. One of them questioned me by saying:

What does your former Governor Earle of Pennsylvania mean when he says, "What America should do is go around the world with an atom bomb in one hand and the Cross of Christ in the other and let the nations decide which they want dropped upon them?" We do not think that sounds very peace-loving.

I answered by telling them of the peace planes that flew from California to Washington, D. C., last year; the peace train that started from the west coast; the 138 ministers who dropped everything in response to a telegram to come to Washington to discuss alternatives
to war, and the many thousands of letters that Americans had written expressing faith in another way than war.

When I had finished a Czech youth rose and said:

You are a different voice of America than we have heard before. We did not know there were so many people in America who really cared.

There were numerous experiences like this—an outpouring of hopes and prayers for peace—while more billions of dollars are being spent on the latest weapons of mass destruction and more youth are put under arms in peacetime. Some place, some time the trend will have to be reversed. The greatest danger lies in preparing for war instead of preventing war.

In Germany I was asked to broadcast to the German women in German. The woman broadcaster was particularly interested in two things about me, which she said would mean much to the German women—the fact that I was an ordained minister, since women have very little or no official position in the German church, and the fact that my work in Washington had included active opposition to peacetime conscription. She said that the German women felt that universal military training had been one of their causes of wars and the growth of militarism. They would be glad to know that the American women were aware of this, and doing something politically to prevent a similar development in America.

A frequent question that has been asked in this country is, “Have pressures been put on other countries to join the North Atlantic Pact?”

**NORWEGIAN REACTION TO THE PACT**

Last January, our United States section received a cable during our midwinter national board meeting in Delaware, Ohio, saying:

Norwegian section Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom against Atlantic Pact. Will split Scandinavia and the Norwegian People. Means vote of censure to UN. Can you help us?

Norwegian Section, WILPF, Alnaes, Chairman.

We have been investigating this. I quote from a letter of April 19, 1949, from Oslo, signed by Aasny Alnaes, president of the Norwegian section of the WILPF, whom I met at Geneva [reading]:

Before joining the North Atlantic Pact the three Scandinavian countries tried to form an Inter-Scandinavian pact of defense, trying in this way to rest independent of the policy of the big powers. While this pact was discussed and tried to be established, we had news from America that the United States would not sell arms to Scandinavia if Scandinavia did not join the Atlantic Pact. This is what has officially been said of pressure here in Norway and, of course, we cannot give other facts than the official ones.

The Scandinavian people were led to believe that if they did not sign the pact, they would be ineligible to buy arms from the United States.

This is at least one example of the uneasiness of some non-Communist citizens in Norway who certainly got the impression through their own press that the United States would deny shipment of arms.

Some of you may have seen the article in the Washington Post during February 1949, announcing the fact that 1,500 Norwegians demonstrated outside the Parliament building against the signing of the pact. One of the banners carried read, “We want peace—not east, nor west.”
The leader, Miss Marie Lous-Mohr, our international co-chairman, is a school teacher who refused to follow Hitler’s edict and spent 28 months in Grini concentration camp, 18 of them in solitary confinement. I well remember her statement to us at Luxemburg in 1946, when without bitterness or resentment, she said, “We must not dwell upon the tragedies of the past. We must go back into the schoolroom and teach the children and youth to build bridges of understanding and friendship between the nations.”

I wish to have put in the record the report of the Norwegian section on the problem of Norway’s joining the Atlantic Union, contained in the international letter No. 18, mailed from the WILPF International Headquarters, 12 Rue du Vieux-College, Geneva, Switzerland.

(International letter No. 18, referred to, is as follows:)

[Continued in the international letter No. 18 mailed from Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom—International Headquarters, 12 Rue du Vieux-College, Geneva, Switzerland]

REPORT OF THE NORWEGIAN SECTION ON THE PROBLEM OF NORWAY’S JOINING THE ATLANTIC UNION

The preliminary work of our foreign department regarding the question if Norway would like to have an invitation from the United States of America to join the Atlantic union has been carried out very silently, and if you had been in Norway a month ago, you would have thought that everybody would like such an invitation. But when the question became acute through the conferences between the three Scandinavian countries, people began to realize at last what was going on.

Swedish newspapers then began to deal with the problem of a defensive Scandinavian union, and it turned out that the three Scandinavian countries had different opinions regarding the background and foundation of such a union. Sweden claimed that it ought to be a Scandinavian union without connection with the Atlantic union, while Norway was of the opinion that our geographical position (Norway lies on the Atlantic) made us dependent on the Atlantic union, and that we are especially dependent economically on the United States of America and cannot procure the necessary armaments without her help. Denmark is also, absolutely in favor of a Scandinavian union, and worked cleverly to bring together the different points of view of Sweden and Norway.

The Norwegian section of the WILPF sent a note of protest to the Government, pointing out that the people of Norway had not been thoroughly informed of the negotiations and claiming that, in accordance with the democratic principles of our Constitution, no decision regarding a military union with the United States of America can be taken before all its consequences were put before the Norwegian people to give them the opportunity of discussing the problem.

In order to give the people the chance of such a discussion, the Norwegian section of the league arranged a public meeting with a prominent speaker for the Atlantic Union and one against it. The meeting was crowded, and a number of prominent men spoke against the union, among them Professor Leiv Kreyberg (whose pamphlet, The Biological Effects of the Atomic Bomb, has been distributed by us). At the meeting one of the representatives of the Labor Party of our Parliament also spoke against the Atlantic union, and it turned out that there was a strong division of opinion among members of the Labor Party in the Parliament as well as in the Government itself. After the meeting, there was a vivid discussion in all the newspapers as well as everywhere where people met, and we were said to have “incised the abscess.”

To proclaim our own opinion, the Norwegian section, in cooperation with the Norwegian Peace Council and the Norwegian Group of War Resisters, called a meeting in one of the biggest picture houses at Oslo, where six prominent speakers spoke against the Atlantic union. It turned out to be of overwhelming interest, and, with more than 1,300 against 50 votes, the following resolution was passed:

“To the Norwegian Government:

“We oppose Norway’s joining the Atlantic union because we believe that this step will enlarge the cleft between east and west and thereby increase the dan-
ger of war; because it will split Scandinavia as well as the Norwegian people; because it will mean a vote of censure to the UN.

We are of the opinion that Scandinavia ought to lead the way to a peaceful settlement of all international conflicts and strengthen the United Nations.

"If the negotiations with our Scandinavian neighbors, on a common basis, should not be successful, the Norwegian people must be given time to get thorough information so that Norway's next move on her problem of defense will be well considered.

"We were informed that the most we could obtain at the moment was a delay of the decision concerning the Atlantic Union. The negotiations with our Scandinavian neighbors were not successful. Sweden was not involved in the Second World War and believes that, by leading a policy of strict neutrality, she will manage not to be involved in a contingent world war, and that joining the Atlantic Union will increase the danger that all Scandinavian countries may be involved in a contingent war.

"Fortunately, however, the Norwegian Government has decided that more background material must be procured before a decision can be taken on the question if Norway would like to have any invitation. Another very strong reason for not wishing to join the Union is that Norway has common borders with the U. S. S. R., and that we fear that such a Union will be a provocation against a country with which we have never been at war.

"As long as Norway has been a free country, our policy has been that of absolute neutrality. We were occupied in the Second World War because of miscalculations, and we cannot see why we should attach ourselves to any of the big powers now, thus giving up every chance of conducting our traditional policy of neutrality.

"These are some of the reasons for which we believe it will be a great danger for our country to join the Atlantic Union. Later, after the other aspects of the problem will have been dealt with, I will send you a supplementary report, but hope that this will give our coworkers a picture of what is going on in Norway. We would like our American and British sections to deal with the questions and to see how they can help us.

"AAGNEY ALNAES."

Mrs. STEWART. I would like to mention a sentence out of that statement. She comments on the preliminary work of their foreign department, somewhat like yours. She says [reading]:

The preliminary work of our foreign department regarding the question if Norway would like to have an invitation from the United States of America to join the Atlantic Union has been carried out very silently, and if you had been in Norway a month ago, you would have thought that everybody would like such an invitation. But when the question became acute through the conferences between the three Scandinavian countries, people began to realize at last what was going on.

Then, further along, she speaks about the meetings that she held, in which there was great division of opinion among members of the Labor Party in the Parliament as well as in the Government itself. After the meeting there was quite a bit of discussion in all the newspapers as well as everywhere where people met, and we were said, because the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom had initiated the discussion, to have "incised the abscess," which, I think, is a rather interesting term about a thing that means so much to people.

Then they held a meeting where about 1,400 people attended, and 1,300 voted against the pact and 50 for it, and they passed a resolution which I am putting in the record. The last sentence which I would like to quote from that is:

Another very strong reason for not wishing to join the union is that Norway has common borders with the U. S. S. R., and that we fear that such a union will be a provocation against a country with which we never have been at war.
Then I would like to comment on one other thing before closing, and that is, "What are some of the alternatives?" I did want to ask a question about the possibility of other regional pacts. I understand from this book here on the Atlantic Pact, by Hoskins, of the Legislative Reference Service, which contains a chapter on "Proposals for Other Regional Pacts," that if this pact is ratified it means further pacts.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nobody who has any authority to make any such statement as that.

Mrs. STEWART. This is from the Legislative Reference Service.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not matter who it is from. It has no authority to speak for the Congress, the Senate, the President, or anybody else.

Mrs. STEWART. I hope very much this is not going to be. I hope very much we will find a substitute for the present North Atlantic Pact, but it makes here a rather significant statement that I think American people ought to know, that a Mediterranean Pact at least is being discussed, as the North Atlantic Pact was discussed all fall.

The CHAIRMAN. We are discussing the North Atlantic Pact now. We are not going out talking about what we are going to do 10 years from now.

Mrs. STEWART. This sentence suggests:

Although a Mediterranean Pact has not passed beyond an early stage of discussion, it is difficult not to suppose that some kind of defensive arrangement for parts or all of that area will receive attention once the North Atlantic Pact is an accomplished fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the statement of one man, supposed to be in the Legislative Reference Service. He is not in the Congress of the United States, he is not the President of the United States, but, of course, you are glad to pick up any crumb there that would indicate opposition to the present Treaty. We are just discussing the North Atlantic Treaty now.

Mrs. STEWART. Of course, Senator, isn't the fact that 12 countries are included in the North Atlantic Pact going to raise questions of others asking to come in.

The CHAIRMAN. We always have questions raised.

Mrs. STEWART. Doesn't it also mean that there may be the danger of countries outside either the Russian orbit or ours wanting to get in?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course they may, but that does not mean we are going to do it.

IMPLEMENTATION WITH MILITARY MANPOWER

Mrs. STEWART. Then, another point I should like to take up for serious consideration is the implementation in terms of troops. There is still uneasiness and confusion as to what is implied. For example, Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, former military editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and one of Britain's outstanding military analysts, in the New Republic for February 14, 1949, after giving his estimate of the current military strength of the pact countries, comments on what he thinks the military defense of Europe would require. If the military strength of Europe is to be built up, according to Cap-
tain Hart, it would probably mean a considerable increase in the number of professional soldiers to form operational forces either by the incorporation of Germans into the western union forces or by stationing a large American land force permanently in Europe.

Would this also mean permanent peacetime conscription in the United States?

The WILPF, United States section and internationally, has opposed the conscription of youth and would call your attention to this added implication commonly overlooked by many.

**ALTERNATIVES TO THE PACT**

What are the alternatives to a North Atlantic Pact as a means of insuring peace?

We have already suggested a number of them as we have asked these questions. They may be summed up in these three points, similar to those in our letter to the New York Times, April 18, 1949, and the Washington Post, April 17, 1949.

1. The building up of democracy in our own country through adequate housing, educational facilities, health programs, and safeguards for civil rights and civil liberties at home and abroad.

   Justice William O. Douglas, of the United States Supreme Court, advocated the adoption of a “positive aggressive program” to fight Soviet ideology both domestically and abroad, the New York Times of February 19 reported. He said [reading]:

   The real victory over communism will be won in the factories and rice fields of the world, rather than on the battlefields. * * * The fight against communism depends for its ultimate success on the people of the various nations, not on their governments.

2. Using the United Nations and its specialized agencies, FAO, WHO, ITO, and so forth, to their fullest capacities for cooperative policies to meet the economic and cultural needs of the world’s peoples. If we were saved the expense of arming ourselves and our allies, we could afford to carry out the President’s proposal for building up the undeveloped areas of the world.

3. Supporting the United Nations Assembly’s proposal for world disarmament under international law.

We believe that such a positive program would bring hope and courage to the world’s people and usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for all the nations.

Gentlemen, your committee has a great responsibility, and you are conscientiously trying to find a solution to the world’s ills. As you weigh the best way to assure security, may you remember these “strugglers for peace”—the common people of the earth who will be the victims of atom bombs, germs that know no national boundaries, guided missiles, and stellar platforms. They are the ones about whom De Nouy wrote in Human Destiny. He has suggested that through the long steps upward from one-cell life to many-celled life, from plant to animal, from animal to consciousness, from consciousness to conscience—

the uncomfortable nonadapting ones that kept struggling and wouldn’t give up were the ones to effect the transitions.

The women of the WILPF are not alone in this struggle for peace. Countless other women and men share with them a determination to
find a way other than the North Atlantic Pact and its accompanying arms bill to meet present world needs.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your statement.

Senator Donnell? Senator DONNELL. No questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. You are excused.

Mrs. Jane Hayford, of WOMAN, Inc., of New York City.

How long is your statement, Mrs. Hayford?

Mrs. HAYFORD. About 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MRS. JANE L. HAYFORD, DIRECTOR OF WORLD ORGANIZATION OF MOTHERS OF ALL NATIONS

Mrs. HAYFORD. Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, my name is Jane L. Hayford. I am here to testify concerning the North Atlantic Treaty in behalf of WOMAN, Inc., the World Organization of Mothers of All Nations.

Our chairman, Miss Dorothy Thompson, would have been here to testify on our behalf, but since she is in Europe, I represent her.

SUPPORT FOR TREATY AND PROPER IMPLEMENTATION

The necessity for firm, swift, united action of peace-loving nations to avert the rising threat of a third world war justifies the North Atlantic Treaty. We, therefore, favor the ratification of the treaty, even though we are far from being satisfied with it. There exist certain grave deficiencies in the treaty, which we hope will be remedied when the treaty is implemented. The treaty as it now stands may lull the peoples of the United States and Europe into a false sense of security—an American Maginot line. Furthermore, by excluding Russia from the pact under any conditions, the treaty merely intensifies the atomic threat and the armament race, and fails to offer any solution other than eventual war.

Many feel that the North Atlantic Pact is but a military alliance and even a menace to peace. But after viewing the possibilities inherent in it we can see it if properly implemented, as the nucleus for the strengthening of the United Nations, setting up under article 51, not only a defense mechanism for collective security but also a world pact under a higher law—a law against aggression and preparation for aggression—with a court of justice to interpret that law, and a police force to enforce it.

Humanity has twice in this twentieth century attempted to establish an effective international authority to restrain aggressors. We must not repeat in the structure of the Atlantic Treaty the same tragic errors that wrecked the League of Nations and now paralyze the Security Council of the United Nations. For the third and perhaps last time there exists a historic opportunity for the United States to help create through the Atlantic Treaty now, and subsequently through a revised United Nations, an international organization of irresistible spiritual, legal, and military authority, so designed that no peaceful nation, whatever its form of government, may be excluded or threatened; and that no government may be permitted to arm for aggression or attack a divided world with any chance of success.
WOMAN, Inc., together with many other national organizations, feel that the answer to the weaknesses in the treaty does not lie in defeating the Atlantic Pact but in implementing it, and placing it on a more effective plane of action.

We therefore urge the Foreign Relations Committee to include in its report on the North Atlantic Treaty two recommendations dealing with its implementation:

First, we urge the establishment within the Atlantic Pact of a workable, veto-free defense authority with its own volunteer emergency force to meet armed attacks.

SECOND, WE URGE WOMAN'S DEMANDS FOR THE REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER SO AS TO MAKE THE ATLANTIC PACT UNNECESSARY, EVENTUALLY. THESE SPECIFIC DEMANDS ARE:

1. Abolition of the veto in defined matters of aggression.
2. Effective control of atomic energy and quota limitation of all other important weapons.
3. Establishment of an international police force. We prefer to revise the United Nations Charter, with Soviet Russia, if at all possible, in accordance with articles 108 and 109; but should Russia veto these proposals for revision of the United Nations Charter, then our Government should move under article 51 of the UN Charter to extend the Atlantic Pact into a world pact, under a proper world authority and backed up by an international police force.

I am a mother of four sons, and I feel that I express the opinion of the great majority of mothers, as well as of our organization, when I say that we want to make it clear to all that we are opposed just as emphatically to a preventative war against Soviet Russia as we are opposed to appeasement of Russia. The American nation must complete her historic mission, twice attempted, and we must help establish in our world of atomic power and power-politics chaos a world authority under a higher law, with a world judge and a world policeman against aggressors everywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. You are for the pact?

Mrs. HAYFORD. I am for the pact if implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand your statement.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. You are excused.

Mr. Charles LaFollette, representing Americans for Democratic Action.

You are a former Member of Congress, are you not?

Mr. LaFOLLETTE. I am a former Member of Congress from the Eighth District of Indiana.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to hear your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES M. LaFOLLETTE, REPRESENTING AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

Mr. LaFOLLETTE. My name is Charles M. LaFollette. I am here today to present the views of Americans for Democratic Action on the
North Atlantic Treaty. Americans for Democratic Action is, as you know, an independent political organization dedicated to the achievement of freedom and security for all people everywhere. We believe that all forms of totalitarianism, including communism, are incompatible with these objectives. We welcome as members of ADA only those whose devotion to the principles of freedom is unqualified.

ADA is aware of the great complexities of international problems and we do not claim that we have all the answers to the troubles which beset the world. We have given our full support to the major objectives of American foreign policy. But we have insisted that the strength and prosperity of this Nation must be used primarily to restore the social and economic health of a broken world. We have a deep faith in this country's capacity to reach and maintain a level of full employment and full production which will insure our continued prosperity and enable us to fulfill our promises and obligations to the democratic nations of the world. We recognize that the progress of economic and political aid to other nations cannot succeed except in an atmosphere of personal and national security; that we must help the world achieve freedom from fear.

SUPPORT FOR TREATY AND IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

We favor the ratification of the Atlantic Treaty. We believe that the pact must be given substance by the subsequent approval of military assistance. But we insist that economic and political aid must be our first line of defense.

Four months ago I resigned as United States military governor of Wuertemergen-Baden and I would like to first make a few observations on the question of the relationship of the North Atlantic Pact to Germany. Naturally the whole question of the pact arose after my return to this country. But I feel that I know the German people well enough to gage their reactions both in military and political terms. It is not too wild or reckless prediction on the outcome of the Paris Conference to assume that if there should emerge a united Germany Russia will not agree to including it within the Atlantic Treaty any more than we will permit it to join the Comintern. If a situation comparable to the status quo should emerge, western Germany would not want to join in the treaty, and there would be no valid reason why the treaty nations should want to include it.

It seems reasonable to believe that if Russia burst out of the Comintern, she would not make a piecemeal thrust to the Rhine, but would surge toward the North Sea or Atlantic coast. We—not Germany—would be her ultimate goal if the Soviet is bent on destruction of a conflicting ideology and our political and economic system. If we accept this premise, then the Atlantic Treaty, implemented to permit the signatories to increase their military strength, would be tremendously reassuring to the Germans. The pact, given substance by military aid, would force Russia to weigh carefully the great cost of a thrust beyond the Rhine. Why overrun Germany, which would neither provide protection from defensive counterbombing nor achieve a result valuable enough to justify a war?
EFFECT OF TREATY ON GERMANY

As to the political effect of the pact on Germany, if I were a German, I would consider that the ratification of the treaty not only gave me my greatest chance to win freedom from aggression, but that it proved that objective of the United States is to strengthen, preserve, and foster the development of democratic living.

The ratification of the treaty must be coupled, however, with an occupation policy which would convince the Germans that we mean what we say about democracy. We must prove to the Germans who want a democratic Germany that our policies are directed toward the development of equal economic as well as political opportunity. Our policy must not be so reactionary that it will either subject the German workers and farmers to domestic exploiters and totalitarians or drive them into the Communist camp in a desperate escape from such exploitation.

FREEDOM FROM AGGRESSION

Americans for Democratic Action believe that the North Atlantic Pact is a logical step in the development of a foreign policy which gradually took shape following President Roosevelt's famous speech of October 5, 1937, calling for a quarantine of the aggressors. In that speech President Roosevelt enunciated the right of all nations to freedom from external aggression.

I think it is proper to interpolate here that a position in favor of the ratification of the pact was taken by the convention of Americans for Democratic Action held on February 10 of this year. Of course, I don't make the implication that there might not be individual members who might not agree with the majority action, and for that reason I feel, as a member—I am not on any official body—that I am justified in saying that an overwhelming majority of the members are in favor of the position which you find in my statement.

Perhaps the first and certainly most dramatic postwar application of this principle of the right of all nations to freedom from external aggression was the undertaking of the Greek-aid program. We regret that the objectives of that program have not been fully achieved, primarily because we have failed to press for essential reforms in Greece. But ADA is fully in accord with the principle of freedom from aggression of which that policy is based and with the European recovery program, which has supplied the basis for a positive and constructive United States policy in Europe.

We have vigorously opposed those who have challenged every step in the development of United States foreign policy as a deliberate attempt to bypass the United Nations. We believe that the American people have come to recognize the source of this kind of inspired criticism. It is also interesting to note that the chief critics of the pact are the extremists of the left and right—the natural enemies of democracy in all parts of the world.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE PACT

On the other hand, the pact is strongly supported by the vast majority of the trade-unions and non-Communist liberals. It is our conviction that the pact is in clear conformity with both the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter.
It must be recognized that the United Nations is not a global panacea. Its limitations must be faced. Most of the UN’s difficulties can obviously be traced to the intransigent position of the Soviet within the UN councils. While our essential policies must not be directed against the Soviet Union or any other nation, we cannot ignore the realities and the tragic consequences of Soviet intransigence.

The United Nations has not succeeded in establishing an international police force nor has it been able to set up a system of international control of atomic energy.

Meanwhile, as we have advanced the frontiers of democracy through economic and political cooperation with western Europe, we are forced to the conclusion that freedom and economic stability are difficult if not impossible of attainment in countries which live in constant fear of Soviet aggression.

It is clear that the policies of the United States have produced some change in Soviet policy. Whether it is a change in policy or simply a shift in strategy remains to be seen. But the United States can be justly proud of its patient pursuit of a formula to ease grave international tensions and lessen the terrible hostilities which threaten to divide the world into two sullen camps. To abandon our policies is unthinkable. We cannot even afford to temporize. Any serious indication of uncertainty and indecisiveness on the part of Congress would reassure the U.S.S.R., aggravate the fears of the western European nations and seriously jeopardize our economic aid program.

No one could deny that these policies involve a calculated risk on the part of the United States. But the risk of allowing a demoralized Europe to shift for itself is too frightening to contemplate.

It is our firm belief that American foreign policies, including the pact and the proposed military assistance program are defensive in character. They will allay the fear of aggression in large areas of the world and thus make way for the expansion of democracy and economic freedom. They will mitigate the genuine fears of many nations that they may again have to rely on “liberation” by a distant and unpredictable ally.

Under no circumstances, however, should the emphasis be shifted from the economic to the military phase of the assistance program. Any reduction in the level of economic aid would undermine the faith of millions of Americans in the democratic and peaceful objectives of United States foreign policy. It would strengthen the Soviet’s propaganda weapons in Europe and alienate our democratic allies throughout the world.

We earnestly hope that the Congress will act promptly and decisively to carry out the twin objectives of economic security and political freedom by speedy ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. If there are any questions, I will be glad to answer them.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. I have no questions, except I think Mr. LaFollette’s testimony is very important because of his official connection with internal German affairs.

Mr. LAFOLETTE. I believe that I have accurately reflected what I think the Germans who want peace, and there are many of them, would feel, that they would feel greatly more secure by the ratification of this pact than they do at the present time.
The Chairman. From your experience and service in Germany, do you or do you not believe that the bulk of the German people prefer democracy rather than communism or totalitarianism under Russian direction?

Mr. LaFollette. Of that I don’t think there is any question. I think that they need some help in operating the democratic system, but I certainly do not believe that they want communism, and I think I am positive in saying that there is a great fear of Soviet aggression, at least in western Germany.

The Chairman. We thank you very much, Mr. LaFollette, for your fine statement. We are delighted to have it.

Senator Donnell?

No Reliance on Liberation

Senator Donnell. One question, Mr. LaFollette. I notice in the part of this statement which was placed into the record but not read this language, and I want to ask you just what you mean by it. You say:

It is our firm belief that American foreign policies, including the pact and the proposed military-assistance program, are defensive in character. They will allay the fear of aggression in large areas of the world, and thus make way for the extension of democracy and economic freedom.

Then this sentence immediately following is the particular one to which I direct your attention in connection with the others:

They will mitigate the genuine fears of many nations that they may again have to rely on “liberation” by a distant and unpredictable ally.

Will you tell us just what the “liberation” is to which you refer there?

Mr. LaFollette. Yes. I think, Senator Donnell, that in the first World War, in which I served as a sergeant of infantry, certainly the Belgians and northern France were liberated, which means that they were fought over twice. In this war all of France, certainly north of Cotentin Peninsula, Belgium, and Holland were liberated. They were fought over twice.

What I think these countries are interested in, and what I think my country is interested in, is that you don’t have to land on coasts in another war and go through the process not only of fighting back from a coast, but the unfortunate psychological condition of destroying some of the property of your allies.

Senator Donnell. May I inquire, Mr. LaFollette, whether or not you had in mind the fact, and by the use of the term “liberation” that in the last World War there was a conquest by our enemy of certain territory, and thereafter there was a slow process of liberation of that territory, and that you think that the people in Europe have a fear of having a duplication of that at the instance of another enemy, but nevertheless a taking of possession of these European nations and the only relief to come therefrom being the slow process of a slow liberation of the territory so encompassed by the aggression? Is that the thought you have in mind?

Mr. LaFollette. I think you have expressed quite well the thought that I had in mind.
AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO DETER

Senator DONNELL. If that be correct, and I thought that that was what you meant, it is important, therefore, is it not, that in the implementation of this treaty there be provided sufficient power of material, or whatever the military power may be, to prevent Russia from actually taking possession of these countries of Europe, thereby avoiding the necessity of an occupation by the enemy and a slow process of liberation? Am I not correct in that conclusion?

Mr. LAFOLETTE. Senator, of course, the question of the implementation is to follow subsequently, but I must say that from reading of the experiences of nations in having pacts I am convinced that a pact without adequate implementation is not a deterrent against an aggressor. I think an inadequately implemented pact might lead an aggressor to think that we did not mean it, and the whole purpose, I feel, of these nations who want to live free is to serve notice to the world and to that specific section of the world which might feel that it needed to extend its philosophy all over the world that you cannot do this without great cost. And to that extent, from having in my youth possibly been a believer in what is generally felt to be pacifism of a description, I have reached the opinion that a pact of democratic nations which must go to their people before they can act, defensive in character, adequately implemented, is a deterrent against war and a step toward peace.

Senator DONNELL. And the fears of many nations which you mention as in your opinion to be mitigated by the American foreign policies would be all the more mitigated if those nations knew that such implementation was going to be put behind the pact as would make it impossible for Russia ever to take possession of Europe again.

Mr. LAFOLETTE. Yes, and that includes the people of the United States. In other words, as I look at this pact, this is a security pact for the United States just as much as it is for Norway or any nation in it, because twice in my lifetime when a nation has surged to the coast of the North Sea and the Atlantic coast the American people have become aware of the fact that that was a threat to their continued existence as a free nation.

Therefore, it seems to me that we are acting in our own interest, and it is only in our own interest that the American people, the President of the United States, the Senate of the United States, act. When we put ourselves in the position by evidencing our capacity to work with other nations, nations 'way back beyond the coast, we have an effective deterrent against war. That is my feeling, and I believe that it is the feeling of the organization for which I speak. I must put that limitation on it, because now to some extent I am answering you with my own personal feeling.

Senator DONNELL. I understand, yes. Then the fears of the European nations who are signatories to this pact would not be mitigated to the utmost unless the implementation of this treaty were sufficiently great to make it perfectly clear to Russia that Russia could not successfully plan to overrun Europe. I am correct in that, am I not?

Mr. LAFOLETTE. Yes, Senator. I am a good enough lawyer and so are you; I will answer your question categorically and say "Yes," and then I will ask you to let me add again that I think the interests
of the American people and the fears of the American people are equally at stake, otherwise I would not be in favor of this pact.

Senator DONNELL. I did not mean at all to obscure the American part of it.

Mr. LAFOLLETTE. I did not want to avoid your question, either.

Senator DONNELL. And you have answered it very frankly and very interestingly. But the point I was getting at—I was leaving out for a moment, America. I have no objection to your including it. I want to get perfectly clear your meaning.

MITIGATING FEARS OF ANOTHER LIBERATION

You say these American foreign policies will mitigate the general fears of many nations that they may again have to rely on "liberation" by a distant and unpredictable ally, and the point I am getting at, and limiting it for the moment solely to the European signatories, is—did I understand you to say that the fears of those European nations will be mitigated in that they think that this pact is going to provide adequate implementation of the pact to prevent Russia from overrunning Europe and thus leaving Europe crushed and only to be resuscitated by the slow process of liberation? I am correct in my understanding?

Mr. LAFOLLETTE. I think you have made one of the finest arguments in support of ratifying the pact that I have heard, Senator. Yes, you are absolutely right, and with what you have said I agree.

May I add, too, that I think what we are trying to do is to give the peoples of Europe, and as I have said in my prepared statement, the peoples of Germany, a chance to revive their economies and their ways of living so that they can become democratically strong. As you have assurance and as there is mutual working together, then you can devote your attention to the development of your economy and the development of the democratic method of operating without looking over your shoulder all the time for fear that someone is going to grab you.

That is why I think the pact is an excellent element of an American foreign policy as presently enunciated, with which I am in complete agreement.

Senator DONNELL. How long were you United States military governor of Württemberg-Baden?

Mr. LAFOLLETTE. Senator, I answer that by saying that I went there December 15, 1947, and left Germany on January 19, 1949.

Senator DONNELL. You were there 13 months?

Mr. LAFOLLETTE. Yes, sir, until January 19, 1949. Prior to that I had been a prosecutor in charge of prosecuting the members of the German Nazi Ministry of Justice in a proceeding at Nuernberg for 1 year.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. LaFollette, have you looked into the question as to what quantity of either matériel or manpower or both would be necessary in order to make it impossible for Russia reasonably to expect that she would be able to overrun Europe in the event of a quick attack by her? I mean, how much implementation opposed to her would be necessary to make it reasonably certain that she couldn't get across and take possession of Europe?
Mr. LaFollette. No, Senator, I have not. I think that is a matter that lies strictly within the competence and the intelligence and knowledge of military people.

May I put one limitation upon that question, if you do not mind?

Senator Donnell. Certainly.

Mr. LaFollette. I do not believe that we have to use the word "impossible" to make this pact, implemented, serve as a dead line. I think we have to make it strong enough that there is a strong probability of extreme cost.

Senator Donnell. Very well.

Mr. LaFollette. Then, on that basis, you measure what would be necessary.

AMOUNT NEEDED TO INSURE EUROPE AGAINST ATTACK

Senator Donnell. I think your amendment is proper, and I am glad you submitted that amendment to my statement. You have not, I assume, given attention to the question as to how much either in men or matériel would be necessary to make it reasonably probable that Russia would not be able, by a quick attack, to overrun Europe?

Mr. LaFollette. I know very well that I would be attempting to put myself in the position of an expert witness who is not an expert, and any lawyer would take me apart if I did. No, that is not within my province, Senator.

Senator Donnell. It is a fact, is it not, that in France there is very much less manpower than there was at the beginning of the World War, or at least there was much less manpower at the conclusion of World War II than there was at the beginning?

Mr. LaFollette. Yes. The French lost people through slave labor, largely, and they also lost people through the last phase of the war, largely through slave labor and through run-down health conditions which prevailed under German occupation.

Senator Donnell. And in order to rebuild France properly it would be advisable to make available as large a proportion of its manpower as possible in the actual building up and rehabilitation physically of France. That is correct, is it?

Mr. LaFollette. I think that is correct.

Senator Donnell. Do you have any information as to the probable number of soldiers that France or any other one of the 11 other signatories than ourselves could put into the field without unduly interfering with the rehabilitation process to which I refer?

Mr. LaFollette. No. I have no knowledge of that, nor do I have enough expert knowledge of the modern methods of war to know whether or not with modern instrumentalities of war you necessarily have to have the same manpower that you did under conditions of war previous to this time. You see, without knowing anything about new weapons, I naturally do not know how many men would be needed.

THE ADA

Senator Donnell. I can well see the correctness of your viewpoint. I wanted to ask this question, and I hope you take no offense at it. That is about the organization of Americans for Democratic Action. You refer to it as an independent political organization. Is it inde-
dependent in the sense that it is nonpolitical? You said “independent political organization.” Just what do you mean by the term “independent?”

Mr. LaFollette. I would use the term “independent” in saying that it does not file candidates for office, it has no precinct committeemen—at least that is what we have in Indiana—it has no county chairman, it doesn’t run any candidates as such. That is what I mean. It certainly is interested in political results.

Senator Donnell. Do its members consist entirely of members of any one political party, or are the members scattered among various political parties?

Mr. LaFollette. Senator, I would say that they are scattered. To be perfectly honest with you, I would say probably that when its members vote, more of them vote the Democratic ticket than any other. I think that is a fair statement.

PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL OR EXPULSION

Senator Donnell. I notice that you say that all forms of totalitarianism, including communism, are incompatible with these objectives, which I understand to be the achievement of freedom and security for all people everywhere. Have you observed anything in the North Atlantic Treaty which would permit either the voluntary withdrawal or expulsion of any member of the community created by the treaty in the event that member should become a Communist nation?

Mr. LaFollette. I am not sure, but I think that practical considerations can always vary the provisions of this instrument. If you have reference to something that you believe precludes it, I must confess that on the specific language I am sure you are much better informed than I.

Senator Donnell. I don’t know about that. You may be far better informed than I am. I assume, Mr. LaFollette, that you have studied it, and I am confident you have. Have you observed anything in the North Atlantic Treaty that provides that if a nation shall become a Communist nation it shall be subject to expulsion by reason of its becoming a Communist nation?

Mr. LaFollette. If you will give me just a second, is there not a provision that says that the parties to the treaty shall consult if there is danger to their internal stability or their internal form of government? With that consultation I think you could reach almost any conclusion, or the signatories could, if that danger became an existing fact.

Senator Donnell. I do not recall the provision. There is article 4 [reading]:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Mr. LaFollette. I think that is pretty broad language. “Political independence” to me is pretty broad language.

Senator Donnell. This pact is created and brought into existence by 12 signatories, is it not?

Mr. LaFollette. Yes.
Senator Donnell. And no signatory could be expelled from it without the consent of all signatories, including itself. That is correct, is it not, Mr. LaFollette?

Mr. LaFollette. I am not so sure that I would say that, in view of the language with reference to political independence and security, a signatory whose territorial integrity and whose political independence had become so jeopardized that it might not exist in the form in which the signatories found it, could not at least no longer be considered an operating member of the operating pact. That is a little involved, but I think you know what I mean.

In other words, I think it would be a threat to the integrity of other signatories if the political independence of one was seriously affected so that it was felt that its political actions were determined by the considerations of a power from beyond its national borders.

Senator Donnell. I will put it this way, Mr. LaFollette: There is nothing which expressly says that a nation may be expelled for any reason?

Mr. LaFollette. There is nothing which expressly spells it, but I do not believe there is anything which necessarily precludes the possibility within the framework of the pact.

Senator Donnell. Is there anything in the pact which tells how many nations must act in order to expel, and in the absence of such a provision would it not be necessary that all the signatories, including the prospective expellee, must consent?

Mr. LaFollette. No, I do not think that is correct. Senator, because in any group very often a person or a body or a group of members who might be expelled for no longer being in conformance with the purpose of the organization would not often consent to being expelled. In other words, they do not consent to it ever. If I were thrown out of the Masons I would not consent to it.

Senator Donnell. At any rate there is a provision, however, as you doubtless realize and know, of course, in the particular organization to which you refer for expulsion of members and everybody who goes in knows he goes in subject to that, but waiving the argument, and I am not criticizing you for presenting your views, there is nothing which expressly says that a nation may be expelled for any cause whatsoever. I think I am correct about that.

Mr. LaFollette. I think that is correct. May I add that I think there is nothing which expressly includes it or implicitly excludes such a possibility.

Senator Donnell. If you were drawing a contract as a lawyer and desired to provide some means by which one of the parties to the contract might be excluded from participation in it, you would say so expressly, would you not?

Mr. LaFollette. Senator, I wonder if you would relieve me from answering that, because I might be passing judgment upon other lawyers. I would not like to do that.

Senator Donnell. Very well.

The Chairman. Thank you for a very interesting and able statement.

Ex-Congressman Hamilton Fish, of New York. State to the reporter your name and background.

Mr. Fish. The name is Hamilton Fish, former Member of Congress.
The Chairman. How many years were you in the House?

Mr. Fish. Twenty-four years. I served with you on the Foreign Affairs Committee a quarter of a century ago.

The Chairman. That is right. I remember very much our association in the House. I am glad to have you, Mr. Fish.

STATEMENT OF HAMILTON FISH, FORMER MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Fish. At the outset of my remarks I desire to congratulate Chairman Connally for urging full diplomatic recognition of Spain. It is sheer humbug to maintain an American Ambassador in Soviet Russia, the most despotic and tyrannical government in the world, and refuse to send an Ambassador to Spain. What is sauce for the Communist goose is sauce for the Fascist gander.

COMMUNIST AIDS

While Soviet Russia is conducting a cold war against us and directing Communist expansion by propaganda, revolution, and force throughout the world, Spain is on our side against world communism, the most evil force in the world, but is powerless to promote fascism beyond its borders. How long will Secretary Acheson abuse the patience of American people in relation to China and Spain? As a result of our ignoring of the Wedemeyer report, China is being turned over to world communism and the rest of Asia will fall like a ripe plum. Within the next decade, when Soviet Russia is prepared and has a supply of atomic bombs, I predict she will start world war III and unleash at least 2,000,000 highly trained Chinese soldiers for marching on the Suez Canal and to fight at Armageddon.

Attainment of world-wide communism is still the guiding policy of the Red plotters in the Kremlin at Moscow. The Communists throughout the world have never deviated since 1917 from their fundamental objective of achieving world communism. I quote from the Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which is the bible of all Communists:

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. In all these movements they bring to the front as the leading question in each case the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time. The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to gain.

To that extent, Mr. Chairman, I admire the Communists, because throughout the world, whether in London, New York, Peking, or Tokyo, all have the same ultimate objective of bringing about world communism.

The Chairman. You do not mean you favor it; you just admire their methods.

Mr. Fish. I admire them because they are consistent in their views, far more consistent than Republicans or Democrats, who make their party platform one day and begin to forget about it the next. Every Communist believes in world revolution.
I have not the time, Mr. Chairman, to go back to the report we made when I was chairman of the Committee of the House to Investigate Communist Activities and Propaganda. When Mr. Foster, then and still the head of the Communist Party, came before the committee he admitted, under affirmation or oath, that they were in favor of bringing about a world revolution, that they were against our republican form of government, that they did not believe in the American flag but in the Red flag, and owed allegiance to Soviet Russia. It is all in this book that I gave you.

**Support for Treaty**

As a former noninterventionist leader in Congress, and proud of it, as every statement we made has been vindicated many times over by time and events, I find myself now compelled, because of the rotten mess we made of it in Europe, to urge our joining the North Atlantic Pact as a peace measure in defense of the remaining free nations of Europe against Soviet aggression. Having helped to wreck and ruin half of Europe we have certain moral obligations toward the nations of western Europe, including Germany, not to let them be swallowed up, one by one, by the Red octopus. In addition, our own national security is involved with half the world already Communist. The place to stop the Red armies is at the Elbe, and the time is now.

May I pause and digress there a moment to commend and congratulate Senator Vandenberg for calling attention not only of Europe but of the American people to the fact that this pact does not necessarily safeguard a large part of western Europe from invasion. It is merely a step in the direction that makes defense possible, and probably for the time being will hold up any attack by the Russian armed forces.

Of course, although the Elbe may be, theoretically speaking, our first line of defense, everyone knows that the Russian Army, if they did attack, would easily overrun the Elbe and our first line of defense would be the Rhine, and they might overrun that. That is why I am so anxious that we should fully recognize Spain and have Spain, if not a partner, a direct partner, in the pact, at least a silent partner or one that would cooperate with the purpose of the pact, because the Pyrenees may become a rampart of defense for western Europe.

**Need for a Defensive Alliance**

Let us be realistic. The Russian Communists have a definite plan of world revolution and armed conquest. The Marshall plan is merely a relief and rehabilitation measure providing food and equipment for Europe. It does not protect or defend the free nations of Europe from Soviet armed aggression. It does not achieve security for ourselves or any other nation. Without the North Atlantic Pact our foreign policy is useless and bankrupt. The Marshall plan is nothing more than a paper blockade, and as ineffectual. It opposes a paper curtain to the iron curtain. It neither frightens, checks, or defeats the Communist plan for world revolution and conquest. It assumes that the nations receiving our gifts automatically increase production and acquire moral force and physical power to withstand the Communist colossus. No nation ever restored its stability and strength by
depending on hand-outs. That can only be done by their own efforts and hard labor, but even then a defensive military alliance is necessary.

The Communist aggressors fear and respect only military might. We should immediately reinforce the Marshall plan by the North Atlantic Pact together with Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark. If I had my way Spain would also be included. It should be done at once so that there will be no doubt of a united military front of all western democratic nations and Spain to oppose and crush any attempt by the Red army to violate the peace of the world by overt acts of aggression in western Europe.

It is their only chance to survive as free nations. Let them pool their armed forces under a single general staff. Once the Communist armies overrun Europe it will be the end of Great Britain and we will be confronted with an aggressive and militant Communist Europe and Asia. The Communists are on the march in China and will probably overrun all Asia within a few years. Our own security is at stake and if western Europe falls before the Communist juggernaut it would leave us almost alone to wage an irrepressible war with world communism.

Although world communism is on the march in Europe and Asia, it is not inevitable here. It must be stopped. It can be stopped.

The words of Patrick Henry apply today more than ever before:

Is life so dear, or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?

That is the paramount issue in the world today—freedom and democracy, or slavery and totalitarianism. There can be no compromise between freedom and slavery, nor between communism and fascism.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity of coming here.

Mr. Fish. I am happy to be here, and want to congratulate you on your efforts to put through the North Atlantic Pact as a peace measure in defense of the security of the free nations of Europe and of our own national security.

Mr. Fish. If I might add, Senator, not many years ago, when I was chairman of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities, and even since then, I was denounced as a Red baiter and a witch burner for telling the American people that the Communists throughout the world had only one main objective, and that was world revolution by conquest, beginning with propaganda and following it up by infiltration and then force and violence, and that has been true since 1917. It was true in 1930 and it is just as true today.

Mr. Fish. If I might add, Senator, not many years ago, when I was chairman of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities, and even since then, I was denounced as a Red baiter and a witch burner for telling the American people that the Communists throughout the world had only one main objective, and that was world revolution by conquest, beginning with propaganda and following it up by infiltration and then force and violence, and that has been true since 1917. It was true in 1930 and it is just as true today.

Mr. Fish. If I might add, Senator, not many years ago, when I was chairman of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities, and even since then, I was denounced as a Red baiter and a witch burner for telling the American people that the Communists throughout the world had only one main objective, and that was world revolution by conquest, beginning with propaganda and following it up by infiltration and then force and violence, and that has been true since 1917. It was true in 1930 and it is just as true today.

Mr. Fish. If I might add, Senator, not many years ago, when I was chairman of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities, and even since then, I was denounced as a Red baiter and a witch burner for telling the American people that the Communists throughout the world had only one main objective, and that was world revolution by conquest, beginning with propaganda and following it up by infiltration and then force and violence, and that has been true since 1917. It was true in 1930 and it is just as true today.

Mr. Ely Culbertson is not here. We will pass him over.

Mr. Donald Henderson, of the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers Union.
Mr. Henderson. My name is Donald Henderson. I am president of the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers Union of America, CIO.

My union has sent me here to oppose ratification of the Atlantic Pact, on the ground that it is a real and present threat to peace.

The Chairman. You say your union has sent you here. You don't mean the whole membership. You mean the officials?

Mr. Henderson. The international executive board of my union.

The Chairman. Go ahead. All right.

Mr. Henderson. I have just returned from a month in France, where I had the honor of being one of the principal spokesmen for the American delegation at the World Peace Congress in Paris.

While in France I met with workers and spoke at several workers' meetings. These were rank-and-file workers, not just top leaders.

Without exception they told me that the working people of Europe will not take part in an aggressive war. They will not tamely submit to such a war being fought on their soil. They will resist such a war with every means at their command, including armed resistance.

PROVOCATIVENESS OF THE TREATY

A war of aggression will bring civil war to all Europe.

This was told me by workers regardless of their political party affiliation or lack of it. It is not a question of sympathy to the Soviet Union or the United States. The people of Europe have had enough war and they are determined to have no more.

The Atlantic Pact, especially when backed up by a huge program of arming reactionary European governments, will go far toward bringing about such a war. This is the opinion of not only the workers of Europe, but also of the plain rank and file of worker in America, too. Unfortunately, he is seldom consulted on such matters, but the American worker, like his European brother, does not want war, and fears that war will come.

The people of Europe see the world already divided into two armed camps. They feel convinced that certain groups in the United States are trying to provoke a war. They do not think that the Soviet Union is trying to provoke war. They feel that the common people of all Europe and of the United States as well want peace.

The Atlantic Pact does nothing to break down this feeling. On the contrary, the signing of the pact and its consideration now by the Senate confirm the feeling that war is the objective of certain very powerful groups in this country and their junior partners in certain governments abroad.

I speak at some length about these matters because I learned them at first hand during my stay in France. My stay was admittedly brief, but I did have the advantage of meeting and talking with the rank and file while I was there. This is an advantage not always granted to officials of the State Department.

The newspapers here did not adequately report the meeting of the World Peace Congress. They did not mention a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions which I also attended.
The Chairman. The CIO is now not a member of and is opposed to the WFTU.

Mr. Henderson. That is not quite correct. It is true the secretary-treasurer of the CIO, James Carey, walked out of the last executive meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions, but there has been no official action taken by the CIO on its affiliation as yet. That matter has to come before the next national executive committee meeting of the CIO, which takes place next week. At that meeting next week I assume they will take some action one way or the other.

These two meetings I attended represented a total of something like one billion people, including some of the peoples of Asia and Africa.

WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE IN PARIS

For the first time in my life, I saw 500,000 people trying to get into a mass meeting of the Peace Congress. The stadium in Paris held 130,000. The half million came from all over Europe, by train, by bus, by caravans, on bicycles, on foot.

Every one of these people came to Paris with one single thought in mind—there shall be no more war. They will resist a new war with every means at their command, up to and including civil war.

Any responsible observer will tell you the same facts. They will also tell you that the Atlantic Pact is regarded by all except certain government officials in western Europe as the most serious danger to peace since Munich.

So much for the feeling of the people in Europe. Since this is an international treaty affecting them as well as ourselves, we cannot afford to shrug it off as the opinion of foreigners.

I told the World Peace Congress delegates that, I quote, "The American workers will not easily be drawn into an aggressive war." That statement stands. Yet there is great fear in our country, fear that war may come despite protestations of our policymakers.

The present easing-off in the German situation has dispelled some of that fear, but it remains.

ATLANTIC PACT AND FEAR OF WAR

The Atlantic Pact nourishes that fear. The huge arms outlay that follows such a pact adds not only to the fear but also to a sense of insecurity, especially among workers.

They see the staggering cost of arming Europe taken out of their living standards. They see the cost of living shooting up as more and more of the Nation's wealth is put into arms production. They see the inevitable result of posing guns against butter—which is plenty of guns, little butter and the probability of a big depression, if not a shooting war, as the inevitable result.

REARMAMENT AND DEPRESSION

The American people are sincerely devoted to peace. This is not just a matter of sentiment. It is a matter of hard, pork chop facts. War brings not only death and destruction to its immediate victims. It also brings unemployment, lower living standards, chaos and misery to the common people. No one can be deceived for very long by the
false prosperity that comes from war preparations—particularly when 5,000,000 workers are already unemployed and millions more are living in the shadow of the lay-off.

The Atlantic Pact is a long step in the preparation of war. Followed by huge arms building, it is a long step toward a new and far more frightful depression in this country. Pyramiding arms instead of producing goods and services for people destroys real wealth, does not create it. We cannot throw away our cake and have it too.

Yet this is what follows the Atlantic Pact, as surely as night follows day. The Atlantic Pact comes in the door and social security, housing, health, education, and all the social needs of this country, fly out the window. It is even said now that we cannot raise minimum wages to $1 or 75 cents an hour because "defense" needs are too great. The infamous Taft-Hartley law stays on the books, but the Atlantic Pact, we are told, must be passed in a hurry.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE PACT

The American people had great hopes for the United Nations. They still do—but the Atlantic Pact will knock the props out from under those hopes if it goes into effect.

The United Nations was built on the unanimity of its strongest members. This is the real meaning of the Security Council with the so-called veto power—that the strongest powers must be in agreement in their relations with each other if peace is to be maintained. You cannot have it any other way, and the United States insisted on the unanimity rule just as strongly as any of the other leading powers did.

But the Atlantic Pact destroys the unanimity rule. Under its provisions every signatory power is forced to go automatically if war breaks out.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to challenge that statement, "automatically," that is not true.

Mr. HENDERSON. I refer you to article 5. There is no choice, either for us or any other nation that signs and ratifies this pact.

The Security Council, where the owners meet as equals, is destroyed by the Atlantic Pact. The Atlantic Pact wipes out the only safeguards that the nations have been able to erect for peace.

The claim that the Atlantic Pact is merely a "regional" agreement is absurd. You cannot make an agreement that covers the whole western Europe and takes arms and military bases right up to the borders of another powerful state and still insist that it is merely regional.

Let me use an illustration from collective bargaining. When a union wants to make an agreement, looking to industrial peace, we try to deal with the employers alike. We don't single out certain ones and say arbitrarily you are good and we'll team up with you against the other fellows. We try to get them all in under the same terms. We try to get and we give equality of treatment for all. Any other approach brings cut-throat competition and conflict, just as the Atlantic Pact now threatens to do.

The way to peace is still through agreement, not through splitting the world into two armed camps. The current agreement on the Berlin situation and the coming meeting of the foreign ministers proves once again that the agreement road is still open.
The common people on all sides of the Atlantic, the Pacific and the other oceans, want peace and they will have peace.

PROGRAM FOR PEACE

To insure peace, we urge this action now before it is too late:
1. Scrap the Atlantic Pact.
2. Let the great powers meet as equals with the guns checked outside the door.
3. Above all, turn to the United Nations, where the powers can meet as equals and where decisions on the future of the world are taken in unanimity and full agreement by all.

This is the way of peace. The way of the Atlantic Pact and the inevitable pyramiding of arms upon an exhausted world is the way to war.

The Chairman. You went to France as a delegate to this World Peace Conference?

Mr. Henderson. As a representative of my union yes, sir.

The Chairman. You say that a lot of Frenchmen and others that were there said that they would not fight if they had a war, is that right?

Mr. Henderson. Against an aggressive war.

The Chairman. An aggressive war? There is no aggression in this treaty. It is a peace treaty.

Mr. Henderson. I think, Senator, an aggressive war, in the mind of the ordinary person in Europe, is a war in which they are in the middle, in which two great powers are having a fight and they are the ones that are the victims.

AGGRESSIVE WAR AND THE TREATY

The Chairman. All right. Do you agree with the views of those Frenchmen and others that have made public statements that in the event of a war against Russia they would not fight?

Mr. Henderson. If I were a European—

The Chairman. I am not asking you that. You are an American. Do you agree with the view that if we had a war with Russia you would not fight?

Mr. Henderson. If we conducted an aggressive war against any nation I would not fight.

The Chairman. This is not an aggressive war. This is purely a defensive pact. Have you read it?

Mr. Henderson. I have read it. I do not claim to be an expert on it.

The Chairman. Are you a lawyer?

Mr. Henderson. I am not a lawyer, I am a labor leader. I think it leads toward war.

The Chairman. Suppose Russia should make an armed attack on one of the signatories to this treaty, and as a result of that the United States got into the war. Would you support that war?

Mr. Henderson. I think an armed attack by any nation on another nation deserves resistance.

The Chairman. You would fight?
Mr. Henderson. An armed attack on any nation by another nation.

The Chairman. That is what the purpose of this treaty is, to prevent that.

Mr. Henderson. I do not understand it that way.

The Chairman. I do.

Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg. I simply wanted to ask Mr. Henderson whether he disagrees with the statement issued on March 20, 1949, by the CIO, which asserts “The Congress of Industrial Organizations is happy to go on record as a firm supporter of the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Pact”?

Mr. Henderson. I disagree. The international executive board of my union disagrees, and the international convention of my union disagrees.

POSITION OF NATIONAL CIO

Senator Vandenberg. What is the relationship which would indicate the relative importance to be assessed to your statement and the statement made by the CIO on March 20? Would you give me an indication of which one carries how much weight?

Mr. Henderson. Their statement represents a majority of the national opinion and policy of the national CIO. I express the opinion of my own international union, which has certain autonomous and democratic rights to determine our own policy as laid down by our membership and our constitution. I am not speaking for the national CIO; I am speaking for my own international union.

Senator Vandenberg. What puzzles me is that when the national CIO speaks, for whom does it speak?

Mr. Henderson. It speaks for those who, on such questions, agree with its policy. The majority of my membership, and I believe the great majority of the rank and file in most unions, do not agree with that expression of policy. We have a disagreement, which is not very rare.

Senator Vandenberg. Did your union support the Marshall plan?

Mr. Henderson. It did not, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. Did the tenth constitutional convention of the CIO in Portland in November 1948, approve the Marshall plan by resolution?

Mr. Henderson. It did, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. Does that have any authority?

Mr. Henderson. That expresses, therefore, the national policy of the CIO; that is correct.

Senator Vandenberg. That is all.

The Chairman. Your union is sort of an outlaw union.

Mr. Henderson. Our union is a minority as compared to this question.

The Chairman. You recognize Mr. Carey as being an official of the CIO?

Mr. Henderson. He is the secretary-treasurer of the national CIO, with whom I disagree most violently on many issues.

The Chairman. I am speaking about this issue. I would not want to get out into the wide fields of your disagreements.
Mr. Carey appeared in support of this treaty.
So you do not represent the views of the national; you are just representing the views of your one union?
Mr. Henderson. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Although the rest of the CIO are permitted to go their own way?
Mr. Henderson. I think I represent the views, not officially, of many rank and file members of many of the CIO unions.
The Chairman. There is no doubt about that.
Senator Donnell?
Senator Donnell. Mr. Henderson, how many members does the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers Union of America, CIO possess?
Mr. Henderson. Approximately 100,000.
Senator Donnell. That is all.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until a quarter of three this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:45 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS
(The committee reconvened at 2:45 p.m., at the expiration of the recess.)
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Richie, Moorestown, N. J. All right, Mr. Richie. Give the stenographer your name, your residence, your business, and so on.

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. RICHIE, MOORESTOWN, N. J., FORMER STAFF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE IN POLAND AND FINLAND

Mr. Richie. My name is David Richie of Moorestown, N. J., a lifelong resident of Moorestown, N. J. My occupation is as secretary of the Friends Social Order Committee of Philadelphia, but I do not represent them here. I am speaking entirely as an individual.
The Chairman. Staff representative? What do you mean by that?
Mr. Richie. I was sent by them as their representative. I would like to make that clear. That I have spent 22 months in Europe as the staff representative of the American Friends Committee during the past 3 years, but I am not on their staff at this time.
The Chairman. All right. Go ahead with your statement.
Mr. Richie. I want to first say that I am really very grateful for this opportunity and really proud to live in a country where the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is willing to listen to an absolutely unknown individual simply because he has a concern. That is something to be proud of and I am glad. I have been in Poland and Germany and other countries where that would never be, and young people feel pretty helpless to say what they think is important.
I have had this privilege of participating in international voluntary work camps along with young people of many different nationalities, of many different ideologies—Communists, Socialists, ex-Nazis, ex-Fascists, and all shades in between—and have found that in working together with them for the purpose of helping other people, we have
found a great unity, a sense of recognition that there is only one real enemy of all of us: War, reliance upon threat of war, of armaments, and that we must all strive to work toward peace. I am completely convinced that there is a better way than reliance upon the North Atlantic Pact. I am completely convinced that we can win the peace we all want, we can win the ideological competition between American democracy and Russian communism without the tragedy of atomic war and without resorting to military alliances and increasing armaments.

In spite of my respect for all those who place confidence in armaments, I am convinced this military alliance and lend-lease armament program seriously threatens to defeat the very purpose for which it is intended, to promote the peace of the world. I must try to tell you why.

**REKINDLING OF HOPE FOR PEACE**

The one absolutely universal desire of all the people of all Europe is for peace for all the world. Anything which contributes to rekindling in the hearts of Europeans, hope that permanent peace will be achieved, contributes to the victory of democracy over communism. Anything which contributes to the almost universal fear and despair and cynicism in Europe contributes to the victory of communism and the defeat of democracy.

It is my conviction that the threat of communism is not primarily a military threat. Russia with its 14,000,000 casualties in the last war and with its most densely populated and most industrialized area, equivalent to all of the United States east of the Mississippi ruthlessly devastated by the German invasion is not threatening a military invasion of the United States or of Europe. What Russia is threatening to do is to take advantage of the bitter despair of the millions of poverty-stricken and hopeless people, particularly throughout Germany, France, and Italy and to use this despair to create opportunities for local Communists to seize power. This is what they are now doing successfully in China, in spite of our $2,000,000,000 military lend-lease program there.

My appeal to every Senator, to every Congressman, to every American, is to put our faith in those acts and policies which rekindle hope and faith in the future in the hearts of Europeans. There is almost universal predisposition on the part of eastern Europeans as well as on the part of western Europeans to want to believe in America and to follow our leadership. America's generous contributions to UNRRA, our millions of CARE packages and direct-mail food parcels, and our original offer of Marshall-plan aid to all of Europe have seen to that.

**THREAT TO MARSHALL PLAN**

Actually the degree of economic recovery that the various nations of Europe have made with our assistance has contributed immeasurably to the decline in popular favor of communism in each of these nations, and this decline, in my opinion, is a fact.

However, the struggle has not been finally won and the overburdening of these convalescent economies with armaments constitutes a serious danger to the success of our construction program. I urge all-
out Marshall-plan aid without armaments as the surest way to win the common industrial worker, the coal miner and the peasant of France and Italy particularly to faith in a better way than communism. We must offer houses and tractors and consumer goods, not rifles or tanks or machine guns, if we are to offer these common people hope.

**SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS**

Secondly, I urge all-out support of the United Nations as the agency to which millions of Europeans will give support if given any real encouragement. We cannot claim to be doing so when spending $1,000 on armaments for every $1 we spend on the UN. However, we can do so, we can support the UN and achieve every objective we hope to gain by the North Atlantic Pact. We can unite all the nations desiring a mutual defense pact under the UN. We can unite all the nations wanting a world police force under the UN. We can unite all the nations wanting economic recovery, and military disarmament under the UN. We can win the confidence of the people of Europe and the world that we are the champions of peace but we must recognize that our tremendous armament program simply does not inspire this confidence today.

It was said, indeed, to be asked again and again in Poland, "Do the people in western Europe fear war as much as we do?" Or to be told in Finland, "No, David, there is no hope of peace, not until you in America have suffered."

I asked young people in almost a dozen other countries of Europe—Italy, Switzerland, France, and England included—if they agreed with this Finnish work camper and the answer was always the same. They wanted to believe there was hope but they really did not have hope. But we can change that pessimism and I still have faith that we will.

**EXTENSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS TO COLORED RACES**

The third plank in an all-out constructive program to win the world competition with communism is a program to win the loyalty of the 1,500,000,000 colored people throughout the world not now aligned with either group. Here, too, they want to believe in the principles of equality and liberty enunciated in our Declaration of Independence but they know us only too well as a Nation of hypocrites. Every effort we make to practice what we preach in terms of fair-employment practices and equal opportunity for every American minority is worth more than millions of dollars of armaments in freeing the world from the threat of communism.

**DANGER OF REARMAMENT**

Finally, every non-Communist European, and that is the vast majority of them, would urge me to urge you, for our own sakes as well as for their own, to find a better method of avoiding another disastrous depression than by ever-increasing armament expenditures. Hitler has proved that way to be the way of death. We must realize it before it is too late.
Economic prosperity purchased at the price of totally unproductive militarization of America and all our allies is a false prosperity and can only lead to bankruptcy if it does not lead to war. We must find the ways by which our total abundant productivity can be harnessed for the welfare and security of the millions of common men throughout America and the world. It can be done.

England and the Scandinavian countries are pointing the way. They are wiping out the slums, they are wiping out disease, they are expanding public education, they are expanding every form of social security. This is the way to overcome the threat of communism, this is the way to win the peace.

There are, no doubt, risks involved, but certainly not any greater risks than the risk of armaments. In fact, in my opinion, it is the only way to win the peace. A military alliance and armament program can only undercut and block this road to peace—it cannot supplement it. We cannot breed hope and fear at the same time. World cooperation for the good of all is the only way because it is the only way that is in harmony with the fundamental laws of this universe which simply require us to learn to cooperate together for the good of all or perish.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Green, any questions?

Senator Green. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. No, sir.

The Chairman. We thank you very much. What is your present business?

Mr. Richie. I am now with the Friends Social Order Committee, a Philadelphia committee that is active in organizing voluntary work camps, helping young people, to help tenants to improve their homes and thereby get an education of the problems in America.

The Chairman. Your activities are in this country, not in Europe?

Mr. Richie. Yes; that is correct.

The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK C. SMEDLEY, ATTORNEY, WATERBURY, CONN.

Mr. Smedley. My name is Frederick C. Smedley. I am an attorney from Waterbury, Conn., appearing as an individual citizen.

Mr. Chairman and Senators, I do not wish to oppose ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. Under present circumstances, I believe it is a necessary action and might be helpful in preventing a recurrence somewhere else of such events as took place in Czechoslovakia last year.

A UN CONFERENCE FOR DISARMAMENT

It is conceded on all sides that the pact is a gamble, subject to all the hazards that have historically been inherent in military alliances. What I want most respectfully, but with all the fervor of my being, to urge upon you is, in effect, that in recommending that we take that gamble, you also recommend that we hedge our bet by accompanying our ratification of the pact with the simultaneous passage of a resolution calling for a UN conference to draft a convention enacting universal disarmament down to a police and coast-guard level, under
every conceivable sanction to insure its strict enforcement everywhere, every day, against everybody, from heads of state down.

I have placed copies of a draft of such a resolution before you and I ask to have one inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will put that in the record.

(The resolution referred to reads as follows:)

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, That the President is authorized and requested to suggest that the United Nations, in a manner approximating the procedure so successfully used by the International Labor Office in procuring agreement among many competing nations on labor matters, call an international conference for the purpose of preparing a draft convention enacting complete national disarmament, except for domestic police forces and coast guards for maritime nations, both of which shall be of limited size, equipment, and field of operations according to territory, population, and coastline they are to police; together with all necessary international controls and means of insuring its rigid enforcement against any individuals who may attempt to violate it; such convention to be submitted to all national legislatures for immediate passage, but not to become operative until it is universally adopted and coming into effect simultaneously for all nations and all territories, territorial waters, ships and airplanes under their jurisdiction.

Mr. Smedley. I make this suggestion because I am deeply conscious of the propaganda blasts that have already emanated and will continue to emanate from those sectors of public opinion which do not agree with our democratic way of life, to the effect that the pact is a capitalistic, imperialistic, warmongering plot, designed to isolate and destroy the peoples' democracies.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF A DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL**

To the well informed minority of the world's population, those claims appear absurd, but I submit that to the uninformed and deliberately misinformed majority they are sufficiently credible to justify our taking every step we can to discredit them, in order to prevent our losing another battle in the war for the minds of men that is now going on in the world.

I believe our asking for such a conference at exactly this juncture of events could not be kept hidden from that vast majority. I believe it might well inspire a worldwide groundswell of public opinion demanding that our proposal be carried through to fruition.

I have placed before you a short pamphlet entitled "What Are We Waiting For"? In it I have attempted to appeal in simple language to ordinary people everywhere for action by them in every way open to them to make their governments insure their security, by all of them at the same time, abolishing the means of preparing for or conducting warfare.

I commend it to your perusal at your leisure as an example of the type of positive propaganda for real security, stability, and democracy in which we could engage if the Congress adopts such a resolution as I propose.

Recently I wrote Dr. Kluckhohn, the eminent director of the Russian research center at Harvard University and asked what in his opinion would be the effects if the pamphlet were to be translated into Russian and circulated among the Russian people by every means that might be used for that purpose. He replied:

I suspect that if it were translated and widely distributed in Russia the effect would be very useful.
I do not believe I have to take much of this body's time in demonstrating that, having offered to renounce completely all atomic weapons if others will do the same under effective guaranties, we should be even more willing, if not anxious, to do the same thing as to all other weapons, in some of which we are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis certain other nations or combinations of nations.

That argument was made far more cogently and eloquently than I can make it by your own colleague, Senator Tydings, when he introduced his Senate Joint Resolution 95 in the Eightieth Congress.

**ADVANTAGES OF A DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL NOW**

I do want to emphasize that our at this time proposing the draft convention procedure for achieving complete disarmament, to come into effect only on universal adoption, would give our foreign policy certain advantages it now lacks, as follows:

1. The conference drafting the convention would channel all the mutual suspicions and antagonisms of its members into the constructive use of strengthening the provisions of the convention for sanctions to insure enforcement of all its provisions. Unlike a treaty, the convention, once it becomes operative by universal adoption, would be self-executing, with all domestic law-enforcement machinery, as well as any necessary international machinery, behind it.

2. Any nations not agreeing to the convention at the conference would face the possibility of becoming isolated as other nations adopt it, leaving them alone preventing the convention from coming into effect, not an enviable position before public opinion.

3. The whole process is the essence of democracy, and the lesson of how to make their governments accede to their most urgent desire, that for peace and security, would be learned by the peoples of the world in the process. It offers what nearly everyone wants most, and shows them how to get it by their own efforts and in their own generation.

4. Aiming directly at total disarmament gets away from the necessity of fixing quotas for each particular nation in relation to others, thus eliminating all questions of pride and prestige.

5. The natural interest of each individual in freeing himself from the possibility of having to go to war and from the certainty of having to be burdened with high taxes for war preparations, can be appealed to without the likelihood that he will feel he is weakening his country, since his decision is only effective if, as, and when the people of all other countries do likewise.

6. In placing reliance for enforcement on public opinion as well as natural and international agencies that operate at the behest of interested individuals and agencies and against offending individuals, and in not coming into effect until public opinion favors it everywhere, and so is alert everywhere to the dire necessity of rigid enforcement, it would be possible to eliminate the most dangerous elements of modern warfare—atomic bombs, cosmic rays, poison gas, disease germs, crop destroyers, and whatever else has been, is being, or may in future be, devised by man capable of destroying life and the means of sustaining life—which seem incapable of effective regulation by treaties alone.
7. It permits us to take the offensive morally and politically, which
is much more effective and less expensive than being on the defensive
strategically and militarily.
8. It would vastly increase the prestige and possibility of com-
plete success of UN by removing national forces, the existence of which
is an ever-present threat of national defiance of UN.
The stakes in this game of international politics are stupendous.
I think I have suggested an excellent bet that we should not overlook
in it, and I hope you will agree that the same time we ratify the North
Atlantic Pact is the time that we should make this other bet.

SUPPORT FOR TREATY

The Chairman. Are you for the treaty, or opposed to it?
Mr. Smedley. I am for it as a necessary temporary expedient at
the moment, but I think there are other things we should emphasize.
The Chairman. The only thing we have before us at this time is the
treaty, so you are for ratification?
Mr. Smedley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In the hope that hereafter we will continue other
measures to bring about the ideas which you have expressed—
Mr. Smedley. Of course, I have said that I hope we ratify the treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF W. A. HUNTON, SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL ON
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

The Chairman. How long will you require?
Mr. Hunton. About 5 or 7 minutes.
The Chairman. Give the clerk your background.
Mr. Hunton. My name is William A. Hunton. I am a resident
in Brooklyn, N. Y. I am secretary of the Council on African Affairs
in New York.
The Chairman. What private business are you in?
Mr. Hunton. This is my job, as secretary.
The Chairman. Secretary on the Council of African Affairs?
Mr. Hunton. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are you a native of this country?
Mr. Hunton. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. Go ahead.
Mr. Hunton. On behalf of the executive board of the Council on
African Affairs, an independent, private, nonprofit organization con-
cerned with protecting and promoting the interests of the people of
Africa and with providing Americans with the truth concerning the
status and struggles of Africans and other colonial peoples for eco-
nomic and political freedom, I wish to express strong condemnation
of the North Atlantic Treaty and urge its repudiation and defeat.
In the first place, the North Atlantic Treaty would create in place
of the one-world system, for which the United Nations was estab-
lished, a two-world system, based upon the false and suicidal assump-
tion that these two worlds cannot possibly live together in peace.
Thus will be provided the psychological basis for what has been
called a preventive war, actually a war to create a new one-world
pattern according to the wishes of the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.

COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE TREATY

It should be carefully noted that the North Atlantic Treaty is a compact of all those powers, with the sole present exception of Spain, which today hold hundreds of millions of colonial peoples in subjection throughout the world.

Great Britain is a prison house of colored peoples, held in bondage under an oppressive colonial system in Asia, Africa, and the Central and South American countries. The Netherlands holds in bondage nearly 80,000,000 people in the East Indies and in South America. The French Government exploits millions of people in its African and Asian colonies.

Belgium holds the people of the Congo in bondage. Portugal exploits millions of Africans. The United States Government, with its "gold and silver" double standard in Panama, its economic and political hegemony in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Liberia, its complete domination of the people of Hawaii and recently acquired islands of the Pacific, its newly established fund for investing in the exploitative enterprises of other colonial powers, is today the most powerful colonial power of all time. Finally, even the Government of Italy is currently struggling to get the United Nations—with the support of the other signatories—to reestablish its dominion over Libya and Somoliland.

The very governments which are committed by the pact to live in peace with all peoples and all governments are in fact today engaged in wars to maintain their domination over peoples of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Madagascar, and Viet-Nam.

In these colonial areas lies the real threat to world peace. Colonialism has been and continues to be a major cause of the world's wars. The North Atlantic Pact is designed to perpetuate this evil instead of erasing it.

Today Africa is the last continental stronghold of colonialism, and for that very reason its people face new and intensified forms of exploitation and oppression. But Africans, no less than Asians, are determined that their continent and its resources shall be developed for the benefit of the people who inhabit it, instead of being utilized for the economic and military designs of European and American imperialists.

While the published terms of the North Atlantic Treaty do not specifically include Africa, except for the one territory of Algeria, there is every indication that in actual practice the people of Africa, who have had no voice in this matter, would be expected to play their role in the war plans of the North Atlantic Pact countries.

ARTICLE IV AND COLONIAL POLICIES

The North Atlantic Pact, article IV, commits the signatories to consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened. And United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, interpreting the pact for the press, has stated that—consultation does not preclude action.
Referring to this same article IV, Belgium's foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, on March 18 said that—

consultation between the signatories could also take place in case of an incident occurring outside the geographical areas of the pact, if one of the parties considered its security involved (New York Times, March 18).

Thus we may assume that if the people of Nigeria or the Gold Coast, for example, should attempt to revolt against British rule and set up a government of their own choosing, this could be interpreted by the Governments of Britain, the United States, or any other of the signatories to the treaty as a threat to Britain's territorial integrity and security, and all of the parties to the treaty would consequently be called upon to take joint action in crushing the revolt of these peoples by force of arms.

**MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COLONIAL WARS**

Further, the Brussels Treaty nations, which include Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, have proposed that the United States furnish military equipment to them as a group to be distributed by them in accordance with their joint defense plans. These defense plans obviously embrace the overseas territories belonging to these countries.

Are we to hope that the United States Government, which granted credit loans and Marshall-plan funds to the Dutch, British, and French Governments, thereby enabling them to prosecute their wars against the national liberation struggles of peoples under their dominion, will now withhold military equipment and other assistance from its Atlantic Pact allies for their use in attempting to stem the march of colonial peoples everywhere toward freedom?

Indeed, there is danger that American troops may be called upon to assist, either directly or indirectly, in safeguarding imperialist interests in Africa and Asia. The then Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, in early March, in reporting to the House Appropriations Committee the fact that several western European nations had made—

insistent requests for additional American troops—

on the European Continent, supported this demand, stating that no one would want to—

risk our destiny in war on the ability of the nations of Europe or Africa or any point in Asia.

Without their assent and in contradiction to the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Africans' homeland is rapidly being converted into a military arsenal—a base for war.

One of several reports to this effect is contained in the United States News-World report on February 27, 1948:

_Africa now is bustling with the biggest boom in its history. Feeding the boom, right now, is the military planning of Europe and the United States. Africa is to become a huge base for armed operations into Europe if trouble comes with Russia._

It is this same preoccupation which apparently dictated the United States delegation's position on the disposition of the former Italian

*New York Times, April 14, 1949.*
colonies—a position which the Council on African Affairs and many other organizations among the American people have condemned as a reactionary and dangerous solution.

THE TREATY AS A THREAT TO AFRICA

According to the New York Times of November 26, 1948 [reading]:

Considerations of military strategy that were discussed and decided on at a meeting of high military officers in Washington about 2 weeks ago have determined the attitude that the United States delegation here has adopted on the question of the Italian colonies, diplomatic circles said today.

The United States has secured the right to establish at Monrovia, Liberia, with no time limits whatever specified—

such naval, air, and military facilities and installations as may be desired by the Government of the United States.

It has secured access to bases in Libya and other colonies, and is giving technical and other assistance by means of Marshall-plan-fund allocations in the building of communication lines linking the network of African bases together.

The United States also, according to a New York Herald-Tribune correspondent, January 7, 1949—

has a "gentlemen's agreement" with France whereby American planes can use north African bases.

The same correspondent reported that—

French Africa, from the Mediterranean coast south to the Belgian Congo, more than 2,000 miles away, has been grouped into a coordinated defense area for the first time. This unprecedented arrangement is expected to facilitate implementing of the North Atlantic Pact.

In view of all these facts it is clear that the North Atlantic Treaty will not only bring nearer the danger of war with the Soviet Union, but will also be an immediate and serious threat to African and other colonial and subject peoples ruled by the treaty signatories.

POSITION OF NEGRO AMERICANS

Were the North Atlantic Pact in fact what its preamble purports to affirm, namely, a treaty committing its signatories to safeguard the freedom and promote the well-being of their peoples and to preserve the peace, then Negro Americans could give it their full and unconditional support. But, speaking as a Negro, I can say that we have had no small share of experience with language which affirms what actions deny.

The language of the Bill of Rights and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments is precise, unequivocal, majestic; yet everyone knows that this language is not in accord with reality, with the real status and conditions of the Negro citizens of the United States.

Democracy begins at home. Let the colonial powers, parties to the treaty, grant freedom to the peoples whom they hold in bondage. Let the United States Government answer the demands of Negro Americans for the right to vote, for the right to work according to their abilities, for the right to live where they choose, for the right to live without fear of lynchings—for the right to live as Americans.
There can be no peace imposed by force of arms. The only enduring peace is that founded upon the freedom and equality and fellowship of all peoples.

Because it is an instrument for war, not for peace; because it means additional hindrance and not assistance to the freedom struggles of oppressed peoples everywhere, I respectfully and most earnestly urge the Senate's rejection of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. We are glad indeed to have your statement.

Membership of Council on African Affairs

Senator Donnell. May I ask a question or two?

You stated that the Council on African Affairs is an independent, private, nonprofit organization. How large an organization is that and how is it financed?

Mr. Hunton. It is financed by contributions from friends and members and by sale of its literature, monthly bulletins, pamphlets, and other publications dealing with Africa.

Its membership has consisted of those elected to membership by the body and therefore is not a large organization but does include representatives of churches, schools, trade-unions, and other major organizations and institutions, Negro and white.

Senator Donnell. Are they scattered throughout the country?

Mr. Hunton. Yes.

Senator Donnell. Or just in one section?

Mr. Hunton. National in scope.

Senator Donnell. Are you able to tell us approximately how many members there are?

Mr. Hunton. Upward of 200.

Senator Donnell. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. You are excused.

The Committee will take a recess until 4 o'clock, so the witness will have to come back. We have to go to the Senate.

(A recess was held.)

After Recess

The Chairman. We are sorry that we had to interrupt the hearing. There was an important matter on the Senate floor.


The Chairman. Dr. Joe T. Thomas, can you get along with 5 minutes?

Dr. Thomas. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. All right, 5 minutes.

Dr. Thomas. I can get along with 3.

The Chairman. How long?

Dr. Thomas. Three minutes.

The Chairman. Change your figures, Mr. Clark; make it 3.

You are very accommodating and we thank you.

Dr. Thomas. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we thank the committee for giving us permission to speak against the
United States joining the North Atlantic Pact with the Belgian Government because such an alliance with Belgium at this time would compel the United States to go to war to defend Belgian slavery in the Belgian Congo.

Our position for reestablishing the Congo Free State as an independent sovereign nation is endorsed by both branches of the National Baptist convention with a membership of 6,500,000 American Negroes: the general conference of the C. M. E. Church, the Church of God and Christ, the Scottish Rite Masons of the United States, and our membership of 25,000 members.

These 6,000,000 Negroes are backing the United States against Russia and all her enemies.

**THE TREATY AND THE BELGIAN CONGO**

We do not believe American democracy can be twin to Belgian slavery in the Belgian Congo. This great Nation founded upon the great moral principles of freedom, justice, and democracy has waged many wars to perpetuate the great democratic principles and moral obligations assumed by our forefathers who founded this cradle of liberty. These moral obligations compelled rebellion against Great Britain and establishment of this democracy where all men might be free and equal.

This obligation brought a civil war that freed the slaves in the United States and set the fires of freedom burning in the hearts of all the people of Central and South America, in Haiti, and Santo Domingo, and they freed themselves, and slavery was abolished in all the Americas.

It was natural for this great Nation to wage war to free Cuba and the Philippines and to join the Allies in World Wars I and II so freedom might have a chance to spread to all people all over the world.

**MORAL PRINCIPLES BEHIND WORLD WAR II**

Grounded in the great moral principles of our fathers, our great President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Hon. Tom Connally and Senator Vandenberg, and their coworkers converted the Allies to these moral democratic American principles, and they organized the United Nations for freedom, justice, and democracy for all people, large and small, who aspired toward self-government.

I can still hear the voice of President Roosevelt ringing over the radio proclaiming that this war is being fought for freedom, justice, and democracy for all people, large and small, who aspire to rule and govern themselves.

I can still hear the bombers as they flew across the ocean to supply our forces so they could stop the smashing German forces that enslaved Europe and were storming at the very gates of Buckingham Palace in Great Britain.

I can still see millions of American men and women coming out of factories where they worked to make ammunition of war to help win the war for freedom, justice, and democracy.
We won the war, we freed the world, and we restored stolen territories to native people so they might have freedom to rule themselves. We drove the Germans out of Belgium, we freed the Belgian people, and we gave Belgium back to the Belgian people. We forgot that Belgium was holding 14,000,000 African Congolese slaves and nearly a million square miles of territory of the Congo Free State, illegally called the Belgian Congo.

We forgot President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. We forgot that American soldiers fought and bled and many of them died to free Belgium from German slavery. We forgot we fought so freedom might come to all nations who aspired toward self-government.

CONDITIONS IN THE BELGIAN CONGO

I do not believe we can forget that Belgian atrocities in the Congo Free State shocked the civilized Christian world. Belgium cut off arms and legs of natives too old to work to intensify Belgian slavery. The Belgian Government cut the breasts from pregnant native women too heavy with child to work. The Belgian Government is still murdering native Congolese in the Congo.

During the San Francisco Conference in 1945, while the United Nations Charter was in the making, a group of natives struck for a raise from 25 cents a day for 10 hours' work and refused to work until they got 50 cents a day. The Belgian Government murdered the strikers with lend-lease machine guns from American lend-lease airplanes. The Belgian Government has violated every provision of the Berlin Act and convicted herself of criminal conversion and made herself unfit to be permitted to handle the Congo Free State.

The Belgian Government has no intention of educating the native Congolese toward self-government. Belgium spends less than 1 penny per annum per capita on the education of the children of the 14,000,000 Congolese slaves the Belgian Government is now holding in the Belgian Congo. Just last year Belgium sent out a financial report that Belgian Congo has taken the Belgian Government out of the red, and Belgium had made millions in profits out of the Congo, but Belgium has not appropriated a penny of this vast sum toward the education of the Congolese children.

Here is Belgium's answer to the United Press when Mr. Spaak was asked just what Belgium intended to do about turning Belgian Congo over to the United Nations. This was just after we had freed Belgium from German slavery and had given Belgium back to the Belgian people. I quote Mr. Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium [reading]:

The Belgian Government can see no future day when the Congolese will be capable of self-government; therefore, the Congolese will have to remain under Belgian rule indefinitely.

Great Britain is practicing democracy in her crown colonies and protectorates and is spending millions of dollars a year educating natives toward dominion self-government in Africa and spreading democracy which will prevent communism in her colonies. The Belgian Government is too poor to give the natives a chance and must resort to slavery and murder to hold the Congo. The Congo under Belgium is a ripe field for communism.
As a measure of international defense, the United Nations should take over the Belgian Congo and join Great Britain in the great human development of Christianity, freedom, and democracy in Africa and prevent the spread of communism in Africa.

Freedom from slavery and restoration of stolen territory to native people and their heirs was decided on the battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa in World War II, and it was signed with the blood of our fallen heroes who died for freedom, justice, and democracy. They knew democracy could not be twin to slavery.

Our allied courts have tried, convicted, and executed murdering leaders of land-grabbing nations of World War II, but they forgot and looked over Belgium, a nation that is just as guilty of murder and land grabbing as Germany and Japan and should not be permitted to hold the Belgian Congo, the Mandates of Urundi and Ruanda, nor any other territory in Africa.

The United Nations should bring the Belgian Government into court and try her for violating the Berlin Act, for murder, criminal conversion, and holding human beings in slavery.

I cannot believe all the great nations of the world have united to defend Belgium, a murdering slave-holding nation. Of course, Belgium is a member of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Security Pact, but she is guilty of robbery, murder, and holding slaves and is unfit to be a member of the family of civilized nations and the North Atlantic Security Treaty. Belgium is violating the mandates of our honored dead who died on the battlefields of Europe to free Belgium from German slavery.

Judas was a member of the great Christian fraternity of Jesus; but he betrayed our Lord and hanged himself. We do not expect the Belgian delegates to hang themselves, but they are guilty because they represent the Belgian Government and to save their faces, they must voluntarily turn Belgian Congo and the mandates of Ruanda and Urandi over to the United Nations, so the family of democratic nations can have clean shirts.

In defense of the widows and orphans of our heroic dead, who gave their lives so democracy might get a chance to function in the world and for the existence of the human race, we ask for plain, simple justice and freedom for the 14,000,000 slaves Belgium is now holding. Reestablishing the Congo Free State by the United Nations will determine the future conduct of other nations, and communism cannot say the United Nations permitted Belgium to hold stolen territory and 14,000,000 Congolese slaves in Africa.

In defense of moral decency, the decision of the United Nations must be freedom of the Congolese and restoration of the Congo Free State as an independent sovereign nation under the Congo Free State flag.

The following great European nations and the United States met in Berlin in 1884 and enacted the Berlin Act. They are: Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, the United States, and some lesser European states.
They recognized the Congo Free State as an independent sovereign nation and appointed Belgium administrator over the Congo Free State to educate the Congolese toward self-government.

But instead, the Belgian Government enslaved the Congolese and murdered 30,000,000 natives who would not submit to Belgian slavery in the Congo. At that time this was the greatest mass murder in the world's history and can only be topped by Germany's mass murder of 65,000,000 white people in Europe during World War II.

In 1884, the Berlin Conference appointed Belgium administrator over the Congo Free State to educate the Congolese toward self-government, but Belgium violated every provision of the Berlin Act, enslaved the natives, and in 1906 she annexed the Congo Free State as a Belgium slave colony over our protest which we filed with each of the signatories of the Berlin Act and the World Court at Geneva, Switzerland; but they did not give us a hearing.

We, the civilized heirs, did not sell Belgium our territory, we did not give Belgium our land, and Belgium did not acquire our territory by conquest; therefore, by all the practices of civilized nations, the territory now illegally called the Belgian Congo belongs to the native Congolese and to us, the heirs residing in the United States and citizens of the United States of America.

UNION OF NATIONS AND THE CONGO

We, the civilized heirs to the territory, hereby file complaint against the Belgian Government and ask the United Nations to appoint the Government of the United States our new administrator. As long as Belgium is permitted to hold slaves in Belgian Congo and have jurisdiction over our territory, the Congolese are a threat to democracy and ripe for communism.

We do not believe the United Nations should drive the Congolese into the family of communist satellite nations; and freedom for the 14,000,000 Congolese and the reestablishment of the Congo Free State will win the Congolese for democracy.

I do not believe the United Nations were organized to perpetuate human slavery; we believe the United Nations is the greatest moral force of nations because it was founded upon the world's greatest human principles—freedom, justice, and democracy.

Therefore, we believe the moral integrity of the United Nations will come before the bar of justice with clean hands and free the 14,000,000 slaves the Belgian Government is now holding in the Belgian Congo and reestablish the Congo Free State and launch a new democracy in Africa which in times of war will be valuable as an aid to the democracies, for then we can mobilize an army of 2,000,000 soldiers to fight with the democracies of the world and keep the democracies living.

We believe the United Nations should have this opportunity to reestablish the Congo Free State as an independent sovereign nation under the Congo Free State flag and set a new pattern for human justice in Africa.

CONDITIONS IN THE CONGO

I wonder just how long can the Christian civilized nations keep their eyes shut to this disgrace to democracy. How long can they...
stand and hear Congolese slaves cry? How long will they hold back and block democracy and shut the sunlight from the blue sky?

Belgium does not permit American missionaries from Negro denominations to enter the Belgian Congo and establish missions and churches to help Christianize and educate the native Congolese, and this prevents the spread of Christianity in Belgian Congo. Belgium spends less than 1 cent per capita on native education.

During the 64 years Belgium has had jurisdiction over the Congo State, the Belgian Government has not educated one native Congolese doctor of medicine, no dentist, no druggist, no engineers, no geologists, no electrical engineers, no lawyers, and no presidents of schools—not even a common school teacher—and no trained nurses. Belgium is preventing Congolese education so she can profit on slave labor. Congolese Americans are blessed with the great privilege of being permitted to participate in building American civilization.

Here in the United States, Congolese Americans have many medical doctors, dentists, druggists, 50,000 school teachers, hundreds of businessmen, hundreds of trained mechanics, hundreds of successful farmers, many presidents of schools, colleges, and universities, scientists, soldiers of distinction, great musicians and artists, over a million home owners, over 1,000,000 churches, and a million trained ministers of the gospel and thousands of workers under the civil service working for the United States Government and in the county and city governments.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONGO FREE STATE

The United States has given the Congolese living here a chance. We believe reestablishing the Congo Free State will prevent the spread of communism in Africa. This new Negro nation in Africa will be a new forward step in human achievement for the United Nations and set a precedent for freedom for all people, large and small.

If that is done, all the participating nations of the North Atlantic Pact can face communism with clean hands, and the United Nations will have a real opportunity to set in operation the Charter of the United Nations and demonstrate to communism that democracy is real and fits black folk into moral concepts of freedom, justice, and democracy for all people who aspire toward self-government, both large and small.

Our position fits in with President Truman's inaugural address. I quote:

The old imperialism exploitation for foreign profit has no place in our plan. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concept of development of democratic fair dealings. All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural resources.

Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

We do not believe democracy can be twin to Belgian slavery in the Belgian Congo. Democracy means freedom, liberty, and justice. The only twin in the world that can be matched with Belgian slavery in the Belgian Congo is Russian communism.
We Congolese-American heirs, descendants of the Congolese and citizens of the United States of America, contend that our property is subject to the jurisdiction and the protection of the United States. The United States should take a protectorate over our African territory and control the world’s greatest supply of uranium and prevent Russia from taking over our property. If Russia did take over the Congo, she would wreck the British in all Africa and communize Africa and spread communism to Central and South America and become a menace to the democracies of the world.

To prevent this impending crisis, at the International Aviation Conference in the Stevens Hotel at Chicago in 1944 we, the owners, heirs, and descendants of the Congolese residing in the United States and United States citizens, gave the United States the right to establish airfields and military stations in the Congo Free State, illegally called the Belgian Congo, and to keep them as long as the United States needed them.

We, the heirs of the Congolese, did not sell or give Belgium our land, and Belgium did not acquire our territory by conquest. Therefore, by all legal processes of civilized nations the property belongs to us, the legal heirs, and the native Congolese people. We have a legal right to give the United States the right to establish airfields and military stations in our territory.

Belgium is still murdering Congolese persons and should not be permitted to participate in the Marshall plan and use United States lend-lease funds to help perpetuate slavery in the Belgian Congo. Therefore, we ask the Foreign Relations Committee to amend the North Atlantic Security Treaty so Belgium will not participate in any United States funds appropriated for the North Atlantic Security Pact until Belgium has voluntarily relinquished all claims of jurisdiction over the Belgian Congo and the mandates of Ruanda and Urundi and turn these colonies over to the United Nations.

We ask the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to recommend that all previous provisions of old leagues of nations and world courts which granted Belgium jurisdiction over the Congo Free State and permitted Belgium to annex the Congo Free State as a Belgian slave colony be reconsidered and that the Congo Free State be reestablished as an independent sovereign nation under the Congo Free State flag.

We respectfully ask the committee to recommend that the United Nations appoint a commission to take over the Belgian Congo and the mandates of Ruanda and Urundi and reestablish the Congo Free State as an independent sovereign nation under the Congo Free State flag supervised by the United Nations.

At the International Aviation Conference in 1944 we Congolese living in the United States and citizens of the United States granted the United States Government the right to establish airfields and military stations within the Congo to keep the Russian Government from going in and taking over our territory. As you know, the Congo State produces a great supply of uranium, from which we get the atomic bomb. She produces 90 percent of the radium of the world. She has copper fields 250 miles long and 50 miles wide. She produces diamonds next after South Africa.
This valuable territory should not go into the hands of Russia. We believe that the Belgian Government is too weak to hold it; and we, the heirs of that territory, ask the United States to take a protectorate over it and control the world's greatest supply of uranium.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly thank you very much. You are the president of this United Congo Improvement Association?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a corporation, or just membership?

Mr. THOMAS. We are incorporated.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you give all your time to this?

Mr. THOMAS. All my time to this particular thing.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Ely Culbertson. How much time will you need?

Mr. CULBERTSON. Last time at the Democratic Convention you said you would give me 5 minutes, and I said, "I double that," but I would not double it this time; I will try my best.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. It is late, and there are not many members here, so we would like to conclude as soon as we possibly can.

STATEMENT OF ELY CULBERTSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM, INC.

Mr. CULBERTSON. My name is Ely Culbertson, and I am here representing the Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform, of which I am chairman.

We favor the outright ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The gigantic propaganda machine of the State Department has left but little choice and little time for the country and the Congress in this matter. We must either ratify the treaty as it is or else find ourselves in a position opposing our Government's effort against the Communist threat.

IMPERFECTIONS OF THE TREATY

We realize only too clearly the imperfections and even the grave defects of the treaty. For instance, the only specific thing in the otherwise misty treaty is the provision in article 10 that admission of new members to the treaty can be made only by the unanimous consent of its signatories.

Now, Luxemburg, which is one of its signatories, is a very fine nation; and its capital city of 60,000 population is a lovely little town. But I submit that it is utterly ridiculous to permit Luxemburg thus to veto the policy of the United States of America in matters that may well prove to be vital to our national interests. We have been already vetoed to a frenzy by Russia, and we have had enough.

I hope that I am wrong in my understanding that the hidden purpose of this provision was to make doubly sure that Spain be barred from participation in the Atlantic Pact—on the grounds, so eloquently stated by Secretary Acheson, that the habeas corpus of totalitarian Spain and totalitarian Russia are not in the same class.

There are other and more serious sins of omission in the North Atlantic Treaty. I am sure that millions of Americans, and many Senators, too, would agree with my wistful wish that there were more brain and more teeth in the treaty.
Once again, the State Department missed a God-given opportunity to create, through the treaty, not a clumsy, hasty and uncertain tool of power politics, but a more noble and far more practical instrument against aggressors.

**SUPPORT FOR TREATY**

In spite of these obvious defects of the treaty, we favor its immediate ratification because we favor the principle of lawful and militant defense by peaceful nations against the greatest threat in history—the double threat of atomic and Communist bombs.

Fortunately for the United States and the world, the treaty is so vaguely constructed and so replete with double talk that an enormous amount of good can be done after the ratification of the treaty, provided it is well implemented.

**ASSUMPTIONS UNDER THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT**

There are three basic assumptions that we must keep in mind in connection with the whole purpose and implementation of the Atlantic Pact:

First, the fact that today and during the next 2 or 3 years at the most, the atomic and industrial power of the United States and her natural allies is virtually irresistible. Therefore, some of the previous testimony that you have heard here to the effect that if the Atlantic Treaty is not ratified immediately there will be war within a year is sheer nonsense. The Moscow Politburo, although at times obliging will certainly not do us the favor of committing military suicide by starting a war before they accumulate some atomic bombs of their own. If Soviet Russia wanted to overrun Europe they would have done so, with far greater chances of success, in 1946, 1947, or 1948.

The Moscow rulers indeed believe that the third world war is inevitable and desirable, but in their own time and with their own strategic surprises.

Second, any settlement now with Soviet Russia that does not include guaranteed international control of atomic energy, the elimination of the back-breaking load of the armament race, and the restoration of the illegally occupied territories would be an act of disguised appeasement, inviting atomic catastrophe a few years later. Time is no longer the ally of the United States.

Third, the Communist Politburo does not and never will understand any language other than the language of inexorable and superior military force. Therefore, the only way to avert the third world war is by implementing the Atlantic Pact in such a manner that the Moscow rulers will be faced by the lawfully organized, collective power of all peaceful nations—a power of such overwhelming strength and united determination that the Moscow rulers will find it to their best advantage to agree without delay or double talk to just and reasonable conditions for guaranteed world peace.

I understand that an important bipartisan group of Senators are now preparing a resolution for a specific implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty in connection with its ratification. The resolution will call for:
1. The establishment, in cooperation with other member states, of an emergency defense force, to be called the international contingent, to operate in defense against armed attack either independently or as auxiliary to the national armed forces of participating member states.

This international contingent—a balanced land, sea, and air force—shall be recruited from volunteers who are citizens of smaller sovereign states: that is, states not possessing their own large military establishments. It will be a highly trained, well-paid professional force, owing its allegiance to the Atlantic Defence Authority. It will be stationed in western Germany or other critical points in Europe. Its use and operations shall not limit the constitutional safeguards of member states nor commit them to the use of their own national armed forces.

At least half of the total of money, goods, and lend-lease armament appropriated by the United States Government in accordance with article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty shall be expended to help equip and maintain the international contingent of volunteer professional troops.

The organization and command of the international contingent shall be vested in the Atlantic defense authority, or defense committee provided in article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The defense committee shall consist of seven delegates, as follows: United States, two; United Kingdom, one; Canada, one (giving two for the British Commonwealth); France, one; Italy, one (giving two for the Latin Europeans); and other smaller member states, one.

The defense committee shall act upon an affirmative vote of six out of seven members.

The defense committee shall establish, subject to its control, a high command for the international contingent, and appoint its commander in chief.

Now, the advantages of this Atlantic contingent are obvious. I believe it will be extremely popular with the American people and the British and French people because it will save lives. It will save many American lives and French and British lives by distributing the load of sacrifice among the smaller nations, too, who number 400,000,000 people in this world.

Secondly, this international contingent, which will be, in effect, a superbly equipped professional body, hand-picked from the smaller nations all over the world, will be a natural ally and an auxiliary force for the United States and other armed forces stationed in Germany under the control of the Atlantic Defense Committee.

It will eliminate the fear of France of being once again conquered before they are eventually liberated.

Even today—and I can predict that in the future—there will be a great deal of trouble on that account. The French, like many other European nations, do not want to be liberated any more. They want to be saved from invasion, and this force could be stationed as shock troops, without requiring the stationing of several hundred thousand, if not half a million troops, as is now the case with many French states.
Now, in addition to this international Atlantic contingent, the resolution by the Senate group will assert that a fundamental objective in the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty shall be to seek without delay the revision of the United Nations Charter so that (A) the paralyzing veto right of an aggressor shall be removed; (B) the rising threat of the atomic catastrophe be averted, and the back-breaking load of the armament race be lifted; and (C) an effective but tyranny-proof international police force be established to support the decision of a workable Security Council and World Court.

In the event that a permanent member vetoes these urgent, just, and indispensable revisions of the UN Charter, under its article 108 then, under its article 51, the resolution will ask that the Atlantic Pact be extended into a world pact, with the Atlantic international contingent extended into a world international contingent; so that a world collective front of all peaceful nations, in possession of overwhelming atomic and military power, shall be established, based on the principle of enforceable law against aggression or armament for aggression.

We believe that the majority of the American people and of the Senate are opposed to a preventive war against Russia just as emphatically as they are opposed to appeasement of Russia. We believe that only by firm action now, through specific implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, can we avert the third world war later.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Culbertson.

We have noted and are acquainted with your activities in international affairs, and we applaud you for your great public interest and your views.

Mr. CULBERTSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DONNELL. I would like to ask Mr. Culbertson a few questions, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

FINANCES OF CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR UN REFORMS

Mr. Culbertson, are you appearing here for the Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform?

Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. What is that organization, and who finances it?

Mr. CULBERTSON. The citizens committee is a nonprofit membership organization. It contains 2,000 members. It contains 7,000,000 members of other organizations who have endorsed the same plan as advocated by the citizens' committee for the revision of the United Nations, called the plan ABC, which was introduced last year by a group of 16 Senators in a concurrent resolution.

This citizens' committee is financed by voluntary donations, and when there is not enough money—and that is usually the case—by donations out of my bridge earnings.

Senator DONNELL. Do you mind telling us approximately the annual budget of the committee?

Mr. CULBERTSON. The annual budget of this citizens' committee varies between 40 and 100 thousand dollars a year.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Culbertson, perhaps I am incorrect, but I rather gathered from some of your language here that you are not par-
particularly enthusiastic over this North Atlantic Treaty. Am I correct in that conclusion?
Mr. Culbertson. You are quite correct, Senator. I think a far better treaty could have been drawn up.

NO ALTERNATIVE TO RATIFICATION

Senator Donnell. I understood you to mention that there has been a gigantic propaganda machine of the State Department, and that machine leaves us no alternative but to ratify the pact?
Mr. Culbertson. That is correct, Senator.
In the past, the State Department, although pretending to solicit the opinion of thinking Americans, has carefully avoided doing so. They work in the darkness and when they prepare their own rather hasty plans they launch them with such a fire as take it or leave it.

Senator Donnell. Did you read in the newspapers the account of the ceremonies here when the pact was signed on April 4?
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, I did. But may I say, Senator, that this reproach applies only to the State Department. It never applies to the Senate and House of Representatives and their bodies.
As a matter of fact, the only chance we ever had to be heard in public was thanks to the courtesies and to the democratic spirit of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I want to make it absolutely clear.

Senator Donnell. Am I correct that you base, in large part, your conclusion that you favor the outright ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty on the fact that this gigantic propaganda machine of the State Department has left us no alternative?
Mr. Culbertson. It has left us no alternative, except either to accept it or to suffer terrific consequences of a moral nature with our natural allies in Europe.

Senator Donnell. I say, in large part, therefore, you base your conclusion of favoring the outright ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty on this condition that has arisen out of this gigantic propaganda machine of the State Department. Am I correct in that understanding?
Mr. Culbertson. Yes, Senator, you are largely correct in that understanding.

IMPERFECTIONS OF THE TREATY

Senator Donnell. Now, Mr. Culbertson, in connection with my suggestion that, I judge, you are not highly enthusiastic over the North Atlantic Treaty, I observe such language as this in your statement: You speak of "the imperfections of the treaty and even the grave defects of the treaty." You speak of it as being "the otherwise misty treaty."

You refer to the fact that it is utterly ridiculous to permit one country, which you name, to veto the policy of the United States of America. You speak of "the hidden purpose of that provision." You mention the "sins of omission in the North Atlantic Treaty." You express the "wistful wish that there were more brain in the treaty." You express a similar wish that there were more teeth in the treaty.
You refer to the fact that the State Department, as you judged it, missed an opportunity to create not a clumsy tool of military alliance, but a more noble instrument, et cetera. You express a similar thought that the State Department has lost a God-given opportunity to create not an uncertain tool of military alliance. You speak of "these obvious defects of the treaty." You mention that the treaty is so "vaguely constructed." You refer to it as being so "replete with double-talk."

I judge from all those, added together or separately—or to adopt the language of the treaty, I believe, "collectively or individually"—that I am quite correct, am I not, in the conclusion that your enthusiasm for this treaty might be bounded within rather narrow limits: That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Culbertson. It is bounded within very narrow limits, but I have hoped that through the implementation of this treaty we would achieve something far more substantial, something with teeth and something with far more brain, thanks to the Senate and the House.

PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY

Senator Donnell. And the implementation to which you refer, at least in large part, is that which you understand an important bipartisan group of Senators are now preparing a resolution to effect?

Mr. Culbertson. Not only this group of Senators, but any group that advocates a step forward. We are in favor of all of them.

Senator Donnell. I understand that you do regard this proposed resolution, that to quote your statement, "an important bipartisan group of Senators are now preparing" is a very important step toward the proper implementation of the treaty.

Mr. Culbertson. Indeed I do, Senator. I also regard your activities as valuable, and I want to express my admiration.

Although I entirely disagree with many of your opinions, I want to express my admiration for your courage and for your fortitude in standing here and bringing up clearly and specifically our commitments in that vital matter.

I think the people of America will be grateful for it, although your act is not popular now; though it does not matter.

Senator Donnell. I appreciate very much the comment.

Mr. Culbertson. We will benefit from you and everybody, and, of course, including Senator Connally, the chairman.

The Chairman. I think that tribute, Senator, deserves a similar tribute to Mr. Culbertson.

Senator Donnell. Yes, I feel myself that Mr. Culbertson is showing a very fine spirit of public service in giving us the benefit of his views and I am greatly interested in his views. In fact Mr. Culbertson did me an honor some weeks ago to drop in at my office one day—

Mr. Culbertson. It was an honor.

Senator Donnell. And go into these matters to some extent at that time.

DANGER OF WAR

Now I judge that you are not convinced that all the arguments that have been introduced in favor of this treaty are valid. I am referring
particularly to your point that some of the previous testimony you say that the committee has heard here to the effect that—

If the Atlantic Treaty is not ratified immediately there will be a war within a year is sheer nonsense.

Mr. Culbertson. Sheer nonsense. Also, Senator, sheer hypocrisy is the statement that this treaty will bolster and strengthen the United Nations. This treaty is an admission of the total and complete failure of the United Nations to operate as an international agency for peace and security.

Senator Donnell. I might add in that connection that your view as to the hypocrisy concurs exactly, even to the choice of the term, with the views suggested by another witness a few days ago who called attention to two hypocrisies of which the one you have mentioned is just one.

Mr. Culbertson. So I am not alone.

Senator Donnell. No; you are not. You may not want to answer this question—you probably would prefer not to mention names—but I recall that Judge Gerard, a man of great distinction in public service, is a gentleman who came to us the other day and submitted his view that—and I am going to quote your language—not that he submitted it in the same language but it was the substance of it—"If the Atlantic Treaty is not ratified"—I do not know whether he said "immediately"—"there would be war within a year."

That was his view as I recall it. You do not concur with that view regardless of who may have submitted it?

Mr. Culbertson. I do not concur, and, furthermore, many others have intimated that unless we ratify the Atlantic Treaty we are going to have a war with Russia, and I say it is sheer nonsense.

INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENT

Senator Donnell. I want to call attention in the record to one point that I think is quite ingenious—and I mean no disparagement by the term "ingenious"—because it intrigued me when you mentioned it in my office: This provision for the defense committee to consist of seven delegates, while you didn't mention it here today, contains obviously the provision which preserves the veto of the United States, because the defense committee shall act on an affirmative vote of six out of seven members and there cannot be six unless the United States votes; that is correct, is it not?

Mr. Culbertson. It preserves the veto of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and not the Europeans; that is correct. At the same time it does not permit one nation to oppose the will of the majority.

Senator Donnell. Mr. Culbertson, there is a bell ringing which indicates a vote, and we are going to have to leave, I take it. I just want to conclude with this observation, and I take it this is your expression, your view, you believe that only by firm action now through specific implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty can we avert the third world war later?

Mr. Culbertson. I do.

Senator Donnell. Thank you very much, Mr. Culbertson.
The Chairman. Your view is that though you think you could have written a better treaty, one more desirable and all that, still you are for the ratification of this treaty?

Mr. Culbertson. I am for ratification of this treaty without reservation or conditions, but I do not think I could have written a better treaty. I do believe that the Senate could implement the same treaty in a far better way.

The Chairman. We are going to implement it later. We cannot implement it in the treaty now.

Mr. Culbertson. We want to prepare for it now, and I want to thank you, Senator Connally, for your great courtesy, and I appreciate your democratic spirit.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

We will recess now until Monday.

Mr. Culbertson. Thank you, Senator.

(Whereupon the committee, at 5:30 p. m., recessed, to reconvene Monday, May 16, 1949.)
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on Friday, May 13, 1949, at 10:30 a.m. in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), George, and Green.
Also present: Senator Donnell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

STATEMENT OF HARVEY W. BROWN, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

Mr. Brown, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Harvey Brown, president of the International Association of Machinists.

I have come here to urge Senate ratification of the North Atlantic treaty. This international agreement is an expression of the desire of the 300,000,000 people in the North Atlantic community of nations for peace and security. It is an essential part of our campaign for peace, our battle against war.

COST OF WAR

Twice in one generation humanity has suffered the scourge of war. The total military cost and property damage of World War II has been put at $1,347,891,463,084—a fantastic sum. But far more shocking than the material cost of war is the ghastly toll in precious lives. Bear with me for a moment while I read these stunning figures: In World War I there were 22,104,209 casualties, 52.3 percent of the total mobilized forces. The dead numbered 5,152,115; the wounded, 12,831,004; and 4,121,090 were reported taken prisoners or missing. In World War II the number of military and civilian dead were estimated at 22,060,000, four times as great as in World War I. The number of wounded in World War II was estimated at 34,000,000, nearly three times as great as in the First World War.

As wars become bigger and more bitter, they may lead to the eventual destruction of the human race. Remember that in World War II only two atomic bombs were dropped. Can the human mind grasp the havoc and destruction of future atomic warfare? Will anyone even remain to count the dead?
I am sure that you will agree with me that no price is too high to avoid another war.

The tragic experience of two world wars has at last taught us that, in the face of an aggressor, peace on earth must be achieved through a show of strength, not weakness. Never again must an aggressor nation be given the opportunity to pick off democratic countries one by one. We must not again abandon the countries of western Europe to the agony of enemy occupation.

NO ISOLATION FOR THE UNITED STATES

If the history of the last two great wars teaches us anything at all, it teaches us that the United States cannot escape becoming involved in a major European conflict unless it is possible to avoid the conflict itself. Toward this end, the 12 nations who signed the treaty are resolved to "unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security." Such united action, together with the military, economic, and human means to do so, should eliminate any false hopes on the part of any potential aggressor that he could succeed in his ambition to divide and conquer.

In the past, the aggressors have relied chiefly upon American isolation. Fortunately, isolationism is a dying creed. We cannot permit the security of the United States to be endangered by allowing the entire European continent to come under the domination of a single power or group of powers hostile to America. In World War II, the Allied Powers lost continental Europe before the United States joined actively in the fighting. To regain it, we had to launch the most dangerous and costly amphibious assault in the history of mankind.

Today, in spite of the strides of the western nations toward economic recovery and toward economic, political, and military cooperation, the nations of Europe still find themselves in a weakened condition as a result of the destruction and privation of war. This affords a golden opportunity for a new aggressor.

OBSTRUCTION TO PEACE

When VJ-day came, we thought that peace and stability would return to the world. We did not, of course, expect that the end of the fighting would automatically settle the painful problem brought on by the war. Even if there were unity among the allies of World War II in the search for a just and honorable peace, there would be many obstacles to overcome before reaching the goal. But we hoped that with patience and care we could attain peace in a reasonable time.

But winning the peace has become even more difficult than winning the war because one single bully among the nations has not only refused to cooperate in the achievement of a just and honorable peace, but, sad to say, has sabotaged the efforts.

Let us be frank about it. The Soviet dictatorship has obstructed all attempts at bringing peace to a shattered world. The democratic nations have tried to find a firm basis for peace by negotiation and agreement. Many conferences were held in the four corners of the earth. Though the few agreements that were obtained left much to
be desired, they offered some basis for peace. But the Kremlin regime has repeatedly ignored and violated the agreements.

We had hoped that the United Nations would succeed to build a world order based on law and not on force. Most of the countries of the world have joined the United Nations. Most of the members support it and endeavor to make it stronger and more useful.

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

However, the U. S. S. R. has staged a veto marathon at sessions of the United Nations, thus destroying its effectiveness as an instrument for peace.

Bear in mind that in the 4 years since the end of the war the Red army was used as the means for establishing Moscow-controlled Communist dictatorships in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It was only a little over a year ago that Czechoslovakia's free, democratic government was overthrown by a Communist coup.

It is clear that in the case of a new aggressor, as in the case of Nazi Germany, control of the European Continent, once achieved, would merely serve as the first step in the grand strategy of an attack on Great Britain and then on the United States and the whole Western Hemisphere.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE TREATY

How can we avoid such terrifying possibilities from becoming horrible realities? The North Atlantic Treaty as a complement to the European recovery program is the answer. The treaty and the ERP are both necessary to achieve a stable, prosperous, and peaceful world. The economic recovery of Europe will be aided by the feeling of greater security which the treaty will spread among the ERP countries. Likewise, the treaty requires a successful ERP as the basic foundation upon which its security must rest.

A little over a year ago I appeared before your committee in support of the European recovery program. While in Europe as a member of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity, I saw the benefits of the European recovery program. But we know that all of our gains can be lost unless we join for our mutual self-protection.

The essential purpose of the treaty is to maintain and strengthen the way of life of the North Atlantic community of nations. This thought is well expressed in the preamble to the treaty, which reads:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

PREVENTIVE EFFECT OF TREATY

The essence of the treaty is recognition of the fact that an armed attack on any of the North Atlantic nations is, in effect, an attack upon them all.

By confronting a potential aggressor with a preponderance of military, economic, and spiritual power, the North Atlantic Treaty will increase the prospects of peace. We all know that our firm and determined policy in Berlin has resulted in the lifting of the blockade. This was accomplished primarily by American pilots, American planes,
and American dollars. The power and might of the United States is needed to translate the North Atlantic Treaty from a noble document to a living reality. I agree with our President that had such a treaty existed in 1914 and 1939, it "would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars." Need anything more be said?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown, your office is here in Washington, is it?
Mr. BROWN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been connected with the International Association of Machinists for some years, have you not?
Mr. BROWN. I have been connected with the Grand Lodge of the Machinist's Union for 28 years, and 10½ years as international president.

The CHAIRMAN. You have testified before committees here from time to time?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, I have.

Senator VANDENBERG. Will you just supplement that statement with an indication of what the International Association of Machinists is? As I understand it, it is not related to the other large labor organizations, but is an independent organization.

Mr. BROWN. We are not affiliated with any of the other labor movements for the time being.

Senator VANDENBERG. What is your membership?
Mr. BROWN. About 625,000. We have agreements with over 12,000 employers.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?
Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green, do you care to ask any questions?
Senator GREEN. I did not hear the witness. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator VANDENBERG. It was a very fine statement.
Mr. Brown. I want to thank the committee for permitting me to appear.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Charles F. Boss, Jr., representing the Methodist Church.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES F. BOSS, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON WORLD PEACE OF THE METHODIST CHURCH

Mr. Boss. My name is Charles F. Boss, Jr., the executive secretary of the Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church, whose headquarters are in Chicago, Ill.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a minister, are you?
Mr. Boss. I am a minister. I have been full time in this particular position for 14 years. I was with you, sir, and pay tribute again to you and Senator Vandenberg for your work, at San Francisco. I put in full time there.
The Chairman. I recall that.

Mr. Boss. We were all interested in that field.

We do not speak for the whole Methodist Church. Do not assume that we do. Nor do we speak for the 14 bishops who released the statement in the press Saturday in Washington, and in the New York Times of yesterday morning. I would call attention to the fact that the 14 bishops who signed that statement constitute a minority of the Council of Bishops. That is, it is 14 out of 35 active bishops.

The Chairman. You represent both the North and the South?

Mr. Boss. Indeed I do.

The Chairman. They have become unified, have they not, except in opinions?

Mr. Boss. The opinions are not confined to South against North, always, but rarely.

The Chairman. I do not mean on sectional lines. I mean the church is united but they still differ in their opinions, as you point out with the 14 bishops.

Mr. Boss. That is right. We believe in a democratic church, and rights of opinion. Subsidiary organizations may take and do take the actions which are theirs, but we have an official place in the church, as has the board of education, the board of missions, and therefore the right to speak. But we do not assume that we speak for everyone in the church.

(Statement on the international situation adopted by the Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church, Chicago, Ill., May 2, 1949, appears in the record as follows:)

TOWARD ONE WORLD

(Statement on the international situation adopted by the Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church, Chicago, Ill., May 2, 1949.)

The Commission on World Peace cannot but be gravely concerned over the trend of international events. Member states of the United Nations who collaborated with patience and persistence in winning the war are now tragically divided over provisions for preserving the peace. To some extent, this should have been anticipated. Collaboration between allies in war is an essential but temporary expedient. It is concerned with military strategy, the objective of which is military victory. War tends to postpone the grappling with real causes of war and subordinates efforts to resolve the issues of permanent peace.

Since mistrust, provocative propaganda, conflict of policy in occupied countries, and insecurity—accompanied by a swiftly mounting arms race—continue to plague mankind, the Christian church is morally obligated diligently to exert itself to promote conditions conducive to a just and peaceful solution of the issues between nations. Unless agreements are reached, mankind, against its will, may drift into the destruction of civilization.

In this situation Christians need not be discouraged or feel that there is nothing they can do. The long-range program of peace-making including the laying of moral and spiritual foundations in prayer and world brotherhood, the relief of human suffering, the support of international cooperation, the increase of economic justice, and other courses set forth in the General Conference statement on the Conditions of Peace are still open to us. (See Discipline of the Methodist Church, 1948 (par. 2025.) In addition, certain other positive courses of action are called for in the present situation.

1. War is not inevitable

Wars are essentially bred in the attitudes and motives of men. No nation on earth now desires war. If attitudes of suspicion, vindictiveness, and fear can
be kept down and corresponding attitudes of understanding, good will, and mutual concern built up, no nation can be thrust into war. The basic answer to the present war hysteria is found in Christ the Reconciler, and in the doing of what he taught regarding "the things which belong unto peace." To this end we urge—

1. That through preaching, teaching, and worship the churches do everything possible to combat the present antagonism toward Russia, making it clear that the Russian people, largely helpless under their dictators, are not to be identified with the Soviet Government. Church members should be led to realize that we have many millions of fellow Christians in Russia and that, whether or not of the same household of faith, we are all made equally in God's image and are brothers one of another.

2. That church members be urged to make a calm and objective appraisal of the merits and defects of communism, such as is to be found in the report of section III of the Amsterdam conference Findings and Decisions; and that the churches, without espousing communism, do all in their power to counteract the present hysterical fear of communism which is leading in America to the suppression of free speech and the misjudging of many liberal movements. Communism cannot be fought by imitation of its own methods.

II. The Marshall Plan

We reaffirm our support of the foreign aid program and urge its larger and more efficient use for building up the peacetime economies of European and Asiatic nations, in order to supply the basic necessities of normal existence, to insure full employment and the achievement of a normal balance of trade, and to serve as the most effective bulwark against communism.

III. Economic strengthening of undeveloped nations

We urge the full implementation of the fourth objective stated in President Truman's inaugural address, which advocates the sharing of American technology with peoples living in less well-developed areas of the world. This we do both out of a Christian concern for the welfare of the peoples involved and because such economic development of lands in which hunger and want now prevail will tend toward the economic stability of every other land.

IV. Human rights

We believe it to be the will of God as revealed in Jesus Christ that all men should have equal rights and be treated as persons of equal dignity, regardless of race, color, creed, or economic status. This is required both in fulfillment of the Christian gospel and as a safeguard to the peace of the world.

1. We commend the United Nations for its adoption of the declaration of human rights and urge its ratification by the United States Government.

2. Also, we urge the churches to study this declaration and consider ways of implementing it in their communities. The church itself must become an all-inclusive fellowship in Christ, without distinction of race, color, or class.

V. The United Nations

It is our conviction that the United Nations must be the keystone of our international policy. Agreements and actions which lie within the scope of the Charter should be routed through the United Nations. Bilateral arrangements by nations should be in harmony with the Charter and should further the general international welfare.

New efforts should be initiated to secure the common consent of all 58 member nations of the United Nations to refrain from invoking the unanimity rule (i.e., the veto) in actions involving pacific methods of solving problems related to the peace of the world, as in cases such as Israel, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

VI. Reduction and control of armaments

We believe the United States should take the lead in efforts to secure agreement on a universal and simultaneous reduction of armaments through the United Nations.

We urge the United States to continue with patient efforts to secure an acceptance of a plan of international control of atomic energy along the lines recommended by the last General Assembly.

VII. Co-operation with the U. S. S. R.

There should be no evasion of the fact that the frequent use of the veto, the extension of Soviet spheres of influence, the curtailment of free expression within Russia and nations closely related to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
The chief industry; and the Russian people of the friendship of the American people.

These Russian people of the friendship of the American people.

We therefore urge our Government—
1. To use every effort to terminate the "cold war" and to refrain from threats and vituperative language in all public statements.
2. To use the radio and any other channels that may be open to assure the Russian people of the friendship of the American people.
3. To facilitate cultural and religious interchanges between Soviet and American leaders.
4. To keep open the channels for diplomatic negotiation even when the results may not be immediately rewarding. The alternative is war.

**VIII. The militarization of the United States**

We reaffirm the statement of the General Conference of 1948: "We recognize the need of national defense. When nations rely primarily on military force, both the spiritual and economic foundations of peace are undermined. Fear and suspicion increase the danger of hostility; the diversion of wealth to this channel withdraws it from the constructive pursuits of peace."

We therefore look with grave apprehension on certain current policies, believing them to be contrary both to the Christian way of life and the true grounds of national security. Among these are peacetime conscription, in whatever form it may take; colossal military appropriations which encourage the armaments race and absorb the major portion of our national budget; the spread of propaganda to make such appropriations acceptable to the public, thereby encouraging hysteria, suspicion, and ill will; the control of political policy largely by military rather than civilian leaders; military influence in education, science, and industry; the stockpiling of atomic and biological weapons; the maintenance of military bases around the world; foreign policy which bypasses and therefore weakens the United Nations. We urge the members of our churches, both as individuals and groups, to declare their opposition to such policies, as occasion may arise, to their Congressmen and to the President of the United States. For the primary goal of Christians is not military defense but the establishment of peace and world order.

**IX. The North Atlantic Pact**

We cannot ignore the momentous issues for peace involved in the proposed North Atlantic Pact. Confusion still exists as to exactly what implementation of the pact is proposed. Under present circumstances, the manner of implementation contains important trends toward peace or war. Equally sincere statesmen and Christians differ on the probable results of the proposed pact. The chief proponents of the pact claim that—
1. The pact is a proclamation to Europe and to the world of what is an established fact—namely, that the people of the United States are no longer committed to a policy of extreme isolationism, but to a policy of international responsibility:
2. The United States views its security as inseparably related to the security of western Europe:
3. The announcement of this policy by the United States will constitute a deterrent to any nation which might resort to aggression to gain its ends. It is contended that this clarification of United States policy is essential to a safe and early settlement of the German problem, and necessary for the successful revival of European economy under the Economic Recovery Program;
4. Since the nations seem unready for a universal approach, much progress toward universal agreement and ultimately federal world government can be accomplished in the interim by expanding the areas of cultural, economic, and political unity through regional pacts, under terms which are provided for in and are consistent with the United Nations Charter.

There are, however, grave dangers lurking in the possible implementation of the pact and in its application in international policy.
1. While the Charter of the United Nations makes provision for the formation of regional agreements, as between the United States and the Latin American republics, there is little likelihood that a pact mainly directed against a member state can have any other effect than to weaken the United Nations and increase the tension and conflict which have hitherto hampered its effectiveness.

2. The Truman Doctrine, which the pact parallels on a larger scale, has not succeeded in stopping communism in Greece or bringing peace to that country. It has resulted rather in the enlargement of Russian spheres of influence.

3. The military rearming of western Europe would make staggering demands on our already overburdened economy, thus precipitating the danger of economic collapse, and would divert to military ends funds much needed for humanitarian relief. The Marshall plan provides much more security against the primary danger in western Europe, the advance of communism by infiltration.

4. There is no guaranty that American arms furnished as military implementation of the pact will not be used to suppress uprisings of nationals in such lands as Indonesia and Indo-China, and thus become a support to western imperialism.

5. The psychological effect of the pact cannot be other than to increase Russian fear of imperialistic aggression, as would be the case in the United States if the U.S.S.R. were to establish military bases in Latin America. There is grave danger therefore, that it may actually serve to precipitate rather than to avert war.

We call upon the church to continue to proclaim with clarity and moral vigor the love of God for all men in all nations and the availability of His Spirit in all efforts to create peace with justice and brotherhood among men. No one knows what the future holds, or whether another war may yet engulf humanity. But of this we can be confident, that this is our Father's world. The Lord is our keeper, and in His will is our peace.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Boss. I want to say also, sir, that I am coming here to interpret the position of the church, and not with a view to attempting to solve the political dilemma in which you men find yourselves and in which the Senate finds itself.

I shall omit the reading of all the introductory section on page 1 and will endeavor to take the headings, then, and bring out certain points, and then read specifically certain paragraphs dealing with the matter of our present policy.

We take the view in the commission, as indeed I think our whole church does, and you do, that war is not inevitable.

THE COMMISSION ON WORLD PEACE

Senator GREEN. May I interrupt, Doctor, to ask a question, whether these are your personal views, or have these been adopted by the organization?

Mr. Boss. Thank you. I should have brought that out. These have been adopted in this 27-member commission, on which there are 6 bishops, one representing each jurisdiction. It has been adopted by a vote of 24 with 3 members abstaining. Of the 6 bishops elected by the Council of Bishops to serve on this commission, five out of the six were favorable, one abstained from voting.

Senator GREEN. What is the commission?

Mr. Boss. The commission is an official body of the Methodist Church, elected by the church, by the general conference, by the Council of Bishops, and the jurisdictions of the church, just as is the board of missions.
Senator Green. What is the commission appointed to do?

Mr. Boss. It is the Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church.

Senator Green. And they are appointed to consider and make a report?

Mr. Boss. They certainly are. This is their report on this particular issue. It is a regular board of the church. We meet from time to time, and part of our responsibility is the consideration of our international situation, of the way to peace, the policies with respect to peace. I have appeared before this committee and other committees here many times in these 14 years.

Senator Green. Then the commission was not appointed for this specific purpose?

Mr. Boss. No, sir; not at all.

Senator Green. For the Atlantic Pact? That is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. Boss. No, sir. It met and released its statement on May 2. It was nearly a unanimous vote of the commission.

No nation on earth now desires war. May I say, sir, that I come also with two and a half months in Europe, in which I was in, as well as the western nations, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany. Both years I have conferred at some length with General Clay, with some members of cabinets, as in Poland, with church leaders and other civic leaders in all these countries, so that I have something of a personal field with regard to the background, and this statement, therefore, is not merely academic.

The Chairman. You were over there on an official mission?

Mr. Boss. I was sent on a peace mission for the church. It was primarily, of course, a mission to the church, but it gave opportunity for these contacts that I have referred to.

I believe that in none of these countries I was in was there evidence of war, and I believe with General Clay and General Keyes that for some time in what might be termed the immediate future there is not a threat of war. However, when we look down the years, it is all a gamble.

The Chairman. You were for the Marshall plan, I believe?

SUPPORT FOR MARSHALL PLAN

Mr. Boss. I think you will find that we are very strongly for the Marshall plan. We reaffirm our support of the foreign-aid program and urge its larger and more efficient use for building up the peacetime economies of European and Asiatic nations. We urge the full implementation of the fourth objective stated in President Truman's inaugural address, which advocates the sharing of American technology with peoples living in less well-developed areas of the world.

The Chairman. That issue is not at present before the committee.

Mr. Boss. No; that is not an issue. I am merely saying that it is in this kind of framework that the action we take is there.

We believe it to be the will of God as revealed in Jesus Christ that all men should have equal rights and be treated as persons of equal dignity, regardless of race, color, creed, or economic status.
I know this is the mind of the committee and the Government also: It is our conviction that the United Nations must be the keystone of our international policy. Agreements and actions which lie within the scope of the Charter should be routed through the United Nations. Bilateral arrangements by nations should be in harmony with the Charter and should further the general international welfare.

New efforts should be initiated to secure the common consent of all 59 member nations of the United Nations to refrain from invoking the unanimity rule in actions involving pacific methods of solving problems related to the peace of the world.

We hope the United States, Mr. Chairman, will take the lead in the next meetings of the United Nations to secure a new agreement at this point. Perhaps the Foreign Ministers will help us.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is pretty much of that opinion.

Mr. Boss. Thank you.

Senator Vandenberg. That is part of the Senate resolution of 1 year ago.

Mr. Boss. I know that.

Senator Vandenberg. And part of the proposals which the Government of the United States has presented for the agenda of the United Nations.

Mr. Boss. We give it our support, our very hearty support, and I think you can count on active backing from our church in that respect.

We believe the United States should take the lead in efforts to secure agreement on a universal and simultaneous reduction of armaments through the United Nations.

**ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT**

We urge the United States to continue with patient efforts to secure an acceptance of a plan of international control of atomic energy along the lines recommended by the last General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there let me intervene. On this matter of reduction of armaments, do you favor a reduction by percentages? If you reduced it only by percentages, relatively, you would have the same overwhelming armament you have now.

Mr. Boss. I think the Soviet proposal at that point was rather unrealistic. We do propose that a plan be set up that would involve justice.

Senator Green. You apparently divide armaments on the one hand and atomic energy on the other. Do you exclude the atomic bombs from the armaments?

Mr. Boss. No, sir; but the matter is being dealt with separately in the United Nations. For that reason, perhaps, you have to make separate approaches. They are all a part of armaments, of course.

Senator Green. You think they all ought to be reduced?

Mr. Boss. I think that the problem of solving the international control of atomic energy is a slightly different problem in its technicalities from the problem of reduction of conventional armaments, and since there are separate commissions at the present time in the United Nations, I think this was the best way the commission knew to state the matter.
Senator Green. It would probably be very easy to get a general agreement that the United States should reduce its atomic bombs. But would the United States agree to it?

Mr. Boss. I do not think the problem is one of reducing atomic bombs. I think the problem is one of an effecting plan of controlling the development of atomic energy and its applications for normal production purposes or power purposes, and on the other hand the control of it to prevent it from becoming manufactured for war purposes.

Senator Green. Do you think the country should reduce its production of atomic bombs unless the other nations reduce their armaments?

Mr. Boss. We have suggested here the principle we would follow, that it should be a universal and simultaneous reduction. Unless we do get international agreement, I think it is unrealistic to consider what one nation should do with regard to it. No nation is going to modify its own affairs very much until we come to some plan of security on an international basis.

Senator Green. I think that is a very laudable aspiration, but suppose the Soviet Government says, “We are not going to reduce our armament unless you reduce your atom bombs”?

Mr. Boss. I think probably these two committees do, in a sense, work together. Some of the same people are on both, and it is inevitable that they do their thinking with regard to the general plan of finding a way to security.

Senator Green. Suppose you were one of those people. What would be your attitude of mind?

Mr. Boss. I should try to make progress in both committees, stick to the United Nations, and give it the fullest support and muster all the strength for the universal approach that I could.

Senator Green. Suppose you were no more successful than we have been in the United Nations.

LEADERSHIP FOR PEACE

Mr. Boss. Then I should keep on going persistently until I died, because I think the alternative to some form of international security is war, and that means the destruction of our civilization in a day of atomic bombs. That is the position I should take. It is a tough problem. It is a difficult one. But is there any alternative to continuing to grow patiently persistently, month after month, until somehow we succeed? That is, I think, the thing we are trying to say in our paper. It is a hard course. It wears our patience. It irritates us; it provokes us. That is what we have to do for the sake of the world. The United States can give leadership. We must give it, not in the direction of opening up the gulf that make for war, but a continuous, patient effort that tends gradually to make the world better.

I supported the air lift. I checked it nights as I lay in my bed, hearing the planes go over. I think that was the kind of step, taken patiently, nonprovocatively, a dramatic thing, that finally won out.

Senator Green. I agree with you we should continue this patient, unremitting effort to come to an agreement, but meanwhile what are we to do, nothing?

Mr. Boss. Oh, no. I think there are a great many things we can do. We suggest here some things we can do.
Senator Green. I am discussing your point VI.

Mr. Boss. I think we have to keep on moving, but I do not think that the proposition is hopeless. I think we have a great deal of hope. I think the United Nations has made tremendous progress. I do not think it is time to desert it. I think we must give it our full support.

Senator Green. We are legislators, and while we may be in favor of unremitting persistent efforts in reaching an agreement, in the meanwhile are we to do nothing? I do not see that you cover that point.

Mr. Boss. Perhaps we do in a couple of things I have here later. Would you mind holding it and coming back to it? I do have some specific things.

COOPERATION WITH U. S. S. R.

VII is cooperation with the U. S. S. R. There should be no evasion of the fact that the frequent use of the veto, the extension of Soviet spheres of influence, the curtailment of free expression within Russia and the nations closely related to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the blocking of peace treaties in the foreign ministers' conferences, the Berlin blockade, religious persecution which has shocked the sensibilities of western nations, and other incidents, have made cooperation with the U. S. S. R. extremely difficult. These acts we believe to be neither politically nor morally justified. Sympathy rather than condemnation is in order for the statesmen who have tried unsuccessfully to work out a settlement. Nevertheless, we believe that the time for negotiation and attempts at reconciliation of differences is not past and that, before the spirit of Christian good will, no "middle wall of partition" can finally stand. We therefore urge our Government:

1. To use every effort to terminate the cold war and to refrain from threats and vituperative language in all public statements.
2. To use the radio and any other channels that may be open to assure the Russian people of the friendship of the American people. I see there is a suggestion this morning in the paper of other means that might be used to reach the Russian people.
3. To facilitate cultural and religious interchanges between Soviet and American leaders.
4. To keep open the channels for diplomatic negotiation even when the results may not be immediately rewarding. The alternative is war.

Senator Green. Is this the time you would like me to renew my question?

Mr. Boss. I think if you would hold it through the things which we suggest a little further, I shall be very glad to come back to it, if you please, because I think we do have something we would like to say on that.

NEED FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

The general conference, and this means the entire church, and this, too, was practically a unanimous action, recognizes the need of national defense. When nations rely primarily on military force, both the spiritual and economic foundations of peace are undermined. Fear
and suspicion increase the danger of hostility; the diversion of wealth to this channel withdraws it from the constructive pursuits of peace.

We therefore look with grave apprehension on certain current policies, believing them to be contrary both to the Christian way of life and the true grounds of national security. Among these are peacetime conscription in whatever form it may take; colossal military appropriations which encourage the armaments race and absorb the major portion of our national budget; the spread of propaganda to make such appropriations acceptable to the public, thereby encouraging hysteria, suspicion, and ill will; the control of political policy largely by military rather than civilian leaders; military influence in education, science, and industry; the stockpiling of atomic and biological weapons; the maintenance of military bases around the world; foreign policy which bypasses and therefore weakens the United Nations. We urge the members of our churches, both as individuals and groups, to declare their opposition to such policies as occasion may arise, to their Congressmen and to the President of the United States. For the primary goal of Christians is not military defense but the establishment of peace and world order. Note that I said the primary goal.

Now, we have this to say with regard to the North Atlantic Pact:

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE TREATY

We cannot ignore the momentous issues for peace involved in the proposed North Atlantic Pact. Confusion still exists—it did when this was adopted—as to exactly what implementation of the pact is proposed. Under present circumstances, the manner of implementation contains important trends toward peace or war. Equally sincere statesmen and Christians differ on the probable results of the proposed pact. The chief proponents of the pact claim—and perhaps I can just sketch this, because you know this story well.

First, we have moved, and our church has moved, from sometime isolation to a sense of international responsibility. I think what has happened in our church is representative of the Nation. We are very clear at that point.

Second, is a statement that the security of the United States is inseparably related to the security of western Europe. I think the members of our Commission are fully realistic about it and know that once you become involved in a war in Europe the old possibilities of our just being completely out are gone, especially with our economic involvements in Europe now.

The announcement of this policy will constitute a deterrent to any nation which might resort to aggression to gain its ends. We would recognize in the Commission the possibility of a short-time function, but a continuation of this seems to us to make for a divided world instead of a united world. We recognize there is a certain gamble in this at that point. Since the nations seem unready for a universal approach, much progress toward universal agreement and ultimately Federal world government can be accomplished in the interim by expanding the areas of cultural, economic, and political unity through regional pacts. We think there are some dangers in that. We know that men like the two Senators here themselves want to pull this whole thing into the universal approach, nevertheless we think the policy we are embarking upon now does contain grave dangers.
DANGERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

We think these dangers are in the implementation of the pact, particularly, although we were unable ourselves to say at this time that we would support the pact.

1. While the Charter of the United Nations makes provision for the formation of regional agreements, as between the United States and the Latin-American Republics, there is little likelihood that a pact mainly directed against a member state can have an other effect than to weaken the United Nations and increase the tension and conflict which have hitherto hampered its effectiveness.

2. The Truman doctrine, which the pact parallels on a larger scale, has not succeeded in stopping communism in Greece or bringing peace to that country. It has resulted rather in the enlargement of the Russian sphere of influence.

I may call attention to the fact that the first announcement of it was in terms of relief and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction of the villages. Actually the reports which have been made of the Greek appropriations show the majority of those funds have gone for military purposes. The President has already announced that he is going to ask for $200,000,000 more for the same purpose, to be used militarily in Greece and Turkey.

3. The military rearming of western Europe would make staggering demands on our already overburdened economy, thus precipitating the danger of economic collapse, and would divert to military ends funds much needed for humanitarian relief. The Marshall plan provides much more security against the primary danger in western Europe, the advance of communism by infiltration.

4. There is no guaranty that American arms furnished as military implementation of the pact will not be used to suppress uprisings of nationals in such lands as Indonesia and Indochina, and thus become a support to western imperialism.

The CHAIRMAN. You say "become a support to western imperialism." Do you charge that the United States is engaged in imperialistic tactics?

Mr. Boss. No, sir. I think the heart of our country has always been opposed to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why do you say "become a support to western imperialism"?

Mr. Boss. I think perhaps it would have been more correct to say "western European imperialism." That is what was intended. We did not intend to involve the United States at that point.

5. The psychological effect of the pact cannot be other than to increase Russian fear of imperialistic aggression, as would be the case in the United States if the U. S. S. R. were to establish military bases in Latin America. There is grave danger, therefore, that it may actually serve to precipitate rather than to avert war. That is, as we look at it in the long run.

WITHHOLDING SUPPORT FROM TREATY NOW

In view of these considerations we feel bound at this time to withhold support of the North Atlantic Pact. We urge that it be given full and free discussion by the American people before it is acted upon by the Senate of the United States.
I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that in this position we have said "at this time" because we recognize possible change of events. It is our conviction that we have something of a gamble here and that only on a short-term basis can we justify some of the things involved in it, because we want steadily, as a church, to hold before ourselves the steps which unite the world. It is possible during a particular period, by tremendous military force and economic force and power, to perhaps have an ascendency in the world over another group. But events change, conditions change, and a divided world leaves us pretty much where we have been, except it is organized differently, just as the Allies organized differently in World War I and World War II.

Senator VandenBerg. Mr. Boss, do you discriminate and distinguish between "withholding" support of the North Atlantic Pact and "opposing" the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Ross. Yes, I do, and I wanted to bring that point out. I am glad you asked the question.

Our commission did not authorize an all-out attack upon this policy. We did feel that because of these dangers and our lack of knowledge of the implementation procedures that we would have to withhold our support at that time, but we have not authorized an all-out opposition to this. I think we should bring that out quite fairly and frankly.

MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

Senator VandenBerg. That could mean that with the further development of the program and prospectus and the adequate disclosure of the purely defensive characteristics of the undertaking that you might ultimately come to the point of view that something of this nature is necessary?

Mr. Boss. Of course, that is possible, but I would think, in the light of the discussions of the commission, that if they had known that it was moving over into the sort of armament implementation which was being taken, possibly, at least, they might have taken a position in opposition. I think the opposition within our commission is much more aimed at the type of implementation which on a power basis can keep a divided world, and may not minister to a successful approach universally through the United Nations, than perhaps through the constructive phases of the Atlantic Pact, which have been named, and we recognize that certain of those constructive phases are there. I think that is our position.

Senator VandenBerg. On the basis of the implementation proposed, to which you refer, and without expressing any personal opinion with respect to it myself, would it not seem to you that the proposed implementation program is so totally limited that it virtually consists only of putting the existing forces in being into greater military sufficiency and gearing them together for a common defense? Would it be humanly possible to turn a program of $1,000,000,000 of military assistance, scattered among the 11 other nations, into anything remotely approaching an aggressive character?

Mr. Boss. That is a technical problem. Our commission did not consider that point with regard to, you say, a billion or a billion and a half or two billion dollars. It looks like a lot of money to me per-
sonally. The armament budget of the United States, when you total it up in the billions, looks pretty big to us, but I think I would not be able to give a technical statement.

I think our fear, Senator Vandenberg, is at the point that if we continue with what is essentially a war technique and the organization of power against communism, rather than to use the methods which really stop the ideas of communism, with constructive alternatives, economically, with means of preventing infiltration with the recognition of the united approaches and lifting the standards of living and preventing misery and unemployment—speeches of that sort, on which communism thrives—that we will more and more, especially if we move into some unemployment, tend to push into the field of increased armaments, increased military, larger armies, rather than finding these constructive solutions which we think are invited in such developments as the Marshall plan and bringing up the standards of other countries through the sharing of technology and constructive methods. We do not believe that primarily power prevents the spread of communism. We think it has to be met head-on with ideas, and it is capitalizing on our mistakes and the weaknesses and the miseries of the world.

SUPPORT FOR TREATY WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION

Senator Vandenberg. Let me put the question a little differently, because I am really interested in your point of view. If there were no supplemental implementation program contemplated at all, would you be in favor of the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Boss. I think most of it I would be in favor of; yes, sir. I am speaking for myself, now, because the Commission did not face it exactly as you have stated it.

Senator Vandenberg. As I read what you have to say in behalf of the Commission, it seems to me that that probably would be a fair interpretation of the attitude of the Commission.

Mr. Boss. Yes. At the time Mr. Bohlen spoke to us from the State Department at Cleveland, he was unable to give us any information or evidences or anything of the sort, nor had this been released, this implementation program, until rather recently. We met just 10 days or so ago.

Senator Vandenberg. That is precisely my point, Mr. Boss. If we start on the premise that we would agree with the North Atlantic Pact, without implementation, then the subsequent question simply becomes a question of fact, does it not, whether or not the implementation is entirely and completely within the nonaggressive character set out in the pact itself?

Mr. Boss. I think that process, however, that it seems to gear more into the technique of a continued cold war—we can see that if the Soviet Union and the eastern states of Asia lack the atomic bomb and such weapons, we can at points coerce them. That is what the airlift did. They tried to hit straight through center every time, and thought they would bull their way through, and the defense shifted and put something else in there that blocked that, and they have had to back off now to see whether they can make any gains around end or by forward passes. But if this fits in, say, a 20-year period—that is what is discussed, with the possibility of reviewing it in 10 years—a 20-year continuation of the possibility of the cold war, with the
possibility of developments in the Soviet Union, it might cause them to use some of the contacts we have used. We think we have to keep at this problem, as you men did at San Francisco, staying with it until we are able to get a more realistic view on the part of the Soviet Union, and in a sense force cooperation; but we think that that has to be the end. The alternative to our successful influence in the United Nations and the revision of the United Nations looks to us down through the long years as opening the possibility for a terrible war, and none of us wants war.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, none of us wants war.

Mr. Boss. I know that.

OBSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. You said earlier in your statement that it might endanger the idea of one world. Didn't we try at San Francisco to establish machinery for one world, in a sense?

Mr. Boss. Yes. That is, we set up the techniques and facilities through which the nations could reach agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. We did that on the theory that the great nations would cooperate and go along the same route. Has that happened?

Mr. Boss. No, sir. I think partly, since I have at least on one occasion preceding the war been in a good bit of that eastern section of the world that is now unable to cooperate, in that we have very deep differences in our history and our outlook on life and our ways. We are dealing with many peoples who are so far removed from what is commonplace with us that I think we have to give it a little time if we are going to find the two groups understanding each other and working together.

The CHAIRMAN. In the face of the fact that on 30 different occasions one nation has by veto blocked and hindered and delayed and postponed the efforts of the United Nations to secure peaceful processes, the prospects along that line do not seem to be very hopeful, do they?

Mr. Boss. No. I think it is only when they fail to hit through center that they try tackle or something else, and they may eventually have to admit diplomatic defeat and find some other way of cooperation.

INCREASING UNDERSTANDING

The CHAIRMAN. In your ambition to have one world, would you have us just abandon our position and go along with them?

Mr. Boss. No, sir. I think the way that this matter of world federal union or something of the sort can be arrived at—well, I use this illustration in teaching in our own groups. When a man comes to a hospital, sick, and he wants good health, but he is ill in a good many different spots in him, you can't just write a general prescription and give it to him for general health and then expect him to get it. There are a great many points of disagreement in the organic system, and you have to find where the difficulties are and diagnose those and treat them. It may be the heart and lungs and stomach and something else are wrong all at once, and I think we have to follow the process we are using in finding how to solve the problem at different points.
But I do make a plea for extending very greatly our efforts at understanding. I think often retaliation, instead of a process of reconciliation—the gospel of Christ, which in a sense I suppose motivates our American life as much as anything else can do, is a gospel which fits into the doctrines of cooperation and into techniques of reconciliation, and it is those that I hope we can keep at work.

Human beings do mellow under a real process of reconciliation. I don't think we can accept everything they put forward just in order to make peace in the family. You can marry people and have a complete federal union, and supposedly govern it, but people differ and you have to take disagreements as they come and work on them. But I think something of the spirit and attitude and technique of reconciliation has to sort of continue to be in the fore and motivate us rather than the sense of "Well, we have done everything we can; now we have to keep the cold war going" until possibly we have actually split our world or our United Nations, which, as you suggest, is the best one world we have at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, in your desire to get one world and that sort of business, you would not take the position that every time this intransient nation would propose something you would say, "Well, we can't get a world union unless we go along. We have to have one world: we have to agree"?

Mr. Boss. No, no. I don't agree that what we should do is just to let them take advantage of the Berlin situation, push us out of Berlin and Frankfurt. I agreed with General Clay. He happens to be a Methodist, so that helped a little in getting good contact.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that warm up your view of international relations, the fact that he was a Methodist?

Mr. Boss. I had a view of international relations before I knew he was a Methodist or knew General Clay.

**ARMAMENT AND ARTICLE 3 OF TREATY**

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Boss, I am interested in your logic. I do not think you can read article 3 of this treaty without reaching the definite conclusion that we are committing ourselves to armaments, and not to disarmament.

Mr. Boss. It is articles 3 and 5, sir, that bother us.

Senator GEORGE (reading):

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Now, there might be a difference of opinion as to what the purpose of arming is. We might insist, and I think most of us do insist, that we contemplate arming for purely defensive purposes and not for any other purpose. But you certainly cannot read in this treaty any commitment to disarm; but on the contrary, for 10 years here is a definite, direct commitment to armament. Don't you agree?

Mr. Boss. Yes. That is the reason our Commission said we could not at this time approve the Atlantic Pact.

Senator GEORGE. I might not agree with your premise, so far as that goes, but once you concede your premise that the only way out of this thing is through disarmament, this North Atlantic Pact does not con-
template disarmament, but on the contrary it specifically binds us to armament for 10 years and thereafter we take another look at the whole thing.

And then, if you look at article 9 of the treaty:

The parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of articles 3—

which I have already read—

and 5—

which I do not find it necessary to read.

What I am desirous of calling to your attention is what your whole logic points away from this treaty, although you may concede as a practical plan that under existing conditions in the world you may have to modify your own premise and your own conclusions. It certainly commits us to armament.

Now, as to what we are going to be asked to do, while we have an outline of it, a vague outline, there is nothing very definite about the outline of what we are going to do to implement this treaty and to carry into effect articles 3 and 5, particularly. On the contrary, that is to be determined by the council and by machinery that is set up by the council and such subsidiary bodies as may be created, and those bodies will carry an immense weight in determining what we will be called on, at least, to do. I do not say that we will do them, because I do recognize that certain autonomy is reserved to the United States.

DANGER OF REARMAMENT

Mr. Boss. You have interpreted, of course, in your way, and excellently, the points where danger is lurking that cause us to feel that we could not come out for the treaty. We recognize that there are a number of constructive things that can be done within this group.

Senator George. Undoubtedly.

Mr. Boss. We recognize also that the United States of Europe might be an aid to world peace, just as the United States of America we hope is going to be the leading force for peace through the United Nations, so that there was a mixture, you see, of those things. But you have put your finger on the thing that caused us to sit back and look back into history, into the history of wars, and to look ahead for 10 or 20 years, to see that if we become too deeply involved in that process we may not put our full strength in the United Nations, and that is the reason the Commission took the action it did by a nearly unanimous vote.

Senator George. I have much sympathy with you when it comes to the implementation of this treaty. I know it can be implemented in such a way as to change its peaceful, defensive character, and that will all depend on what the nations do, and in a large measure it will depend on us. I merely want to call attention to that. I have heard so many witnesses here who emphasize the peaceful character of the whole thing, when we are right in the very teeth and face of a direct obligation to maintain our armament for 10 years without any let-up. Thereafter there might be some let-up.
Mr. Boss. May I add, Senator George, that the difficulty is, we do not see in much of this conventional armament process any real defense against attack. No one has yet figured out how you defend yourselves against jet planes or atomic bombs, and if we have a preponderance of power we might have a generous attitude toward the use of this sort of thing as a general defense, but actually if the going gets a little harder attitudes might swiftly change, and they would change if they felt that a preponderance of power of an equalization of power was coming east of the iron curtain.

That is where the great danger of war lies. Implementation of armaments to the nth degree is like fighting the old wars over again instead of facing this new situation, looking into an atomic age, which we must do now.

I thank you for what you have said, because it has helped in interpreting it.

The Chairman. Senator Green?

**SCOPE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE**

Senator Green. Mr. Boss, I would like, if you will, to clarify the position that you call "militarization of the United States", your point VIII. You quote from the general conference: "We recognize the need of national defense * * *", but then you emphasize the point that that is not a primary but a secondary purpose. Along those lines, however, you limit various forms of national defense or amounts of national defense.

Now, someone has to determine it. There may be 100 different points of view. Some people may think that a thousand men is enough, others 100,000 men, other 1,000,000, others 10,000,000. And even the experts may differ. But under our form of government it is left, is it not, to Congress to determine that?

Mr. Boss. That is correct, sir.

Senator Green. So why should you lay down certain prohibitions as to how that general purpose is to be carried out, as has been declared by your conference?

Mr. Boss. We do that because the church itself has fundamental views of life and of society and the social organization of the world. We believe we live in a moral universe, with moral laws that are derived from the reality of God and from His continual purposes, His continual love for men, mankind, and the operation of His universal laws. When we see repeatedly in history the disaster which has come upon people such as it did come upon the whole world in the Second World War, through the organized national sovereign purposes which states develop, and the means which are used, and then witness at the close of it two swift actions which gave us just a little glimpse at the beginning of what another war would be, we do not see much hope for mankind in a world which almost divides between the great mass of eastern Europe and Asia and the West, using these weapons.

We do not believe that any of this today really constitutes defense of our Nation or any other nation. We think this is the way to great disaster for the world. That is the reason we did this.

Senator Green. Do you think that the First World War or the Second World War, so far as we are concerned, the United States of
America, came about because we had too much defense or because we had too little defense?

Mr. Boss. I think it came about, as Woodrow Wilson said, largely because of certain economic conflicts which had arisen, and our involvements in the economy of Europe, and we are much more deeply involved in the economy of the world. I don't think it came through having much or little defense.

**EXTENT OF DEFENSE NECESSARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

Senator Green. I thought you attributed it to the fact that we had too much defense, that that was the trend of your argument.

Mr. Boss. I do not think the United States fundamentally has been militaristic, and, as I said to Senator Connally, I do not think we are imperialistic, but we are now involved in oil and steel and everything else all over the world, and unless we take the lead in bringing the forces of the world through the UN to prevent an open conflict in a divided world, victor and vanquished both are going to suffer. The victor doesn't come out of this unscathed because he is good or virtuous or because he has larger armament. He comes out of it depleted and destroyed, if not to the extent, near enough to the extent, of the vanquished to make it a terrible thing to have to contemplate.

Senator Green. I agree with you that we cannot rely on military defense alone, but since the conference appreciates the necessity for national defense and expresses its belief in it, it seems to me that it might be left to the Congress, under our form of government, to design the extent of that defense and the kind of that defense.

Mr. Boss. Having been in the committee which was involved in this, I may say, sir, that a majority did not want that in at all. That was put in, and the word "military" was definitely left out by the group itself, because, while it was agreed that the defense of the Nation was the defense of values we all stand for, the question of the whole method of defense was not one upon which the state of the church committee and the general conference, the committee being composed of about 125 or 150 people, would have been able to have agreed upon. For that reason the recognition that there are values in the United States to be defended was put in and means of defense was left out, and even the military defense.

Senator Green. Yes, but then here in your statement you attempt to implement the idea by stating certain kinds of defense which you do not think the Congress should adopt.

Mr. Boss. That is correct, sir.

Senator Green. Should that not be left to the Congress to determine? If you once admit that there should be national defense—

Mr. Boss. Yes, sir, but we think Congress, in determining it, should consult everybody who has any valid opinions to give and that is what you are doing in this committee.

Senator Green. Congress does attempt that. That is what it is doing in connection with this pact.

Now, many witnesses for whom we have respect, and no doubt for whom you have respect, have declared to us in no uncertain terms that the adoption of this pact will help to prevent—it can't guarantee it, but it will help to prevent—a third world war. We have gone so far as to say that if we had had this pact we would not have had the
Second World War and possibly not the First World War. If so, it seems to me your reasoning must lead to conclusion in favor of the pact.

Mr. Boss. No, sir. As I said at the beginning, I could only come here to interpret the position of the commission. We recognize that you and the other Members of the Senate have the responsibility, and a very grave responsibility, for determining the final issues. We will continue to pray for you, whichever you do.

Senator Green. We will reciprocate, I assure you.

Mr. Boss. You have the decision to make. We cannot make the decision. All we can do is to give our point of view and develop it and to answer your questions and to do so humbly and reverently, but when we have done that, you have to act.

Senator Green. That is why I am trying to get your point of view. I am trying to find out the logical conclusions from what you have said.

Mr. Boss. That is correct.

Senator Green. When you say you recognize the need of national defense, evidently they did not wish to go against national defense in a military sense, but they did not want to commit themselves to it, perhaps. If it is left uncertain, who must decide, if not Congress? That is my point.

Mr. Boss. Yes. If we brought the whole statement of the general conference, you would find it completely committed to the United Nations; you would find it believing that the processes of negotiation and reconciliation must continually be applied; you would see that it asks for the means of developing better understanding between the nations; that it emphasizes the cultural and economic steps which we can take.

That is, I think the United States now stands in the place where we do have a recognition of strength among the nations. I think we have the great moment of history when the United States can give the leadership for creating a peaceful world.

Senator Green. To apply that to the Atlantic Pact, do not those thoughts run through the whole Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Boss. With the exception of the points Senator George brought out, which we think are the points where the dangers lie in the pact.

Senator Green. There may be danger. I am not saying that. But in the pact itself those thoughts permeate it. So it seems to me that you cannot hesitate to endorse it. You may later decide that you do not like the way in which Congress has implemented it, but that is another question.

Mr. Boss. I know, but the commission looked ahead and it at least took the rumors of implementation, and for that reason felt it was not ready to approve the pact. We did not care to come out and call upon the whole church to take a position of opposition to it. That is where we stand.

The Chairman. Just one question.

Mr. Boss. Yes, Senator Connally.

The Chairman. In the last part of your statement, you say:

We urge that it be given full and free discussion by the American people before it is acted upon by the Senate of the United States.

Mr. Boss. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. From your reading of the papers and from your observations, do you not concede that this committee has been under-
taking to go fully into the matter and give everybody that knows anything an opportunity to speak?

Mr. Boss. Yes, sir. I am sure our whole commission would unite in thanking you and expressing appreciation for opening this thing widely, as you have certainly done for me this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your statement.

Mrs. Clifford Bender, who is representing another branch of the Methodist Church. It is the woman's division of Christian service of the Methodist Church. Is that correct? You represent both branches of the Methodist Church, I assume, north and south?

Mrs. Bender. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recognize this organization that has just spoken as a part of the Methodist hierarchy?

Mrs. Bender. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

STATEMENT OF MRS. CLIFFORD A. BENDER, ON BEHALF OF THE WOMAN'S DIVISION OF CHRISTIAN SERVICE, THE METHODIST CHURCH

Mrs. Bender. Thank you for the opportunity to appear. I am going to cut my time so as to save your time.

My name is Margaret Bender. I live in Leonia, N. J. I appear this morning as a member of the department of Christian social relations and local activities of the woman's division of Christian service of the Methodist Church.

The CHAIRMAN. You are authorized to speak for them by some action of this body?

Mrs. Bender. For that department; yes, sir.

ALTERNATIVE ACTION TO THE PACT

On March 22, 1949, the following action was taken by the executive committee of the woman's division of Christian service:

In order to achieve world security by common efforts the woman's division recommends the following:

1. That the Senate allow ample time for the discussion and full hearings on the North Atlantic Defense Pact and possible alternatives.

2. That the United States take the initiative in proposing as an effective alternative to the pact, consideration of a general security agreement, under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which would be open to all members of the United Nations.

3. That the United States propose a full-scale conference at the earliest possible date on German and Japanese treaties.

4. That continued efforts be made to reach agreement on the international reduction of armaments and control of atomic energy.

5. That the United States make increased appropriations to the United Nations and provide for full participation and support of specialized agencies, such as the International Trade Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, etc., and the International Children's Emergency Fund.

6. That there be full cooperation of the United States through United Nations agencies, for the promotion of greater economic and social well-being throughout the world.

7. We continue to oppose a policy of commitments to foreign military aid. Such a policy will hinder economic recovery through diverting manpower, machines, and materials for defense purposes; provoke fear, and stimulate an arms
race on the part of the Soviet Union. Also such a program of foreign military aid, plus our national rearmament program, would substantially increase our United States budget, and threaten our domestic economy.

We recognize that opinions of equally sincere statesmen and Christians differ on the probable results of the proposed pact. While we would be in accord with the objective sought by the proponents of the pact, that of—

deterring aggression and establishing the sense of security necessary for the restoration of the economic and political health of the world (Secretary of State Dean Acheson)—

we believe that all responsible citizens must consider the possible dangers as well as advantages of pursuing this policy. And we must continue to think of alternatives.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE PACT

While it is true that basic mistrust, fear, provocative propaganda, conflict of policy, and insecurity have tragically divided the world and caused stalemates in the United Nations, we believe that this organization offers the chief hope for world peace.

Already the efforts of the United Nations and its related agencies have prevented war and stopped aggression at several points, and have laid the foundations of a peaceful world in the economic and social fields. It is a place where all the nations of the world may meet, expose issues to the light of public opinion, and seek out areas of agreement and compromise. Notwithstanding the imperfections, the United Nations provides techniques for the peaceful settlement of disputes, if the necessary moral and spiritual conditions can be met.

Is the pact a desirable addition to American foreign policy? Will it be effective where the United Nations has been ineffective? Is the pact consistent with the United Nations? Will it strengthen the United Nations?

While the pact is legally permitted by the Charter of the United Nations, we believe that such arrangements are contrary to the spirit of the United Nations.

Freda Kirchwey writes in the April 9, 1949, issue of the Nation:

Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the right of member nations to defend themselves against armed attack, individually or collectively, until the Security Council has taken measures to deal with the emergency. But article 58 provides that no enforcement action shall be taken by any regional agency “without the authorization of the Security Council,” and article 54 says that the “Council shall be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements • * * ”. The text of the pact ignores these detailed provisions; instead it states that the signatories will act “forthwith” in case of armed attack upon a fellow member and will then report action to the Security Council.

The pact further states that members will stop action when the Security Council takes the necessary steps to restore the peace.

The signatories thus tend to become judges in their own case; they decide the problem of aggression and the aggressor without standards being laid down or procedures defined. They are free to act without mediation, and become the judges of the adequacy of the United Nations Security Council’s actions. Does not the pact, in fact, deny United Nations jurisdiction on action regarding aggression, or at the least, fail to spell out the relationship?
In spite of the statement in the preamble of the pact that the parties to the treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and practices of the UN Charter, there is likelihood that the prestige of the UN will be endangered, and that confusion will be created in the minds of member nations by the fact that article 2 binds the signatories to educational and economic activities which are clearly within the scope of United Nations agencies, without spelling out the relationship.

**CONSISTENCY OF TREATY WITH CHARTER**

Despite the repeated assurances that the North Atlantic Treaty is consistent with the UN Charter, the treaty tends to overshadow and bypass the United Nations in its procedures, expenditures, and the loyalty of member nations.

The size and importance of the nations signing this agreement causes it to overshadow the UN because it includes three of the five permanent members of the Security Council, all of the major colonial powers, and represents more than 50 percent of the world's industrial capacity. The five nations that are outside the pact might possibly feel insecure because of the wealth, power, and prestige of the pact signatories.

The UN budget, furthermore, compares tragically with the sum contemplated for military assistance to the treaty countries. The total UN budget is $33,469,587 and the United States contribution, $18,115,260. The proposed sum of $1,130,000,000 in military assistance to treaty countries is over 60 times the amount we spend on the UN and over 30 times the UN budget. And the United States is spending over 900 times its contribution to the UN on its own Defense Establishment.

There is grave danger that the UN may splinter into armed camps, and that the UN will decline in prestige. The pact may widen the gulf between the east and west, cause Russia to make countermoves, and lessen the chance of finally reaching a universal security system under the UN.

In offering the Atlantic Pact as a substitute for what we feel to be the declining faith in the UN's ability to prevent aggression on the part of the vulnerable nations of western Europe we are gambling on our ability to make this substitute faith a sure one.

In spite of all efforts expended to popularize the pact, there are still grave doubts as to whether the people of the countries involved have actually been able to make this transfer of faith. In Norway, for example, there are indications that the popular fear of being caught in a war has not been alleviated by the pact. This is especially serious because of Norway's proximity to Russia.

**MILITARY ALLIANCES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER**

History indicates that the most that can be achieved by military alliances is a temporary balance of power, while they eventually give rise to increasing insecurity and a menacing armaments race, ending in war.

Blair Bolles, writing in the New Republic, February 21, 1949, states:

The twentieth century diplomatic boneyard is littered with dead defense treaties that failed their purpose. They did not prevent the outbreak of war, and once war came, they did not always insure victory.
The necessary concomitant of the pact is the arming of Europe. It is difficult to imagine that this step will not provoke more tension, fear, suspicion, and a swiftly mounting armaments race.

There is not, however, evidence to prove that armaments of themselves protect a civilization. The historian Toynbee has pointed out that of the 16 civilizations which have fallen in recorded history, 16 were strongly militarized. The crisis of a civilization, he concludes, comes not in the test of its military strength, but in the way in which it summons its moral resources to meet a great challenge.

The next two decades may well be our great chance to show the mettle of our civilization. The task of making it possible for two conflicting ideologies to exist in a peaceful world while their adequacy to the needs of their people is tested by time seems an almost impossible one at the moment, but a nation with economic, technological, and human resources that we possess might be capable of rising to this emergency, as it has risen in the past to wartime emergencies.

**EFFECT OF TREATY AT HOME AND ABROAD**

In this day of shrinking distances and accelerating communication, the speed with which political and military events shape up makes it impossible to guarantee that arms provided to signatory nations will not be used against those whom they were intended to protect, as has been the case with China, or even against us.

What will be the effect on recovery at home and abroad? These new expenditures added to the $15,000,000,000 already appropriated for defense purposes would tend to increase inflation and the tax burden, and might lead to wartime controls and growing restrictions on the freedom of American people.

Though it is claimed that it is not the intention to build up large armaments that would interfere with economic recovery, it is difficult to see how the increasing of military production in western Europe could help but curtail seriously civilian production. If scarce resources, machinery, and manpower are diverted from peacetime production to armaments, needed restoration of factories, agriculture, homes, and so forth, will be delayed. Delay of economic recovery may cause communism to spread.

**ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES IN THE TREATY**

There are a number of points in the proposed pact where practical administrative difficulties will appear with increasing force as the pact gets under way. The difficulty of a decision as to what constitutes a necessity for going to war is perhaps the primary one of these. For instance, if a Communist revolution occurs in a signatory country, is that to be interpreted as an aggressive act on the part of Russia or as an internal matter? It is interesting to note in this connection that actually more of the acts of Russian aggression during the last few years have been of this type than of the marching-army type. The long-term provisions for keeping the pact in existence may also cause difficulties unforeseen at this point. For instance, if a nation—say France—should go Communist, would it be desirable to keep her in the pact? There is no provision for expelling a member in the present pact.
Article 4, which calls for the consulting together of the parties to the pact whenever a threat of aggression is believed to exist, and article 9, which establishes a council of member nations, need much more clarification. The defense committee and "such other subsidiary bodies" which are also suggested in article 9, offer alarming possibilities for the piling up of cumbersome machinery and duplication of UN functions.

It also seems that the provision for unanimous approval of new nations seeking entry to the pact is as unworkable as any of the difficult provisions of the UN Charter. We might not stay a unanimous group after the crisis seems to have passed.

It seems quite possible, therefore, that we are attempting to escape the problems of the UN by setting up another type of organization which will eventually be confronted by those same problems in no less degree, instead of facing the issue in the United Nations squarely at this point.

While there is no single easy answer to the present world crisis and the threat of totalitarian or Communist expansion, there are areas in which our Nation can work vigorously.

**FULL SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS**

1. Full cooperation, adequate support, and strengthening of the UN. It is our conviction that the UN must be the keystone of our foreign policy. Agreements and actions that lie within the scope of the Charter should be routed through the UN.

The break-down of the UN would make impossible that gradual development of mutual trust which can only be achieved by working together and which is the only logical and reasonable way in which a gradual surrender of sovereignty in some areas can be secured. Our only hope of developing such a world morality as is called for by the Charter of the UN is in a continuing development of situations in which we can work together and in which the value of each surrender of sovereignty becomes obvious in concrete form to the nations involved. For analogy note the frontier town where everyone has complete sovereignty which he gradually surrenders in an effort to get greater safety and more services for himself until he shows no unhappiness at what he has relinquished—only pleasure in the improvement of his life. He does not mind that he cannot set a machine gun up on his lawn to defend himself; he is content to obey quarantines, and so forth. Similarly, Russia might conceivably at a future date be willing to trade some of her sovereignty for greater security from disease and a better standard of living if she was as sure as our ex-frontiersman is that her personality would be protected.

**PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

2. Maximum cooperation by the United States, preferably through UN agencies, for the promotion of greater economic and social well-being throughout the world. We must continue to act on the belief that the best way to stop the spread of communism is to help rehabilitate themselves. The major problem of Europe is not military; it is economic and psychological. We reaffirm our support of the United
States economic cooperation program and urge its larger and more efficient use through UN agencies—

In order to supply the basic necessities of normal existence, to insure full employment and the achievement of a normal balance of trade, and to serve as a more effective bulwark against communism.

We urge the full implementation of the fourth objective stated in President Truman's inaugural address which advocates the sharing of American technology with people living in less well-developed areas of the world. This we do both out of a Christian concern for the welfare of the peoples involved and because such economic development of lands in which hunger and want now prevail will tend toward the economic stability of every other land.

There is growing recognition that economic well-being is a necessary foundation for world peace and security. The UN has made a good beginning in attacking basic world-wide problems. The long-term program of improving food, trade, health, and literacy must have increased appropriations, and only in an atmosphere of trust in the UN can these appropriations be secured. If UN prestige is damaged to any degree, nations—such as the Scandinavian countries—which are really making heroic national sacrifices in order to do such work as the tuberculosis campaign for school children in Europe, will feel that their effort is useless.

The threat of mass starvation can probably be averted only through a united world effort. Possible solution lies within the scope of the Food and Agriculture Organization's activities. The FAO, because of the lack of funds, cannot undertake more than a fraction of the projects requested. Likewise much of the program contemplated for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries could be carried on most effectively and efficiently by such UN agencies, were their budget and personnel enlarged.

It is a fallacy to think that any major world problem can be attacked unilaterally in this day of interdependence. Soil erosion in Australia, forest fires in Maine, irrigation projects in Iran are inextricably tied into the food and health potential of the world; it is impossible to find solutions on a unilateral basis.

SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH RUSSIA

3. Since the administration points out that there is no threat of immediate or early war with Russia should not the present time be used for determined and persistent effort to end the cold war and to seek flexible negotiations with the Soviet Union on issues outstanding between the countries—patiently seeking common goals and mutually acceptable compromises?

The Cleveland Study Conference on the Churches and World Order urged that—

the avenues of formal negotiation between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union must be kept open, and the way should be cleared for informal conferences between unofficial religious, educational, business, labor, and cultural groups of both nations. * * * We believe that the method of tolerance that is basic to conference will enable each to learn from the other, and give opportunity for the extension of this method on which peace in a world of contradictory ideology depends.

4. We urge full-scale conferences at the earliest possible date on German and Japanese treaties.
5. The United States should campaign vigorously and persistently for the universal reduction of armaments, subject to adequate international inspection and control. Flexible negotiations for the control of atomic energy must be continued.

FOR A UNIVERSAL SECURITY SYSTEM

6. Only a universal security system backed by an effective force can provide true collective security. We suggest that the United States attempt to get the Atlantic Pact accepted as a part of the United Nations structure under article 51, opening it freely to all who wish to join, and providing for the placing of contingents at its disposal for use in case of aggression, with the decision as to when that aggression exists to be made in some way through the General Assembly, perhaps utilizing the Little Assembly at times when the General Assembly is not in session, but arranging it so that the decision will be made by a simple two-thirds majority of the members of the United Nations.

Used wisely, this pact might be the means of bypassing the Security Council veto so effectively that a modification of the use of the veto might be easily secured. Such issues as the veto are fundamental and must be faced before world confidence is lost.

To the pessimistic who fear that Russia would walk out of the United Nations, let us point out that we have said that again and again about areas of disagreement—for instance, the Little Assembly—and Russia remains a member of the United Nations. Such a facing of issues would bring a torrent of abuse and perhaps such a gesture as Russia made when she left the World Health Organization, but at the worst it could hardly make the situation more difficult than it is.

The primary question facing us is whether we are to put our ultimate faith in the force of arms or in the process of reason. We share the fears engendered by belligerent acts and attitudes of the Soviet Union, but we still feel that a Christian Nation we must continue courageously to explore every possibility of constructive action in the framework of the United Nations before returning to the balance of power strategy.

The alternative of the pact and the arms program cannot at best be looked upon as anything but an inferior alternative. Before an easy acceptance of the pact as the “best under the circumstances we must take time to examine with patience and realism and imagination all alternatives and amendments that could bring it closer in line with the stated objectives of the pact—that of “strengthening the United Nations, deterring aggression, and establishing the sense of security necessary for the restoration of the economic and political health of the world.”

POSITION ON RATIFICATION

The Chairman. On the whole then, are you for or against ratification?

Mrs. Bender. That is an extremely difficult question to answer. I am for modification of the treaty and its subsequent adoption.
The Chairman. You realize that the modification would have to be taken up by all the 11 other nations, do you not?

Mrs. Bender. Certainly.

The Chairman. You would not ratify it now; you would postpone it and wait to see if we could renegotiate the treaty?

Mrs. Bender. I would not hastily ratify it; that is correct.

The Chairman. So you are against it.

Mrs. Bender. In substance, no.

The Chairman. In substance, no?

Mrs. Bender. No.

The Chairman. You are not against it?

Mrs. Bender. I believe that with modification—

The Chairman. We do not have the modification here. I mean just as the matter stands now, are you for ratification or oppose it?

Mrs. Bender. Without further adjustment and change in it I would be opposed to its adoption at this point.

The Chairman. Do you speak for your organization when you say that?

Mrs. Bender. I think so.

The Chairman. Did it pass on that question?

Mrs. Bender. The executive committee has passed the resolutions which I read.

The Chairman. So the main body—

Mrs. Bender. The interpretation of that is my own.

The Chairman. The main body of your organization did not pass on that?

Mrs. Bender. The duly elected representatives of the main body, in executive committee, passed on it.

The Chairman. I understand that. But that does not answer my question. The main body never passed on it.

Mrs. Bender. You mean did the million and a half women in the women's division vote on it individually? They did not. They elected the people who passed on it.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chairman. You say you oppose military commitments and foreign military aid. By that do you oppose aid to Greece?

Mrs. Bender. In principle; yes.

The Chairman. In principle? I do not know what you mean by "principle." Do you favor aid to Greece or not?

Mrs. Bender. Not as unilateral action.

The Chairman. That is the only kind of action we can take ourselves, is unilateral action. Are you opposed to military aid to Turkey?

Mrs. Bender. As unilateral action; yes.

The Chairman. Do you think we ought to wait and get the other countries in the world to join us?

Mrs. Bender. I think it should be done through the United Nations. The Chairman. The United Nations did not do it. It had a chance to do it.

Mrs. Bender. I do not think we explored that sufficiently.
The Chairman. You want to think of alternatives. That means the abandonment of this treaty and the negotiation of some other kind of treaty?

Mrs. Bender. No; it does not mean the junking of it. It would mean the amendment of it. I think our suggestion is for a clear amendment.

Consistency of Treaty with United Nations

The Chairman. You speak continually of the United Nations. Does not this treaty, in a number of places, state its view that we want to cooperate with the United Nations, this treaty is being made in subordination to the overriding authority of the United Nations, and that we hope to strengthen the United Nations? Is that not all through this treaty?

Mrs. Bender. We have mentioned that that is what is stated. We have also pointed out the points at which we think it would actually tend to undermine the prestige.

The Chairman. You do not agree, then, that this treaty in a number of places affirms its loyalty to the United Nations?

Mrs. Bender. I agree that it affirms its loyalty. But I feel in practice it actually would work to the disadvantage of prestige.

The Chairman. In other words, you recognize this claim of loyalty but you do not believe it is going to be loyal?

Mrs. Bender. It is not a question of believing it is going to be loyal. It is a question of foreseeing what the actual result will be, which is extremely difficult to do.

The Chairman. You say: "Is the pact consistent with the United Nations?" Is it not specifically stated in the treaty that it is being urged under article 51 of the United Nations Charter?

Mrs. Bender. We said in our statement that we believed it was technically in accord with article 51, but that it was not in accord with the spirit of the United Nations.

The Chairman. You say "In spite of the statement in the preamble," and so on, there is the likelihood that the prestige of the United Nations will be endangered and that there will be confusion created in the minds of the United Nations.

Mrs. Bender. That is right.

Inclusion of Norway in the Pact

The Chairman. You speak of Norway. You question Norway's sincerity in joining the pact. You say:

In Norway, for example, there are indications that the popular fear of being caught in the war has not been alleviated by the pact. This is especially serious, because of Norway's proximity to Russia. Is it not a fact that Norway's Parliament ratified the treaty by an overwhelming vote?

Mrs. Bender. It is.

The Chairman. You spoke about your committee being elected by the people, and so on. Is not Norway's Parliament elected by their people?

Mrs. Bender. Yes. There are two questions involved there.
The Chairman. There is no question involved at all except the one that I asked you, and that is: did not the Parliament of Norway overwhelmingly ratify this treaty?

Mrs. Bender. The answer to that question is "Yes." I would like to point out though, that the problem that worries me—

The Chairman. You are not in the Norwegian Parliament. I asked you about the Parliament. You agree that the Parliament did overwhelmingly ratify the treaty?

Mrs. Bender. Yes. I would like to point out though, that that is not the problem that worries me. The problem that worries me is the choice of alternatives that was presented to the Norwegian Parliament at that point, and the feeling of the people of Norway which at any point could change the decisions and faith in its Parliament.

I think Norway, confronted with a definite worsening of world trust in the United Nations, which was partly brought about by the discussion of the Atlantic Treaty, had very little alternative except to accept the pact.

The Chairman. They had the alternative of not ratifying the treaty, and the other alternative was to ratify the treaty.

Mrs. Bender. That is right.

The Chairman. So they considered the alternatives.

**ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST COUP**

You refer to a Communist revolution in a country that is a member of the pact, and what is to be done about it. If there were a country that turned Communist, is it not entirely probable and likely that that country would not cooperate any further with the members of the treaty?

Mrs. Bender. I just am confused at that point. I do not see what the treaty says about what you do, and I would like that further clarified.

The Chairman. I am just asking you, if a country turned Communist, is it not probable that they would decline, from then on, to cooperate with the other members of this treaty?

Mrs. Bender. That might be so. Then what do we do? Do we compel them to?

The Chairman. We will get to that a little later. If they refused to cooperate and not to carry out the treaty, would not the other powers to the treaty not cooperate with them, and let them fade out, let them leave, withdraw, or do whatever they please to do?

Mrs. Bender. I do not know.

The Chairman. Is that not logical?

Mrs. Bender. I do not know just what would happen in such a situation.

The Chairman. I do not know for certain, but I think I know that.

That is all that I have to ask, I believe.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your views on this matter.

Mrs. Bender. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Ewing Cockrell, president, United States Federation of Justice. How long a statement do you have, sir?
STATEMENT OF EWING COCKRELL, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES FEDERATION OF JUSTICE

Mr. Cockrell. A very short one. I have only what might be of interest to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this federation?

Mr. Cockrell. To promote the successful measures of law administration, the things that work.

The CHAIRMAN. Sir?

Mr. Cockrell. To promote the successful measures of law administration, the things that work.

The CHAIRMAN. How many members have you?

Mr. Cockrell. We originally started with 5,000. There is just a national council now.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a council?

Mr. Cockrell. Ten or twelve.

The CHAIRMAN. So all the authority of this organization is now vested in this council, is that right?

Mr. Cockrell. Yes, sir. I have had to do all the work.

The CHAIRMAN. So after all, you are the council?

Mr. Cockrell. I am the working member. I may say, we have organized with the endorsement of Chief Justice Taft, Vice President Dawes, Speaker Longworth, and the majority and minority leaders of the Congress on both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. Your organization has shrunk from 5,000 to you?

Mr. Cockrell. No, not exactly that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. Cockrell. We are working to supply information, to support the American bipartisan peace enforcement policy of President Truman, the United States Senate, and members of this committee particularly. That is our primary work at this time.

I have 10 statements here that I will make one at a time and be glad to answer any questions that you have.

THE TREATY AS AN UNPRECEDENTED STEP

The North Atlantic Treaty, instead of only an incident in the cold war, is an unprecedented step in American and world history. Of all the agreements in modern history to resist aggression in Europe where it is most apt to occur, this one appears to be the most effective yet made.

Its basic character is that today it is the only such agreement among governments to resist force with force that surely binds all such governments.

It is made by the largest number of militarily powerful states that ever joined in advance to resist with armed force, if deemed necessary, an attack upon them.

As preparation for defense against attack in Europe and involvement of the United States, it is superior to any treaty ever submitted to the Senate since the defeat of the Versailles Treaty provisions of the First World War.

It is the only agreement by the United States that it will resist with force, if need be, an attack on European states that would endanger the security or welfare of this country.
It is the only agreement even by all the European states, who have been so repeatedly attacked, that they will hereafter defend each other. It provides more of the essential first need of peace than all the other proposals put together ever submitted by all governments in the United Nations in its whole history—to wit, the essential of force to defend the peace.

It is the only official notice in advance by the United States to potential aggressors that it will resist their attack and do so enough to overcome it.

It is the only agreement ever officially proposed to Congress that carries out in part the strong, repeated declarations for world peace enforcement made by the President, by the Senate, and 12 individual members of this Senate committee.

To carry out the treaty, Congress and the President are given the extreme range of freedom of action. They have only one limitation. That is that their action shall be what they think will succeed, not action they deliberately think will fail.

The official record on these 10 assertions is plain. A number of them are self-evident or well known. Others that should be stated are the following:

**ABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS TO FUNCTION**

(a) Lack of UN agreements or proposals for peace:

All pending United Nations proposals for force to maintain peace have, instead of providing such a force, presented three blocks to that maintenance.

That is the result of what Senator Connally mentioned, that they have taken no cognizance, as yet, of the change in the conditions when the Dumbarton Oaks provisions were made, and now: (1) Any state can refuse to furnish any such forces. (2) Even if all furnished, they are too small to prevent war by any of the three great powers now able to wage it. (3) Even if made large enough, their use by the United Nations can be vetoed by any one of the five permanent Security Council members.

To be specific: Suppose the Soviets and all other United Nations agreed today to all the provisions proposed by any government or all governments to maintain peace. The Soviets could then attack all the 12 states in the Atlantic treaty and at the same time legally block the Security Council from using any UN forces, even of the same 12 states to defend themselves against such attack.

(b) United States obligations under the treaty:

These obligations boil down to one thing; that is, for “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” What kind of action and how much are solely what may be judged necessary by the Congress and the President, acting under the constitutional powers of each.

**FLEXIBILITY OF OBLIGATIONS**

The treaty contains no agreement to defend any state. The best assistance to Norway, if quickly overrun by the Soviets, might be to leave it alone until final victory is achieved elsewhere.
There is no agreement to send troops at all anywhere. If Congress, the President, and military men thought best, our assistance might be almost wholly by air and arms to other nations, or any way that Congress and the President thought best at the time.

The legal obligations on the Congress and the President are so little as to make it almost worthless. But there is one moral obligation that makes American agreement supremely valuable to Europe and a peace-loving world. That is that the action taken by us, and others, is to be what Congress and the President deem necessary to restore security of the North Atlantic area. And that obligation on an American Congress and President will bring everything needed for final victory in any war, if war must come.

Right here, I would like to cite as a fine statement of that position the statement of Senator Taft, nearly 6 years ago:

The principal aggression on the League of Nations is how to use our armed force to prevent aggression in the other parts of the world. Insofar as Europe is concerned I believe the only obligation should be the secondary obligation after the council of Europe has made every possible effort and failed.

Many will object to any such undertaking, but I believe within carefully defined limits we should take an active part in maintaining peace. I see no loss of sovereignty in a treaty binding us to send our armed forces abroad on the finding of an international body.

Being sovereign, we could refuse to keep our promises. Being Americans, we would not refuse.

This treaty is fine, and still has not caught up with Senator Taft’s announcement of 5 or 6 years ago, that we should send troops abroad on a finding of an international body.

Nothing happens under this treaty, except what the individual Members of the Senate and House and the President deem necessary. It is a very fine treaty, gentlemen, in the way in which it has been drawn.

The extreme extent to which it goes, as I have said, is unprecedented, the only thing yet that says we will go far enough to maintain peace, and yet how much we do, what it has done, is all up to the individual Members of the Senate and the House and the President, provided it is what they deem necessary.

PEACE POLICY OF THE SENATE

This treaty is the first step to provide force to carry out the peace policy of the Senate, the President, and the American people to prevent war. The treaty now makes a fitting occasion for Congress to announce this policy to the world and at the same time to strengthen the treaty by declaring it a first step toward a maintained universal disarmament if the Soviets will so agree.

Nobody could be entitled to precedence over this committee to lead in this announcement. Twelve of its thirteen members have already led in declarations for such a strong international force. Senators Connally, George, Thomas of Utah, Tydings, Pepper, Green, Vandenberg, Wiley, Smith, and Lodge—and Senator Truman—voted for or favored the Connally resolution for “international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world,” November 3, 1943.

Eighty-five members to five voted for that, and I think everybody on this committee, who was in Congress at that time, voted for it, or
favored it, and Governor Hickenlooper favored it later in a declaration which was gotten up.

Senators Green, Thomas, Truman, and Governor Hickenlooper joined in a separate declaration for the same force in 1944. Senator Tydings' resolution, January 28, 1946, was for a similar international force and world disarmament, and it was immediately endorsed by Senators Taft, Fulbright, and Smith. Senator Vandenberg gave such a policy the supreme place in men's lives when he called "an approach to mutual disarmament incomparably the greatest of movements for the common good" if there be "summary disciplines against bad faith"—February 8, 1947, and repeated in substance February 10 and April 25, 1949.

General Eisenhower and Dr. Karl T. Compton and a majority of the President's Commission on Universal Training also gave the same supreme place to the same policy in 1947.

What I think would be of help to this treaty, to the whole country, and to the whole world, would be for this body, the Senate, or the President, to state or adopt a simple resolution like this:

**INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE**

That the bipartisan peace policy of the American people, Congress and the President is for an international force able to maintain world peace and disarmament and, if any state refuses to join in it, for the necessary world rearmament by the other states for protection against its possible aggression.

That the North Atlantic Treaty and all action under it is to be considered as one step to carry out this policy of, first, world cooperation for universal, fully maintained disarmament and peace, or, second, world cooperation for defense against aggression.

That such international force is:
1. The one for which Senator Truman and 84 other senators voted against 5 opponents, on November 3, 1943, for—the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.

2. The one with the same international authority contained in a declaration of ten peace fundamental policies in which Senator Truman again joined with 65 other Senators, Representatives, Governors, United States judges, former ambassadors, and others on June 22, 1944 (and as printed in the Congressional Record of June 21, 1945, copy annexed).

3. That which is in the resolution for maintained world disarmament of Senator Tydings of January 28, 1946, which was then endorsed in substance by Senators Taft, Fulbright and H. Alexander Smith.

4. The one in the declaration of President Truman on December 2, 1946 for "a sufficient police force for United Nations to maintain the peace of the world" and then "world disarmament."

5. That which is able to maintain the "practical formula for disarmament and the outlawing of war," expressed by Speaker Martin January 3, 1947.

6. That of the former chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Vandenberg, for "summary disciplines against
bad faith” of the great powers in “the utmost limits of disarmaments,” as expected February 8, 1947 and repeated February 10, 1949 and April 25, 1949.

7. That which will carry out President Truman’s declaration for “atomic energy to be placed under international control and on a practical realistic basis that means the control will work,” and that: “The fearful power of atomic weapons must be placed behind the reach of any irresponsible government or power-mad dictator,” as he so expressed October 14, 1948.

8. That which is in the statement of President Karl T. Compton in 1947 for “universal, progressive disarmament under conditions which will safeguard every nation against threat of military aggression by others,” endorsed by him, the chairman and a majority of the members of the President’s Commission on Universal Training and by Harry Woodburn Chase, chancellor, New York University; Arthur H. Compton, chancellor, Washington University (St. Louis), Nobel Prize winner in physics; Robert C. Clothier, president, Rutgers University; Joseph E. Davies, member Commission on Universal Training, former Ambassador to Russia; Harold W. Dodds, president, Princeton University, member Commission on Universal Training; Ernest W. Gibson, Governor of Vermont; Truman K. Gibson, member Commission on Universal Training, former civilian aide to Secretary of War, attorney at law, Chicago; George William McClelland, president, University of Pennsylvania; F. D. Patterson, president, Tuskegee Institute; Daniel A. Poling, president, International Society of Christian Endeavor, member Commission on Universal Training, editor, Christian Herald; Charles Seymour, president, Yale University, United States delegate at peace conference, Paris, 1919, former exchange professor at Universities of Brussels, Ghent, Liege, and Louvain; Charles E. Wilson, president, General Electric Co., member Commission on Universal Training; J. Strom Thurmond, Governor of South Carolina; Donald B. Tressider, president, Stanford University.

9. That which has been endorsed in substance by Secretaries of State Byrnes and Marshall, Secretary of War Patterson, ex-President Hoover, Presidential nominees John W. Davis, Alf M. Landon, and Thomas E. Dewey, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and many other American leaders.

We commend an invitation to all governments to join in a like statement of peace policy.

IMPORTANCE OF DISARMAMENT

With this commendation, we submit the following expressions of the supreme place in the life of mankind given to such a force and disarmament by the following:

General Eisenhower speaks of “agreements whose universal acceptance will one day eliminate the need for armed forces.” And says:

Attainment of no other goal could add so much to the tranquility and prosperity of all mankind (January 17, 1947).

Senator Vandenberg calls—an approach to mutual disarmament incomparably the greatest of movements for the common good (February 8, 1947).
President Compton and 14 associates state:

The inestimable gain to all peoples of the world which would be achieved if a general disarmament program could be put into operation would seem to make this the supreme goal of international effort.

If desired, the following could be added to the resolution:

For the terms of the universal disarmament the resolution to comment (or “submit to the consideration of the United Nations”) the proposals of the Soviet Union of 1928-32 for: Universal disarmament down to internal police, to be effected simultaneously by the reduction of all weapons of all states by equal percentages, by an international commission acting by majority vote of all participating states, with the commission to have “every facility for the full investigation of all branches of the activities of the state, of public associations and of private persons ‘concerning the observance’ of the disarmament ‘undertaking,’ with each state to make violations of the agreement ‘a grave offense against the states.’”

That resolution, if you wanted to, could contain in it its own proof, to recite the declaration first of the Connally resolution, then the President’s statement of 1946 for sufficient police for the United Nations to maintain the peace of the world, and then world disarmament. But the force comes first.

The same sentiments were expressed by Speaker Martin, as expressed by Senators Vandenberg and Truman, that no power-mad dictator or aggressive government could take possession of atomic energy plants.

Every proposal on atomic energy in the United Nations now spreads atomic energy facilities over the world, and professes that it cannot stop their use by any adverse government.

I will be glad to answer any questions, by Senator Donnell expressly, or anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you are a son of a former Senator, Francis Cockrell of Missouri, who served in the Senate?

Mr. COCKRELL. Yes, sir; for 30 years.

The CHAIRMAN. You have some distinguished relatives in Texas?

Mr. COCKRELL. Yes, sir; I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Red Cockrell, of Dallas, and another Cockrell at Abilene?

Mr. COCKRELL. Uncle Bart served two terms in Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Joe Cockrell was the Dallas lawyer?

Mr. COCKRELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A very distinguished lawyer.

Mr. COCKRELL. That is what they tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. A very able man.

Mr. COCKRELL. He was the son of Uncle Bart.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. I was not here to hear much of Judge Cockrell’s testimony, but I wonder if the record shows that he himself was a member of the circuit bench of the State of Missouri some years ago?

The CHAIRMAN. That does not show.

Senator DONNELL. I would like to have that shown.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have that shown.

Senator DONNELL. I do not have any questions to ask the judge.
Mr. COCKRELL. I am here primarily for two reasons. One is that this is a first step to carry out the policies that you men have enunciated and expressed, and the President. It is the first one that provides for force.

In the second place, it is a very fine job in itself, the way in which it provides the extreme limit of force, if necessary, and leaves that up to the Senate and to the House and to the President to decide what it shall be.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, very much. We are glad to have your testimony.

Mr. COCKRELL. Thank you.

(The declaration of peace fundamentals from the Congressional Record mentioned by Mr. Cockrell follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, June 21, 1941, p. 8024]

DECLARATION OF PEACE FUNDAMENTALS

Mr. THOMAS of Utah. Mr. President, an outstanding contribution toward creating support for a proper International organization for peace was carried through by Judge Ewing Cockrell. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the declaration of peace fundamentals which Judge Cockrell worked out and which were accepted as objectives by many persons be printed in the Record with the names of the persons who allowed their names to be signed to the objectives.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The declaration, with the names signed thereto, is as follows:

"DECLARATION OF 10 PEACE FUNDAMENTALS"

"We approve in substance the following 10 fundamental policies or foundations for postwar peace. They are, expressly, only policies, do not include the forms of international organization to carry them out nor exclude our support of other policies or measures:

1. Disarmament of Axis or aggressor nations.
2. Maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.
3. Fair treatment of Axis or aggressor nations.
4. A body or procedures to secure peaceful settlement of any international dispute. 
5. Victorious allies to hold armaments and decrease them as they feel secure.
6. The peace to bring more freedom to peoples.
7. Mutual aid between nations, especially to the weak.
8. International cooperation for betterments in all fields of human life.
9. Special postwar cooperation by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China, with the other United Nations.
10. International organization on a wide and voluntary basis.

Senator Warren R. Austin, member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; joint author Mackinac Declaration of Republican Postwar Advisory Council.
Senator Joseph H. Ball, joint author of Four Senators' Resolution on Postwar International Cooperation; member, bipartisan campaign committee, 1943, for international cooperation.
Senator Harold H. Burton, joint author same resolution and member same bipartisan campaign committee.
Senator Theodore Francis Green, member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; United States delegate to International Red Cross Convention, 1912.
Senator James F. Guffey, member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Senator Carl A. Hatch, joint author, Four Senators' Resolution, and member, bipartisan campaign committee.
Senator Lister Hill, joint author, same resolution, and member, bipartisan committee; Democratic whip, United States Senate.
Senator Burnet R. Maybank, member, same bipartisan committee."
"Senator Elbert D. Thomas, of Utah, member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; chairman, Senate Committee on Education and Labor; vice president, American Society of International Law; member, Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of Interparliamentary Union.
"Senator Harry S. Truman, chairman, Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Programs; member, bipartisan campaign committee for international cooperation, 1943.
"Senator Robert F. Wagner, member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; former justice, New York Supreme Court.
"Senator Wallace A. White, Jr., member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; assistant Republican leader, United States Senate.
"Former Senator George W. Norris (Independent), former chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
"Representative Charles A. Eaton, ranking Republican member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
"Representative Richard P. Gale, member, bipartisan campaign committee.
"Representative Robert Hale, member, bipartisan committee (M. A., Oxford).
"Representative Christian A. Herter, member, bipartisan campaign committee; member, United States Embassy staff in Berlin and Belgium, 1916; secretary, American Peace Commission, 1918.
"Representative Walter H. Judd, member, bipartisan campaign committee; China medical missionary and superintendent of hospitals, 1925-38; speaker against Japanese military menace, 1939-40.
"Representative Charles M. LaFollette, member, bipartisan campaign committee.
"Representative Clare Boothe Luce, former foreign correspondent.
"Representative Howard J. McMurray, member, bipartisan committee.
"Representative Robert Ramspeck, member, bipartisan committee; Democratic whip, House of Representatives.
"Representative James A. Wadsworth, member, Committee on Foreign Affairs; former United States Senator from New York.
"Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court; chairman of board that investigated Pearl Harbor disaster.
"Gov. M. M. Neely, West Virginia, former United States Senator.
"Admiral J. O. Richardson (retired), Commander, United States Fleet, 1940-41.
"Chief Justice D. Lawrence Groner, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
"Judge Calvert Magruder, Boston, senior (presiding) judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Judicial Circuit; former professor and vice dean, Harvard Law School.
"Judge John J. Parker, Charlotte, N. C., senior (presiding) judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Appeals; medalist, American Bar Association, 1943, for conspicuous service in the cause of American jurisprudence.
"Judge Orle L. Phillips, Denver, senior (presiding) judge, Tenth Judicial Circuit Court of Appeals.
"Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, Philadelphia, United States Court of Appeals, Third Judicial Circuit; former president, American Association of Law Schools.
"Judge Justin Miller, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
"Judge John C. Knox, senior (presiding) judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York; chairman, Federal Courts Committee on Jury Selection, appointed by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
"Judge Albert L. Reeves, senior judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

"Gov. E. P. Carville, Nevada.
"Gov. Prentice Cooper, Tennessee.
"Gov. Colgate W. Darden, Virginia.
"Gov. Sam C. Ford, Montana.
"Gov. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa.
"Gov. John Moses, North Dakota.
"Gov. Henry F. Schricker, Indiana.
"Gov. Sumner Sewall, Maine.
"Gov. Edward T. Thye, Minnesota.
"Joseph B. Davies, former Ambassador to Russia.
"John W. Davis, former Ambassador to Great Britain; Democratic Presidential nominee, 1924.
"Ferdinand Q. Blanchard, moderator, Congregational Christian Churches.
"Chancellor Harry Woodburn Chase, New York University.
"President Frederic R. Condee, American Society of International Law; commander, French Legion d'Honneur; officer, Crown of Belgium; former chairman, New York League of Nations Association.
"George Creel, former editor, Denver Post and Rocky Mountain News; chairman, Committee on Public Information, First World War; former chairman, San Francisco Regional Labor Board.
"President Frank P. Graham, University of North Carolina; chairman, National Advisory Committee on Social Security; public member, War Labor Board.
"President William Green, American Federation of Labor; former member, governing board of the International Labor Organization.
"Dean A. J. Harno, University of Illinois College of Law; former president, American Association of Law Schools, and director, Illinois Association for Criminal Justice.
"Chairman Robert A. Millikan, California Institute of Technology; former president, American Academy of Arts and Sciences and American Physical Society; Nobel price winner; member, League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Cooperation; Order of the Jade, of China, and Chevalier de l'Ordre National de la Légion d'Honneur, of France.
"President Julian Morgenstern, the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.
"President John L. Newcomb, University of Virginia.
"Rt. Rev. Msgr. John A. Ryan, former professor, sociology and economics, Catholic University and Trinity College; director, social action department of National Catholic Welfare Conference.
"Bishop P. A. Wallace, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Churches, Brooklyn.
"Robert J. Watt, international representative, American Federation of Labor; American Workers' delegate to Geneva, 1938-40; member, National Labor Relations Board; chairman, Labor Advisory Committee, Federal Communications Commission.
"Dr. Mary E. Woolley, president emeritus, Mount Holyoke College; delegate, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments; former honorary moderator, Congregational-Christain General Council; former president, American Association of University Women, and chairman of its committee on international relations."

(Note by Ewing Cockrell: 7 of these 10 fundamentals were never before used or adequately used in international relations. All or their equivalents are successfully used nationally and locally in the United States. They provide a yardstick to measure the attainment of successful international organization.)

The CHAIRMAN. Bishop Walls?

STATEMENT OF BISHOP WILLIAM J. WALLS, BISHOP, AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL ZION CHURCH


The CHAIRMAN. You are the bishop of the Second Episcopal District, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church?
Bishop Walls. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Bishop WALLS. As an American, whose peculiar people have always made their loyal contribution to the Nation's cause, I feel grateful for this privilege of citizenship accorded me by this august committee.

COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE PACT

Like others, we seek the peace of the world and security of our own beloved America. The North Atlantic Pact, in the judgment of many of us, contains seeds of very grave import, and none more so than its implication for colonials. The situation, bad as it is in the colonies, will be approved and involved in permanency among the colonial nations signatory to the pact agreement.

For instance, if America pledges herself, as the pact provides, to engage in armed force without qualification on this issue, she will be bound to defend any pact nation against any group seeking release or redress of the usurping nation in colonial territory. Had that condition obtained in Palestine, the Jews would have been considered at war against America when they set up the Israeli Government and resisted England's occupation.

What is more, our own American Colonies could not have been helped by France, as we were in the American Revolution, without involving other nations to go to war with us, which would have defeated our cause of freedom.

It is evident that we intend, by the pact, to contain Russia against attack or invasion upon the nations of freedom. What answer can we, the greatest nation of freedom on earth, give to Russia and the world when they hold up slavery, brutality, and even torture of colonials as a picture nestled in the so-called freedom compact, and say, "This is what your capitalist nations stand for."

In Africa alone, 72,320,000 native people, inhabiting a territory of 4,033,858 square miles, live in bondage, made more terrible by centuries of British deception, exploitation, and terror.

It is common knowledge that another of the signatories, the Netherlands, holds in bondage nearly 80,000,000 people in the East Indies and in South America.

A third signatory to the pact, the French Government, continues its attacks on the people Viet Nam and exploits millions of people in its African and Asian colonies.

A fourth signatory, Belgium, holds the people of the Congo in bondage; that is, Belgium and Congo are sufficient.

A fifth signatory, Portugal, controls the destinies and arrests the development of some 9,000,000 Africans in Portuguese Guinea, Congola, Mozambique, Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome, and Principe.

A sixth signatory, Italy, is currently struggling in the United Nations—with the support of the other signatories—to partition Ethiopia and reestablish its domain over Libya and Somaliland.

A seventh signatory, our own Government of the United States, maintains a "gold and silver" double standard for its white and Negro employees in Panama and has recently acquired islands in the Pacific, and anticipates with satisfaction the profitable prospect of increasing investments in the exploitative enterprises of other colonial powers. Through the power of its wealth in a near-bankrupt world, our Government itself is fast being tempted to become a colonial power.
It is a matter of historical record that all these colonial powers, all of them members of the so-called North Atlantic community of nations, subverted the mandate system of the League of Nations into an instrument which, far from effecting the gradual elimination of colonialism, actually provided a legalistic cloak for strengthening it.

COLONIAL POLICIES OF SIGNATORIES

It is a matter of record that these very governments have nullified in practice and—in the current debates regarding former Italian colonies in Africa wrested from Africans by the bloodthirsty vandals of our late enemy, Mussolini—seek to continue to nullify the trusteeship provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

One has only to remember that the expenditures of the Netherlands in their outrageous war against the Indonesians exactly equaled the amount of American taxpayers' money granted the Dutch under the Marshall plan, to realize what may eventuate under the pact.

We face the dismaying prospect of American substance, American arms, and American boys being used to put down the democratic stirrings of peoples who seek today to accomplish the independence and freedom which our forebears could only win in a bloody revolution 173 years ago.

Such a prospect of serving as instruments for holding back the march toward colonial freedom is not a pleasant one to Negro Americans.

I realize it may be said that the terms of the pact limit its application to a territory one of whose boundaries is the Tropic of Cancer, and that the bulk of Africa of which I have made especial mention is excluded from this area.

It is sufficient, however, to note that "By their deeds ye shall know them." The colonial powers which have signed the pact are notorious for their disregard of written commitments. For centuries their pledged word has meant nothing if it interfered with their profitable exploitation of helpless people.

But the darker peoples of the world, living in the main in colonial slums, are no longer helpless. They are pressing their demands for equal status as world citizens. They are demanding the right of self-determination. They are insisting that the riches of their lands accrue to the security of their inhabitants and not to the profits of absentee overlords who despise their culture and abuse their hospitality.

A truly democratic America must show by deeds to the colonial peoples throughout the world and to the Negro people and other minority groups in our land that our Nation understands that there can be no security for any nation or people unless there is freedom and security for all peoples everywhere.

WORKING FOR PEACE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS

This we can demonstrate best by working and building for peace diligently through the United Nations, which we helped to found under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

I do not enter into the intricacies of that instrument, but I have the feeling that many others have, that it can be applied and adjusted to any sort of emergency that might arise.
Because it is my firm belief that the North Atlantic Pact does not in fact do this, I join with those who call for the rejection of this instrument of our foreign policy. As a churchman, who loves his church, his Nation, and its people, I express to this committee my profound conviction that only a covenant that is suffused with the love of Christ’s teaching, “Love thy neighbor as thyself”—I know how far this is from practical policy, but I bring this in as a standard that we must keep sight of—can indeed bring to America and to the world the peace which all peoples everywhere work, struggle, and fight for so passionately.

For these reasons, the United States Senate is called upon to reject the North Atlantic Pact, as an honored pledge of this Nation to resume the path to peace, phrased by another great American, Theodore Roosevelt, by “speaking softly and carrying a big stick.”

**FREEDOM FOR COLONIAL PEOPLES**

We should do this also as a signal of our intention to promote the freedom of colonial peoples and extend civil liberties to American Negroes at home.

As a Christian minister, I cannot do other than warn that the chief means for us, as a Christian nation, for defense is the practice of brotherhood, justice, and equality among citizens and nations. I believe it is possible to avoid war with any nation if we cease to think war and cultivate peaceful relationships in spite of the recalcitrance of any one of them.

God has always aided us to victory, and I believe always will, without involving ourselves in dangerous international-league systems, which carried the ancient nations, from Egypt to Greece, down to their ruin.

A pact is no stronger than its weakest nation; and we who join it inherit the weaknesses of the most offending nation.

May the good Lord deliver us from dependence on compacts and save us to dependence on righteous acts.

I may add there, if it becomes necessary in the judgment of the wisest of the nations who, from the inside, may know things that we on the outside do not know, to enter any sort of pact of the kind, may it not be in the wisdom of the Senate, and of this great committee, to do so with reservations protecting ourselves from defending the colonial system, and if possible it would not be necessary for us to be committed to an arms program that will tax our people to carry on warfare for other peoples in their capricious undertaking, such as the Balkans always practiced, and maybe always shall.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much, Bishop. It is a very fine statement. I want to say that I sympathize very deeply with the colonial peoples.

However, would the rejection of this treaty be of any benefit or assistance to the colonial peoples?

Bishop WALLS. I believe so. I believe if it were done so, with the understanding that the United States regards that as one of the chief features for rejecting it, that it would cause them to mend their ways, the colonial nations, to become fit to be in a pact of this kind.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything in the treaty which binds us to do anything internally for a signatory? Is it not all directed at armed attack by one nation upon another nation?

Bishop WALLS. There is nothing in the treaty that binds us to interfere with the other nations' internal affairs.

But, as I have intimated here, it is very dangerous to join up with nations that have weaknesses, to invite us to protect systems that are contrary to our great national tradition.

AMERICAN ACTION TOWARD COLONIAL PEOPLE

The CHAIRMAN. I do not agree with you there. I do not think the treaty does anything like that.

You speak of the United States aiding the colonial system. Is it not true that at the end of the Spanish-American War that the United States, if it had desired, could easily have incorporated Cuba within our system; and did we not, on the other hand, free Cuba and give her assurance of protection for a long period of years?

Bishop WALLS. That is very true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not also true that in the Philippines, which we acquired as a result of the Spanish-American War, that we have given them independence and freed them from any colonial control of the United States?

Bishop WALLS. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that not illustrate the American attitude toward these things, that we do not favor colonialism?

Bishop WALLS. The American attitude now may not necessarily be bound by its former attitude that it seems to have had, just as we have changed on the Washingtonian advice of not being involved or entangled in foreign alliances, and on other such American differences from international situations.

When we go out in these complexities, we may expect to be involved in things we did not anticipate, and we are suggesting here that we should enter it with caution, if we enter it at all, and with certain protection against being involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the United States, in the case of the Philippines, since the war, has passed legislation giving them loans and paying their war losses and all that sort of business, even though it is free and independent of the United States?

Bishop WALLS. I wish to be understood, Mr. Chairman, that I am not indicting the United States colonialism, or even imperialism. I say she is tempted. She has a strain of temptation in that direction. And if she enters these compacts, this compact with these other offending nations, that she will have more and more temptation and less and less defense to remain out.

Do you not think so, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is any temptation, in the face of our record, and the temper of our people. We are not going to embrace these colonial policies of other nations at all.

Bishop WALLS. Mr. Chairman, I think the main objection we have here is giving sympathy and maybe support—there is support; it involves support—to the colonial system; because we do not stand against it.
The Chairman. I think this entire committee stands against it. As a matter of fact, however, you have already admitted, there is nothing in the treaty that obligates the United States to do anything within a country. It is only as a resistance to aggression or armed attack by one nation upon another.

Thank you, very much, Bishop.

Bishop Walls. You will notice that I have said here, as a firm hope, that if we entered such a pact we would make reservations that would protect ourselves from seeming, even, to be in sympathy with colonialism.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. No questions, thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you, Bishop.

Bishop Walls. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Linfield, Young Progressives of America, New York City. How long is your statement, sir?

STATEMENT OF SEYMOUR LINFIELD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, YOUNG PROGRESSIVES OF AMERICA

Mr. Linfield. A few pages, sir.

The Chairman. How many is that?

Mr. Linfield. Seven.

The Chairman. In view of the fact that we have heard quite a number of representatives of the Progressives, we hope you will not be too long, because we have their views. I do not suppose you want to conflict with any of the views that have gone before.

Mr. Linfield. I shall try not to repeat.

The Chairman. What is the Young Progressives? Is that a different organization?

Mr. Linfield. Yes, sir. It is the independent young people's organization, independent of the Progressive Party, although subscribing generally to its principles and program.

The Chairman. That is what I thought. You are aligned with the Progressive Party.

Mr. Linfield. We are organizationally independent of them.

The Chairman. You elect your own officers but believe in their doctrine?

Mr. Linfield. In their general program and policies; yes. The young people of this country who will be asked to underwrite the proposed North Atlantic Military Pact, even with their very lives, have not yet been heard by this committee.

The Chairman. We are hearing them now. We are hearing them in you.

Mr. Linfield. That is correct.

The Chairman. You represent all the young people of the United States, I assume, in your statement.

Mr. Linfield. I speak, as you know, Senator, for the Young Progressives of America, and only for that organization.

The Chairman. All right.
Mr. LINFIELD. The Young Progressives of America is an independent young people's organization—a large number of whose members are veterans of the past war—an organization which, by its deeds, cherishes the memory of the great Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It appears before your committee this morning to respectfully present its views concerning the proposed North Atlantic Military Pact.

REVIEWING QUESTIONS OF THE TREATY

After 2 weeks of testimony by the architects and supporters of the pact, including certain distinguished members of this committee, five major questions remain unanswered, their character spotlighted by hearsay, evasion, or silence:

PROOF OF SOVIET AGGRESSION

First. Does the Soviet Union threaten the national integrity, the national interests, the national existence of the United States? We have anxiously awaited the proof that the Soviet Union bases its internal or external policies on the premise that war is necessary or desirable; that the Soviet Union has entered or proposes to enter military alliances directed against our country; that the Soviet Union has built or seeks to build military bases on our borders, or that it has engaged or seeks to engage in military action against our country; that Mr. Dulles, a spokesman for our foreign policy, was wrong when he stated in Cleveland on March 8, 1949, before the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America:

So far as it is humanly possible to judge, the Soviet Government does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you here as an apologist for the Soviet?
Mr. LINFIELD. Certainly not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LINFIELD. If you will permit me to complete my statement—

The CHAIRMAN. Go right along.

Mr. LINFIELD. I shall be glad to answer any questions that you may have. I continue quoting from Mr. Dulles:

I do not know any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this Government, or any government, who believes that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

That is from the New York Herald Tribune, March 9, 1949.

No such proof has been offered by any witness before this committee. Without such proof, the major reason for the pact urged by its proponents fails. What then remains is a military alliance directed against the Soviet Union, directed to accomplish the very ends from which it ostensibly seeks to protect us.

COMPATIBILITY OF PACT WITH UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Second. Does the pact, as the Wall Street Journal has stated, "nullify the principle of the United Nations"?

We have anxiously awaited proof that this pact, covering all the land from the Aleutians to the Mediterranean, from the Arctic to the Tropic of Cancer, is a regional agreement under article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, or that it is authorized by article 51 of the
Charter which preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.

Reliance upon article 52 has apparently been abandoned; for, if this be a regional agreement, enforcement measures would require Security Council approval under article 53, the very procedure which the architects of the pact seek to avoid.

The proposed pact certainly does not square with article 51, which applies only in the event of an armed attack.

The fact is that the proposed North Atlantic military pact violates the plain provisions of the Charter itself, for it would destroy the supreme power of the Security Council to determine the existence of aggression and threats to peace.

We speak here not as lawyers, but as young Americans who on the very day that the United Nations was born in San Francisco sealed the pledge of world peace there made by embracing the first Russian patrol on the Elbe. The GI's who fought on three continents, and the young people who recognize that the Charter of the United Nations and faithful fulfillment of its obligations is the only guaranty of peace, will not take kindly to its destruction.

These two major arguments, here briefly presented, all of deep concern to the people generally, have already been earnestly pressed before this committee by other witnesses, and apparently already rejected. However, there are three additional questions, all of vital importance to the young people of this country, which have to date been evaded by supporters of the pact.

**IMPACT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON UNITED STATES DOMESTIC PROGRAM**

First. What is the cost in dollars of the North Atlantic military pact, and what will its ratification mean to the working and living conditions of the young people of the country? This question is of urgent importance to almost 3,000,000 unemployed young people; almost 1,000,000 young people who will leave school to enter the labor market this year; millions of young Negroes who are Jim-Crowed from decent jobs; millions of young women who must work to live; millions of young farmers who are confronted by the dead end of mortgaged farms and share cropping; millions of young people who want to continue school but must instead try to support their families; millions of veterans who live doubled and tripled up; and millions of young people who cannot afford adequate medical care in this richest country of the world.

This is the condition of young America, and we ask: What is the cost of the pact; how will it affect these conditions?

**COST OF ARMS IMPLEMENTATION**

Secretary of State Acheson has told us that that proposed North Atlantic Military Pact is inextricably tied to its arms implementation. However, he and other Government spokesmen have refused to state publicly the total cost to the American people of the arms program for western Europe.

When Mr. Wallace testified before the committee on May 5, the respected Senator from Michigan is reported to have stated during
the course of the questioning that he had not yet been informed of the total cost of the program. Why do supporters of the pact fear to reveal to the American people, who will have to pay it, the total cost of the pact? Why do they want the American people to give them a blank check?

The State Department, in its "peace paper" of May 15, placed the arms cost for western Europe for the coming year at $1,130,000,000. We have also been told that $452,000,000 of this is in surplus arms valued at 10 cents on the dollar—arms which the committee was told on April 21 by Colonel Johnson that the National Military Establishment expects to have replaced. This $452,000,000 means at least $4,520,000,000. But replacement will be at higher prices and more expensive models.

Said the United States News:

> Europe in the first year is to get $4,520,000,000 of United States arms, written down to $452,000,000 to calm taxpayers. Replacement cost of arms to be given might be around $8,000,000,000.

Even this, however, the State Department tells us is only an interim program, with programs for subsequent years to be later revealed. Western European signatories of the pact candidly indicate to their people that the total cost of arming western Europe will run to a minimum of $30,000,000,000. The American Government should be no less candid with the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get that?

Mr. LINFIELD. This, sir, is from a report of the meeting of the Brussels Union, where it was stated that the signatories to the Brussels Union are of the opinion that they must have 36 to 70 divisions, and they estimated that the cost of arming, at a minimum, each of these divisions would be between 200 and 400 million dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. That did not envisage any contributions by the Europeans. You are putting it all on the United States?

Mr. LINFIELD. No it apparently did, because, as I recall, Secretary Acheson, or one of the early governmental spokesmen before this committee, state that, for each dollar that the United States would contribute, the governments of western Europe signatory to the pact would be expected to contribute $6 to $7 of their own for arms.

**IMPACT OF ARMS PROGRAM ON UNITED STATES ECONOMY**

Dr. Nourse, of The President's Committee on Economic Advisers, stated on April 7 that our economy, if it is to avoid a sharply lowered standard of living, cannot spend more than $15,000,000,000 for arms, the amount already authorized by Congress. Arms for western Europe is over and above that.

The $15,000,000,000 arms budget is already taking its tragic toll of young Americans. Mounting unemployment, increased speed-up, increased discrimination and denial of civil rights in industry, in the community, and on the campus; no decent housing, inadequate funds for education, a dead end to social welfare—this is the price now being paid by the young people of this country. This is the current American translation of "guns and not butter."

The additional expenditure of tens of billions of dollars for arms will take an even more tragic toll of the working and living conditions...
of young America. There will be that much less money for houses, for veterans' benefits, for social security, for education, for health. It will bankrupt American youth, further aggravate its unemployment, and torpedo its opportunities for marriage and a decent family life. It offers even more billions of profits for the monopolists of American industry; it offers only insecurity and unemployment for American youth itself. We therefore ask the supporters of the pact: What is the cost in dollars of the North Atlantic Military Pact, and what will be the effect of its ratification on the working and living conditions of the young people of this country?

SENDING AMERICAN TROOPS OVERSEAS

Second. What will be the cost in American lives of the North Atlantic Military Pact? Has our Government made a commitment to send American troops to Europe, and, if so, for what purpose?

Young Americans are entitled to an answer before the pact is recommended for ratification, for it is our young people who will be this country's military ambassadors.

To date, the State Department has coyly avoided a direct reply. Why? The answer is suggested by the reported testimony before the committee of my former commanding general, General Bradley.

The general indicated that American military thinking views the pact as stationing American troops in the heart of Europe to "defend" the nations of western Europe. The general knows that during the past war we never had more than 70 American divisions in the combat areas of western Europe; that Hitler's 300 divisions could not stop the Russians; that, if there is war, 70 divisions would only make a Dunkirk of all western Europe. If this be the plan, then sober people must characterize it now as reckless adventurism, which will sacrifice the future of America, its young people.

If troop commitments have already been made by our Government under the proposed North Atlantic Military Pact, its reason must be sought in the statement of the semiofficial spokesman of the State Department, James Reston. In the New York Times of March 1, he said:

The executive branch of the Government is convinced that some of the western European nations must have military aid not only to defend themselves against external aggression, but primarily to bolster their police powers against their own Communists.

Secretary Acheson further confirmed this purpose in his March 18 press conference and in the State Department white paper of March 19. The State Department "peace paper" of May 15 finally indicates with bluntness the first purpose of arms for western Europe to be the establishing of "individual and collective military strength adequate to control internal disorders."

Therefore, young America should be bluntly told: This pact means you will be sent to Europe to keep tottering, undemocratic governments in power. You will fight young Greeks to protect a king they do not want. You will confront young Frenchmen who will not permit their country to be despoiled or sold by De Gaulle or any Quisling. You will confront young Italians to protect a government which has already made one and a half million of them unemployed. You will look down the barrel of an M-1 at the young men and women of
Europe, who with their own blood sealed friendship with us but a few short years ago in heroic resistance against the common enemy.

Young America is entitled to a full and honest answer to these questions before ratification of the proposed pact is recommended by this committee.

**INTERNAL REVOLUTIONS AND THE PACT**

**Senator Vandenberg.** Where do you find in the pact any suggestion of the use of American manpower, or American intervention, in respect to internal revolution?

**Mr. Linfield.** The evil of the pact, Senator, is not in the words of the proposed North Atlantic Pact. It lies in the fact—and has been made abundantly clear—that this pact is tied to arms implementation, and tied, above all, to a policy which, as the State Department paper released last Saturday finally states bluntly, is directed to—and again, if I may quote—"the establishing of individual and collective military strength adequate to control internal disorders."

**Senator Vandenberg.** What has that to do with our responsibility to engage solely in resisting armed attack, which must be an external thing before we move in? I just do not follow your logic. I just do not believe that it is fair that you suggest that there is anything in this program which is going to require young America to be sent abroad to fight, to maintain any internal government abroad. I do not believe there is anything even remotely involved of that character.

**Mr. Linfield.** Unfortunately, Senator, the logic is not mine, but that of the architects of the pact. To date, as you know so well, no statement of any governmental spokesmen, notwithstanding the tie-up of the proposed pact to the program of arms implementation, and the clear statement that the latter involves necessary military force to suppress, as it is called, internal disorder, has bluntly stated that American troops will not follow American arms to western Europe.

I am sure that any effort on your part, sir, to propose an amendment on the Senate floor to bar the sending of American troops to western Europe under the pact, under the arms program to implement it, would receive the most widespread support.

**Senator Vandenberg.** Now you have moved under the broad area of the obligation to resist armed aggression. I can conceive of a situation where, if you have World War III, the Lord only knows where we will all be fighting.

**Mr. Linfield.** That is true.

**Senator Vandenberg.** But it seems to me that at this particular point you are, in your own language, bluntly telling the American youth that under this pact he is headed for service in the internal suppression of revolution in Europe. I just do not believe that is so.

**Mr. Linfield.** I am sure that many, Senator, would be glad to have an explicit statement from the State Department that such is not the case.

**AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE**

**Senator Vandenberg.** This question has been raised before. It has never been put in quite the, shall I say, extravagant language that you used. But it has been raised, and I think there ought to be a
very definite answer to it, because I think the very definite answer is "No," and if that is the answer I do not see any reason why it should not be definite.

Mr. Linfield. That is exactly the position that I am taking, sir.

Memorandum Submitted by the Department of State

In the committee hearings on April 27, the question was asked, "* * * Are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there [western Europe] as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries' capacity to resist?" Secretary Acheson replied that the answer to that question was a clear and absolute "No."

The treaty does not relate to strictly internal disorders. It is concerned with resisting an armed attack on any of the signatory governments. An internal revolt not aided and abetted by another state would not be an armed attack within the meaning of the treaty. Whether or not external assistance to such a revolt would constitute an armed attack would depend upon the nature and extent of such assistance. This determination, however, would be the responsibility of each individual government and would be made in light of the existing situation.

Senator Vandenberg. You are going a little further than that, because you are assuming that the answer is "Yes."

Mr. Linfield. No. It has been our experience during a number of years of war, sir, that where there are American generals and American planning staffs, American GI's do not tarry far behind. At the present time, in Fontainebleau, there is American participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which will become official, assuming ratification of the North Atlantic Pact by the Senate.

Senator Vandenberg. I have no quarrel with you for raising the question. Any question that anybody wants to raise about this thing ought to be raised, because it ought to be liquidated in advance. If I am quarreling with you at all, it is because you have answered it in advance "Yes" and I have answered it in advance "No," and I think we should both wait for the official answer.

Mr. Linfield. I am sure that any reservation which would be voted by the Senate along this line—that no American troops have been committed or will be committed under the North Atlantic Military Pact—would be the most firm answer that could possibly be given to this charge.

Use of American Troops in Internal Disorder

Senator Vandenberg. Again it seems to me you are changing the area which I am discussing. I say that if World War III results, Heaven only knows where the American troops will have to go. The area of our discussion is whether or not there is anything in this pact, or contemplated by this pact, which will send American manpower to Europe to control internal disorder.

Mr. Linfield. That is exactly the question, sir.

Senator Vandenberg. And that is the one to which I say the answer is "No" and you say "Yes." I agree that we ought to find out. I think you are wrong, and you probably think I am wrong.

Mr. Linfield. I am sure, sir, that the North Atlantic Military Pact is not viewed as a military alliance for World War III, and therefore I cannot most heartily subscribe to the framework in which you have placed the question, with which, of course, I concur. And that is whether under this pact commitments have been made; and if so, for what purpose?
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY AT HOME

Third. Who do proponents of the pact speak with such vigor of our defending democracy overseas, when they do little or nothing to bring it about here?

We ask this, a vital question for the young people of America, in the spirit of the economic bill of rights proposed to Congress by Franklin Delano Roosevelt on January 11, 1944.

Democracy means a useful and remunerative job in industry. But this Congress has turned its back on young workers, on the millions of unemployed.

Democracy means strong unions to protect young workers. This Congress has refused to repeal the Taft-Hartley law.

Democracy means the raising and selling of produce at a return which will give a decent living. This Congress, with severe impartiality, has no less turned its back on young farmers.

Democracy means civil rights, equality of opportunity, no poll tax. This Senate, in this session of Congress, has shamefully vetoed civil rights.

Democracy means care for its veterans who defended our country with their lives. This Congress remains undisturbed by the approach of July 25, 1949, when the 52-20 provisions of the GI bill of rights expire.

Democracy means decent housing, decent health facilities, the opportunity for marriage. This Congress has legalized rent gouging, refuses to build houses, and does nothing for the health and leisure of our young people.

Democracy means the opportunity for adequate high-school and college education, open to all, in a climate of academic freedom. This Congress is unconcerned about the education of young people—unconcerned with the maintenance of freedom on the American campus.

We therefore ask again, “When will Congress pass such an economic bill of rights? When will this Congress defend democracy—here in this country?”

The coming meeting of the foreign ministers in Paris opens but 1 week from today. We greet this conference because its very convening is a victory for all peace-loving people, because we know that it is taking place against the wishes of the warmakers; because we know that there will be no hot war as long as our Government negotiates around the same table with the Russian Government.

The people of this country, especially its young people, expect much of our delegation to Paris. They expect that no obstacles born of narrow interests will be permitted to block successful negotiations for a unified and democratic Germany, along the lines of the Potsdam agreement signed by President Truman, Prime Minister Atlee, and Premier Stalin.

The five major questions with respect to the proposed North Atlantic Military Pact, respectfully presented to this committee, cast an ominous shadow over the meeting of the foreign ministers. The North Atlantic Military Pact, initiated by our Government, is a dagger pointed at the heart of the conference which can only undermine the chances of its success.
We, therefore, respectfully urge the committee to accept the proposal first made by Henry Wallace that the proposed ratification of the pact be withheld pending the outcome of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris. Any effort to rush the pact through to ratification at this time can only be interpreted by young people the world over, including young Americans, as a lack of faith in the Paris conference.

The proposed pact is a snare and a delusion for American youth. This committee could best defend the interests and lives of young Americans only by completely rejecting the proposed pact.

The CHAIRMAN. You, in your statement, make the charge of what the cost will be, first in money, and then in lives, if we ratify the pact. What would the cost of a third world war be, in money; do you know?

Mr. LINFIELD. I would assume, Senator, trillions and quadrillions.

The CHAIRMAN. What would it cost in lives?

Mr. LINFIELD. I assume your life, as well as my life, would be in direct jeopardy, as well as the lives of tens of millions of others.

EFFECT OF THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Is not this treaty, at least in the views of its proponents, aimed at preserving the peace and preventing World War III, with all of its cost in blood and treasure?

Mr. LINFIELD. My only quarrel, sir, is that in my opinion, and in the opinion of the organization which I represent, it will accomplish the diametrically opposite result.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wallace, you mean. That is what you mean when you say the views of "my organization." You mean Mr. Wallace's views.

Mr. LINFIELD. No, sir. I do not. I mean the views of the Young Progressives of America.

The CHAIRMAN. You cite Mr. Wallace's views here with approval, in several places.

Mr. LINFIELD. I refer only once to Mr. Wallace's views.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all you need to refer, if you adopt them all. You say Mr. Wallace's views. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. LINFIELD. I do not in any way disassociate myself from the testimony which, as reported, Mr. Wallace made before this committee on May 5.

The CHAIRMAN. You are for it all, of course. That is what I am assuming. What is your business, outside of this organization?

Mr. LINFIELD. I am the executive director of this organization, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a lawyer?

Mr. LINFIELD. I am an attorney.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you work at your attorney's business or work mostly at this?

Mr. LINFIELD. I am an elected official of the Young Progressives of America.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a salaried man?

Mr. LINFIELD. I am, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are here in that salaried capacity?

Mr. LINFIELD. On behalf of my organization.
The Chairman. Were you a member of Mr. Wallace's staff during the last election? Did you take an active part?

Mr. Linfield. During part of the campaign; yes, sir.

The Chairman. The last part?

Mr. Linfield. Sir?

The Chairman. The last part?

Mr. Linfield. No. From the date that the Young Progressives were first launched, at a delegate convention of over 2,000 in July 1946, for the past year I have been on the staff of the Young Progressives of America.

The Chairman. On a salaried basis?

Mr. Linfield. On a salaried basis; yes, sir.

The Chairman. You started to work when the salary started?

Mr. Linfield. No. I started to work before the salary started, sir.

UNITED STATES OBLIGATION IN EVENT OF A REVOLUTION IN A SIGNATORY

The Chairman. I wish that you would take this treaty and put your finger on the line or on the clause, or anything else which obligates the United States in anywise to intervene in the domestic affairs of any signatory to the treaty, with regard to internal disorder, internal revolution, or internal disturbances of any kind. Where is that?

Mr. Linfield. I have stated, sir—

The Chairman. You have the treaty there?

Mr. Linfield. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Put your finger on that. I want to see where you are talking about it.

Mr. Linfield. I should be glad to attempt to answer your question, sir. In reply to the question asked before, by the Senator from Michigan, I indicated that the quarrel is not with certain of the clauses of the proposed North Atlantic Military Pact but that the North Atlantic Military Pact is tied to its arms implementation, and that it is part of a policy, the policy of the cold war.

The State Department has explicitly stated—Secretary Acheson on the 18th of March, the State Department White Paper on the 19th of March, and now the State Department Peace Paper on May 15—that the purpose of the arms, the primary purpose is to make it possible to repel internal disorder.

The Chairman. I am talking about the treaty now. I want you to put your finger on the treaty, not what somebody said about it. You are complaining now at what is in the treaty, but you are complaining of what is not in the treaty.

Mr. Linfield. I am seeking to point out, sir—which I believe must be pointed out, because we have been told that, sir, by the State Department—that the arms implementation can not be separated from the pact. There is nothing in the pact, in the words of its clauses, which obligates the United States to go into Europe to suppress internal disorders.

The Chairman. I am glad to hear you say that, because it is contrary to what you have been contending all the time.

Mr. Linfield. I must disagree with that conclusion.

The Chairman. I knew you would. What about the Young Communist League? When did you quit that, if you did quit it.
Mr. LINFIELD. I was never in the Young Communist League, sir, and I resent very strenuously, any effort to change the purpose of this testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to change the purpose of this testimony. I apologize to you if I am wrong, but we have some evidence somewhere that the Young Progressives of America is the new name of the former Young Communist League, and will be in straight-line opposition to the pact.

Do you know about the former Young Communist League? You know about it, do you not, even though you were not a member?

Mr. LINFIELD. My impression is, sir, that—at least so I was informed after I was honorably discharged—that some time at the beginning of the war the Young Communist League disbanded.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the war?

Mr. LINFIELD. Some time at the beginning of the war. I may be wrong in this, sir. At least that is my information.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your organization is not the new name for the Young Communist League?

Mr. LINFIELD. Absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. How many members—

Mr. LINFIELD. Excuse me, sir. As your inquiry at the beginning of this discussion solicited, in terms of reply, we are a young people's organization, subscribing to the program and policies of the Progressive Party, although organizationally independent of it.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the purposes and views of the Progressive Party, you mean the views and policies of Mr. Henry Wallace, do you not?

Mr. LINFIELD. I mean the program and polices as determined at the elected convention of the Progressive Party in Philadelphia at the end of July 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. LINFIELD. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Paul L. Rhoads. Whom do you represent, Mr. Rhoads?

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. RHOADS, SECRETARY, PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. RHOADS. I am the secretary of the Progressive Party in central Pennsylvania.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we not going to have any witnesses here who are not Progressives? We have had five or six. We would like for somebody to represent them and not have every member of the party as a witness.

Mr. RHOADS. Will the Senator excuse me if I say that I represent a part of the organization which might be compared with the Daniel Boone aristocracy? The Pennsylvania Dutch section of this country yields farm interests that certainly will bear looking into in regard to the North Atlantic Pact.
The Chairman. We do not want to discriminate against the Dutch or the farming industry, so go ahead. By the way, the Dutch enter this treaty.

Mr. Rhoads. Many citizens of Berks County in Pennsylvania and myself are opposed to the North Atlantic Pact for the following reasons:

REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO TREATY

We believe that the North Atlantic Pact can serve only to pollute public opinion on the question of American-Soviet relations. It will prolong the hostile attitude between America and Russia which is costing American workers their jobs, their civil rights, and their American integrity as it appears to a majority of the world's peoples.

We believe that the military-defense program which is presumably to accompany the North Atlantic Pact will kill any hopes Americans and western Europeans have of social-security programs, adequate housing programs, and improved systems of education.

We believe that American industrialists and their representatives in our State Department are developing a mania against communism which in practice only produces more Communists, as in Greece and China.

We believe in the workability of the United Nations Organization because we want it to work, because we want peace. We urge our Senators to oppose the ratification of the Atlantic Pact and to oppose all forms of American foreign policy which seeks to protect the invested wealth of industrial tycoons even at the cost of human lives.

We believe that the inclusion of Italy and Portugal in a regional pact for peace betrays the proclaimed purpose of the North Atlantic Pact. The United Nations recognize Italy as the former enemy of democracy which in the future accordingly shall be deprived of its war-making potential. The signatories to the pact would apparently restore military strength to Italy so that she can fulfill her obligations under the pact. Portugal is not a member of the UN but is considered worthy of membership in the pact: this is also a defiance of the spirit and letter of the United Nations.

We believe that if western Germany were to be enlisted into the North Atlantic alliance, Russia would be forced to register a protest with the UN on the grounds that Germany is again being equipped with a military potential, and is being involved in a treaty which conflicts with the United Nations Charter.

We further believe that the Atlantic Pact, with its cordial consideration of our World War II enemies in unwarranted terms of their defense against aggression (presumably of Russian origin), has further helped to hack to pieces the UN and hopes of world peace. It seems to amount to Hitler and Mussolini having won the war, since they, too, fought Russia and what they presumed was Russian communism in their own countries; or at least Hitler and Mussolini or their ideology have enlisted the democracies in their fight against communism. This was all they could have desired while still in power.

We believe that the North Atlantic Pact will continue the degradation of a majority of the world's citizens by its attempts to maintain strong defenses against the constructive organizing of these same world citizens. The more than 350,000 unemployed in Pennsylvania
are being degraded daily by our Congress' failure to enact legislation for human welfare. The Second World War and their present unemployment has set them to wondering if there is not something truly rotten in Denmark, and in Great Britain, Italy, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, and the United States and the rest of these Atlantic Pact countries.

We believe that the Atlantic Pact military expenditures will certainly mean higher taxes to the American wage earners. Dr. Nourse, of the Council of Economic Advisers, told us this recently and he was repudiated by President Truman. Earlier in his budget message President Truman said that more military spending would be ruinous.

The citizens of Berks County, Pa., want peace: they want the UN kind of peace which raises the dignity of all nations and all peoples. We want to feel secure about atomic energy being put to peacetime uses; we want to give jobs to every human who is capable of exerting himself or herself constructively. We want to bear our responsibilities toward all living things on earth, knowing that we have done everything possible to preserve the spiritual and physical dignity of man.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a paid representative of your organization?
Mr. RHoads. I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business?
Mr. RHoads. I have been called an idealist.

The CHAIRMAN. You have some occupation, do you not?
Mr. RHoads. I am a bookkeeper for a restaurant-equipment outfit in Reading.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. Do you have any questions, Senator Donnell?
Senator Donnell. No, sir; thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused.

Mr. Pirinsky. Yes, sir. Would you permit me?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. You cannot go on. I have consulted the members of the committee.

Mr. Pirinsky. Just 1 minute?

The CHAIRMAN. It is not our policy to hear foreigners. Where do you live, what is your country?

Mr. Pirinsky. I live in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but of what country are you a citizen?
Mr. Pirinsky. I am not a citizen of any country because I have not renewed my citizenship. I used to be a citizen of Bulgaria. I was born in Macedonia when the country was under Turkey.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a citizen of Bulgaria?
Mr. Pirinsky. No, sir. I am not. I have not renewed my citizenship.
The Chairman. For the present we will have to decline to hear you, because it is the rule of this committee not to hear foreign witnesses. I have consulted with the committee and that is their decision.

Mr. Pirinsky. Will you just let me say that I feel that the committee, by this ruling, is violating the constitutional rights of no citizens—

The Chairman. You have no constitutional rights. You are not a citizen of the United States.

Mr. Pirinsky. I understand that no citizens have the right to express their views on domestic and foreign problems.

The Chairman. This committee is sovereign unto itself. We hear whom we please. So I will have to excuse you, sir.

Mr. Pirinsky. All right, sir. I protest.

The Chairman. All right. Protest. You have already protested. We are protesting against hearing you because you are not a citizen.

Mr. Pirinsky. I tried twice to be a citizen.

The Chairman. Sir?

Mr. Pirinsky. I tried twice to become a citizen.

The Chairman. And you were rejected? There must have been some reason why you were rejected. I do not care to argue with you. You are excused.

Mr. Howe. How long is your statement, Mr. Howe?

STATEMENT OF REV. LEE A. HOWE, PRESIDENT OF THE BAPTIST PACIFIST FELLOWSHIP, WEBSTER, N. Y.

Mr. Howe. Eight minutes.

The Chairman. You are president of the Baptist Pacifist Fellowship?

Mr. Howe. That is right.

The Chairman. That is the Northern Baptist Church?

Mr. Howe. The Northern Baptist Convention.

The Chairman. Did the convention adopt your views, or are you just expressing your own views?

Mr. Howe. The convention has not acted on the question at all, and I would not be speaking for them at any rate. I represent a small group within the convention.

The Chairman. You have it headed here as if you represented the whole group. Be as brief as you can, because we are running overtime now.

Mr. Howe. Yes, sir.

This statement is being offered as expressing the general position of the Baptist Pacifist Fellowship, a group of Baptists, predominantly clergy, from all parts of the Northern Baptist Convention and numbering about 500.

The Chairman. You said a while ago you were not speaking for the specific fellowship. Now you say you are.

Mr. Howe. I said I was not speaking for the convention.

The Chairman. That is the body that rules it; is it not?

Mr. Howe. In the Baptist denomination there are many organizations, independent organizations.

The Chairman. All right. Your group represents 500?

Mr. Howe. Approximately.

The Chairman. How many Baptists are there in the United States? 
Mr. Howe. I will have to confess my ignorance as a Baptist. I do not know.

The Chairman. You know there are a whole lot more than 500.

Mr. Howe. That is right.

The Chairman. A great many churches have more than 500 members in the local church.

Mr. Howe. That is right.

The Chairman. Go ahead. You want to express the views of 500, as I understand it.

CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

Mr. Howe. We base our opposition to the North Atlantic Pact primarily on the ground that it is another attempt to contain an idea by force or the threat of force. The only effective way to stop the spread of an idea, we believe, is to confront it with a better idea. History is strewn with the vain attempts of men to silence a thought by killing the man who holds the thought, or imprisoning him.

We are as opposed to the totalitarian philosophy and freedom-denying practices of Soviet communism as are the defenders of the North Atlantic Pact. We have no desire to see either the philosophy or the practices spread any further. We would like to see the philosophy and practices defeated within those areas where they are now in force. We are opposed to these totalitarian ideas as found in Spain as well as in Russia and Russia-dominated countries. But we are convinced that to try to isolate or restrict the philosophy and practices of totalitarianism by military coercion or the threat of force is not only futile but will, in the long run, encourage and spread the ideas and methods we wish to defeat.

That there are far-reaching military implications in this pact, Mr. Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, clearly indicated when, testifying in favor of the pact, he declared to this committee, according to the Time's report, "Our frontiers of collective defense lie in the heart of Europe." He also went on to indicate that the pact was only a step leading to the next step, which would be the furnishing of arms to the other members of the pact. In fact, as has been declared time and again, the pact will be of little value unless it is implemented by such military support.

I am here to say this: We cannot stop the spread of communistic ideas by a military alliance or the threat of the use of military power. Others may legitimately question the military wisdom of sending arms and supplies to countries which, in the event of war, might very possibly be quick and easy victims of Russia; and raise questions about the necessity of supplying men from this country along with the arms; others may debate the constitutionality of a pact which would seem to place our Nation in the position where we can find ourselves at war without an act of Congress; and others may stress the apparent defeat of every nation in an atomic war. I am here to say one thing: We cannot stop communism or the spread of communistic ideas by a military alliance or the threat of the use of military power.

MILITARY ALLIANCES AND CONTAINMENT

For example, the last war was fought to stop and to eradicate the totalitarian ideas and practices of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
We, with the cooperation of totalitarian Russia, defeated both Germany and Italy. But the totalitarian ideas and practices are more widespread now than they were before the war, it seems to me. The economic dislocation, the failure to solve economic problems, the killing of many of the finest of the youth of all countries, the use of totalitarian techniques and reliance upon force—these make inevitable, no matter who wins the war, the kind of chaos and thinking which encourage the spread of totalitarian ideas. Thus we have large numbers of people in Europe and Asia accepting communism as the way to solve their problems. Another war, even with the defeat of Russia, might witness the triumph of totalitarian doctrine on a worldwide scale.

We have been told that this pact, and the implementation which will follow, will prevent war, and that much I have said is therefore beside the point. If this pact prevents war, it will be one of the first times in history, as I remember history, that a military alliance has ever kept nations at peace for long.

Moreover, a willingness to rely upon war, or the threat of war, in international relations, tends to weaken our support of such peaceful channels of solution as the United Nations; to transfer our economic support from such policies as the Marshall plan to an intensified armament race; to give the peoples of Europe not the security the pact is designed to give them, but rather a sense of insecurity as they see two great powers, increasing their military might and apparently ready to rely upon arms rather than upon discussion.

**COMBATING TOTALITARIANISM WITH DEMOCRATIC IDEALS**

If we are to prevent the spread of the ideas and practices of totalitarianism, whether those ideas be found in Russian, Chinese, Spanish, French, Argentinian, or other American minds, we must combat them with the ideas and practices of democratic philosophy. This means that we must give our support to every measure in this country which makes our Nation more democratic, as for example, in the spreading of civil rights to all people in all parts of the nations; that we must help the peoples of Europe to find economic security, and a sense of freedom from the threat of war, and do so without depriving them of any of the freedoms we associate with democracy; and it must also include progressive reduction of armaments.

It will be told that this is idealistic and impractical, that we must fight fire with fire, that there is no possibility of talking any other language than that of force when dealing with a nation which puts so much of its confidence in military might. Speaking as a realist, I contend that we cannot defeat an idea by winning a military war; that we do not fight fire with fire, we fight it with water; that Satan is not cast out of Satan; and that to talk with Russia only in the language which Russia uses best is to fail to educate Russia or the rest of the world in the language which must be used if we are to have peace.

In saying this, I believe I have the support of great numbers of Christians and I know I have the support of many of the church leaders who attended the study conference on the churches and world order in Cleveland, March 8 to 11 of this year. That conference, while
they took no final action on the North Atlantic Pact since the text was not available, made these, among other statements:

No defensive alliance should be entered into which might validly appear aggressive to Russia, as a Russian alliance with Latin America would undoubtedly appear to us. Regional pacts may make for common security and welfare provided they pursue this interest in ways that do not jeopardize world community. Regional military alliances are, of course, no substitute for the relief of human distress.

History indicates that the most that can be achieved by military alliances is a temporary balance of power, while they easily give rise to menacing armament races ending in war. The tragedy of our times calls for heroic efforts in new directions. We must increase our efforts for the universal reduction and control of armaments, and, more, we must launch "bold new programs" looking to the general elevation of living standards throughout the world, and the assurance of a fair chance in life to all men regardless of race, color, creed, or nationality.

The North Atlantic Pact is not a "bold new program."
The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. You do not want to see another war; do you?
Mr. Howe. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. The purpose of this treaty, according to our view, is to try to prevent another war. Senator Donnell?
Senator Donnell. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. You are excused.
Mr. Howe. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The next man is Mr. Peters, who will take 5 minutes, I believe he said.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. PETERS, JR., OF SPRINGFIELD, PA., FOR PEACEMAKERS

Mr. Peters. Yes, sir. My name is Robert H. Peters, Jr., and I am a student at Swarthmore College. I have spent a year and a half in the Army on an enlistment, was discharged in 1948.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak for yourself or for an organization?
Mr. Peters. I speak for an organization.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the organization?
Mr. Peters. The organization is Peacemakers.
The CHAIRMAN. The Peacemakers?
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that local to Swarthmore?
Mr. Peters. It is a national organization, with headquarters in New York.
The CHAIRMAN. Swarthmore is a Quaker university; is it not?
Mr. Peters. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. I have high respect for the Quakers. They are a great people. Go right ahead.
Mr. Peters. Peacemakers represents approximately 500 people who take a radical pacifist position. The organization as such advocates civil disobedience as individuals see fit to practice in accordance with their conscience. More than 50 members of the organization of draft age have conscientiously refused to register under the draft act and are now in prison as a consequence of having taken that action.

The first part of my statement, which I will not read but summarize, points out what Peacemakers considers to be irrelevant arguments as to the Atlantic Pact.
It considers irrelevant that the Atlantic Pact will be inexpensive because, indeed, if the Atlantic Pact achieves what it states it will do, it would be very cheap at half the price.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Peacemakers is an organization representing an increasing number of persons who believe that the only real solution to the fundamental problems of our time—economic, political, social—lies within the individual. Only insofar as each person becomes aware of his ability and responsibility within his community, his country, and his world, will there be peace in our time and, more important, the freedom and security which are the sine qua non of a peaceful society. Peacemakers is devoted to the principles of individual freedom, and to non-violence in every aspect of life. Far from Tolstoian passive resisters, we are aware of the economic and political implications of civil disobedience as manifested in the Gandhian movement in India. We remember the use of noncooperation as a military weapon by the people of the Ruhr in the 1920's. Such techniques have been social forces in our own history, the Boston Tea Party, the Underground Railway.

Our conviction that the essence of democracy is individual responsibility combined with open and nonviolent resistance to injustice has led more than 50 Peacemakers of draft age, as I previously mentioned, to conscientiously refuse to cooperate with the Selective Service Act of 1948. Most of these men are now in prison. I make these remarks to give you an understanding of our organization and to indicate that our opposition to military force and the philosophy of diplomacy which the Atlantic Pact embodies is not empty talk, but rooted in a way of life, and in our day-to-day activities.

CRITICISMS OF THE TREATY

There is not one of us here who disagrees with the purpose of the North Atlantic Pact, insofar as the purposes are outlined in the preamble. The question is whether the pact will, in fact, achieve those ends.

1. There are those who consider the treaty incompatible with the UN Charter (especially articles 51, 52, and 53). Some of these persons favor the treaty, others are opposed to it. Each in turn, and according to his acuity, seeks and finds legal loopholes. Peacemakers agrees with Secretary of State Acheson that this is essentially not a legalistic question, for if the pact were indeed to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, it would necessarily be a bulwark to the UN.

2. There are those who worry that the treaty violates Anglo-Russian and Franco-Russian pacts of 1942 and 1944. It seems strange that some who hold this position are trained observers of diplomacy, yet who have not learned that treaties are a reflection of the present situation, that they will carry through time only insomuch as they are flexible or the situation remains static. Thus the Monroe Doctrine was more or less strictly interpreted for a century and only recently, with developments placing our eastern security boundary, we are told, first at the Atlantic Ocean, then at the Rhine, and just recently at the Elbe, do people come to realize that political doctrines and
treaties, like all things, must keep up with the times if they are to survive.

3. There are those who complain about the cost of the pact and the projected arms aid to Europe. Peacemakers wonders that a Government spending thirty billions of a forty-billion budget on war-incurred expenses—past, present, and future—could not find a place for one or two billions in the name of peace—if the pact really offered promise of this.

The Peacemakers, who are now refusing to pay income taxes which are devoted to war preparations, would be among the first to offer money and services for a truly constructive peace program.

4. Finally, Peacemakers has a little sympathy for the Russians who complain that the North Atlantic Pact would violate the already many time Soviet-mutilated Potsdam and Yalta agreements as it has for the Americans who proclaim the unconstitutionality of the pact. These persons would do well to remember that a strengthened UN or world government has, and will, necessitate far broader interpretations of constitutional provisions than the extremely agreeable “action as (each) deems necessary” clause in the North Atlantic Pact.

**CRITICISM OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY**

Peacemakers offers these arguments against opponents of the pact in order to clarify its own position. We consider such opposition specious and irrelevant, for it neglects the fundamental question of whether the pact will fulfill its purpose and what, in fact, it will really accomplish. It is on these basic issues that Peacemakers challenges the Atlantic Pact.

**THE PACT AND COMMUNISM**

I. The Atlantic Pact is an attempt to check and halt communism. Peacemakers submits that the pact, its long and short run effects, the philosophy which engendered it and will probably accompany it in the future, is fallacious. The pact will strengthen communism in its stronghold, Russia, in its outlying satellites, and in the rest of the world. I know that I, were I a Russian youth, no matter how I should dislike or distrust Stalin and the Politburo, could not fail to be impressed, during the past 3 years, by the way in which the United States led western powers were doing just what Stalin and Marxist thinking predicted would—economically, politically, militarily.

I should feel toward the atom bomb the apprehension the Americans were made to feel about Czechoslovakia. Talk of United States arms flowing into Europe would arouse in me the anger that Americans felt toward the Berlin blockade. How long will it take us to realize that when we defend ourselves, it necessarily looks like aggression to the Russians, and when they defend themselves right back, it seems from our side as though they were aggressing. Senator Jenner has rightly said that the pact would make us no new friends and might alarm our potential enemy. Senator Taft, I understand, feels that sending arms to Europe is going too far, that it might be interpreted as an act of hostility by the Russians. What does he, and what do you think the Atlantic Pact itself must look like from the other side? And our toying with Fascist Spain? And our recent decision to end
Japanese reparations to speed their recovery as a barrier against communism? Russia made a so-called peace offer earlier in the year. We do not make treaties outside of the UN, we said to Stalin. He probably was not fooled, but I am more concerned about the peoples of the world who might have agreed with us then, but who now see us, on our own initiative, proposing to operate beyond the bounds of the Charter. There are Europeans, and Russians, who are coming to believe that we do not really want to end the cold war, and I do not know how we are going to convince them that we do as long as we continue our about faces.

What we must realize is that a big stick policy is not going to scare away or stave off communism. It will find a big stick of its own and shake it right back at us. China and southeastern Asia are looking more and more like a mighty big stick.

THE FACT AND SECURITY

II. The Atlantic Pact, while purportedly holding back communism, is at the same time an attempt to bring peace, security, and stability to the North Atlantic area.

Peacemakers considers it ill-advised statesmanship which thinks that an arms race is going to bring peace to the world. During the last 4 years, possessing the atomic bomb, we have been immeasurably stronger than Russia, but we have never stopped trying to be still more powerful. What will happen when Russia, too, has the atomic bomb? We might consider whether action now, international control at the cost of a compromise, might not be wisest policy. In an arms race it is always later than we think. The Atlantic Pact will not stop the race—it is but one of the measures taken by one of the contestants.

Peacemakers feel that one of the most dangerous trends today is the increasing distance between governing and the governed, but an accompanying increase in influence by the former. The secret negotiations of the Atlantic Pact, and the recent legislation put through Congress with a request for minimum discussion are examples.

Such things are expedient, but expediency is not a measure of freedom. The point is not our advantage of the totalitarian countries, but rather the fact that we have less liberty today than we did a year ago and that we will probably have less tomorrow than we have today. I, and other individuals, representing organizations, may talk with you around a table, but Peacemakers is alarmed that the Atlantic Pact, both here and abroad, is essentially a treaty which vitally concerns people, but is being negotiated by governments among governments. You have recently read in the New York Times of the Indian statesman who said that plows and not guns would stop communism in Asia. The people of Europe are more afraid of another war than they are of communism. And I am not convinced that the people of this country believe that our boundaries are now on the other side of Paris—or that saying that they are is the way to peace.

THE FACT AND SECURITY

In the last analysis Peacemakers feels that the pact will not diminish but only increase the support for communistic governments abroad,
and tends to support the kind of measures which lead to authoritarianism here at home as well as in the rest of the world. I refer to the measures necessitated by the continued stock piling of atomic bombs and biological weapons, to the continuance of peacetime conscription, huge military expenditures, the support of undemocratic countries as bastions against communism.

More allies and bigger guns has never prevented a war. At best it means a postponement until both sides are more capable of destruction. More important than this is a fundamental psychological reality. For the past 4 years we have been seeking national security. Since the bomb exploded over Hiroshima, only insecurity has increased. Attempts to produce peace by threat, violence, and counterviolence seem necessary but we end up more fearful than ever. All the guns this country can build will not make us, or the Europeans any safer. They fear the Russians, they are dependent upon us, and they dislike equally the walls of this vise. The Atlantic Pact means more pressure, not a relaxing of the military and psychological squeeze. Every time President Truman says we will drop an atomic bomb if necessary, the American people feel no false joy, for they realize that we can expect only similar treatment from the enemy.

In a very real sense, gentlemen, the Atlantic Pact is the atom bomb of the cold war. It is as ultimately futile a departure from the UN and peace as nuclear fission is from gunpowder; as far as human security and happiness is concerned. It will delineate more clearly than ever the split between east and west, and make it harder than ever to bridge. Henry Wallace and his friends urge that ratification of the treaty be postponed beyond the meeting of the foreign ministers. It follows that cooperation may be expected at the meeting. Peacemakers feels it extremely unwise to think that brandishing a ratified treaty will make agreement here, or anywhere else, more possible.

In summary, then, the Atlantic Pact is the closest thing to a battle cry and the farthest from a peace offering that has yet taken place since World War II. Peacemakers therefore considers it anything but a sign of progress or a goal to be desired.

From what we know of history, the only effect such a move will guarantee is a countermeasure. Instead of giving a breathing space for a real peace settlement, such a show of power as the Atlantic Pact only increases the tensions on both sides, necessitates measures which limit the freedom we are trying to protect and maintain, strengthens the enemy instead of making him weaker, and destroys us as we are forced to become more like him. However defensive it may seem to us, the Atlantic Pact will sow the seeds of violence and power, and our harvest shall be fear and hate.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, young man. You may be excused.

Mr. Peters. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carolyn Hill Stewart.

STATEMENT OF MRS. CAROLYN HILL STEWART, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. Stewart. I am a housewife in Washington, D. C. I represent no organization. However, as the mother of a son of 5, I feel that I represent the unorganized mothers of America.
Under the North Atlantic Pact, the United States of America is to become the political and military ally of certain European nations among whom are Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Britain, France, and the Netherlands are nations having colonial possessions in which the urge of the native peoples for self-determination and freedom from exploitation have flared already into sporadic rebellion and open warfare. The Dutch are even now at war with the native peoples of Indonesia while elsewhere in Asia, in Africa, and the East, the rumble of dissatisfaction with the status quo gives warning that further and more volcanic eruptions are to be expected in these so-called unenlightened or backward areas of the world.

THE PACT AND COLONIAL POLICY

On May 14, 1949, the State Department’s release on the arms aid corollary to the North Atlantic Pact stated that "defensive strength in the hands of nations of peaceful intent does not lead to war." The past and present record of Britain, France, and the Netherlands when faced with the desire for freedom by native peoples long subject to their domination is bloody and cruel and reveals that the peaceful intent of these signatory countries is in inverse ratio to the degree of their desperate self-interest and tenacity of their grip upon the lands and lives of these native peoples.

Prior to these hearings on the North Atlantic Pact, our newspapers carried the announcement that certain signatories of the pact, among them Britain, France, and the Netherlands, would ask jointly for American armaments under the North Atlantic Pact. Assuming this statement to be true, it follows, therefore, that arms for any one of these nations will be arms for all.

Any pretense of refusing arms aid to, let us say, the Netherlands would be farcical while arms were being sent those nations party to the Atlantic Pact and their own joint arms agreement. Any sanctions invoked by the United Nations against any one of these nations could be aborted unless directed against them all.

In its May 14th release the State Department made it clear, also, that "aggression" as used in the North Atlantic Pact would be defined as covering internal communist revolutions as well as outside attacks. Thus do we find those who ratify the pact committed to interference in the civil affairs of member nations and their colonial possessions subject only to a "gentleman’s agreement" that the red label be applied first.

QUESTIONS ON THE ATLANTIC PACT AND COLONIES

In view of the aforementioned matters, we of the United States need ask ourselves these questions:

1. Is it possible under the North Atlantic Pact and its arms aid corollary to prevent the defensive weapons of western Europe from being used against the native peoples of Indonesia, Indochina, Africa?

2. As possible coadministrators with Britain, France, and Italy of lands raped by Italy prior to World War II, as advisers, administrators, and military occupants of areas unsettled by World War II, as dispensers of the European recovery program, of Greek and Turkish aid, with the ratification of the pact and its arms aid corollary, do we
not become a colossus astride the world? Are we not, then, so hopelessly entangled and so completely indentified with the Caesars, the Napoleons, and the Kiplings of this world that we are rendered utterly ineffectual as active champions of freedom and democracy for all peoples?

3. Will not the entanglement and indentification which becomes definite and official with the ratification of the pact and the passing of its arms aid corollary force the exploited, dominated colonial peoples of the world to turn to Russia and communism as the only hope of succor?

4. Even when the native peoples of colonial possessions receive neither internal nor external aid from Russia, will not our own need for self-justification lead us to echo blindly the cry that any strong native movement for freedom or for change in existing government is Communist-inspired, Communist-dominated?

(a) Are we not forced, therefore, into a protective pattern of lip service to our ideals of freedom and democracy while we supply arms to those who can and will use them to suppress freedom and democracy in vast areas of the world? However beautiful our present intentions, do we not become, then, the greatest liars and hypocrites the world has ever known?

5. Is the taking of sides in a civil war or the military support of an undeclared war on native peoples any less a war than that which might conceivably take place between a western European nation and Russia?

6. Is it not probable that the gravest danger of war lies not in Europe, but in Asia, Africa, and the east?

If there be among us men with the vision of the Prophet Isaiah and the wisdom of Solomon who can assure us that we have a special dispensation from God that will protect us from the blunders of ignorance, prejudice, incompetence, avarice and greed within ourselves; and, if these men can say with authority that this divine providence will lead these nations of peaceful intent to use the defensive guns we give them in offensive action against no peoples' struggle for freedom—then, let us ratify the North Atlantic Pact and pass its arms aid corollary straight away.

If these latter day Isaiahs and Solomons can further assure us that the questions I have asked are intellectual or emotional meanderings that have not and will not arise in fact nor be answered in our sons' consciences and blood, then, indeed, let us act with speed amid prayer and rejoicing.

THE PACT AND WAR

But if there are no Isaiahs and no Solomons, and if our only assurance is to be found in collective huddling, the power and weight of arms, and the peaceful intent of nations of known frailty, then let us ratify the pact and pass the weapons fully realizing that we do so, not as a show of strength but as a revelation of fear and weakness.

Let us ratify the pact knowing that the end of this act is not peace but war—declared or undeclared—the price of this act, not the dollars and cents, but the years through which we the peoples of the world must pass until we have faced issue by issue those problems we now deny or evade. Let us act knowing that we will
pay our debt of blood and turmoil, of divided consciences and confused loyalties until some people, somewhere, sometime win through to the strength to be found only in positive action inspired by and directed to extending to all, the freedom and democracy we now profess.

The CHAIRMAN. As the treaty stands, are you for ratification or opposed to it?

Mrs. STEWART. Opposed.

UNITED STATES COLONIAL POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of colonial areas, the United States has no colonial areas. At the end of the Spanish-American War, did we not decline to take—and we could have—Cuba within our control, but that we gave Cuba her freedom and guaranteed her freedom?

Mrs. STEWART. At the end of the Spanish-American War we had not considered ratifying the Atlantic Pact.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, if you cannot answer the question any better than that.

Mrs. STEWART. We had not.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that. I just asked you if that was a fact.

Mrs. STEWART. It is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That we did give Cuba her freedom and guaranteed it for many years?

Mrs. STEWART. We did.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the Philippines, which was our possession and our territory, did we not voluntarily liberate her and give her her independence?

Mrs. STEWART. We did. But I would like to say this: I do not speak here of what we did at that time.

The Chairman. I know.

Mrs. STEWART. What is to happen in the future is not necessarily—

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything more about the future than the rest of us do.

Mrs. STEWART. That is why I raise these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You judge the future by the past. Has not the United States, since World War II, passed legislation that aids the Philippines, grants them homes, war damages, and a lot of other legislation that shows our sympathy for what might have been termed a "colonial area," but which we did not recognize as a colonial area?

Mrs. STEWART. But does our sympathy assure the colonial peoples of the sympathy of Britain, France, and of the Netherlands?

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot put your finger on anything in the treaty that says anything about intervening with the internal affairs of any country?

Mrs. STEWART. It is not the things that are written that we have to fear; it is the things that are not.

The CHAIRMAN. What are we ratifying? Something that is written or not written? Are we reaching in the air and ratifying it? The treaty is in writing, before you. You know what is in the treaty. You read it; you understand it. We are ratifying the treaty. We are not ratifying your imagination.
MRS. STEWART. But in a document in which the wording is so written that it can be interpreted by later groups of people to mean a different thing—

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the case with this treaty. I thought you said in one of your statements here that you had not made up your mind.

MRS. STEWART. Since the State Department release of Saturday, May 14—

The CHAIRMAN. On April 28 you said, in a statement made at that date, that you did not know how you stood, whether you were for it or against it.

MRS. STEWART. Since the State Department release of May 14 I have made up my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

MRS. STEWART. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 1:50 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene Tuesday, May 17, 1949, at 10:30 a. m.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to adjournment on May 16, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Connally (chairman), Green, Fulbright, Vandenberg, and Wiley.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Emerson.

How long is your statement, Mr. Emerson?

Mr. Emerson. Six minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is commended to the attention of all other witnesses.

STATEMENT OF E. A. EMERSON, MIDDLETOWN CITIZENS COMMITTEE, MIDDLETOWN, OHIO

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Emerson, you represent the Middletown Citizens Committee, Middletown, Ohio?

Mr. Emerson. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell what your business is and where you live, and give your name to the reporter.

Mr. Emerson. My name is E. A. Emerson. I am acting as honorary chairman of the Middletown Citizens Committee, of Middletown, Ohio. That is a small city of about 35,000 lying about 30 miles north of Cincinnati.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a citizens' committee on what, just a general committee to which they refer everything?

Mr. Emerson. This committee was organized, Senator, early in 1946 to arouse public opinion for strengthening the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Emerson. There are Middletowns in all parts of America, and I imagine a good deal like the one I speak for. Our particular committee has had the formal support of the citizenry of Middletown in very complete measure. I list at the back of this statement 34 organizations which have formally approved the committee's program, and I believe its membership represents a good cross section of a representative small city in the Middle West.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Emerson. There are 167 granite crosses in our cemetery to the Middletown boys killed in World War II. There are about half that number erected to the local boys killed in World War I. Just 3 years
ago, in May 1946, the citizens of Middletown, assembled in town meetings, decided that they did not wish to repeat three times in one lifetime the same tragic mistake. Twice they had sat on the sidelines while their country drifted into war. This third time they saw the same drift developing again. They decided that this time they want to be on their feet doing something about it.

We started raising local sentiment in favor of putting teeth in the United Nations so that it could do the job it was set up to do.

**STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS**

We discovered very early that the only real obstacle in the way of that reasonable course is the destructive and effective sabotage of the Kremlin dictators. Our community commenced to awaken to the fact that in some way that implacable Kremlin sabotage of world peace plans had to be stopped. (In 1946 that feeling was not as general in Washington as we hope it is now.) Our efforts to arouse an awareness to this fact in our part of the country spread faster and farther than we had expected, aided by some very helpful counsel from Members of the Senate and, of course, aided to a very great extent by the continuing vicious attacks of Vishinsky and other Kremlin spokesmen, and by the killing vetoes the Kremlin imposed on 30 UN majority decisions.

The Chairman. May I interrupt you there and ask you a question? You say “aided by some very useful counsel from Members of the Senate.” Do you mean the Senators from Ohio?

Mr. Emerson. We had discussions with Senator Taft; also the privilege of a conference with Senator Vandenberg.

The Chairman. I am speaking about Ohio. I know Senator Vandenberg; he is all right. Were your Senators for it or against it?

Mr. Emerson. I am unable to say at this moment. They were for our program of strengthening the United Nations at the time we presented it.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Vandenberg. I would like to say that I have not discussed the Atlantic Pact with Mr. Emerson or his associates, but I have been long interested in the very unique adventure which the Middletown Citizens Committee represents, and I highly commend its patriotic purpose and its anxiety to do something in behalf of practical citizenship and patriotism.

Mr. Emerson. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. It is a very laudable enterprise if you can work it out.

Mr. Emerson. I am just back, Senator, from an extended trip in South America, and I have not had an opportunity to see Senator Taft since my return. I hope to soon.

The Chairman. Senator Bricker is also from your State.

Mr. Emerson. Yes. He was with us Sunday, but we did not have a chance to discuss this.

Our community expressed itself in 1946 through its citizens' committee's pamphlet, Crossroads Middletown, as believing firmly that disaster will overtake our American way of living unless the democratic powers take the initiative from the Kremlin dictators and use initiative against them in the critical years immediately ahead of us.
A program for doing this is outlined in this present pamphlet which the citizens of Middletown published at their expense this year and which I have asked Mr. O'Day to place on your desks and enter for the record. This is the third one Middletown citizens have published.

As stated in this pamphlet entitled, "Who Called a Spade a Spade in 1948?" Middeltown believes the Atlantic Pact is the immediate means of stopping the sabotage of the Kremlin dictators, and in strengthening the UN so that it can keep our peace. We also point out our belief that as the pact countries arm themselves for their own mutual self-defense they should take steps to strengthen the United Nations itself so that eventually it will be the United Nations and not the North Atlantic countries that will police world aggressors.

Our group feel that one point has not been sufficiently stressed in statements on this subject, namely, that the Kremlin dictators must be stopped before they acquire their atom bomb plants. After they have acquired their supply it will be too late, because in addition to atom bombs they will also have one other invaluable weapon that we can never equal—the ability to move swiftly without forewarning and to attack us by surprise and deceit. This consideration we feel is all-important. It means that to be effective, our action must be now.

**DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY**

The Atlantic Pact, we believe, offers us the only basis possible for prompt action. Through the Atlantic Pact, properly supported and implemented, the Kremlin dictators can be faced by a weight of defensive strength great enough to make it manifest that a Russian attack against that combined strength would lead to sure defeat.

If this fact is established and then dramatized to the Kremlin dictators and, even more important, also to the Russian people, we feel it entirely probable that either the will or the ability of the men in the Kremlin to act aggressively can be curtailed and their present determination to equal us in the colossally expensive effort of atomic bomb production can be blunted or turned aside.

We have heard much talk to the effect that we should stop the threat of Soviet communism by the use of ideas rather than the use of strength. We know no place where communism has really become dangerous except where it was supported, directly or indirectly, by the use or threat of Soviet military strength. In our opinion, it is the Kremlin's military might that we must check. Only then can our good ideas and ideals have a clean soil in which to grow. Only then can the United Nations act as the peacemaker we all intended it to be.

Few Americans want a preventative war—and no Americans want the horror of atom-bombed American cities. We are inevitably drifting toward one or the other of these disasters unless we take the one alternate course open to us now.

The first and all-important step is to ratify the Atlantic Pact. We earnestly urge that you do so.

**THE PACT AND THE CHARTER**

The Chairman. We thank you very much for your very fine and splendid statement. I want to say, however, that strengthening and modifying the United Nations Charter has long been the objective
of most of the members of this committee, if not all of them, as well as the Senate. A resolution which the Senate passed in 1948 had as one of its objectives to strengthen and improve the United Nations, and when we met at San Francisco and adopted the Charter it was with the theory, at least, that the great nations would cooperate in making the United Nations Charter work. Of course, you are familiar with the fact that for 30 times the purposes of the United Nations have been vetoed, arrested, and prevented by the action of a single power.

Mr. Emerson. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. And we are still bent upon that purpose. The fact that we endorse and adopt this particular North Atlantic Pact in no way lessens our responsibility and desire to improve the United Nations Charter itself, and throughout the North Atlantic Pact, if you recall, it is over and over stressed that the North Atlantic Pact is not to be in conflict with the United Nations but supplementary thereto and as an aid, in a way, to the activities of the United Nations. Is that not true?

Mr. Emerson. It is. And as we studied this subject, Senator, it seemed to us very definitely that the North Atlantic Pact is the implement which can again put on the main line the United Nations that was derailed by the Soviet vetoes, and this pamphlet of ours, which you may have an opportunity to glance through, which was published early this year, develops one plan that we have worked out for the Atlantic Pact to react on a strengthened United Nations. In essence our idea would be to so implement that Atlantic Pact that it can operate on a majority-decision basis, where the UN cannot. As the Atlantic Pact is made to operate successfully, its strength can then be welded into the structure of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to do that. We have undertaken to do that insofar as we can in this treaty. Of course, it is not all-encompassing.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. I am sorry I wasn't here to hear all of your statement. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much. We think you had an admirable paper and represent the views of your citizens very faithfully and clearly.

Mr. Emerson. Thank you, Senator. I will be glad to so report.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection we will put the statement of the witness in the record.

(Statement, Who Called a Spade a Spade in 1948? appears in the printer's copy of this record, as follows:)

WHO CALLED A SPADE A SPADE IN 1948?

MIDDLETOWN DID * * * IT STILL DOES. LET'S GET ACTION * * * IN 1949

The Berlin blockade is just one example of Russian aggression. Daily our gallant airmen supply Berlin with the necessities of life over Moscow's vicious blockade. At this writing, 37 of our men have died—meeting that threat—and western Berlin's factories work only part time. Our airlift is not the final answer.
An effective world authority is the answer. We have the beginning of such an authority—It is the United Nations. Middletown's goal, from the beginning, has been a strengthened United Nations. Now with Russia starting its fake peace offensive it is more important than ever that we must make it work for peace throughout the world—rather than allow indecision to lead to defeat.

Here is how * * * In '49

1. Strengthen the United Nations through regional arrangements

The Charter of the United Nations must be strengthened so that aggression will be stopped. A United Nations so strengthened necessitates veto limitation in matters of aggression, international control of armaments, including scientific weapons, and the establishment of an effective International Police Force.

Amendment to the Charter is the goal. Unfortunately it is clear that this cannot be accomplished now. The Soviet Government has stated plainly that it will block any attempt to modify the veto; it already has vetoed the United States' proposal on atomic energy control. It has used the veto over 50 times to block majority action.

Containment of Soviet Communist aggression is not enough. We must now take the initiative! In 1949 we must no longer bewail our weakness. We must talk of our determination—of our moral, economic, and military strength. Let's use the provisions of the present Charter to gain the revised Charter of the future.

Under article 52 of the Charter, regional arrangements are specifically permitted for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, provided that such arrangements are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. What could be more consistent with those purposes and principles than to establish a world organization that can control aggression?

So * * * let's use article 52.—Our State Department should use its influence to:

1. Speedily establish regional alliances of free peoples who wish to remain free. Of most immediate concern is the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance, which would at first include the United States, Canada, and the nations of western Europe. The Pan American Union already is established. These or additional groups might include the Scandinavian nations, the Mediterranean nations, a Middle Eastern bloc and the states of South Africa.

2. Secure the establishment by these groups, separately and possibly together, of a charter that would contain the three necessary provisions now lacking in the United Nations Charter. Concentrate particularly on the establishment of such a charter by the North Atlantic Alliance in which is centered the greatest strength in the world today. The three recommended provisions would be:

(a) Make decisions on aggression by a vote of two-thirds of the members—no veto. Aggression and preparation for aggression would be defined and interpreted by an International Court of Justice.

(b) Establish minimum armaments production quotas. Adopt the United States' proposals for international control of atomic energy to become operative when all nations have joined. Guarantee the proper working of these systems by positive international inspection.

(c) Establish an effective tyranny-proof world police force to consist of an independent active force under the direction of the alliance and a reserve force made up of the national armed forces of the member states. Each member would contribute a specified number of armed units and equipment to the world police force. The world police force would be used as a shock force on the spot in Europe or elsewhere and perhaps could act as occupation troops in the western zones of Germany. The national armed forces would back up the world police force when needed in order to throw the full power of the alliance against any aggressor.

3. Endeavor to get other nations and regional groups to join with the North Atlantic Alliance in order to form a world-wide organization to oppose aggression.

4. Simultaneously, the North Atlantic Alliance would go before the General Assembly of the UN to review its complaints against the Soviet Union. It would point out the immediate aggression in Berlin where thousands of persons would be starving or taken over by the Communists were it not for the North Atlantic group airlift. Other indictments (listed on inside of back cover) would be enumerated.

* For further details read Crossroads Middletown.
Call on the General Assembly to declare the Soviet Union an aggressor and a threat to peace, its Berlin blockade an "armed attack." A vote of the nations of the world would be requested.

The North Atlantic Alliance would declare that it would be bound by the vote of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.

5. If this vote should declare Russia an aggressor or a threat to peace, the alliance would announce its intention, in the interest of the rest of the world, to oppose Soviet Communist expansion. The alliance would guarantee its mutual self-defense, under article 51 of the Charter, by taking effective police action against the aggressor, and in the name of the UN—whenever and wherever it becomes necessary.

6. The alliance would guarantee to the peoples of the world that the UN Charter will be amended to include the three strengthening provisions included in the alliance's own charter whenever the Soviet Union will agree to such provisions.

Realistic—yes.—At present we are threatened by an increasingly dangerous aggressor.

Intelligent action is required to curb this aggression and threat to peace—soon.

We know from bitter experience that the Kremlin understands only one philosophy—superior force.

The procedure outlined here would enable the gathering of the maximum force to stop the aggressor while this police force still has a monopoly on the weapon that can best convince the aggressor he must comply peacefully.

The Kremlin would know that the free nations of the world are united in their desire to stop aggression by peaceful means if possible but determined to use police action if necessary.

II. The Marshall plan has been effective; let's continue it

American dollars and goods must continue to help Europeans rehabilitate Europe. Self-sustaining economies will be the strongest bulwark against Communist expansion and for the preservation of free institutions.

1. Our aid must be carefully administered so that it continues as a means of recovery rather than a subsidy or relief measure.

2. Encourage investment of private capital abroad and offer technical advice to increase industrial and agricultural production.

3. Make more clear that the Marshall plan is a means of preserving free institutions and peoples by giving courage and help to the strong-hearted while creating envy and suspicion among those countries subjected to the whip of Moscow. Eventually their growing discontent will lead to a desire to actively cooperate in the overthrow of their oppressors in the Kremlin.

III. Counterattack on the propaganda front

Battle with all our might the flood of lies and treacherous propaganda of the Communists.

By getting the truth into Europe—

1. Encourage and support the continuance and growth of the Voice of America.

2. Publicize everywhere the Soviet violations of agreements.

3. Penetrate the iron curtain by pamphlets, newspapers, votes of the United Nations Assembly, radio, word of mouth.

4. In every way possible, entice willing and freedom-loving peoples away from the Russian sphere.

5. Publicize the postwar benefits of a free and strong America.

6. Drop 1,000,000 copies of the Sears, Roebuck catalog in Russia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

7. Supply our comrades in this propaganda battle with the best of our technical know-how, publicity, and advertising genius, etc.

8. Encourage the bolstering of morale among individual Europeans by adoption of European cities by American cities.

9. Carefully censor American movies produced for world consumption. We want other nations to understand the true American way of life.

10. Educate our own people to our world responsibilities.

* Actually, effective police action cannot be taken under the Charter without the affirmative vote of all the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. The Russian veto blocks such action. In order to stop aggression now we are proposing that the North Atlantic Alliance Act, until 16 above can be effected, on a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly rather than the required unanimous vote of the permanent members of the Security Council.
IV. Talk from our strength

Keep America strong. But $15,000,000,000 per year for defense is a tremendous burden to our free economy. So we must use our present military, political, and economic resources to call a spade a spade—while there is time. We are strong. Our Air Force, Army, and Navy are prepared. We have the A-bomb and our Air Force is capable of flying it to any part of the earth. Let's talk from strength instead of weakness. Let's use our strength effectively by joining the North Atlantic alliance—now. Our strength must be the backbone of the alliance until the aggressor is stopped. Then a strengthened and revitalized United Nations can keep the peace.

THE CASE AGAINST THE SOVIET DICTATORS

Repeated breach of nonaggression pacts—Finland, Poland, Estonia, etc. Invasion of Iran. Dismemberment of Manchurian industry. Plundering of Poland and Germany. Active support of guerrillas in Greece and revolutionists in China. Fomentation of strikes and treason in Italy, France, Turkey, Greece, Colombia, Paraguay, United States. Failure to return war prisoners as agreed. Blatant misuse of the veto in the Security Council. Infiltration of Czechoslovakia—Remember the fate of Jan Masaryck. Only negative vote to the United Nations "bill of rights." Berlin blockade. Coercion of the Scandinavian countries. Religious persecutions and attacks on religious leaders—Hungary's Cardinal Mindszenty and Bishop Lajos Ordass: Bulgaria's protestant ministers. Apathy is as killing as an atomic bomb. The choice [of peace or war] is still yours.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas J. Reardon, of Hartford, Conn. How long is your statement?

Mr. Reardon. I would say about 12 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Reardon. Tell the reporter your name, your business, where you reside, and whom you represent.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. REARDON, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, HARTFORD, CONN.

Mr. Reardon. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen. May the blessings of Almighty God enlighten our minds and move our hearts to know and to do rightly.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not told us yet whom you represent.

Mr. Reardon. I represent the United States Constitutional Defense Foundation. My name is Thomas J. Reardon. I am a sinner and whole citizen of these United States.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I request you to place me under oath because of the nature of my opposition to the North Atlantic Pact and the charges I am about to prefer. I will waive my right to refuse to answer any question the committee sees fit to ask me, whatever the consequences are.

The CHAIRMAN. We assume you will testify without an oath as well as you would with one. It is not the custom of the committee to put witnesses under oath. You have your obligation to your conscience and we are willing to accept it.
Mr. Reardon. I say that for a very pertinent reason. People have come before committees in this Congress, and when they were asked questions they refused to answer because it might incriminate them.

The Chairman. I understand.

Mr. Reardon. They were very strong on their civil rights, but they were very short on their civil responsibilities, and that is the important part.

The Chairman. All right; go right ahead.

Mr. Reardon. I am here to discharge my full civil responsibilities in the common defense of the United States and our Constitution that insures my civil rights that I am exercising here and now with your permission.

In my statement you have Material A, entitled "The Clue to the Fundamental Human Error." I will come back to that later.


Second in the classification, trying to "alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

The second is equally as deadly and destructive of liberty as the first; more cleverly disguised and is far more successful in altering our concept of government. Direct evidence of the success of this domestic enemy activity I will leave with you, and it happened in Hartford, Conn.

Material BB and C: Power journalism, power politics, and power radio played a major part in its success in Hartford. It has now been approved by the superintendents of our schools and it will now become part of the instructional course of citizens of the United States.

Material D, E, F, and G: With a shout of emergency! The ever-existing threat and ever-existing potential danger is defined as positive. Then the false doctrine based on this premise follows with the campaign of fear, hate, and cheer.

Supporting a bipartisan foreign and domestic policy by resolutions.

The Fulbright resolution, the first bastard document; then the Connally resolution and then the Vandenberg resolution.

The Fulbright resolution and Connally resolution, the forerunners of the great fraud, the United Nations, admitted a failure by all, including President Truman.

Material H, HH, and I: The Vandenberg resolution, the forerunner of another fraud, positively doomed to failure because of the false concept inherent in the premise it is based on. The proper classification of both documents proves that by constitutional processes the Senate or the Congress of the United States has no right of action on such documents.

THE FACT AND THE CHARTER

The United Nations document is a warrantee deed conveying the territorial possessions of 59 nations to 5 nations.

The Atlantic Pact document is of similar nature, but in conflict with the first document. We have nothing to gain and all to lose as parties to both documents.

This state of affairs stems from our disregarding the advice of our forefathers, particularly the advice in George Washington's Farewell Address, and following the false doctrines from Monroe to Tru
man that involved us in the Spanish-American War, the First World War, and developed the incident that involved us in the Second World War and will involve us in future wars.

This revolution in our history of foreign affairs has altered the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. That's positive.

Note our oath of allegiance to our flag as citizens of the United States and your oath as officers of our Government. And then note the oath of allegiance to the United Nations. Then there will be another oath to the Atlantic Pact, another probably to the Pacific Pact, whittling away our independence. No man can read the oath of allegiance and then for 1 minute support our supporting these documents. I owe no allegiance to the United Nations, the Atlantic Pact, or other documents that divide that allegiance with other nations and their concepts of government.

Now we get to the conflict in the world today. The conflict in this world is a conflict of concepts, and there are only two concepts. One is based on heredity and the other is based on environment, and our forefathers in denouncing the concept of government that they were subjects of did not compromise. They could have, and remained subjects. But they didn't compromise. And then they insured that liberty in the Constitution of the United States, and you had better get this straight. That is an irrepealable law, no matter what shout of emergency you give.

In this little leaflet, Material A, you find a most important event. It is this guidance in finding the fundamental human error, and it happened in Hartford, in a sermon, March 20, 1949, in Hartford, Conn., and I am quoting from the sermon:

The last state of anyone who compromises with evil will always be worse than that which preceded it.

This is not merely a Christian belief; it is writ large in the history of men and nations.

The tables of experience shout it forth from every page.

It is self-evident that it is a falsehood that men or nations can better their state by compromising with evil.

How true this all is. And here is the part that takes it out of theology and into the world of materialism. Just across from St. Joseph's Cathedral in Hartford, Conn., where the Very Reverend Monsignor Hayes delivered this sermon on March 20, is the Aetna Life Insurance Co. Now, in classifying investments in the investment field, insurance comes first in their classification. Let's examine what is the substance and fundamental behind that security. It is because of their strict adherence to the tables of experience. And then let's follow the table of experience in our compromising, and the condition of the United States today shows that each compromise that we have made has caused our condition to become worse than that which preceded it, and from an economic standpoint, I came to Washington in 1939 and spent time with the experts on Senator O'Mahoney's committee to prove to him very positively the cause of the collapse of '29 and the correction that could be made in the method of valuation in the Federal Reserve Bank, and that same false method of valuation continues, and from time to time I have brought that to the attention of Congress and presented bills that would have corrected that error.
The Chairman. Let me interrupt you to say that unless you stick
to the subject or to your statement, you are going to exceed your 12
minutes.

Mr. Reardon. I have some more left.

Now for the Atlantic Pact.

The Chairman. That's better.

Mr. Reardon. When Mr. Bemis, a professor of Yale, on April 3,
over WITC, and Mr. Morgan Beatty on April 4 over WITC, stated
their conclusions on the Atlantic Pact, it was self-evident the pro-
fessor and the commentator did not know the special responsibility
of an officer in our Government, and this is a special responsibility.
He must be able to point to a sentence in the Constitution that gives
him authority to act and defend the Constitution of the United States
against foreign and domestic enemies.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREATY

We, the people, cannot suspend any of the provisions of the Con-
stitution of the United States by constitutional processes. And I
quote from a decision in 1865 by Mr. Justice David Davis of the
United States Supreme Court in the Ex parte Milligan case:

No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government.

So the challenge today to us is, as God has given us liberty let us
keep it, and enemy activities, the domestic enemy activities, are those
who propose to alter our Government by unconstitutional means, and
that only can happen by presenting documents before you for con-
sideration that have no business to be considered when you give a
proper classification of the document.

For that reason alone—I don't expect you to remember, Senator—
when I testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, at the end
of my statement you said "Thank you, Mr. Reardon. We will cer-
tainly look into the unconstitutionality of it." If you had looked
into it, Senator, you would find that there is no process, no constitu-
tional process, to have that document before you, because the concept
involved in it, and those associated with you—you have fifty-odd as-
soicates—and the concepts of government that you are joining hands
with were very positive that it would be a failure, and the fact is, the
veto power was in there and is there yet and will continue to be there
so any theory of strengthening that pact through any other pact—let's
get that out of our heads. Let's admit the failure.

But there is only one course, and we have done this. We have had
experience with corridors. We have the corridor in Berlin, and the
first act that led to the blockade was the criminal negligence on some-
one's part who gave the plates that we printed our currency with to
Russia, and that currency issue is there yet. Now we are building
a corridor in New York, an international corridor, whereby subversive
activities, foreign enemies, can come to American soil, and you have no
means of blockading it.

Let's stop that before we go any further. You have appropriated
$75,000,000. Stop it before it goes any further.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Reardon. Save America.
The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg?
Senator Vandenberg. No questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
(The statements referred to by Mr. Reardon are on file with the committee.)
The Chairman. Stanley Nowak, former State senator of Michigan. Whom do you represent; where do you live; and what is your business?

STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY NOWAK, FORMERLY STATE SENATOR OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Nowak. My name is Stanley Nowak. I come from Detroit, Mich. In my city, over half of the population is of foreign birth.
The Chairman. Whom do you represent? What organization?
Mr. Nowak. About 17 of the different national groups of European origin banded together several weeks ago.
The Chairman. Do you segregate in your approach to national problems the foreign-born from the American-born? Why do you do that? Are you not all Americans?
Mr. Nowak. No; we do not segregate them.
The Chairman. You are not all Americans?
Mr. Nowak. We are all Americans.
The Chairman. You live here. You make your living here. You live off the people of the United States. Do you in these political alignments cut your crowd off over here as those of foreign birth, and the American citizens over here as of another birth?
Mr. Nowak. No, Senator.
The Chairman. All right; go ahead.
Mr. Nowak. If you will permit me, I will finish what I was trying to discuss.
The Chairman. Very good.
Mr. Nowak. These groups organized what is known as Nationality Councils for Peace, and asked me to come before your committee to present their views on the North Atlantic Pact.
The Chairman. All right. This is the foreign view, now, the view of these foreign groups?
Mr. Nowak. No, sir. They are all Americans, and they consider their view to be an American point of view.
The problems created by the North Atlantic Pact affect intimately the lives and welfare of all of the American people. First and foremost, of course, is the question of war or peace. But no aspect of the lives of our people or the functioning of our Government can escape certain consequences of the pact. Deep and serious constitutional questions, such as the right of the Congress of the United States to declare war, are involved. The basic civil rights of the American people are concerned. The standard of living of our people, whether there will be homes and food and jobs for all or whether we will have less of the necessities of life in order to be able to make more armaments, is deeply involved.

I request an opportunity to appear before your committee not so much to ask you questions about the North Atlantic Pact as to present to you some of the problems that vex and concern the people back
home in relation to the pact. These are questions that concern the people. They are also questions that must be answered by every Member of the United States Senate before he casts his vote for approval or rejection of the North Atlantic Pact.

DEFENSE AND REARMAMENT

1. We are told that this is a defense measure, but how do we justify saddling the war-weary peoples of Europe with a new arms race when all real authorities agree that the Soviet Union has neither the intent nor the power to attack?

The CHAIRMAN. Of what country are you a native? Where were you born?

Mr. Nowak. I was born in Poland.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of Russia at one time?

Mr. Nowak. Before 1913.

The CHAIRMAN. You were born there in what year?

Mr. Nowak. In 1903.

The CHAIRMAN. You were born in 1903?

Mr. Nowak. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are a Pole by nationality?

Mr. Nowak. I was a Pole by nationality.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a citizen?

Mr. Nowak. I am. I served in the Michigan Senate for 10 years. I would have to be a citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

OTHER QUESTIONS ON THE ATLANTIC PACT

Mr. Nowak. 2. How can we explain this pact as a defense of freedom when Portugal, governed by a dictator who does not permit freedom of religion and other basic freedoms, is a signatory of the pact?

3. How can we explain to the two-thirds of the world which is colored and to 15,000,000 American Negroes that this is a pact in defense of democracy when we are providing military aid to governments engaged in warfare against colonial peoples?

4. How do we justify more billions for arms when the futility of military measures against social and political ideologies has been demonstrated in China and Greece?

5. I know that Secretary Acheson has said that the pact will not deprive the Congress of the constitutional power to declare war. If we reserve the right to discuss and debate a declaration of war in our Congress, how do we view the obligations of the European governments under the pact? Are they permitted legislative discussion and debate? If we alone reserve the right not to go to war, then does not the pact become a device for our use of European manpower?

6. How do we explain to millions of Americans of Eastern European origin that the pact is for the defense of western civilization? We Americans of Polish and Slavic origin find it difficult to distinguish between Hitler's Aryan concept and Churchill's western civilization.

How do we explain western civilization as ending at the Polish and Czech borders? How do we explain Nazi industrialists returned
to power as defenders of western civilization and our former allies as peoples against whom we must arm?

I can tell you that western civilization, whatever that phrase may mean, was built with the arms and backs and brains of millions of Eastern Europeans and peoples from Africa and the Orient who will not accept the racist notion of Anglo-Saxon superiority enunciated by Churchill and other fathers of the North Atlantic Pact.

7. How do we explain to people abroad and to people at home Mr. Acheson's revealing phrase "the European members of the American community" which he used in describing the European signatories to the North Atlantic Pact? Americans of foreign birth or extraction owe their complete loyalty to this country, but I don't know a single American of Irish, French, British, or Scandinavian origin who wouldn't be angered by the thought that the land of his origin is now considered to be a colony.

8. How do we interpret the phrase "political independence" in the pact? American newspapers were shocked when the Czechoslovakian cabinet was reshuffled, constitutionally, to exclude certain parties. This was described here as a loss of political independence. Our press was not shocked when the State Department had earlier excluded Communist parties from the cabinets of France and Italy. If Communists were to regain places in the French and Italian Governments would this be considered a threat to their political independence? Also, does a member nation have to invite assistance or could we and the British and Belgians, for example, rush troops into France if the French Communists should win an election and form a government?

9. Are we to subvert the Constitution of the United States and transform our Government from a civilian into a military government by placing in the hands of the military the power to make decisions that will irrevocably commit us to war?

10. Recently a distinguished Member of the United States Senate, Senator Edwin Johnson of Colorado, stated that if the cold war were stopped the American economy would collapse. Is this true? Is this the reason for our continued and developing armaments program? Is it true, as this statement implies, that we are definitely committed to a war program?

11. How can we explain to the people of my own city of Detroit, 50,000 of whose families are now living doubled up and who need a minimum of 8 public housing projects costing only $78,000,000, that the Federal Government is preparing to spend $460,000,000 each week for the cold war, but only $225,000,000 all of next year for slum clearance and low-cost housing?

12. More than 20,000 children in my city of Detroit alone go to schools which are now more than 50 years old or attend only half days because of overcrowding. How can we explain to their parents that we can afford $460,000,000 each week for a cold war but that the $300,- 200,000 the Federal Government will spend all of next year for education does not permit the construction of the 79 new schools needed in Detroit?

13. In that part of Detroit with by far the largest population, there is more space devoted to cemeteries than to parks and playgrounds. How can we explain to the people there, as elsewhere, the expenditure
of $24,000,000,000 in support of a program that will assuredly create still more cemeteries and no additional playgrounds?

14. How can we explain to my neighbors and to Senator Vandenberg's constituents in Detroit why it will take 25 years, at the present rate of progress, to build a civic center, when its total cost is less than the Federal Government is spending for militarization and war each week?

15. The Berlin air lift cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Now that the blockade has been lifted, it is no longer necessary, but we have been told that it will be continued anyway. How can we explain to the people of Detroit, who, according to the city plan commission, need four district health centers and a larger tuberculosis hospital, the continued expenditure of millions of dollars for an air lift which is no longer needed?

16. How can we explain to the more than 5,000 laid-off tool and die makers in Detroit, yes, and to the 5,000,000 unemployed in our country, that our policy of refusing to trade our machine tools and equipment, the products of our industries, with the countries of eastern Europe really serves American interests?

BURDENS OF THE PACT AND PEACE

These, gentlemen, are some of the questions relating to the North Atlantic Pact that concern the American people, the people who are being called upon to shoulder the immediate financial burden and the potential military burden of the pact. Growing numbers of these people are alarmed that the real reasons for the formation of the pact are revealed in statements such as that of Secretary Johnson; and they are wondering if the real need is simply that of supporting our economy, why that purpose cannot be achieved by the expenditure of $24,000,000,000 on schools and hospitals and homes, rather than on tanks and planes and atom bombs.

Can prosperity be purchased only at the price of war?

Cannot prosperity be achieved and maintained with our country and the world at peace?

This is the question that is uppermost in the minds of our people. I know that it is a question that is beginning to concern you, too. I hope that our Government has learned from the experience of other governments that efforts to insure prosperity at the risk of peace have resulted in the loss of both.

I propose that we Americans stop talking about a war and instead take immediate steps toward assuring peace and harmony among the major nations of the world by sending a peace mission to the Soviet Union and the other eastern European countries to negotiate the resumption of trade relations and to discuss the major differences which are now keeping us apart.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a former member of the State Senate of Michigan?

Mr. Nowak. I was.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not now?

Mr. Nowak. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you resign?

Mr. Nowak. I did not run in the last election.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good way to get out of it.
Mr. Nowak. Senator, if I may, I was elected five times from that district, and I decided to run for Congress. I did not get the congressional nomination, but I feel confident that if I had run for the Senate I would have been reelected.

The CHAIRMAN. You run better for big jobs than you do for little ones; is that it?

Where do you get this $24,000,000,000 that you say this treaty will require us to expend? Where do you get that?

Mr. Nowak. A very prominent, and shall I say very conservative, publication, the United States News-World Report several weeks or a month ago devoted a lengthy article and quoted extensively from what I believe a reliable source, pointing out that our cold-war policy, from the time it started, in a period of 3 years, will cost us approximately $24,000,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do you believe everything you see in print?

Mr. Nowak. No; I don’t believe everything; no, Senator. But this article was convincing to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe it only if it agrees with your views; is that right?

Mr. Nowak. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg, any questions?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator Green. I was interested in the various faults that you find in conditions here now, most of which an attempt is being made to correct. But, on the whole, since you draw such a dark picture of conditions, do you not yet believe that our Government is the best in the world?

Mr. Nowak. Positively. I am of the opinion that our Constitution and our form of government, in my humble opinion, are the best in the world, and I have utmost loyalty to it, and my criticism of events in this statement is not in our form of government nor of our Constitution, but of the present trend to war.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE PACT

Senator Green. Yes. But then, if you believe our Government is the best in the world, as you say, do you think there ought to be any limit on the amount that we spend to defend it?

Mr. Nowak. If our country is in danger by any foreign aggressor, in my opinion, we should spend everything to defend it. But my contention, Senator, if I may conclude, is that there is no such danger at the present moment and that there is no need for that expenditure.

Senator Green. In that opinion you apparently differ from those of the governments of these nations who are signatories to the Atlantic Pact, who apparently believe that there may be danger of attack because the pact is made in order to defend against aggression. Is that not true?

Mr. Nowak. Yes; I differ with them.

Senator Green. You differ from those who represent the governments of all these countries?

Mr. Nowak. Yes, sir.

Senator Green. It is a question of opinion.
Mr. NOWAK. That is correct.

Senator GREEN. And you are setting yourself up against those who
are in control of these various governments?

Mr. NOWAK. That is correct.

Senator GREEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; that is all. Go ahead. We will excuse
you, Senator.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, before you call the next witness,
I may state that Senator Fulbright came in and was unable to stay,
but he asked me, in his absence and in his behalf, to ask for permission
to have printed in the record of this hearing a communication in the
Washington Post of February 20, 1949, relating to this pact.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[From the Washington Post, February 25, 1949]

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR

A COMMUNICATION

The proposed Atlantic Pact raises grave issues of high policy for the United
States. It is extremely difficult for any nation to lay down precisely the condi­
tions under which it will commit itself now to use armed force in the future.
Such problems must be faced squarely by those who have the responsibility for
conducting our foreign affairs.

These are far too important for anyone to take refuge in the comfortable
but erroneous theory that they need not be faced because our Constitution does
not legally permit them to be faced. Whether the United States should give any
commitment to use military force, and upon what conditions, are very hard
questions indeed. But the questions are questions of policy and not of legal
power. It is clearly demonstrable that the United States is legally under no
greater disability than any other sovereign nation to make a solemn commitment
with another state that each will use armed force to repel an attack on the other.

The debates in the Constitutional Convention, the provisions of the Constitu­tion
itself, and the subsequent conduct of this Nation have clearly established the
following:

1. The President and the Senate are authorized to enter into treaties of alliance
with other nations involving commitments to defend each other against invasion
or attack.

2. The President, as Commander In Chief of the armed forces, has the power to
make war to the extent necessary to repel sudden invasion or attack. What
constitutes an invasion or attack is for the President to determine, either in
advance by a formal declaration of policy such as the Monroe Doctrine or by the
making of a treaty with Senate approval, or at the moment when it occurs.
Throughout our history, all three methods have been used to extend our concept
of what constitutes an attack on the United States.

3. When and if the President makes war to repel an attack, the Congress has
the power to declare war in support of this act, or not to do so as it sees fit.
Whether the President acts pursuant to a Senate-ratified treaty or on his own
initiative, Congress is, of course, under strong moral compulsion to stand behind
him. But, despite the position in which Congress would thus find itself, the
framers of the Constitution never indicated that the legal power of the President
and the Senate to take such action is or ought to be limited.

I

One of the major purposes for creating the Union was self-defense. The
Constitution attempted to give the most ample powers necessary for this pur­
pose. As Hamilton said, "The means of security can only be regulated by the
means and the danger of attack. They will in fact be ever determined by these
rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the
impulse of self-preservation."

In the minds of the framers, an important means of self-defense was the
power to make treaties of alliance involving solemn commitments between
nations to defend each other against attacks by third parties. The constitutional
debates do not indicate that the treaty-making power was to be limited to such
innocent topics as commerce, navigation, or the standard of weights and meas-
ures. The whole flavor of the intense discussion of the treaty-making power
in the Convention debates and in the Federalist Papers shows full appreciation
of the fact that treaty making involved great powers that could be used to save
the Nation.

Solemn treaty commitments to defend others against attack or invasion were
not unknown to the framers of the Constitution. Under the Articles of Con-
federation, the United States in 1778 entered into a treaty with France for this
very purpose, guaranteeing to the King of France, against all the world, his
continued possession of French territories in North America. Article VI of the
Constitution specifically reaffirmed this obligation to France by providing that
"all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the land."

This pledge was made in the very same document which gives to Congress the
power to declare war. It proves specifically that, in the minds of the framers,
considerations might exist—and, in fact, did exist under a treaty already made—
which would morally oblige the Congress to declare war.

Similarly, article IV, section 4, of the Constitution states that "the United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of govern-
ment and shall protect each of them against invasion." Here again is a specific
commitment, contained in the Constitution itself, that under certain consider-
ations the Congress is morally obliged to exercise its power to declare war in
order to protect the States against invasion.

It was because treaties were recognized to be such grave affairs that the
framers debated at great length whether the President alone should be allowed
to make them, whether the Senate alone should be allowed to make them, and
whether the approval of the House of Representatives should be required. In
support of the proposition that the approval of the House should be required,
it was argued that treaties were the supreme law of the land and binding on
the Congress and should, therefore, be approved by the entire Congress in
advance.

The argument was rejected after James Madison had pointed out in the debates
"the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of treaties of alliance for
the purposes of war." The conclusion is inevitable that, in committing the
treaty-making power to the President and to the Senators, the framers knew
they were giving to these men, and to these men alone, the power to commit
the United States to make war to the extent of repelling attacks against our
treaty allies.

II

The Constitution states significantly that the Congress shall have power to
declare war. An earlier draft had given the Congress the power to make war,
but "make" was changed to "declare" during the debate of August 17, 1787, on
motion of James Madison, of Virginia, and Elbridge Gerry, of Delaware, for
the specific purpose of leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.
The change was supported by Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, on the ground that
the Executive should be able to repel and not to commence war.

It has never been contested that the President has the power to use armed force
in order to repel invasions or attacks. This means that the President has the
power to make war, even though Congress has the power to declare war.

The President's power to use military force to repel an attack has been exer-
cised on numerous occasions in our history, the most recent, of course, being the
Sunday of Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese planes began shooting on our fleet,
the Navy did not have to wait for instructions from Congress before shooting
back. Significantly, when the President subsequently asked Congress to declare
war, he asked for a declaration that since the Japanese attack on December 7
"a state of war has existed." The Congress thereupon resolved that "the state
of war * * * which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby
formally declared," and authorized the President to employ the entire resources
of the Government to bring the conflict to a successful termination.

Since the President can himself repel an attack, the crucial question is what
constitutes an attack. This is a political question for the President to decide. It
is not a legal question. The Prize cases (2 Black 635 (U. S. Sup. Ct., 1862)).

Throughout our history, it has been the policy of our Presidents to regard an
attack against the vital interests of the United States in the same manner as an
attack against its physical territories. In 1823, President Monroe declared that "any attempt on the part of other powers to expand their system to any portion of the Western Hemisphere is dangerous to our peace and safety" and "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt obtained Senate approval of a treaty which said categorically that "The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama."

President Wilson asked for war against Germany in 1917 on the ground that Germany had committed repeated acts of war against us, even though these acts had been committed far from our shores. In 1922, Secretary of State Hughes signed the Nine-Power Pact, with Senate approval, in which we gave a commitment and obtained similar commitments to respect the territorial integrity of China.

In 1941, President Roosevelt authorized American naval craft patrolling out to the middle of the Atlantic to "shoot on sight" when German naval vessels were encountered. In 1947, President Truman requested and obtained Senate approval of the Rio Pact, which stated the principle that an attack on any American state would be regarded as an attack on all the American state. Today, the President and the Senate are considering whether, when, and how to announce that an attack against western Europe will be regarded as an attack on the United States.

It thus appears that our Presidents (and the Senate) have steadily broadened our notions of what constitutes an attack and that they have employed the treaty-making procedure, just as President Monroe employed his famous message to Congress, as a useful means of defining, for the benefit of other nations, precisely what we would regard as an attack on ourselves. And once the President has decided that an attack has been committed, this legal power to repel that attack with armed force is clear. For example, if an attack is committed against an American nation—defined in the Rio Pact to be an attack against the United States—the President, if he thinks the situation requires, has clear power to repel such an attack by armed force, before asking Congress to declare war.

When the situation permits, any President will undoubtedly prefer to consult Congress first. But there may not be time to indulge this choice. "There frequently are occasions when days, nay, even hours are precious," said John Jay in 1788. "As in the field, so in the Cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in capacity to improve them."

When the President finds it necessary to repel an attack without waiting for Congress, it is, of course, for the Congress to decide whether to follow that action by a declaration of war pledging all the resources of the Nation to a military conclusion of the dispute. The Congress can decide that the President acted hastily or improperly, and decline to declare war. Or, as has always proved true in the past, it can decide that he acted properly and back his action by a declaration of war.

The problem does not become essentially different when the President's action in repelling an attack is taken pursuant to a treaty commitment rather than in the absence of any such commitment. The President has power to repel an attack, treaty or no treaty. Once the President has exercised this power, the Congress is under strong compulsion to support him, treaty or no treaty. In this respect the treaty itself makes little difference. In either case, the Congress can be compelled to take action only by its own conscience. There is no national or international tribunal which can force it to support the President.

It is apparently true that Congress has never failed to take legislative action required by a treaty commitment. A serious and inescapable question of policy therefore arises each time the President and the Senate consider whether and how to engage the good faith of the United States in any treaty commitment to repel an attack against another nation. But the question is not one of legal power under the Constitution.

The President and the Senate have the power to make such treaties and the President has the power to use armed force to carry them out. While the making of such a treaty creates the possibility that Congress may be confronted with a fait accompli, it also creates the possibility that a potential aggressor may be deterred from attacking. It can hardly create the second possibility without creating the first. That is the nub of the problem—not whether the President and the Senate can take action, but whether they should take action, and of what kind.
When the Constitution was being debated many people argued that the powers of making treaties and repelling attacks were too great to be lodged in the President and the Senate. It was pointed out that these powers might be abused and that officeholders might be corrupt or inept. But the framers expected the President and the Senators to be men of the highest character and achievements, fully capable of facing and making great decisions. "With such men," to quote John Jay again, "the power of making treaties may be safely lodged." This argument was accepted by the American people in 1789. Nothing in our past or current history indicates that their judgment was erroneous.

Oscar Cox.
Lloyd N. Cutler.
Philip B. Brown.

WASHINGTON.
The Chairman. Mr. John Brickajlik.

STATEMENT OF JOHN BRICKAJLIK, SELLERS, PA.

The Chairman. How long is your statement?
Mr. Brickajlik. I have just an oral report of my viewpoint on it.
The Chairman. Whom do you represent?
Mr. Brickajlik. I am a farmer from Bucks County. I am a member of the Farmers' Union, and I am a farmer and interested in food and our soil. I feel that our Nation should not send arms and guns and bullets but should send food which we can produce here. We can produce food.
I have been a farmer ever since I was 14. I am a man of 28 today. And our problem is not raising food, it is marketing, trying to get it to the people who can use that food, and trying to give it to them.

USE OF MONEY FOR REARMAMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

I appreciate food. When I grow it, when I go out in the field and see it grow, I appreciate it. But what hurts me is, will somebody use that food instead of letting it go to waste? I feel about the North Atlantic Pact, instead of having that pact, we should send food instead of guns and tanks, and so forth.
The farmers in our area are concerned about the tax issue. The North Atlantic Pact is going to cost us money. For every billion there will be 5-percent increase in taxes, and 5-percent increases in taxes are getting burdensome. Right now I know it is getting tough going for a lot of us. As a good example, there are a few sheriff's sales around already.
The Chairman. Do you pay a Federal income tax?
Mr. Brickajlik. I do.
The Chairman. You are doing pretty well.
Mr. Brickajlik. I hope I can continue that way. It is getting burdensome already. Another 5 percent for every billion to be spent on the North Atlantic Pact will be more burdensome to us, and it will deprive us of some of our conveniences at home. A lot of farmers don't have running water; a lot of them don't have baths. And the worst thing is, our soil is being washed away. I know on our own farms, if we had a little more money we could improve ourselves, and thanks to the conservation program we have in this country we are gradually improving it, but it is still not to the best advantage.
In our country there are still a lot of one-room schoolhouses, with no running water at all. Why is not some of that money spent there?
My kid brother goes to school, and I went to school, and we didn't even have a well there. We took water from a neighboring farmhouse. The water had never been tested. That was the State's fault, but I think the Federal Government has a lot of interest in it. And I feel that the money that we are spending for the North Atlantic Pact the people would appreciate better, and there would be better harmony here, and we would love one another better, if spent for the improvements of life, not to go out and destroy somebody. If I was a European myself and somebody would send guns and bullets, I wouldn't really feel right. I don't even feel right now, as far as police protection, and so forth.

So all I can say is a few words. I took a day off from my plowing to come down. They asked me to come down. I try to do my part as a citizen to express my simple views.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you do.

Mr. BRICKAJLIK. I was here when I was on a graduating trip in 1940. It is just a pleasure for me right now to be here, and I never thought I would see the day when I would testify. I feel that just these small views I have expressed—the money spent—is worth while. On the North Atlantic Pact let us try to spend it for better things than tanks and guns and give food and try to improve our soil. We were fortunate that we had big crops a few years, but what will happen if drought comes and people are hungry?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Have you any questions, Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We respect your views.

Mr. G. Burton Parshall, how long is your statement?

Mr. PARSHALL. As long as you tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do not put it on us.

Mr. PARSHALL. Five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Five minutes is all right.

Tell the reporter your name, your business, where you live, and whom you represent.

STATEMENT OF G. BURTON PARSHALL, FRIENDS SOCIAL ORDER COMMITTEE OF PHILADELPHIA

Mr. PARSHALL. My name is G. Burton Parshall. I live in Primos, just outside of Philadelphia. I am a life-insurance salesman; treasurer of the Friends Social Order Committee of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends. The social order committee has authorized me to make a statement for the committee.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

We, as the name indicates, are concerned with the study of all the questions which we feel go into the making of a better social order, and as a result of those studies we feel that the problems in the world which are leading us into difficulty today are not being tackled in exactly the right way. We feel that the essential trouble in the world
is a racial problem, an economic problem, and a problem of political suppression of minority groups.

We feel that there are some 2,000,000,000 colored people in the world who for centuries have been given to believe that the white people were superior, and that today, with our modern means of communication—radio, telegraph, motion picture, and so forth—these people are being brought to the point where they are no longer satisfied to look on white people as a superior race. They feel that they have their place in the sun just as anyone else does, and we have the job of recognizing that fact and helping them, not only here in our own country but all over the world, to attain a full, free, independent life, with full and civil liberties.

We also feel that the problem is one of economic inequalities, and that certain nations in the world, through their superior ability and aggressiveness, have built up themselves to some extent at the expense of colonial nations. They have, it is true, helped those nations to some extent, but to a large extent they themselves have gotten rich at the other nation's expense, and nations are no longer willing to have that happen. The individual inhabitants of these nations want a share of the world's goods.

In this world picture, we have two forces competing for the good will of these people. We have communism and we have the United States with its capitalistic system. We, as the social order committee, which is composed essentially of business men, like the free enterprise system and like the capitalistic system, and we want to maintain it, and we feel that with some adjustments within our system at home and abroad the system can be maintained, but if we are unwilling to make these adjustments, that the trend all over the world as well as at home is toward some form of socialism.

So it seems to us that the problem is not one of combating communism but it is a problem of relieving these conditions all over the world: racial intolerance, economic inequality, political suppression, and trying to do away with a basic disease so that communism cannot flourish, and if we do those things we think we will then defeat communism.

If we spend $20,000,000,000 to $40,000,000,000 on defense and only $5,000,000,000 on economic aid, to us it seems like paying $5,000 for a home and then spending $20,000 for fire insurance. We would recommend that we reverse the procedure and that we spend this money on economic aid. It would keep our factories busy for untold years and it would satisfy people's wants instead of aggravating them, and it would raise conditions all over the world so that communism would no longer have the excuse that it has now to get the people stirred up and to say "We have a solution," because we feel that we here in America have a better solution, but that right now we are not doing too good a selling job.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator Vandenberg?

Senator Vandenberg. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Green?

Senator Green. Then you do believe in spending some money for insurance?
Mr. Parshall. Frankly, as an individual I do not. I am perfectly willing to put my own dependence on moral law and doing away with any defense.

Senator Green. Your illustration called for that.

Mr. Parshall. We have to recognize that most people in the country do not agree with us Friends, consequently when we are speaking in public we have to try to temper what we say by that fact. If I ask a person to come entirely over to my side they would think I was crazy, so I ask them to come half way.

Senator Green. You really believe there should be no insurance?

Mr. Parshall. Right.

The Chairman. I have very high regard for the Friends and their organization. They are very great people.

Mr. Farmer, how long is your statement?

Mr. Farmer. I have a statement that is a little too long to read, but I am prepared to make a brief oral statement and file this. I was informed by Mr. O'Day that witnesses were requested to be very brief, but that they could file any accompanying statement.

The Chairman. Whom do you represent?

Mr. Farmer. I represent myself.

The Chairman. Yourself?

Mr. Farmer. Yes.

The Chairman. You are not here, then, to represent some organization?

Mr. Farmer. No, sir.

The Chairman. All right. Tell us who you are and what you do, what your business is, and so on, and your background. Give it to the reporter.

STATEMENT OF FYKE FARMER, NASHVILLE, TENN.

Mr. Farmer. My home is in Nashville, Tenn. My name is Fyke Farmer. By profession I am a lawyer. Two years ago I gave up the active practice of the law to devote my time to working for world government, and I am here today to give the committee my views regarding the North Atlantic Pact because of my interest in the establishment of world government.

The Chairman. We haven't primarily before us the world government idea. We have the North Atlantic Pact. If you can show any relationship between the two, we will be glad to hear you briefly.

Mr. Farmer. That is the point. I think there is no relationship between the two, and for that reason—

The Chairman. You think there is no relationship between the two?

Mr. Farmer. Between the North Atlantic Pact and the ideal of world government. I think they are two opposite things.

The Chairman. We are dealing now with the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. Farmer. And I oppose the Atlantic Pact because I am for world government. I believe we can abolish war through world government, but that the North Atlantic Pact is a step in the wrong direction.

The Chairman. Let me interrupt you. Do you believe that if we reject the Atlantic Pact we will have world government right away?
Mr. Farmer. Not by rejecting the pact, but by doing the positive things that we must do to get world government.

The Chairman. All right.

**Steps Toward World Government**

Mr. Farmer. Now, answering your question more specifically, I think the thing that we must do to get world government—that is, the first step to world government—is what has been done in my own State, in Tennessee. The Tennessee Legislature, which has just adjourned, enacted a law providing for an election at the regular election the first Thursday in August 1950, to elect delegates to a constitutional convention to meet in Geneva in 1950, three delegates representing the people, and this law was drafted in accordance with a uniform plan which, if followed in other States, would result in the people of the United States electing one delegate per million population, 131 delegates, to meet in a world constitutional convention to formulate a world federal constitution. Other nations would be invited to send their own delegates, chosen by the people.

That is what I am for. That is what I believe we must do to remove the threat of war, to abolish war by law, to establish the world government.

The Chairman. Are you one of the delegates?

Mr. Farmer. I am a candidate. We have not had the election. We will have the election in 1950.

The Chairman. Do you desire to be a delegate?

Mr. Farmer. I have announced I am a candidate.

The Chairman. Who elects the delegates?

Mr. Farmer. It is just like you run for anything.

The Chairman. Is it a popular vote?

Mr. Farmer. It is by popular vote.

The Chairman. Does the Governor appoint or the legislature select, or what?

Mr. Farmer. No. They will be elected at the regular election the first Thursday in August 1950. Candidates, according to the law, for the office of delegate, to have their names placed on the ballot or in the voting machines, would have to get nominating petitions signed by 500 registered voters, and have that petition filed with the State board of elections 30 days before the election, and the people vote on the delegates.

The Chairman. All right; go ahead.

**Consistency with Principles of United Nations**

My reasons for believing that the North Atlantic Pact is not the right thing at this time are that I think that it is inconsistent with the principle of the United Nations. I realize that the State Department and members of this committee have expressed the view that it is consistent, and that a statement has been inserted in the treaty to that effect, that it is consistent with the United Nations, but saying it is and putting a clause in it does not make it so.

The principles of the United Nations Organization, as expressed in the Charter, or one of the basic principles, is that force will not be used save in common interest, and that force will not be used except
under orders of the Security Council where there has been a determination of aggressor, a breach of the peace or a threat to the peace.

The organization of the combination of governments, members of the United Nations, for the use of military force, independent of any decision or independent of submission of the question to the Security Council for determination, it means to me is palpably a violation of the fundamental and basic principle on which the United Nations was set up.

We have not got the case of an armed attack. There has been no justification sought to be made for this pact on the ground that there has been an armed attack or that there is an immediate danger of an armed attack which would give rise to the right of members, under article 51 of the Charter, to defend themselves in case of an armed attack. Neither do I think that the proposed treaty and the implementing arms legislation amount to a regional arrangement within chapter VIII, because, as I read the Charter of the United Nations, regional arrangements must be subordinate to the authority of the Security Council and they must be formed for the purpose of dealing with a matter that is appropriate to a regional arrangement.

**MILITARY ALLIANCES AND UN CHARTER**

The object and purpose of the North Atlantic Pact, as I read the statements, the policy statements for the President and the Secretary of State, are to form a combination for the use of force by threat, not actual use of force, independently, not in subordination to the Security Council or the United Nations. The situation which gives rise to the formation of this pact, the difference between one group of nations led by the Soviet Union and the other group of nations led by the United States of America, certainly it seems to me is not a matter of such nature as it can be appropriately dealt with by the formation of military alliances. If the western side of this dispute has the right, under the Charter, to organize a military force for the purpose of threatening the other side with overwhelming force, by the same token the other side has the right to form a combination for the use of military force to threaten the western side with their overwhelming force.

The Chairman. A while ago, when you were discussing the regional arrangement, what about article 51? You skipped that.

Mr. Farmer. I said that in my opinion that had no application, because article 51 is limited to the case of an armed attack.

The Chairman. That is what this treaty is dealing with, armed attack.

Mr. Farmer. There is no armed attack that has occurred.

The Chairman. After the armed attack is over there is no use bothering about it. After they have submerged you and conquered you and killed a lot of your citizens——

Mr. Farmer. But the purpose of the United Nations was to settle all disputes.

The Chairman. I am asking about article 51.

Mr. Farmer. Which must be read in context with the whole Charter, and the whole object and purpose of the United Nations was to settle all disputes by peaceful means, and the Charter defines what are peaceful and pacific means, and the formation of a military alliance is not
defined, and I respectfully insist that it could not be considered a peaceful means. It is a martial means.

Now then, the second point that I wish to make, and it is elaborated in the statement which I would like to file and ask the committee’s permission to file as a part of the record, relates to the pact as regards the Constitution of the United States.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR TREATY

What is the constitutional authority, if I may ask the committee a question? What power, under the Constitution, gives the President and the Congress the right to make this treaty, and appropriate money to furnish arms to these other treaty members?

The CHAIRMAN. You ask us that question?

Mr. FARMER. If I may.

The CHAIRMAN. The Constitution of the United States vests in the United States, a sovereign government, the right to deal with foreign nations and to make treaties, and the President of the United States under the Constitution, is in control of our normal diplomatic relations with other people. It would be a very weak sovereignty that could not make treaties and assume obligations with regard to foreign nations. That is the answer, in my judgment.

Senator Vandenberg, do you want to add anything?

Senator Vandenberg. No.

Mr. FARMER. Is there any limitation upon that power?

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking about this particular treaty. I haven’t time to go all over the whole category of things that might occur. We discourage witnesses from covering all the earth. We would like to stick to the treaty when we can.

Mr. FARMER. Well, the point that I wish to make, I assumed that that was the reason or the idea behind it, that there was such a power of sovereignty, which I believe is not recognized by constitutional authorities. That is, that even the power of the President and the Congress in the matter of foreign relations is subject to the Constitution.

Now, granting that the President has the power to propose treaties and make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and assuming that the President would have the power to make the treaty with any foreign governments to settle disputes by pacific means, and to prevent war, I think the question arises under the Constitution whether this treaty can be carried out without violation of the Constitution.

OBLIGATION FOR IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

An essential part of this program or this alliance is the implementing arms legislation. The treaty is to be for a 20-year period. Secretary Acheson told this committee, according to press reports, that there will be an obligation on the part of the Congress of the United States, if this treaty is made, to appropriate money, to furnish arms and assistance to these foreign governments. That means for 20 years. He says that is an obligation of some sort, more, I suppose, of a moral obligation than a legal obligation, but it is a recognized principle of constitutional law and international law that where a treaty is made
that is not self-executing and the Senate approves it, that that does entail some kind of obligation on Congress.

Senator Green. I think either the newspaper account or your view have misrepresented Mr. Acheson's statement. He said there was an obligation to do something, and that in all probability that would be decided to be what we should do, under certain circumstances, but there was no specific obligation to render any military assistance; that that was in the discretion of the Congress, but that force of circumstances would probably result in their rendering military assistance. That is very different from your statement that there was an obligation to do that. There was simply an obligation to do something.

Mr. Farmer. I have not seen the text of his statement. I have only read newspaper accounts.

Senator Green. Assuming that my statement is correct, would it not change your argument?

Mr. Farmer. I think not. I think not, because I think that the general public realizes that this is an armament program. We already have the ERP program.

Senator Green. That is a mistake on the part of the public, then.

Mr. Farmer. I think that is what all the talk has been about for several months, that it is not enough.

Senator Green. That is because the critics are seeking to find some foundation for their criticism. They say that certain things might be done under this, and therefore we will criticize the pact because they are not prohibited.

Mr. Farmer. I realize that there is not in the treaty, and I have not seen the proposed legislation for furnishing arms. I have not seen a draft of that. I do not know whether it has been published or not. I understood such legislation was being prepared, but I have not seen it.

I realize very well, Senator, that in the treaty itself there is no specific obligation on the part of the United States Government to send arms to any particular government for 1 year, 2 years, or 20 years. But if the treaty amounts to a military alliance, where these countries agree to stand together and our Government is to help them—

Senator Green. Your first statement contradicts your second. Your first statement shows it is not a military alliance.

Mr. Farmer. I do not think you can separate the treaty from what the whole tenor of the conversation has been.

If economic assistance was what we had in mind, we have the ERP program, and there is no need for the North Atlantic Treaty. I do not think the public is wrong. I think the general public realizes, and I think Congress realizes, that this is a military scheme.

Senator Green. If they do say that, it is a misnomer. What they mean is that that may be the result of the circumstances, very naturally. In case of an act of war on the part of a foreign nation toward us, we do not have to go to war, we do not have to use military force. There are other sanctions which can be employed, but probably we will want to use military force. But that is in the decision of the Congress of the United States.

Mr. Farmer. I think that the matter of the power of the Congress to declare war after we have sent a great supply of arms to other
governments is a matter about like the power of Congress to grant letters of marque and reprisal, if I may say so.

Senator GREEN. You must know that sanctions have been imposed many times before an act of war and there has been no war.

Mr. FARMER. I realize in the past these ideas of balancing power and formation of military alliances have been depended upon as a means of keeping the peace. I think it was Churchill who said, when he was First Lord of the Admiralty before World War I, that the way to have peace is to be strong enough to win any war that occurs, and two world wars have not shaken that formula that he has. But I submit that that is false, because if you have a world divided into two armed camps, each trying to keep the peace by being stronger than the other to make war, then you have a physical impossibility and therefore the only alternative to this present situation of conflict is that it will disrupt the United Nations, divide the world into rival military alliances armed for war to keep peace, not to make war but preparing for war in order to make peace.

I say the alternative to that is the development of the United Nations into world government.

DEFENSE AND AGGRESSION

Senator GREEN. Your mistake, it seems to me, is that you confuse the preparation to defend against war and the preparation to make war. This pact is not a preparation to make war. It is a preparation to defend against an attack.

Mr. FARMER. But under modern conditions, Senator, it is not possible to make a distinction between defense and aggression. At the San Francisco Conference, I believe, if I am not mistaken, Senator Vandenberg was the United States delegate at Subcommittee 4 of Commission III, and the Bolivian delegation proposed to insert, did they not, Senator, a definition of aggression, and that was defeated. The United States delegation stood with the other nations that opposed the insertion of such a definition, and the statement appearing in the official minutes of the Conference shows that the grounds upon which that objection was based were that it is impossible to draw the distinction between aggression and defense, and that the acts and conduct that from one side's viewpoint are defense from the other side's viewpoint may be a provocation for war.

Senator GREEN. It is true of many other phases of human thought. It is impossible to draw the exact line of demarcation, yet you know there is a line somewhere. There is a distinction between right and wrong, and you cannot draw the line between them that there is between the animal kingdom and the vegetable kingdom, yet you know there is a difference, and there is a line of distinction.

Mr. FARMER. But if you have to wait until the war comes to draw that line and say, "This thing was aggressive and not defense," to wait and sit in judgment on perhaps the defeated, the vanquished, in the war, then we are not able to prevent war.

My point is that in advance, looking forward, we are not able to make such a distinction. And we could not, in our own country, make such a distinction. If Tennessee and Kentucky were trying to keep the peace by Tennessee maintaining an army and Kentucky maintaining an army just for defense, I am pretty sure that some
hostilities would occur, all for defense. So that under our system we have abandoned those notions and have set up a system for the enforcement of law through courts.

Senator Green. But you are not abolishing State police for that reason.

Mr. Farmer. No, no; but that is a kind of a small force. They are constabulary.

Senator Green. It is the same thing in theory.

Mr. Farmer. No; this is quite different. If Tennessee and Kentucky and Arkansas and Mississippi decided that there was danger from Ohio and Michigan and Nebraska, and the best thing they could do would be to build up a military force to prevent an attack from being made, that would be disruptive of our system of government. We don't have that. Our police force in Tennessee, our State guard, is just purely for internal policing. It is not susceptible of being used for any attack outside of the State, and could not lawfully be used that way.

Senator Green. A fire department is a defensive and not an offensive organization. It is to put out fires. Suppose two adjoining towns each had a fire department. Could they not enter into an agreement that they would come to the rescue of each other in case of a fire breaking out?

Mr. Farmer. Frankly, I do not see the analogy between the fire department and military forces.

Senator Green. You are trying to prove that this is unconstitutional?

Mr. Farmer. The fire department has no relation to warfare, to violence. It is just for putting out fires.

Senator Green. That may be, but the same theory applies. You are trying to prove it is unconstitutional, are you not?

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREATY

Mr. Farmer. And I never quite got my point over, and that is this: This treaty is for 20 years. It is expected by these other governments that the Government of the United States over this period will come to their assistance, mutual assistance and mutual aid, with arms; yet, by the Constitution of the United States, article I, clause 8, Congress is prohibited from appropriating money for armies, even our own Army, for a longer period than 2 years.

Senator Green. You are ignoring the fact. It has been stated categorically that there has been no agreement to supply arms to these countries, and you are ignoring that fact. Does that not affect the constitutionality?

Mr. Farmer. I do not think I am ignoring the fact. I do not think it is a fact that is so much expressed as it is implicit in the scheme.

Senator Green. We may wish to.

Mr. Farmer. Could I have permission to file this statement?

The Chairman. Yes; you may file it.

(Statement entitled "What's Wrong With the North Atlantic Pact?" was filed with the committee.)

The Chairman. I want to ask you, do you give all your time to this world-government organization?

Mr. Farmer. I do.
The Chairman. You said you had retired from the practice of law?
Mr. Farmer. I would not say "retired." That is not quite the right slant. Except for winding up two or three cases that were pending when I quit, I am devoting full time to this.

The Chairman. Do you get a salary?
Mr. Farmer. No, sir. I get anybody who wants to help me. I take their contributions.

The Chairman. Do you get a good many contributions?
Mr. Farmer. Not enough.

The Chairman. Senator Vandenberg, have you any questions?
Senator Vandenberg. No.

The Chairman. You are excused.

Reverend Cotton, how long is your statement?
Reverend Cotton. My full statement will require 30 minutes. I do not know your time for lunch, so I state it will be about 30 minutes for the full statement.

The Chairman. We cannot guarantee that you will get a full 30 minutes, so you will have to wait.

George Hartman, chairman of the War Resisters League.

Mr. Richards. Professor Hartman was unable to come, and I have been asked to take his place. My name is Edward C. M. Richards.

The Chairman. How long is your statement?
Mr. Richards. A couple of pages. I suppose I can get through in 5 minutes, maybe 10.

The Chairman. All right. Give the reporter your name, your business, whom you represent, and any other background you care to submit.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD C. M. RICHARDS, WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE

Mr. Richards. My name is Edward C. M. Richards.

The Chairman. Where do you live, Mr. Richards?

Mr. Richards. I live on a farm outside of West Chester, Pa. My address is R. D. 3, West Chester, Pa.

The Chairman. Whom do you represent?

Mr. Richards. I represent the War Resisters League, of which Professor Hartman is the chairman.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Richards. My name is Edward C. M. Richards and I live on the farm that I operate outside of West Chester, Pa. I have come here as representative of the War Resisters League, of 5 Beekman Street, New York City.

The War Resisters League is a section of the War Resisters International, which has its headquarters in England, with sections in many countries over many parts of the world. The War Resisters League is convinced that war is a crime against humanity and is therefore opposed to war in any form, under any circumstances, and for any cause whatsoever. In presenting this testimony for the league, I do so for the reason that in the league's judgment the North Atlantic Defense Pact is in reality a war measure, and would, if ratified, make for war and not for peace. Being opposed to war, as such, therefore, the War Resisters League is opposed to the North Atlantic Defense Pact.
The War Resisters League opposes the North Atlantic Defense Pact for many reasons. I shall speak upon only some of them, viz:

COMPATIBILITY WITH UN CHARTER

1. The diplomatic language used in the North Atlantic Defense Pact might lead the unwary to imagine that it is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, a careful reading of the document shows this is not the case. The real purpose of the pact is to form a military alliance among the 12 nations involved, such military alliance being aimed at the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. Soviet Russia is an important member of the United Nations. It is quite clear that under the Charter of the United Nations there is no place for the organizing of one group of member nations in a military alliance which deliberately threatens with war another group of United Nation members. Yet that is just what the North Atlantic Defense Pact does. The proof of this lies in the fact that neither Russia nor any of its satellite nations have been asked to join in the Atlantic Defense Pact. If the supporters of the Atlantic Defense Pact wish to prove that the pact is not aimed at Soviet Russia, let them invite the Soviet Union to join in signing the document. Until this is done, the War Resisters League cannot believe that the North Atlantic Defense Pact is not outside of and contrary to the fundamental purposes and Charter of the United Nations, and is just another in the age-long list of futile, costly, provocative, military alliances which during the past 50 years have repeatedly led Europe and the world into ever-increasingly destructive wars.

MILITARIZATION OF UNITED STATES

2. The War Resisters League has followed the progress of the militarization of the United States and the growth of the influence of military minded men in determining the foreign policy of the United States Government. The North Atlantic Defense Pact is the crowning folly to date of this militarization. It, however, has this value in that it lays bare the naked reliance of its supporters upon armed force and war. In article 3 of the pact the signers agree to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Translated into everyday English this means that the signers agree to keep their armed forces as large as they are at present, and also to enlarge them and to help each other in this enlargement. The result would mean not only an arms race among the signers, but a constantly growing threat to those nations in the world who are not signers. History shows that such armament races end in war, destruction and collapse. For this reason the War Resisters League is opposed to the North Atlantic Defense Pact.

COST OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

3. The tentative cost for the first year of the operation of the North Atlantic Defense Pact plus military aid to Greece and Turkey, and so forth, has been stated as approximately $1,450,000,000. This huge sum would be in addition to the stupendous military budget demand of $16,000,000,000. In the light of the findings of the Hoover Commis-
tion as to the waste of taxpayers' money by the armed services, the miserable citizen, who is to supply this added cash out of his fast-shrinking savings, may well cry out in protest. Even if it was assured that no waste was to occur, the spending of all this money to supply guns and military equipment to assorted foreign countries is fantastic.

The United States spent such sums on shipping arms to China and today much of such military equipment is in the hands of the Chinese Communists. What is to prevent the same thing from happening under the North Atlantic Defense Pact lend-lease plan? The War Resisters League raises its voice in protest against the whole idea. It is strongly against the North Atlantic Defense Pact for financial reasons. It is opposed to handing the armed services money to finance Operation Rathole via military lend-lease to Europe.

The fundamental difficulty faced by our Government today is that its foreign policy has been too much determined by military-minded men. Military-minded men know how to win a war. They have shown clearly that they do not know how to make peace. What is needed is a basic shift in attitude, seeking to establish trust and confidence between nations. It is confidence and trust and simple honesty that are the foundations of peace. Under the influence of military-minded men our Government has been acting on the basis of establishing peace on a foundation of fear and threats. Peace cannot be established in that way. The North Atlantic Defense Pact is a "show of force," a threat. The War Resisters League is convinced that its greatest contribution to peace today is to urge you gentlemen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to oppose the ratification of the North Atlantic Defense Pact.

WAR IS NOT A SOLUTION TO ANY PROBLEM

The CHAIRMAN. Your organization is against any kind of war at any time, anyhow?

Mr. Richards. Yes. We feel that war in itself is destructive. It doesn't produce the results hoped for.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose this country should be invaded by a foreign nation and war made upon us. You would oppose our going to war to resist it?

Mr. Richards. That is right. We feel that in the long run it would not result in the good that we had hoped for. For instance, an illustration is the great Civil War, the War Between the States. There it happened, almost a hundred years ago, and you know and I know that you can go down to South Carolina and Mississippi and still find people who are bitter against the "damned Yankees."

The CHAIRMAN. You can find some up North that are bitter against the "damned Southerners."

Mr. Richards. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a one-way street.

Mr. Richards. Oh, no. I am not blaming the South a bit, not at all. Half of my people are from the South, so that does not enter. But what I am saying is that the result of the Civil War was that we won the victory, but there has been this tension ever since, even in our own country, and we contend that if we had not used that method of war we could have settled the slavery business down there peaceably and we would not have had all this tension.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you are probably right about some of that. But, for instance, the Confederate Army invaded Pennsylvania. They resisted and fought the battle of Gettysburg. If you had been living at that time you would have said to the southerners, “Come on and take Pennsylvania; we aren’t going to fight you”?

Mr. RICHARDS. I happen to be another Quaker. You heard one this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard a good many here.

Mr. RICHARDS. I happen to be another one.

The CHAIRMAN. I respect the Quakers. I think they are a great people, but I just want to get your viewpoint. Suppose an army comes over and invades the United States and captures the Capitol and the White House and all that. You would not be in favor of resisting them at all? You would just say “Come on”?

Mr. RICHARDS. No; I would not say “Come on.” Not at all. Don’t misstate that.

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t want to misquote you.

Mr. RICHARDS. We have had in the world today an excellent and very striking little text that has come to us in Philadelphia recently. We have had the demonstration of a whole nation that was able to get its freedom without war, the case of India. Now, of course, the circumstances are very complex, and I will not endeavor to go into it, but the sum of it is that a man that I know has recently been to India, and he has just returned, and on his way back he stopped over in Germany. He has had a chance to visit with Prime Minister Nehru and a lot of the other people in India, and when he got to Germany he was asked by the United States military government if he would not talk with a group of young men who had been trained in the Hitler youth movement, trained as Nazis, and this fellow said he started to talk to these Nazis, and they got so interested in it that when 12 o’clock midnight came they wouldn’t stop, and they kept him talking there until 4 o’clock in the morning, and the reason for that was this, that these boys had all been trained with the idea that the world was going to be made better by means of force and violence. and here this fellow came along, fresh from India, saying that a better world can be made by nonviolent means. It was so new that these Hitler boys were completely intrigued with it, and they kept him up until 4 o’clock in the morning asking questions about how it had been done in India.

The answer to your question is that there are other means of resisting attack, resisting aggression, than trying to fight with guns.

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Senator VANDEMBERG. For example, what would you have done at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. RICHARDS. In the first place, I would not have allowed, if I had had any say, the situation to get to that point.

Senator VANDEMBERG. That would have been a good idea.

Mr. RICHARDS. I would have stopped, for instance, the shipment of scrap iron to Japan for all of those years that that took place, helping Japan to start the war in China. I would have stopped that. I would have said, “It isn’t the thing to do. We don’t want to help Japan doing that.”
Senator VANDENBERG. There is much to be said for that, but you confront a fact: An attack at Pearl Harbor. What would you do?

Mr. RICHARDS. As I said, I would not have let it happen. If it had happened, I would not have precipitated it.

Senator VANDENBERG. All right. We would not have precipitated it, but we would have tried to stop it. It happens. What would you have done?

Mr. RICHARDS. I would not have gone to war about it.

Senator VANDENBERG. What would you have done?

Mr. RICHARDS. I would have immediately endeavored to get a peace conference started between Japan and the United States, immediately.

Senator VANDENBERG. But this attack is coming down out of the sky on Sunday morning. Now what are you going to do on Sunday afternoon? Are you going to fight back, or are you not going to fight back?

Mr. RICHARDS. The first thing to do would have been to try to pick up the pieces of the people that were injured and try to get them in the hospital, of course. But so far as the authorities were concerned, to my mind the thing to do was to try to prevent it going any further, which would mean by trying to get together and form a peace conference with the Japanese.

Senator VANDENBERG. You would not have fought back on Sunday afternoon and tried to protect what was left?

Mr. RICHARDS. No; I think that was a mistake. That, of course, meant going right ahead at the war business.

To put it in a personal matter, if somebody comes up and slaps my face the natural and human thing which anybody would feel would be that you would slap him back and hit him. But there is something in the idea of not doing so. There is, of course, a long Quaker tradition. The Quakers have managed to live for a long time and they have done a lot of good in the world, and they do not believe in this fighting business. They believe there is a better way. I think there is something that you gentlemen might well consider.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all I am asking about.

Mr. RICHARDS. And as I said, I think that the thing that would have been hardest to do, undoubtedly, but most effective and most constructive, would have been to call a peace conference immediately, and try to settle the difficulty without a continuation of the war. I will grant you it would be very difficult, but I think that in the light of the present world situation it is a real idea, and Gandhi's work there I think has given us a real lead.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one question. You say you would have called a peace conference with Japan. Didn't we have a peace
conference with Japan at that very moment going on here in Washington? Didn't Japan have two of her diplomatic representatives here and, pending their discussions, was not the attack made?

Mr. Richards. So far as I have been able to delve into the historical record as shown by Dr. Charles Beard's book, President Roosevelt and the Coming of World War, 1941—I don't know whether you have seen that—

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you know, though, that those two representatives of Japan were here in conference with the President and the Secretary of State and protesting armament and all that, and at the very moment Japan was preparing to commit murder at Pearl Harbor? Isn't that so?

Mr. Richards. I think you are overlooking something. Wait a minute. I want to say this, if I might. These people who were representing Japan here, talking peace, were not being met with the right attitude by the Americans. The whole thing was a tricky shifting around, dodging in and out, and there wasn't a frank, honest, open desire to settle it. It was tricky.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you reflect upon everything that our people did to try to adjust this matter, and you are boosting the Japanese who were here with words of peace on their lips and a dagger in their hands.

Mr. Richards. I do not agree with that, Senator. I am not boosting the Japanese at all, not a bit, not a particle. Rather, I am criticizing the whole crowd, both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, that is all.

Do you have any more questions?

Senator Vandenberg. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We will excuse you. Carry back our greetings to the Quakers. We respect them and have a great affection for them.

I will hear one more witness and then we are going to recess. Mrs. Robert Harrison, of Memphis, Tenn.

STATEMENT OF MRS. ROBERT R. HARRISON, GLEN RIDGE, N. J.

Mrs. Harrison. Aren't you hungry?

The CHAIRMAN. I am hungry for information.

Mrs. Harrison. I hope I may give you some.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you represent?

Mrs. Harrison. A world citizen's point of view. That is what my attitude is.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not represent any organization?

Mrs. Harrison. Just myself and my own opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Your own views and your own opinion?

Mrs. Harrison. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. You live in Memphis, do you?

Mrs. Harrison. No; I am a resident of Glen Ridge, N. J. I was born in Tennessee, and the correspondence between Mr. O'Day and myself has been carried on from Memphis, my old home town.
The CHAIRMAN. How long is your statement?

Mrs. HARRISON. My statement is an oral statement. I lost my "specs" on the way driving from Memphis, and I borrowed some magnifying glasses, so I haven't written it. I promised Mr. O'Day I would give a written record, but I haven't been able to.

The CHAIRMAN. You may speak and you don't need to write it. He will take your statement down.

Mrs. HARRISON. I have a telegram here which I sent, unsigned, to the President, on April 4, when he was in Secretary Acheson's office with the others who signed the North Atlantic Defense Pact. Twenty-four hours before that pact was signed I was alone in my home in Glen Ridge, and because of certain convictions I had I got on the train and came down to Washington and tried all day long in this Senate Office Building to get one lone Senator to listen to what I had to say.

One year ago in January, feeling I was ignorant as to what I should know as an American citizen or as a world citizen, I decided that the place to get information was at the place of attack by most of the people of the world. You people have my sympathy, you Senators and that Congress and our Government, and I sort of feel as if I want to have a part at clearing up the misunderstandings which exist between so many peoples of the world, and our Government.

OPPOSITION TO PACT

I believe in the Constitution and I believe that you Senators and our Government believe in it. Now you will want to know, "What do you think of the Atlantic Pact?" Perhaps you are thinking at this moment that I am getting off the subject. What has this got to do with your attitude with regard to the North Atlantic Pact? If I read to you my telegram, which is all I had to voice my opinion and attitude toward the pact at the time I was helpless to do anything about the pact, it will show my feeling. This telegram I got yesterday from the main office. I came here. I had gone up to the main office, sort of feeling that perhaps there would be a difficulty, because these people here in this building told me there perhaps would be difficulty even getting it out of the files of the Western Union. I went up myself to the Western Union office.

Now, Mr. O'Day, may I say just before I read this, was the only person in 1½ years in your Foreign Relations Committee room in the Capitol who listened to me and gave me a chance.

The CHAIRMAN. You had not been here a whole year and a half, had you, before you got to see Mr. O'Day?

Mrs. HARRISON. I had been coming down. I had been here on four trips to Washington on my own. This was the fourth trip, and today makes the fifth day.

To the President, Mr. Truman, and to those signing the Atlantic Pact, care of Mr. Acheson, of the State Department, Washington, D. C.:

In the name of God, in whom many in America and the world trust, in the name of the freedom-loving peoples of the world, I send you this message. These freedom-loving peoples of the world are looking to our way of life proving superior and better than Russia's communistic way. Russia's way is ruling by force. That very same military force the Atlantic Pact expects to use if and when necessary to protect only about a quarter of the world's population. Please do
I dare to sign that and today I dare to stand before you as a volunteer—I am to sit before you—and to volunteer as an ambassador of peace. I have been living in Korea, China, and India for 24 years. My family has been receiving from the Orient our very life. Now, because I have received so much from my own country, my own native land for 30 years before I was chosen to represent a group who asked me to go out and teach our way of life, because I married out of this group and into the business world I now stand before you, not only as an American citizen but as a citizen of the world, because my family, you see, began in Korea. Our children were born in Seoul, they have been educated in the system of British and American schools in China, and in India, so don't you see my point of view is a point of view which is no longer that of only a person who has been receiving his life or living in this country all of his life, but may I say that I see a danger in the Atlantic Pact as discriminating against three-quarters of the millions of the peoples of this earth who want to be free from the very same thing that we wish to be freed from, which is the type of life that will destroy the "four freedoms?"

Fear—the Basis of the Pact

I see in this Atlantic Pact, because I have been studying mass psychology, the psychiatrists' point of view, the psychologists' point of view, and all of these attitudes of mind which they say will defeat an individual's success, and I see in this Atlantic Pact there is an element of fear which is the basis of the very pact itself, and because we are afraid we are taking this try and this organ and we are using it, and there is good in it, Senator. I am not fighting against the good that it may do to secure a few people in Europe, but I wonder if we aren't making a mistake, we in the American Government who represent the democracies and are trying to free the world and make the world secure. I am wondering if an alliance will not cripple us and handicap us in the future. I am wondering if it is not a shortsighted policy which is going to make trouble for us in the future.

World Trade and Commerce

For instance, I have been out of the business world for 26 years. My husband is still out there. He is in Siam now. All right. What we need for the prosperity of our America and the world is commerce and trade, is it not? All right. Let's look at this Atlantic Pact. We have been talking about sanctions and what we could do as a government in case we wish to use this method of sanctions. And perhaps we would not have to go to a war if there was a war in Europe. But suppose three-quarters of the millions of the world would decide to joint with the Communists?

Now, at the present time, India has just become an independent country. We don't know how India is going. We do know that a
type of communism is in China which is a Moscow-controlled communism. China is an old friend. She depends, and has depended, on our faith. Somehow or other I feel we should, perhaps, with regard to China just now, do as we have done in previous times with exiled governments, continue to give China confidence, this little tiny remains of the Republic of China, if we could just somehow or other give them courage or some support or some help.

All right. Now India. If India remains nonviolent, if these other countries remain friendly toward us, well and good. We do not know what would happen if the other countries of the world would become so tied up and blocked as China is today. We have needed China's business in the past. Is that not so, Senator? Will we not need India's business? And will we not need these other businesses? But in China, I understand, we have crippled ourselves so with regard to getting over to North China—if I am mistaken please correct me—on transportation that we cannot do business. Therefore we are willing to come out of China and have nothing more, and leave them to the Communists, because we can no longer make money out of China.

All right. Suppose other countries become so that they can't do business? What then is going to happen to our trade and commerce? So don't you see from that point of view, as one who is and has received all of her light, you see, from the Orient, that I am speaking from that point of view of trying to look into the future and speak for a world organization which will make collective security of all the countries?

So what is good for us—trade, commerce, education, all of those things that will build for peace, build a relationship on which we can build a new world of peace and brotherhood.

**IMPORTANCE OF OTHER AREAS**

It seems to me that we are not quite on the right way to this cementing of relations of all the peoples of the world. In a democracy, as in a family, if we are to save our family from some outside enemy, each member of that family must be loyal, must work together and cooperate for the mutual good and welfare of that family. So, as a family of nations, how can we be interested as an American Government, which should be an arbitrator, a peace maker, working not only for Europe. Yes, the North Atlantic Pact is all right. Let us work with and cooperate with Europe, but what are we going to do? We have a Pacific Ocean on the other side. Are we going to be silent with regard to what is going to happen on the Pacific Ocean? If we could only now, at this present time, begin to talk about a Pacific Pact. And, you know, saving the face of the Oriental is a serious thing, Senator. Are you listening?

The CHAIRMAN. I am listening.

Mrs. Harrison. I was in Japan in 1924 when the Exclusion Act was made a law. My husband said, “Don't go out in the street today, dear. You might be subject to some insult.”

I said, “But please, may I go out, because that is the only way I can learn and see what the reaction is?” I have a passion for learning to understand other peoples of the world, to see what their points of
view are. So I made an excuse of going to the bank, and I went
and did some banking that morning.

The Japanese businessmen were lined ahead of me and, according
to their custom, this noise that they make and their courtesy of bow­
ing, the first thing I knew, instead of being at the end of the line
I was at the cashier's window, and so apparently, you see, Japan was
going to accept this European, this foreigner, and not let her know
really how they felt, slapped in the face and insulted.

But do you know what happened immediately after that? I was
asked to teach English to the families at Keijo University. Do you
know that the Government of Japan at that time began to send out
the best brains and the best minds, families, and they supported those
families to live over in Germany, to learn how the Nazi military tactics
were to be carried on in case of war. They came back, all of them, and
helped Japan to become our No. 2 enemy.

Senator, I am sure none of you men here have forgotten, and I surely
know how serious it is to insult an oriental, to make him lose face.

Well, I don't think any of us like to lose face, and I believe we can
save our face now before the world. I know all those things, I have
been living out there. I know what they are saying against us. And
I will fight these people who just talk against us without knowing
facts.

But here is what I would like to beg of you. Let's do something
now that will save the face of America, of the American Government
and of the American people, and save the other peoples of the world
who are afraid of us. Give them something that will no longer make
them afraid of us and therefore our enemies, and that will precipitate
them into some sort of scheme or something whereby they will become
our enemies.

So let us try, and I seem to feel that there is a way, now, if we
would talk about another organization. I know we cannot do what
we want to do with the United Nations on account of the veto.
Couldn't we very cleverly do something in a world organization which
will be perhaps regional pacts. Let's have one, the North Atlantic
Pact. We need it. It is right. All right, let's have an Oriental Pact.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you for the North Atlantic Pact?

Mrs. HARRISON. For everything in the Atlantic Pact that will build
for peace.

POSITION ON THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. You are the judge of that. Are you for the At­
lantic Pact or against it?

Mr. HARRISON. I am not a whole 100 percent for it, because I
think—

The CHAIRMAN. What percent are you for it?

Mrs. HARRISON. I am the worst mathematician in the world. I
don't know how to make that percent really honest. I want to be
honest. I want to be sincere. I know we are accused of dishonesty
and insincerity, and I am not avoiding your question and I am going
to answer it. Insofar as the Atlantic Pact preserves the peace of the
world and defends democracy, I am for the Atlantic Pact. Does that
answer you, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think so—in a way.
Mrs. HARRISON. Do you want to ask me another question?
The CHAIRMAN. No; I do not want to ask you any.
Mrs. HARRISON. May I ask you one?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes: you may.
Mrs. HARRISON. I am not so convinced that the basis for the Atlantic Pact is altogether democratic. I am against anything that isn't democratic. But tell me—maybe I am not informed about it. But do you know whether or not this European Pact, may I call it?—
The CHAIRMAN. No; you may not call it that.

MOTIVES BEHIND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Mrs. HARRISON. All right, the North Atlantic Defense Pact—would you tell me if it is in some way trying to secure what the military people and military forces are going to depend on in the next war, which would be oil?
The CHAIRMAN. Oh——
Mrs. HARRISON. I hear all these criticisms about it. I am asking you, could it be that they are trying to protect the Arabian pipeline? I don't know. I wonder. There must be something. You see, in all history back of every war it is said that the citizens within the country betray the country before an outside enemy comes in to conquer us and betray us. I can't tell you how much I want this question answered. I know I was in Tientsin—
The CHAIRMAN. That is all very interesting about Tientsin, but let's get on with this subject. We are talking about this treaty now.

Mrs. HARRISON. I know we are.
The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to.
Mrs. HARRISON. And that is what I am trying to get at. I want to ask you a question with regard to business. You see, I don't want us to be betrayed by some group within our America that has selfish interests, and because of its power are a united group who have been the ones who have signed the Atlantic Pact. Don't you see what I am getting at?
The CHAIRMAN. No, I don't.
Mrs. HARRISON. Would you be interested to ask me a question, then?
The CHAIRMAN. No; I have asked you one question and you didn't answer it. I asked you, were you for the pact or against it. You do not seem to have made up your own mind. You are here to advise this committee whether we ought to ratify this pact or reject it. You refuse to tell us which side you are on. You are for the Koreans and the Indians and the people over in Asia, but I want to talk about this treaty.
Mrs. HARRISON. Don't you realize that I am first and foremost for my country of America?
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; that is true.
Mrs. HARRISON. When you have lived outside of the country you appreciate your own country more when you get back and you will be willing to sacrifice and go to more sacrifices.
The CHAIRMAN. I have never been abroad but what I was glad to get back to the United States of America.
Mrs. Harrison. I have my first home in 16 years. I just now bought it, and you can't know how much I appreciate for the first time in 26 years being a citizen. So, Senator, I am just trying to find out if a group, or if there is not a danger of a certain group, misinterpreting us or, well, I would say, destroying our heritage. Could it be that now, with this North Atlantic Pact, we might be selling our birth right, which is the heritage of democracy, for a mess of pottage?

The Chairman. No.

Mrs. Harrison. That is what is concerning me so much.

The Chairman. You asked me that question. My answer is "no." It is to protect democracy. It is to protect the peoples that believe in democracy and protect their independence and their security.

Mr. Harrison. But only over here on the Atlantic Ocean, and we have a Pacific Ocean here too.

The Chairman. I understand. We can't do it all at once.

Mrs. Harrison. Don't you think it would be wiser now if we were to have a Pacific Pact?

The Chairman. I think we had better stick to our last until we get through with this job. All these questions about "Let's go over beyond here" are beyond what we are trying to do. We are trying to find out about this Atlantic Pact. You don't seem to know whether you are for it or against it, so you are not of much help to the committee when you do not know your own mind.

Mrs. Harrison. I told you, please, awhile ago, when you asked me, that I was for it insofar as it would protect the democracies of the world.

The Chairman. That is what it is designed for.

Mrs. Harrison. A world government and world peace. I am for it if it does that.

The Chairman. That is what our purpose in mind is.

Mrs. Harrison. I want to be sure it is going to do that.

The Chairman. We do not know what the future is going to hold.

Mrs. Harrison. We have to make ourselves secure for the future, and we have to know whether or not this North Atlantic Defense Pact is going to secure our future, Senator. That is all I am concerned about.

The Chairman. We think so.

All right; thank you very much for your testimony. The committee will take a recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

(The committee reconvened at 4:30 p.m. at the expiration of the recess.)

The Chairman. Joseph L. Bradford?

Mr. Bradford. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. How long is your statement?

Mr. Bradford. Three or four minutes.

The Chairman. Whom do you represent, where do you live and what do you do?

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH L. BRADFORD, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Mr. Bradford. My name is Joseph Bradford. I represent no organization. I live in Philadelphia, 1625 Walnut Street. I just took
the day off from work to come down and tell the Senate committee why I am in opposition to the North Atlantic Pact.

The Chairman. All right. We will be glad to hear you. Go right ahead.

Mr. Bradford. I am a machinist by trade. I have been a workingman all my life and all my life I have been active in trade-unions and in everything that affects unions. And being interested in unions, naturally, I am interested in the things that affect my fellow workingmen and the people of my country.

I am for peace and for everything that will help keep the peace between our country and the world; therefore, I am against the North Atlantic Pact and its entangling alliances.

I was a sincere and constant supporter of our late President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, primarily because of the benefits and gains that the workingman was able to obtain during his administrations. And I do not propose to sit idly by and keep my mouth shut when I look around me and see everything that we gained during Roosevelt's administration go down the drain. Since Roosevelt's death everything he stood for and I stand for has been abandoned. It was his efforts to bring about victory over the enemy and lasting peace for the world that took him to Yalta. It was at Yalta that the Three Great Powers met and agreed to work together after victory. The North Atlantic Pact voids the Yalta agreements and divides the world in two. Roosevelt showed the world that the United States and Russia could work together in peacetime as well as in wartime. The North Atlantic Pact provides for a military alliance that excludes Russia and therefore destroys all the efforts of Roosevelt whose policy for world peace was founded upon cooperation with Russia.

REARMAMENT AND THE TREATY

If the administration and the pact supporters are sincere in their belief that this is a peace pact why then does not the administration have the intestinal fortitude to tell the American people that along with this so-called peace pact goes the expenditure of untold and unknown billions of dollars for arms? We have already appropriated over $15,000,000,000 for arms and rearming and if we continue spending most all of our income for arms, how are we going to get the things that every American workingman is vitally interested in?

In the city where I live, housing conditions are terrible. Unemployment or the fear of unemployment is affecting almost everyone I know. Factories are beginning to shut down and throw their employees on the street with no place to turn. Most everyone I know is asking, "Are we in the beginning of another depression like the dreaded depression of 1929? Are the bread lines and soup lines coming back again?"

Tell me, Senators, how is it that we can spend billions on arms but become so miserly when it comes to providing money for the things that people need so badly today? We need billions, not millions, for public works that will provide needed employment for the unemployed. We need billions, not millions, for the over one-half of our population who are ill-housed, and at the same time provide jobs at decent pay for the unemployed.
If I could only convince you Senators, to stop spending billions upon billions for arms and spend a goodly part of that to meet the people's needs here at home; then you would make democracy work. Let's stop this war spending and spend for peace and we will have peace and not pacts that breed war.

I think I speak for the untold millions who want peace and, therefore, I urge you in all humility to reject the North Atlantic Pact.

The Chairman. You are a war veteran, aren't you?
Mr. Bradford. No, sir. I did not serve in this war.

The Chairman. In any war?
Mr. Bradford. In neither war, that is right.

The Chairman. You got a job?
Mr. Bradford. I have a job.

The Chairman. You are complaining about unemployment. You have a job, haven't you?
Mr. Bradford. I had it when I left yesterday. The plant I am working in has laid off 40 people last Friday.

The Chairman. They didn't lay you off?
Mr. Bradford. Not me.

The Chairman. You laid yourself off.
Mr. Bradford. I took today off to come down here.

The Chairman. I am glad you came. You are getting satisfactory pay, aren't you?
Mr. Bradford. I am not complaining about that. But I have an interest in the people. That is why I am down here.

The Chairman. You are a sort of a missionary for others. But I am talking about yourself. You are getting along all right, you are getting satisfactory pay, and you have a job, is that true?

Mr. Bradford. That is right.
The Chairman. What do you do?
Mr. Bradford. I am a machinist.

The Chairman. What kind?
Mr. Bradford. I work in a tool room, making tools and dies.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bradford. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Tittman.

STATEMENT OF A. O. TITTMAN, KEW GARDENS, N. Y.

Mr. Tittman. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am glad that I again have the opportunity to present to you my views; this time on the proposed "North Atlantic Security Alliance," as I did over a year ago on ERP.

I represent the Voters Alliance for Americans of German Ancestry the thousands of readers of my brochures and probably the wishes and opinion of many American citizens who, all propaganda of interested sources to the contrary, are still isolationists at heart but cannot make themselves heard.

The North Atlantic Security Alliance commits the American people to something about which they know little. It is, therefore, audacious to claim that they are in favor of it. An old-time Gallup poll might give the clue. Certain it is that 99 percent know little or nothing about it while 999 per thousand won't even go to the trouble to inform themselves. The greater, therefore, is the duty of those who have in-
formed themselves to point out the dangers to the American people inherent in this pact.

This so-called defense treaty betrays a total lack of historic and geographic knowledge, and it is not difficult for its enemies at home and abroad to point out its unreliability. It is nothing but a document designed to perpetuate by force for its participants their territorial possessions, including those which can only be termed “loot” or “allocation,” now the polite word for it, acquired through aggressive war, for an alleged waging of which most of the former German Government were executed.

**GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF TREATY**

Even the title is misleading. It is called the “Atlantic” Treaty, and in article 12 it speaks of “peace and security in the North Atlantic area,” while in article 6 it includes “the Algerian departments of France” and “attacks on vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.” By no stretch of the imagination do these Algerian departments belong to the Atlantic. They are in the Mediterranean and belong in a Mediterranean pact, but they were probably included on France’s insistence. Now let’s examine a little closer the case of France. These Algerian departments which we are called on to protect, by force of arms, if necessary, are French only through armed French aggression. Their conquest began about 100 years ago, but was not completed until 1870 to 1871, when the Algerians rose in rebellion. The more recent conquests in Morocco do not seem to be included, although they belong on the Atlantic, albeit not the North Atlantic. Are they supposed to be part of the “Algerian departments”?

Well, the French hold on North Africa is already challenged by the Arab League, and Abd-el-Krim, the famous Berber leader, now in Egypt, who fought the French so long, has vowed that he would devote the rest of his life to the liberation of Algeria and Morocco from the French. Behind Abd-el-Krim stands the Arab League, already antagonized by us through our pro-Jewish partisanship. Are we to protect the French conquerors of Africa against the liberation of these regions?

Then there is Alsace-Lorraine, German since the days of Caesar. The French stole some parts during the Thirty Years’ War when Germany could not defend her territory. Strassburg fell into their hands through treason in 1681. Other parts did not fall into their hands until the French Revolution, including Muehlhausen, which until then belonged to Switzerland. The people are to this day German speaking, and all town names are German. The Rhine never was the frontier between France and Germany until French aggression made it so in the south. The racial and historic boundary ran along the top of the Vosges Mountains. East, everything was German, and west it was “Welsh” (French). When Marshal Weygand unveiled the statue to Marshal Turenne in Thann in 1932 he said, “Turenne was the first Frenchman to make Alsace French.” What was it, then, before?

Turenne and Melac were the two French generals who devastated the Palatinate, blew up the wondrous Heidelberg Castle, and caused the German emigration to Pennsylvania. Incidentally, Germany never received reparation for this act of vandalism. But this treaty guar-
The proposed treaty of alliance is a pact for war like the Entente Cordiale. I have lived in England when Stanley Baldwin renewed it. I then told my British friends that while I had believed that never again would Britain and Germany fight each other, another war and Britain's participation was now assured. "Oh, that is only for defense," they said. But Britain not only wanted war herself; Churchill also talked France into the proper frame of mind to follow suit and honor her pact. So both declared war on Germany on September 1, 1939, and I heard both declarations over the radio in London at that time. It will be remembered that Baldwin resigned and handed his mess over to Chamberlain on a plea of ill health. But it killed Chamberlain while Baldwin was knighted and, I believe, is still alive.

Like the Entente Cordiale this is a war pact, and as our future allies are pitifully weak, unenthusiastic and unreliable, the whole weight would again fall on us, and our losses, bloody and otherwise, would far surpass those in the last war. Such a war would probably bankrupt us and turn us into a second-class nation. It might even end white predominance at home and result in our mongrelization.

Has Mr. Acheson ever considered what it would cost to be constantly prepared and which of the two sides could stand such tension longer? The Russian private gets the equivalent of about 10 cents a day, and he lives on the country. The American soldier gets at least $3 a day and his wants are much greater. Besides, in the matter of intervention and logistics, Russia, next-door neighbor to Germany would be there long before we or our allies could do anything effective.

GERMANY AND THE TREATY

What then should be our policy? We should certainly abandon our over-all policy toward Germany, written by Mr. Acheson when As-
sistant Secretary of State and our guide all this time. I called attention to the existence of this over-all policy but do not know if the Senate acquainted itself with it. The aim of that policy was to keep Germany fettered. It is not a policy written in the interest of a durable peace. It is punitive and destructive and the occupation statute and Ruhr control as well as other features prove that we are still following it. Mr. Acheson, it is said, is a fairly recent American. His father was a British-born clergymen, his mother a Canadian heiress. It should, therefore, not surprise you if some of us don't like Mr. Acheson's deck of cards. Not that he uses supernumerary aces but because there are too many Jacks in it—Union Jacks.

Before this last war Germany was the buffer against Russia, against Asia. She was the main support for Britain's balance of power. Unless we aspire to that prop ourselves, we should restore that balance by rearming Germany. She is the only country that would make a worth while ally, and she was never considered a threat by us until Britain turned her wrath on her. It is generally admitted that the Germans are the best soldiers in the world, and it is also said that without the 500,000 Germans and 300,000 Irish in the Union armies the North could not have won. Besides, German militarists and Junkers were very welcome here at the time, and the map of Gettysburg reads like an Almanac de Gotha. Nor did the South turn down German militarists at that time. Heros von Borke, a giant of a man and adjutant to General Johnstone, through his service and intrepidity, made a name for himself and became an almost legendary figure. Von Massow, in Mosby's cavalry was another. He later became commander of a Prussian Army Corps, but he returned for Confederate reunions and remained loyal to his friends and the Confederacy all his life.

The way to make of Germany a willing ally is to do away with all these restrictions, to take an interest in her recovery, not in her destruction. That's what General Clay meant when he said that the "punitive phase is over" and "construction should begin." Dismantling should stop absolutely. German lands should not be given to avaricious neighbors. The so-called Deutsche mark, which we imposed on Germany, should be valued at around 20 cents so that Germany could again sell in foreign markets. It was arbitrarily valued by us at 30 cents, far too high. No wonder the industrial exhibition in New York was a "complete flop" as Walter Winchell joyously announced. It has risen from a retail price in New York of 8 to 17 cents. Why we don't know, but some people here are making fortunes out of this rise. Personally, I would favor tying currencies of all major nations this side of the iron curtain to the dollar, as the pound has been tied for years. That largely maintained the British economy. Such a step would certainly increase western solidarity and recovery.

It is time that all this racial persecution and discrimination were stopped. In the long run it certainly pays to create just and decent imponderables. The Golden Rule applies everywhere, even among animals. A badly treated dog will fear but never love you, and an elephant with a grudge only bides his time to get even with you. It is not exactly fair either, this "stomping" on the down-and-outer, as we have been doing, especially as it concerns a country of our own, the white race.
In view of the fact that the German people without their stolen eastern provinces cannot support in their rump state the indigenous population, much less the 10 millions or so of the 15 to 20 millions that survived the unbelievable atrocities accompanying their expulsion and furthermore that these new boundaries are not confirmed or recognized, many Germans even now would side with the west if the return of these, to them, indispensable lands were held out to them because they hate communism. They have experienced it, and it is said that even German Communists have been weaned away from this perverted ideology through the conduct of the Red armies. Although I am aware of the leanings of the National Geographic Magazine, I am nevertheless surprised that on their new map of Europe accompanying the June number, it has accepted the Polish-made borders as final, has put the ancient German names in territories occupied by the Slavs in brackets but given fanciful Polish, Russian, and Czech names, freely invented, the place of honor. These names never existed before because no Slavs lived there. Is this an attempt to justify Slav claims to these stolen German lands? And why should a magazine accept a temporary occupation as final?

Most of the witnesses, I believe, have dwelt on how far this pact involves us, but I doubt if many or any have gone into its causes.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE TREATY

Fundamentally, this treaty is to safeguard the integrity of Britain and if possible to reestablish her former European hegeinony. Certainly the indispensability of Britain to us has become, through constant propaganda an axiom of our rulers, a fetish. But its direct cause is the result of the crazy, unconditional-surrender demand of Roosevelt and Churchill. That tragic, inhuman policy prolonged the war and brought about the complete destruction of Germany, creating a vacuum which the nearest strong power would fill, and that power was Red Russia. As a matter of fact, Russia was invited to come as deeply as possible into the heart of Europe, and our armies were withdrawn from large Germanic territories already occupied by them in favor of the Reds. That was a dreadful betrayal of western civilization and of the white race, for do not be deceived into thinking that the advance of the half-Mongolian Red hordes into Germany caused white eclipse in Europe alone. This betrayal also caused the retreat of the Caucasian race in many other parts of the world and with it the enhanced prestige of the colored or pigmented races. Not many here may be informed that Russia, after systematically exterminating the Baltic whites, has settled in their ancient lands and especially in East Prussia Mongolians from far off Asia, thus destroying all the culture of the white race in those parts.

This fateful development could have been halted if our Government had taken an intelligent, just, charitable, and far-sighted view of the situation instead of obeying the clamorers and whisperers among the millions of vindictive Slavlocks in this country, who were not satisfied with the holocausts of Hamburg, Dresden, Wuerzburg, and nearly all larger German cities, who were not satisfied with the disappearance of one-third of the unfortunate expellees, with the stripping of present and past German wealth, but demanded unending punishment. Even now these strata are not satisfied, as the activities of the so-called
Society for the Prevention of World War II of New York prove. This society, more properly called Society for the Extermination of the German People, financed from secret quarters on a tremendous scale, charging no dues, floods the country with its outpourings of insatiable hatred under the leadership of one E. Anselm Mowrer and is in large measure to blame for keeping open the wounds of war and preventing a decent settlement. This organization contains many leftists and refugee foreigners and can hardly be called an American society. Years ago I asked the House Committee on Un-American Activities to investigate this outfit, but it was not done.

The British General Fuller, in his recent book, has this to say about the unconditional-surrender policy which made possible the destruction of Germany:

Object of war is not slaughter and devastation but to persuade the enemy to change his mind. "Strategic bombing," politely so-called, was not only morally but militarily wrong and politically suicidal. One only has to look at central Europe to see this. In Germany the net result of the bombing of the cities was appalling slaughterings that would have disgraced Attila.

I am not at all happy over the thought that our country took the leading part in this insane, senseless, wholesale destruction and in the murder of millions. What will future generations say about our responsibility on viewing the ghastly ruins of the once peerless German cities, ruins that will prevail long after we are all dead, after centuries? Attila and Genghis Khan will certainly be superseded by the names of the men responsible for this unbelievable abomination.

**POLICY TOWARD GERMANY**

Instead of inventing all kinds of novel procedures, like trial on ex post facto basis of the German Government, confiscation of assets in Germany, abroad and even in neutral countries, dismantling and dynamiting of factories, "allocations" of coal, timber, potash and scrap, slave labor of PW's, et cetera, all things that violated every precedent and could have been legalized only through inclusion in a treaty of peace, we should have helped to heal the wounds of war and made peace years ago, as always has been done heretofore. Then there would have been less friction with Russia and the danger of a new war would not have existed. I think that our statesmen know that their conduct has not been conducive to peace and that it is one reason why they don't want to terminate the occupation. In 1871, after the end of the Franco-Prussian War, it was largely held here in America that France was not responsible for the acts of Napoleon III and should go scot-free, and this in spite of the fact that the French National Assembly practically unanimously voted for war and that the whole of the French people was in favor of it. But when Germany was compelled to go to war with Britain and France after they had declared war on her, no punishment for resisting aggression against her can be severe enough. Such is the illogicalness of "public opinion."

It is said that every war has in it the seeds of another war unless the vanquished is exterminated or treated with moderation. Abraham Lincoln believed in moderation, or he would not have said:

with charity for all and malice toward none.

Would that our country had produced another Lincoln in our time. After the Napoleonic Wars there was a long period of peace because the
interests of the vanquished French were so considered that Talleyrand was said to have emerged the victor from the Congress of Vienna.

**STATUS QUO AND THE TRENTY**

This new treaty certainly turns us away from our real destiny, makes us the guarantor of the status quo everywhere, and propels us into channels full of hidden obstacles and pitfalls. Far more momentous than the Monroe Doctrine, it will, if adhered to, involve us in about every quarrel, and who will say that disputes will not arise again or do not exist right now? There is war in China, in the Dutch and French colonies of Asia. The Palestine war has been settled temporarily until one side has caught its second breath. There is race tension in South Africa. The peace of Russia's satellites is forced. Northern Island is a bone of contention. Distribution of the ex-Italian colonies contains dynamite. Ethiopia is on the alert. In central Europe there is peace; the peace of the graveyard. It is quiet because one side is disarmed, starving, and powerless to move, unable to assert even its most primitive rights. Tinder everywhere. Plenty of prospects for Uncle Sam. And the Atlantic treaty is supposed to subdue all such conflicting interests through force of arms. Might makes right after all, it seems. A far cry from what the United States once stood for—the friend of all and enemy of none. That is what the one-worlders have gotten us into. Wars can be averted only by reconciling as far as possible conflicting aims and ambitions and by restraint. Where is the permanent peace promised to us?

**ABANDONMENT OF TRADITIONAL POLICY**

Primarily responsible for the state of affairs are President Roosevelt and the 17 millions which, according to repeated Gallup polls were for active intervention. Not responsible are the 83 percent consistently opposed to active intervention. Responsible also is our system of Government which gives the Executive too much power, and lets him prepare for any war he wants to engage in. Already when a boy my grandmother told me that "every 4 years we elect an absolute monarch." other forms of dictatorship not being thought of at that time. When the country was founded, executive prerogatives were tailored to the figure of Washington. If the Secretary of State were chosen by the Congress and responsible to it, we would then have a better right to call ourselves a democracy which, in a political sense, we are not.

The present situation is the result of our meddling in Europe, the erroneous belief that Britain is our first line of defense when in reality she has been the cause of our involvement and we are her defense. The Frankenstein of Red Russia is the child of Roosevelt and Churchill. The record of our new allies does not justify optimism. Britain proved in two wars her inability to win, even with all her European allies. France showed she has become a minor nation. Italy would not defend her African empire and not even her home country. She let the Germans fight for her. Even against tiny Greece she made no headway until the Germans turned the Greek flank. The Dutch and Belgians have no taste for war. Besides, Holland is entirely and Belgium one-half Teutonic in race and speech. But there remains Luxemburg.
I know that tiny state. It might provide a corporal’s guard. Some of these countries have strong pro-Russian minorities. These are our allies that Mr. Acheson counts on to defend “our frontier on the Rhine,” to hold it until we are ready. A recent rumor has it that the west Germans are slated to provide the light infantry with which to absorb the Russian shock, but that would depend on the Germans. At present they are in no such mood. At present the saying in Germany is said to be, “Ohne mich.” that is “without me” or “leave me out.” So it is all left to Uncle Sam, as before. Give us the tools, the manpower, and the leader, and we will finish the job and make the V sign. But a fine opportunity to complete the destruction of the German people by making their country our battleground. They won’t be evacuated like the South Sea Islanders.

SITUATION IN GERMANY

I had just come to the end of this paper when I received from Germany an air letter, dated May 3. It is from one of the 15 to 20 millions who on account of the Potsdam agreement were brutally and without any compensation driven from their ancestral homes where their families had been for centuries, in some cases from time immemorial and longer than the Slavs. They were driven off their homes in any kind of weather, compelled to leave everything behind. Many were thrown into the rivers which became choked with bodies. Others were soaked with oil and set afire. Children were brained on sidewalks and walls, daughters and wives were raped innumerable times, abominations which nobody has punished.

The writer of this letter is a real “Junker,” an aristocrat of the old school. Four years ago he was a millionaire with a 2,000-acre farm, highly productive, fitted out with all the latest machinery. Today he is a pauper, and I am sending him food parcels. His 74-year-old father and 72-year-old mother were brutally murdered by the Russians; his married sister was raped many times by Poles so that she committed suicide like so many other abused folks. Are you aware that in the regions overrun by these foul and bestial invaders there were over 2,000,000 abortions? But we are not behaving much better. In Munich alone there are said to be over 1,000 mulatto babies. This policy of sending Africans into the cradle of the white race and mongrelizing it is another all-time low of policy, engineered by the enemies of the Caucasian race.

But what will interest you most in this letter is in relation to the proposed treaty. I quote in literal translation:

According to the latest news it looks as if the Soviets would return parts of Silesia, even at the cost of fooling the often-fooled Poles, who are now beginning to leave Silesia. Where there is smoke, there is a fire.

Is this Russian bait? If so, we had better look out, or they will get more Germans on their side. Even a return to a wilderness where once were their productive farms would be the only escape for many Germans. I have here the photograph of the former home of my correspondent. It dates back to 1567, and all that time it has been in his family. It has been plundered, and defiled by these unspeakable barbarians and partly destroyed. Yet he would return to it although he would have to rebuild the rest of his life. And he is but one of many.
Lincoln once said that this Union cannot endure half slave and half free. That also applies to Europe as a whole and to Germany in particular. If we do not free the Germans, someone else will, or the Germans will free themselves. They certainly will choose that side which gives them a chance to live. My correspondent thinks that in case of a Red attack the German Red police of the Soviet sector would pour into the western zone, liquidate all the people that their Red bosses did not like and terrorize the others into submission, and that would mean the complete bolshevization of Germany and making of her another Red satellite. That goes to show that the rearming of Germany is a necessity if we do not want to see her in Russian arms. If she is to be rearmed, it had better be done by us and soon.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Tittman.

Mr. Tittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT KEYES, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE, STATE COLLEGE, PA.

The Chairman. Mr. Scott Keyes, State College, Pa. How long will it take you, Mr. Keyes?

Mr. Keyes. About 8 minutes.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. We welcome that kind of a witness. What chair do you occupy?

Mr. Keyes. Assistant professor of economics.

The Chairman. Whom do you represent in this hearing?

Mr. Keyes. I am speaking as an individual. I also have a statement from the Peace Committee of the State College Friends Meeting, which I have been asked to transmit to the committee.

The Chairman. Very well, go ahead.

Mr. Keyes. I have a prepared statement, and I will read excerpts from it.

I wish to comment on only two questions: First, whether the pact, by its very nature, can achieve its own purposes; and second, the relation of the pact to the United Nations.

THE PACT AND PRESERVATION OF THE PEACE

With regard to the first question, I think it is a fair and a hopeful thing to say that we are all agreed upon one larger objective—the attainment of peace. The proposed treaty itself, and Secretary Acheson's defense of it, both stress this objective repeatedly. Nevertheless, in view of the long record of failure of armed preparedness as a means of preserving peace—in view of the positive record of armaments races culminating in war, the question of whether the pact can achieve its purpose must receive the careful attention of the committee.

As Secretary Acheson has pointed out, no one can say with certainty that the pact will succeed in its purpose. Likewise, no one can say with certainty that it will not achieve its aims. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that it will not achieve its own objectives because of the very logic of the circumstances.

The pact has been developed in response to tensions that exist in the world today. These tensions arise out of differences of opinion on certain basic social, economic, and political issues. They can only be
eliminated by the admittedly difficult process of negotiation, seeking constantly to widen areas of agreement, and to narrow areas of disagreement. When one group of nations, therefore, undertakes re-armament, and establishes machinery for joint military planning, such action must inevitably call forth parallel action elsewhere. It takes two sides, each of somewhat comparable strength, each believing in the justice of its cause, to create tension in the first place. In the process of the armaments race, the belief grows, however erroneous it may be, and however eloquently and sincerely the several foreign ministers of the respective countries plead their peaceful intentions, the belief grows that the die is irrevocably cast for war.

Thus the elimination of the tensions, the only basis upon which peace can be established, becomes difficult, if not impossible, and war, the very occurrence the pact seeks to avoid, almost inevitable.

There is another sense, also, in which it is questionable whether the pact can or will achieve its own larger objectives. The purpose of this pact is not merely to achieve peace; it is to preserve the free institutions which are part of the cultural heritage of the signatory nations. Yet, we must ask ourselves very frankly whether these free institutions can be maintained in the midst of an armed society. National defense, in these days of atomic warfare, as the President's Committee on Universal Military Training pointed out so clearly 2 years ago, is a far-reaching concept. Not only must the Nation have armed forces ready for instant action; it must likewise be prepared industrially, socially, scientifically. It must carry on, also, extensive intelligence operations at home and abroad, to promote its own philosophy in other countries, to learn of the actions of potential enemies, to counteract espionage, to prevent the infiltration of subversive ideas.

The effects of these needs of national defense on our social and economic institutions are plain. Economically, the needs of national defense stimulate that concentration of control over business and industry which the Federal Trade Commission and Senate investigating committees tell us is destroying the very system we seek to maintain. Governmentally, the needs of national defense lead to situations such as that in Washington today, where secret military organizations conduct operations of unknown scope and magnitude with budgets which are not matters of public record. Scientifically, the needs of national defense lead to a barren preoccupation with the problems of warfare. Socially, the needs of national defense lead to increasing interference with civil liberties—that phase of our society on which we pride ourselves most highly. Increasingly, people who out of an honest concern for the welfare of their country question any social or economic policy find themselves regarded as subversive, as traitors, frequently being deprived of their livelihoods.

Where is the logic of this situation? Do we preserve our free institutions by turning our own and our neighbors' countries into armed camps; by promoting the concentration of economic control which is destroying free competitive enterprise; by increasing the magnitude and scope of secret operations in the Government; by increasingly violating civil liberties, and instilling fear into all who would protest? Furthermore, if our objective is to encourage the growth of civil liberties in nations outside the pact, can we hope to accomplish this aim by a policy of military containment, particularly in view of
the effects of such a policy in our own free society? These questions will, I hope, receive your earnest consideration.

THE PACT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Secondly, I should like to comment briefly on the relationship of the proposed pact to the United Nations. On this matter I speak with diffidence, recognizing that some of the members of this committee were among the architects of that organization. Nevertheless, every person who believes, as I do, heart and soul, in the cause of the United Nations has a responsibility to examine to the best of his ability the contention which has been made repeatedly that the proposed North Atlantic Treaty is consistent with the spirit as well as with the letter of the United Nations Charter.

We are told that the Charter recognizes the importance of regional arrangements consistent with its purposes and principles. Can the proposed treaty be said in the largest sense to fit this definition? This, I think, is a debatable point. For better or for worse, the Charter establishes an association of nations which can only function effectively when its principal members are on friendly terms with each other. The regional arrangements which are recognized in article 51 and the several articles of chapter VIII must be construed in the light of this fundamental prerequisite of the organization as a whole. Thus, any regional arrangement by which some members arm themselves against other members is not consistent with the basic philosophy of the organization. By their solemn ratification of the Charter, the several nations have not only expressed their intent to make such a step unnecessary but have made it out of keeping with the spirit of the organization. The rearmament that is countenanced is against former enemies which are not members of the United Nations. Furthermore, any arrangement which divides the members into armed camps only renders it more difficult to achieve in practice the unanimous agreement of the major powers which, for all its shortcomings, is the one principle which makes an international organization possible at this stage in the world's development. Pursued to its logical conclusion, any other argument culminates in the ultimate question whether the United Nations can and should continue to exist, and I cannot believe that the American people are willing even to entertain the thought of abandoning their participation in that organization.

The very fact that the proponents of the treaty have been at considerable pains to square it with the United Nations—and I am not making any charge of bad faith—indicates, I think, the deep-seated concern the American people have for the success of the United Nations. Finally, I think our people will also become increasingly disturbed if they find our Nation committed to continue spending more per day to maintain our own and other military establishments than the United Nations is spending per year to achieve peace.

In view of these arguments, therefore, that there are grave doubts whether the pact can, by the very logic of the circumstances achieve its own larger objectives of attaining peace and protecting our free institutions, and that it is inconsistent with the larger philosophy of the United Nations. I respectfully urge that the members of this committee recommend the rejection of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Keyes, you are a war veteran, I assume?
Mr. Keyes. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You haven't been in either the First or Second World War?
Mr. Keyes. No, sir.

CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. You speak here of the terrible conditions that exist in this country at the present time. You say—the effects of these needs of national defense on our social and economic institutions are plain, economically the needs of national defense—and so forth—
destroy the very system we seek to maintain.

Is it not true that today we have the largest national income we have ever had, with the exception of a slight decline?
Mr. Keyes. That is true.
The CHAIRMAN. Does that indicate prosperity and commerce and industry, or otherwise?
Mr. Keyes. It does.
The CHAIRMAN. So in that respect you haven't any complaint with the United States Government?
Mr. Keyes. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What about the government that you are particularly complaining about? What have we done that is so terribly wrong?
Mr. Keyes. What government am I complaining about?
The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were talking about conditions here at home.
Mr. Keyes. I am pointing out what I believe to be the inevitable consequences of the defense policy.
The CHAIRMAN. You go beyond that. You say:

Governmentally, the needs of national defense lead to situations such as that in Washington today where secret military organizations conduct operations of unknown scope and magnitude which budgets are not a matter of public record.

Mr. Keyes. I had in mind there the Central Intelligence Agency.
The CHAIRMAN. You don't call that a big outfit, do you?
Mr. Keyes. I don't know. Its budget is not a matter of public record and its operations are not a matter of public record.
The CHAIRMAN. Congress knows what it is doing when it appropriates for it. You don't believe in an intelligence agency!
Mr. Keyes. I don't like to see agencies in the Government whose budgets are not matters of public record.
The CHAIRMAN. You can't draw a dime out of the Treasury unless you have a record of it. You ought to know that. You are a professor of economics.
Mr. Keyes. Is their budget found in the Federal budget?
The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that it is published, but it is certainly known to Congress, as the representatives of the people. Were you active in the last political campaign?
Mr. Keyes. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What ticket were you for?
Mr. Keyes. Progressive ticket.
The Chairman. Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Keyes. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I thought you sounded like Mr. Wallace. That is all. Thank you very much.
Mr. Keyes. Thank you, sir.
I have here the statement of the State College Friends Meeting which I have been asked to furnish.
The Chairman. That is the Friends’ organization?
Mr. Keyes. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You are a member of them?
Mr. Keyes. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I respect your beliefs in that regard if not in this.
Mr. Keyes. Thank you, sir.
(The statement referred to is as follows:)

May 16, 1947.

To the Members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate:

The proposed North Atlantic Treaty presents to each of you the need for a decision of momentous importance for the future of our country and of the world. This treaty represents the furthest departure to date from our traditional relation to European affairs, as well as from the course we had hoped to pursue after the recent war. Even more, it raises the question in which each member of your committee must answer in his own mind and conscience—whether the proposed action will enhance or weaken the possibility of a just and lasting peace.

As a help to your thinking, the State College Friends Meeting would like to set forth briefly its considered judgment on this matter.

Underlying our attitude is one of the basic tenets of our society—exemplified so eloquently in the life and work of the founder of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—that of the universal brotherhood of man. Different people may arrive at such a tenet by different routes. But however arrived at, once accepted, it leads to a peaceful environment in which understanding and mutual adjustment become possible among individuals.

Such a philosophy is applicable to nations fully as much as to individuals. The Society of Friends has stated its conviction time and again that no plea of necessity or policy, however urgent, should divert our Nation, or any nation, from a fundamental reliance on the power of love in the conduct of its affairs. Collectively, we in the State College Friends Meeting desire to say to all the world as we say to each other—as William Penn used to say so continuously and with such humility and such deep conviction—"I am your friend."

With respect to the proposed treaty, we are concerned for many reasons. First, looking at it as the latest in a series of steps of increasing gravity taken by those whose concern for the national security has led them to place reliance on the threat of force more than on peaceful persuasion and arbitration, we believe that it does not work in the direction of true national peace, which is the only means by which true national security can be achieved. Rather, by raising fear and suspicion in the minds of those outside the pact, it increases international tensions, rivalries, and frictions, and calls forth parallel actions elsewhere which further confound the initial hostility. It is of little consequence to urge the peaceful intentions of the signatories; to point out that the treaty will only come into operation if an aggression is committed or seriously threatened. The treaty itself establishes machinery for point military planning and for rearmament.

In view of the tensions which today exist among nations, these developments can scarcely fail to lead others to believe, even if erroneously, the die is cast irrevocably for war. Thus the elimination of the tensions, the only real basis upon which peace can be established permanently, becomes difficult, if not impossible; and war, the very occurrence the pact seeks to avoid, almost inevitable.

Similarly, we believe that the attitudes and actions embodied in the treaty prejudice other and larger negotiations aimed at a settlement of the basic problems out of which the present international differences arise, and render a genuine meeting of minds difficult, if not impossible. Although it may be argued legalistically that the treaty is not in violation of the provisions of the United
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Nations Charter, the more germane question is, does the treaty contribute to the achievement of the objectives of that Charter? Article 3 of the treaty, calling for increased armaments, is certainly contrary to those objectives of the United Nations Charter which seek a reduction in armaments. The fundamental objective of the Charter being peace, we seriously doubt that the treaty can be relied upon to assure peace.

While our concern arises chiefly out of religious considerations, we believe it is also in point to observe that some who examine the treaty even in terms of its own strategic conception find it questionable. Realistically it represents a calculated risk involving two considerations: (1) That the unity demonstrated among the members will deter Soviet aggression; and (2) should Soviet aggression occur, that the obligations contained in the pact would assist in making military forces available in addition to our own.

Regarding the first risk, the course of events since the termination of the war has demonstrated that the “get tough” approach has only brought increased intransigence on the part of the Soviet Union, and the pact may contribute to the final breach between east and west—which can have no other consequence ultimately than war. Likewise, regarding the second risk, events in Europe since the recent war raise serious question whether all the members can deliver on the obligation to produce unity in their respective countries adequate to repulse an aggressor. We cannot ignore the fact that conflicting ideas are involved, and ideas do not halt at national boundaries. Thus, in some of the areas upon which we would depend, we could conceivably have to go it alone, or with limited support against internal opposition. Such considerations suggest the greater realism of a peaceful approach to our difficulties.

We would recall to your attention the parallel difficulties William Penn faced in founding this Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a new and potentially hostile land. Where other colonies found themselves involved in frequent wars with the Indians and remained armed for their security, Pennsylvania remained unarmed and at peace because of Penn’s policies of friendliness, tolerance, complete honesty, and peaceful arbitration of disputes. As a practical administrator, Penn took the seemingly greater risk. History proved his wisdom in doing so. That history might well be reviewed for the lessons it holds for us today.

We conclude, therefore, that the security of our own country and the peace of the world are not advanced by the proposed treaty, and we urge most strongly that you vote against its ratification and use the influence of your committee to bring about its defeat.

On behalf of the State College Friends Meeting:

John H. Reedy,
Secretary, Peace Committee.

STATEMENT OF CURTIS P. NETTELS, PROFESSOR, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The Chairman. Dr. Nettels! How long will you take, Doctor?

You are not going to read all that, are you?

Mr. Nettels. No, sir. I have two statements, one about 17 minutes and one about 4 minutes.

The Chairman. Can you not cut that 17 minutes to 10, and give us the 4?

Mr. Nettels. I will give you the 4; yes, sir.

The Chairman. All right. Go right ahead.

Mr. Nettels. If the Atlantic Pact were described in terms of its likely effects, its preamble might properly read: “A treaty to repeal the Declaration of Independence, to subvert the Federal Constitution, to weaken and impoverish the United States, to strengthen Soviet communism, and to intensify the danger of our involvement in a Pacific war which we would have to fight alone, without allies, and in a weakened condition.”

The Chairman. Is that all it does?
Mr. NETTELS. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean it does not do anything else besides that?
Mr. NETTELS. That is the beginning.

EFFECT OF THE TREATY

The pact is a negation of our national interests. It asks us to pour out our substance to western Europe, where the danger of attack is nonexistent, and to ignore—for the present—the area of real peril across the Pacific.

It calls upon us to endorse and confirm two treaties of two major powers that bind them not to assist us in a major war. It requires that we sanctify two treaties that are directed against ourselves. It compels us to mutilate the sovereignty and independence of the Nation and thereby to expose it to a process of disintegration.

It will enfeeble the Nation by impairing its Constitution, its historic policies, its integrity, its traditions, and its spirit of self-reliance. It invites us to oppose a hostile force by sapping the Nation's strength, by undermining the national institutions and by devitalizing the national spirit.

It will gain us ill will from all states outside the pact, but it will not gain us any real allies or any effective aid from the member states. We will be isolated in the world, and obliged to carry on alone an extended contest, in a denationalized and debilitated condition.

We will be left with a national shell, with a set of national burdens, and an expensive military facade. Our resources will be depleted for the benefit of those who are pledged not to act with us against a potential enemy.

The policy which the administration has followed since October 1945 is, in its effects, a pro-Russian policy. It avowedly seeks to check or contain Russia by using the wealth of the United States for the benefit of allies of Russia that are pledged not to act against Russia.

Under this policy, the strength of Soviet communism has grown. Two major victories for it have been won in Czechoslovakia and China. Although the policy has not stopped or contained communism, it has implicated the United States deeply in a very costly contest.

Our bill for the cold war may amount next year to $24,000,000,000. Throughout the world the opposition is increasingly directed against us and focused upon ourselves.

We are now asked to go into the Atlantic Alliance and thereby to extend the policy that hitherto has failed to accomplish its intended results. We are asked to meet an adversary by arming and subsidizing his allies and by depriving the Nation of its principal sources of strength.

If the Senate ratifies the pact, it will commit us to an indefinite continuation of the present contest. The threatened drain on the Nation's resources and vitality is incalculable. We will prepare for the contest by impairing everything that has given the Nation its strength—its Constitution, its historic policies, its integrity, its traditions, its spirit, its sovereignty, and its independence.

That so much must be sacrificed for the present policy is decisive proof that it is a negation of our true national interests.
Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it will destroy the Declaration of Inde

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And destroy the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. NETTELS. I think it will seriously impair the Constitution;

yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it will “subvert the Federal Constitution”?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your statement?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And “weaken and impoverish the United States”?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. “Strengthen Soviet communism?”

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And “intensify the danger of our involvement in a

Pacific war, which we would have to fight alone without allies in a

weakened condition”?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe all those things?

Mr. NETTELS. Absolutely.

ANGLO-SOVIET AND FRANCO-SOVIET TREATIES

The CHAIRMAN. You say “it requires that we sanctify two treaties that are directed against ourselves”?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

Mr. NETTELS. The British-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Alli

ance of May 1942, and the French-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of December 1944, both of which contain the clause binding Britain and France not to enter into any alliance or any coalition against Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. You read the treaties?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this pact bind us to go against Russia?

Mr. NETTELS. No, sir. It endorses these treaties. It endorses, con

firms, and renews these treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not say anything in the treaty about that, do we?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir. Article 8 says something to the effect that nothing in this treaty, the Atlantic alliance, conflicts with existing international agreements between a member of the Atlantic alliance and a third state.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the declaration, though, of the nations af

fected. It says that they affirm, in the treaty, that they have no obligations with any other nation that would conflict with their obli

gations under the pact.

Mr. NETTELS. That means the Atlantic alliance is consistent with the British-Russian alliance and the French-Russian alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. Not necessarily.

Mr. NETTELS. Mr. Bevin, in Parliament, in speaking on the ratifica

tion by Parliament, said specifically that the Anglo-Soviet alliance
stood, and that he hoped this treaty, the new treaty, would provide better conditions for the British-Russian alliance to operate in.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bevin was here and signed this treaty. You know that.

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when signing it, he proclaimed what was in it, which was that they had no treaty with any other nation which would conflict with this treaty.

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir, that is right. The Atlantic alliance does not conflict with the Anglo-Soviet alliance. It confirms it; it renews it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not agree with that. We do not confirm that. You speak of two great Soviet triumphs and one in Czechoslovakia. Did you approve of that?

Mr. NETTELS. No, sir, I did not, decidedly not.

The fact remains that the German militarist Von Moltke, commonly called the greatest strategist after Napoleon, called Czechoslovakia the bastion of Europe, and said that the power that controlled the country, the land that is now Czechoslovakia, would have the strongest position in Europe.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. You are a full professor, are you?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In charge of the economics chair in Cornell University?

Mr. NETTELS. Professor of American history; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor of American history at Cornell University?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you occupied that chair?

Mr. NETTELS. Five years.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Senator DONNELL. May I ask the professor a few questions, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed. Go ahead, Senator Donnell.

Senator DONNELL. Professor Nettel,s you say you have been a professor of American history at Cornell University for 5 years?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. What was your educational background and experience prior to that time?

Mr. NETTELS. I attended the University of Kansas as an undergraduate; I attended the University of Wisconsin as a graduate student, and received the degrees of B. A. and M. A. at Wisconsin. I began teaching at Wisconsin at that time, and was there for 23 years.

Senator DONNELL. In what department?

Mr. NETTELS. In the department of history.

Senator DONNELL. Was Dr. Glenn Frank the president while you were there?

Mr. NETTELS. He was president part of the time while I was there; yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Go right ahead with your experience, for the 23 years you were teaching at the University of Wisconsin.
Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir, I spent 1 year in London as a fellow on the Guggenheim Foundation.

Senator DONNELL. What year was that?

Mr. NETTELS. 1928.

Senator DONNELL. Go right ahead.

Mr. NETTELS. I went to Cornell, as I say, 5 years ago. I was visiting lecturer of history at Harvard University, 1937-38, I believe. I taught at Columbia.

Senator DONNELL. Are you a full professor?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. Have you taught American history most of the time that you were engaged in this college graduate work?

Mr. NETTELS. English and American history.

DEPARTURE FROM TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

Senator DONNELL. Will you tell us, Professor Nettels, whether you regard the North Atlantic Treaty as a distinct departure from anything that the United States has ever entered into by way of foreign policy in the past?

Mr. NETTELS. I regard it as a drastic revolutionary change.

Senator DONNELL. For what reason do you regard it to be drastic and revolutionary?

Mr. NETTELS. I think it incorporates the United States in a new super state. I think it blends, reunites the United States with Britain and western Europe.

Senator DONNELL. Have you studied in considerable detail the proposed North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. NETTELS. I read it several times, yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. If I am not mistaken, in fact I know, although I did not hear you participate in it, I knew you were on the platform of Town Hall. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. And you debated that question over a Nationwide broadcast under the auspices of the Town Hall?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. What position did you take in that debate? Were you opposed to the pact or in favor of it?

Mr. NETTELS. I opposed it, on the ground that it confirms and renews the British-Russian alliance, which binds Britain not to enter into any alliance or coalition against Russia.

Senator DONNELL. You have examined the history back of this treaty, I take it, that is to say, the matter of the negotiations and what has led up to it, and the vetoes by Russia in the United Nations of that type?

Mr. NETTELS. I have no opinion on that subject as to what actually motivated the formation of the Atlantic Pact.

Senator DONNELL. In the preamble to the pact, there is one sentence that has been mentioned quite frequently in connection with
the testimony here, namely, that the parties to the treaty—and then I begin the quote—

are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

Would you tell us, professor, whether or not you regard Portugal as being in the class of countries—as presently administered, at any rate—which are founded on the principles of democracy?

Mr. Nettel's. No, sir. I do not believe that Portugal is a democracy, in our sense of the word.

MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE PACT

Senator Donnell. We have it sometimes mentioned in the testimony here that this treaty was, in a way, a development out of the Monroe Doctrine. I do not recall any specific mention, but I have heard it from time to time; different people said it. Whether it was in the testimony here, I cannot vouch.

Do you regard this treaty as analogous to the Monroe Doctrine?

Mr. Nettel's. Not in any sense.

Senator Donnell. The Monroe Doctrine is a unilateral doctrine!

Mr. Nettel's. It is.

Senator Donnell. There are no contractual relations entered into by the United States with any other signers?

Mr. Nettel's. That is right.

Senator Donnell. I am speaking of the Monroe Doctrine. The North Atlantic doctrine is a contractual doctrine, in which 12 nations sign as to various things provided for in the contract?

Mr. Nettel's. That is right.

COMPARISON WITH PAST MILITARY ALLIANCES

Senator Donnell. You spoke of having taught English history also?

Mr. Nettel's. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Have you had occasion to examine into the language of different treaties made in the past between different nations, language of alliance treaties?

Mr. Nettel's. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator Donnell. This does not intimate at all, by this question, and I am not at all intimating even indirectly, that this is a treaty of aggression. I am asking you, professor, whether or not you have observed that the treaties generally made, military alliances between other countries separate from this treaty, have expressed themselves on their face to be treaties of defense, or have they customarily expressed themselves to be treaties of offense?

Mr. Nettel's. I know of no treaty which expresses itself as a treaty of aggression, or intended aggression.

One example is the British-Japanese Treaty of Alliance of 1902.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PACT

Senator Donnell. Professor, you stated that you think this treaty will subvert the Federal Constitution.

Would you amplify on that, please, as to why you think it would effect that result?
Mr. NETTELS. In the first place, I think it will deprive Congress of the power of declaring war, within the scope of the treaty.

It defines an attack on these 11 countries, foreign countries, as an attack on the United States. If the United States is attacked, Congress has no choice but to declare war.

Senator DONNELL. That is, as a practical matter, you would say that if this country were attacked by a material number of troops of some other country, that the only course of action that would be left to Congress would be to declare war, is that correct?

Mr. NETTELS. That would be my position if I were in Congress; if the United States were attacked, we would have no choice but to declare war.

Senator DONNELL. And the provision to which you refer in the North Atlantic Treaty is that in article 5, in which the parties agree that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. From which, I take it, you judge—if I am correct, please state so, or if I am incorrect—you draw the conclusion that if an armed attack, not necessarily a small handful of troops but a material attack by, say, 100,000 troops, upon one of the signatories to this treaty should occur, you would consider that there is a contractual obligation that we are obligated to treat that attack as if it were an attack on the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes, sir; for instance, if an attack on Belgium, as in 1914, should be reenacted, it would be an attack on the United States; and the United States would, therefore, be obligated to declare war on the aggressor.

EFFECT ON TREATY OF A COMMUNIST COUP

Senator DONNELL. Professor, have you had occasion to examine into the facts presently existing in Italy or France as to the number of Communists in those two nations?

Mr. NETTELS. The last figures I saw on France indicated that about one-quarter of the people voted the Communist ticket. Whether that means they were all Communists, I presume—I presume that does not mean they were all Communists by any means, but they certainly must have been very sympathetic to communism.

Senator DONNELL. Do you have some information about Italy, as to the percentage of persons in Italy that are either Communists or voting Communist ticket?

Mr. NETTELS. My impression is that it is about 30 percent.

Senator DONNELL. Do you find anything in this treaty which either directly or inferentially provides that if a nation should become a Communist nation that it could be expelled from the community of nations formed by the treaty?

Mr. NETTELS. I saw no such provision, no arrangement, for getting a member out of the alliance.

Senator DONNELL. You say in your statement that "the pact is a negation of our national interests," that "it asks us to pour out our substance in western Europe, where the danger of attack is non-existent, and to ignore, for the present, the area of real peril across the Pacific."
Tell us, please, whether or not you mean by “pouring out our substance to western Europe” the implementation of the pact, by matériel and various expenses of that type?

Mr. Nettels. Yes. As I interpret the pact, it commits us to the program of mutual aid for 20 years. It says “this shall be continuous.”

Senator Donnell. And effective?

Mr. Nettels. And effective. It commits us to establishing a joint military establishment. I do not recall the exact words, but it says something about uniting the efforts for defense. It sounds to me very much like we are going to create an international military establishment, in which the armed forces of the United States will be merged.

That is the way I interpret it.

Senator Donnell. Professor, have you given this treaty what you consider a sufficiently thorough study to enable you to express the opinions that you have given here today, or have you just studied it casually?

Mr. Nettels. I have studied it carefully, I would say.

Senator Donnell. Have you lectured upon this subject elsewhere than over the radio, or have you written, if you have not lectured—

Mr. Nettels. I have written a good many letters on the subject. I wrote one letter to the New York Times, which was printed, about a column and a half. I think it was printed February 9.

That letter was made the basis of a leading editorial in the Chicago Tribune soon afterward.

I have written some letters to the Washington Post, to the New York Herald Tribune, some other newspapers. The Gannett newspapers have published several letters that I have written on the subject.

Senator Donnell. And has the Washington Post, and also the Herald Tribune, published your letters?

Mr. Nettels. Yes, sir.

DURATION OF THE TREATY

Senator Donnell. You spoke of this being a 20-year obligation. Do you find anything in here by which there is any provision for terminating the obligation, under the treaty, in less than 20 years?

Mr. Nettels. There is a clause with reference to reconsidering it after 10 years.

Senator Donnell. That is consulting together “for the purpose of reviewing the treaty.”

Mr. Nettels. Yes.

Senator Donnell. I mean, however, is there any provision by which the obligations existing under this treaty may be terminated in less than 20 years except by mutual consent of all parties?

Mr. Nettels. I regard it as a 20-year treaty essentially.

Senator Donnell. Is there any further proof you can think of that should be pointed out which would give your views with respect to this treaty? Any other argument or any other point that you would like to call attention to while you are on the stand this afternoon?

WORLD FEDERATION AND AMERICAN POLICY

Mr. Nettels. I would just like to say this, in conclusion: That my interest in this arose from my study of the early period of American
history, the period of the American Revolution. During the past 20 years a new school of historians has arisen which is called variously the revisionist school, or the imperialist school, that attacks and repudiates the American Revolution, discredits the American cause, and thereby, of course, denies to the United States a valid title as an independent nation, since our title from nationhood derives from the struggle for foreign independence.

I note today there is very extensive propaganda in favor of an actual political union of the United States with Great Britain, and countries associated with Britain traditionally, and I thought it highly important that three of the outstanding witnesses before this committee—Mr. Clayton, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Patterson—are heading an organization for the purpose of bringing about an actual, real, political union of the United States and Great Britain.

Senator Donnell. You are not favorable, I take it, to such a union?

Mr. Nettels. I am very strongly opposed to it.

ENTANGLING ALLIANCES

Senator Donnell. Professor, every once in a while somebody will say that notwithstanding the fact that George Washington advocated a policy of no alliance, no permanent alliance with other nations, that we have outgrown the conditions of those days, or we have changed conditions, perhaps more fairly stated, and that therefore, today, that warning would have no applicability.

Would you tell us whether or not in your judgment, from what you have observed, there are reasons today why we should go into this treaty which would overcome the reasoning of both Washington and Chief Justice Marshall, for that matter, back at that time?

Mr. Nettels. I do not see any justification for this treaty which would, in any way, replace or supersede the counsel of the Farewell Address. After all, when Washington wrote the Farewell Address he had had long and intimate association with foreign nations. His career began, his military career began in connection with the British and the French, and especially from 1775 on until the time he wrote the Farewell Address he had had intimate relations with the major European powers. And I think the principles of the Farewell Address are just as sound today as they were in his day, with the possible exception, perhaps, that you could not put so much emphasis on remaining aloof from Europe.

I presume we are more deeply involved in Europe.

Senator Donnell. Do you think, even if we are more deeply involved with Europe, even though the space has been annihilated in large part by the airplane, that we should surrender the view that Washington took that we should not enter into contractual obligations with these nations, or do you think that—

Mr. Nettels. Temporary alliances to meet extraordinary emergencies, I think, is the phrase of the Farewell Address.

Senator Donnell. One of our distinguished Senators, in delivering Washington's Birthday Address, I observed, drew from the Farewell Address the conclusion that this pact is expressly authorized by Washington; that is, would have been expressly approved, because he said this is a temporary alliance. Would you regard, within the ordinary
acceptance of the term, a 20-year contract to be a temporary alliance for extraordinary emergencies?

Mr. Nettles. No; I do not think that is what Washington had in mind. If there is an extraordinary emergency it certainly arises from Russia. That makes the Atlantic alliance contradictory because Britain and France are pledge both to enter into a coalition or alliance against Russia.

INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN JEALOUSIES

Senator Donnell. What do you think of this point that has been brought out by at least one witness, very forcibly, I thought, a few days ago? If we enter into this agreement with 11 other nations, and agree that an attack upon any one of them shall be considered an attack upon ourselves, that we immediately subject ourselves to all of the idiosyncrasies and the enmities and jealousies that may exist against any one of the 11 other signatories, so that, for illustration, if signatory X shall have trouble or a ruler who shall be litigious or warlike-minded, that we would, by this signature, become contractually obligated in a war that we might never get into, might never find the necessity of getting into, if we had not entered into such contractual obligation?

Do you care to comment on that general point?

Mr. Nettles. I had not thought about that particular point. But it does seem to me that this treaty will not gain us any friends outside the circle of the alliance, especially if it is going to commit us to this mutual aid, continuous mutual aid for 20 years, which we do not give to anyone else.

I do not think we will get any friends outside the alliance through this treaty.

Senator Donnell. Do you or do you not think there is merit in the proposition that by signing up a contract with 11 other contracting parties, that we are exposing ourselves to the jealousies that may exist against it, against every one of these other parties, I mean, that we are exposing ourselves to all of the contingencies that may arise from ill temper or bad judgment on the part of its government over a long period of years, and that from that standpoint it is very unwise for us to enter into a contractual obligation for such a length of time?

Do you think there is merit or not in that view?

Mr. Nettles. I have not thought over that point. I imagine, however, that something like that would occur, perhaps, that we might incur enmities that are directed against our associates in the alliance.

Senator Donnell. At any rate, today we are not subject to these contractual obligations; if we ratify this treaty, we are. There can be no doubt about that. That is true, is it not?

Mr. Nettles. Yes, sir.

Senator Donnell. Do you know Prof. Edwin Borchard of Yale University?

Mr. Nettles. Only by reputation.

Senator Donnell. Will you tell us please, what is his reputation?

Mr. Nettles. His reputation is that of a scholar, a sound scholar in the field of, I believe, international law.

Senator Donnell. Is he a man of wide experience along those lines, according to his general reputation?
Mr. NETTELS. I do not know him personally. I would not want to comment on that.

Senator DONNELL. Very well.

I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both the chairman and the professor for permitting me to examine you.

ATLANTIC UNION AND GREAT BRITAIN

The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement about Justice Roberts and former Secretary Patterson and Mr. Clayton. You said they advocated before this committee an alliance with Great Britain. Was it not true that they did not confine it to Great Britain, that they said a sort of world arrangement among the democratic countries?

Mr. NETTELS. Yes. I interpret that—

The CHAIRMAN. You interpret that plain language, and it does not say an alliance with Great Britain alone. Your statement is that they were going to line up with Great Britain alone.

Mr. NETTELS. I do not think I said Great Britain alone.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not say alone?

Mr. NETTELS. I said United States and Britain. That would necessarily, of course, include all the British-speaking dominions, and the new plans which include some of the western European countries.

The CHAIRMAN. It would exclude everybody that you did not mention, would it not?

Mr. NETTELS. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. I say it would exclude everybody except those you mentioned. Their statement was all the democratic countries.

Mr. NETTELS. Yes. That includes Britain. It means a union with Britain.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not mean a union with Britain at all. It means an alliance with Britain and all the democratic countries. You seem to be just prodding at Britain all the time.

Mr. NETTELS. Because, Senator, you will agree that our relations with Britain are especially intimate and important, will you not! We were, originally, possessions of the British Crown. Certainly on occasion it involved—the events leading to World War II are involved in World War II.

You remember the time when Britain was fighting alone, and Mr. Churchill’s great orations, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. NETTELS. You would not deny the importance of Britain and Canada.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly not, but I would not by the use of that term exclude everybody else.

Mr. NETTELS. I did not mean to.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did mean it, or you would not have said it.

Mr. NETTELS. No, I said he favors a reunion of the United States and Britain. They presumably favor bringing in some non-English-speaking countries, but that does not preclude the fact that it involves a reunion with Britain.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you read their testimony in the record?

Mr. NETTELS. I read accounts of it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did not read that.
Mr. NETTELS. I read newspaper reports of their organization, and the statement that they regard the Atlantic alliance the Atlantic pact, as a step toward a formal political union.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. If you had been as accurate in your other statement as you were in that I would agree with you. Do you want this long statement of yours published in the record?

Mr. NETTELS. I would like to have it if I might.

The CHAIRMAN. We will publish it in the record.

Mr. NETTELS. Thank you.

(The statement referred to follows:)

THE ATLANTIC PACT

PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 17, 1940

(By Curtis P. Nettes)

I do not believe that the Atlantic Pact is an aggressive military alliance or that it is an instrument of so-called American imperialism.

However, the pact is considered in the context of our relations with Soviet communism. A serious situation appears to be taking shape in the Far East. During the coming year, American taxpayers may be called upon to contribute $24,000,000,000 for the cold war.

If the pact were described in terms of its likely effects, its preamble might properly read: "A treaty to repeal the Declaration of Independence, to subvert the Federal Constitution, to weaken the United States, to strengthen Soviet communism, and to intensify the danger of a war in which the United States will have to fight alone, without allies, and in a weakened condition."

Two of the states to be included within the pact, France and Great Britain, are long-term allies of the Soviet Union, bound and pledged by solemn treaties, until 1962 and 1964, respectively, not to take effective action against Russia.

Reference is made to the following clause in the British-Russian treaty in 1942 and the French-Russian treaty of 1944:

"Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party."

Thus, both Britain and France are pledged not to give effective aid to the United States, if we should become involved in a major war.

The Governments of Britain and France have repeatedly affirmed the validity of their treaties of alliance and friendship with Russia. The Atlantic Pact, in article 8, declares that the pact is not inconsistent with those treaties. The pact therefore endorses, confirms, and renews two treaties of Russia which bind two major powers not to give us effective aid in a major war.

In the words of Washington's Farewell Address, "* * * it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another * * *. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure. * * *"

The pact will strengthen Russia by strengthening the allies of Russia—allies that are pledged not to take effective joint action against Russia. By strengthening the allies of Russia, the United States will surely weaken itself.

It is proper to reflect upon the meaning of the British and French alliances with Russia. Britain and France have been making alliances for 400 years. Their treaties with Russia were made when the character of communism and the nature of the Russian state were well understood. They were made by the most experienced statesmen of Britain and France. Is it conceivable that such statesmen would make, in ignorance and carelessness, a solemn commitment to Russia for 20 years? From the terms of the treaties one is forced to infer that their authors foresaw, at the end of the war, an American-Russian contest, and that they arranged things as far as possible, to assure the neutrality of Britain and France.

The treaties were made when the United States was a wartime ally of the two states. There was absolutely nothing in the war situation in 1942 or 1944 which obligated Britain and France to bind themselves for 20 years, not to act in concert with the United States against Russia. In this sense, the treaties
are directed against the United States, since they prevent us from securing effective allies against a possible enemy.

If there is doubt as to the meaning and effect of the British-Russian alliance, one might call to mind the history of the British-Japanese alliance of 1902 to 1922.

The British-Japanese treaty of 1902 provided that if Japan should become involved in war with another state, Britain would remain neutral. This treaty, therefore, set forth the principle that is asserted in the British-Russian treaty of friendship and alliance of May 1942.

Under the cover of its alliance with Britain, Japan gained strength rapidly. The first fruit of the alliance was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, whereby Japan acquired Russia's leases in China. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea. Entering World War I as Britain's ally, Japan seized the German islands in the Pacific and held them thereafter as the mandatory power. In 1915, Japan made its notorious 21 demands on China, at a time when China was powerless to resist. The program of the 21 demands set the stage for Japan's attacks on Manchuria and north China in the 1930's.

The growth of Japanese power, under the cover of the British-Japanese alliance of 1902-22, resulted in increased tension and enmity between the United States and Japan. By 1922, Japan had become a threat to our security. By the time of Pearl Harbor, Japan had become a formidable foe. The United States was obliged to carry practically all the Japanese end of World War II.

The fruits of the British-Russian alliance are comparable to those of the British-Japanese alliance. Under the cover of the former, the strength of Soviet communism has grown, precisely as Japan gained strength in the days of the British-Japanese alliance. Czechoslovakia and China represent two major victories for Russia—victories unmatched by comparable gains of anti-Communist forces. No effective resistance to Soviet communism can be organized, on an international basis, as long as Britain is an ally of Russia, pledged not to act with other states against Russia.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was an indirect result of the British-Japanese alliance of 1902-22. Yet only 5 months after Pearl Harbor, Britain entered into a similar alliance with Russia. By virtue of Pearl Harbor, we are now deeply involved in Japan. The fortunes of Japan are interwoven with those of China. By reason of the British-Russian alliance, which we are asked to endorse and consecrate by ratifying the Atlantic Pact, we are isolated in the Far East. Are we to withdraw from Japan? If we remain, what are we to do? Are we to adopt a pro-Communist policy and thereby strengthen and extend communism in the Orient? Or are we to adopt an anti-Communist policy and thereby incur the risk of clashes and incidents that may involve us in an exhausting and ruinous war?

Under the British-Japanese alliance, Japan gained strength. Eventually, the United States had to defeat Japan alone.

Under the British-Russian alliance, Russia is gaining strength. Will that lead to a new Pacific war? If so, will the United States again have to fight alone? The answer given to that question by the British-Russian alliance of 1942 and the Atlantic Pact is an emphatic "Yes."

In a second Pacific war, we may not have China as an ally. In all probability, Japan will be a source of danger and weakness—an additional drain on our resources.

The Atlantic Pact is not necessary. It presumes that western Europe will be attacked by Russia. But Russia has never attacked, or tried to attack, any country now included within the pact. Russia's national interest and historic policy have not been to dominate western Europe. Several nations there, including France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain, are already united in the Brussels pact, pledged to mutual aid in case one is attacked by an aggressor. Together, these states command immense resources and territories. They are not merely small states; they are extensive imperial powers. An attack on them would not be a trilling matter, even for Russia. Most important: the United States has now made it clear that it will not acquiesce in acts of ruthless military aggression against independent nations; 1917 and 1941 mean far more as a deterrent to aggression than could possibly be meant by Senate endorsement of two treaties that bind Britain and France not to enter into any alliance or coalition against Russia.

If one accepts the thesis that Soviet communism seeks to dominate the world, then one must put faith in certain statements of Communist leaders, notably
Stalin and Lenin. If faith is given to such statements, must not equal faith be
given to the views of those leaders as to the means by which communism is to
attain world dominion? Neither Lenin nor Stalin has advocated military attack
by a Communist state as a means of establishing Communist regimes. Both
have asserted that communism would come through internal revolution and civil
war. Such has been the reality in the two principal theaters of Communist suc-
cess—Russia and China. The chief danger of communism at present is not in
Britain-western Europe but in the Orient.

By the Atlantic Pact makes no provision for the Far East. Its effect may
be to increase Communist pressure in that quarter. For 50 years we have been
unable to ignore the Orient. World War II really began in 1931 in Manchuria.
We became fully involved as result of the Japanese-German-Italian alliance and
Pearl Harbor. The present advance of communism in China may make our posi-
tion in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines increasingly precarious. It is possible
that we may suffer one disagreeable incident after another, until we may have
to retreat in disgrace or accept a challenge of war. Are we to permit Japan,
with its industrial capacity, to fall within the Communist orbit? If we should
become involved in a war in the Far East, the great British and French empires
(strengthened by our aid) would be pledged not to help us. Such pledges would
bear the stamp of our own

Reliable reports state that the British have permitted their port of Hong
Kong to be used as a base of supply by Chinese Communists and as a nerve center
of Communist activities in China.

The menace of the pact arises because it will gain for us no certain allies
and because it is likely to inflame our relations with Russia, and thereby to
intensify the danger of a Pacific war. It will increase the risk of our having
to fight a major war, without allies.

In the meantime, the pact is certain to have a weakening effect on the United
States, in all respects.

First, it will cause the peoples of western Europe and Britain to relax, under
the assurance that they are guaranteed protection by the United States. The
pact offers them another Maginot line.

Second, it will lull Americans with a false sense of security, by fostering the
delusion that Britain and France are our full-fledged allies, whereas in reality
they are the allies of Russia.

Third, the pact will be a source of economic weakness to the United States.
By committing us to the support of two allies of Russia, plus many other states,
it will waste our resources and labor in fruitless war production. Such unpro-
ductive outlays will impoverish a large part of the American people and increase
tensions at home. The pact commits us, for 20 years, to a program of aid for the
benefit of 11 foreign states. The threatened drain on the Nation's wealth, re-
sources, and vitality is incalculable, and may prove to be disastrous. The pact
will surely prolong the cold war. Since we are now spending for that about $24,-
000,000,000 a year, we may expect the Nation to be impoverished by nearly
$500,000,000,000, during the lifetime of the pact.

Fourth, the pact is most dangerous because it threatens to deprive us of our
main source of strength—the Nation's independence. It incorporates the United
States, as an inferior member, into a new community. By defining an attack on
any member state as an attack on the United States, it makes this country a mere
extension westward of Britain-Europe. By committing us to contribute to the
economic well-being of 11 foreign states, it implies that we are joined with,
and obligated to, such states in a way that we are not joined with, and obligated
to, others. It will gain us ill will from all states that are excluded. It tells the
nonmember states that they are of slight importance to us—unworthy of the
aid which we are to bestow so freely upon our favorites.

"The Nation," said Washington in the farewell address, "which indulges toward
another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.
It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to
lead it astray from its duty and its interest."

The pact will undermine our national institutions. It will subvert the Con-
stitution by depriving Congress, in principle, of the power to declare war. If
one power of Congress may be mutilated, then so may another, and another, and
another. If the Constitution is lost, the Nation will disintegrate. The pact
itself provides for an unlimited usurpation of the powers of Congress. It pro-
poses to erect a new Atlantic council. Are we to have but 1 vote in 12 on this
council? Operating behind closed doors, such council will be beyond the control
of Congress. It is to have unlimited powers to create subsidiary bodies. Since
the pact provides for common action as to defense, economic well-being, and civilization, the council will have the power to create bodies that may act on any subject. Actions of such bodies will enjoy the sanction of a treaty made under the authority of the United States; they will become the supreme law of the land. Congress will become an important rubber stamp. It will legislate under the duress of the fait accompli.

The pact requires that we abandon the historic policies of the Nation and substitute therefor a new policy utterly alien to our traditions. We are asked to forsake the unbroken practice of 149 years—the practice of abstaining from peace-time military alliances. We are asked to reject the wisest counsel of the farewell address—that which warns against habitual favoritism and habitual animosity toward particular nations. The pact calls upon us to endorse, to confirm, and to renew two treaties that bind two major powers not to give us effective aid in a major war. It invites us to tell Britain and France that we approve their pledges not to aid us in a major war. The pact sanctions two treaties of Russia which proclaim Russia to be a virtuous state. Senate approval would therefore endorse and consecrate all actions of Russia prior to the ratification of the pact. Such a step, taken in the name of resisting Russia, would be a self-defeating contradiction. It would not be the act of an independent nation. The pact is a negation of our national interest. It is a death warrant of the independence of the United States.

Already, several leading sponsors of the pact are pressing for a formal political union of the United States with Britain-Europe. This kind of propaganda can only denationalize and devitalize the United States. Many people appear today to be taking refuge in a vague, misty sort of Internationalism, hoping that by some miracle of wishful thinking they may be spared the effort of defending the Nation's heritage. Such an urge to sacrifice the national heritage betrays an attitude that nothing is worth preserving. If long indulged in, it will make the Nation a listless prey of its enemies.

Although the pact will deprive us of the strength and spirit of an independent nation, it will leave a national shell, a set of national burdens, and an expensive military facade. By reason of the British-French-Russian alliances, we will continue to be isolated. Through the pact we will pour out our substance to western Europe, where the danger of attack is nonexistent, and ignore the Far East—the area of greatest peril. In the process, we will antagonize all countries outside the circle of an inviably conceived “civilization.”

We ought to seek the good will of all nations. And, essentially, we must rely upon ourselves. We ought to renew the strength that flows only from the spirit of independence. The Nation is our only sure and certain means of safety and protection. How dangerous, then, it is to vitiate the national institutions, to devitalize the national spirit, to impair the Nation's Constitution, to trifle with the Nation's independence, and to throw aside the historic policies that have long served us so well. "Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?" Why sacrifice the Nation's heritage in order to favor two allies of a presumed enemy? In time of stress, how senseless it is to weaken, to impair, to jeopardize our only sure and certain means of safety and defense?

Cooperation with all nations in efforts to keep the peace need not divert the Nation of its protecting cover of sovereignty and independence. A renewed emphasis on the national spirit of self-reliance need not express itself in the accents of war. It is our truest national interest "to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."

STATEMENT OF REV. J. PAUL COTTON, CLEVELAND, OHIO

The Chairman. Mr. Cotton? You have testified here several times before, and you say you want a half hour?

Mr. Cotton. Whatever time you think the importance of the material requires.

The Chairman. All right. I will give you 10 minutes.

Mr. Cotton. Here is my statement for the record, which can be followed by the Senators who are present.

I am Rev. J. Paul Cotton, of Cleveland, Ohio. I am here to present this message. I have a few copies of my printed article which are
available to the press. I previously have given a few copies of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a pastor of a church?

Mr. COTTON. No; I am not a pastor of a church.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your occupation now?

Mr. COTTON. I am occupied as a checker in an ice-cream plant. I am an ordinary worker.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a checker in an ice-cream plant?

Mr. COTTON. Yes, sir.

I shall try to prove today that this pact should be rejected because it is unconstitutional, for it provides that we commit ourselves in advance to a war about which we know nothing, and considering the nature of these nations we could never be sure in advance that it constituted a real threat to our security.

The Russian aggressions are simply another name for our past mistakes, and this alliance is designed to meet a Russian technique that does not exist. Rather than checking Stalin, it plays right into his hands by promoting an armament race with the resulting hindrance to European recovery. It undermines the authority of the United Nations. There is no indication that Russia wants war, but war may rather be provoked by this pact.

If there are any questions in this material, which I may not have time to cover, I will try to answer them at the close.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

SENATE RESOLUTION 239

Mr. COTTON. The newspapers of the country, apparently accepting wholesale the propaganda of the State Department have asserted that just because the Senate adopted the Vandenberg resolution 64 to 4 it was a foregone conclusion that they would ratify this North Atlantic Military Alliance.

But one part of the Vandenberg resolution only approved the idea of regional alliances and promised association with them without defining what that association meant. Most of them thought they were only voting moral support; not a military alliance. Hence it was hastily voted.

The CHAIRMAN. You talked with them all?

Mr. COTTON. Senator Vandenberg himself on the day it was considered declared, of his resolution:

It declines automatically military alliances. It declines all peacetime renewals of the old, open-ended lend-lease formula. It declines unilateral responsibility for the fate of western Europe.

It is none of these things; it is the exact opposite. * * * It is a paraphrase of the Rio Treaty. It never steps outside the United Nations’ Charter. It never steps outside the Constitution of the United States. It never steps outside the final authority of the Congress.

* * * We are proceeding on the theory that the people of the United States and the Government of the United States would not consent to any arrangement which would require us to go to war at the behest of others and without our approval.

I shall seek to prove today that the North Atlantic Alliance is everything that Senator Vandenberg claimed his resolution was not. Senator Connally, that day the Vandenberg resolution was considered, declared:
I would be very reluctant, I may say, to join any other regional organization in the world. It would involve us in difficulties we might not be able to avoid.

Both Senator George and Senator Hatch expressed the belief that they were not voting for a military alliance outside of the Rio Treaty already voted. Senator Hawkes summed up the feeling of that day when he said that when a treaty comes back for ratification pop o moral obligation has been created.” Therefore, when administration officials go far beyond Senate commitments, this body is perfectly free to turn down such a proposal.

**CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREATY**

This military alliance, by agreeing in advance for the next 20 years or more to enter any war in which any of these nations are engaged, violates the Constitution of the United States which provides that both Houses of Congress, the representatives of the people, shall have the sole right to determine when our sons shall be drafted to kill and be killed.

Under this pact, either Congress does or does not have the right to decide in each particular case whether the situation requires our entrance into the war. If it does retain this deliberative right, then we have no right to ratify this moral commitment in advance to enter war, for we give the other nations to understand that they can count on us, and then we let them down, and violate our solemn word when the crucial moment arrives.

But if the Congress surrenders its deliberative power to decide and becomes only a rubber stamp, as I believe this pact provides, then we should refuse to ratify a pact that would destroy an essential part of our constitutional rights. Article 5 of the pact says—

The CHAIRMAN. You have 3 minutes more for your statement.

**DECLARATION OF WAR**

Mr. COTTON (reading):

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

We need to say at the outset that the whole purpose of this alliance is to guarantee automatic American intervention at once whenever any of these countries suffers any kind of armed attack. The moral commitment is unmistakable. All these nations were solemnly assured by both the President and the Secretary of State that, if the Senate ratified the pact, our entrance into their wars would be guaranteed at once.

I quote from the official interpretation of the treaty, Department of State Publication 3462 of March 1949:

By entering into this arrangement it would recognize the fact that any armed attack upon any nation party to the treaty would so threaten the national security of the United States as to be in effect an attack upon the United States. Under the United States Constitution the Congress alone has the power to declare war. The United States certainly can obligate itself in advance to take such ac-
tion, including the use of armed force, as it deems necessary to meet armed attack affecting its national security.

The fact that the fulfillment of a treaty obligation, as far as a declaration of war is concerned, depends upon the action of Congress does not inhibit the United States from undertaking the commitment.

Both Houses of Congress for the next 20 years or more then become a rubber stamp, if the Senate ratifies this treaty committing this Nation in advance to enter any war in which any of these nations are engaged.

**SURRENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS**

I call attention to the fact that the Senate alone must decide the fate of this treaty, whereas both the House and Senate are empowered to decide upon our entrance into war. No Congress should be allowed to dictate the actions of a Congress 15 years from now. And still more important, no one has the right or ability to tell in advance that an attack upon any of these nations will constitute a threat to our national security during the next 20 years or longer.

There are some who would say that our constitutional rights were preserved by the addition of the words “such action as it deems necessary.” But the words that follow are “necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” In other words, Congress can decide how much money it wants to appropriate to win the war, but it cannot decide whether it wants the war or not.

Any declaration of war it is called upon to make becomes a mere formality. It has already committed itself in advance to enter the war by stating that an attack upon any of these nations is an attack upon the United States.

Article 11, which states that the treaty’s provisions shall be carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, is probably only lip-service to our Constitution, thus helping it to get to get ratified. But when once the Senate ratifies this treaty, it becomes of binding force.

Senator Robert A. Taft, in a radio address of March 30, 1949, declared that it was not certain that even a formal declaration of war by Congress would be necessary under this pact:

The President of the United States undoubtedly has the constitutional right to use our armed forces against an armed attack on the United States without a congressional declaration of war. Article 5 says that an armed attack against any other nation shall be considered an attack against us. If a treaty can modify provisions of our Constitution, the President might be able to use armed forces without congressional action to protect the territory of one of the European participants against armed attack.

Under article 6 of our Constitution, treaties are given an independent status equal, in some respects, to the Constitution itself, and the Supreme Court has so held in *Holland v. Missouri* and other cases.

The word “forthwith” in article 5 of the pact suggests such immediate action as only the Executive, as head of the armed forces, can take. I hope you now see how serious is the step you are being called upon to take. If this pact is ratified, no deliberative action remains in Congress to decide whether or not we enter a war, and even if a declaration of war is used, it becomes a mere formality.

Yet such a matter as drafting our sons to kill and be killed is a matter of such importance that each Congress must decide each question on its own merits, and no power of discretion can be trans-
ferred to the President of the United States, but it must remain in the hands of the representatives of the people.

OBLIGATION IN EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK

But under this military pact United States officials propose to underwrite in advance with the blood of our sons any kind of war in which any of these nations are ever engaged. Article 5 of this alliance does not qualify this armed attack in any way. A nation could provoke an armed attack and still we would be required to go to war. One of these nations could even begin an armed attack on another and still we would be obliged to enter the war on their side.

It would be impossible to change article 5 to meet this objection, for each nation always considers itself the innocent party, and the other nation is always the aggressor nation.

CO-SIGNATORIES OF THE PACT

Consider some of these nations with whom we propose to enter a military alliance, giving a blanket endorsement in advance of all their wars. Italy is one, on the opposing side in both world wars. Portugal, a Fascist nation, is another. How can we deny Spain the same privileged position, when both Portugal and Italy are in?

One of the members of this military pact, the Netherlands, has suppressed a genuine movement for independence in Indonesia with bloody fighting, with its leaders in prison, all in defiance of the United Nations' decision. Temporarily, while this pact is under consideration, the Dutch are behaving just now, but what about the future? For better or for worse, that nation becomes our ally, and probably we shall have to dig deep into our pockets to finance arms to pour into the Netherlands, and then in turn the Dutch use them to suppress freedom in Indonesia.

The French in Indochina are certainly not saints either. Recently, under the security of this pact, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and the Saar stole 52 square miles of valuable territory from Germany. If Germany ever fights to get back this land, the United States of America will be committed in advance to enter the war to protect the sovereign rights of these robber nations.

Against the protests of the Arab League, Algeria is included in this pact. This means that if ever Algeria, perhaps in union with other powers, attempts to gain its freedom from France, we shall be obligated in advance to shed the blood of our sons to prevent freedom from reaching Algeria.

Is the Senate willing to guarantee in advance that any war in which any of these nations is ever engaged will definitely be the same as an attack upon us and so automatically involve us in war as allies? Bear in mind that it is not only these nations, but if the North Atlantic Pact is adopted there will be a Mediterranean Pact, a Near-East Pact, a Pacific Pact, and no one knows how many more. If any of these nations goes Communist, we will be obliged by the language of the pact to defend their interests just the same.

It is true that Secretary Acheson goes beyond the language of the pact, and declares that if there is a Communist civil war in any of these countries our country will be obligated to defend the existing govern-
ment. But what if the people of Portugal rise up against their Fascist rulers in the effort to be free? Will we be obligated by this pact to defend dictatorship against democracy?

Yes, the congressional right to deliberation in each specific case must be preserved. No nation has the right to tax people and draft people to enter wars unless they shall have some voice in deciding whether or not to enter such wars. But if this pact is adopted, and some issue arises where I do not wish to see my Nation involved in war, and I telegraph my Congressman, he will reply to me:

There is no use in your writing or sending telegrams to me anymore. Congress has given up its power to decide and has transferred it to the capitals of Europe.

One of the principal arguments used by the official Department of State Publication 3462 for this pact was that "two world wars have taught them that their security is inextricably linked together, that an attack on any one of them is in effect an attack on all." If this statement is true, then why is Russia not included in this pact? For in both world wars Russia was an ally. Italy, an enemy state in both world wars, is now included.

This only goes to show that we cannot tell in advance what the situation will be; therefore, no one has the right to say that an attack on any of these nations means an attack on us. As to our entrance into these two World Wars, many today are questioning the necessity. I simply refer you to the eminent historian, the late Charles A. Beard, who wrote the book President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941.

COMMITMENT TO DECLARE WAR

But even if the necessity for our entrance into these wars be granted, it does not follow that we will determine in advance that we will always want to intervene. Consider what an ardent supporter of World War II, Senator Claude Pepper, said on the floor of the Senate June 11, 1948:

In World War I and in World War II we made a choice, when we had all the facts before us, to go in. We did not have any alliance like the military alliances that bound European nations together and automatically committed them to war. I am not prepared to see this country, by implication or otherwise, commit itself to the defense of western Europe or any other part of the world in advance, without knowing the facts and circumstances and conditions that would lead us to the terrible mobilization of our mighty strength.

There are safeguards in other arrangements we have signed. In the United Nations, when it comes to the use of armed force our nation has a right of veto in the Security Council. In the Rio Pact, note these words: "No state shall be required to use armed force without its consent." Article 20. In the Rio Pact there was some consideration of our Constitution, our desire to be consulted before we entered a terrible war. But these words of the Rio Pact are conspicuous by their absence in the North Atlantic Pact.

Speaking of the Rio Pact, it is sometimes argued that we have had a successful Monroe doctrine and the proven benefits of this plan should be more widely extended. But let us bear in mind that the Monroe doctrine was primarily directed against these very nations with whom we now plan an alliance. Take a look at the map of South America.
and you will find there British Guiana, Dutch Guiana, French
Guiana—all stolen before the Monroe doctrine came into force.

Instead of agreeing to defend these American nations against the
aggression of western European powers, we now propose to give up
the Monroe doctrine and put in its place the Truman doctrine which
 guarantees that we shall go to war whenever most of the nations on
the globe are attacked, no matter who attacks and under any condi-
tions.

COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

The reasons given for this new military alliance are that Russia
exercises the veto power so much over trivial matters, and has gained
so much territory. But let us analyze these Communist aggressions. Is
it not true that communism arose out of the ruins of World War I
and greatly expanded her territory as a direct result of the victories
of World War II, to which victories the United States of America
was a mighty, contributing factor?

We must therefore do our best to prevent another war. While
regrett ing the results of the last war, it is no remedy to plunge the
world into another to increase the area of fascism or communism.
Then when it came to peace settlements, Roosevelt at Yalta and Tru-
man at Potsdam gave Russia everything she asked for on a silver
platter. Not only was the Russian veto given on all peace settle-
ments, but in the United Nations Charter the United States consented
to the Russian veto in every trivial matter.

The past crisis of Berlin was solely the result of the United States
leaders agreeing to a situation where the western sectors of Berlin
would be surrounded for 100 miles by Russian-dominated territory.
So everything that our leaders object to about Russia is the result
of their own planning. They are unwilling to admit their guilt, but
instead contrive to get us into yet another war through this pact.

This alliance is designed to meet a Russian technique that, as a
rule, does not exist. Their method is not to cross national boundaries
with Russian troops after the manner of Hitler. It is to bore from
within and to promote civil wars as in Czechoslovakia and China.
When conditions become so desperate economically that the people are
ready for any change, then Communists take over.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The Marshall plan does to a considerable extent restore these nations
toward normal conditions, so that communism today is becoming
less serious a threat. Further economic reconstruction will meet the
challenge of the Communist strategy where the North Atlantic Pact
utterly fails. By promoting an armament race, causing a million or
more men to withdraw from active production of goods, we would
nullify the effect of the Marshall plan and cause such misery and
hopelessness in Europe as to play right into the hands of Stalin.

Countless Europeans are tired of war and of the mental attitude
that leads to war. When we, due to our military leadership, hand
them guns when they ask for bread, and invite them to beat back
their plowshares into swords, we give the Communists a golden
opportunity in all of these war-torn nations.
This pact does promote an armament race. Article 3 of the pact promises mutual aid, which means principally the United States, to develop their “capacity to resist armed attack.” This means, as Secretary Acheson affirms, that “the Senate would have an obligation to approve arms shipments to Europe, if it ratifies the pact.”

In fact, President Truman promised arms to the members of this pact. To develop the capacity of these nations to resist any armed attack is no small commitment. Hanson Baldwin says that a lend-lease program of arms and equipment amounting over a 4- or 5-year period to perhaps $15,000,000,000 to $18,000,000,000 is one of the duties expected of the United States when the alliance has been completed (New York Times, December 5, 1948.)

Since then he has admitted it might amount to over $20,000,000,000. When we consider that we shall in peacetime this year go into debt by probably $1,000,000,000, we shall see what an appalling prospect this additional load becomes. This will mean greatly increased taxation, and taxes really come out of the pockets of the common people.

When Russia increases its own armaments and armed forces in retaliation, the European governments will complain that they were promised security by this pact, and we have failed to live up to our promises.

George Marcy, the military critic of Figaro, conservative French newspaper, as reported in the New York Times for January 28, 1949, asserted that it would cost $15,000,000,000 to equip the French army alone. Our own economy would be seriously threatened, not only because of taxes, but because of the lack of steel where even now the shortage is so great as to hamper our production of other goods.

But to encourage other nations now to enter an armament race is to invite disaster. See with what zeal the Communists provoked strikes in France to interfere with the Marshall plan. But for us to hamper production of useful goods by promoting militarism is to do exactly the same, and so overcome the good we have accomplished.

In France 1 out of 4 to whom we would hand guns would be Communist. In China 90 percent of the billions we sent for military equipment was seized by the Communists. Sooner or later we would find that an essential and necessary part of our rearmament program would be the remilitarization of western Germany. So the North Atlantic Pact gives no defense from the usual type of Communist activity, but it does weaken these nations at the very point where Communists are most liable to attack.

The North Atlantic Pact does undermine the prestige of the United Nations by the promotion of military alliances, which have always led to war, just as the League of Nations was undermined. As Senator Pepper so well expressed it last year:

I believe that whatever is a bypassing of the United Nations, whatever threatens to undermine its power or prestige, or authority, is a step backward, not forward, and that we would better support the organization we have, and let time and momentum sustain and succor its strength.

THE PACT AND RUSSIA

The State Department refers to the Russian vetoes and their refusal to come to agreements on vital European matters. But can such a
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Pact as this help the situation? It will rather hinder. It will add to the tension of Russian-American relations and make agreement even more difficult.

Although Russia has been hard to get along with, because she has insisted upon the privileges that our past leadership so freely granted, yet there is no indication that Russia wants war, because her people and economy suffered so badly from the last one. So much is this the case that our militarists are hard put to it to find reasons for getting us excited. Whenever the Russians hold spring maneuvers, we are told they are getting mobilized for war.

Lately these militarists have become so hard up that they have tried to stimulate the imaginations of the people by saying that flying saucers are not a joke. With the western defenses as weak as they are, why has Russia not already made the attack? The only answer that can be given is that whether she is deterred by the atom bomb, or it simply does not fit in with Russian strategy to antagonize the common people by wars of aggression, Russia clearly does not want war.

NORWAY AND THE PACT

But this North Atlantic alliance can cause the war that it was designed to prevent. The presence of Norway in this Pact with the resulting obligation imposed that American guns and American generals shall be used to help strengthen these countries is a threat to Russian security, just as a similar Russian arrangement with Mexico would be a threat to us.

We read that United States representatives promised military supplies to Norway only if she joined the alliance. (New York Times, February 13, 1949.) When American guns and generals so freely used in Greece are also given to Norway, we create an impossible situation for Russia and invite war.

The Christian Century of March 2, 1949, declared:

The real issue is whether a permanent military alliance of this sort, ostensibly within the UN, but acting independently of the UN and against a member nation of the UN, by forging a cordon of steel around that nation and pushing its army, navy, and air bases right into that nation's front yard, will serve peace or breed fear, anger, and war.

The Cleveland meeting of the Federal Council of Churches affirmed:

No defensive alliance should be entered into which might validly appear as aggressive to Russia as a Russian alliance with Latin America would undoubtedly appear to us.

If we enter this military alliance and help western Europe rearm, we present an engraved invitation to Russia to attack, for it will take years to get ready the armies needed for defense. So why not attack before they are prepared? If war is made to appear inevitable, Russia certainly will not wait. So this pact tends to incite the very war it tries to prevent:

PROVOCATIVENESS OF THE TREATY

This military alliance, like all others before it, leads to war. World War I was caused because Germany had an alliance with Austria, and Russia had an alliance with Serbia, so both Germany and Russia were obliged to fight, because of the military alliance. Neither the
military alliance of Great Britain with Poland nor the alliance between Hitler and Stalin prevented World War II, but rather encouraged these nations to fight.

In contrast, see how the Israel-Arab conflict was settled. Here there was no alliance of Russian nations supporting Israel, and other nations supporting the Arabs, to keep the war going. If there were, there would have been no desire for peace among either Jews or Arabs. They would have said: “We have powerful allies, so why should we back down from our positions?” But instead the nations shut off the supply of arms, and although the UN has no police force, simply the moral force of world opinion and the persistent efforts of UN officials were instrumental in bringing the conflict to an end.

The present situation does not call for bypassing and snubbing the United Nations, calling it a failure, giving only lip service to it, and putting our trust instead in a military alliance, letting the UN die by neglect. Somehow the past mistakes of our leaders must be corrected. More just peace terms must be made. The United Nations must be made into a real world government.

In the meantime we should use every possible avenue through the United Nations and other conferences to iron out our differences with Russia and come to some agreement.

OBLIGATION TO DECLARE WAR

The Chairman. Just one question: You say this would force us into any war that any of these other countries might be engaged in?

Mr. Cotton. Not only against Russia, but any nation.

The Chairman. Do you think you are quite fair when article 5 provides:

If such an armed attack occurs—

that means an armed attack on any of these other nations—

each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary.

Does that not leave it to the discretion of each one of the countries to do whatever it deems necessary? Would the United States have to declare war under that article?

Mr. Cotton. The words are “necessary to restore the security of the North Atlantic area.” And the words that precede are vitally important in that. They are “an attack upon one is an attack upon all.” So automatically it is like an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Chairman. What does it mean when it says “an attack”?

Mr. Cotton. I cannot possibly interpret those words. But I want to say that the word “forthwith” does suggest that such immediacy of action must be taken, and only the Executive could do it. It would not remain for a deliberative body to decide.

The Chairman. Senator Donnell?

Senator Donnell. No questions. But I would like the record to show at this point that Mr. Acheson himself has defined the expression “as it deems necessary” to indicate the exercise of an honest, genuine judgment on the part of our country, so that a mere arbitrary decision, I take it, by our country, would not be in accordance with the language as it may determine.
I do not know whether this gentleman has seen that language of Mr. Acheson or not.
Mr. Cotton. However, it should be stated that whatever was said before, in fact, whatever was said for the Vandenberg resolution, the important thing is that we have this treaty, and it says certain things, and the nations of Europe have been given to understand that it means certain things. The important thing is not what the Secretary tells us, but what he has told the other nations what this means.

The Chairman. Do you know what he told the other nations?
Mr. Cotton. The fact is that they will—

The Chairman. Do you know what he told the other nations? You say you know all about that.

Mr. Cotton. From all we learn in the newspapers they have been given to understand that their security is assured, because of our entrance into the pact.

The Chairman. All right. You are excused.

Mr. Cotton. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF O. JOHN ROGGE, FORMER ASSISTANT, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Chairman. Mr. Rogge, how long will you take?
Mr. Rogge. I should like, if the chairman please, to make an oral statement, I would say, of 10 or 12 minutes.

The Chairman. Have you a written paper?
Mr. Rogge. I have what you would really call notes that will aid me in making an oral statement.

The Chairman. Can you get along on 10 minutes? The hour is late.

Mr. Rogge. I know the hour is late. I will try it in 10 minutes.

The Chairman. You will have to do it in 10 minutes if we say so.

Mr. Rogge. I recognize that.

The Chairman. I hope you can get through in 10 minutes, because we have been working hard all day, and we have been working hard every day. We do not get much time to play golf while working on this treaty.

Mr. Rogge. I appreciate that.

Senator Donnell. His bite is not as bad as his bark, Mr. Rogge.

The Chairman. I have not been rough on anybody.

Mr. Rogge. My residence is 400 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. I have a law office in that city and also here.

The Chairman. Whom do you represent?

Mr. Rogge. I am here under my own steam, Senator. I have clients, but I am not here representing any organization. I am here myself, to express my own views, and in conformance with our tradition that American citizens may give their ideas on issues that affect them. And that is why I am here.

The Chairman. Go right ahead. We will give you 10 minutes orally.

Mr. Rogge. I am here in opposition to the North Atlantic Pact because I think, in substance, it is a military alliance, and although it may not violate the letter, it does violate the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and in my opinion plays into the hands of communism.
I think the State Department, through its devotion to discredited doctrines and its resulting failures, has become one of the most effective recruiting agents for world communism. This pact, if ratified, is going to put us and the western European nations on a garrison footing, and any new trend toward a garrison state would mean even further curtailment of basic American freedom which has already been sharply curtailed. That is my No. 1 concern.

I think we have been destroying our best characteristic, and that is our freedom. We already have large armament expenditures. Now they are going to be still larger. I am not reassured at all by an article, for instance, which I saw in the New York Sun of Saturday, quoting an AP dispatch that the State Department declared that the present defenses of western Europe are so weak that they invite military aggression, and proposing for fiscal year 1950, $1,180,000,000 for the North Atlantic Pact countries, and $320,000,000 for Greece and Turkey, making a total of $1,450,000,000.

The drafters of this proposed pact have committed another serious blunder, in my opinion, this time dredging up a military alliance to combat a threat which is essentially ideological, social, and economic. The result of this faulty evaluation will be not only an immediate waste of billions of dollars but will also eventually be as costly a failure as was the mistaken evaluation of the situation in China.

I hold no brief for the Soviet Union. I am interested primarily in my own country and its people. I have been to Europe twice this year, this past year. I spoke at two peace conferences, and I suppose that they were rather heavily weighted on the left-wing side. I know that when I stated that American leaders did not want war, and that the Soviet Union shared much of the blame for the deterioration of international affairs, I received some hisses and boos.

I am convinced that the two systems are in conflict the world over. I do not think we can sit by idly in this conflict and must in fact actively defend ourselves and our form of government against those hostile to it. But I think we are acting negatively rather than positively in this North Atlantic Pact. I think we are putting our worst foot forward.

COMPETITION OF IDEAS

What you have is a competition of ideas, and you do not fight ideas with guns; you fight them with better ideas. We are in competition for the allegiance of men and women in Europe, and I think democracy can triumph. I think our freedom is the best thing that the human race has known to date. I think it can triumph over any other system, but a garrison state is not a democracy, and this treaty, if ratified, will put western Europe on a garrison footing as well as strengthen in this country the military forces which are historically an antidemocratic force.

The Nazis tried guns instead of butter, and it did not work. Should this pact be ratified with its emphasis on arms and might, I think it will fail as miserably as has the Truman doctrine in Greece and the same kind of policy in China. There is just no future in arms expenditures. The State Department, in getting up this Atlantic Pact, has ignored the ghosts of similar alliances and treaties which
have never worked before, and which littered up the diplomatic graveyards. And despite all the headlines and speeches about Russian aggression, I do not think the Soviets are a military threat. They are making political warfare, not military aggression, and I am not alone in my opinion on that.

For instance, I see, in a column of David Lawrence, in the New York Sun of May 6, in which he says:

The cry of the Russians that Americans are warmongering has been dismissed heretofore as absurd, but it will be difficult indeed for America to keep on spending $15,000,000,000 a year for armament after Russia calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from German soil and carries out, as she doubtless will soon, a complete demobilization of the Red Army.

Or this, from John Foster Dulles, a statement before the Third National Conference on Churches, on March 8, 1949. He said:

I do not know any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this Government or any government, who believes that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

They wage political warfare and the way to fight them is by better politics. They thrive on mass discontent and the way to fight that is to remove the causes of discontent. This treaty in my opinion does neither. It is a dangerous venture which I think has three objectives:

1. Strengthening America's hand in the cold war;
2. Provide international guaranties against reform and revolutionary movements within the member states; and
3. Lay the groundwork for a military coalition for a possible war against Russia.

Insofar as the cold war is concerned I think the majority of Americans are already sick and tired of it. It has cost us dearly. We have inflationary prices, we have artificially created shortages, and the thing I come back to, that troubles me most, is that we, along with it, have been in the process of destroying our right to think as we like and to say what we think.

I am exercising it here, but I would like all Americans free to exercise that.

The Chairman. They have the same privilege as you have, have they not?

Mr. ROOSE. That is right. But they have been scared, Senator.

The Chairman. I cannot unscare them, because you keep scaring them.

POSITIVE APPROACH INSTEAD OF NEGATIVE

Mr. ROOSE. Really, instead, for instance, of the State Department coming along with a negative thing like the North Atlantic Pact, I would like to suggest an idea on the positive side. I would like to suggest, for instance, that they think in terms, let us say, of an idea of the RFC for the new China, in which American businessmen could put their money, have the Government guarantee the principal of it, let us say, and let them invest that money in manufacture in China, so that China could be developed.

That would be a positive approach rather than a negative one as contained in this North Atlantic Pact. The talk about mass discontent, and the clamor for reforms and blaming that on the Kremlin, I think, also does not look at the facts correctly. I think those things
in Europe are due to the fact that capitalism has been unable to provide the basic standards of living.

I can say to you that when French workers talk to you about the lack of milk they have no milk. Then when they talk about being cold they are really cold. You cannot blame those things on the Kremlin. I think the two danger spots are France and Italy. And if those people want industry nationalized or if they want large land holdings redistributed, I think they will have to be allowed to do that.

They will have to get the reforms there, and they will have to be allowed to do it in their own way.

The third point, about military coalition for a possible war against Russia, I do not think I have to elaborate on that, beyond reminding that these anti-Comintern pacts have existed before and they have not gotten us anywhere. I think the solution to our problem lies in the United Nations. I think the North Atlantic Pact, for all its talk about carrying out the United Nations, does not do it.

I think it violates the spirit of the United Nations and we should proceed in that way, we should proceed positively, rather than in the negative form of what is in effect a military alliance, because we are going to spend ourselves either into a depression or a war, or both. And I am concerned primarily about all the money that we spend for armament and we are going to spend still more under this pact.

I think it is a negative approach to the world's problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. You favor the rejection of the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. ROGGE. Yes; I definitely do.

Senator DONNELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you subscribe to the doctrines and policies of Henry Wallace?

Mr. ROGGE. I was a supporter, and I suppose, Senator, you could say an ardent supporter of Henry Wallace in the last campaign. I think that I agree pretty much with his ideas. I am not going to say that I agree with all of them, because I do not know what they are. But he and I are in pretty general agreement, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wallace, of course, is against the treaty.

Mr. ROGGE. So I understand. I read that in the newspaper account.

The CHAIRMAN. He testified here against the treaty.

Mr. ROGGE. That is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. You read his testimony, did you not?

Mr. ROGGE. No; I will have to say I have not had a chance to do that. I am rather busy, a practicing lawyer, and I have had two cases in the last 2 months, one in the Supreme Court of the United States and one in the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey. My law business takes up most of my time, but I do feel about this pact. I have talked to people from other countries.

I do think that the thing that the Soviet people are conducting, they think they have an idea that is better than ours. I do not think you can fight that with guns. I think you have to fight that with a positive democracy of our own and we are able to, do it, but we do not do it in this pact.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not do it all in this pact, of course.
Mr. Rogge. I do not think we do any of it in there.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

THE COLD WAR

Mr. Rogge. No, sir. It is a military pact, and I think it violates the spirit of the United Nations.
The CHAIRMAN. You say it is a military pact. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the treaty that binds us. There is no aggressive action contemplated in the pact, is there?
Mr. Rogge. Well—
The CHAIRMAN. Do not say "well." Say what you mean.
Mr. Rogge. Yes. Let us just be honest about this. I think this pact has in mind continuing the cold war against Russia. It says here, for instance, in article 3—
The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about a hot war.
Mr. Rogge. Yes; and it has that in mind, too. This North Atlantic Pact has as its objective dividing the world into two camps.
The CHAIRMAN. Are they not already divided into two camps?
Mr. Rogge. Do we have to go still further in that direction by putting it in black and white?
The CHAIRMAN. I asked you a question. We did not divide it. Is it not divided by the action of Russia?
Mr. Rogge. I think we helped to divide it.
The CHAIRMAN. Has not Russia said she is not going to be content until she controls the rest of the world, and communizes the whole world?
Mr. Rogge. I do not think she put it quite like that. They have the idea that communism is going to sweep the world. Why do we have to agree with them and set up a military pact? We play into their hands when we spend this much money for arms. I say put it in positive terms, let us put the American businessmen, for instance, to work to help industrialize China.
It may be that Russia has missed the boat in China, too, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Thank you. You are excused.
Mr. Rogge. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. We will meet tomorrow morning for the last day of the hearing at 10:30 in this room. The committee stands in recess.
(Thereupon, at 6 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene Wednesday, May 18, 1949, at 10:30 a.m.)
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1949

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, on May 17, 1949, at 10:30 a.m. in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senator Connally (chairman).

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee has some telegrams and communications here on the matter. I will ask the clerk of the committee to read them out so that you can hear them and insert them in the report.

(Telegram and letter approving ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty were read into the record from the following: Mr. William Green, president, American Federation of Labor; the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; United States Junior Chamber of Commerce.)

CLEVELAND, OHIO, MAY 17, 1949.

Hon. Wm. Green,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:--

The executive council of the American Federation of Labor, now meeting in Cleveland, unanimously approved the North Atlantic Pact. The council believes that the pact will serve to promote peace, increase national and international morale, and will serve to make more effective the work of the United Nations. The council urges Congress to approve the pact as quickly as possible.

Wm. Green,
President, American Federation of Labor.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Hon. Tom Connally,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: The Chamber of Commerce of the United States hopes that your committee on Foreign Relations will recommend strongly that the Senate consent to ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In thirty-seventh annual meeting during the first week of May, the membership of the national chamber adopted a declaration of policy renewing support of the United Nations. The final paragraphs of that declaration urge that the United States Government speedily implement the purpose of national security and universal peace by exercising the powers and privileges under articles 51 and 52 of the Charter. I attach a copy of the complete policy statement on these questions.

The national chamber believes that the North Atlantic Treaty is consistent with the purposes and provisions of the Charter and that it will contribute to the preservation of world peace.
We therefore support it as promoting the security and welfare of our own country.

I should be happy if you would make this correspondence a part of the record of your current committee hearings.

Cordially yours,

CLARENCE R. MILES.

Enclosure.

[From Policy Declarations of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States approved by the membership on May 4, 1949]

REGIONAL DEFENSE FACTS

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the inherent right of nations, singly or collectively, to defend themselves against armed attack, and article 52 specifically provides for regional arrangements among nations in matters of security. States interested in restraining aggression and preserving the peace may therefore organize collectively for these common purposes within the framework of the United Nations.

We therefore urge that our Government, recognizing the destructive impact of the veto power by Russia and its satellite nations, move speedily and progressively to implement the purposes of national security and universal peace by exercising the powers and privileges reserved to all member nations under articles 51 and 52 of the Charter.

We endorse and approve the principles of the Vandenbergh resolution passed by the United States Senate on June 11, 1948, and the purposes and principles of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance entered into with our sister nations of the Americas with whom we have consistently maintained friendly relations. By such agreements the national security of the participating nations can be strengthened and the cause of peace can be progressively advanced.

We urge that similar regional treaties and agreements be negotiated and concluded with the free democracies of Europe and with Canada, and that the Congress extend to all such participating states every reasonable assistance, consistent with our own security and our domestic economy, for the purpose of strengthening defense against aggression or acts of war.

MOBILIZATION FOR PEACE

It is now our hope and the hope of mankind that, by such progressive union of peace-loving nations under the provisions of articles 51 and 52 of the Charter, sufficient strength and power may be mobilized against aggression and such a powerful concert of purpose to keep the peace developed that aggression may be stayed and world peace achieved within the framework of the United Nations. Thus we may preserve the United Nations with all of its beneficent purposes and avoid the destructive impact of continued abuse of the veto power by those nations whose purposes cannot be achieved in a world at peace, and ultimately achieve for our America and for all the world escape from the crushing burdens of national defense.

UNITED STATES JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.


Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: AS president of the United States Junior Chamber of Commerce, I should like to make a statement concerning the Atlantic Pact.

Our organization recently sponsored the largest single group ever to travel over either ocean by air to attend the Junior Chamber International Congress in Brussels, Belgium. The 322 delegates from the United States were thrilled with the progress which has been made in England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Some of our delegates also visited in the Scandinavian countries and were equally impressed with the progress which has been made there. After spending 3 weeks with the young men in these countries which are signers of the Atlantic Pact, we became more convinced than ever that they require and deserve the wholehearted, unqualified support of the United States. I believe that all of us, both here and abroad, regretted the necessity for the Atlantic Pact, but the
decision to make this agreement was not one of our own choosing but a requirement thrust upon us by the constant threat of Russia and her satellites.

In our opinion, this is another step toward an eventual world government which members of our organization favor. We do not believe that this pact in any way alters our agreement in the United Nations nor our firm resolve to work for the success of this body.

Sincerely,

PAUL D. BAGWELL, President.

The CHAIRMAN. Reverend Wahlberg?

Tell the stenographer your name and what your business is, where you live, and whom you represent.

STATEMENT OF REV. EDGAR M. WAHLBERG, DETROIT PEACE COUNCIL, DEARBORN, MICH.

Reverend Wahlberg. My name is Edgar M. Wahlberg and I live in Dearborn, Mich.

Honorable members of the Foreign Relations Committee, first of all, I wish to congratulate the members of this committee and the Senators from my own State—namely, Arthur H. Vandenberg and Homer E. Ferguson—who in conformity with our democratic tradition have provided for an extensive hearing on this most important issue of the North Atlantic Defense Pact.

I have the privilege of representing the social action commission of my own church, a group of ministers and Christian laymen of the Detroit area whose names are attached, the Detroit Peace Council, and the Michigan Council Opposing Peacetime Conscription.

The following statement is my own. The motivation for it is in my Christian faith and basic desire to serve the Prince of Peace. It is my contention that Christianity and its teaching of love for all mankind is the third alternative to the alternatives of appeasement and war.

We believe that no one sincerely desires war. We should do everything to prevent a third world war and the destruction of our way of life. The deepest desire of mankind is peace. The American people desire to maintain a democratic way of life and to lead the way to world security.

Peace depends upon an understanding between the United States of America and the U. S. S. R. and a satisfactory working relationship in a pattern of world responsibility and concern for the people of the world.

Fear and unfriendly acts by both nations have deepened the division between them and have generated hostility. Both nations are burdened with expenditures of a military nature that have endless and exhaustive proportions.

If the present pattern persists, there is danger of a violent war at any time. It is only logical to assume that the present cold war can lead to an outbreak of actual war. Yet a further step is now being prepared in the form of a North Atlantic Defense Pact, to be followed by a huge and costly program of arming western Europe.

We contend that in practice, if past experience is a guide, the very nature of this alliance and the process of rearmament will generate fears which still further rearmament will be needed to allay, creating a mounting spiral of expenditures in which military estimates will
prevail over considerations of economic and social recovery. In this way we will be perpetuating the very conditions of misery, want, and dissatisfaction, at home and abroad, which, according to the State Department analysis itself, foster communism and thus play into the hands of the U. S. S. R.

We contend that we must put a general settlement with the U. S. S. R. ahead of the North Atlantic Defense Pact. We feel that the State Department and the administration should provide an answer to this question. We believe that it is preferable to set up standards of conduct rather than standards of geography in which we militaristically divide the world into two warring camps.

**THE PACT AND WORLD SECURITY**

We are of the opinion that the Atlantic Pact is a second-best attempt to provide for world security. It is not unlikely that a series of regional pacts and agreements will take precedence over the facilities of the United Nations and will in time overshadow the United Nations universal character and aims. It would seem that such arrangements will hamper and further weaken the United Nations. In actuality, the pact is a substitution for the first-best alternative—the United Nations—and will lead to the "bankruptcy of the political and legal system for which the United Nations was created."

We believe "that it will prove impossible to restore a sense of security regarded by the United States as essential to western European recovery, no matter how much we arm the nations along the Atlantic seaboard, until Russian troops are withdrawn from Germany and Austria."

Our problem is to relax the tensions which make it essential for us and others to keep troops in Europe. Let us rather demonstrate our good faith in the possibility of the ultimate adjudication of the real difficulties dividing east and west by making a thoroughgoing overture through the United Nations of universal disarmament with the obviously necessary sanctions.

We are deeply convinced that capitalism and communism not only can, but must live together in the same peaceful world. No dispute between the United States and Russia need be resolved by force, and there are no differences between them which in time cannot be settled by peaceful negotiations. We are of the opinion that all of the possibilities for such negotiations have never been fully explored.

We petition for the discharge of our responsibilities as a peaceful Nation to the end that all mankind may be freed from the threat of total war. Confidence in an enduring peace will be created in a series of friendly acts so directed as to bring understanding between the United States of America and the U. S. S. R.

We, therefore, urge you to oppose the Atlantic Pact and the rearmament of western Europe by the United States; and we urge you to give consideration to every genuine opportunity in which it is possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to enter into relationships of understanding and agreement, as regards the settlement of international disputes, and to a speedy end of hostilities as related to World War II and also to the so-called "cold war." We urge the strongest support of the United Nations and the use of its facilities for world understanding and social and economic recovery and disarmament.
As I have said, Christianity is the third alternative to the tragic pathways of appeasement and war. The sheer hypocrisy of security by preparing for an atomic war faster than any other nation is seen in the desperate way that atomic scientists are trying to get the American people to do some clear, honest thinking about human relationships. This kind of thinking does not call for atomic armaments and the militarization of the West. If we wish to save the world it calls for God's plan for our lives.

The early Christians went into the world with a plan. It was God's plan. Because it was better than the Roman plan and other plans, the people turned to the Christians and laid the foundations for the humanitarian efforts of mankind which led to the expansion of democracy and man's dream to save the world. Man found the stuff for a new world in his divine nature. The power came from God.

We see this in the establishment of our own Nation, the first best democracy on earth. When things were confused in the Constitutional Convention, our forebears recessed to pray. They reconvened and found the way to agreement.

God gave us the world with all its abundance. God gave us life and a nature than can be good and helpful. God gave us Jesus Christ, who more than any other has shown us the way to live. In Christ, we have the teaching of faith and love. We have the power of God and the grace and discipline of prayer. God's plan is adequate. Here we have that added greatness of soul which drives out fear and in which we can work together for the common good.

This is the glory of God's plan for our lives. God made us in His image and through Christ has lifted us to the greatest knowledge known to man. We belong to God in the fact of our birth. Let us belong to God twice in our response to His love and our unhurried love for all the children of men. We pray that our representatives in Washington may implement this universal faith in the support of these universal institutions and values which alone will direct us to world peace, understanding and security.

(The persons referred to are as follows:)

Dr. Henry Hitt Crane, Central Methodist Church, Detroit, Mich.
Rev. Earl Sawyer, Epworth Methodist Church, Detroit, Mich.
Rev. Herbert Fink, North Detroit Methodist Church, Detroit, Mich.
Rev. and Mrs. William Bostnick, 20970 North River Park Drive, Inkster, Mich.
Rev. Charles A. Hill, Hartford Avenue Baptist Church, Detroit, Mich.
Dr. J. Perry Prather, First Church of the Brethren, Detroit, Mich.
Margaret R. Ranson, St. Francis Xavier Church, 4265 Monroe, Ecorse 29, Mich.
Rev. I. Paul Taylor, 17682 Cooley Avenue, Detroit, Mich.
Lucy Mae Piotrowski, 4594 Palmer Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Rita Goodall, 4561 Helen Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Lottie M. Beck, 4805 Korte Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Muriel Robison, 4800 Curtis Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Ruth Lattrull, 4618 Rosalie Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Rose Peterson, 4796 Korte Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Marlan Hong, 5736 Cabot, Detroit, Mich.
Gwendolyn Dunsmore, 4609 Rosalie Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Violet Toles, 4614 Westland, Dearborn, Mich.
Alice Crosley, 4615 Westland, Dearborn, Mich.
Sophia M. Hayes, 4831 Korte, Dearborn, Mich.
Joan White, 4893 Curtis, Dearborn, Mich.
Mrs. Forest Hammond, 4351 Sharon, Detroit, Mich.
Mrs. Bessie Gulliver, 5403 Springwells, Detroit, Mich.
Harry Goodall, 4591 Helen, Dearborn, Mich.
Elmer E. White, 4956 Curtis Avenue, Dearborn, Mich.
Stella Ballard, 2746 Home Place, Dearborn, Mich.
Mary Talmadge, 5215 Lawndale, Detroit, Mich.
Geraldine Washington, 8611 Dennison, Detroit, Mich.
W. D. Mooney, 6825 Coleman, Dearborn, Mich.
(This statement is also supported by Dr. Paul Morrison, Minister of Trinity Methodist Church, Detroit, and as President of the Michigan Council Opposing Peacetime Conscription.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a veteran?
Reverend WAHLBERG. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you belong to one of the veterans’ organizations?
Reverend WAHLBERG. I belong to the American Legion.
The CHAIRMAN. You are a Legion man?
Reverend WAHLBERG. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you.
Miss Mabel Vernon.
This is the last day of our hearings, and we have a lot of witnesses, and I will have to ask all the witnesses to be brief, because otherwise we can’t hear them all. All right; go ahead.

STATEMENT OF MISS MABEL VERNON, DIRECTOR OF PEOPLES MANDATE COMMITTEE

Miss VERNON. The Peoples Mandate Committee, composed of women in all the American Republics, works to abolish war. It has its headquarters at the Hay-Adams House in Washington.
The committee was organized in 1935 and from its inception has advocated peaceful settlement of all disputes and universal disarmament. It has worked and is working to strengthen the organization of American States and the inter-American treaties and conventions designed to keep peace in the Western Hemisphere.
The committee is now concentrating on securing adoption of an international agreement within the United Nations for universal disarmament under international control and for a world police force to maintain peace.
The Peoples Mandate Committee opposes ratification of the North Atlantic Pact and particularly the implementation of the pact by supplying United States arms to the western European nations. The inevitable results of such action would be increased reliance on force, military control of our foreign policy, increased tension between blocs of nations, and overwhelming and continually increasing expenditures for armaments. All of these results belong to the pattern not of peace but of war.
Many American citizens are deeply concerned about the course our Government is taking. All our policies must be directed to preventing another war in which the human race might perish. History shows that military alliances such as that provided by the North Atlantic Pact have not succeeded in preventing war. As one writer puts it, “the twentieth century diplomatic boneyard is littered with dead defense treaties that failed in their purpose.”
WAR CAN BE ABOLISHED BY ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The first step is an international agreement providing sufficient international control to prevent atomic and all other wars and to maintain universal disarmament.

We urge that the American Government and the American people concentrate all their energy on securing such an agreement by the General Assembly of the United Nations meeting in September 1949.

We call on the Foreign Relations Committee to recommend to the Senate a resolution urging on the President that the United States Government sponsor this agreement in the United Nations.

In order to provide effective international control, a comprehensive program must be offered along the lines of the one contained in the following resolution:

\[\text{Be it resolved, That an international agreement be adopted for the establishment of an International Control Commission, the members of which shall be approved by every member state of the United Nations, and which shall act by simple majority vote: (1) To create and control a World Police Force of Volunteers, with fullest powers of inspection; (2) to supervise the simultaneous reduction of all armed forces and all armaments within each state to police level to maintain internal order; (3) to destroy atomic and all other weapons of mass destruction and prevent their future manufacture.}\]

The International Control Commission provided in the agreement could be created in the following way: Each state of the United Nations lists nominees from all countries who it believes would be acceptable to all the member states. Each state then strikes from all the lists any names of which it disapproves. Those that remain become the members of the Commission. If more are needed, the governments then elect, in any way they agree upon, the numbers required. If there are less than required, new lists are similarly made until the desired number is secured. (This procedure follows the best jury systems of the Anglo-Saxon countries, where each side strikes from a jury list the names it disapproves.)

The International Control Commission would act by simple majority vote. No veto would be allowed to any state.

The World Police Force of Volunteers, with fullest powers of inspection, created and controlled by the International Control Commission, would be composed of men selected for special abilities and qualities who had passed the strictest examination for character, intelligence, and ability. They would be highly paid. In every country participating in the agreement, the World Police Force would have a section made up largely of nationals of that country. Their allegiance would be primarily to the United Nations, and not to their own or to any other national government.

The International Control Commission should have every facility for full investigation of the activities of all branches of the state, public associations, and private persons regarding the observance of the agreement. Atomic scientist inspectors would be included in the forces of investigation.

The simultaneous reduction of all armed forces and all armaments within each nation to a police level to maintain internal order would be made, under the supervision of the International Control Commission, by equal percentages leaving all states in the same relative position at all times during the process of disarmament. The size
of the national police force to maintain internal order in each country would be determined by the International Control Commission, and the size of the national police in each country would necessarily influence the size of the section of the World Police Force to be stationed there.

Destroy atomic and all other weapons of mass destruction and prevent their future manufacture is a provision which would completely eliminate all atomic and biological weapons, whether in the hands of local, national, or international authorities.

It will doubtless be stated that Russia would never agree to such a plan, but such a plan has never been offered in the United Nations. Whatever Russia does, it is our responsibility to present the best disarmament program that can be constructed and to work with sincerity and determination for its acceptance. If Russia does not accept it, nothing will be lost. And we will have gained the increased confidence of people throughout the world.

We therefore ask the Foreign Relations Committee when it reports the Atlantic Pact to recommend to the Senate a resolution urging that the President negotiate within the United Nations an agreement providing for effective international control to prevent war and to maintain universal disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN. We have advocated a police force all the time.

Miss VERNON. I know you have. I remember particularly your resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Soviets have prevented us from getting a world police force. The Military Staff Committee will never agree to anything.

Thank you very much. You never have said whether you were for the ratification of this pact.

Miss VERNON. I think I read it. The Peoples Mandate Committee opposes ratification of the North Atlantic Pact, and particularly the implementation of the pact by supplying United States arms to western European nations.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not before us at the moment.

Thank you very much.

Mrs. Agnes Waters.

STATEMENT OF MRS. AGNES WATERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. WATERS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Mrs. Agnes Waters. I live at 3267 N Street NW., Washington, D. C. I represent myself and millions of mothers who have to supply the cannon fodder for wars, and I appear here against the North Atlantic Pact, and I am also opposed to any arms program or bill to supplement it, or to supply any of the member nations or to supply the so-called United Nations or the so-called Security Council or any other foreign body with our guns and munitions of war, and I am most emphatically against sending any of our armies or navies overseas to aid any foreign nation’s war or to police the world. Our soldiers and sailors are not slaves to be placed at the disposal of foreign nations.
I charge that the North Atlantic Pact and every bill or treaty that follows this pact, and every bill or treaty that went before, is a part of an international conspiracy for a world revolution or diplomatic, legislative, and military coup d'état to overthrow the Government of the United States and every other nation to build a world government for the Socialist Soviet Republics and a Jewish world state.

Ten years ago I stood at the doors of this Senate committee at the hearings on the repeal of the embargo, and I pointed out to all the members of this committee the enemies of this Republic who came in here to testify as witnesses for the repeal of the arms embargo. A few days before I had attended a Communist meeting where I saw and heard them plot and plan for 3 days at round-tables the steps that got us into war. They wrote the blueprints for war and for the overthrow of this Government, starting with the repeal of the arms embargo, and they appointed over 100 witnesses to come up here to put it over.

Their leader and director was Clark M. Eichelberger, the director of the American League for Peace and Democracy, which was after­ward raided on September 28, 1939, by the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the files seized which disclosed that over 3,000 officials and other employees of the United States Government were members of the Third International.

Now the same gang is here for this pact, and on the list of the propaganda committee for this pact is the name of Clark M. Eichel­berger. I refer to the Atlantic union committee which I charge is a subversive propaganda committee taking the place of the discredited old American League for Peace and Democracy.

The representatives of this Atlantic Union Committee are the chief witnesses and proponents for this North Atlantic Pact. This sub­versive committee is represented here by its president, former Justice Roberts, by its vice presidents, former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and former Assistant Secretary, under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Mr. Will Clayton. And these witnesses are by their testimony all of them advocating the overthrow of this Republic with this pact.

On the statements of these witnesses I demand that this pact be killed.

I charge that this pact is a part of this world revolution, and that it lays the groundwork for a Jewish world state.

It is a diplomatic, legislative, and military coup d'état.

This is borne out by the testimony of at least four of the witnesses and proponents of this pact right here in this hearing room and I quote from the testimony of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, from the testimony of former Justice Owen J. Roberts, from the testimony of former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and from the testimony of former Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton.

First. Secretary Acheson testified that the pact implements the United Nations.

Second. Former Justice Roberts testified as follows:

The Atlantic Union Committee—

of whom Mr. Roberts is the president—

proposes that, after the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, the President of the United States invite pact sponsors to a Federal convention. Our committee hopes
that such a convention would discuss Federal union—world government—of the Atlantic democracies as a means of making the Atlantic Pact work to the full.

And he adds:

The concept of such a Federal union of Atlantic democracies can, however, become a practical reality only if the Atlantic Pact is ratified. I urge you to go forward with the ratification now, and then to move on to consideration of Atlantic union.

Now those are the words of Mr. Roberts for this pact.

If this does not prove that it is a part of a plot to overthrow the Government of the United States of America and all other nations that are parties to this pact, then what does? And there are three more of these witnesses who put their foot in their mouth and said worse; so that anyone would have to be deaf, dumb, and blind not to realize that this pact is a part of a diplomatic and legislative and military coup d'etat.

I charge these four traitors with conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States. I hold in my hand a copy of the testimony of former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, now the vice president of the Atlantic Union Committee and who appeared here as one of the witnesses and proponents for this pact. And I quote his words on page 3 of his mimeographed testimony given here on May 9, 1949, as follows:

After the pact has been ratified, the Atlantic Union Committee proposes that the Senate examine the project for Atlantic union as a means of implementing the pact by a firmer union of the people. But first and foremost we urge ratification of the pact.

Now those are the words of the great war criminal Patterson before this Senate Committee for this pact.

I hold in my hand the statement before the Senate hearings of the former Assistant Secretary of State, Will Clayton, now another vice president of the Atlantic Union Committee and who appeared here as one of the witnesses and proponents for this pact, representing the Atlantic Union Committee, and he stated as follows:

This pact will afford time to consider and prepare for the larger enterprise which lies ahead. For this pact is a natural and necessary step on the road to a Federal union. We are in the midst of a world revolution, the implications of which are not yet fully understood. But all of us should now realize that man's victory over time and distance and matter renders completely archaic the present political and economic structure of the world.

and he adds:

the battle of the Middle East must be fought.

Now if this testimony of the witnesses for this pact does not show it up to be an international conspiracy for a coup d'état to overthrow the Government, then what do you call it?

I demand the arrest of these war criminals and witnesses for this pact.

Former Assistant Secretary of State Will L. Clayton, now vice president of this subversive propaganda committee for the pact called the Atlantic Union Committee, then goes on to testify further along these lines, proving the criminal conspiracy back of this pact. He says:

The United States, having more to lose than any other country, should take the lead in calling a convention of representatives of the nations composing the
Atlantic Pact to explore how far they can go in forming a federal union within the Charter of the United Nations.

Now, if that is not suggesting and attempting the overthrow of this Government, then what is it? I demand the arrest of Mr. Will Clay­ton. It’s as plain as day what these traitors are up to with this pact, and that this North Atlantic Pact is to implement the United Nations was testified to by the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson. I demand his arrest; and it is to be followed by the setting up of an international army made up of our materials and men to be supplied by the United States is also an admitted fact. This completes the picture of a diplomatic, legislative, and a military coup to be followed by the battle of the Middle East, according to one of these war criminals, Mr. Will Clayton, who goes on to testify further along these lines of conspiracy and adds that—

we have not won the battle of Greece, although we have sunk a billion dollars there, and the battle of the Middle East must still be fought.

Imagine this. Now, if this does not involve a serious conspiracy for war, then what does! Very evidently it’s in the cards of these sinister planners to get us into the battle of the Middle East. We got to go save the Jews in Palestine. This is an admission of war crimes planned by these war criminals.

I demand the arrest of these war criminals, the Messrs. Acheson, Patterson, Roberts, and Clayton, under the precedents set at Nurem­berg for plotting and planning war crimes against all humanity, but most particularly against the people of the United States of America. I demand their arrest also for conspiring to overthrow the United States and for advocating the overthrow of this Government. . . .

The most arresting statement in the congressional report on Pearl Harbor investigation was this:

In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American diplomacy is moving to war, so that they may check its advance if impudent and imprudent, or support its position if sound.

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

Before the last world war a few leaders of Government managed national policy and foreign policy as if it were a private preserve, and their decisions were announced to the American people after the event, if at all. This sort of criminal conspiracy to railroad us into world wars and world revolutions, for the purpose of building a . . . world state has got to be stopped by the hangman’s noose if necessary.

A coup d’etat, in contrast to a popular revolution, is the seizure of full power by a faction in the state. It is based upon the use of official powers already held by the faction and does not depend upon bloodshed, not necessarily so. It Ain’t Necessarily So, as tipped off by the music of the Marine Band at the signing of this pact. Just take a look at that map on the Senate hearing-room wall. It’s significant that North America is all blacked out

As states became more modern, more highly organized, more bureau­cratic, the anatomy of the state changed and the means of seizing control had to change also. This is taken from the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, as printed by the Committee on For­eign Affairs, Eightieth Congress, report of Subcommittee No. 5 on national and international movements, Mrs. Bolton, chairman. And it is known as Supplement 3A, the Coup d’Etat in Prague. Also let
me call your attention to the fact that the Department of State in its official publications, notably Department of State Bulletin 508 indicates that it is operating on an international scale, just as if there was no United States of America. It is the United Nations and other international organizations such as this pact and various treaties and world councils, with which it is wholly concerned, not the sovereign rights of this Republic and its sovereign people. Let me remind the State Department that they are still paid by the taxpayers of the United States to look after America, not to serve the world, or to create a world state. But with these Red crackpots and traitors the United States as an official authority is out of the picture. They openly state “We are creating a world.” I thought only God could create a world. I demand an investigation of the State Department and the arrest of all Red crackpots and traitors to the United States of America. It’s high time we cleaned up our own back and front yards instead of sticking our nose into cleaning up all the rest of the nations, and that includes Russia, too. Let’s mind our own business.

What we need here is an American foreign policy, not a world government.

I demand arrests, trials, and hangings of all these war mongers and war criminals, as laid down by the precedent set by the Nuremberg trials. And if you men can’t run this Government as it should be run by Americans and for Americans, just get out of those seats and let us women take over.

Nineteen centuries ago, our Lord Jesus Christ anticipated the North Atlantic Pact and similar treaties of internationalists and He said:

When they shall say “peace and security”; then sudden destruction cometh upon them.

The Scriptures are clear that entangling alliances made by the internationalists will not bring peace, but on the contrary, will bring war, war on an international scale. All nations involved in the entangling alliances will be dragged into war.

We send spies to other nations to find out their plans for the future, but we do not spend 5 cents to find out what God wants us to do. We will not make the effort to find out the future of the nations as outlined in the Scriptures.

America and the rest of the nations have turned a deaf ear to God, and are rushing blindly and madly toward the greatest war in all history, toward annihilation, toward an eternal hell.

Get the word out to the people: Fight the pacts, fight the devil. Raise all hell before it’s too late to save America!

The pact if ratified will be implemented by a new lend-lease bill to rearm certain European nations. Secretary Acheson on April 27, 1949, admitted as much to the Senate committee.

The first lend-lease bill was enacted in 1941, and it was sold to us by the same wrecking crew in the State Department that is lousy with the enemies of God and America. These liars falsely offered it to Congress and the country as a measure to avoid war. It was masked as a security and peace bill, but when these traitors speak peace, they mean war; they did not fool us mothers. We who know the score fought those bills and every step to war, as today when again these devils are going through the same steps and taking us to war under the
same old false pretenses and lies. And this pact also masks the steps
to overthrow the Government of the United States of America.

How long, oh, Lord, will you permit these deceivers to live?...

There is a great Judgment Day coming. Those of you who have
betrayed this country are going to have to give account of your stu-

dieship. Regarding impeachable acts, the House of Representatives
in 1868 declared:

We define, therefore, an impeachable crime or misdemeanor to be one in its
nature or consequence subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of
government, or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a
violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act
committed or omitted, or without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discre-

tionary powers from improper motives, or for any improper purpose.

The subversion of the Republic has now proceeded so far as to place
in jeopardy the very freedom and independence of the American peo-
ple; and we may no longer in conscience withhold judgment. The
Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by
the President, not by Congress, not by the Supreme Court, but by the
people and for the people; and should their civil officers fail them,
the people themselves are bound to use whatever means may be neces-
sary to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. ...

This pact is illegal, unconstitutional, and a criminal conspiracy,
and if ratified by the Senate amounts to treason and compounding
a felony. Also creating and precipitating war. I demand the arrest
of every proponent, of every witness and of every lobbyist or propa-
ganda committee for this pact. I demand their arrest under the
precedents set at Nurnberg for war criminals who plotted and planned
war, and under the United States statutes concerning treason and con-
spiracy and overthrowing our United States Government. More than
10 years ago I warned this Senate against these enemies who have
appeared here for every New Deal bill, for the repeal of the arms
embargo, for the lend-lease bills, for all the draft bills, for all the
"loans" to foreign nations, for all the war powers bills, for the Charter
of the United Nations, for the Truman doctrine, for the Marshall
plan, for all of the treaties, and now they are here for war again with
this North Atlantic Pact. I demand their arrest. I have identified
over 3,000 of these witnesses and lobbyists and propagandists over the
years I have appeared against them in every congressional committee
room, as enemies of the United States of America. They are all linked
to the ... spy rings in the State Department of whom Miss Bentley
and Whittaker Chambers testified there are 77 "Red" spy rings alone
in the State Department. Yet no arrests, not even an investigation,
has been made by this administration. ...

For more than 10 years I have appeared here before this Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and every other congressional com-
mittee on Capitol Hill to fight every step to war and every New Deal bill
and I have pointed out to you these enemies who have appeared here
as witnesses and lobbyists and propagandists for every one of these
terrible measures. Yet you have given these "Reds" days and hours
to testify and for years you have cut me off with 5 minutes or 10
minutes at the most, and then you had police waiting to drag me
out, and often I was dragged out of other congressional committees
when I tried to point out that these proponents and witnesses are all
enemies of this Republic who are overthrowing the United States, by
these legislative coup d'états and by bloody world wars mass-murdering the best of our beloved people...

Under articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution there are certain inalienable rights reserved to the people, and that is the right of self-government that this North Atlantic Pact takes away.

I fought the Charter of the United Nations in the Senate hearings in July 1945, on the same grounds of criminal conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States, and I charged collusion on the part of the signers to that pact. At that time Russia was one of the signers. And the accused Red spy, Mr. Alger Hiss, was the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Mr. Alger Hiss was also at Yalta when we gave away to Red Russia the victory our American boys had so bravely won. Mr. Alger Hiss was one of the advisers of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he was in the State Department with Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Acheson claims him as one of his very dear friends. He is now with the Carnegie Foundation, which is an institution working to overthrow this Government to build a world state. I pointed out every one of the witnesses for the Charter at that time as enemies of this Republic seeking to overthrow it. The father of the Charter was Leo Pasvolsky of Russia, who was our State Department expert on foreign affairs.

I served with the War Department, United States of America, for 15 months, with the commissioned personnel during the First World War; I was also with the Ordnance Division, United States of America, and later with the Judge Advocate General, United States of America, so I know something about military tactics and I want to say that I believe that the North Atlantic Pact if ratified would be the greatest single military stroke for Russia. Gen. George Washington warned: "Why leave our own to stand on foreign ground?" Great distances, oceans, and intensely cold Arctic barriers, and thousands of miles of cold, barren ice and waste land and sea are today between us and Russia, that's a natural defense barrier between us and Russia but with this pact our United States front line of defense is moved right up to the very borders of Russia, and while we are defending that front line on foreign far-away soil, the enemy plans to come in upon us by way of Siberia and Alaska and Canada. This was disclosed recently in the testimony given before the Supreme Court in New York in the trials of those 12 Communists. And all Russia has to do to wipe us out in Norway is to get the place mined before we can get there. Russia won't need any long distance bombers, or any heavy haul for 3,000 miles.

Do not be deceived or confused by the outward display of opposition to this pact from Russia and the Communists. That is the way they get you to support their plots and their plans like this one here. This is a coup.

Why, if this pact is ratified it becomes the greatest military triumph as well as a diplomatic and bureaucratic coup for Russia. It's a Russian victory.

And the treasonous proponents shrewdly admit the pitfalls and dangerous shoals that even an innocent child could fathom in this pact or trap for war and Red revolution here and everywhere on earth. Readily they admit it could precipitate a war, and maybe that is what it is designed to do. But why do anything to precipitate a war?
I demand a congressional investigation be made of the forces behind this pact, and I want immediate arrests made by the Department of Justice, too.

The same old gang of one worlders and Red and pink revolutionists are here testifying for this pact, or are lobbying for it or are on propaganda committees to put it over as a defense measure on the people....

This pact is a very dangerous matter, and it seems to me that you who are charged with the general welfare and security of the people of the United States have no business taking any such chances on precipitating another bloody war such as you have been to blame for in the past with these terrible bills and plans for the total destruction of the great Christian nations and civilizations of the world. For what? I ask, for what? This is a part of a world revolution....

The very workings of the pact, and the proponents do not deny it, discloses that the obvious thing is to force us into a shooting war at any price without Congress declaring war. In fact it places the American people in the hands of foreigners who have no interest at all in the lives of our people, and who can get us into war without our consent, and the foreigners are to be our new draft board—the idea—also it practically does away with the Congress of the United States, who can have nothing to say if this pact is ratified by the Senate. This is an outrage against the rights of every citizen of the United States, making us cannon fodder for our enemies, and it places the power to declare war in the State Department and in the hands of aliens.

It seems to me that instead of these vicious pacts, and so forth, if the Congress is acting in good faith the right thing to do is to pass a resolution officially ending the war....

The dangerous thing here and now is that our constitutionally provided checks and balances are fast being wiped out by these bills and pacts and treaties and what-not? Introduced by the Truman administration or the so-called fair deal, which was worse than the New Deal as its galloping communism.

And I want to call the attention of the people of the whole country to the fact that if this pact is ratified as a treaty it becomes treaty law and treaty law supercedes all Federal, State, and local laws, and makes the United States citizen subject to the treaty which constitutes a league of nations, and these member nations can make any rules they please to govern Americans. One of the worst features is the fact that these foreigners can get us into war, and our armies and our materials of war will be subject to their orders! Also this pact implements and sets up a world government within the framework of the already established United Nations organization, and other and even worse treaties are awaiting Senate ratification setting up criminal penalties to be administered by international criminal tribunals where any American can be taken, tried, and executed for violations or charges of violations of these terrible treaties and pacts, and any of our enemies can arrest us!....

I want to say that the time allotted to me by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is so limited that I will not be able to present to the Senate all of the facts concerning this diabolical plot. But let me say again that what we got to do is clean up our own backyard right here; never mind about rushing into pacts and treaties and
wars and world governments guaranteeing the borders of foreign nations. Why, we can’t even protect our own borders. I heard the Attorney General, Tom Clark, testify before the Senate Civil Service Committee that 600,000 potential enemies, alien refugees, terrorists from the sewers of Europe’s bloody underground, are pouring over both our Mexican and Canadian United States borders per year, and that is 2,000 per day. An army of “Reds” invading us. And I heard him testify that the Department of Justice is powerless to prevent it—and that was 2 years ago, and nothing has been done! How is this? Why don’t our State governors call out the National Guard, or has the National Guard gone to take care of Norway, Italy, England, France, Portugal, Iceland, Greenland, and what else? No wonder the administration cannot take care of the United States of America. We can’t stop invasions here.

I am the only woman candidate for President of the United States in 1952. I am no pacifist, but a fighter for the United States of America, the land of my birth and that my ancestors helped to found and fought and died for in almost every war. I am the widow of a veteran of the First World War with the AEF, who was among the first to volunteer and the last to leave. He fought in the front-line trenches at the Battles of Luneville Sector, Toul, Montdidier, Nayon, St. Michel, Aisne-Marne, Meuse-Argonne, and was with the army of occupation in Germany. I am the mother of a veteran of the Second World War, who volunteered and served with the United States Army, Eighth Army Command, General Headquarters, for 2½ years. And I am the proud mother-in-law of two fine American boys who are also veterans of the last World War, having served with the United States Army. But I am not anxious to become the grandmother of a veteran of the third world war; and, in this respect, I would like to prevent war if possible. And I am a grandmother. Let me say again that I am no pacifist but a fighter for the United States of America, and I am an anti-Communist with a record here in the Congress of the United States of America for fighting every Red New Deal bill. I am also known as “Pistol-Packin’ Mamma,” and I believe in defending my right to live. There is no Red on earth going to take this country except over my dead body, and there are millions of women like myself who stand ready to defend their homes and their country, and those of us who do not have guns have ropes in every little backyard. We stand ready to defend our lives, our liberty, our homes, and the great Republic of the United States of America, and I think that, as an unexpected reservoir of power, the American women will be more effective than all the atomic bombs. Few know of this American power.

Few know that Yankee women can handle a gun, but it is a fact that more women have gone in for pistol practice in the United States than have the men, and some of us are crack shots, and can shoot with both hands, and we know who our enemies are. We stand ready for any outbreaks of Communists...

Therefore, we are not so much concerned about any bloody revolutions here, for we can take care of those and really would make it open hunting here, but what we are concerned about are these “steps,” as President Truman calls them. But I call them coup d’états, and I charge that they are engineered by our enemies within our gates and, indeed, in every key position of this Government, and most especially in the State Department, where the records of the House
Appropriations Committee prove that there are more than 108 suspected Communists, 64 of them draw more than $5,000 per year salary. These are enemies.

What we are after is these Red traitors within our gates, not those in far-off lands. It seems to me that we ought to clean out the State Department and all other executive departments before we take any steps like this pact that might precipitate us into a war with Russia, and I would not take these steps like this pact under any circumstances, as it is absolutely unconstitutional and a violation of the rights of the people of the United States of America. It is an illegal act, and it sets up a super world government, implementing and supplementing the United Nations Organization, even to equipping the result of this coup d'état or supergovernment with our arms and our armies. This cannot be done. The American people are very suspicious of these moves or steps, and well may they be suspicious, for practically every witness for this pact is an enemy of this Republic and is out to overthrow this Government to build a one-world state, and most of them are known members of the Third Internationale. This pact and the following steps and treaties are the modern diplomatic methods of world revolution as practiced by both Hitler and Stalin.

The North Atlantic Pact places the decision of war or peace into the hands of our enemies and gives to them the military advantage of time, distance, climate and place. It removes distances that are now in our favor, and brings our front lines right up to Russia. Think of this mischief, this outrage against the lives and liberties of the American people. Our ancestors had sense enough to put distance between us and the hellholes of Europe, Asia, and Africa; yet these traitors destroy all that we have won in peace and happiness in 150 years of American progress. This pact sets the world back a thousand years—aye, to the Dark Ages . . .

You don't need to go to Russia to clean up these Reds. They are all right here. Then we ought to turn our attention to taking care of America. Our cities are in a pitiful condition of decay, from total neglect. Yet, you are running to Europe with billions of dollars to rebuild what it took 500,000 good American lives and 1,000,000 good American lives and 1,000,000 good Americans wounded; years of blood, sweat, and tears to rip down . . .

What the world needs is a safe haven of refuge in America, not an America torn by wars in defending the Old World.

What we should do with this great country of ours is to build a richer, greater United States of America, and make it a heaven on earth for our own people, not a hell like this pact is building. Why do you monkey with things that are no concern of ours, and build nightmares of horror for our people, all because some crazy crackpots in the State Department have bad dreams? They ought to be put in St. Elizabeths Insane Asylum, if not arrested, tried, and hanged for their crimes . . .

In the name of our merciful Lord Jesus Christ, I ask the Congress not to pass this terrible pact for war and world government.

In the name of the Prince of Peace I ask that instead of this vicious pact, that you pass a resolution declaring the war ended; and let this beautiful world and her wonderful people have peace once more on earth.

Yours for America only.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will excuse you, Mrs. Waters.
Mr. H. Scherbak, do you have a written statement?
Mr. SCHERBAK. No. I have just a few remarks.
The CHAIRMAN. We will give you 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF H. SCHERBAK, NEW YORK CITY

Mr. SCHERBAK. I am all out for the pact and I am sure that the fears of the people who have appeared are unjustified.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you for it or against it?
Mr. SCHERBAK. Absolutely for.

None of the witnesses so far has mentioned what is necessary to make it really effective, and I want to say that I know what must be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Give your name and your business and so on to the reporter.

Mr. SCHERBAK. Mr. Scherbak, 25 Broad Street, New York. Industrial consultant and writer on foreign politics.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an American citizen?
Mr. SCHERBAK. I am an American citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SCHERBAK. In all of the countries in the world it seems to me to make the pact effective it must be made extremely popular with their common people, and that would be done if for every district so-called Atlantic Pact or AP trustees were elected simultaneously who have the duty to propagate the pact and to win support in every direction.

Secondly, in addition to this trustee organization, they have to see to it that the nations understand each other better, and that the English language shall be taught as the second language in the schools of all the cooperating nations who are not British.

The trade associations should be given an AP classification in which all of them agree so that the professionals can meet each other for protocol and so on, and there are dozens of other provisions which have to be made, but which I can put down in the record.

Another thing is that it must be possible to bring all of these nations under America by broadcasts of 15 or 30 minutes, and that cannot be done today because the military maps and the navy maps of these nations are not adequate for broadcasting. Many cities have double names or the same name, and if one is not a well-known city it is practically impossible to develop the source of trouble, so I propose to modify the maps, as I have already discussed with the Arms Committee of the Senate, and they like it. Would your chairman like to see one of those maps?

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you can file it if you wish.

Mr. SCHERBAK. Every part of the world has a certain number.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE ATLANTIC PACT

(Submitted by H. Scherbak, New York, N. Y.)

To win widest support of the Allied Nations, it will be necessary to show what the machinery of the pact will look like once it is set up; how it will operate and how it will be defended against internal and external emergencies.

It is evident that the AP must make itself indispensable not only as a deterrent to war, but through far-reaching continuous business and cultural advantages
to all nations concerned. The following measures should bring intense mutual economic interests about.

All AP nations to use English for official communication. It should be a second language taught in France and other non-English-speaking countries. Exchange of professors and students. The English-speaking countries shall teach French as a second language.

An AP daily newspaper containing translation of news in the languages of all Allied Nations. AP trade magazines bringing the Allied Nations the progress made in United States, England, and others. A standard classification of trade associations accepted by all AP nations. An AP classification of all professions for easier collaboration of specialists.

An AP central register of the outstanding experts of all AP nations under the numbers of the profession.

A standard classification of government agencies. A central registration of the leading officials. A standard specification of the national interests whether food or shelter, education, health, justice, labor, and more.

An AP organization center which forms AP committees for every outstanding common interest. One such committee will handle AP patent trade-mark interest. Another committee will look into the school books of the AP nations. Another committee will arrange pools of arbitrators.

Arrangement of an AP headquarter and an AP signal system where it will be known for every essential part of the allied nations main characteristics as to economic conditions, factors which cause the disturbance, military conditions, civil defense conditions. For this purpose the Allied Nations and the main parts of their countries will be numbered and subnumbered for easy identification in case action should be necessary against trouble sources or for assistance in case of foreign attack.

Simultaneous election of AP trustees in every important locality whose duty is to win friends for the AP and to win voluntary space workers for AP projects. There may be in large cities trustees for civil defense, trustees for medical services, and others.

A committee to assist in the drafting of AP master plans for individual war industries; that is, a combination of national master plans.

A committee to facilitate business between the AP nations with a number of subcommittees for currency and barter problems.

A center to register all of those who volunteer work for the AP and receive AP membership cards.

An AP statistical center which will show how satisfactory conditions are in every main district and how these conditions change to be able to tabulate where need and surplus exist.

For mutual defense against internal unrest and foreign attacks or aggression the following matters may be needed:

A signal system using geographical maps with every important locality numbered, to be able to identify it in broadcasts for help.

Registration and control of all laboratories, with fingerprinting of all chemists, to prevent clandestine production of explosives and poison germs.

Coordination of all secret services against communism, neo-Nazis, warmongers, special signal maps showing conditions and danger signs for every important district.

Standard numbering of military units, weapons, and operations for easier collaboration.

Every Allied soldier to know some English. All AP nations to form standby committees of their legislation for immediate action, if necessary.

Laying out of master plans to release vehement economic and moral pressure against war makers. Coordination of press and radio, churches, business interests for mutual defense.

Preadarrangement of arbitration between the AP nations.

**POSSIBLE EMERGENCIES FOR THE ATLANTIC PACT**

The AP extends the frontiers to be defended by United States to parts of the world which are many thousand miles distant and vulnerable to attack. The United States also through the AP becomes a kind of a trustee for the safety of a number of nations which are very weak in a military sense. Differences among them or great political errors by some of them may involve United States in a world war.
From this point of view it is preferable to realize the following dangers for the security of the United States and that way for the security of the AP nations. Those cited below seem evident.

United States cities could be attacked at any hour by Russian bombers working direct or through Chinese Communists.

One-man submarines, bomb-loaded, can sneak any hour into United States harbors, blow up liners, and disappear. Explosives can be smuggled into United States harbors on barges any time.

It is doubtful that the United States can fight successfully attack by foreign submarines equipped with snorkel breathing.

Saboteurs or fanatics can rain fire bombs or poison germs on United States cities at any hour of the day. How many War Asset-sold planes are in the hands or under the influence of criminals, spies, and smugglers is not known.

Explosives can be smuggled into United States harbors on barges any time.

It is doubtful that the United States can fight successfully attack by foreign submarines equipped with snorkel breathing.

Saboteurs or fanatics can rain fire bombs or poison germs on United States cities at any hour of the day. How many War Asset-sold planes are in the hands or under the influence of criminals, spies, and smugglers is not known.

Clandestine production of poison gas and germs in United States laboratories, of which there are thousands, is out of control.

No preparation has been made yet to make United States population alert and to arrive at concerted operation of the armed services and civil defense, although decisions may have to be taken eventually within 15 minutes.

The above shows that next to the military aid to the western nations, immense efforts are to be made to streamline the United States defensive machinery. However, the Atlantic Pact, combining 270,000,000 people in their will for security and to bring humanity out of the valley of fear, is worth the greatest sacrifice.

Alternatively, it is obediently suggested that the United States accepts the pact excluding the clause that any aggression on any pact nation to be considered as an aggression on the United States. Recommended is a waiting time of 1 year during which the United States shall have the option to agree on this clause.

During this year, the United States to provide the AP nations with armament and any possible assistance for economic recovery and coordination. The United States doesn’t seem to be in a position to bind itself to warfare at present.

As to Germany, it may be submitted that the Germans need strong military command and that they may accept military leadership by United States generals who are of German ancestry. If such strong command is not provided, the most ruthless faction of the Germans, the new Nazis, will come to the lead again and plunge the world into another war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all very interesting.

Mr. SCHEBAK. In that way it is possible to identify by broadcast.

Now, I make up a statement on the enormous efforts necessary to make the pact work and to give it daily very great economic and cultural advantages to all of the nations of the world. It must become indispensable to all of these men for business reasons.

Now, having made that survey, it looks to me—and Mr. Chairman, I beg to apologize for this suggestion—that before the United States should enter war, if any of these nations should be attacked, or there are troubles between them, that there should be 1 year of trying in which a master plan would be laid out, but during the year any one of the nations could retire from the pact or could be asked to resign, as, when a couple marries, they have a little engagement to get to know each other better.

The pact is one of the greatest things in history, and it would be very terrible if by some neglect of any matter it would fail.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate your coming here.

Miss Grace L. Oswalt.

STATEMENT OF MISS GRACE OSWALT, MOROCCO, IND.

Miss Oswalt. Ratification of the North Atlantic Pact, accepting as fact that it is within the framework of the United Nations, and that it does not abrogate the right of Congress to declare war, would be a
demoralizing affront to the courage, the integrity and the common sense of the average citizen, who should repudiate all its present implications but could subscribe to the basic ground work if integrated properly and honestly into democratic principles and the purposes of the United Nations. The Senate realizes the importance of this decision to itself and to this Nation.

It is a thin subterfuge to claim that military preparedness would be used only against an aggressor. The United Nations has been unable to write the label of an aggressor. It has also been unable to formulate a method for establishing a world police force, and, although in principle, it takes a stand against the use of armed force, like its predecessor, the League of Nations, the UN has no substitute means of authority. Ratification under proposed conditions, would not only be the end of the Monroe Doctrine, but if entered into for a period of 20 years, the death knell of the United Nations and of all pretense of democratic principles and human rights.

Time was when immigrants came to the United States to avoid compulsory military service. Now, boys too young to take care of legal matters and too young to be represented by vote, can be conscripted. Whatever the origin of these unsatisfactory conditions, the Atlantic Pact, as it stands, is no panacea. However, if United States, as elder brother of the family of nations, were to enunciate a definition as to what constitutes international justice, and the nations signatory to the Atlantic Pact should accept that definition, together with a mutual-aid plan to put it into practice, these nations could form the nucleus for a stable world unity and the pact could be ratified, maintaining military power until such time as voluntary participation could become world-wide, looking toward a day when military force could be dispensed with in favor of a world guard—an authentic police force.

Pressure for ratification, on the theory that these nations have signed in good faith and that it would not be gracious for the Senate to refuse, is not the fault of the Senate nor of the people whom the Senate represents. It is a vital necessity to the whole bankrupt world, that this United States reservoir of plenty remain solvent and proceed to put into effect a method to rid humanity of the vast overhead of military force now maintaining national advantage, wherever possible, in the world under the cloak of justice, rather than by endorsing this 20-year stricture ourselves abdicate to the world-order concept of the Kaiser, who envisioned a world without war, but without true peace and freedom, constantly under military control.

What, then, is international justice? It is equal economic opportunity for nations, as for individuals within a free nation, undue advantage for none. If the signatories to the Atlantic Pact declare themselves dedicated to back this concept, then they, with the United States, could form a justifiable military alliance with that principle their declared objective and duration of this alliance subject to satisfactory accomplishment of this specific aim. While maintaining this temporary military strength, democratic and nonmilitary implementation of this principle could be established with the intention of ultimately turning over to an authentic international guard or police force, responsibility for preventing violation of this world principle so essential to world peace and order.
The basic physical needs of humanity provide the foundation for world unity, peace, and freedom. Desire for mundane security is the motivation back of each and every ideology, and is the root of nationalism and the condoned justification for war. Economic stress is the acknowledged cause of conflict. Man cannot enjoy the privileges set forth as desirable in the United Nations Charter nor hope to become invested with the human rights set forth in the recent declaration, unless and until he becomes the master, and is no longer the slave of his physical necessities.

Implementation of the foregoing concept of world justice would perpetuate democratic principle and draw the teeth of war. It would invest the United Nations with the authority it lacks and permit it to act freely within its scope, with the consent of the members. With a positive international principle agreed upon and unequivocally endorsed and backed by sponsors of world order and not dependent on military power, the question of veto by any nation would not arise. Subscription to this definite concept of international justice would be prerequisite to membership in United Nations and any nation not subscribing, would be outside the pale, unless and until such nation becomes eligible for membership by giving evidence of renouncing military force as a method of maintaining economic security. Disarmament for any and all (except for the proposed international guard) could then safely and logically be systematically accomplished by all voluntary members and if necessary forcibly done and government deposed of any nation dissenting after a reasonable period of grace.

Disarmament, however, being the natural result of true peace, cannot be the basis for it, but the sooner the world frees itself of this vast overhead the sooner world economic recovery will ensue. Excessive practice of, or necessity for, philanthropy on a world-wide scale, is undisputable evidence of critical lack of economic balance, and a state of affairs calling for drastic, forceful, and positive readjustment measures. This Nation has international relations, but no definite international policy. The present state of relations is not fair to any peoples, least of all, to the citizens of the United States, who have done and are (under protest) doing what is required of them, hoping desperately that leadership is capable of realizing on the tremendous opportunity the people have twice won and now sustain at great cost. If statesmanship is ineffectual and reactionary, in establishing rational world order, especially the statesmanship of a democracy, the only hope for the world's people lies in revolution.

A statement as to what constitutes international justice is the missing link in the chain of peace necessary to bind together both big and little nations trying to arrive at a universal goal. Surely powerful nations may safely bear up economically under equal opportunity, if any semblance of justice now exists for small nations or those under jurisdiction of larger nations ostensibly for protection. Unless international justice is first enunciated, international law, by democratic standards, classifies as tyranny. In such case enforcement, however mild, is oppression and is a denial of human rights. All that is talked of in international relations is enforcement. This is because, law being stressed and justice not defined, the fact that justice must be administered and its positive phase recognized, has been overlooked. Once the formula for world justice has been established law to protect
it and opportunity to enjoy the security that it guarantees may be enjoyed. Then an authentic world police force could maintain world organization and through this assure human rights to all peoples.

Peace is a business proposition and requires a practical foundation. The world is said to be building for peace but, so far, the structure has not been anchored to realities, of which there are good as well as bad. The situation with regard to the weakening status of United Nations is now quite similar to that of the League of Nations (and World Court), membership in which was repudiated as being undemocratic, and activity to correct this objection being blocked, at least in part by national politics. Today the bipartisan approach offers better opportunity to make United Nations, not only an exponent of objectives, but an actual and forceful practical organization. This Atlantic Pact, in reference to its abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine, in itself does not impose any particular loss to the cause of peace. However, this serves to bring to mind the walk-out of Japan from the League because of denial of the proposition to form a Monroe doctrine of the east for supervision of China. Ratification of the Atlantic Pact, as presented, would be not only untrue to democratic standards but also entirely lacking in business foresight.

An international board of production and distribution would be necessary to help to administer peace. "Divide and conquer" could mean division of the world's resources to conquer war. In fact, many existing international organizations could be "converted" overnight to the purposes of peace, such as the world bank, through which a common money standard could be established and where forfeit, or bond, could be deposited from resources now being used for armament. In this way an adjustment and catastrophe fund would be available, providing nonpolitical financing for maintaining justice. In the past, some have been "our brother's keeper" in the sense that the freedom of some has been possible because others have been the "bound-men." Instead of the "blood and sweat and tears" of war, it is possible to provide bread, oil and milk, and through this establishing of lasting security for physical needs, liberate the spirit of mankind to enjoy his constructive accomplishments, at this critical time when destructive accomplishments threaten to rule the destiny of humanity.

The world is top-heavy now with overorganization and needs mergers and simplification instead of more burdens for the people to shoulder, such as proposed implementation of the Atlantic Pact. The methods for this simplification must not be beyond the comprehension of the human common denominator, nor so costly as to enslave him. In this simplification process it can become possible to stabilize the symbols of exchange if their antecedent, world economy, is stabilized first. Hindrance to world recovery and prosperity lies almost entirely in international relations, and it is governments, not peoples, that obstruct. On the other hand, an honest and practical organization need not disturb the status quo. Free enterprise could exist in every nation and philanthropy would go begging.

It is not a matter for pride that this Nation fails to realize that not all nations, in fact, few, if any, have had commensurate opportunity with the United States. This does not mean that this Nation should coddle others nor that they would like it. However, with interna-
tional relations on a firm and simple foundation, national development will take care of itself.

Centuries of living have taught the value of separation of church and state and that a person's religion is his private affair. International business can be conducted without mind control or interference in religion, business integrity is employed and respected for what it is worth, in contrast to the wiles of diplomacy. A lot of overhead in that line can be cut down, too.

Senators, do not sell down the "river," for 20 years, all latitude for world economic readjustment by ratification of this backward-looking pact!

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you very much.

Mr. Carl D'Aquino, of Brooklyn, N. Y.

This matter is on the treaty and it is not on any general questions. I understand you have a long statement here about general foreign policy and so on. You will have to get down to earth and talk about the treaty. Have you a prepared statement?

Mr. D'AQUINO. Yes, sir. It will take 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Not over that. That is our limit this morning.

What business are you in and where do you live? What is your name?

STATEMENT OF CARL D'AQUINO, BROOKLYN, N. Y.

Mr. D'AQUINO. My name is Carl D'Aquino. My address is 1867 West 12th Street, Brooklyn 23, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business?

Mr. D'AQUINO. I am a salesman for the Elno Corp., which manufactures portable electric-sewing machines.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an American citizen, I suppose?

Mr. D'AQUINO. Yes, sir; and a veteran.

May I state before lending my testimony for or against the North Atlantic Pact, a few facts about my past influence in creating a foreign policy through the late President, Mr. Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you claim that you formulated the foreign policies of Mr. Roosevelt?

Mr. D'AQUINO. I claim I inspired the creation of the United Nations back on August 26, 1936.

The CHAIRMAN. You say:

a few facts about my past influence in creating a foreign policy through the late President, Mr. Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Did you influence the President to adopt his course of foreign policy?

Mr. D'AQUINO. I believe I have. I most honestly believe that.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to hear from the real source of our foreign policy.

Mr. D'AQUINO. The proof of the matter can be found in a front page article in the New York Times of August 26, 1936. My letter was dated August 20, 1936. It provided an inspiring suggestion encouraging the creation of the United Nations. As proof of that I have a State Department letter dated September 11, 1936.

I would like to see the United States strong always, even if pacts are required to accomplish it. Just what is it that this pact lends to the
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

conduct of a saner life for all concerned? There seems to be some military assistance permitted to the North Atlantic countries and to that I shall address some further remarks.

I was with the Chemical Warfare Branch of the United States Army and the feelings I held on their contemplated activities, should gas be used by Japanese, were not envious. I have kept abreast of national affairs for 16 years and feel any remarks I make should be of some beneficial nature to you gentlemen. I observed the results of activities of chemical officials, who make claims about their products of research. Have these men provided a haven for themselves if they should loose their vermin on the populace and see their servants destroyed, their food, drink and dwellings? The only refuge then would be another planet.

I spent 3 years on active duty with the Army, 2½ of it overseas. I've witnessed certain reactions of dissatisfaction among the people who were rescued after 1 year of occupation. A Philippine Island provincial governor who was paid by the United States Navy for occupying his lands, also on which a fine airfield was created, was still dissatisfied because of the barrenness of the land. The land was practically saved for him by the bloodshed of many Americans, both male and female. In regard to foreign policy, I would suggest we take a permanent lease on that well-placed airfield for future use in the peaceful conduct of international relationships. One of their delegates has already asked for a pact in the Pacific theater, similar to that of the Atlantic Pact.

And yet I say, let's not have the policy of our Foreign Affairs Committee constantly influenced by other neighboring officials who look forward to such hand-outs of our Government to their own aggrandizement. We've neglected the internal affairs of our Nation too long. Greater concentration of thought should be given our native people, our veterans, our civilians, our women, and children, who inspire us to greater humane affairs. Let's be a little more selfish to Uncle Sam's children, where the appreciation is evidently sincerely strongest.

If we are to continue world leadership in foreign activities, all nations must be heard and recognized in voice. Yet in encouraging the voice of smaller nations, let's look forward to consolidating the many smaller nations bordering each other, to improving relationships amongst themselves, excluding, of course, the weapons of defense, offense, or any other name you may call it. By encouraging the introduction of communication systems, as well as transportation vehicles, on the ground, sea, air, or underground, and developing a fellowship of good neighborliness, and then permitting those nations to self-adjustment toward a more fruitful period of life, then progress of the right sort can be made. Even the encouragement of world government should be made, but without relinquishing the democratic ideals of the United States Government that are ideally accepted by other nations. My remarks as made regarding weapons are based on a study of a report made by the Senate committee investigations of munitions, headed by Senator Nye, a very able Senator.

Whenever investigations are made too little thought is given to the revelations that are made. One of their justifiable concluding remarks was that the trend is there are many bribes made in the executive branches of all governments for un-earthly enterprises, such as the con-
duct of war, conflict, genocide, and yet even another name is appropriate, premeditated murder by other participants, and not of the planners.

I've had the opportunity of observing constantly for the past 16 years the truthfulness of the conduct of the results of Senator Nye's committee. Their conclusions are pretty exact in many ways.

The North Atlantic Pact permits the donating of armaments to foreign nations of Europe. I say it is wrong. It is wrong because the same people gain by wars or even the donation of these instruments that eventually lead to conflicts. While on this subject I would like to ask two questions of you gentlemen.

Has Senator Burton K. Wheeler collected any moneys for his client under the Lend-Lease Act? His client, I'd say, was the man who helped the painter from Germany become a genocidist. Also, to whom were those payments made that President Truman declared in his last lend-lease report so vaguely and so much.

As far as I am concerned, I haven't as yet seen the profits of war removed from war materials.

Let's get and give further encouragement to ideals, those that tend to lend a greater outlook on life, that enrich rather than destroy. More apprenticeships in good trades should be encouraged, just as those spoken about in the United Nations chambers and by UNESCO. It seems we have given greater consideration to our enemy nations than to our own people here in America and our allies in China and the Philippines. I don't mean money when I refer to consideration.

The UN needs a definite injection of new blood to encourage the finer activities recommended by UNESCO. A better enforcement agency should be encouraged in the UN to prevent other conflicts, and patrol the seas, airlanes and grounds of destructive devices intended for genocide. If only a major concentration of effort were made toward developing nondestructive articles, I am sure a greater life could be enjoyed by all peoples everywhere. Rather than supporting a program of artificially created atmosphere, we would be concentrating on realism. That is the only ism I stand for now. The advice of men who seek the preservation of civilization must be heeded, not that of those who seek its destruction.

How can the honorable board—I mean the Foreign Policy Board—legislate properly when the reports of the Russian nation are really and truly not permitted a better analysis by the reporters of our newspapers? How much is really known of Russian activity to permit this Atlantic treaty to go through to its full intent to arm to the teeth the most meddlesome governments civilization has known to exist? If we again sectionalize areas and designate them as an armed force, those nations will again fail to recover economically and properly for humanity's sake.

To accomplish a peaceful world does not require the supply of a section of people with destructive instruments which bring good to no one.

If the same cooperative security were used as used by these nations participating in the North Atlantic Pact, to provide its people and the people of other bordering nations with the finer necessities of life and the peaceful products that are manufactured in peacetime, then a Utopian civilization would not be impossible, rather than have those
conniving delegations who get out of hand by accepting bribes to permit the contemplation and introduction of warlike and unneeded articles, to maintain a false and insecure governmental program that eventually leads to the destruction of fertile lands that sustain human life.

Only then can the North Atlantic Pact be an asset to the legislative geniuses that are assembled before me.

Do not misinterpret my remarks. I do not claim that those necessities should be given without any strings attached. There must be some form of remuneration.

The economics of the other nations should not be figured accountable with the economics of a going concern such as the United States Government. A separate set of books should be devised so that the burden of accountability does not fall entirely on the shoulders of the United States and its people.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you for the pact or against it?
Mr. D'AQUINO. I have stated that I am for certain views that do not permit the adding of additional armaments to these nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are against the pact.
Mr. D'AQUINO. Does the pact actually permit the donating of arms to these countries? It doesn't say it in the pact.

The CHAIRMAN. That is up to the Congress. That is for future action if we do it. It is not in the pact. We are just on the pact now. I would like to know if you are for the pact or against it.

Mr. D'AQUINO. I am only for the peaceful—

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. You are not going to answer my question, I see that.

Mr. D'AQUINO. The pact states that there is no donating of any arms at all, yet the papers give another view.

The CHAIRMAN. That will have to come up in the implementation, which is not before us but which will come later.

Mr. D'AQUINO. I will say I am for the pact but not for the implementation.

The CHAIRMAN. You are for the pact but you do not want to give them any arms?

Mr. D'AQUINO. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your statement.

Mr. Alcott L. Tyler, business manager, local No. 121, Chemical Workers of America, CIO. They are meeting somewhere now, the CIO. We have had several witnesses along the lines of the CIO, Mr. Tyler, and you will have to be very brief.

STATEMENT OF ALCOTT L. TYLER, LOCAL NO. 121, CHEMICAL WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO

Mr. Tyler. My opposition to the Atlantic Pact flows from the following:
1. It will tend to divide the world into two antagonistic and irreconcilable blocks;
2. This will intensify an uneconomical, wasteful, armaments race.
3. Internal economic conditions of all countries will worsen because of this armaments program which is a virtual indispensable part of the pact.
4. The fight by workers against unemployment, speed-up, and other economic consequences that will flow from the Atlantic Pact will hardly make for the stability necessary for peaceful relations within and among countries.

5. Big business that profits from armaments will, as they always have, fight against any attempt by workers to stave off speed-up, unemployment, and will even shut off commitments made under the Atlantic Pact, if such commitments interfere with their profits. This will mean that our country will be forced into the position of reneging on the commitments that the Atlantic Pact would mean.

I shall attempt to document my first four points. However, I should like to state now that the false hopes that the pact will generate in Europe and that we will later be forced to repudiate, will be the basis for a world-wide economic slump similar to or worse than that of 1929 which followed the failures of the Dawes and Young plans.

SUPPORTING DATA

1. Nearly all witnesses before your committee—either those for or against the pact—attempt to document my No. 1 point that the pact will force each country to join up in one or another block.

2. Secretary Acheson and others have indicated that an armaments program is an indispensable part of the pact. Over a billion dollars now, and several billions later if we are to keep our word should the pact be ratified. Already the so-called economy advocates in Congress are demanding the reduced appropriation of funds for social security, health, education, etc., in order to be able to support armaments for the pact and for the armed forces of other signatories, without materially increasing our already $40,000,000,000 budget. In addition to being a drain on our economy as a whole, as well as depriving us of necessary social services, an armaments program tends to create unemployment—as witness the technical improvements reported last month by the Standard and Poor's Corp.

This report high lighted the dropping of scrapping of alloy casting production; a substantial increase of worker output of electronic equipment; an increased productivity in the steel industry where units of production per man-hour, using 1939 as 100 reached a peak of 124 in 1948 against 123 in 1947 and 113 in 1946. The coal industry is another in which output per worker has made substantial gains. The conclusion of Bernard T. Frevert, who is writing for this corporation was that—

"... layoffs of least efficient workers in recent months have had a sobering effect on those still employed, spurring them to greater effort. Many corporation executives have noted this change in attitude. A west coast manufacturer sums up the situation by saying: "There is virtually no turnover now, and there is more regular attendance. Everybody is hanging on and putting more elbow grease into his work. If this trend continues, we should be in a good position to meet the keener price competition that lies ahead.""

These industrial experts were only voicing the general attitude of big business that under the guise of patriotism spurred workers to tremendous speed-up while they raised prices with a net result of 20 billion in profit, the highest in our history, more than twice the net wartime profit high of 1945. Workers will not long take this growing unemployment coupled with speed-up, as evidenced by the 62,000 Ford production workers strike.
The result of all of this will be that big business drive for greater profits under the slogan of rearmament to save our country from some cooked-up aggressor, will be checked, and I predict that any checking of the grabbing of profits by big business will result in a cooling of their ardor for aid to Atlantic Pact countries. Should our country accept the Atlantic Pact obligations, our ability to fulfill them will be at the mercy of big business' profit take. Such a situation is not one conducive to stability on which peaceful relationships within and outside a country depend. It is the wrong way to plan for international stability.

I urge, therefore, the rejection of the Atlantic Pact and an attempt by our Government to seek security and peace through genuine cooperation of all countries within the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. What business are you in?
Mr. Tyler. I am the business manager of Local 121, United Chemical Workers Union.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in some sort of business before you got this job, were you not?
Mr. Tyler. No. I worked in a plant.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am talking about.
Mr. Tyler. I worked in a plant, that's right.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of a plant?
Mr. Tyler. A chemical plant.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the duties of a business agent? You have the president of your local and the secretary. Where does the business agent fit in?
Mr. Tyler. He negotiates contracts, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Contracts for employment?
Mr. Tyler. Contracts for employment.

The CHAIRMAN. Or contracts for other things?
Mr. Tyler. Contracts for employment.

The CHAIRMAN. You are against the pact?
Mr. Tyler. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McDaniel, I notice you represent the People's Progressive Party.
Mr. McDaniel. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had four or five different witnesses from the Progressive Party.
Mr. McDaniel. I am representing the student division at the University of Wisconsin.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but you belong to the Progressive Party. How long will it take you to get through?
Mr. McDaniel. I have just one page. I will be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

STATEMENT OF WINSTON McDaniel, DANE COUNTY CHAPTER, PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF WISCONSIN

Mr. McDaniel. I am here representing the Dane County Chapter of the Progressive Party of Wisconsin. I am a student at the University of Wisconsin. I am a resident of Jefferson, Wis.

I also think that I can unofficially represent the views of 11 Madison clergymen who issued a joint attack against the Atlantic Pact a short
time ago. The basis of their attack was that they said the agreement will not insure peace, and they also attacked the influence of the military upon our civilian establishment.

POSTWAR AID

I would like to very briefly review our postwar foreign policy with respect to aiding other nations. First of all was the killing of UNRRA. The American people were told that the United States had sent enough aid to Europe. The real reason was the fact that 80 percent of the aid was going to eastern Europe, but this fact was not widely circulated. There is no official indication that any unilateral program of aid for Europe was being considered. The first development of the unilateral aid program was enunciated as the Truman doctrine, but this was not a means of feeding starving people but rather of fighting communism, and communism at the most critical points on the globe—Greece, China, and Turkey—found their military establishments benefited.

However, the American people were not happy with this type of aid and its purpose, so our leaders were pressured to devise a new covering or veil for this anti-Communist program. The new concept put forth by Secretary Marshall at Harvard was that, on the surface, the Marshall plan was not directed at any nation or against any ideology. This plan was so subtly presented that the American people concluded that the Russians were actually welcome, despite the sentiments expressed to the contrary in the Congressional Record.

The plan resulted in a grouping of the western European countries which we really wanted to build up as bulwarks against communism. So, under the banner of good will, charity, and brotherhood, this anti-Communist project was carried further.

WORLD DIVISION

This splitting of the nations into two worlds or spheres was so successful that the Western Powers became so united that our leaders decided to take another step forward. Thus, today we have the proposed Atlantic Pact. Again we claim that this is not directed against any specific power, but this argument has become a farce by now. It has become quite clear that our entire foreign policy has been geared to anticomunism, not aid to democracy or for the needy peoples of the world. These are merely selling points for the poisonous products of the bargain package of three values for one.

STEPS AFTER THE TREATY

Since each declaration of policy has been a veil for new pills to follow, one must ask what will follow the Atlantic Pact, if approved. We must grab hold of all the trains in order to understand the motives and the direction in which we are moving. I think that one may justifiably predict the following additions to the program:

1. Seven or eight billion-dollar program to arm western Europe. This would be a conservative estimate, and probably include only the first year of such a program.
2. Full cooperation of the economies of these Atlantic Pact members, and complete subordination of civilian authority to the military program and production, and training of large armies.

3. The climax of this plan, short only of the war which it might incite, will be a proposal for a Western Federation of anti-Communist countries completely aside from the United Nations. This would bring to a final death and complete burial any hopes for a strong world government. The Atlantic Pact virtually prepares this grave, and this is the burial ceremony to follow. Thus I claim that essentially that we have done is to walk out on the United Nations. We have claimed that the Russians have done this on occasion, and I think they have been very tactless in doing that. However, I think we are being much more subtle. We are paying lip service to the cause after we have in essence walked out.

QUESTIONS ON THE TREATY

In conclusion I would like to raise the following three questions:

What will we get for our seven or eight billion dollar annual investment? If there is to be an act of aggression upon the European Continent we have three possible bulwarks against this communism: Western Germany, Italy, and France. Are you going to put faith in the Nazis, the Germans, or are you going to rely upon a Nazi Army to stop so-called Communist aggression? Can we expect any support from France and Italy when one-third are Communists? Do we propose to erect a Maginot line along the Ruhr?

The second question: Where is the seven or eight billion dollars going to come from? Dr. Edwin Nourse, economic adviser to the President, has said that it must come out of the present military expenditures, the proposed $42,000,000,000 budget. If our economic condition is so serious, then it must be a question as to whether we arm ourselves completely or drop most of this program to arm the Socialists and Communists and pro-Nazis of western Europe, supposedly to fight the Communists of Russia.

How strong could this ungodly coalition become and how long could it last?

Finally, if it is not our intention either to provoke an attack by Russia or to wage an aggressive war ourselves, how can we possibly accept article 5, which obligates all signatory powers to assist any party or parties which have been the object of an armed attack; regardless of congressional power to declare war, there is nothing which would prevent the President of the United States from fulfilling our obligation by dispatching troops upon the slightest provocation. This would, in effect, nullify the power of Congress to declare war.

In conclusion, I would like to ask and request that further consideration of this be postponed, because I feel that the American people, upon the first news of the Atlantic Pact, concluded that the pact was signed and there was nothing they could do about it. However, recently, as the testimony has been introduced in the newspapers, after a lot of secrecy of about a month, the American people realize it is not completed, and I think the American people would like for time to consider it, so I ask your consideration of the postponement or the delay of recommendation to the full Senate.
The Chairman. You claim that the President could make war without the action of the Senate?
Mr. McDaniel. I think so.

The Chairman. Have you ever studied the Constitution any?
Mr. McDaniel. If the President dispatches troops to a certain area, and actually fulfills the obligation of this charter, the Congress could do nothing but declare war.

The Chairman. Yes, it could do whatever it pleased, because it reserved specifically "as it may deem necessary" as the Congress may deem necessary. I will not argue with you, however. What are you studying in the University of Wisconsin?
Mr. McDaniel. Political science.

The Chairman. How far advanced are you? What year are you in?
Mr. McDaniel. Third year. I am serving on the student board at the University of Wisconsin as vice president this year.

The Chairman. Vice president of the student board?
Mr. McDaniel. But I am not representing them here.

The Chairman. You are representing nobody but yourself?
Mr. McDaniel. The Dane County Chapter of the Young Progressives.

The Chairman. You are here representing a political party then?
Mr. McDaniel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You took active part in the last campaign?
Mr. McDaniel. Yes.

The Chairman. You subscribe unqualifiedly to the policies of Mr. Henry A. Wallace?
Mr. McDaniel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. All right. Stand aside.
Mr. McDaniel. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. We have had Mr. Wallace already, so your views reaffirm what he said, as I understand you.

Mr. Nicholas Topping. Mr. Topping, whom do you represent?

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS TOPPING

Mr. Topping. I represent quite a wide number of citizens of the State of Wisconsin.

The Chairman. No organization?
Mr. Topping. No organization.

The Chairman. What is your business?
Mr. Topping. I am a businessman in Milwaukee, Wis., and I have been very active in community and veterans' affairs.

The Chairman. What kind of business are you in?
Mr. Topping. I am in the retail business. I sell imported foods, foreign music records, and other specialties.

The Chairman. All right. Can you get through in 5 minutes?
Mr. Topping. I think I can.

The Chairman. We will give you 5 minutes.
Mr. Topping. All right, sir.

OPPOSITION TO TREATY

I am opposed to the ratification of the North Atlantic Pact because it is not a step toward peace, but can be a step toward war. I am
Opposed to the ratification of the pact because it is not a definitive pact, as so many of its supporters loudly claim. I believe that it is an aggressive move which will bypass the United Nations, and divide the world into two irreconcilable and hostile blocs.

It will inevitably lead to a series of measures and countermeasures on the part of both sides, particularly in the form of an armaments race which can only result in a war of complete devastation.

I am appearing before you today upon the request of many sincere and profoundly disturbed citizens of Wisconsin, as the result of a radio address I made, of speeches against the pact, and an advertisement placed in the Milwaukee paper. I have found widespread opposition to the pact, which is masqueraded as a pact for peace.

Those are copies of the advertisement that appeared in the Milwaukee Journal.

The CHAIRMAN. Who paid for them?
Mr. TOPPING. Quite a number of citizens in Milwaukee.

The CHAIRMAN. You collected the money?
Mr. TOPPING. I collected $252.

The CHAIRMAN. How much did you pay in?
Mr. TOPPING. $252.

The CHAIRMAN. We cannot put your ads in the record, because we are not running an advertising agency. Go ahead.

Mr. TOPPING. Working on this advertisement, I soon noted that many who opposed the pact were fearful of expressing their opposition. This is due, as you know, to the atmosphere of hysteria and intimidation prevalent in our country today. I personally experienced this.

For example, this paid advertisement I was instrumental in placing in a local paper was edited by the newspaper with the ultimatum that it could not appear unless certain key words were deleted.

Before the ad made its appearance, another ad tried to intimidate and harass local leaders by distorting and misrepresenting the purpose of the act, and even the individual signers were harassed. In spite of this, many people contributed financially to the expense of the ad, even though they were fearful of expressing themselves as endorsers of the statement.

As a veteran who served two and a half years in the African-Middle East Theater of War, in the capacity of a special agent in the Counter Intelligence Corps, I do not wish to see the major portion of my tax dollars and the tax dollars of other Americans pay for the rearmament of western Europe, a step which can lead only to war.

History, at the same time, has proved that arms races lead inevitably to war. The tens of billions that will be spent will have to be followed by American divisions because western Europe is not in a position to defend itself, and not in a position to support its ancient curse, which is a large standing army.

EFFECT OF THE TREATY

Not only will the implementation of the pact impoverish Europe, but it will disrupt our economy and dissipate our resources, and it can only mean spiraling prices, a continued lack of adequate housing, a continued lack of social security, health, and education measures, and also can only generate an even greater degree of war hysteria.
and depression. For example, the proposed Mundt-Ferguson-Nixon bill.

For lack of time I would like to go briefly over a certain number of other points I have in my statement, and one is the question of the automatic commitment of our country to war.

Article 9 of the pact gives the military council of the Atlantic Pact nations the authority to decide what action they can take, and in reference to a question you put before to Mr. McDaniel, of Madison, Wis., I do not know that James Reston, of the New York Times, when he was speaking in favor of the pact in the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on March 23, said categorically, “I do not think any President in the future is likely to wait for Congress to declare war after the Congress has passed, and the world has accepted our signature on article 5 of the Atlantic Pact.”

The question of the abrogation of the United Nations Charter, especially articles 51 and 52, are well known to you. I remember that a month ago the Department of State was telling us that the Atlantic Pact was a regional arrangement, but since that time, 1 month ago, there has been no reference to the fact that it is a regional arrangement, because a reading of the United Nations Charter would point out that this regional arrangement would not be separable.

The question of Spain, which is not a democracy, in my opinion, but is tied up indissolubly with Franco Spain, is another question that is causing a lot of concern among American citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Spain is not in this treaty. What has that to do with this?

Mr. TOPPING. Franco Spain is tied up with Portugal and there has been pressure on many sides, even in the last few weeks, to permit Spain to sign the Atlantic Pact.

The CHAIRMAN. She did not sign it, and she is not a party to it. Go ahead.

COST OF REARMAMENT

Mr. TOPPING. I would like to point out a conclusion here, again, what the staggering cost of the armament of Europe, together with the amount of money we are paying toward the cold war, is going to cost us.

I think China and Greece have shown that the $7,000,000 spent there, and the sole program of anticommunism, has not been successful. It has proved that you cannot contain an idea or a philosophy that has attracted as communism has. But if you can present a better idea, like an ardent, virile, dynamic democracy, you have a philosophy that can win the minds and hearts of men all over the world.

In my experience during the war, when I was very close to the Greek situation, and saw much of Greek history made, and had the opportunity to interrogate and interview and examine many of the present members of the Greek Government, high and low officials, doing refugee work, interrogation of Greek refugees, with British intelligence in the Middle East, it was easy for me to see, and many others who were close to the Greek scene, exactly what was to happen in Greece since we started to aid them. The Wyman report that was made public about a month ago also points out the conclusions that many of us have felt.
By way of recapitulation, let me just say the pact can only give us a false sense of security. As one prominent Milwaukee women's leader put it to me: The Atlantic Pact is just another shot of morphine to hold back the pain of honestly facing the underlying causes of war, of facing up to the steps that can lead but only to a war of destruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. You were in the United States Army Counter Intelligence Service?

Mr. TOPPING. The CIC—Counter Intelligence Corps, the counterespionage branch of Military Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you operating?

Mr. TOPPING. After a year of training here in the United States, I was sent to the African-Middle East Theater of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any United States armies there then?

Mr. TOPPING. Yes, there were troops in North Africa and the Middle East. And after the British Eighth Army, with the help of the Allies, defeated the Afrika Korps, Africa and the Middle East ceased to be a war zone but remained an important zone of supply and communications.

I can remember the many intelligence files I saw concerning the widespread espionage system of the Germans and the Japanese in Turkey, another country which is far from democratic, and which was far from being friendly to us.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not have an army in Turkey, did we?

Mr. TOPPING. No, we did not, because they were supposedly neutral.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a native-born American citizen?

Mr. TOPPING. Yes, I was.

The CHAIRMAN. You were? Are you not still?

Mr. TOPPING. Yes, sir. I am. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin?

(No response.)

Mr. Martin is not here.

Now we have the pleasure of hearing from Mr. Don Wilson of Clarksburg, W. Va., who represents the American Legion. He is accompanied by Gen. John Thomas Taylor, legislative director of the veterans' organization of the American Legion, and also by Mr. Robert R. Post, who is associate director of the national legislative committee.

STATEMENT OF DON WILSON, REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN LEGION; ACCOMPANYED BY BRIG. GEN. JOHN THOMAS TAYLOR, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE; AND ROBERT R. POST, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

General TAYLOR. I have Mr. Post and Mr. Wilson here Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The national commander, Mr. Perry Brown, approves the position of these gentlemen. He told me so personally. But it was impossible for him to be present to make the presentation. So we will have Mr. Wilson.

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I would be derelict if I did not express to you my admiration for the marvelous way in which these
hearings have been conducted this morning in the truly American democratic fashion when the pros and cons on such a vital issue have been presented to you, and with such patience on your part. Individuals speaking for themselves and individuals speaking for organizations.

Our speaker today is here to speak for the American Legion, three and a half million men and women who wore the uniform in the last two great wars; a million women in the auxiliary of the American Legion, the mothers, the wives, the sisters of these soldiers and sailors and marines. And we think, for 400,000 men who did not come back at all, we think we speak for them. We feel that way about it.

The democratic processes depend upon national security, Mr. Chairman, and this North Atlantic Pact is a part of our national security. It has been given careful consideration by the American Legion.

I have with me today a young World War II soldier, 40 months in the service, right out of the uniform, from the grass roots of the Legion, the department commander of the State of West Virginia, a brilliant young lawyer, delegated, designated by National Commander Brown, to speak for the American Legion: Don Wilson, of Clarksburg, W. Va.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I first of all want to thank this committee for the opportunity it has given to me personally, and to the American Legion to place before it the views of the national organization of the American Legion.

I have prepared a statement, Mr. Chairman, which I would like to introduce into the record in the interests of saving time, if it is agreeable to you. I shall extemporize on that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be satisfactory if you desire it. Go ahead.

(Prepared Statement of Mr. Don Wilson is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF DONALD R. WILSON, DEPARTMENT COMMANDER OF WEST VIRGINIA, THE AMERICAN LEGION, ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the American Legion has eagerly accepted this opportunity to appear before this committee for the purpose of expressing its views on the North Atlantic treaty.

In the light of some of the charges which have been made to the effect that the treaty is a prelude to war, it may be interesting and helpful to this committee to have an expression from the largest veterans' organization in the world, with over 3,000,000 members, giving its considered view that, far from being an instrument of war the treaty does much toward the accomplishment of its announced objectives of obtaining peace and security for the world.

There is no organization of individuals more devoutly interested in the cause of peace and security than an organization of veterans who have had the experience that can only come from participation in a global armed conflict. They have seen and felt the destruction that comes with war; they have observed at first hand the dislocations which result; they have seen the suffering not only of their comrades in arms but of all peoples.

As a result of their experiences in the first great world conflict, the organizers, leaders, and members of the American Legion during the years 1919-41 urged time after time that the United States of America keep itself militarily strong and cooperate with the peoples of other peace-loving and democratic nations, to present a united front against the aggressive designs of nations whose leaders were mad with a lust for conquest and power.

It was with a sense of impending doom during those years that the members of the American Legion, veterans of World War I, watched the United States destroy its military effectiveness, encourage aggressors by displaying only weakness, place its confidence in high-sounding but meaningless and nonimplemented declarations of policy, sit idly by while Japan plunged the dagger of conquest into...
a prostrate China, refuse to be alarmed and effectively cooperate to deal with Mussolini's blatant aggression against Ethiopia, and fail to see the significance of Hitler's relentless march into conquest against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Perhaps the attitude of mind of the American people during those tragic years was best expressed by our announced policy of neutrality, which amounted to a complete abandonment of our sense of obligation toward peace, freedom, democracy, and the human dignity of man.

Partially as a result of our abandonment of the responsibility in international affairs, another generation of Americans was called upon to secure in bloody conflict the peace that had been so carelessly thrown away. Another generation of Americans was called upon to participate in the destruction of a malignant way of life. Upon the conclusion of hostilities, there were then two generations of American veterans, members of the American Legion, who possessed an overwhelming desire to secure to future generations what had been denied to them, namely, a peaceful and secure world. They had seen and understood the war, even when conducted in a righteous cause, left behind it untold misery. Particularly after the Second World War was it apparent that the peoples in many nations in the world were disheartened, exhausted, and practically devolved even of a will to live.

It is out of that background of experience that the American Legion sees adherence to the North Atlantic treaty not only as a desirable step, but as an imperative step for the United States to take if we are to be consistent and progressive in our endeavors to build an edifice of peace. The participation of the United States in the North Atlantic treaty is not an isolated step; it cannot be considered alone; it must be considered only as one further advance along the road upon which we are now marching.

I have spoken of the peoples of some of the nations of the world losing their will to exist. In our opinion, that will was partially recreated by the hope that was held out to them when the United States joined in the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter. That served to sustain them during the difficult years of war.

At the conclusion of the struggle, with the promulgation of the Charter of the United Nations there was recreated in the hearts of the peoples all over the world a desire not only to live, but to struggle upward toward a goal which for so many years had seemed completely beyond reach and was now within the realm of the possibility of attainment. It was significant that so many nations which had gone through the experience of war could unite and struggle together for enduring peace through the framework of a world organization.

After the first enthusiastic acceptance of the United Nations, it became apparent that there were defects in the structure, defects which would be difficult to remedy. Because of those defects the Soviet Union has been able to expand its power and influence over practically half of Europe and much of Asia. It has been possible for the Soviet Union to contemplate the enslavement of the remaining portions of the world. Her obstructionist and aggressive designs brought about a situation which too closely parallels that which existed in 1939.

To meet Russian encroachments, and to fortify ourselves against enslavement from whatever source it might come, we came to believe that it was not enough for the people of the world merely to have the will to live and an ideal goal to struggle toward, but it was necessary for us to build within them the desire to promptly and effectively cooperate to deal with, themselves and their resources.

To that end the United States announced what might be called the most selfless act in the history of nations. We proclaimed the Marshall plan. We have been enthusiastic in our participation in it. We are proud to know that it is accomplishing its purpose, and we delight in the evidences of the increasing domestic strength of our friends.

After thus acting to do our part in creating the will to prosper, we observed with warm approbation the rebirth of the will on the part of these nations to protect what they and we were building; to resist all further efforts to deprive them of the progress they were making. It was for that reason that we so strongly approved of the Brussels Pact, which announced on behalf of five nations in western Europe that they would protect and preserve themselves and their way of life against all aggression.

Upon this background of history, we come to the North Atlantic Treaty. It is not only an expression of the will to resist, but it is an expression of the desire to work with others in maintaining that which is noble, good, and desirable.

As I previously indicated, therefore, the American Legion does not view the North Atlantic Treaty as an isolated step. It is merely one further imperative
step along the road we have been traveling since we were brought to a realiza-
tion that we have an obligation to shoulder our responsibilities in international
affairs.

It indicates our community of interest with other peoples having the same her-
itage of freedom and democracy that we possess. It indicates our desire to
be helpful to them and likewise to expect them to discharge their obligations
to us, to all other signatories of the treaty, and to the other peace- and free-
dom-loving nations of the world. It reaffirms our belief in the ultimate success
of the United Nations. Created within the framework of the United Nations, it
strengthens that organization by strengthening the members in it. It places us
on record as having learned the lessons of two wars, namely that aggression
against our friends so endangers our own security that we cannot permit that
aggression to go unchallenged. Our participation in the treaty will proclaim
to the world that the United States of America is not this time withdrawing
from its international responsibilities.

We do not view the North Atlantic Treaty as a mere play on words. The
pledges we will have given should be considered as solemn ones, as solemn
as a matter of fact that we are willing to work with others in building up
strength against aggression, strength in the diplomatic as well as in the military
spheres. We do not recoil from the use of strength if strength should become
necessary. The treaty leaves it open to us to ascertain what strength we must
begin to build now and what strength we should call into play if our cooperation
with our friends or their cooperation with us is ever challenged.

It is our sincere hope and belief that the participation of the United States in
the North Atlantic Treaty will help us to build a stronger and more peaceful and
a more secure world for ourselves and all generations to come. It is for that
reason that the American Legion, through its national executive committee, in
session on May 4-6, 1949, unanimously and enthusiastically passed the following
resolution:

"Whereas the treaty known as the North Atlantic Pact is now before the
United States Senate for ratification; and

"Whereas this pact was formulated under articles 51 and 52 of the United
Nations Charter for the peace and security of the member nations to this pact:
Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved. We urge early ratification and implementation as provided in the
articles of the pact."

I have the honor to transmit this resolution to you in the hope that its terms
will be met and in the hope that by taking the step recommended we will have
built peace, security, and prosperity, and will have advanced considerably toward
our goal of a strong and effective United Nations as the enduring foundation of
world peace.

Mr. Wilson, I have been particularly interested this morning and
on other mornings in reading in the newspapers some of the charges
that have been made in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty,
to the effect that actually it is merely a prelude to war. I thought
it might be interesting and perhaps helpful to this committee to have
the American Legion, representing over three and a half million vet-
erans and their families, appear here and state that it is its firm
conviction that this North Atlantic Treaty, far from being an instru-
ment of war, is actually calculated to accomplish its announced objects of peace and security for the United States and all the
world.

It goes without saying that there is no organization in the world
more devoutly interested in the cause of peace and security. To appre-
ciate that it is necessary to realize that the American Legion is com-
posed of members who know war first-hand. They have been through
the experience of war, they have seen families destroyed, they have
seen the destruction, the deprivation of all rights and human dignities.

Naturally, then, the members of the Legion are interested in obtain-
ing peace. We are sometimes interested in hearing individuals say
that we want war. No one who has seen war first-hand wants it. The
one who has seen war first-hand wants only peace and security and the human dignity of man.

As a result of the experiences of the veterans of the First World War, the American Legion was organized. Its organizers, its members, and its leaders, time after time during the years 1919–41, urged that the United States keep itself militarily strong, and that it cooperate with other peace-loving nations of the world to present a united front against aggression from whatever source it might come.

**ISOLATIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES**

Unfortunately many of the preachings of the Legion during those years were disregarded, and the Legion, viewed with a sense of impending doom the successive steps of the United States in withdrawing from its international responsibilities. We saw the United States refuse to participate in any form of international organization. We saw the United States place its reliance upon comparatively meaningless statements of broad, international policy that nations of the world made without any apparent intent to live up to them. We saw the United States absolutely disregard the necessities for being militarily secure.

We sat by while the United States looked at aggression as it occurred, and refused to act. The aggression that was accomplished upon China by Japan, the aggression that occurred when Mussolini marched into Ethiopia, the aggression that occurred when Hitler enslaved Austria and Czechoslovakia. As a result of our complete withdrawal from our sense of international responsibility we as a people proclaimed that we would be neutral and perhaps at that time we reached an all-time moral low when we thought we could buy our own peace and security at the expense of the freedom of other peoples of the world.

We all know the tragedy that came from that withdrawal, the tragedy is demonstrated here and throughout the United States, in that we built another generation of veterans who had once again to secure in war what had been carelessly thrown away in peace.

We had to once again liberate, as best we could, the areas of the world that were threatened with enslavement, and we entered upon that, to accomplish that task, and came back resolved that insofar as it was within our power, we work with all our strength toward the accomplishment of peace and security so that succeeding generations would not have to experience those things which the last two generations experienced.

So it is with that background of the Legion’s policy during the years 1919–41 that we approached the North Atlantic Treaty. We see in the North Atlantic Treaty not only a necessary and desirable step, but we consider it to be an inevitable step for the United States to take.

I might call to the chairman’s attention the fact that, as he well knows, during this Second World War peoples of the world at one time had almost lost, in many areas, even the desire to live; having been enslaved and oppressed they wondered whether it was worth the candle.

I think our Government recognized that when we joined in the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter, we gave to those downtrodden peoples of the world some glimmer of hope. We created in them some
desire to continue to live. We created in them the hope that eventually they would once again rise and be free. But that was only the beginning of this Government's policy in recreating a better and a stronger and a more secure world.

THE UNITED NATIONS

After the conclusion of hostilities in World War II we entered upon the proclamation of the Charter of the United Nations. To the Legion's way of thinking, the Charter of the United Nations gave to the peoples of the world an ideal toward which they could work. It gave them further hope that once again we might, with some degree of confidence, contemplate a great world organization that would bring to us all of the security that we had in times past thrown away.

But we did not stop with the United Nations, because it became apparent, after the United Nations had been in operation for a while, that there were defects in that Charter, and it is significant that one nation of the world, the Soviet Union, seized upon every conceivable defect in that Charter and endeavored, and with some degree of success endeavored, to bring about the enslavement of as many areas of the world as it possibly could.

Through its use of the veto power the American Legion believes that the Soviet Union has deliberately blocked every effort that could be made through the United Nations to bring about a peaceful solution of many of the problems confronting the troubled areas of the world today. We of the Legion recommended many changes in the Charter of the United Nations. We have recommended that it be strengthened in many ways.

Thus far, those recommendations, although never considered, and although this Government has been moving in the direction of the recommendations, have not borne the fruit that we would like to see them bear. So we approved, and enthusiastically approved, another step, although somewhat different from the Charter of the United Nations, still within its fabric and framework, namely, the proclamation of the United States in the Marshall plan, which we considered the most unselfish act that had ever been made by any country in the world.

THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE BRUSSELS TREATY

The American Legion went on record in the convention in New York as favoring the Marshall plan even before it became the policy of this Government. And it did so because it saw in the Marshall plan a further step along the road we wanted to travel, a step in which was not only the will to live created, but after the will to live was created the people of the world were to be given an opportunity to build their businesses, to build their economies, so that it would be secure, and we recognized that we had an obligation to help them in their efforts to do that.

Shortly after the proclamation of the Marshall plan we were most pleased that this Government saw fit to approve the proclamation of the Brussels Treaty, because the Brussels Treaty represented the intention of five nations of western Europe not only to live and to build their economy and their internal security, but it represented
that they had the will to resist any encroachments against them from whatsoever source they might come.

We enthusiastically endorsed that Brussels Treaty at our last convention in Miami, and we endorsed the principle upon which it was based. And now the North Atlantic Treaty we think follows so logically from that step, so logically that we are again enthusiastic in our approbation of that treaty.

SECURITY AND HOPE THROUGH THE ATLANTIC FACT

After having created the will to live, the will to build, now it is necessary to create in the hearts and minds of the peoples of these 12 nations, a sense of feeling that they are all working together toward a common goal, within the fabric of the United Nations, which represents their ideal to which they are struggling, and an ideal with which the American Legion is in hearty sympathy.

The North Atlantic Treaty, we believe, is clearly within the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Efforts have been made, as you well know, to say that it was not within the United Nations Charter. But it is clearly contemplated there that the nations of the world may work together to secure themselves against aggression, so that if there is no question there, as we believe there is not, then we view also with approval, the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty represents to the peoples of the world, that the United States, once and for all, has seen clearly its obligation in international relations, and that it has no desire to avoid those obligations; it has a desire to carry through with them, placing its strength, such as it may be, at the disposal of a great world organization. And at the same time requiring that the nations with which it is associated in this treaty, contribute their fair share toward the security of the world that we are all working toward.

The ratification of this treaty cannot help but be a great encouragement not only to the peoples of the nations with whom we are associated in it, but to the peoples of all the world, to see that the United States, great, strong, and powerful as it is, discharging its obligations and has no hesitancy to discharge those obligations to the fullest extent.

I must call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to this fact: The American Legion does not believe that this North Atlantic Treaty is just a play on words. We believe in the North Atlantic Treaty so strongly and so sincerely that we want our organization on record before this committee as favoring the implementation of that treaty. We have never looked forward to the use of strength as a means of obtaining great and noble objectives.

The American Legion, composed of veterans of two world wars, has never been reluctant to proclaim that if the occasion should arise, that strength should be used in the interest of righteousness and justice. And so we look forward to the implementation of this treaty when the United States becomes a signatory to it.

I have given you, Mr. Chairman, a summary of the views of the American Legion with reference to the North Atlantic Treaty, viewing it only as a logical step in the development of the policy we have been pursuing thus far. At the meeting of the National Executive
Committee, held in Indianapolis, Ind., recently—as a matter of fact the dates are on that, May 4 through 6—the National Executive Committee enthusiastically—and when I say enthusiastically, I mean that when the time came they rose to their feet and applauded this resolution.

RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

The Chairman. Read the resolution, and I want the press to take note of this resolution.

Mr. Wilson. The resolution is as follows:

Whereas the treaty known as the North Atlantic Pact is now before the United States Senate for ratification; and
Whereas this pact was formulated under articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter for peace and security of the member nations to this pact: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, We urge early ratification and implementation as provided in the articles of the pact.

Mr. Chairman, I have the honor to transmit this resolution to you, and to your committee, and to the United States Senate in the hope that its terms will be met, and in the further hope that by taking the step recommended we will have built peace, security, prosperity, and that we will have advanced considerably toward our goal of a strong and effective United Nations, as the enduring and ultimate foundation of world peace.

I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy of this committee in hearing the statement of the American Legion, and to express my own appreciation for the opportunity to be with you.

The Chairman. We thank you for a very illuminating and sound and splendid statement. I want to extend my congratulations to you, sir, for being the commander of the West Virginia American Legion, as I understand it. Is that correct?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. You have seen war in close contact.

Mr. Wilson. I have, sir.

The Chairman. And you know the ambitions of those who want peace and want to provide the agencies and the implementations necessary to secure peace?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct.

The Chairman. Is it not your view that this treaty is well within the framework—I think you said so a while ago—of the United Nations?

Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir; I believe it is clearly within the framework of the United Nations.

THE TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chairman. Is it not true that in article 1 of the treaty is set forth—

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes—

and so forth?

Mr. Wilson. That is right.

The Chairman. Is it not true that in several places within the present treaty it is unequivocally plainly stated that it is not in co-
lict with the United Nations Charter, but is in aid thereof, and supplementary thereto?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct, sir. And further than the words used in the draft of the treaty, the sentiment of the peoples of the nations that are signatory to it, is such that they all want this to be within the fabric of the United Nations and to contribute to the building up of the United Nations?

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

The Chairman. I do not want to lead you but I want to direct your attention to particular phases of the matter. Is it not true that this treaty is purely a defensive pact, and has nothing whatever, not a word, not a sentence, looking to aggression or the armed attack by the signatories upon any other nation or country?

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I cannot see, in this treaty, any indication of an aggressive design by the signatories to the treaty. There is not a word in here that would indicate an aggressive intent. As a matter of fact, the entire draft of the treaty, throughout, is indicative merely of a defensive arrangement within the Charter of the United Nations.

The Chairman. I want to direct your attention to article 5. This article reads:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all. Consequently, they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties—and that is what I want to direct your particular attention to—such action as it deems necessary—

that is each country—

Including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council—

That is the Security Council of the United Nations.

Such measures shall be determined when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Do you not construe the language that requires the nations to take "such action as it deems necessary," a complete assurance to the United States that under our sovereignty there is no automatic declaration of war, there is no automatic pulling into the war, but that it is up to the United States to determine what action it deems necessary in view of all the circumstances?

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, that is the only logical interpretation of those words that are used in that article 5.

The Chairman. Is it not true that article 5 acknowledges the overriding authority of the Security Council, specifically?

Mr. Wilson. It acknowledges it, and sets it forth clearly, in language that cannot be misunderstood by anyone.

The Chairman. In other words, whatever is done by the nations shall be reported to the Security Council?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. And that such measures shall terminate whenever the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security?

Mr. Wilson. That is clearly expressed in that article, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that this treaty is only directed against an armed attack by some nation other than a member of the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct.

SECURITY THROUGH THE PACT

The CHAIRMAN. And that it is intended to aid any of the signatories to the pact when an armed attack is made upon that nation by some other nation?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Without the joint action of these small and weak nations, would it not be possible for a strong power to pick them off, one by one, and thus consolidate a tremendous military establishment of some nation, with these nations incorporated therein?

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, the policy of an aggressive nation in picking off smaller nations has been well demonstrated to us in the not too distant past, when one by one the nations of the world that were weak and defenseless were picked off by nations that had aggressive designs and intentions.

The CHAIRMAN. What became of Estonia?

Mr. Wilson. Estonia is at the present time part and parcel of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. What became of Lithuania?

Mr. Wilson. It is in exactly the same posture, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And Latvia?

Mr. Wilson. In the same posture.

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the satellite states, what happened in Czechoslovakia, one of the oldest countries of central Europe, that had been democratic and had ambitions for freedom and liberty and constitutional government for hundreds of years? What happened to it?

Mr. Wilson. In Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union has moved in, bag and baggage, and has made Czechoslovakia a satellite of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. And a police state.

Mr. Wilson. A police state completely.

The CHAIRMAN. The same thing is true of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, is it not?

Mr. Wilson. That is true. And it is significant, Mr. Chairman, that each of those nations at one time or another has indicated that it did not want to get involved with any other nations in any sort of an arrangement or agreement to protect it against just such aggression as ultimately developed.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that in article 11 it is stated that—

This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes?
Does that not refute the claims of certain witnesses and others that the power of Congress to declare war or not to declare war is abrogated by this treaty? Does this not recognize that all action taken under this treaty by the governments of the signatories should be carried out in accordance with the respective constitutional processes, which would include the declaration of war?

Mr. Wilson. This article 11, Mr. Chairman, completely refutes the contentions of those who have said here before this committee that the United States could declare war without any action on the part of Congress, and in an unconstitutional fashion.

It is not contemplated by this treaty that such action be taken unconstitutionally. If that had been contemplated it would be difficult to justify the insertion of the words you just read in article 11.

The Chairman. And when the other article, which says that the countries may take such action as they deem best, individually, presupposes, does it not, that the nation will discuss and take such action under its constitutional provisions as it may decide necessary to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct.

The Chairman. I believe that is all, sir. We thank you very much. It is a great statement.

The American Legion, of course, is a great patriotic organization. You have the best interests of the United States at heart. And since your formation you have contributed to the civic and public functions and responsibilities of citizens, is that not true?

Mr. Wilson. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. We think so, too. It is a great patriotic organization devoted to the welfare of the people of the United States.

I want to thank you very earnestly for coming here and giving us such a clear and explicit statement of the views of the American Legion on this treaty.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I want to say to the public now that this concludes the hearings on this treaty.

Mr. D'Aquino. Senator Connally, may I ask a question, please?

The Chairman. What is it?

Mr. D'Aquino. About the article—

The Chairman. You have testified once!

Mr. D'Aquino. I have. But something has come up which I would like to make a remark about, this section 8.

The Chairman. Section what?

Mr. D'Aquino. Eight.

The Chairman. Make it short now. You have had 1 day in court. You are not supposed to have 2 days.

Mr. D'Aquino. I shall not read article 8, but I should like to ask a question in this regard: England, which is a part of this pact, now has an international agreement with Russia to permit the exchange of international trade.

The Chairman. That has nothing to do with this question.

Mr. D'Aquino. It is not in conflict with this treaty?

The Chairman. No, it is not. You are excused.

Mr. D'Aquino. That is what I wanted to know.
The Chairman. I want to say that during these hearings it has been
the intent, and I think the practice, of the Committee on Foreign
Relations to give every phase of public opinion represented by wit-
tnesses, a hearing in order that they may lay before the committee and
the country their views respecting this treaty. We have, I think, been
most generous, contrary to the complaints of some people that we are
rushing action. We are trying to perform our duty, we are trying to
respect public opinion, we are trying to give the citizens who desire to
come here a hearing.

We have heard 96 witnesses, which is among the largest—not the
largest, but among the largest—number of witnesses heard by any
responsible committee of the Senate for a number of years. The press
is witness to the fact that we have been here patiently from day to day,
trying to give opportunities for those interested to express their views.
We thank the witnesses for their presence here, and appreciate their
views.

There is one gentleman here, George R. Laird, who did not file his
request in time. He comes up here just as the curtain is going down.
If he wants to make some comments, he will have to make it mighty
brief, and mighty to the point, because we have given everybody
opportunity.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE R. LAIRD, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Laird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me just a minute.
I am enthusiastically in favor of this North Atlantic Pact. And I
was delighted to hear some people get up here and denounce it and
criticize it, because that shows the freedom of speech that we have in
America, and they do not have it in Russia. If you people, I, or any-
one else, got up and talked about anything that is advocated by
Stalin, he would disappear from the scene.

The great thing about this country is that it is a free country, free-
dom of speech, freedom of religion. Some have quoted Christianity
and religion as opposed to the Atlantic Pact. If you want opposition,
go to Russia where Stalin is atheist, and all the Russians, or nearly
all of them, are denouncing real religion. You do not get real religious
freedom there.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the mentioning of this fact, and I
want to say again that I want to thank the gentleman representing
the American Legion.

I gave a lecture on George Washington in Clarksburg, W. Va., 40
years ago, and I pointed out then, as I point out now, that George
Washington said, "The best preparation for peace is thorough prepa-
ratin from a military standpoint."

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Give the reporter your
name and occupation, and so on.

Mr. Laird. My name is George R. Laird, I live at 18 Fourth Street
Southeast. I was for many years a teacher in Wisconsin University,
in Northwestern, Ill., and for many years a lecturer on the Red-
path and the Radcliffe Chautauqua Bureau, having lectured in 40
States in every section of the country, on Washington, and Lincoln,
and Franklin, and other historical subjects.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your presence.
Miss Oswalt. Would it be possible for me to speak?
The CHAIRMAN. You will have to make it short. I did not stop you.
Miss Oswalt. I know it. I do not want to take advantage of it.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you want to say?
Miss Oswalt. I want to say that in proposing this foundation for international relations, if the North Atlantic Pact were, instead of being just announced as a definite treaty, if it were to make the stand, the North Atlantic nations, were to make a stand for this principle of equal economic opportunity, then we would have something on which to base a world police force, an authentic basis. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. These hearings are closed.
(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was closed.)
(The following statements were submitted for inclusion in the record:)

VILLANOVA COLLEGE,
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH,
Villanova, Pa., May 16, 1949.

HON. CLAUDE PEPPER,
Senator from Florida,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

I am sending this material to you as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate so that the points I raise in my letter to the Times may be considered in the hearings of that committee and in the preparation of the Senate report by the committee on the Atlantic defense treaty.
Believe me,
Yours very truly,
GILBERT MACBETH,
Associate Professor of English, Villanova College.

LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO THE ATLANTIC DEFENSE TREATY

(The letter that follows was denied publication by the New York Times, a similar letter having been rejected earlier by the New York Herald Tribune. Since the regular channel of publication in the press has proved unavailable to me, I have recourse to the present means of circulation.)

To the Editor of the New York Times:

However desirable the Atlantic defense treaty may seem from the point of view of immediate necessity, there are two objections to its acceptance by the United States that are grave enough to deprive it of its ultimate value as an instrument of American foreign policy.

One of these objections is that the terms of the treaty violate the provision in our Constitution relating to a declaration of war. Under article 5 of the treaty the United States agrees, in the event of an armed attack upon another party to the pact, that it "will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." But the Constitution specifies that Congress alone has the power "to declare war."

It has been argued that the expression "as it deems necessary" permits the signatory governments to exercise their individual discretion as to what action may be required of them in the event of an attack upon a member of the pact. Such an interpretation is untenable. The expression "as it deems necessary" restricts in no degree the meaning of the passage in which it occurs; if it were removed, article 5 would have the same force as before. The words "as it deems necessary" merely convey what would be assumed anyway, that each nation, being sovereign, of course decides what its obligations under the pact may be in any given situation.
At an illustration, let us suppose that Luxemburg, a party to the pact, should be attacked by Greece, and should be in clear need of military assistance from the United States. Let us suppose that our Government should find it inexpedient to give this military assistance. Could we plead before the world that we were not obligated to implement article 5 of the pact because in our judgment military aid was not necessary "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area"? Of course, we could not. We would be compelled by world opinion to give military aid to the attacked nation whether or not we believed that it was expedient for us to do so.

There is no escape from the conclusion that, as the pact now reads, it violates the letter as well as the spirit of our Constitution. The Senate by virtue of its treaty-making power cannot determine how Congress as a whole shall exercise its power to declare war. It is possible that our State Department was mired as to the import, or rather the lack of it, of the words "as it seems necessary," a phrasing that might well have been suggested by representatives of other nations concerned in the drafting of the treaty, conceivably eager to secure a commitment of military support by the United States in the event of war.

This difficulty in the treaty can be easily remedied. It is only necessary to replace the above expression by one like "as it shall determine" in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that Congress as a whole must declare war. Without some such alteration of article 5 it would be the office of the Supreme Court to rule the ratification of the pact by the Senate null and void.

The other serious objection to the Atlantic Pact is that it violates the terms of the charter of the United Nations, which the Senate ratified as a treaty by a vote of 89 to 2 less than 4 years ago. The Atlantic Pact conflicts with the requirement in the charter that:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice (art. 33)."

"Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council (art. 37)."

The United States has had a serious dispute, constituting a great danger to international peace, with the Soviet Union, one having begun over 2 years ago, and growing more serious with the passage of time. In January of this year Premier Stalin, in accordance with article 33 of the charter, offered to open comprehensive negotiations to settle the major differences between Russia and the United States. The United States Government rejected this offer, ostensibly because the Soviet Union could not be trusted to keep the agreements that might result from such negotiations. President Truman's expression of willingness to see Premier Stalin if he should come to Washington only underlined that rejection.

If we will not negotiate now, one may ask in passing, when will we negotiate? When will we decide that Russia can be trusted? Will we ever negotiate? There is no hope of peace in such an attitude; there is only the prospect of ultimate war.

The signing of the Atlantic Pact, a treaty initiated and promoted by the United States, followed hard upon the offer by Premier Stalin to settle by negotiation the differences between Russia and the United States. The Atlantic Pact is a substitute for recourse to the measures of arbitration and conciliation prescribed by the United Nations Charter for the precise kind of situation that now prevails between the United States and the Soviet Union. The confirmation by the Senate of the pact will be a violation of the UN Charter, a document which includes the solemn asseveration that the United States by accepting the charter has made its own:

"All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present charter (art. 2)."

This objection to the Atlantic Pact is one that is inherent, and can be removed only by the rejection of the pact by the United States Senate.
Senator Tom Connally,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Connally: At a recent annual meeting of members of this association which is composed of merchants, shippers, and exporters of American raw cotton in all the cotton-growing States of America the following was adopted with regard to the Atlantic Pact:

"Every American citizen is concerned with the maintenance of a peaceful world. The International trade in cotton which is our business and so important to the United States and the world is still suffering from the disruptions of the recent war. World war has hit us twice in a generation and each time there is a reasonable ground to believe it might not have, had the aggressor nations fully understood that we would be an inevitable and immediate participant. The Senate of the United States now has before it the Atlantic Pact in which we and the nations of western Europe agree to make common and immediate defense against any aggressor. This is a momentous step for the United States, but it is a recognition of the changed world situation, and vital to our own defense and democracy. We think we should so advise our Senators and we recommend the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the American Cotton Shippers Association urge the immediate ratification and implementation of the Atlantic Pact as essential to national defense and democracy; and

"Resolved further, That a copy of this resolution be wired Chairman Connally of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and sent to each other Member of the Senate, and that Justice Owen J. Roberts be advised of this action."

We respectfully request that you give the above expressed views of our members your careful consideration.

Yours very truly,

R. C. Dickerson,
Executive Vice President and Secretary.

statement of Moses H. Douglas, South Hill, Lempster, N. H., on the Atlantic Pact: Its Causes and Consequences

Major changes in the political motivation of the United States became fixed during the Senate leadership of Nelson Aldrich, (R. R. I.) who entered the Senate in 1878; and who stood for a theory of government which has been defined by his biographer as "the conception of society as an economic hierarchy, which is the heart of Hamilton's vision." See Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, page 317.

Mr. Aldrich's influence upon our wars with Spain and Germany has been underestimated, but to say that Mr. Aldrich and American policymakers alone effected the changes in our political motivation would be rash; for English pressure and discord-making have been incessant from Cobbett to Churchill, and all have been directed against American principles of government and political morality.

Of Cobbett, publisher of Porcupine's Gazette, 1793, in the capital city, Wyndham said in Parliament that he deserved a statue of gold for his services here in the interest of Great Britain, England's official pressure in 1793, and for 20 years thereafter, was rugged terrorism; and a project of British origin for detaching New England from the Union found its way into American State Papers (Vol. VIII: p. 258: 2d edition). After the War of 1812, subversion took the place of force. Beginning about 1828, our antislavery associations were altered from a wholesome national movement in all the States, to sectional abolition, largely by the labors of George Thompson, an English emissary (see George Lunt's Origin of the Late War, 1866). British periodicals came to New York during the Crimean War period, and Paris Conference, 1844-50. The cooperation of Sir John Russell with the Northern States in 1862, while British sympathy was believed to favor the Confederacy, amounted almost to an allied war (see President Davis' message to the Confederate Congress, December 1863).

Just before the Civil War the New York organ of the American Party was conducted by four British editors, and one American, Other New York papers, according to L. A. Wilmer (Our Press Gang, 1859), were not very differently
managed. The leading weekly story-paper, half a million circulation, was English owned. An Englishman owned the New York Herald.

During the period from 1890 to 1903, Charles Welsh, an English publicist, operating from an American educational publisher's, procured alteration in our school-books of passages unfilial toward Great Britain. I can speak without references concerning Mr. Welsh, who was my close friend; but for the sake of verifying, I will add that Mr. Welsh's most prevailing argument can be found in the Educational Review, January 1900. By 1914, nearly everyone in the United States under 30, had possibly felt Mr. Welsh's influence in favor of Great Britain.

At a critical moment in 1914, a newspaper in this country which is now featured as the most quoted paper in the world, made an English Journalist its editor. In 1946, Mr. Churchill brought the church's opposition to communism into American politics.

These are subversive and subtle acts. They can be verified. To study them is a liberal education in tyranny and intrigue. The people are unsuspecting, and need to be informed upon all the channels of foreign influence by volunteers as well as by governments. Yet whoever examines volume I, 1898, of the publications of the Institute of Propaganda Analysis, will find no mention of these acts, nor, strange to say, any mention of the American principles of government and political morality which they were meant to disrupt. In place of both, on page 2, he will find a formula of the type Washington described as an "imaginary common interest."

** * * A passionate attachment of one nation for another." Washington said in paragraph 33 of his Farewell Address, "produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into the one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification."

No common interest in human right exists between a sovereign who ordains justice in foreign intercourse, and one who is motivated by power. Nor is there common interest between the acknowledgment of political liberty, which we declared to be a universal right, and the English policy of order, or world government. They are contradictions.

As the policy of order has not perhaps been sufficiently publicized, I will cite it from Bell's Life of Canning; page 331: "Canning always protested against the system of holding congresses for the government of the world. Mr. Canning's 'system' of foreign policy, as described in his own language, resolved itself into this principle of action, that 'England should hold the balance, not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles; that, in order to prevent things from going to extremities, she should keep a distinct middle ground, staying, the plague both ways.'"

In order to bring the United States into this system of mutual slaughter, which mows down friends and foes alike, for England's economic advancement, a common interest is imagined in peace and freedoms which have been promised by war makers possibly from the beginnings of civilization, although these ancient gold-bricks are conspicuously absent from our constitutional objectives.

Peace is always subject to recall by an executive, through shaping public thought into a popular demand for war. Our fathers accordingly, provided that peace should not take precedence of justice; nor should aggression on the part of the United States invite the political liberty of another nation. They implemented these provisions with a risk of impeachment for the man held responsible for war making, their chief executive.

These provisions were not merely isolationist ideals, though our unique ordnance of justice isolates us in a distinguished sense from other nations. They were partly an indignant reaction against the dumping-ground policy of British commerce, shown in the following extract from a letter of the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations to Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, in 1756: "As we are by our commission directed to consider of the means to prevent the colonies from furnishing themselves or other colonies with what may be supplied from this kingdom, we cannot give it as our opinion that you should comply with the request of the persons concerned in the scheme (the manufacture of linen) that they may be erected into a corporation."

Instead of moralizing upon this grasping system of servitude, I will cite a London correspondent of the Boston Transcript (Carroll Binder), quoting an English official, August 23, 1937. He shows that the balance of power in which we last took part, was motivated by the same interests which governed the Lords Commissioners in 1756:
"There is absolutely no thought in official quarters here of leaving the luscious prize of China to be devoured or destroyed by either the Japanese or Chinese. The British have enjoyed it a long time and expect to continue enjoying it when this shooting is over.

"Things may look black now for British interests. But Britannia will be heard from when the combatants' strength is spent by prolonged warfare."

In my opening reference to Mr. Aldrich, he was further described as believing that a "divine right to rule had passed from kings to property." Such a departure from the sovereignty of the people explains our changes of political motivation, and our participation in two British balances of power, as well as the project to tie our hands from making just or lasting peace and our participation from the sovereignty of the people explains our changes of political motivation.

The Atlantic Treaty is a typical British balance of power, and a British balance of power without a war for economic conquest is unusual. I believe it would be unprecedented.

LORD, D'AY & LORD,

HON. TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: I desire to add my voice to those who are urging upon your committee that it recommend to the Senate ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Professional obligations have prevented me so far from asking time for personal testimony before the committee, and you have already had a long list of witnesses before you. However, if before your hearings close my appearance should be desired, I am now available. But in any event, feeling strongly on the subject, I desire in this way to record my view that great injury to the cause of peace, of economic stability, and of mutual confidence among nations would be the result should this country not now adhere to the treaty. I write this as one who is not only interested in international affairs but has some knowledge about relations in Europe.

I have the honor to be the first head of our economic mission to France during the war, and saw at first hand that country as it emerged from German occupation and from the horrors and destruction of the fighting. I have both business relations and a number of personal friends in France, Belgium, and Holland, and have made it a point to keep closely in touch with the progress of events in those countries. I was in Europe last summer and observed the development and probable consequences of the Marshall plan, which was then beginning to function, and also discussed the situation with various business interests, Government officials whom I have known, and others.

I am convinced that the Marshall plan has done a great deal to bring about economic rehabilitation in western Europe and to preserve or restore conditions in which democratic institutions can be maintained. On the other hand, I am equally convinced that something more than the Marshall plan is needed. I know a number of instances where, despite the economic improvement which the Marshall plan has accomplished, much needed investments in plant rehabilitation or in new industrial enterprises, for which there is a need, have been withheld because of fear of the future. In France and in Holland the fear of war has been expressed as fear of another occupation. And in the instances to which I have referred I was informed that investments of funds which were available were being withheld because of fear that if plants were modernized or new plants constructed they would simply be taken over by occupying forces. In many personal conferences last summer and in correspondence since then it has been impressed upon me that the Marshall plan could not achieve its maximum usefulness and full European recovery could not be had unless something could be done to inspire confidence and remove or mitigate the fear of another war and another occupation.

While there is, of course, the risk that the intentions of the countries entering into the North Atlantic treaty may be misinterpreted, nevertheless I strongly believe that, balancing all considerations, it affords the most immediate hope which we have of imparting some degree of confidence to the people of western Europe. And I certainly believe that at this stage for this country to refuse to adhere to the treaty would destroy hope and invite a breakdown of morale whose consequences would be terrible.

I shall be glad to have this letter made a part of your record.

Yours respectfully,

PARKER MCCOLLESTER.
To the Members of the Foreign Relations Committee, of the United States Senate.

GENTLEMEN: I am transmitting herewith a resolution adopted by the national affairs committee of the City Club of Chicago and approved by the board of governors of the club, endorsing the North Atlantic Pact and urging its immediate ratification by the United States Senate.

We trust you will give the pact your personal support.

Sincerely yours,

G. D. YOAKUM,
Chairman, National Affairs Committee.

RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, CITY CLUB OF CHICAGO, ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

Whereas the North Atlantic Pact is claimed to be a defensive movement within the framework of the United Nations, and is for the sole purpose of protecting the independence, political rights, and individual liberty of the citizens of the member nations and their present boundary lines; and

Whereas many of our citizens deem a pact necessary wherein the United States shall accept responsibility in proportion to her power to protect the weaker nations from any aggressor: Be it

Resolved, That this committee approves of the North Atlantic Pact and urges its immediate ratification by the Senate of the United States.

The following recommendations of the department of International Justice and good will of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America are also approved by the committee and are an integral part of the committee's action.

Recommended that the Senate declare that ratification of the pact:

1. Is not construed as closing the avenues of diplomatic conversation with the Soviet Union.

2. Is not construed as the equivalent of, or as a substitute for, a universal system of collective security.

3. Is not construed as the equivalent of, or as a substitute for, those curative and creative efforts of government through which it is sought to promote economic recovery, to strengthen the institutions of democracy, and to advance the political and social well-being of subject and dependent peoples.

4. Is not construed as comprising in any way the prior responsibility of the President and the Congress in the shaping of American foreign policy.


HON. TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Connally: It is my pleasure to present to you the attached text of a resolution unanimously adopted by this council at its recent spring convention in Denver, Colo.

We shall be grateful to you if you will kindly instruct that the text of this resolution be placed in the record of the hearings on the Atlantic Pact.

With kind personal regards,

Cordially yours,

WILLIAM HARLLEE BORDEAUX, General Secretary.

RESOLUTION ON RUSSIA ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES, MEETING IN DENVER, COLO., APRIL 27-29, 1949

There is no dodging the fact that atheistic communism is on the march, and that the very existence of western civilization and freemen is threatened. A strong military defense is an absolute essential to deter Russia or to deal with her in case of aggression. Indifference, compromise, and confusion, to which the United States is a party, have made possible her expanding power and the liability to hold a peace conference following World War II.

We call for the ratification of the Atlantic Pact with its present intent and purpose, and the implementation of the same. The threat of war is real and the
cry of Pacifists and Socialists in the Federal Council of Churches should be recognized for what it is—an undermining force aiding the Russian cause.

We hold that Christian principles and common sense require that an understanding with Russia be secured before the advantage the A-bomb gives the West is equalled by Russia's own supply of the weapon. To sit idly by and permit Russia to move for the leadership and control of the world is the utmost folly.

At the same time, we would remind those in positions of authority that it is righteousness which exalteth a nation, and that our first line of defense should be a spiritual one in a return to God through Christ, in repentance and confession of our sins.

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS,

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I hope you will permit me to file with your committee the attached statement in support of the North Atlantic Pact now receiving consideration by your committee.

Will you please make my statement a part of the committee's record.
Very truly yours,

Geo. M. Harrison, Grand President.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE M. HARRISON, GRAND PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY CLERKS, SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS URGING APPROVAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

I should like to express my appreciation to the honorable chairman and members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the opportunity to present my views in support of the North Atlantic Treaty. I wish to state categorically it is my view that the North Atlantic Pact should be approved by the Senate of the United States. I believe such action is in the best interest of world peace and is essential to the security of the American people.

The Congress of the United States has twice in our lifetime decided the United States could not remain aloof from war which we had no part in starting. All our efforts—and it has been a sincere effort in both instances—to isolate ourselves from the differences that arise between the nations of the world have failed to leave our Nation free to pursue its own course in peace. These differences that have accumulated between nations which have ultimately exploded into world conflagrations have in both instances involved the interests of the American people so greatly that they have finally cost American lives and resources before they were finally brought to an end. Our experience in these two instances should be proof enough that the interests of the American people cannot be protected if we are to await until wars are started before we assert our influence. The conclusion would seem obvious that we must of necessity inject ourselves into the problems that arise between the nations of the world in our own self-interest. If, as has been our experience twice in our own generation, we cannot avoid being drawn into the wars that arise from the differences between other nations, it follows that our influence should be exerted to resolve these differences in an effort to avoid wars.

The American people are convinced that since we cannot remain aloof from world conflagrations, we must try to prevent their starting. Public opinion in the United States, so far as I have been able to determine it, is overwhelmingly in favor of our Government taking an active part in preserving world peace. This opinion is evidenced by approval of the action of our Government in initiating the formation of the United Nations. Public opinion overwhelmingly endorsed the action of the Senate in approving the United Nations Charter, and public opinion continues to support the United Nations.

Our Nation has contributed great stores of our resources within the past few years and we are continuing to do this for the purpose of assisting in rehabilitating the economic systems, not only of our allies in World War II but also of our enemies during that war. The people of this Nation have approved this action of Congress because they understand that hunger and deprivation breed the despair which causes people to turn to totalitarianism. The American people understand there can be no security and prosperity for ourselves with much of the world in economic chaos.

HOR. TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Our Nation has contributed great stores of our resources within the past few years and we are continuing to do this for the purpose of assisting in rehabilitating the economic systems, not only of our allies in World War II but also of our enemies during that war. The people of this Nation have approved this action of Congress because they understand that hunger and deprivation breed the despair which causes people to turn to totalitarianism. The American people understand there can be no security and prosperity for ourselves with much of the world in economic chaos.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 1189
The citizens of our Nation have approved the action of our Government in exerting every effort to encourage the formation of organizations of the nations in the several regions of the world committed to the use of the conference method for the settlement of disputes. The Bogotá agreement of the nations of the Western Hemisphere; the encouragement by our State Department of the adoption of the Benelux agreement, under which it is planned to integrate the economies of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg; the assistance given the western European nations under the Marshall plan in the formation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which has as its objective the integration of the economies of all the Marshall-plan countries—all of these have the approval of the overwhelming majority of the American people because they are convinced each is essential to the attempt of our Government to build an arch of world well-being and understanding to sustain world peace.

So far, our efforts have been primarily devoted to the rehabilitation of economic systems of the western European nations. This is as it should be, for economic chaos breeds political instability. Without political stability, there cannot be security from internal and external aggression. Political stability seems fairly well assured by reason of the economic assistance so far rendered by the United States. These western European nations are not yet sound pillars in the arch that sustains world peace because the task of economic rehabilitation has not been finished. Congress has itself, through extension of the Economic Cooperation Administration, acknowledged the need for our continued help to the western European nations. These nations will make greater progress the greater is their feeling of security from external aggression. Approval by the United States Senate of the North Atlantic Pact will enhance their feeling of security and the rebuilding of their economies will be speeded because of the greater confidence of the people in their security from attack. The point of all our effort so far in rendering assistance to the western European nations has been to strengthen them to make them a greater force in preserving world peace. The North Atlantic Pact will further this cause.

The assistance rendered by the United States in western Europe, to Greece, to Turkey, and in other troubled spots of the world, and the firm position taken by our representatives in the United Nations, has demonstrated to Russia very pointedly that her tactics are out of harmony with world opinion. This is demonstrated in a very telling manner by the votes cast on the propositions which have come before the United Nations General Assembly. Whereas, in the earlier months of the sessions of the General Assembly, Russia found a few nations voting with her and others abstaining from voting, in recent months the Russian position has been supported by only the six votes she controls, and many of the very nations which previously abstained from voting now demonstrate by their votes that they recognize the Russian obstructionist tactics for what they are. Our position in the United Nations Council could have been reversed today had we abandoned the western European nations to their own misery following the close of the war. Our economic aid to those nations can be said to be responsible in a large measure for preventing the spread of communism in those countries and, consequently, for sustaining our position on the questions that have come before the United Nations. Our positions could yet be reversed in the Councils of the United Nations if we were now to adopt a policy which abandoned the western European nations to shift for themselves. Congress has expressed the views of the American people against such a policy by approving the continuation of economic aid through the extension of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

We have built well the foundations for an arch to sustain world peace. The Atlantic Pact is the keystone of that arch. The arch rests on the free democratic nations of the world with one pillar in the United States and the other pillar resting in western Europe.

The North Atlantic Pact, as with other regional agreements mentioned above, finds approval in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is not, therefore, an alternative to the United Nations as an instrument for bolstering world peace; rather it is a device for strengthening the United Nations— one which has the full approval of that Charter.

The North Atlantic Pact is solely defensive in character. Any nation that views it as an interference with its national policy admits that aggression and the subjugation of other nations is a part of its foreign policy. The representatives of our State Department and the foreign offices of the other nations which it has been planned will subscribe to the North Atlantic Pact have been skilled in shaping the keystone of the arch upon which world peace must rest. The
Senate of the United States should take the action which is overwhelmingly endorsed by the American people and drop that keystone in place by promptly giving its approval to the North Atlantic Pact.

Volunteer Educational Center for the
United Nations, Trinity College.

To the Honorable Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington 25, D. C.:

Believing that the North Atlantic Pact will be a strong factor in defending the United States, Canada, and western Europe from any possible attack and, at the same time, be an effective aid toward international peace and security, we, the undersigned, respectfully urge the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report in favor of the ratification of the pact.

Volunteer Center for the United Nations
International Relations Club
[Signatures omitted],
Students of Trinity College.

Willard Straight Post,
Post No. 842, New York, the American Legion,
New York, N. Y., May 9, 1949.

Hon. Tom Connally,
The United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Senator: As commander of the Willard Straight Post, I am enclosing herewith copy of a resolution adopted by that post at its meeting held on May 2, 1949, urging ratification of the Atlantic Pact.

Very truly yours,

Irving M. Engel, Commander.

This is to certify that the following preamble and resolution were duly adopted at a meeting of the Willard Straight Post, No. 842, of the American Legion held May 2, 1949:

"Whereas, the Atlantic Pact is essential to the independence, freedom, and security of the United States and the nations of western Europe: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That we call upon the United States Senate to ratify the Atlantic Pact and to provide adequate implementation to assure its effective operation."

Irving M. Engel, Commander.

Hon. Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Senator: I am writing to add my word of approval of the North Atlantic Pact. It is very unfortunate that a few church leaders have issued a statement withholding approval of the pact. These statements are in no way official expressions of the Methodist Church. I am convinced that the vast majority of our Methodist members and ministers are in favor of it. I look upon it as an extension of the principle embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. It will certainly be a very effective deterrent to any aggressor nation. I hope that your committee will give it prompt approval for ratification by the Senate.

My best wishes.

Faithfully yours,

Clare Purcell.
In the light of its resolution on the United Nations calling for United States adherence "to a democratic foreign policy consistent with the aims of the United Nations Charter," the National Council of Jewish Women has considered the North Atlantic Treaty and adopted the position stated below.

The National Council of Jewish Women supports the basic premise of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely, that the threat of aggression in Europe requires adequate measures for self-defense. The National Council of Jewish Women recognizes that aggression against the countries of western Europe threatens United States security. We recognize also that the United Nations has not yet demonstrated its ability to prevent such aggression and that the United States and the countries of western Europe must act to guarantee their security. The aggressors of the two world wars were spurred on to attack by the fact that the United States was not committed to the defense of western Europe. Potential aggressors now and in the future must know in advance that the United States will not remain neutral if Europe is attacked. The North Atlantic Treaty is a statement of America's intention to guarantee the security of western Europe.

No one denies that the treaty strengthens its members by providing for their collective defense against attack. But the treaty is criticized on the ground that it conflicts with the United Nations. This is not so. The treaty, in fact, strengthens the United Nations by strengthening the security of the North Atlantic area which is so critical to the peace of all the nations. The treaty supplements and does not supplant the United Nations.

To date the United Nations has been unable to secure peace. Russia has consistently used the veto to obstruct the settlement of problems plaguing the world. In Berlin, in Korea, in Iran, and in Greece, force has prevailed as the instrument of international settlement. It has also been impossible to establish the International armed force without which the United Nations cannot maintain world order.

The National Council of Jewish Women therefore supports the North Atlantic Treaty as a realistic measure of collective defense against military attack. We must, however, make certain that the treaty is given its proper place in the whole of our foreign policy. Economic aid to Europe, support of the United Nations and assistance to underdeveloped areas, as well as strengthening freedom-loving nations against aggression are the basic aspects of American foreign policy, which were enunciated by President Truman in his inaugural address. All these programs must be supported with equal vigor if the United States is to pursue a constructive and democratic foreign policy.

It is especially important that the military aid which the United States will provide as a concomitant of the treaty is balanced against the economic aid which continues to be essential to the recovery of Europe. This balance requires that economic aid is not made secondary to military aid. The National Council of Jewish Women believes that American aid for European recovery must take precedence over any armament program. We urge that it be carefully and publicly stated that the ECA program has first claim on American funds for Europe.

United States support of the United Nations has always been, and continues to be, strong and devoted. Support of the United Nations must continue as an integral part of United States foreign policy. For this reason, the NCJW believes that the treaty should not be limited to a particular regional grouping but should be opened to all nations willing to abide by its provisions. The treaty itself offers no prohibition against this. Article 5 of the treaty which binds the members to act if any one of them is attacked, takes its authority from article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which specifically recognizes the right of individual or
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

collective self-defense, and does not limit this to regional arrangements. If
the treaty is opened to all nations, then the signers of the treaty will avoid estab­lishing themselves as a bloc within or outside the United Nations. They will be
stating their determination to maintain collective security within the spirit
and letter of the Charter.

In his inaugural address, President Truman outlined, as one of the four funda­mentals of the United States foreign policy, a program of technical and scientific
assistance to the underdeveloped territories of the world to aid in developing
their economies and strengthening the economy of the world. This program
will add great weight to the democratic nature of American foreign policy and
will give tangible evidence of the United States concern with the welfare of
dependent peoples. That North Atlantic Treaty must not be allowed to conflict
with this policy by binding the United States to support of the colonial policy
of any major power. It must be made clear that article 4 of this treaty, which
calls for consultation when “the territorial integrity” of any of the parties
is threatened, does not require the United States to aid in supporting the
colonial policies of the treaty members. The purpose of the treaty is the pro­tection of the metropolitan territories of the signatories, not of colonial areas.

The severe rift which exists between the United States and Russia requires
the North Atlantic Treaty for self-defense, but this must not bring the United
States to base its foreign policy solely upon military considerations. Peace will
be maintained and economic stability assured through the combined measures
of strengthening freedom-loving nations against aggression, strengthening the
United Nations, rebuilding the economies of the war-torn nations, ad develop­ing the potential economic resources of the backward areas. All of these steps
taken together will form a total American democratic foreign policy.

THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,

HON. THOMAS CONNALLY,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I should like to submit for your information the
enclosed statement on the North Atlantic Pact by the world order committee and
the juridical institutions subcommittee of the Catholic Association for Inter­national Peace.

Sincerely yours,

RITA SCHAEFER, Committee Secretary.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE WORLD ORDER COMMITTEE AND THE JURIDICAL
INSTITUTIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

The North Atlantic regional pact for joint defense of the United States, Canada,
and western Europe seems necessary. It is consistent with the UN and may fill
gaps in the UN. It should, in fact, have been entered into in some form years
ago to fit long-standing realities of the North Atlantic countries. Accompanied
by the present swift but difficult steps toward European economic and political
unity, themselves magnificent, the pact has already had good effects.

These committees urge its speedy ratification.

The present inadequacies of the UN to maintain international peace and security
due to the veto in the Security Council require other means of adequate protection
against aggression or armed attack. The North Atlantic Pact is a necessary step
forward in this direction.

The North Atlantic Pact is consistent with the UN in that the UN provides for
regional pacts and for collective self-defense. Some have contended that a
regional pact violates the idea of a world organization. The UN Charter itself
takes no such position, and the American states, even before the UN was formed,
took steps to form a far closer regional agreement than that of the regional North
Atlantic Pact. In fact, there should be no contradiction of a world organization
with regional organizations any more than with national governments. All three
are needed and have to work together.

Others object that the pact is a threat of aggression against Russia, or at least
that Russia will consider it. Anyone who knows American, Canadian, and
west European opinion could scarcely construe the pact as anything but defensive.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Now that the countries of this region are determined to work together in the pursuit of peace, their Atlantic Pact, although not yet in effect, has already had a salutary effect on the Soviet.

A change in the Soviet is necessary to save the UN. Every pressure of peaceful opposition to any Soviet aggression, every practicable move for world and regional peaceful cooperation, inclusive of Russia if she will enter, or apart from her if she refuses, and such joint agreements on regional military defense as the organization of American states or the North Atlantic Pact needed to wake up the Soviet to her dangerous policy, should be used.

The Atlantic Pact can, therefore, be a means of saving the UN.

We entered a pact in the UN for the defense of every country and we entered a pact for the joint defense of the Western Hemisphere in the organization of American states to solidify a similar decision that we made alone a century and a quarter ago to defend the Americas from western European agression. However, in the North Atlantic old prejudices make some of us hesitate.

Yet for the last 50 years our own well-being, the well-being of Europe, the prevention of two world wars, and prevention of the depression of 1929 largely depended upon Europe, Canada, and the United States working together. In the Marshall plan, in the drive for a united Europe, in the continued use of the UN, and now in the Atlantic Pact, we are catching up somewhat with the facts.

The Atlantic Pact is only one part of a general plan. It is an essential part. The great hope is that through the success of these other methods there will never be need to use military action to defend Europe, Canada, and the United States. Meanwhile, in adopting the Atlantic Pact, let us employ and strengthen the UN and hasten the union of Europe.

POWELL-MARTIN-BARRETT POST, No. 37,
THE AMERICAN LEGION,
Lake Providence, La., May 13, 1949.

CHAIRMAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: The Powell-Martin-Barrett Post, No. 37, of the American Legion, located at Lake Providence, La., with a membership of 905 active members, has unanimously adopted the following resolution relative to the North Atlantic Treaty or pact of mutual defense now pending before the Senate.

We will appreciate your committee’s favorable consideration of this resolution, which we believe has the support of the vast majority of the American people.

Yours very truly,

POWELL-MARTIN-BARRETT POST, No. 37,
By MAX F. STOCKNER, Adjutant.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED (IN SUBSTANCE) BY POWELL-MARTIN-BARRETT POST, No. 37, OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, LOCATED AT LAKE PROVIDENCE, LA., AT ITS SESSION OF APRIL 20, 1949

Whereas currents or movements are discernible in this Nation tending to defeat or weaken the effect of the so-called North Atlantic Security Treaty or Pact of Mutual Defense now pending before the Senate; and

Whereas these endeavors assume the direct form of opposition to ratification of the said treaty and the indirect forms of opposition to adequate provision of arms and economic assistance to nonaggressive European nations and of opposition to prolonged maintenance of the United States flag and United States forces on European soil at the outposts of the prospective western alliance; and

Whereas the said neoisolationist endeavors, if successful, would, in our opinion, not only gravely impair the power position of the United States and hence its security, but would render a third world war more probable, and victory in such a war more difficult and costly in lives and resources; Therefore be it

Resolved by Powell-Martin-Barrett Post, No. 37 of the American Legion:
I. That the United States Senate be and it is hereby respectfully memorialized to ratify the said North Atlantic Security Treaty or Pact.
II. That the Congress of the United States be, and it is hereby, respectfully memorialized to support the following objectives in appropriate ways, and consonant with executive leadership:
   A. Adequate rearmament and economic rehabilitation of friendly and non-Communist Europe and, where expedient, Asia, by the United States within the bounds of sound strategy and financial policy.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

B. Maintenance of the United States flag and suitable armed forces at key points in Europe in order to warn Teuton and Slav, and to reassure the rest of Europe, of United States determination forcibly to resist, and capacity to halt and eventually repulse, aggression; and thus presumably to safeguard the west from war or from conquest, whether by resurgent Germany or the Soviet Empire or both together in any relationship of alliance, or subjugation of either by the other.

C. The continuation of this regime of military guaranty and necessary aid in civilian supplies and arms matériel for a prolonged or an indefinite period rather than for a short term of years; or until United States security and world peace are stabilized beyond serious risk of overthrow; the political and strategic pattern suggested by the present resolutions being, in our opinion, comparable to an extension of the permanent Monroe Doctrine across the oceans and well up into the Eurasian Continent, so as to prevent, or meet at its inception there, armed or conspiratorial expansion of any political and military power, and acquisition of any strategic positions, that would menace our peace and safety.

D. Adequate United States strength in population, industry, agriculture, resources, and arms to implement the aforesaid objectives.

III. That a copy of these resolutions be submitted to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senators Allen J. Ellender and Russell Long, of Louisiana, and Representative Otto E. Passman of the Fifth Louisiana District.

FREE TRADE UNION COMMITTEE,
LABOR LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

Hon. Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Senator Connally: In behalf of the American Federation of Labor, International Labor Relations Committee, I have issued a declaration in support of the Atlantic Pact.

I am herewith enclosing a copy of the declaration with the hope that you will give it careful and favorable consideration as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate.

If you have any questions or inquiries at all as to our position, kindly do not hesitate to call upon me for further clarification.

Thank you most heartily for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

MATTHEW WOLL,
Chairman, International Labor Relations Committee, A. F. of L.

RATIFY THE ATLANTIC PACT

DECLARATION BY MATTHEW WOLL, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMITTEE, A. F. OF L.

The American Federation of Labor strongly urges the Members of the United States Senate to ratify the Atlantic Pact. We urge ratification for the sake of our own country's highest ideals and best interests. We plead for prompt and favorable Senate action in the interest of world democracy, recovery and peace.

The A. F. of L. views with the greatest admiration the determined and fruitful efforts of the European peoples to overcome postwar chaos, rebuild their countries and secure social justice. But in this grave hour, we cannot overlook the most painful feature of the crisis of our times: The war-breeding course pursued by totalitarian Russia and its world-wide fifth column—the Cominform and the WFTU—is the heaviest obstacle to coordinated international effort for overcoming the heritage of the global war. Today, totalitarian communism is the one force deliberately planning, plotting, and pushing the aggravation of the international crisis. This destructive Communist role is no less evident and dangerous in the spiritual and moral realms than in the political, economic, and military fields. Therefore, the overriding need of the hour is the maximum international cooperation of all freedom-loving and peace-seeking peoples.
It is in this spirit that the A. F. of L. has been seeking the transformation of the UN into an effective instrument for world peace. It is in this spirit that we have hailed and worked for the Marshall plan. It is likewise in this spirit that the A. F. of L. now calls upon its 8,000,000 members to rally their representatives in Washington for whole-hearted support of the Atlantic Pact.

America and the rest of mankind are not facing or fighting an obnoxious theory. We are facing an overawing condition and cruel challenge. It is true the Communist dictatorship oppressing the Russian people and the Soviet satellites has not yet launched a frontal military assault against our country or any other western democracy. But it is already waging ruthlessly and relentlessly a cold war against all nations not under the yoke of Communist totalitarianism. We need but point to the sinister role of Russia's Communist fifth column—the Communists. They are hypocritically exploiting the democratic rights to demoralize and disrupt the democracies in peacetime. Their traitorous activities are aimed solely at helping the Kremlin tyrants defeat and destroy the liberty-loving peoples in the event of war.

These dastardly machinations conceived and directed by the present Russian regime are as much crimes against the Russian people and particularly Soviet labor as against the people and labor movements of the rest of the world. Unless these crimes are checked now they are bound to lead to the worst and most unforgivable of all crimes against humanity—total war. Surely, the democratic world dare not forget this vital and costly lesson learned from the experience with Nazi totalitarian aggression.

The A. F. of L. believes that the only time to prevent war is before it breaks out. The A. F. of L. believes that it is far better to prevent a war than even to win it most decisively. History has taught us that the best way to defeat aggression, is to deter it. Only the active and permanent cooperation of free peoples—armed with unshakable determination and unbeatable power to maintain freedom and peace—can be strong enough to deter aggression, to prevent war, to preserve human dignity and liberty, and assure enduring peace.

What is more, there can be no real economic recovery and sound social and economic reconstruction as long as the spectre of war haunts the peoples of the world. No worker can give his best to production as long as he is harassed by the terrifying fear of war and frustrating uncertainty of an unstable world. No greater encouragement and incentive to healthy economic reconstruction and improved working and living conditions could be imparted to the ranks of free labor than imbuing the working peoples of the democratic countries with a firm feeling that they are secure against the encroachments and aggression by totalitarian communism—the twentieth century slave state. Hence, the dollars and cents cost of procuring such military defense and democratic security is infinitesimal in comparison with the vast social, economic, and political benefits resulting therefrom.

If we make the fatal mistake of being defenseless today, we will not get another chance to defend ourselves successfully against expanding totalitarian enslavement tomorrow. Either our own and the other free nations amass and pool enough strength to prevent a war—and surely win it if totalitarian communism should lose its head and launch a military conflict—or we disarm now and let the Bolshevik enslavers take over the world. There is no other alternative. Half a partnership among the free peoples, half rearmament of the democracies, would be suicidal. That would only give us a feeling of false security and make us an easy prey for the ruthless aggressors.

We call for Senate approval of the Atlantic Pact as an act of living solidarity and full partnership with all the forces of freedom. In the words of Jefferson, America and the rest of the free world have arrived at "a geographical line coinciding with a marked principle." We cannot preserve this principle of human liberty and decency without safeguarding this geographical line. America never was and never can be neutral in the event of any serious assault on freedom. Our love of liberty and social justice is entirely incompatible with standing idly by, with doing nothing, with being neutral when giant military powers seek to extend their tyrannical hold and expand their imperialist ambitions to attain world domination. Furthermore, for the Communists, there is no such concept as neutrality. Those who are not with them, are against them, and are considered by them as their mortal enemies—to be enslaved or slaughtered at the very first opportunity.
Moreover, it was the hope and belief that America would remain neutral or would not be prepared in time to help the nations attacked which have encouraged the aggressors to start the last two World Wars. The Atlantic Pact will dissipate such hopes and beliefs and will deter any imperialist power from plunging mankind into another total war.

Given the present world situation, there is only one nation capable of rallying the forces of freedom and providing them with enough material strength to convince a would-be aggressor in advance that his attack is doomed to failure. That nation is America. Only vigorous American adherence to the Atlantic Pact can convince a would-be aggressor that an attack even against the smallest and weakest people would call forth a crushing counterblow by the strongest power at the head of an invincible coalition for international justice and peace.

The A. F. of L. especially emphasizes that the American people have a spiritual and moral bond which binds them to all liberty-loving peoples. This community of sacred purpose underlies the basic necessities for our joining the Atlantic alliance. This identical mainspring of human values and aims is the best reason for our Senate endorsing the Atlantic Pact. We assure the workers of all countries that organized labor in America is solemnly devoted to these democratic ideals. Here is our firmest guaranty for the Atlantic alliance serving not against any people or groups of peoples, but only for defending the world peace and promoting international harmony on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR,
WASHINGTON, D. C., MAY 12, 1949.

HON. TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Be assured I would welcome the opportunity of presenting the position of the American Federation of Labor toward the approval of the North Atlantic Pact upon which hearings are now being held by the Committee on Foreign Relations of which you are chairman, to said committee.

In order to do so it is my purpose and plan to consult with my associate members of the executive council of the American Federation of Labor when they attend the meeting of the executive council which will be held in Cleveland, Ohio, beginning next Monday, May 16. As soon as possible after consultation with my associate members of the executive council of the American Federation of Labor, I will communicate with you and advise you as to how and in what way we can present our recommendations regarding approval of the North Atlantic Pact.

Be assured I will communicate with you as herein set forth at my earliest opportunity.

Very sincerely yours,

W. GREEN,
President, American Federation of Labor.

[See p. 1187 for communication.]

THE INSTITUTE FOR CANCER RESEARCH,

The Honorable TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CONNALLY: An appointment was made for me to testify before your committee today in its hearings on the proposed North Atlantic Pact, on behalf of the Philadelphia Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. However, my time is fully occupied with my duties as head of the Department of General Physiology of the Institute for Cancer Research, and rather than spend by time and yours in verbal testimony I have felt it best to present my point of view in writing.

The North Atlantic Pact is a very touchy and dangerous move which can be of great importance for either good or evil. If, and its collateral legislation, must be given the closest scrutiny. I am utterly opposed to any move which is exclusive, which is aimed against anyone, or which may serve to weaken or bypass the United Nations. Insofar as the Atlantic Pact is aimed at consolidation of the western powers in their similar economic and social aims, the establishment
of general spheres of cooperation, the breaking down of nationalistic and sectional barriers, the setting up of regional agreements within the United Nations, I am for it. Insofar as it is a military alliance against Russia or against anyone else I am utterly opposed to it. I would be strongly against our spending any money whatever to arm western Europe.

Obviously the world is going to have to spend some money on police protection—armaments. But the only armaments money which I would be prepared to approve freely would be for a United Nations police force. It is high time we recognized that competitive armament is disastrously costly and unnecessary.

I therefore urge you—

(1) To approve the Atlantic Pact only if it is so amended that all friendly nations, including Russia, are not only invited but urged to join it.

(2) To reject any expenditures for regional armaments either under this pact or in relation to other agreements and to recommend the allocation of equivalent funds to support a nonregional military police force under the United Nations.

(3) To urge upon President Truman, as head of our country's administrative and diplomatic forces, to use the danger of our present regional tendencies as grounds for still another attempt at those discussions of the problem which divide the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the highest diplomatic levels which were so successful in obtaining cooperation during the war.

It seems perfectly obvious to me, from considerable experience in various parts of the world, that neither the United States nor Europe can afford the expenditure of funds and the economic disruption entailed in even a moderate armament on a present-day scale. We have got to find means of providing for our security in another way. The United Nations, as a strong centralized power with real police powers, seems the most evident method for obviating regional armaments. The fact that the North Atlantic Pact, with military connotations, could be even seriously considered, since it obviously would undercut one of the intended purposes of the United Nations, seems to me to emphasize the need for a complete reconsideration of the problems of regional versus central police power.

Let us remember the resemblance between the present stage of the United Nations and the situation of our own confederation before 1789, which was resolved by the establishment of a strong central authority, the United States of America, and also the unhappy resemblance of the present recrudescence of sectionalism which the Atlantic Pact would seem to legalize, to the state of affairs in our own country in the 1840's to 1860's, which led to secession and the Civil War. Let us be sure that the Atlantic Pact is not an act of secession.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP R. WHITE,
Head, Department General Physiology, Institute for Cancer Research.

THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA, INC.,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND GOOD WILL,

The Honorable Tom Connally,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: No position for or against ratification of the North Atlantic Pact has been taken by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America since when its executive committee last met the text of the pact had not been made public. It is desirable, however, that such pact actions of the Federal Council as may have a bearing upon the forthcoming debate in the Senate be brought to your attention.

I am writing to you in my capacity as chairman of the department of international justice and good will. We believe the considerations here set forth are warranted in the light of pronouncements previously subscribed to by the Federal Council.

1. The Federal Council of Churches is convinced that war with the Soviet Union is not inevitable. We recognize, and have said, that "Marxist communism in its orthodox philosophy, stands clearly opposed to Christianity." But a war with the Soviet Union is believed by us to be improbable, given proper use by the United States of its powerful influence. Accordingly, we hold steadfastly to the
view that the avenues of diplomatic conversation between the Soviet Union and the United States should be kept open and used. Such action as may be taken by the Senate on the pact should not be allowed to close the doors of direct negotiation with the Soviet Union.

II. The churches related to the Federal Council supported Senate ratification of the Charter of the United Nations in the conviction that the security of our Nation was to be derived from a system of collective security embracing all nations. They still hold to this view.

If, as a result of such action as may be taken by the Senate on the pact, the interest of the American people in supporting and strengthening the United Nations were to be diminished, the consequences might well be inimical to the peace of the world.

III. In the event the pact is ratified by the Senate, many people of our churches would desire that it be so implemented as to give impetus to those acts of government by which the conditions of peace with justice can be established. The Federal Council believes that "if our Nation's leadership is to be worthy, it must develop constructive and creative programs that will capture the imagination and enlist the support of the multitudes whose interest in defending political, economic, and racial injustice is greater than their interest in defending such injustice merely because communism attacks it."

The North Atlantic Pact may conceivably act as a deterrent to the more violent acts of Communist aggression by the Soviet state. However, the ideological thrust of communism cannot effectively be countered by defensive measures. What is required is the transcending of communism by enlarging the areas of political and spiritual freedom and economic well-being throughout the world.

Accordingly, we believe the implementation of the pact, if ratified, should be of such a kind as not to imperil the success of those recovery and reconstructive programs to which our Government is or may hereafter be committed. Senate support of authorization of the funds required to assure the continuous success of the European recovery program is very heartening in this respect.

IV. In the event the pact is ratified by the Senate, the people of our churches would desire that this regional arrangement be not used as a pretext for unduly expanding the influence of the military in the formulation of foreign policy.

The Federal Council's executive committee has expressed the view that "if our national power is to serve the ends of peace, our basic national strategy should be made by persons who have faith in the achievability of peace and who are qualified by experience and training to use and to evaluate the great possibilities for peace that reside in moral and economic force in organizations like the United Nations and the World Court and in the resources of diplomacy andconciliation."

We recognize that under pacts of the kind now being discussed our military leaders have their necessary place. Foreign policy, however, far from being accommodated to the views of the military should remain, as heretofore, the prerogative of the President and the Congress.

V. In view of the foregoing, we venture to raise the question as to whether it would be appropriate for the Senate, in the event that body votes to ratify the pact, to accompany the instrument of ratification with a clarifying resolution in which the sense of the Senate would be expressed along such lines as the following:

(a) Ratification of the pact is not construed by the Senate as closing the avenues of diplomatic conversation with the Soviet Union;

(b) Ratification of the pact is not construed by the Senate as equivalent of or as a substitute for a universal system of collective security;

(c) Ratification of the pact is not construed by the Senate as the equivalent of or as a substitute for those curative and creative efforts of government through which it is sought to promote economic recovery, to strengthen the institutions of democracy, and to advance the political and social well-being of subject and dependent peoples;

(d) Ratification of the pact is not construed by the Senate as compromising in any way the prior responsibility of the President and the Congress in the shaping of American foreign policy.

Faithfully yours,

William Scarlett, Chairman.
Senator Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Affairs Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Will be unable to appear before your committee Monday as scheduled. I want to express my opposition to the proposed Atlantic military alliance and to the gigantic rearmament program to follow. The American people have had enough of the discredited Winston Churchill dictating our foreign policy to us. We cannot afford the cost of buying a gold brick in the form of bankrupt British and Dutch empires. This foreign policy is costing us our entire New Deal program because we cannot have money and materials for war and still have housing, electrification, education, and a real farm program. We pay for this foreign policy by sacrificing our democratic heritage for a mad spree of hysteria against co-ops, labor, farmers, liberals, and minorities. We ordinary people do the paying while militarists and munitions moguls grow fat abroad. This wasteful program of dollar diplomacy to bolster corrupt reactionary governments against the demands of the common people everywhere for New Deal reforms is morally wrong. It has already failed in Greece and China. Can we not learn from experience that the extension of our present foreign policy into new areas can only result in more colossal failures and in world hatred for America?

James M. Youngdale,
Nominee for Congress, 1948, Seventh District, Minnesota.

Hon. Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senate Office Building, Washington 25, D.C.

My dear senator: I am the International representative for the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union. We are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and with the Railway Labor Executives Association. We have more than 425,000 members in the States and Territories in our 800 local unions.

Please be advised that the convention of our international union which concluded their deliberations in Chicago, April 30, 1949, as a result of a resolution introduced, discussed the North Atlantic Treaty and after discussion voted by an overwhelming vote to endorse same and urge that the Senate ratify.

It is an extreme pleasure for me as per instructions to add the name of our great international union to those endorsing and urging the ratification.

Very truly yours,

Chas. E. Sands
International Representative.

National Religion and Labor Foundation,

Hon. Tom Connally,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear senator Connally: I send you herewith a copy of the official publication of the National Religion and Labor Foundation which reports the opposition of our annual conference in Cincinnati, March 28 to 30, to the North Atlantic Pact.

Our conference held that peace "will not come by military alliances which further split our world and further weaken the United Nations and contribute to the polarization of power at the expense of the little countries caught between the United States and Russia." It held that "it [peace] will not come by Atlantic, Mediterranean, or Pacific power pacts, or by intensification of the already ominous armaments race."

Our conference insisted that "the architects of our Government's foreign policy bring it into conformity with our prophetic and democratic faith."
We believe our alternative program for peace outlined on page 2 comes more nearly being based on our religious and democratic heritage and will do more for peace than the North Atlantic Pact. We spend 1,000 times more for wars annually—past, present, and future—than we do on United Nations. We shall probably be spending 100 times more on the military implementation of the North Atlantic Pact than upon United Nations. We do not believe this is proof of sincerity, when we say we work for peace.

We sincerely hope that the Senate will not take action until after the Council of Foreign Ministers has met.

Sincerely yours,

WILLARD UPHAUS,
Executive Secretary.

[From the Economic Justice (Bulletin of the National Religion and Labor Foundation), May 1949]

THE GREATEST TASK OF OUR GENERATION IS TO END DRIFT TO WAR, CINCINNATI RLIF CONFERENCE DELEGATES TOLD—COMMISSION ON THE WORLD SCENEDeclared That Peace Will Not Come by Atlantic Pact, Ominous Armament Race, or by Alliances With Reactionary Regimes—Alternative Program Offered

(Text of report)

We have met here under the auspices of the Religion and Labor Foundation—mindful of our prophetic Judeo-Christian heritage and its impact on American democracy. We have met as citizens of the Nation which gave the world the Declaration of Independence, the American Revolution, the free public-school system, the Emancipation Proclamation, the economic Bill of Rights, labor’s Magna Charta—the Wagner Act. We have met in the country where the United Nations was born.

We seek to follow the great Hebrew prophets and Jesus—who demanded justice for the poor, liberation for the oppressed, new wine skins for new wine, new attitudes and motives for new ways of life, “new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.” We seek to follow Thomas Jefferson, who declared in the very launching of our Nation “That all men are created equal and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and that among these rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” We believe this Declaration and know it applies to all peoples—to the Indonesian and other colonial people struggling for democratic independence today, as much as to our colonial forefathers.

We insist that the architects of our Government’s foreign policy bring it into conformity with our prophetic and democratic faith. Let it once again champion the cause of independence for colonial peoples, and justice for the poor and oppressed in America and around the world. Specifically, let us champion the right to independence of dependent peoples, not merely by good words, but by refusing to arm and aid the colonial regimes which use violent aggression to prevent liberation—in defiance of the United Nations. Our plea is that foreign policy decisions be determined by our loyalty to democracy and not by strategic or power advantages. Let us end the color line both at home and in our foreign policy. In colonial and semifeudal lands the time is at hand for fundamental reforms, bringing independence to peoples, and giving land and economic opportunity to exploited peasants, following the example set by the agricultural reforms in Japan. The people in the vast areas involved demand these changes. Let an America which fought a revolution against colonialism and feudalism heed these popular and justified demands and ally itself with them. Let America meet the challenge of world revolution by being true to our own revolutionary past.

We meet in the atomic age and in the midst of an ever hotter, ever tougher cold war, in a time when armament is challenging armament, belligerence challenging belligerence. We do not like the fruits of that cold war—on either side of the battle lines. We are aghast at the present trend toward war, definitely influenced by military and financial interests. Unless that trend is checked, it will lead us and the peoples of the world into the greatest holocaust in history. It is folly to talk of anyone’s winning a third world war, atomic scientists tell us. Humanity must lose it. All peoples of the world want peace. The drift in our world it toward war. The greatest task of our generation is to end that drift, and secure the peace for which the world yearns and prays. We deny that war is inevitable, affirm that peace is necessary and possible, and that the desire for peace is not the monopoly of any people.
The last war brought death to many of America's finest boys—and devastation and death on a far larger scale to other invaded nations. A war between the United States and the Soviet Union would be insane and suicidal for the Soviet Union—and insane and suicidal for the United States. The time has come to seek with Isaiah and Micah that day when the nations shall "beat their swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks, when every man shall sit under his own vine and fig tree, and when none shall be afraid."

This will not come by military alliances which further split our world and further weaken the United Nations and contribute to the polarization of power at the expense of the little countries caught between the United States and Russia. It will not come by Atlantic, Mediterranean, or Pacific power pacts or by intensification of the already ominous armsments race. It will not come by the suppression of democracy anywhere in the world—or by alliances with reaction as in Portugal, Greece, Spain, China, and Argentina.

We have an alternative program to offer. We cover for our Nation the historic glory of taking the initiative on that program's behalf. We know that there is much suspicion, fear, and mistrust in the Soviet Union of moves initiated by the United States, and equal mistrust in the United States of the moves initiated by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the initiative must be taken. Therefore, we call on our Government to:

AN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM FOR PEACE

1. Advocate now a definite and specific program of world disarmament through the United Nations, especially on the part of the great powers from whom comes the threat of global war. We do so because armament expenditures are now so heavy throughout the world that they deprive the peoples of the world of needed consumer goods, housing, health, aid to education, and other socially beneficial economic programs. Men in armed forces are not men who can participate in economically beneficial production. Since voluntary enlistments are more than meeting the quotas set by the armed forces themselves, and since peacetime conscription is an unjustified departure from American tradition and contributes by design to a militaristic spirit alien to America's democratic heritage, we should immediately repeal the unnecessary and costly draft. With the coming of multilateral disarmament and demilitarization, the economic resources and production now devoted to war preparation must be devoted to serving the crying and as yet unmet peacetime human needs: to a great program of slum clearance and housing, to a program of national medical care and hospitalization opportunity for all, to a program to save and expand our river valleys, to produce ever more consumer goods and to secure for the people who need them the necessary purchasing power. Thus will we strengthen basic American institutions.

2. Strengthen and build the United Nations, and develop government under law for the world. Work for a United Nations police force, stronger than the armed forces of either the United States or Russia. Make the United Nations so strong that the sovereignty of all nations will be respected against any act of aggression by any nation. We believe that the United Nations should be transformed into a federal world government, acceptable to the United States and Russia, with powers adequate to insure peace. Such a government would (a) be constituted of representatives elected directly by the people, (b) be able to act directly upon individuals in the maintenance of peace, (c) have authority to pass laws that are binding upon its members, (d) possess sufficient power to enforce its laws, and (e) have powers of taxation adequate to insure its own maintenance.

3. Seize every single opportunity for consultation through the UN with Soviet leaders in the interest of facing and resolving the problem and tensions which so ominously threaten the peace. Promote contact and understanding, not only between government leaders, but between the peoples of our great nations.

4. Return to the American democratic tradition under which foreign policy is under civilian and not military control. (We commend the President for the beginning recently made in this direction.) See that the American people as a whole are considered, consulted, and involved in the making of fundamental foreign policy. For example, assure that they are given adequate time, even yet, for careful deliberation and consideration of the serious implications of the Atlantic Pact (which our State Department has brought to its present stage largely without the participation of the people). We believe there is no emergency justifying adoption of any legislation without congressional knowledge.
or debate of that legislation's specific contents, as was done by the House in the case of the Espionage Act.

5. Dedicate the unmatched economic resources of the United States to the meeting of human needs everywhere, returning to the spirit and program of UNRRA, in which nations cooperated under and through the United Nations in a great program for all the devastated peoples. Expand and implement the splendid suggestion made by President Truman that there be cooperation by all nations through the United Nations for the development of industrially undeveloped areas. We affirm here the basic worth of human beings wherever they live and under whatever creed. No nation, including our own, should play politics with food or with the lives of little children. We are impressed with the record of UNRRA and seek a return to its universal and humanitarian principles. We are impressed also by the testimony of the Brethren, Friends, and other religious groups who are conducting a splendid program of relief and rehabilitation in various areas of the world, and who are distributing aid on the ethically and religiously valid basis of need, regardless of political belief.

6. Implement the commendable support given by our Government to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights by applying it at home through that change in Senate rules necessary to make possible the adoption by this Congress of the President's civil-rights program.

7. Build here at home a democracy which is not afraid of itself or of the Bill of Rights which is at its roots—a democracy which practices before an observant world equality and fraternity as well as liberty for all—the kind of democracy in which both freedom and security will be guaranteed.

8. Open the doors of immigration to all peoples without discrimination. An America which recaptures its revolutionary democratic faith and which applies it in every corner of our land will be a united America, a morally strong America, and an America which used not and will not be afraid.

[Telegram]

NEW YORK, N. Y., May 19, 1949.

Senator Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.:  

Furriers Joint Council of New York representing 15,000 fur workers opposes ratification of North Atlantic war pact. Urge conferences be initiated with Soviet Union for settlement of differences. We feel that certainly no decision should be made until Council of Foreign Ministers have completed their May 28 meeting in Paris.

SOL OAKLANDER,
Secretary, Furriers Joint Council of New York.

FARMERS EDUCATIONAL AND COOPERATIVE UNION OF AMERICA
National office: Denver, Colo.


Senator Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: With this I am enclosing a copy of a resolution adopted by the board of directors of the National Farmers Union, March 19, 1949, with respect to United States foreign policy and in particular with respect to such regional agreements as the North Atlantic Treaty now pending before the Foreign Relations Committee.

It should be observed that the board of directors of the National Farmers Union is composed of all State presidents of our organization and is not a select group. Hence the attitude adopted by the board on March 19, on foreign policy may unquestionably be taken as fully representative of the rank-and-file membership of the organization.

I should appreciate it very much if you would see to it that this letter and the board statements are made a part of the record of the hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty.

Sincerely,

JAMES G. PATTON, President.
DENVER, Colo., March 22.—The National Board of the Farmers Union has adopted a resolution condemning the proposed North Atlantic Security Treaty as “directly contrary to American precedent and history” and “a futile gesture.”

The group adopted the resolution at its semiannual meeting in Denver.

Declaring there are “very disturbing elements in our Government’s foreign policy,” the farm representatives from 35 States said, “The most alarming is the proposal for a North Atlantic Security Treaty, obviously to be followed by extensive arms aids to Europe. We cannot approve such a course.”

At the same time the board of directors of the National Farmers Union pointed to four actions which “indicate a possible new trend in the conduct of this Nation’s relations with other nations.”

These were listed as “The installation of Secretary of State Acheson and the removal of Secretary of National Defense Forrestal, President Truman’s staunch refusal to permit the military to stampede him into approving an increased military budget, the partial success in its peaceful aspects of the European recovery program, (and) the elimination of Assistant Secretary Draper from a controlling voice in German economic affairs.”

The Farmers Union officials strongly endorsed President Truman’s now-famous “point four” of his Inaugural address, and went on to list eight other steps that need to be taken on the international scene to preserve world peace and promote the security and welfare of the people of the world.

(The full text of the resolution adopted by the board of director of the National Farmers Union is as follows (the board is composed of all State and Territorial presidents)):

STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, MARCH 19, 1949

Since VJ-day, our Government’s foreign policy has under military domination been a blind unreasoning prosecution of cold war—on the basic premise that a third world war is inevitable. The installation of Secretary of State Acheson and the removal of Secretary of National Defense Forrestal, President Truman’s staunch refusal to permit the military to stampede him into approving an increased military budget, the partial success in its peaceful aspects of the European recovery program, the elimination of Assistant Secretary Draper from a controlling voice in German economic affairs—these actions indicate a possible new trend in the conduct of this Nation’s relations with other nations.

Beyond all else, the President’s proposal in the now famous “point four” of his inaugural address, has encouraged the people of the United States to hope that at last the United States will turn its enormous energies from military preparations to the waging of a successful peace. The emphasis the President has put upon working through United Nation agencies in the execution of point four has especially impressed us. We hope that this marks a definite and permanent turning point. For a peaceful world, it is imperative that the United States cease its widespread bilateral action and that it work through the UN agencies it helped to establish.

We especially commend President Patton for his earnest efforts to forward this peaceful course, particularly his call for the resignation of Secretary Forrestal and his persistent attempt to encourage the development of the “point four” program along lines of true international cooperation.

There continue to be, however, certain very disturbing elements in our Government’s foreign policy. Of these, the most alarming is the proposal for a North Atlantic security treaty, obviously to be followed by extensive arms aids to Europe. We cannot approve such a course. We believe it to be directly contrary to American precedent and history and to be a futile gesture. We cannot conceive of a situation arising under the proposed treaty where the United States would fight unless it would also fight in the absence of a treaty. Therefore, we view the treaty merely as a preliminary to the sending of arms to European nations. Specifically we make the following recommendations:

1. We endorse the President’s “point four” program as he presented it in his inaugural address:

   “Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas.

   “More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.
"For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

The United States is preeminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

Our aim should be to help the free people of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty and freedom.

With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture and labor in this country, this program can greatly increase the industrial activity of other nations and can raise substantially their standards of living.

Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guaranties to the investor must be balanced by guaranties in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments.

The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing.

All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural resources. Experience shows that our commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically.

"Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge."

"Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies, hunger, misery and despair."

We will continue to be opposed to exploitation of citizens and the economies of other countries by American corporations.

2. We deplore the sponsorship by the United States or by Russia or, participation in regional or bilateral "defense" agreements, and believe such efforts will weaken the UN.

3. We endorse all efforts to strengthen the UN and its technical agencies, and approve such movements as those looking toward a constitutional world federation with defined and limited powers.

4. We again insist that aid to other countries should be channeled through and administered by specialized agencies of the United Nations including the FAO, the World Bank, World Health Organization and the International Trade Organization.

5. We urge that every effort be made to conclude an International Wheat Agreement and that, if its terms are at all reasonable, it be ratified by the Senate.

6. We ask the early initiation of discussions, under the auspices of FAO, looking toward the negotiation of other international commodity agreements.

7. We favor the early approval by this Nation of the Charter of the International Trade Organization, as well as approval of the pending proposal for extension of International trade agreements authority.

8. We urge international control of the Ruhr on such a basis that all European countries will have equal access to the products of the Ruhr. We further urge that policies be put into effect which will eliminate all cartel and Nazi influence in German economic affairs. United States administration in Germany should be immediately transferred to civilian hands.
9. We urge that the President, through the State Department, assume full responsibility for administering our foreign policy, with emphasis on political diplomacy to the end that military-banker influence in shaping our foreign policy be completely eliminated. We especially urge that the National Security Council be divested of its overriding influence in the administration of our foreign policy.

Hon. Tom Connally,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
The Senate of the United States, Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir: As we are unable to avail ourselves of the privilege of being in Washington to testify on May 17, we take this opportunity to appeal to you and your fellow committee members to reject the North Atlantic Pact. There are many reasons why we feel that the United States should not be part of this alliance, but will name just a few for your consideration.

First, even if the pact is a defensive measure, it is an attempt to freeze the social structure of a large portion of the world. The nations that have embraced the Soviet ideology have done so because the old order proved itself impotent. Power alone cannot defeat an idea as the Chinese fiasco so convincingly demonstrates.

Second, the recent accord on the Berlin problem makes it imperative that the United States make no move that might indicate bad faith in the coming Foreign Ministers' Conference. The tension can be further relaxed by mutual compromise at the conference table.

Third, this inclusion of Italy seems to verify the suspicion of Russia that it is a plot to further contain her. This is especially true with the emphasis the pact puts on armaments.

Fourth, and probably the most disastrous aspect the pact presents, is that it writes the obituary of the United Nations. There is no longer any choice for small nations but to align themselves with one or the other rival big powers. The one-world dream of Wendell Willkie and Franklin Roosevelt can never materialize in a world divided into two hostile, frightened blocks.

Fifth, in our discussions with many of our friends, we find they resent the indiscriminate waste of our wealth to prolong the regime of Chiang K'ai-shek. They fear the Atlantic Pact is a similar venture that can only end in ignominious failure. Our understanding of the pact justifies their conclusions with the additional factor that world war is much more possible in the European situation.

Respectfully,

Elizabeth and Merl Shipman.

Social Service Employees' Union
Local 19, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO

Senator Tom Connally,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Connally: The enclosed statement of this union's position on the North Atlantic Pact is being submitted in accordance with your telegram of May 16.

This union is composed of over 5,000 professional, office, and maintenance employees in private and nonprofit agencies, and represents the thinking of many other white-collar workers in this field, who have become increasingly concerned over and country's adoption of a program of rearmament, rather than one of meeting welfare needs. We will watch closely the results of these hearings and strongly urge that the position taken in our enclosed statement be adopted by the administration in Senate debate.

We further urge that you personally, will use your good offices to ensure a vote against ratification of the North Atlantic Pact.

Sincerely yours,

Helen S. Mangold, President.
The Social Service Employees' Union, which we represent, is composed of people trained and dedicated to the principle of rendering service to the individual. We are concerned at the growing numbers of our clients who suffer the deprivations of such basic life necessities as adequate working conditions, decent housing and health facilities, ample food, provisions for child care and training, healthy play facilities for young children, care of the aged, and among our own members, a denial of old-age survivors, and unemployment insurance.

We cannot believe that the emphasis in our foreign and domestic policy for rearmaments and the intervention in the sovereign affairs of other states is meeting the needs of the people of this country. We cannot believe that the North Atlantic Pact will provide either peace of mind or body for the people of this country. We cannot believe that a Federal budget which in 1949, allowed only 6 percent for welfare needs, and which next year, if this pact is ratified, will in all probability eliminate even this inadequate sum, is concerned with the well-being of the people of this country.

We cannot help but question why the United Nations Charter, which adequately provides for the handling of all international questions is bypassed today by some of the very same nations which were instrumental in establishing the United Nations. Examination of the United Nations Charter shows that article 24, for example, rests the right to determine the evidence of a threat to peace primarily in the Security Council. Article 61 of the Charter provides that if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, no act of individual or collective self-defense may be taken until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain peace and security. Articles 58, section 1, of the Charter provides that no enforcement action under regional agreements or agencies shall be taken without the authority of the Security Council, except when such measures are taken against an enemy state. The term "enemy state" is further defined in this article as applied to any state which during the Second World War had been an enemy of any signatories of the Charter.

We cannot help but question why a former enemy state (Italy), and one which aided and certainly gave comfort to our enemies, although ostensibly neutral (Portugal), have been selected as allies, while a nation which suffered some of the severest attacks of fascism (the Soviet Union) and fought back so heroically that the people of the world pledged themselves to undying gratitude, was not invited to join in this agreement. The excuse that this is a regional agreement, thereby forbidding the admission of the Soviet Union, is proven false in article 10 of the pact which provides for the subsequent admission of other European states.

We cannot help but question why a foreign policy which has cost this Nation billions of dollars, which has proved itself bankrupt, and which has at no time since its inception, in the form of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan, proved its ability to either aid in world reconstruction or to achieve world peace, is still being pursued.

We cannot help but question why the signatories of this pact are returning to the anachronisms of regional agreements and "little ententes" when history since the First World War has taught us that peace can only be secured effectively through world organization.

We cannot help but question the necessity for the existence of such an agreement as the North Atlantic Pact with its veiled threats, when only recently, direct negotiations with the Soviet Union succeeded in doing what no amount of sabre-rattling in the past year has achieved, namely the lifting of the Berlin blockade.

We cannot help but question therefore, whether the gentlemen who are sponsoring the North Atlantic Pact really have as their objective the establishment of world peace. We are forced to conclude from examination of our foreign policy in the years since the Second World War, first, that nowhere in the world, particularly not in our country or in the Soviet Union, do the people want another war. Second, that signatories of the pact have been carrying out government without representation. Third, that the effects on the people in this country and throughout the world of such an alliance, can only be increased deprivation. Fourth, that our support of defunct, militaristic states such as exist in Greece, and which existed until recently in China, will only succeed in costing us untold billions of dollars but will not succeed in stemming the battle of those people for demo-
cratic governments. Fifth, that the stock piling of atomic weapons is creating a stock pile of ill-will for this country throughout the world. Sixth, that the exclusion from any international agreements of a whole group of nations whose philosophies happen to differ from those prevalent in the United States, is in itself an act of aggression on our part. Seventh, that because of all the foregoing, the North Atlantic Pact is not designed for the peaceful solution of world problems, but rather one which can precipitate the world into war at any moment. Eighth, that such a pact will mean many more years of privation and fear for the entire world.

We have it within our power now, today, to prevent still greater damage than has already been done to the successful functioning of the United Nations and the principle of one world living in peace and freedom, which was the heritage of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. We urge you not to ratify the North Atlantic Pact.

STATEMENT BY CHRISTIAN F. RENDEIRO OF SOUTH WINDSOR, CONN.

Mr. Chairman. I am an American citizen of Portuguese birth. I requested permission to testify on the Atlantic Pact, as it affects Portugal, because I feel that neglect to consider and understand the prevalent conditions in that country might be detrimental to the welfare of our democratic Nation. When I first came to the United States I was under the wing of my oldest brother who had assumed responsibility for my bringing up, after the death of my father. It was with him, too, that I returned to Portugal, but the taste of freedom was too sweet for a young man to forget, and so, against the wishes of my family. I immigrated to the United States where I soon began the process of becoming an American citizen. While in that process, and trying to convince my family that I had become a convert to the democratic American way of life, and would renounce my Portuguese citizenship, the United States was attacked and war was declared. I volunteered through the draft board, the only agency that could take me before I had completed the process of citizenship. A month after my induction, the regular issuance of certificates included my final papers. I served in the Army from the first months of 1942 to the first months of 1947, when I was honorably discharged with the rank of major. I shall be honored to serve again whenever necessary. It is only natural, therefore, that I should be most interested and better informed on the issues relating to the affairs of the two countries than the average citizen. I cannot say that I am impartial in my concern for the people of Portugal, since my affection for them is deeply rooted, and it grieves me enormously to know that a great majority of them are today some of the most unhappy people of the world, and that some actions of the United States might have been a contributing force to that condition.

Through my investigations I have been able to find that there is less knowledge of the conditions in Portugal than perhaps any other civilized country of the world; and that the veil of service is not completely accidental, but rather a well planned technique used to further policies that cannot withstand the light of scrutiny.

May I, then, Mr. Chairman, take but a few moments to high light the conditions of Portugal, in order that we might more readily understand and decide the results that mutual membership of Portugal and the United States in the Atlantic Pact might have.

Portugal is a dictatorship, entirely authoritarian, and a corporative state. The dictatorship has been in power since 1926. Marshal Carmona, who is President, functioning in the same manner as King Emanuel to Italy under Mussolini, gave his views to the Secretary of Propaganda, Mr. Antonio Ferro, as follows: "Elections, a falsification of public opinion; voters, a bunch of reeling drunkards." Mr. Ferro, in turn, defined the Estado Novo—New State—as: "General Carmona is the dictator, Dr. Salazar the dictator."

The transformation of Portugal into a Fascist state with most of the characteristics of the Italian regime of Mussolini was completed about 1933, 5 years after Salazar was called to office. This transformation was accomplished with the strong backing of the army and the church, and both had many of its members in official positions, especially in small towns, as heads of executive boards that took the place of the elected municipal councils.

It was under this dictatorship that the military coup to overthrow the Republic of Spain was planned. At Estoril, a fashionable resort outside of Lisbon, General Sanjurjo, who was the leader of the coup, made all the plans. Fate
was not very kind to him, however; he was killed in a plane accident while taking off from a military base near Lisbon. After that General Franco assumed command. From the start the Portuguese dictatorship gave substantial help to Franco, and even sent troops under the command of Jorge Botelho Moniz; these troops were known as "Viriatos." To the officers who were killed while commanding these troops, awards of compensation were given as if they had died for their fatherland. At the end of the Civil War, the Spanish refugees of the Republican Army who sought asylum in Portugal, after handing over their weapons to the frontier guards, were returned to the Falangists of Franco and killed at sight.

Dictator Salazar has defined the corporative state, in a speech to a convention of the Uniao Nacional—the only party legally authorised in the country—as: "Antidemocratic, antiliberal, antiparliamentary." In the early portion of the dictatorship not only was the one-party system established but also the Legiao Portuguesa, modeled after the black shirts of Mussolini in Portugal, however, the shirts turned green. The youth were formed into youth groups under the Mocidade Portuguesa. After the defeat of the Fascist powers the uniform and insignia went out of vogue, and were not shown to the buyers who must be impressed and carry dollars in their purses.

Most of our information on Portugal must be based on the little items that are published now and then, or on the purposeful propaganda that is planted wherever convenient. It is important to remember that there is a strict censorship in Portugal, like in Russia, and the Secretariat of Propaganda is very well aware of the fields which are most likely to influence the greatest amount toward the objective. One of the strongest impressions that the dictatorship has wanted to make is that it is a devout adherent of the principles of the Catholic doctrines. Anyone, however, that would take the trouble to examine carefully both the words and deeds would have no trouble recognizing the hypocritical conduct of these fanatics. Our present Holy Pope and the princes of the church have always proclaimed liberty as a gift of God, that only God may take away. And the magnificent concept that is fundamental with all who give any consideration to justice: "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these you have done it unto Me."

It is hard to believe that public officials who allow the functioning of concentration camps for political prisoners, sent there very often without even the sham of a put-up trial; who at the infamous Tarrafal, in the Cape Verde Islands, are allowed to keep people interned until they die with tropical diseases, or for want of attention, for the sole crime that they dared to fight for the liberty of the human soul, which we cherish above all, can find any shelter under the beautiful doctrines of the Catholic Church. Can it be that these officials who take part in executing the orders of the dictatorship firmly believe that they are acting in accord with the preachings of the church? If so, then they are practicing the shameful tactics of the inquisitors of the past, to the shame of all of us.

In 1946, Dr. Ferreira Soares, of Nogueira da Regedura, while attending his patients, in his office, was killed cold-blooded in the presence of his patients "for resisting arrest." He was being arrested for the awful crime of disagreeing with the dictatorship about the manner in which social attention should be given to the sick. The secret-police agent who shot the doctor was acquitted cum laude.

During World War II the dictatorship passed through various phases of admiration. At first it was all for the Fascists, and proclaimed openly its feelings for rapid and complete victory for them. When things began to look darker, it shouted neutrality. The kind of neutrality which permitted enemy ships and submarines to use its coast line thereby facilitating our ships and men to fall prey to their attacks; the kind of neutrality which permitted its army to help the Fascist spies operate in Portuguese East Africa to the extent that we had to send our own intelligence men down there to take measures which would stop the heavy toll we were suffering; the kind of neutrality which forced us to prepare and even name an invasion force to occupy the Azores. The Lifesbelt Operation was not fulfilled only because Britain was able to call on its alliance with Portugal. Finally an agreement was virtually imposed on Portugal whereby we obtained military air facilities in the Azores.

The victory of the Allies, even though joyfully received by the Portuguese people, was not a happy moment for the dictatorship. In fact, when Hitler was announced dead, the dictatorship ordered all official buildings to display the Portuguese flag at half mast, in official mourning. But the Allies
won, therefore the dictatorship had to give some signs of recognition to the reality of the moment. When in 1945 there were some elections, it authorized "sufficient liberty" which meant that the opposition would be allowed to say or write only that which the dictatorship thought was enough to proclaim that "liberty" in fact was allowed. While there was a feeling that with the victory of the allied cause, and the first indication that the dictatorship was trembling, the opposition felt that a sound, democratic beginning might be made. At this time, however, the United States sent units of its fleet to pay homage to the Portuguese Duco, which proved to him that his conduct of the affairs of the state were quite in harmony with the wishes of at least some elements of the armed forces in the United States. The effect was instantaneous: the "sufficient liberty" was withdrawn, the leaders of the opposition were arrested, or dismissed from public office or the universities. General José Godinho, former commander in chief of the Portuguese forces in Azores during the most critical period of the war, was arrested in April 1947 and charged with conspiracy against the "legal government." Before he and other superior officers were transferred to the very old, damp, cold, fortress of Caxias, from the hospital for mental diseases where he had been kept a prisoner, two doctors certified that, due to his advanced age, and precarious health, his transfer might be fatal. Nevertheless, the government carried out its decision. He soon died. A scandal developed, and it reached the highest levels of indignation among the Catholic hierarchy since the widow of the general was a fervent practicing Catholic. She brought suit against the dictatorship's Minister of War, Lt. Col. Santos Costa, charging him with murder of her husband. In 1948 both she and her attorney were arrested for daring to take such a step. Well, that just about brought on a state were quite in harmony.

Government crisis, and the situation of the moment. When In

Of particular interest were the copies of letters written by the same Minister of War to General Godinho, during his command at Azores, in which unkind remarks were made of the English and the Americans. These letters were circulated clandestinely by the friends of the widow. It was indeed a shameful, serious condition for the Minister of War to be in, at a time when it was necessary to put on a good show for the leading allies of the democratic world. Precisely at this moment a United States military mission was dispatched by air to Lisbon to decorate the same Lt. Col. Santos Costa, the Minister of War, at an elaborate public ceremony that was widely used by the Government to show to all interested the degree of prestige held by the Portuguese dictatorship from the standard bearer of democracy.

General José Godinho was already in the grave, no embarrassing reply would be forthcoming * * *.

The first agreement between the dictatorship of Portugal and the United States was obtained in 1944, and provided facilities on the island of Santa Maria. This agreement expired after the end of hostilities. It was followed by an agreement of June 2, 1946, that lasted 2 years and provided a base at Lagos on the island of Terceira. The latest agreement was signed February 2, 1948, and will last until 1953. The admiration shown by the dictatorship to the United States is a simple, matter-of-fact approach: it needs dollars.

In close cooperation with the dictatorship of Spain, it set its course along a line that would give it the most results: even though it would not receive any financial consideration at first, in the end the harvest would be reaped. Having made handsome profits out of the war selling to both sides—before formal war almost completely to the Fascists—it could not pretend being out of funds. Instead it got special consideration in the purchase of strategic, scarce items of which it had dire need. Today, however, having played the part and acted in the most popular trend, it could take courage and demand financial help through the Marshall plan.

One other impression that the dictatorship tries to leave with the casual citizen, is that the dictator is a financial wizard who has been able to keep his budget balanced. But again, those who take the trouble to examine under the surface find that the rosy apple on the outside is really rotten to the core in the inside. The important thing concerning the welfare of any country has to be judged on the basis of the standard of living, the percentage of literacy, and the general mortality rate. To examine those phases of life under the dictatorship one has to conclude that the budget is balanced only on paper. Half of the population is
still illiterate, and even though the dictatorship wants to impress all with the number of new schools that it has built, it never mentions that the children, very often, are kept out of school in order to go begging for alms with their parents. In over 20 years in power the great financial wizard has not been able to find a way to stop the thousands of beggars who go from house to house asking for alms while exposing the most nauseating sores from cancer, malnutrition, syphilis, etc.; these afflictions are more developed in the older people, therefore the children are used to call the attention of the passers-by to the pitiful sights, especially when the begging is done in the market places or the streets. For the sake of the tourists such begging is forbidden in the capital and important cities.

Trade-unions do not exist. Wages are set by guilds, whose leaders are appointed from the ruling class of the industry concerned, by the dictatorship, and lag far behind the very high cost of living with the result that workers earn hardly enough to keep body and soul together. The extravagant and useless spending of money in military and other uses to keep the dictatorship in power has brought the country to a very bad financial status, so much so that there have been serious indications that a number of banks would close unless the Government stepped in to keep them going a little longer. Such economy, whose basic goal is not the general welfare of the people and the country, is financially unsound and certainly not worthy of any capital risk.

The amount asked by the dictatorship from ECA is not yet certain, but it ranges from $600,000,000 for a 4-year period to $10,000,000 for the first year.

In the recent months, every time the dictatorship has had a chance to put on a marionette show of sufficient liberty to impress the western democracies it has done so. The last occasion was in February when it held the so-called election to choose the president. The result was as expected when the still Minister of War, Col. Santos Costa, ordered for the entire week of the elections the most extensive air war games ever to be staged, to culminate in the capital the exact day of the election. Marshal Carmona naturally continues to be President.

The campaign was good for one thing, it allowed the dictatorship to say at every opportunity that it favored the idea of the Atlantic defense pact as a weapon against Soviet Russia. May I say here, Mr. Chairman, that all statements that I have seen and read from the anticommunist democratic opposition in Portugal clearly indicated that the democratic forces of the people of Portugal are wholehearted in favor of a union of democratic states opposed to the aggressive design of Soviet Russia. The dictatorship, however, used a double-edged weapon. At home it said that it had to be maintained in power since the opposition was controlled by the Communists; while abroad, especially in the United States, its spokesmen shouted high and loud that the Government of Portugal had been one of the first to oppose Soviet Russia. It has consistently fought Communists, and today there was no Communist danger in Portugal magic, now you see it, now you don’t. Recently, the dictatorship of Portugal has been able to find the United States of its side whenever it needed to be propped up. With serious economic troubles at home, with a vast opposition not only at home but amongst the immigrants who are in close touch with the situation and contribute a large amount in tourism, revenue from films, and upkeep of families back in Portugal, it needs the economic help of ERP, and the new arms and prestige of the Atlantic Pact, to which we have accepted it as a signatory, paving the way for its admission to the United Nations.

That’s the background, Mr. Chairman. The present-day realities are much simpler. The dictatorship of Portugal was and continues to be a government that has not the slightest consideration for the democratic ideals which we proclaim throughout the world. It continues to suppress all freedoms: Religion, speech, assembly, and representation—not to mention from want and from fear.

Morally, the dictatorship of Portugal could not have been accepted in the Atlantic Pact. If the aims of the pact were the basis of admission, since it states: “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”

Ideologically, it is a government that could easily contaminate the good harvest that we have collected in the Atlantic Pact. Its opposition to communism is flagrantly dishonest since it practices that which it condemns. By suppressing everything except fascism, it has actually encouraged the increase of communism to the extent that while those ranks were almost void of any membership during the parliamentary republican government, today the clandestine Communist force is considerable, and full of tension and possibilities for increase.
Strategically, we already have the bases by agreement. And if we did not have them the alliance that it holds with Britain would always make those bases available to our most important ally. We need not buy those bases at the high price demanded, in prestige, compromise of ideals, and weapons.

Politically, the dictatorship, which now professes sympathy with the aims of the United States, if faced with a development of nationalist, corporative, Fascist movements in France, Italy, or Germany, in addition to its ally Franco in Spain, would immediately abandon its camouflage, and again parade its youth and legions in the green shirts, now in moth balls, as was done in the recent past, and paying tribute to the memory of Hitler and Mussolini.

There is indeed, Mr. Chairman, a great need to oppose communism, with even more vigor than they use to spread their gospel of hate. We must strengthen the bond of all democracies everywhere, and by the constant preaching and practicing of dynamic democracy, expose the evils of tyranny wherever it exists. Our greatest weapon in this struggle is never to compromise with principles, our democratic principles.

In asking Portugal to be a signatory to the Atlantic Pact we have made a grave error. Let's admit it, and take the necessary steps to correct it before it embarrasses us, as follows:

Firstly, deny any arms to the dictatorship of Portugal under the North Atlantic Pact. Such arms would be used primarily against the democratic people of Portugal whose respect and friendship we must seek first of all.

Secondly, refuse to grant, as a bad investment, economically, and morally, any ECA funds to a dictatorship which has shown regression in all phases of human endeavor, unlike the democracies that fought at our side and are steadily showing progress and a dynamic urge to develop and give substance to the basic liberties of man. If aid is given let the conditions be so rigid that the people of Portugal will get the full benefit of the grant, and with it, the support of the American people in their struggle for freedom.

We have too often compromised with the tyrannical dictatorship of Portugal. Let's not compromise again.

**STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK CITY, MAY 9, 1949.**

**HON. TOM CONNALLY,**

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I will greatly appreciate your favor in reporting and recording for the record the following relative to the hearings on the proposed North Atlantic Treaty.

Although I agree with the North Atlantic Treaty in principle, I strongly oppose its ratification in its present form.

If this proposed treaty be amended and streamlined along spiritual and moral lines (with particular reference to art. 5) it would revolutionize the world's search for an effective peace formula to handle the aggressor nation problem.

The substance of my proposed amendment for harnessing the power of religion to prevent war and to bring into captivity the threat of "dictatorship by the few" is as follows:

**PROPOSED AMENDMENT**

After the treaty has been in force for 5 years, any party shall automatically cease to be a party which fails to submit proof that its political structure has been amended to provide that it is mandatory to give its people the right to vote in a referendum for peace or war except in the case of direct invasion and except for the use of joint military power by the parties of this treaty.

Adoption of the above proposal is the kind of ammunition the Russian people need to liquidate the members of the Politburo.

It is about time that the world scrapped "peace and war making by the few" for "peace making by the multitudes" as exemplified in my proposal.

Physical might can win wars, but only right ideas can win the peace.

Sincerely submitted,

**CLIFFORD R. JOHNSON.**
Concerning Communism, the Atlantic Pact, and China, Etc.

Communism claims that it is a system of dialectical materialism; consequently, it is antagonistic at once to God, morality, and to all the nobilities of life. Grounded in the principle of class antagonism, it looks upon class strife as normal. Dedicated exclusively to the dictatorship of the proletariat, it makes use of any procedures that will promote this end—lying, conspiracy, murder, revolution. Its schools train men in all these forms of immorality and violence.

Both in principle and practice communism robs men of all the rights and privileges that are deduced to the conclusions of science. It forbids men free knowledge, shutting away from them the facts of life. It regiment men both in residence, in work, in travel, and in knowledge. It practices falsehood, deceiving its own people. It brutalizes men. It liquidates men.

The several Communist states cannot be looked upon as responsible governments, for both in principle and in leadership they are dedicated only to the dictatorship of the proletariat; and they pursue this goal with complete disregard both for truth and honor. Within the structure of the United Nations Russia has been guilty of such continuous abuse of the veto power as to make that world organization almost impotent. Her notorious effort to retard economic recovery in Europe, and her ruthless blockade of Berlin are illustrations of the dishonesty of her purpose. The present Communist clamor for world peace is evidently an hypocrisy, as the drive of the Communist armies now developing in China makes evident. What world communism wants is not peace but an impotent democracy. Communism is unrelaxing in its devotion to world-wide revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Because these things are true it must be evident that the only kind of world peace at present possible is an armed world peace. A peace of understanding and of honorable cooperation is not possible with communism, because communism does not recognize the authority either of truth or honor. The leaders of the free world have a right to the gratitude of all Christian and free men for their notable achievement in accomplishing the North Atlantic Pact. This and the increasing stability of Europe, due to the healing influence of the Marshall plan, has greatly enlarged the present world prospect of peace.

We regard with grave anxiety the present do-nothing policy of our Government in China. As American free men we cannot afford to allow communism to overwelm and dominate that great eastern people. America has been traditionally China's friend; and we feel that this historic friendship should be retained and implemented at the present hour. As Bishop Fred P. Corson has pointed out to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, an American investment of $500,000,000 would probably be enough to turn the tide, and enable the free men in China to defend and maintain their freedom. If we fail to do this and China is overrun by communism, it will mean the same pattern of tyranny and Christian repressio,n with which we are now familiar in eastern Europe. It will also mean, later, a greatly enlarged American investment in Asia, for we will be under the necessity of organizing the defenses both of Japan and of the Philippines.

As churchmen we are, of course, deeply committed to peace. We firmly believe in the peaceful intentions of our own Government and of the free peoples of western Europe who are united with us in the defense of our Christian liberties.

We point out that communism as an international conspiracy to destroy free government cannot be regarded a political party organized under a national constitution. Communist office seekers must be regarded as leading conspirators pledged to overthrow our institutions. Manifestly it is no violation of our American principles to refuse the facilities of our Government to the work of accom-
passing its own overthrow. Daniel Webster said more than 100 years ago that no national instrument ever includes a provision whereby it, itself, can be destroyed.

We order that this expression of our convictions and confidence be sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress, and to both the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations.

STATEMENT OF LADIES GARMENT CENTER, AMERICAN LABOR PARTY, NEW YORK, N. Y.

We wish to go on record opposing the ratification of the North Atlantic Pact as an instrument for war, and not for defense. This pact also will empty our pockets to the tune of billions of dollars over and above what is being spent for armaments in the national budget.

ABE SKOLNICK, Chairman.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Chicago 10, Ill., February 18, 1949.

HON. TOM CONNALLY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the meeting of the house of delegates of the American Bar Association held January 31 and February 1, 1949, resolutions were presented by the section of international and comparative law and adopted by the house endorsing in principle the Atlantic Defense Pact and making certain recommendations with respect to the guaranty clause of the ECA Act. Copies of these resolutions are enclosed for your information and for whatever action may be appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH D. STECHER, Secretary.

RESOLUTION REGARDING ATLANTIC DEFENSE PACT, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DElegates of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEBRUARY 1, 1949

Whereas the constitution of this association provides, among other things, for the advancement of the science of jurisprudence and promotion of the administration of justice; and

Whereas by resolution adopted February 24, 1948, this association recognized that these objectives cannot be advanced effectively in countries lacking economic and financial stability; and

Whereas, this association by such resolution did accordingly endorse in principle aid by the United States for European recovery; and

Whereas such recovery cannot be effectively advanced if fear of aggression exists in such countries and if the security of this country and other peace-loving, democratic countries is not firmly established: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That this association endorses in principle:

(a) The establishment, by constitutional process, of regional and collective arrangements based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, in accordance with Senate Resolution 230, Eightieth Congress (the Vandenberg resolution) and within the framework of the United Nations;

(b) Provision by the United States of military armament, supplies and advice to those areas and countries whose security is of primary importance to our own and whose efforts to maintain freedom and independence cannot be accomplished unless fear of aggression against them is removed.

I hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the resolution adopted by the house of delegates of the American Bar Association.

Dated February 18, 1949.

JOSEPH D. STECHER, Secretary.
HON. TOM CONNALLY,  
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SIR: At the request of Mr. William Roy Vallance, chairman of our committee on international law, I am transmitting certified copies of resolutions adopted at our annual meeting held at New York City in January.

Faithfully yours,

CHESTER WOOD, Secretary.

At the annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association, duly called and held at the house of the association of the bar of the city of New York on the 29th day of January 1949 (a quorum was present), the following resolution was duly introduced, seconded, and duly adopted:

"Resolved, That this association favors—

(a) The early implementation of United States Senate Resolution 239, Eightieth Congress (the Vandenberg resolution), through the establishment, by constitutional process, of regional and collective arrangements based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The enactment of legislation by the United States Congress authorizing the provision of military assistance to those areas and countries whose security is of primary importance to our own and whose efforts to achieve and maintain economic recovery and maintain freedom, independence, and democracy require that they be relieved of the fear of aggression."

STATE OF NEW YORK,  
City of Albany, ss:

I, Chester Wood, secretary of the New York State Bar Association, do hereby certify that a resolution of which the within is a full, true, and correct copy was duly adopted at the annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association held at the city of New York on the 29th day of January 1949; that each member of the association had due notice of said meeting in the manner prescribed by the constitution and bylaws of the association.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of New York State Bar Association this 10th day of February, 1949.

[SEAL]

CHESTER WOOD, Secretary.

At the annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association, duly called and held at the house of the association of the bar of the city of New York on the 29th day of January 1949 (a quorum was present), the following resolution was duly introduced, seconded, and duly adopted:

"Resolved, That the New York State Bar Association recommend that the Congress of the United States appropriate funds to give effect to the exchange of students and teachers, especially in the field of law, as authorized by the Buenos Aires Convention, the Smith-Mundt Act, and the Fulbright Act."

STATE OF NEW YORK,  
City of Albany, ss:

I, Chester Wood, secretary of the New York State Bar Association, do hereby certify that a resolution of which the within is a full, true, and correct copy was duly adopted at the annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association held at the city of New York, on the 29th day of January 1949; that each member of the association had due notice of said meeting in the manner prescribed by the constitution and bylaws of the association.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of New York State Bar Association this 10th day of February 1949.

[SEAL]

CHESTER WOOD, Secretary.
STATEMENT OF MRS. BJORN BJORNSON, NEW YORK CITY

To the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, re the North Atlantic Pact:

As a wife, and mother of two grown sons, I am conscious of my duties and privileges of citizenship in a matter of such importance as the North Atlantic Pact.

The newspapers and radio have established one thing clearly. We will spend $1,130,000 immediately for European armaments. That means we intend to go into the armaments business in a big way. We also, if the pact is passed and implemented, will have to establish Army personnel to handle the arms we export to the European countries which have already indicated their own inadequacy in this respect. What will our boys with guns do in Europe while waiting for an aggressive act? What will the alleged aggressor (the Soviet Union) be doing while our boys with arms stand around waiting for an aggressive act? It seems to me that when you make this type of preparation—and history attests this as a fact—you embark on a blood bath. It resolves nothing.

Is our policy to fight communism so determined that we hope to exterminate it by a war? I am not sure that we have raised our children to this single purpose.

It has been stated that the purpose of the North Atlantic Pact is to increase our security and chances for world peace. But the net effect on our youth—and I speak from personal experience—is to heighten their expectancy of participation in a war in the near future.

I also note that a peace parley is imminent. I remember peace parleys with the Soviet Union during the war period which produced many fruitful results despite ideological differences. We approached them then with a determination to reach agreement. Do we hope to reach agreement when we hang a sword via the North Atlantic Pact over the conference table?

If the Soviet Union is actually threatening Europe, the small initial allotment for arms, ammunition, and personnel will certainly not be adequate to fortify all the signers of the pact. How much more are we prepared to sacrifice for a military settlement of differences?

We wives and mothers have learned to be realistic. We know what it costs to raise a family. The forthcoming white paper of our State Department indicates that the President will have emergency powers to send additional amounts as may be necessary. If any part of our promises to the cosigners are to be carried out, these emergency powers will not long be waiting to be exercised. Where will it lead?

It seems to me our diplomats and statesmen who found a way to agree with the Soviet Union in wartime have enough sagacity and equipment to do so now. If American business is fearful of communism, it can find more practical measures of combating it. Why not try doing business with Russia?

From where I sit, the North Atlantic Pact can mean nothing but war. I am against war for any reasons promulgated on the present world scene. I am therefore against the pact, and every family in our country who sees it this way is against the pact.

STATEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL, AND SMELTER WORKERS ON THE PROPOSED NORTH ATLANTIC PACT, PRESENTED TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

For many years trade-union leaders in the United States, in contrast with their brothers in other countries of the world, confined their activities to the on-the-job problems of the membership. Wages, hours, and working conditions—these were the proper concern of the trade-unionists—other phases of the political and economic lives of the members were passed over. And the politicians were happy about this narrow division of interest and responsibility.

But we learned, slowly and the hard way, that it was easy to lose in the political area what had been so bitterly and expensively won on the picket line and in collective bargaining. We are still learning this lesson. The recent action of the House of Representatives in refusing to repeal the vicious Taft-Hartley Act taught many more American workers the need for the most active participation in the political life of our country.

Needless to say, labor legislation, social security, housing, even taxation, have gradually been accepted as legitimate concerns of trade-unions. Only in foreign policy has the old hands-off attitude persisted.
And here we meet again and again the attitude that the relations between our own country and the other countries of the world are complex and intricate, not the fit concern of the ordinary citizen uneducated in these matters.

The International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers absolutely rejects this kind of a dismissal of our interest and our imperative responsibility to participate in the formulation of the foreign policy of our country.

The fact is that for too long the striped-pants boys have had a field day leading us down the rosy lanes of their own choosing. And the result has been that we suddenly find our country on the wrong side, and we use wrong advisedly, of an issue; taking a stand, and supporting reactionary or corrupt regimes in a manner that is a complete contradiction of everything our country has ever stood for either at home or abroad.

It's about time a few people in Washington began to understand that the noble aims and aspirations of our foreign policy that are so eloquently expressed by them in speeches will never be realized through corrupt military dictation in South America, or tottering semi-Fascist regimes in Europe, or disintegrated feudal states in the Far East. These aims cannot be realized while antagonizing and alienating the workers and the common people all over the world, because, as much as some high-placed persons try to forget it, most of the people of the world still sweat, and work with their hands to earn a livelihood. And these common working people must be our friends, not our enemies.

The members of our union are such working people. They are people who desperately want peace, who suffer most the privations and horrors of war. And they are people who see in this Atlantic Pact now before this committee the preparations for another war.

Frankly, to us the Atlantic Pact represents the drift to war. We see in the preparation of the leaders of our country to try to work out the differences we have with the Soviet Union, and we admit this is a tough job to do, for the easy alternative of setting up a series of relations with other countries which inevitably and logically can end in the most destructive war in the history of mankind.

We wish to discuss some aspects of the pact and the climate within which it is being presented to the American people. It is these facts which have convinced us that the pact can mean nothing but evil and disaster for the American people.

Our examination of the facts leads us to conclude that the Atlantic Pact increases the risk of war, endangers our security, and lowers our standard of living.

It is our conviction, simply put, that the Atlantic Pact subverts the United Nations. And in doing this, the pact is undermining and weakening, if not destroying, mankind's best hope for peace.

There is no denying the fact that people everywhere in the world look to the UN today as the only organization of mankind that can maintain the peace and steadily decrease the risk of war.

Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, of Australia, and president of the General Assembly of the UN said all this quite explicitly and clearly last month when he pointed out in a speech:

"The peoples of the world have faith in the United Nations. It is their chief instrument in the struggles to create a world based upon justice. Nothing else is a substitute for it; nothing else can be a substitute for it."

Our own national organization in its convention as well as the National CIO has repeatedly passed resolutions endorsing the United Nations and urging the further strengthening of this organization.

Although we do not hold ourselves to be experts on the Charter of the UN, nevertheless we do feel that any group of American citizens who sees so much of the future of the world in the United Nations, as we do, have the right and the responsibility to evaluate the Atlantic Pact in terms of what we know to be the terms of the UN Charter.

We have listed below six separate and distinct contradictions between the function and role in international affairs of the UN and the Atlantic Pact. In every instance the pact would abrogate to its members a unilateral role explicitly granted to the UN and its agencies through the Charter.

1. The UN Security Council is the only body authorized in international law to determine the existence of aggression or other threat to peace.

The Atlantic Pact permits unilateral determination by its members that an act of aggression has occurred or is threatened. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the United States specifically opposed any definition of aggression in the UN Charter.
2. The UN Security Council has exclusive authority under the Charter to enforce peace.

The pact directs its signatories to take "such individual and collective action, including the use of armed force, as each party considers necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Pact area."

3. The UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council can take action.

The pact uses this clause as a pretext to justify its authorization of unilateral military action.

4. The UN Charter permits use of regional arrangements to enforce peace, "provided that such arrangements * * * are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

The pact covers parts of two hemispheres and three continents, hence is not regional. Its basic purpose, establishing a military bloc of states outside the UN, is wholly inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

5. The UN Charter provides that "the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies."

The pact provides that measures taken by its signatories shall be reported to the UN Security Council only after the event.

6. The Charter provides that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements * * * without the authorization of the Security Council."

THE ESSENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT IS THE ASSERTED RIGHT OF ITS SIGNATORIES TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY AND OTHER MEASURES WITHOUT THE PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As disturbing as these specific points are is the more general retreat from the One World philosophy of the UN to the already discredited policy of big-power alliances. This committee is examining a pact which has as its aim the substitution of an alliance directed against the Soviet Union for a solution of international differences through a body whose sole purpose is to try to prevent war and reach solutions.

The San Francisco Conference clearly rejected the system of great-power alliances which has dominated international politics for centuries—and for centuries has resulted in nothing but war and destruction and suffering. The UN was born out of a search for a new and better world—and born out of the bitter awareness that the common people throughout the world had of the toll that World War II had taken.

The pact, on the other hand, appears to us as a calculated and carefully conceived plan to build a military alliance outside the UN. It is as clearly the result of thinking and planning which has given up any intention of permitting the UN to prove its worth.

In retrospect, the Atlantic Pact appears today as the latest step in the unfolding foreign policy of our country outside the UN.

The Greek-Turkish aid program, as Secretary of State Acheson has indicated, was the first step in the path that today has reached the pact now before you. And similarly the Marshall plan designed to instill "fighting spirit" in the western European countries and prevent their remaining neutral in the cold war was the second major step in this plan.

Because the pact establishes an alliance outside of UN, and because it is directed against one country or a group of countries, and because it is intricably tied to a military-aid program and military planning, it inevitably increases the risk of war.

ATLANTIC FACT AND ARMAMENTS

No one denies that the approval of this pact will be followed by a demand that Congress appropriate funds for financing the rearmament of the countries that are party of the agreement. This is a military alliance pure and simple. The billion dollars in military lend-lease proposed by the State Department is integral to the pact itself. With the approval of the pact we would be embarking our country on the most fantastic peacetime arms expenditure in world history. And toward what end? Can it be said honestly that all of this expenditure and planning has a peaceful objective? That's a hard one to swallow, either by an American worker or a worker in any other country of the world.
Incidentally, much has been made of the relatively small expenditure, so-called, $1,130,000,000, proposed by the State Department. We are being told that we're buying a cheap bargain. Yet a recent analysis of this proposal reveals that it includes $452,000,000 for United States military equipment now on hand, and valued at 10 cents on the dollar. Thus, the actual value of the first installment instead of being slightly less than half a billion is actually closer to four and a half billion dollars at original cost. And at current replacement cost the value of these military items is probably closer to $8,000,000,000. (See United States News, May 6, 1949, pp. 5 and 11.)

It is deception of this kind, so potently aimed at not revealing to the American people the full extent of the military commitments already made that causes us to be doubly suspicious of all we can learn of this pact and its purposes.

To us one of the most disturbing, and revealing, features of the Atlantic Pact and its purposes is what it means in terms of Germany. It is already clear that German manpower and the Ruhr Industrial power are being counted on to ease the strain on the United States economy, as some put it.

It is strikingly clear that the pact has no reference to the provisions in the UN Charter for regional arrangements, without the prior authorization of the Security Council, directed against any further German aggression. The Atlantic Pact makes no specific reference to Germany. And it is clear from what has been said here, and by leading political figures elsewhere that defense against German aggression is the last thing in the mind of the authors of the pact.

Moreover, the regional arrangement in which the pact relies in western Europe, the so-called Western Union, is explicitly based on the policy of rebuilding western Germany, utilizing the old pro-Nazi and militarist elements there.

This policy will inevitably come home to haunt every one of us. We have presented to you but a few general aspects of the pact that strike us as being particularly frightening in their implications for world peace. Perhaps our approach is too simple, but we cannot help feeling that world peace is not found and maintained in military alliances and heavy armament programs. But we repeat this is what the ordinary American citizen thinks, and we have seen nothing to change our thinking or our conclusions on the Atlantic Pact.

FOREIGN POLICY AND JOBS

Behind the pact and the armament program that is its blood brother lurks the conviction that the cold-war foreign policy which produced the pact is good for American Industry and the American economy generally.

Senator Ed Johnson put this succinctly when, in a recent talk before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States he contended that without the cold war the present economic situation in the United States really would be alarming. Senator Johnson concluded: "If Russia suddenly decided to be a good neighbor there would be hell to pay."

This is, to say the least, an undesirable foundation on which to build a program for jobs and security of the American working people. And we cannot stop with this statement. What we really have before us for consideration are alternatives, which path truly leads to security and jobs:

On the one hand there is the way of military alliances, pointed toward war, and totally destructive of the security of our workers if carried through to its logical conclusion. And if the "danger" of peace develops, certainly a program geared to military preparations can provide neither jobs nor the Fair Deal program to which the administration committed itself.

On the other hand there is the alternative to the Truman doctrine-Marshall plan which our union has supported, a United Nations program of economic aid and development and a determined effort by our country to seek the settlement of differences through the United Nations.

We would like to discuss these alternatives as they apply to the industries in which our members are employed.

EFFECTS OF ECA COLD-WAR PROGRAM ON JOBS AND PRODUCTION IN INDUSTRIES IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL, AND SMELTER WORKERS ARE EMPLOYED

The heavy armament program, stock piling and Marshall-plan aid to European countries are undoubtedly using large quantities of nonferrous metals and thereby, to some extent, cushioning cyclical contraction in demand.
The effects of the cold war on nonferrous metals markets must be weighed, however, against available alternatives which, in the long run, would undoubtedly create much greater demand for metals and minerals produced by mine-mill members.

A general relief and rehabilitation program administered by the United Nations would promote industrialization of all Europe, thereby building up more stable and larger markets for nonferrous metals.

A United Nations program would similarly open up vast new potential markets in eastern European countries, many of which are now attempting to develop their own basic industries.

Money now used on armaments could be put to better purposes on much needed programs as increased housing and coordinated river valley development programs, both of which would require much greater amounts of basic nonferrous metals.

The known details on the effects of cold-war spending on mine-mill industries are presented below:

Through March 31, 1949, the Economic Cooperation Administration authorized purchases of $394.5 millions of nonferrous metals with Marshall-plan funds. Of this total, $294.2 millions had been actually shipped up to that time.

The greater bulk of Marshall-plan authorizations for purchases of nonferrous metals were to come from Canada and Latin America.

The high lights on ECA authorizations and shipments of nonferrous metals are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[in millions]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All nonferrous metals</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Shipped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>From United States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brass and bronze</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>From Canada</strong></td>
<td>126.6</td>
<td>126.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>From Latin America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From tenth report of the Public Advisory Board of the ECA.

The total amount of shipments of nonferrous metals from the United States ($86.8 million dollars) are less than half of amount spent on shipments of tobacco ($85.6 million dollars).

As declining purchases hit nonferrous markets more ECA purchases are being made in the United States at expense of Canadian producers (Northern Miner, May 5, 1949).

These figures alone do not, of course, reveal what would take place under the alternative program of encouraging trade with all countries operating through a United Nations program. But it is clear that additional metal markets are being blocked off by the United States policy of denying shipments to eastern European countries. Our union is directly concerned with the expansion of markets for both United States and Canadian products.

The United States News of January 21, 1949, reports:

"* * * United States exports to Russia and eastern Europe already are diminishing rapidly. Russia's share of United States exports, for example, are down from a monthly average of $12,400,000 in 1947 to $2,550,000 as a monthly average in 1948. Last year, Russia sold the United States about three times as much as the United States sold to Russia. United States exports to the Soviet sphere in 1948, as the chart shows, were far below the figures for 1947, lower still than in 1946 when the UNRRA was sending American aid to eastern Europe.

"Question for United States businessmen is how much longer it will be worth the risk and the effort to handle American exports to the Soviet sphere, how much longer Russia and her satellites will sell more to the United States than they get in exchange."
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Similarly, Marshall plan objectives retard development of a staple European economy and promotion of a free flow of trade among European countries.

A recent United States News World Report article "Dollars Stay Scarce Despite ERP" in the May 13, 1948, issue reports opinion of Swiss bankers on ERP operations:

"* * * The Swiss assert that ERP countries tend to concentrate on imports that will make life easier, giving second billing to the things that will help to build up national economies. For example, they report that gasoline being brought in under ERP is being used largely for private automobiles rather than for major industrial uses. Emphasis, they argue, should be on imports of industrial equipment, not raw materials, semifinished or finished goods."

On promotion of inter-European trade, this article also says:

"The trouble, as Swiss bankers size it up, is that there is more competition than cooperation among European countries. These countries scramble for United States dollars—the only currency that can be used in buying American goods. Little evidence is seen by these men that the ERP countries, as a means of opening broader markets, are getting together to lower barriers that prevent a free flow of money and of goods. The view of the ERP beneficiaries, as interpreted in Switzerland, seems to be that United States will go on putting up dollars to keep industry afloat, so why do all the changing that probably should be done?"

The effect of trade barriers on sale of nonferrous metals was commented upon by the trade journal Engineering and Mining Journal in their February 1949 issue:

"TRADE REVIVAL SLOW"

"Progress in reviving trade between countries in Europe that in the past have been important consumers of copper was painfully slow. As 1948 ended, it was apparent that currency depreciation threatened to further limit the movement of products containing copper from one European country to another. In fact, some of the increase in stocks of refined copper that occurred in the last quarter of the year could be traced to the chaotic economic situation that deepened with the unrest over establishing stable mediums of exchange."

The ECA program, through its Strategic Materials Division, facilitates control of foreign sources of mineral supply by American monopolies thereby enabling these monopoly groups to play off colonial labor against American labor to their own advantage.

In the long run, this can be one of the simple results of the cold-war program most injurious to our membership.

That this is a realistic appraisal of the perspective we face is indicated by the functions of the Strategic Materials Division of ECA. These functions are:

1. To expedite transfer of materials from ECA countries and possessions to United States stock piles.
2. To use ECA funds to expand production of needed materials.
3. To assure United States capital fair treatment in buying of materials or development of new sources of production. This is accomplished through requiring ECA recipients to negotiate schedules of minimum materials available to the United States, and also through pledges by these countries that American enterprise will receive equal footing with their own nationals in the development of new sources.

ECA countries are also required to pledge to expand their mineral production and commit portion thereof to United States. But, as the Engineering and Mining Journal for September 1948 bluntly puts it:

"Exactly how do you go about assuring that a given nation will direct output of its mining industry so as to fulfill that obligation and yet not impose undesirable controls on private enterprise?"

The official 14.3 billion dollars plus 1.5 billion dollars more for Atlantic Pact countries to be spent on armaments purchases in the next fiscal year will, of course, mean use of fairly substantial quantities of nonferrous metals. The exact amounts to be so employed is not known to us.

Significantly, however, it should be noted that these large outlays for armaments have been unable to prevent serious recession developing in those industries which would normally be expected to benefit from such expenditures. For example, the brass industry which would normally be expected to be producing various types of armament materials is now at the lowest level of production since before the last war.
EFFECTS OF A POSITIVE PEACE PROGRAM ON JOBS AND PRODUCTION IN MINE MILL INDUSTRIES

An alternative to our present cold-war program would necessarily involve the following features:

A UN program for relief and rehabilitation of distressed countries.

A program for better living at home involving a large-scale housing program, development of regional valley authorities, increased rural electrification, as well as numerous social security, health, and welfare benefits. Such a program would obviously mean more to the workers in mine-mill industry in terms of jobs and employment (not to mention other obvious far-reaching benefits) than the present cold-war program.

While exact estimates, in terms of actual figures are difficult, it is fairly obvious that:

A UN program that covered all the countries of the world would promote increased use of metals through greater industrialization. Such a program would obviously open up larger markets for metals through inclusion of eastern European countries.

A 2,000,000-homes-per-year housing program would mean, roughly, 785,000 tons of copper alone, or the equivalent of what would go into 523,333 bombers (these estimates are based on an average of 785 pounds of copper for a model 8-room house, including all appliances, as estimated by the president of Anaconda Copper before the TNEC, and an estimate of 3,000 pounds per bomber).

Similar equivalents to housing use of copper can be worked out on the basis of the following rough estimates:

One B-17 Flying Fortress uses 2,968 pounds of copper.
One B-24 Liberator uses 3,025 pounds of copper.
One 45,000-ton battleship uses 3,056,000 pounds of copper.
One aircraft carrier uses 2,000,000 pounds of copper.

An expanded rural electrification program would vastly increase consumption of copper, lead, and possibly aluminum (to the extent that aluminum was used instead of copper for wiring).

Similarly, a comprehensive regional development program through creation of river valley authorities would require huge quantities of nonferrous metals, particularly copper, for transmission lines, power stations, etc.

Again exact estimates on this are difficult, but rough calculations can be made on the basis of these approximations:

One mile of high voltage transmission lines uses 31,378 pounds of copper.
One mile of urban distribution electrification system uses 5,944 pounds.
One mile of typical rural distribution system uses 1,068 pounds.

STATEMENT OF JOHN GILMAN, MILWAUKEE, WIS.

Senator Tom Connally,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Here is the statement which I would have given to your committee had it been early enough to testify in person:

I am opposed to the North Atlantic Pact as a veteran since the pact is without doubt an aggressive pact ** * a pact which directly threatens the Soviet Union with force of arms should the President interpret any event which takes place among the signatory nations or its colonies, an act of aggression.

I fought for almost 9 months against Nazi Germany as a machine-gunner and was awarded the D. S. C. and Silver Star. I didn't fight, I'm sure, to make money for the international cartelists. I didn't fight so that we could prepare ourselves to fight Russia. I fought because I felt that it was in the best interests of our country.

However, this pact is a war pact and is not in the best interests of our country. An uprising in French Morocco can be interpreted as an act of aggression on Russia's part ** * internal aggression ** * as the pact infers. This pact is similar to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis in that it is out to smash bolshevism. Actually, the Axis was interested in smashing not bolshevism but any and all phases of democratic procedure as we know it. And so it seems that the creators of this pact are hell-bent on doing the same thing.
I am opposed to the pact because it is violating the entire foundations and spirit of the UN. The pact is not a regional pact but an international pact covering several regions ** the Mediterranean region ** the Scandinavian region ** the western European region ** and the American region. The UN at San Francisco specifically defined regionalism and this pact is exactly what the UN didn’t want done.

And lastly, I oppose this North Atlantic Military Alliance because I am opposed to automatic declarations of war. Congress would have little to say if the signatory nations decided that an act of aggression took place. It would be committing our Nation to war under the terms of the pact.

Why don’t you creators of blood-money profits and destructible conflicts spend your hard-earned salaries so that the National Association of Manufacturers can accumulate enough profits without sending us boys into war? Why don’t you suffer as I and thousands like myself by staying up 24 hours per day working together with Russia instead of working for war?

I swear by God Almighty that if that pact goes through and if war comes about, I shall pray day and night that every Member of Congress who votes for it shall be its first victims. I’m disabled and can hardly stand on my feet from the results of the last holocaust. If there should be another war, may God see to it that every Member of Congress who is whooping it up for another war by talking demagogically about “peace,” may He see to it that they suffer and die as I and the boys who I saw die on the battlefield.

It’s easy to sign papers committing us little people to die for someone else’s profits. But it’s not so easy to convince us that we are dying for America. I love my country more than any one of those war creators will ever love this country. I was willing to die for it and proved that I was willing to die for it. How many of you can say the same thing?

Distinguished Service Crosses ** Silver Stars ** Purple Hearts ** I’ve got them. But they will mean only medals awarded by big business for bravery in earning blood profits if you recommend this pact to Congress.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN GILMAN,
Staff Sergeant, Thirty-ninth Infantry Regiment,
Ninth Infantry Division, Serial No. 3701156.

PROGRESSIVE PARTY,

Hon. Tom CONNALLY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator CONNALLY: Mr. Wallace who is now on the west coast has asked me to return the enclosed transcript of his testimony before your committee with several corrections noted therein.

At the time of his appearance, in response to a question from Senator McMahon, Mr. Wallace stated that he would present the committee with documentation for the purposes of the record, in support of his statement that between the date of the Russian offer to lift the Berlin blockade on March 21 and the date when that offer was disclosed by Tass on April 25 “the State Department was filling the press and radio with stories about Russian aggressiveness, intensifying the atmosphere of fear and hostility which it evidently thinks necessary to assure the ratification and implementation of the Atlantic Pact.”

Mr. Wallace has asked me to transmit to you the following very partial chronicle of acts and declarations of an official character in support of that statement:

March 21
President Truman officially welcomes Winston Churchill upon his arrival in this country at a formal dinner in Blair House (N. Y. Post, March 24).

March 31
Winston Churchill addresses the Mid-Century Convocation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and says, among other things:

“The failure to strange Bolshevism at its birth and to bring Russia, then prostrate, by one means or another, into the general democratic system lies heavy upon us today. ** It is certain that Europe would have been com-
munized and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States" (N. Y. Herald Tribune, April 1).

March 31
Senator Connally, in a press interview, speaks of "an open Russian plan and design to impose upon the civilized world their plan of government and economy." (N. Y. Times, April 1).

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in an address before the United States Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, deplored the "discouraging, disagreeable, frustrating role" played by Russia and referred to the "terror and international intimidation" of eastern Europe (N. Y. Times, April 1).

April 4
In an address made at the ceremonies accompanying the signing of the Atlantic Pact, President Truman referred to the pact as "a shield against aggression" (N. Y. Times, April 5).

April 5
Speaking at an Army Day ceremony before the Jewish War Veterans in New York City, General Bradley discussed the Atlantic Pact at the invitation of the State Department saying: 
"Strategically, the North Atlantic Pact would enable free nations of the Old World and the New to funnel the great strength of our New World to the ramparts of the Old, and thus challenge an enemy where he would transgress." He further referred to Russian protests against the pact as "the expressions of angry resentment from jackals denied their plunder" (N. Y. Times, April 6).

April 6
Speaking before the new Members of the House and Senate, President Truman declared:
"Now I believe that we are in a position where we will never have to make that decision (to drop atom bombs) again, but if it has to be made for the welfare of the United States and the democracies of the world are at stake, I wouldn't hesitate to make it again" (N. Y. Times, April 7).

April 9
General Walter Bedell Smith, former United States Ambassador to Moscow, speaking before the Military Order of World Wars, stated that Russia—
"is pointed behind its iron curtain with a formidable military entity, preying on the fears of the free peoples of Europe. It is typical of Communist cynicism that while they administer liberal doses of fear, at the same time they press their so-called peace offensive" (New York Times, April 10).

April 9
The House Appropriations Committee released the testimony of "top air officials" that the air force "now plans to keep flying supplies into the blockaded city (Berlin) indefinitely" and that "they did not expect war during the year starting July 1—although, they added, it was a possibility at any time (New York Times, April 10).

April 12
A report from London that announces facilities "necessary to the United States Air Force for atomic bombardment have been prepared in this country by agreement between the United States and British Governments."
The correspondent added that:
"The mutual responsibility of the two governments in such defense has recently been highlighted by Winston Churchill's statement that western Europe owes its liberty solely to possession by the United States of the atomic bomb and to President Truman's declaration that he would use the bomb again if it became necessary" (New York Times, April 13).

April 12
In his message to the Senate requesting ratification of the North Atlantic Pact President Truman referred to "the rights of small nations, broken one by one and the people of those nations deprived of freedom by terror and oppression" (New York Times, April 13).
Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said on the floor of the House:

"Moscow and every other center in Russia, we must hit within one week after the war starts, and it can be done only by land-based planes such as we now have ... With the signing of the North Atlantic Pact we would have ample land bases. "We will absolutely demoralize the enemy. We will destroy all his lines of communications. We will blast at the centers of operation, and then let our allies send the army in, other boys, not our boys, to hold the ground we win" (New York Times, April 14).

April 25

A report from London announced that:

"The first American superfortress group with the know-how for atomic bombing will arrive in England next Saturday and put the United States in position to drop an atomic bomb anywhere in Europe on short notice. "Air Force officers revealed that the famous 509th 'Atom Bomb' Group of 30 planes will fly to this front-line Atlantic pact base for training with its specially equipped, specially trained crews. "Included in the 509th's personnel will be at least two veterans of the history-making missions that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (New York Times, April 26).

April 25

Tass statement announces the Russian offer made on March 21 to lift the Berlin blockade (New York Times, April 26).

At Mr. Wallace's request, I am asking that the committee include the foregoing chronicle in the record of the hearings as an addenda to Mr. Wallace's statement.

Very truly yours,

John J. Ait, General Counsel.

Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator: In connection with the forthcoming hearings on the North Atlantic Pact, several points have arisen in my mind in connection with the partition of Ireland which I think may have some bearing on the consideration of the pact by the United States.

As I read article IV, the thought occurs to me that under the present wording the United States is bound to uphold the unjust partition and occupation of Ireland by Britain where it seems to bind all signatories to the preservation of the present territorial limits.

If my understanding is correct, is it not within the realm of possibility that American troops might be sent in to aid in putting down revolt in the six-county area against the unjust government of Great Britain?

My thought on that is based on the reports which we have received from time to time of the resentment of the younger generation, particularly toward the injustice of partition and the threat offered from time to time that there may be determined revolution in the six-county area.

With this premise I naturally do not subscribe, but the fear is always within our minds that the younger group may not heed the wisdom of the older generation and take matters into their own hands.

A further question in my mind is whether the United States should sanction any further elimination by Great Britain of the elementary demand of the right to self-determination on the part of all Ireland by signing of the pact.

It occurs to me that there are two angles of approach on this; first, direct and vigorous opposition to the present wording of article IV, and second, by the action of the Congress on a resolution which would provide for mediation by the United States and Britain on the question of partition.
This second approach may be feasible in view of the deep desire on the part of the United States that the North Atlantic Pact shall not be one of oppression and discrimination but one of aid and advancement of peace.

We have recently heard an objection offered by one of those opposing any action, particularly in the State Department, that the six-county area has been depended upon in two world wars and that the southern counties have been neutral.

I thing that this is very easily overcome and that if partition is removed Ireland would become copartners with the other signatories and bases in all the counties would be immediately available if need arose.

In addition, I believe we agree that any conflict between the North Atlantic Pact signers and other countries in Europe will be based on the issue of communism and I daresay that no one will contradict the fact that Ireland is the strongest field of anticommunistic sentiment in the entire European area.

I hope to be in Washington some day next week and I shall try to see you personally if I may.

With every good wish to you, personally, I am

Sincerely and respectfully yours,

THOMAS H. BUCKLEY,
Commissioner of Administration.

APRIL 26, 1949.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
The Secretary of State, Department of State.
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed is a letter which I have received from Mr. Thomas H. Buckley, commissioner of administration of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who is also a vice president of the American League for an Undivided Ireland, which asks a number of very important questions regarding the effect of article 4 of the North Atlantic Pact on Ireland. I wish you would respond as fully as possible to all the questions raised in Mr. Buckley's letter. I also hope that you will not be limited by his letter, but will cover all phases of this question, in particular the following:

(1) Does the wording of article 4 require the United States to uphold and preserve the present partition of Ireland?

(2) If so, could American troops be employed under the terms of the pact in quelling disturbances resulting from a possible revolt of the six-county area against Great Britain?

(3) What would be the effect of United States ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty upon the right of self-determination on the part of all Ireland?

I consider it to be a matter of fundamental and urgent importance that the whole question of the impact of article 4 and of the entire pact upon the situation in Ireland be explained, analyzed, and answered in as completely an unequivocal and detailed fashion as possible. I merely cite the above three questions to indicate some of the more significant points to which I believe your reply should address itself.

Your prompt attention to this matter will be most gratefully appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.,
United States Senator.

MAY 4, 1949.

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR LODGE: Thank you for your letter of April 26 bringing to my attention Mr. Thomas H. Buckley's letter concerning the North Atlantic Treaty with respect to Ireland. The answers to Mr. Buckley's questions are clear and simple.

Article 4 of the treaty does not require the United States to uphold and preserve the partition of Ireland. That article merely requires the parties to consult under certain circumstances. It contains no further obligation.

Digitized by Google
It is inconceivable that American troops could be employed, under the terms of the treaty, in quelling possible disturbances in northern Ireland. As I stated Monday in response to a question asked during the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, there is no thought whatever of stationing American troops in Europe in peacetime other than existing forces of occupation.

United States ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty would have no effect whatsoever upon the right of self-determination in Northern Ireland or anywhere else.

In short, the treaty, as I have explained both to Mr. MacBride and Mr. Nunan, has no relation whatever to the problem of partition.

I have noted with gratification Mr. Buckley's statements, which are similar to those previously made to us by the Irish Government, concerning the devotion of the Irish people to Christian and democratic principles which the Treaty is designed to preserve.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

NEW YORK 7, N. Y., April 25, 1949.

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., United States Senate.

DEAR MR. SENATOR: As an aid to you in fully appreciating Ireland's attitude on participation in the Atlantic Pact, we enclose—
(a) A summary of Ireland's attitude on the Atlantic Pact;
(b) A summary of the considered viewpoint of representative American citizens of Irish blood with respect thereto;
(c) Reprint of a special article by John O'Donnell, the well-known journalist.

These are submitted for your consideration and study.

The Irish Government has expressed a desire to participate in the Atlantic Pact, provided England withdraws from Ireland and hands over all power of government to a Central Government elected by the Irish people. The Irish Government is particularly inviting American consideration of the obstacle which is preventing Ireland from joining the Atlantic Pact.

It appears to us that certain questions in relation to the issue raised should be carefully considered and answered at this time:
1. Does the Atlantic Pact, in its present form, bind the United States to uphold the unjust partition of Ireland and the occupation of part of Ireland by England? The answer is "Yes"—Article 4 would bind the participating countries to maintain present territorial integrities for 20 years.
2. Is it our American purpose that the United States should lend its sanctions to a denial by England of the elementary democratic right of national self-determination to the Irish nation? The obvious answer is "No."
3. Is it our desire to achieve cooperation among the Atlantic nations? If such is really the desire, why does the United States of America hesitate to exert its very real influence in order to bring about a settlement of this issue which endangers the success of the entire Atlantic Pact? It is the admitted geographical fact that Ireland's strategic position on the western flank of Europe makes her a vital link in the Atlantic chain.

England's continued occupation of the northeasterly corner of Ireland, against the recorded wish of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people, is therefore jeopardizing the enormous investment of the American taxpayers in this mighty venture directed to the preservation of world peace.

These are vital questions which should be considered by every American. Ireland is (a) vetoed by Russia from participation in the United Nations and (b) partitioned by England against the will of the Irish people.

Is the United States of America prepared also to take sides against Ireland by guaranteeing the partition of Ireland, and thereby excluding Ireland from taking her full and rightful place among the nations of the earth?

We do not believe so.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH SCOTT,
National President,
American League for an Undivided Ireland.
A SUMMARY OF IRELAND'S ATTITUDE ON THE ATLANTIC PACT

(A) THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

Ireland's Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Sean MacBride, stated his Government's position in relation to the Atlantic Pact in the Irish Parliament on February 23, 1949, as follows:

"Exchanges of views have taken place between the Government of the United States and the Government of Ireland on the question of Ireland's participation in the proposed Atlantic Pact. I took advantage of these exchanges of views to make clear the attitude of this Government on the matter, and I have kept other Governments concerned in the pact informed of our views.

"As I explained in the course of these exchanges, Ireland, as an essentially democratic and freedom-loving country, is anxious to play her full part in protecting and preserving Christian civilization and the democratic way of life. With the general aim of the proposed Atlantic Pact in this regard, therefore, we are in agreement. In the matter of military measures, however, we are faced with an insuperable difficulty, from the strategic and political points of view, by reason of the fact that six of our northeastern counties are occupied by British forces against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people. Partition is naturally and bitterly resented by the people of this country as a violation of Ireland's territorial integrity and as a denial in her case of the elementary democratic right of national self-determination. As long as partition lasts, any military alliance or commitment involving joint military action with the State responsible for partition must be quite out of the question so far as Ireland is concerned. Any such commitment, if undertaken, would involve the prospect of civil conflict in this country in the event of a crisis.

"Any such alliance or commitment is equally out of the question from the strategic point of view. The defence of a small island such as Ireland can be undertaken effectively only by a single authority having at its back the firm support of a decisive majority of the population of the whole country. Furthermore, it would obviously be necessary, from the strategic point of view, that the productive capacity of the country as a whole should be integrated under a democratically elected central authority; and this is impossible so long as partition lasts because the six northeastern counties are the principal industrial area of the country. These practical difficulties are aggravated by the state of feeling naturally created by the undemocratic practices used to maintain and insure the continuance of the partition of our country. Our attitude is that neither this Government, nor, we believe, any other Irish Government, could expect to find the necessary support for a policy involving joint military commitments with the power that continues to lend its sanction, tacit or active, to evils of the very kind which it is the object of the proposed pact to oppose and prevent.

"In explaining our attitude, I made it quite clear that this Government is not actuated by feelings of hostility toward Britain; on the contrary, we are anxious to develop and strengthen our relations with Britain, and there are so many factors and interests making for good neighboring relations between the two countries that it is inconceivable that, once partition were removed and once the geographical, ideological, and other forces making for friendship between the two countries were given full play, Ireland should ever constitute a source of danger or embarrassment to Britain in time of war. Any detached or impartial survey of the strategic and political considerations involved must lead to the conclusion that a friendly and united Ireland on Britain's western approaches is in the interest, not merely of Britain or of Ireland, but of all the countries concerned with the security of the Atlantic area. Every consideration of constructive statesmanship points to the necessity of ending, as soon as possible and once and for all, the centuries-old conflict between our two countries. I have strongly urged that it is better to face this question now as a matter of urgency rather than to allow a situation to develop wherein a satisfactory solution might be much more difficult to bring about. I also indicated that, inasmuch as the solution of the partition problem would not merely end an undemocratic and dangerous situation, but would also make a vital contribution toward strengthening the internal harmony and cohesion of the North Atlantic community, the matter was one which should receive the active consideration of all governments interested in the cooperation of nations concerned.

"That, briefly, is the attitude of the Government on the question of Ireland's participation in the proposed Atlantic Pact, and, as I said, I have taken steps..."
to make our position clear to the governments of all states immediately
concerned."

Asked by Sir John Esmonde whether acceptance of the Atlantic Pact would
imply "acceptance of the unnatural and enforced division of our country," Mr.
MacBride replied:

"Article 2 of our constitution provides that: 'The national territory consists
of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and its territorial seas.'

"Article 4 of the draft Atlantic Treaty, which is the consultative article,
refers to 'the territorial integrity, political independence or security' of the parties
to the treaty. The provisions of this article might well, under existing
circumstances in regard to the six northeastern counties, imply an acceptance
that 'the territorial integrity' and 'political independence' referred to in the
article, are the concern of Great Britain, unless it is clearly recognized that the
national territory of this state consists of the whole island of Ireland, as provided
by article 2 of our constitution."

Asked by Deputy Lehane whether the exchange of views on the proposed North
Atlantic Treaty which took place between the Government of the United States
and the Irish Government was written or verbal, and, if this exchange was in
writing, whether he will consider the publication of the notes exchanged, Mr.
MacBride replied:

"The exchange of views referred to took place by way of alde-memoire. The
Irish Government's alde-memoire was delivered to the United States on the 8th
February last. No intimation has so far been received to indicate that the
United States Government, and the governments of the other convening powers,
have yet had an opportunity of considering the Irish Government's alde-memoire.

"As already stated, the Irish Government's view is that a constructive ap­
proach to the concept of Atlantic cooperation would suggest the necessity of
examining, in the first instance, problems tending to prevent or weaken the
cooperation in the Atlantic area. The Irish Government has indicated that it
would welcome such an approach to what we consider to be the unnatural and
unjust division of our country.

"In these circumstances, I do not envisage the publication, at the moment, of
the documents in question."

[From the Irish Press (Dublin) of Tuesday, March 22, 1949]

(II) STATEMENT IN RELATION TO THIS MATTER BY MR. DE VALEMA, THE LEADER OF THE
OPPOSITION

Asked at a press conference, which he gave in Sheffield yesterday, what would
be his attitude to the Atlantic Pact if he was returned to power, Mr. de Valera
replied that the first thing they must ask themselves was: What was the Atlantic
Pact for?

"Its object," he continued, "was to enable various countries to maintain their
independence which they already had and which they wished to protect.

"We in Ireland have not yet got our national independence and before we could
protect it, we must secure it."

Asked if partition were out of the way and Ireland was independent, what
would be his attitude to the Atlantic Pact, Mr. de Valera said that if we were
united and Ireland had her independence, he personally would advocate join­
ing the pact, but, until unity was secured, he did not think that there was any
chance of the people of Ireland wanting to join the Atlantic Pact.

[From the Daily News, New York, April 13, 1949]

CAPITOL STUFF

(By John O'Donnell)

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 12.—Just to pursue that ancient "this is where I came
in" line, we wish to direct the attention of readers with Irish blood to the present
visit in Washington of Sean MacBride, Eire's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The extremely hush-hush talks of Ireland's MacBride and United States Secretary
of State Dean Acheson mean just one more unreeling of that ancient theme:
That the last tie which binds this piece of ground in the Atlantic to the monarchy
of Britain must be slashed. These are the facts:

Ireland's Secretary of State MacBride has told United States Secretary of
State Acheson that his government holds office because the voters elected its
members on the platform pledge that the artificial partition of Ireland would be
abolished. That Ireland will not enter into any Atlantic military alliance which prohibits the majority of any nation from changing frontiers to meet the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants.

And at the same time, the Washington diplomatic representatives of His Britannic Majesty have insisted to our State Department that the United States must not meddle in this delicate problem. And when the heads of our armed forces have mildly reminded the Londoners that we would like to have the use of the air fields of Eire as a part of our chore in saving all of western Europe from the Kremlin, they have been met with the brusque British come appance:

“Well, we won World War I while the Irish were staging a revolution. We won World War II without Irish bases which we wanted. And if World War III comes along, we’ll win that without the Irish—provided you come across as Franklin Roosevelt did 10 years ago and from then on.”

All of this brings up the present battle over the Atlantic treaty and the proposition of whether to give, under some new lend-lease set-up, billions of American military equipment, planes, guns, and brains. This is just an echo of what happened upon Capitol Hill after World War I when Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations got what it deserved—an ignominious exit via the international garbage can.

**TRICK CLAUSE IN FUZZY-BRAINED LEAGUE**

In 1919, when the great battle over the League was being staged, the voters of Irish descent played an important part. The same holds true today.

The trick clause in the fuzzy-brained League of Nations was article 10, slickly written into the pact by Britain for the sole purpose of knocking off all efforts of the Irish to win their independence.

Well, we’ve got the same set-up in the present Atlantic Pact. If the Irish were stupid enough to sign it they would pledge that for the next 20 years (according to article 13) they must respect the “territorial integrity and political independence” of the cosigners (read article 4).

In other words, the present Government of Ireland, elected on a platform sworn to end the present partition of their nation, would perform agree to brush aside its most important issue for at least 20 years. Back in 1919 and 1920, during the days of the troubles which flamed into the honest Anglo-Irish war, a tough, hard-fighting, and accurate-shooting Irish settled that problem when the identical proposal was slipped into the League of Nations by Woodrow Wilson on the needling of Lloyd George.

Into the present conversations moves notorious article 10 of the League of Nations, which the Senate of 1919 courageously tossed back in Woodrow Wilson’s teeth. Had the Wilson League of Nations gone through, these United States would have been called upon to send troops to Ireland to preserve the “status quo” of that time. In other words, we would have been pledged to use Americans to shoot down Irishmen who wanted freedom from London rule.

**SAME SENATE, SAME DIPLOMACY, SAME ATTITUDE**

Thanks in great measure to two great Senators from Massachusetts—Henry Cabot Lodge and David Ignatius Walsh—article 10 of the League and the League itself was properly killed.

And now, 30 years after, the same thing pops up again. Same Senate, same slick British diplomacy, same angry “to hell with it” attitude of the Irish.

What the British slipped into article 10 of the old League of Nations they’ve put into article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Why they haven’t the simple honesty to call it by its right name—“a military alliance against communism”—we don’t know.

This article 4 proclaims that “the parties” (this means U. S. fighting men carrying the battle load) will take suitable action whenever “in the opinion of any of them (that’s Great Britain), the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.” Well, if the voting majority of North Ireland votes to toss the British crown the hell out of there and join up with Eire to create one simple state, that article, by any reading of words, means that the territorial integrity of the King of Great Britain and North Ireland is most seriously threatened.
And so we're going to send United States troops over there to protect the absentee landlords of London? This is going to be good. But we heard most of it back in 1919 and 1920. The Irish won then and we think they're going to win again.

RESOLUTIONS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY CONFERENCE OF KEYMEN OF THE AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR AN UNDIVIDED IRELAND, AT CHICAGO, FEBRUARY 12 AND 13, 1949

Whereas there has just been issued by the Irish Government at Dublin an official declaration entitled "Ireland's Attitude on Participation in the Atlantic Pact"; and

Whereas this document has been placed in the hands of our appropriate officers by Hon. John Conway, Irish consul at Chicago; and

Whereas this document has been read to and considered by this Conference of Keymen of the American League for an Undivided Ireland, assembled at Chicago the 12th and 13th days of February 1949: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the said statement of Ireland's attitude on participation in the Atlantic Pact meets with our sympathetic understanding and approval;

That we endorse to our fellow Americans each statement of fact therein contained as accurate; and

That we record our fixed determination to intensify and augment our American effort looking to American aid to abolish the border in Ireland.

The Honorable DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed are the following:
A letter from Mr. John Scott, national president of the American League for an Undivided Ireland; an enclosure which Mr. Scott sends me entitled "A Summary of Ireland’s Attitude on the Atlantic Pact"; an article which Mr. Scott sends me by John O'Donnell in the New York Daily News of April 13, 1949, entitled "Capitol Stuff."

I send all this material to you for your comment, inasmuch as they deal with the Atlantic Pact and come from an important organization to which many American citizens belong.

1. You will note that Mr. Scott makes the following assertion:
"1. Does the Atlantic Pact, in its present form, bind the United States to uphold the unjust partition of Ireland, and the occupation of part of Ireland by England?
"The answer is 'Yes'—Article 4 would bind the participating countries to maintain present territorial integrities for 20 years."

2. You will note that Mr. Scott further says:
"Is the United States of America prepared also to take sides against Ireland by guaranteeing the partition of Ireland, and thereby excluding Ireland from taking the full and rightful place among the nations of the earth?"

3. You will notice that in the enclosures entitled "A Summary of Ireland's Attitude on the Atlantic Pact" the following quotation is made:
"Asked by Sir John Esmonde whether acceptance of the Atlantic Pact would imply 'acceptance of the unnatural and enforced division of our country,' Mr. MacBride replied:
"'Article 2 of our constitution provides that: 'The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and its territorial seas.'

"'Article 4 of the draft Atlantic Treaty, which is the consultative article, refers to 'the territorial integrity, political independence or security' of the parties to the treaty. The provisions of this article might well, under existing circumstances in regard to the six northeastern counties, imply an acceptance that 'the territorial integrity' and 'political independence' referred to in the article, are the concern of Great Britain, unless it is clearly recognized that the national territory of this state consists of the whole island of Ireland, as provided by article 2 of our constitution.'"
4. You will notice that in the article entitled "Capitol Stuff" which Mr. Scott encloses, the statement is made that "the heads of our armed forces have mildly reminded the Londoners that we would like to have the use of airfields of Eire as a part of our chore in saving all of western Europe from the Kremlin." Is there authority for this statement?

5. You will also note that the article "Capitol Stuff" refers to article 10 of the League of Nations and says "We've got the same set-up in the present Atlantic Pact. If the Irish were * * * to sign it they would pledge that for the next 20 years (according to article 13) they must respect the 'territorial integrity and political independence' of the signers (read article 4)."

6. You will note the further statement in the same article, "And now, 30 years after, the same thing pops up again * * * What the British slipped into article 10 of the old League of Nations they've put into article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Why they haven't the simple honesty to call it by its right name—a military alliance against communism—we don't know.

"This article 4 proclaims that 'the parties' (this means United States fighting men carrying the battle load) will take suitable action whenever 'in the opinion of any of them (that's Great Britain), the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.' Well, if the voting majority of North Ireland votes to toss the British crown the hell out of there and join up with Eire to create one single state, that article, by any reading of words, means that the territorial integrity of the King of Great Britain and North Ireland is most seriously threatened.

"And so we're going to send United States troops over there to protect the absentee landlords of London? This is going to be good. But we heard most of it back in 1919 and 1920. The Irish won then and we think they're going to win again."

I trust that you will at your convenience give clear and unequivocal answers to the questions which I have enumerated and to all other pertinent issues raised in Mr. Scott's communication and enclosures.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.
United States Senator.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

The Honorable HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR LODGE: Thank you for your letter of April 29 sending me certain material from Joseph Scott, national president, American League for an Undivided Ireland, concerning the North Atlantic Treaty with respect to Ireland. Your letter particularly calls attention to certain questions raised by Mr. Scott and others, and I am glad to make the following comment:

The North Atlantic Pact certainly does not require the United States to uphold and preserve the partition of Ireland. Article 4 merely obligates the parties to consult under certain circumstances. It contains no further obligations. Article 5 obligates each party in the event of an armed attack upon any of them, to take such action as they deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, but I am confident that the Irish Government has no thought of making an armed attack on anyone. The United States Government certainly has no thought of taking sides against Ireland or of guaranteeing the partition of Ireland. It has always taken the position that the partition question was not one in which it could intervene, but that, on the contrary, the question was one for settlement by the Irish and UK Governments.

I have noted the reply given by Mr. MacBride to Sir John Esmonde's question, which is similar to statements made personally to me by Mr. MacBride. I could not, of course, enter into a discussion with him of Irish constitutional matters.

I know of no authority for the statements in the newspaper column enclosed with your letter that American military officials have expressed interest in London, in the use of airfields in Ireland.
The comparisons made in the same column between the pact and the covenant of the League of Nations are not in accordance with the facts. As you know, article 10 of the League covenant committed the members to "respect and preserve the political independence and territorial integrity" of all other members. Article 4 of the pact, as I have stated above, merely obligates the parties to "consult" whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened.

United States ratification of the Atlantic Treaty will have no effect whatever upon the partition question or upon the right of self-determination in Northern Ireland or anywhere else. It is inconceivable that American troops could be employed, under the terms of the treaty, in quelling local disturbances in Northern Ireland.

I recently had the pleasure of discussing the North Atlantic Treaty, among other matters, with Mr. MacBride, and was gratified at his understanding of the treaty and sympathy for its objectives.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson.

Enclosure: Letter of April 25, 1949, from Mr. Joseph Scott.

THE AMERICAN LEGION REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECTION OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION TO NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MAY 6, 1949

The executive committee of the Foreign Relations Commission consisting of Leon Happeil, chairman; John Barnhardt, of North Carolina; John Wicker, of Virginia; and William Verly, of Ohio; members, met in Washington on May 2 and 3, 1949. At this time their discussions and deliberations were benefited by interviews with Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Under Secretary of State James Webb; Lloyd A. Lehrbas, Director of Information, State Department; Lloyd V. Berkner; and Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer, a military-liaison committee of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Dr. Bielecki, chairman of the National Democratic Party of Poland, in exile.

This executive committee had the further advantage of the experiences of two trips to Washington by John Barnhardt. Mr. Barnhardt attended several meetings at the State Department, the most important of which was the national conference on American foreign policy, on special assignment by the National Commander.

The executive committee then proceeded to Indianapolis on May 8 where they were joined by other members of the Foreign Relations Commission—Charles Gonser, of Washington, and Oscar Rohlf, of Wyoming, and the NEC liaison committee composed of Chairman H. Kirk Grantham, of Mississippi; Roscoe B. Galther, of Mexico; and Ray Murphy of Iowa.

Since the last report on foreign affairs, which was the convention committee report of October 1948, there has been a change in the status of the cold war. The world is still threatened by a totalitarian state obsessed with imperialistic ambitions; however, in the past 6 months we have seen the United States and the countries of western Europe tip the scales in favor of the west by taking the offensive from the Russians.

Because of the crucial situation in the field of foreign relations at this moment it appears appropriate to this Commission that a statement of policy in the matters of foreign relations should be made to the executive committee. It is our feeling that this policy, if approved, should be publicized widely through the press, radio, and Legion channels and publications so that all Legionnaires, Government officials, and the public everywhere will be aware of the foreign policy of the American Legion.

The future of this great organization, in fact the future of our very lives, depends upon a sound, constructive United States foreign policy. For the past several years the American Legion has been most helpful in formulating and implementing the foreign policy of our Nation. Because this fact is known to few Legionnaires, it is our opinion that the reputation and stature of the American Legion will be increased if this fact is more widely known, and if the foreign policy platform of the American Legion can be more widely disseminated.

Since the close of World War II Legion foreign policy has been aimed primarily at three activities in the field of foreign affairs, namely, implementing the European Recovery Program and its ramifications; enlightening the world as to the democratic methods and ideals of the United States; and strengthening the United Nations Charter in the interest of world peace. We believe that these
fields of activity are still the most important and we further believe it to be the advantage of the Legion to restate and to bring up to date our policies in these matters.

There can be no real peace or security in the world until the United Nations can be strengthened sufficiently to stop aggression. The American Legion has not merely cried out for a stronger United Nations; we were the first national organization to offer specific methods of how the Charter of the United Nations could be strengthened so that it would become an effective world authority. We believe that these three amendments merit renewed emphasis and we again urge their early adoption by the Congress:

1. Removal of the veto in matters of aggression or preparation for aggression; also the strengthening of the International Court of Justice by giving it the power to interpret aggression and preparation for aggression with appropriate jurisdiction over individuals, corporations, and nations in these matters.

2. In connection with this, the limitation of world arms production through the establishment of arms quotas guaranteed through a system of positive international inspection, and the adoption of United States proposals for international control of atomic energy.

3. Establishment of an effective world police force to consist of an independent active force, presumably to be recruited from the small nations, under the direct control of the Security Council; and a reserve force made up of national contingents of the five major powers.

Because of the misuse of the veto in the United Nations, the peace-loving countries of the North Atlantic area have been forced to take action to guarantee their mutual self-defense. This action became necessary because of the imminent threat of aggression by Soviet Russia to the nations of this area. Stymied by the veto in the United Nations and threatened with aggression by Soviet Russia the North Atlantic countries have joined together in a regional defense pact in accordance with the provisions of articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.

We wholeheartedly approve this pact and all of its ramifications. We are convinced that this pact is necessary to prevent further aggression by the Soviets. We hope that it will have the effect of showing to the Russian leaders that the peace-loving nations of the world will no longer tolerate their bullyingism, and that it would be to their advantage to join the family of nations through proper and full participation in the United Nations.

In the meantime we hope that the pact countries will do all they can to bring about the strengthening provisions of the Charter itself, as recommended by the Legion, so that eventually it will be the United Nations and not the North Atlantic countries that will police world aggressors.

We urge other democratic nations of the North Atlantic area to take advantage of article 10 of the pact when they are able to join the present 12 countries now dedicated to their mutual self-defense and the preservation of the ideals of democracy, liberty, and justice.

We also hope that countries in other areas of the world will take advantage of articles 51 and 52 of the Charter and will form regional arrangements under the United Nations Charter to guarantee their mutual defense and to preserve individual liberties.

We believe that the North Atlantic Pact will hold and maintain the gains from the Marshall plan or economic recovery program. The principles of the plan for economic rehabilitation of Europe were first advanced by the American Legion at its New York convention in August of 1947. The American Legion plan was adopted by the convention at New York 3 months prior to the official formulation and release of the Marshall plan in Washington in November 1947. Since that time, the American Legion's faith in the Marshall plan has been fully justified.

Now that we are realizing these economic gains in western Europe we cannot afford to abandon or neglect future necessary help, nor should we neglect to properly protect the areas that have received our help. There is in Europe at this moment a feeling of insecurity caused by the constant threat of aggression. It is because of this lack of security that the North Atlantic Pact was developed. The pact is the obvious outgrowth of the Marshall plan and the Benelux Countries Pact, and it is a necessary step to protect the economic and ideological gains of the past 2 years. The North Atlantic Pact also strengthens and implements our policy of fighting everywhere the insidious forces of communism.
We repeat that the spread of communism is the threat to peace. We can avert war and stop this plan of world domination if we aggressively follow a policy of firmness in the right, coupled with preparedness for any eventuality. We are happy to join the many and varied forces and groups throughout the world who are fighting this evil growth. We offer encouragement and help to all peoples who are fighting with every available resource either Communist aggression or infiltration.

We must not be satisfied with just containment of this Soviet Communist aggression. The United States must now take the initiative, as we are doing in the North Atlantic Pact. We must talk not of our weaknesses but of our determination—of our moral, economic, and military strength.

We applaud the good work of the overseas information branches of our Government who are attempting to spread throughout Europe and into and behind the iron curtain the ideals and methods of the United States of America. Even so, we urge our Government to do more.

The cold war is a war to capture the minds of men. The propagandists in Moscow have been most effective. We cannot afford to be satisfied with anything less than something better than can be supplied by Moscow. We urge the early enlarging and strengthening of the Voice of America and other such programs. We urge the State Department and Congress to use every other practicable means to get the truth into Europe and Asia.

At the Miami Convention the Foreign Relations Committee indicated the focal point of the cold war to be Berlin. We believe that the Berlin blockade is a deliberately inhuman and unjust blockade by the dictators of Russia, and that it could still easily kindle the flames of war. Because of the courage and daring of the Allied air lift the Berlin blockade is now a detriment rather than an advantage to the Russians. It is a defeat for the Russian dictators. If the blockade should be shortly lifted, we believe it is an acknowledgment of defeat rather than an indication of a willingness to cooperate with the nations of the North Atlantic area. We believe that we should always leave the door of friendship and cooperation open to the Russian people, but because of past and bitter experience in our dealings with the Kremlin we believe that action rather than words should be an indication of their willingness to cooperate.

We deplore the inhuman persecutions and physical violence against religious leaders of the countries now under the domination of the Soviet dictators. We offer these persecutions to world opinion as evidence of the true feelings of the Soviet dictators. It is a clear example of the interpretation of freedom by the rulers in the Kremlin.

We realize that all the programs mentioned above depend upon the United States itself remaining strong and free. We insist that our armed forces be maintained at adequate levels and that our economy remain free, so that we, as a people, can carry out our full responsibility for maintaining peace, resisting aggression, and preserving the rights of free men.

As always, we place our trust in God.

We commend Commander Perry Brown for his prompt and vigorous protest to the issuance of visas to 22 delegates from behind the iron curtain to attend the so-called Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace in New York City, March 25-27, 1949.

We are indebted to Leonce Legendre, assistant national adjutant, Washington office, for his untiring efforts and the valuable assistance rendered to this commission. Mr. Legendre was the American Legion’s representative at the formal signing in Washington, D. C., of the North Atlantic Pact.

Respectfully submitted.

LEON HAPPELL, Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HAMILTON A. LONG

CHICAGO 14, ILL., MAY 16, 1949.

Re North Atlantic Pact.

Senator TOM CONNALLY, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: It is requested that this statement be accepted and incorporated in the record of the current hearings with respect to the pact. In lieu of my personally appearing before your committee to state my facts and reasons for being opposed to the pact. My decision not to ask permission to appear in person is prompted, in part, by the public announcement that a large number
of witnesses remain to be heard, that the hearings are to be terminated in a few days, and that each witness opposed to the pact is to be allowed only a few minutes in which to present the reasons—which would be inadequate opportunity to present the within material. I earnestly hope that my request is granted.

I speak as a citizen of undivided allegiance to America and as an individual, representing no group or organization; as a long time, unchanged, uncompromising, outspoken enemy of everything for which communism, Communists, and the godless despots of the Kremlin stand; as a veteran of the armed forces of America in both World Wars (a major in the Air Forces in Europe in the last one); as a formerly active member of the New York bar, long interested deeply in foreign policy. Since 1943, I have been devoting my full time to studying, lecturing, writing, about governmental affairs; principally foreign policy. 

The prospective impact of the loyal citizen's proposed rejection of the Atlantic Pact is presented in the accompanying statement of what I call the Ten American Principles of a Sound Foreign Policy in this Russo-American Era. (See exhibit A.)

These principles indicate what I believe to be a sound, truly American, alternative to the general foreign policy of which the pact is a part: a policy which, in genesis, is basically British and in character is not genuinely American but British-American. The chief architect thereof is Winston Churchill—proudly boastful of the fact, as indicated by the recitals hereinafter. These observations, of undeniable fact, connote no hostility on my part to Churchill or the British or Britain; much as I oppose their policies as a guide for the spirit of American tradition and to what I believe to be to America's best interests in the light thereof and of the harsh facts of international life today.

Indeed, I have nothing but admiration for Churchill, the peerless apostle of imperial impeccability, wholly devoted to his country's imperial interests. He and his fellow British leaders are due full honor for unfailingly exhibiting undivided loyalty to British interests, which we of this generation must match respecting America if we are to be judged by American posterity to have been faithful to their heritage for which we of today are merely temporary trustees.

It should not need to be stated but, due to a seemingly widespread misconception, it does need to be asserted that any loyal citizen's opinion as to what is best for his country is entitled to full credit and a respectful hearing at all times; however right or wrong he may seem to be factually and logically, however objectionable it may seem to this or that foreign government or nation. He is entitled to full protection against imputation of disloyalty or unfaithfulness to country or neglect of its interests, even though he be a minority of one. He is entitled to be free from any degree or manner, however subtle, of such character assassination, and, consequently, denial of genuine freedom of thought and its expression. The prospective impact of the loyal citizen's proposed policy, on this or that foreign nation, and the prospective rejection thereto of this or that element, regime, or nation abroad, are not legitimate tests in judging its merit with respect to America's best interests or his right to a full and fair hearing and respectful treatment—especially by public servants, in line with the spirit and philosophy of the Declaration of Independence. This is doubly true when basic values are at stake, as in the case of this present issue of adoption or rejection of the North Atlantic pact.

CRIMINALLY GAMBLING WITH OUR INHERITANCE

The truly precious thing at stake here, as precious as it is uniquely American, is our Nation's lifelong tradition against involvement in the war-breeding power politics and system of military alliances of the Old World. All pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding, the pact is a military alliance with Britain and her continental allies, chiefly. As Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg pointed out, in his splendid and still timely book (1926), The Trail of a Tradition, the second Declaration of American Independence occurred when the administration of President Washington decided, in 1795, to set for America a course of noninvolvement in the Old World's power politics and military alliances and wars, of aloofness from these Old World evils. In this connection, Senator Vandenberg said that on page 247: "We cannot forget—except as we criminally gamble with our inheritance—either the first or the second Declaration of American Independence."
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

It bears repeating that this is not our inheritance, except temporarily as trustees thereof, of the just inheritance of all succeeding generations of Americans. It is not ours to do with as we will, for our advantage.

Yet the pact will scuttle this second Declaration of American Independence irremediably. It will involve America in the Old World System of military alliances only nominally for 20 years, actually, for all practical purposes, indefinitely—inducing if not impelling our permanent involvement in these war-breeding Old World arrangements. It will, moreover, undermine the basic values of the first Declaration of Independence, in 1776—of our philosophy and system of man-over-state. This will be the result of our carrying out the obligations, express and implied, legal and moral, of this alliance pact; of its economic implications no less than its military aspects. This will foster in America conditions which cannot but breed ever-increasing state over man; Government controls, especially over our economic life; killing taxes; gradual but certain undermining of individual liberty against state-over-man, sure victim in time of Old World militarism to be thus imported through its most fostering feature—alliances.

This is criminally gambling with our inheritance with a vengeance; especially since it will undermine our national security, as later noted.

THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THIS TRADITION

This lifelong tradition of our Nation is still valid and full of life. Witness the endless protests against it by the proact groups who urge that it must not be permitted to block the pact's ratification by the Senate; and at the same time claim that the pact's approval will kill the tradition. Those who declare that it is already dead are just indulging in wishful thinking, or arguing thus to gain their end, at the expense of the tradition. The tradition is yet to be killed.

It certainly was not invalidated in 1916, when both Presidential candidates based their pleas for votes on the binding character of this tradition, both asserting that they would not take America into the war. Likewise in 1940, with President Roosevelt out-doing Willkie in this regard, asserting "again and again and again" that the fathers and mothers of America need never fear about their sons going to fight on foreign battlefields if he should be reelected. His then close associates have since admitted that they deliberately made this claim, though knowing that it was false, because they knew it was necessary to do so in order to win the election. The people evidently still held to their tradition.

Similarly in between the two wars. Witness the Vandenberg book just cited, arguing in favor of the tradition's continuing validity and great value to America. His arguments still hold good in every respect, it might be noted in passing. In the thirties, President Roosevelt stated on several occasions that he stood on the basis of the tradition—opposed to America's involvement in the power politics and wars of the Old World, which he correctly defined as the true American isolationism. "Insulation" was the Vandenberg term, in that 1926 book, instead of "isolation." Claims that it embraces the economic field, and so forth, are false.

It is thus obvious that America's involvement in hostilities soon after the 1918 election did not kill this American tradition. In one of his talks with Stalin, President Roosevelt declared that, but for Pearl Harbor, the American people never would have sanctioned America's entry into the fighting. Right up to Pearl Harbor, in fact, they did hold to their antipathy to entering the war—at least about 80 percent of the people, according to reliable surveys. Their sanction of lend-lease in early 1941 and other "aid to the allies" measures was by way of helping to prevent America's entry into the war; as antivwar measures, which was the basis on which they were accepted by Congress also. False claims to be sure, and since admittedly so; but nevertheless this was the basis on which the people and Congress approved; showing that the tradition under discussion was not only then valid but controlling, politically.

Certainly the bombs of Pearl Harbor did not kill the tradition. So this leaves only the question as to whether America's entry into the United Nations invalidated our tradition against involvement in the balance of power politics, the internal politics, the military alliances, and the wars, of the Old World.

JOINING THE UN DID NOT IMPAIR THE TRADITION

It needs no argument to establish that the American people and the Congress, on the whole, intended in 1945 to help create an instrument—the UN—which would bar war-breeding balance of power politics; and most assuredly did not
sanction it as a means for America's participating therein. The UN Charter expressly forbids any nation, America or otherwise, from interfering in the internal affairs of any other member nation. Nor did any one suggest in 1945 that America was authorized, under the UN Charter, to make a military alliance with the Old World nations of the West—to the exclusion of Russia and therefore, in her eyes, against her. In passing, it should be observed here that, for practical purposes of war or peace, it is the view of the excluded nations which determines the offensive or defensive character of a military alliance such as this pact, not the pretensions, or even bona fide intentions, of the nations which form the alliance. Those excluded react thereto as they deem best.

To contend that, at the San Francisco Conference, such a United States-west Europe alliance—to the exclusion of Russia—was contemplated, and that Russia nevertheless signed the UN Charter, is to deal in nonsense. To claim that such a Russia-excluded alliance was indicated by the debates at that conference or in Congress when the UN Charter was under discussion in 1945 is to falsify the record of those proceedings; so far as my examination and inquiry has disclosed, supplemented by my independent recollection, in fact, the controlling concept—aside from any select intentions—was cooperation of the two new controlling powers, Russia and America, with the UN being utilized to this end to the extent that this might be possible under its express Charter limitations such as the veto. This was the basis on which the UN Charter was ratified by the Senate with popular approval, despite the fact that, as we shall see later, there was a secret British-United States agreement to police the post-war world to the exclusion of Russia, dating back to 1941 at the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter conference. This British balance-of-power scheme, with Roosevelt and Truman cleverly inveigled into it, by Churchill chiefly, was more than matched of course by the Kremlin despots' well-known and long-known intentions to use every such instrumentality (like the UN) as a mere tool to advance their world-conquest aims. Surely neither British nor Russo-Communist power politics is a sound guide for America.

In an attempt to justify the pact as being within the bounds of the UN Charter, its supporters resort to the most strained construction—in truth misconstruction—of its provisions, such as the merely permissive provision of article 51; which did nothing but recognize the continuing existence of member nations' right to act in self-defense. The provision created no obligation, legal or moral. Apart from its expressly created obligations, the UN Charter left unimpaired America's freedom to act in keeping with her tradition and governing principles in international relations. America's joining the UN, therefore, did not impair the force of its long-standing tradition and experience. In passing, the disposition of that record shows.

The pact hangs suspended in mid-air therefore, so to speak—lacking any support whatever—so far as concerns America's heretofore controlling tradition against involvement in such military alliances with the Old World; and in the accompanying war-breeding balance-of-power politics of Old World nations—Britain's chief of all, as the record shows.

THE BRITISH (CHURCHILL) ORIGIN OF THIS "TRIPLE-THREAT" FACT

A just estimate of the true character of this pact, having in mind its implications and potentialities for evil results for America, cannot be made without considering its three basic aspects—military, political and economic—and the fact that the mind which germinated the key concepts, respecting each aspect, was that of the wily Churchill—most skillful in manipulating the minds and emotions of men—in America. It is noteworthy that in 1944 he told the Polish General Anders that:

"Perhaps after this war we (Britain) shall no longer be as strong (as before) but in any case we shall be more skillful than others."

How true; Churchill himself above all others—especially when it comes to manipulating the minds and moods of various American leaders, political and otherwise, and of a substantial segment of American public opinion. This skillful British is the chief architect of the three basic ideas underlying the pact:

(1) An alliance between America, on the one hand, and Britain and her continental allies (in the main) on the other hand, making available to Britain America's vast military power for use in the centuries-old British "game" of manipulating other nations in support of her aims against her chief continental rival of the moment, in the contest for power dominance in Europe and southern Asia; against Germany of late, now against Russia (but note Britain's power politicking against Russia in the thirties; in the war);
(2) Political collaboration by America with Britain (and her dominions or Commonwealth associate nations) looking toward "common citizenship"—In other words, drawing America's vast strength into the common pool (politically) on which Britain can draw in furthering her imperial aims; with a British bloc in Europe in tow; to create the next world-wide British system (per Smuts, 1943).

(3) Making America's vast economic strength in effect a tool of the bankrupt British Empire as distinguished from the separate, solvent dominions), of bankrupt Britain; to the twin ends of furthering her military security and the creation of her proposed new empire, based on utilization chiefly of Africa's resources.

All done so skillfully, of course, that American leaders (political and otherwise) are permitted to enjoy the role of seeming leadership; indeed, carefully indoctrinated with the false notion that they are the originators of the key ideas and plans—in reality conceived and skillfully "planted" by the adroit Britons, power politicians par excellence. As Churchill put it on his and their behalf: "** * * we shall be more skillful than others."

**CHURCHILL ORIGINATES THE MILITARY ALLIANCE PLAN IN 1941**

Churchill brought to the meeting in August 1941 several schemes for President Roosevelt's consideration; all interrelated, dovetailing with his plan to get the President's cooperation in bringing America into the war and furthering the postwar Churchill plans for British-United States teamwork.

Besides his plan for a joint United States-United Britain ultimatum to Japan, he obtained the President's approval of his scheme to have British-American forces police the postwar world; to the exclusion of Russia, of course. This was highly secret until revealed by the testimony of then Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who was at the conference, testifying in the Pearl Harbor congressional investigation in late 1945.

The plan included a scheme, in effect, to use any future league of nations as a screen behind which to carry on this British-American world-police activity, as will be noted in detail hereinafter. This too was highly secret until the Welles testimony in 1945.

Churchill also brought to this meeting his drafted ideas for a so-called Atlantic Charter; to be publicized as the main work of the meeting and to serve as a prorog emotional appeal for Americans and as a war-slogan type of propaganda for the Allies. Hopkins recorded that the British group, with whom he proceeded to this conference, considered this Atlantic Charter as being not much more than a publicity hand-out. While Roosevelt's attitude toward it—never even written into shape as a formal document—is indicated by these remarks of Senator Vandenberg in January 1945, protesting against the President's flippan treatment of the subject in a recent announcement: 'I assure the President does not anticipate the shocking results of his recent almost jocular, and even cynical, dismissal of the Atlantic Charter as a mere collection of fragmentary notes. It jarred America to its very heart-stones. It seemed to make a mere pretense of what has been an inspiringly accepted fact. It seemed almost to sanction alien contempt.' ** * * The President's statement was utterly devastating in its impact."

The Atlantic Charter served effectively as a cloak for the real business transacted at this August 1941 meeting as above indicated. It should be noted that the plan, then approved, for a postwar British-American working military alliance was in line with the plans agreed upon by British-United States authorities even earlier in the year 1941, involving the adoption by United States officials of objectives of the Roosevelt administration, including prevention of the disruption of the British Empire and eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balance of power. The President and Churchill had long been in close and frequent communication long before this August 1941 meeting.

Thus we find Churchill laying the basis in 1941 for the military alliance of America with Britain and her continental allies, now in the form of the military part of the North Atlantic Pact. Bring it into being under the sanction, allegedly, of the United Nations Charter also stems from that 1941 meeting, as is clearly apparent in the not too much to say that America's postwar foreign policy was then channeled—its pattern set—in August 1941; our British-American policy, that is. The chronological review of postwar developments hereinafter will make this startlingly clear to those who have not followed closely events in this connection.
CHURCHILL ORIGINATES THE BASIC POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PACT

The underlying political consideration of prime consequence, from the standpoint of Churchill's long-range program for British-American collaboration, was expressed by him in Parliament in mid-1940; saying that the trend toward closer collaboration was irresistible and:

"If this trend should lead to the same kind of consummation as we hoped for in the case of France—namely, eventual common citizenship—all the devils of this war will have been almost worth while."

At Harvard, in 1943, he again expressed the hope that common citizenship would be the eventual outcome of ever-closer British-American relations; and periodically since then, especially since V-J day, he had reiterated this hope. He seems to voice in this regard the sentiments of his farsighted fellow British planners, and even of some Americans who, for various reasons, desire to see the result of 1776 reversed, in effect, in this respect—some deluded by the absurd notion that America's fate is so interwoven with Britain's that we must stand or fall together.

CHURCHILL ORIGINATES THE BASIC ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE PACT

America's upholding the British Empire economically is the underlying prime economic aim of the pact—not express but nevertheless true; supplemented by the aim of British-American collaboration with other nations cooperatively minded with respect to British-American aims in general—military, political, economic with regard especially to the power contest in the Old World with Russia.

According to Churchill, he was instrumental in inducing President Roosevelt to evolve the original lend-lease program. In the middle of the war he also succeeded so well in influencing Roosevelt's thinking with respect to postwar lend-lease aid to the British Empire that by 1944 he secured Roosevelt's promise of the first installment of about $5,500,000,000—the beginning of what Morgenthau called phase II of lend-lease that would follow V-E Day. Note that in January 1945 the first official disclosure of how much Britain would get under the Marshall plan occurred, the sum being estimated at $3,348,000,000—just what Churchill had arranged in 1944, at his Quebec Conference with President Roosevelt. Morgenthau, who was present there, had previously discussed the subject with Churchill in London, when Churchill told him that Britain would be bankrupt on the day the war ended and that only continued lend-lease could help her recover. At Quebec, according to Morgenthau, Churchill's chief nonmilitary objective was to obtain the desired postwar lend-lease aid—then arranged with such satisfaction to Churchill that he had tears in his eyes when he thanked the President. "Eventually we agreed on a program for the first year of phase II of about $5,500,000,000" as Morgenthau puts it. By no coincidence, it was at this meeting that Morgenthau obtained Churchill's consent to the Morgenthau plan regarding Germany. Morgenthau reported that Churchill's consent was influenced by the consideration so important to British trade; namely because Britain would thereby acquire many of Germany's iron and steel markets and thus eliminate a dangerous competitor. (Per Hull's memoirs.)

Roosevelt wrote Hull a memorandum in this connection explaining the aim of saving the British Empire economically, saying, * * * The real nub of the situation is to keep Britain from going into complete bankruptcy at the end of the war. * * * I just cannot go along with the idea of securing the British Empire collapse financially. * * *

In 1946 President Truman admitted that the March 1947 Truman Doctrine program was just preliminary to the June Marshall-plan program, which a reliable report states stemmed specifically from top-secret conversations between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Bevin in January 1947. In 1948 congressional and administration work on carrying out the plan for Marshall-plan aid was so intertwined with preparations for military lend-lease and other aspects of the North Atlantic Pact and the underlying Senate (Vandenberg) resolution in May 1948 that the relationship is unmistakable, part and parcel of the same long-range planning, primarily by Churchill. To him is due the lion's share of the credit therefor.

It is noteworthy at this point that in August 1945, soon after taking office, Foreign Minister Bevin prepared a plan for the development of Britain's new empire—largely in Africa, also in the Middle East in part. The plan was cut-
lined in a memorandum explaining that Britain would work with native peoples primarily, not through their pashas (leaders). A copy of this "people, not pashas" document having been requested reportedly by General Marshall at the Moscow meeting in the spring of 1947. Here we find the origin, presumably, of President Truman's "point 4" program of January 1949 to have America's resources used to develop backward areas in Africa principally, also in the Mid-East; also now part of the aim of the Marshall plan acknowledgedly, though at first vehemently denied. The origin in part only, though, if reports be true that the pact's main features were discussed in 1944 at Bretton Woods Conference meetings. Other areas within the scope of British influence, diminishing but for the moment anyway existent, will presumably be included gradually in this program for American economic development; southeast Asia and so on.

BROWDER MATCHED THE "POINT 4" PROGRAM IN 1944

Most interesting of all, however, and also noteworthy here, is the fact that, in that same year in which Churchill gained the promise of the first year of postwar lend-lease aid, the Communist chief in America, Earl Browder, wrote a book (then published) which not only urged the Truman "point 4" program but, according to Henry Hazlitt (Newsweek, April 11, 1949), did so in quite identical terms and even language. The book "Teheran: Our Path in War And Peace," is quoted by Hazlitt thus: partly:

"* * * America can underwrite a gigantic program of the industrialization of Africa, to be launched immediately at the end of the war. It must initiate a general and steady rise in the standard of life of the African peoples. * * * Closely related to point 4 is the economic, and politically with Africa are the Near Eastern countries. * * * Here also a broad regional program of economic development is called for (also in South America). * * * The Government can do it, if 'free enterprise' fails to meet the challenge and bogs down on the job. Our Government can create a series of giant industrial development corporations, each in partnership with some other government or group of governments, and set them to work upon large-scale plans of railroad and highway building, agricultural and industrial development, and all-round modernization in all the devastated areas of the world. America has the skilled technicians capable of producing the plans for such projects, sufficient to get them under way, within a 6-month period of time after the decision is made. * * * On a world scale the combined projects could be self-liquidating in the period of a generation. They would become the best investments the American capitalist class had ever made in its whole history.

**

Browder was then official head of the Communist, (Kremlin-headed) "party" (really conspiracy) in America; and so was, of course, seeking as always to further not America's but the Kremlin's aims and welfare. How odd that the Kremlin-Browder plan for America's postwar spending in endless billions should have set the pattern for both the 1945 Bevin "Peoples, not pashas" plan and for the 1949 Truman "Point 4" program under the "North Atlantic Pact." America seems to be caught in the cross-ruff between London and Moscow. The British Empire has much to gain through America's depleting her already overstrained resources and industry to help create another British empire in Africa and the Mid-East; but Russia has far more to gain through our being trapped into carrying out this Browder plan. It is in line with the Kremlin's tactic of "conquest through bankruptcy"—here to be applied by inducing America to bankrupt herself in support of this program; which might be called the London-Moscow Axis plan for America's economic debilitation. The program becomes more significant still, when one considers that Russia's armed forces can take over the Mid-East and Europe today at will; and then easily dominate North and East Africa—all Eurasia in fact, as we shall now see. So any developments there with American resources would amount to their preparation not for America's but even for Britain's benefit—but for the Kremlin's only; being subject to her seisure at will. This grim fact puts a new light on Browder's program for America; and, inescapably, on the British plan which is the twin underpinnung of the Truman "Point 4" program.

This is even more significant when one pauses to consider that Russia can, and certainly will, maintain the power dominance which she now possesses in Eurasia and vicinity; for reasons now to be discussed.
RUSSIA HAS POWER DOMINANCE OVER EURASIA AND VICINITY

(a) Russia can overrun Europe at will

The fact that Russia can overrun Europe at will is not the result of events since VJ-day. Russia’s power automatically filled the vacuum left by the defeat of Germany’s power—on VE-day; when Russia became militarily supreme, in fact, throughout Eurasia and vicinity. This was obvious even in 1945, when I used this era-starting fact as the basic factor of the foreign policy program for America which I then proposed in a book-manuscript—in line, generally, with the principles presented in exhibit “A” hereinafter. The fact has just become more obvious since 1945.

This Russian supremacy in Europe, in terms of power dominance—latent though it be until Russia chooses to exercises it—was foreseen clearly during the war by American and British leaders. By 1943, for example, America’s highest military authorities—and presumably their British military collaborators—conceded officially that this would be the postwar power picture. At the 1943 Quebec Conference, says R. E. Sherwood—writing on the basis of Harry Hopkins secret papers—

“... Hopkins had with him at the Quebec Conference a document headed Russia’s position, which was quoted from ‘a very high-level United States military strategic estimate’ (the source was otherwise unidentified). It contained the following: ‘Russia’s postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-a-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported. The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Mediterranean vis-a-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power in Russia is the decisive factor in the war she must be given every assistance, and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia’ ...”

The United States military high command still hold to this 1943 decision—that Russia would have complete power dominance over Europe after the war. Numerous reports from responsible sources are available to support this conclusion. One noteworthy report is a composite study, by the New York Times Washington Bureau’s most experienced men, of military opinion in Washington in September 1945; reflected in their report as follows: “... all studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff here concede that the small forces of the Western powers west of the Elbe River could not do more than hold any Soviet advance for more than a few days or weeks at the most. There is agreement, in short, that the Russians have the power to stop the airlift whenever they wish, and that they also have the military forces to sweep to the North Sea and the Atlantic within a very short space of time.”

In the past few weeks, this still controlling opinion of United States military leaders was evidenced by the statement on the floor of the House, by Representative Cannon, that: “All military experts agree that Russia would occupy the entire European Continent within 90 days after the opening of hostilities.” Various reliable reports of top military opinion put the time limit much shorter than 90 days. In fact, reflected in December 1947 by the public admission by the chairman and other members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that it would take a few days or weeks at most—Chairman Eaton putting it at 24 hours.

British leaders also knew this would be the result after crushing Germany. British military leaders were present in Washington as part of the British-American Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff—top policy-making, military-control body all during the war; and, of course, knew about and doubtless joined in the decision referred to in the 1943 Hopkins memorandum above quoted. Indeed, as soon as the event of Pearl Harbor brought America into the war—guaranteeing Britain against final defeat by Germany. Churchill started his unremitting efforts to prevent Germany from being crushed by direct attack by American armies. He tried endlessly and vigorously to divert the American armies into the Mediterranean and Balkan areas to head off Russia—to keep her out of Europe. He continued these maneuverings right up to the time, almost, of the invasions of France—from the West and South. He wanted to preserve Germany’s might substantially, to help hold Russia in check; in line with the Brit-
ish aim in the thirties of helping to rebuild Germany's military might to "bal-
ance" Russia's growing military strength and her threat to British Eurasian
interests. The full details of this Churchill wartime course are fully recorded
in the writings of Stalin, Hopkins, and others. The British leaders, political
and military, knew full well during the war that Russia's power dominance
over Europe would be complete and unchallengable. There is nothing sur-
prising in today's power picture.

It should be noted, in passing, that it is fallacious to contend—as some do—
that Churchill's wartime course above-mentioned was sound for us and that
America's leaders should not have done as they did: insist that America's armies
attack America's official enemy, Germany, and not join in the Churchill double-
cross-of-Russia plan. (America's military leaders were adamant on this score,
though for a time Churchill succeeded in swaying Roosevelt in line with his
aim.) This typical piece of British balance-of-power maneuvering—against
the future strongest continental power even while allied with her in war—well
illuminates the spurious nature of Old World "war aims" and objectives and the
evil nature of Old World power politics, especially the British balance-of-power
phase of it. The fact that America now wishes, and soundly too, that her
attack America's official enemy, Germany, and not join in the Churchill
wartime scheme. Rather does the fact argue against
the soundness of America's entering Into the Old World's endless power politi-
cing, by entering into the war against Germany, in the first place; which gains
support from the now-known facts about the German military leaders' prepara-
tions prior to Munich to oust Hitler and his Nazis from control of Germany and
about their repeated attempts to do so—even trying to have him assassinated
during the war. The Churchill wartime balance-of-power maneuverings against
Russia illustrate the wisdom and value of America's tradition before mentioned—
against involvement in the power politics and wars of the Old World, in part
because America cannot hope to better things by participating therein. Witness
today's results!

In 1946 the British Imperial Military Conference decided, per reliable reports,
that no power exists which can bar Russia from overrunning Europe at will.
The French military chiefs agree; they having even asked the Spanish Govern-
ment in 1947 for permission for the French army to escape across Spain to North
Africa in case of Russian attack. Franco states that he refused, saying that
men, armies, should stay and defend their country. Numerous reliable reports
state that the French military leaders concede that Russia's forces could reach
the Channel coast in a few days. A reliable report states that in 1948 General
defGaulle even said that a defending force of some 50 divisions (about 500,000
men) "would create an army of prisoners again." "A gigantic Dunkerque," said
British leaders. In 1948. Recently the Italian Senate was told by Premier
defGasperi that Italy is powerless to defend herself; that in case of war Italy
would probably be cut in two and would have an internal war on her hands (with
over 20,000,000 Communists in Italy). Italy is not only limited by the war
treaty to few arms but is notoriously lacking in both capacity and will to fight.
Italy is a military liability to any wartime ally of hers, as the Germans knew—
they having made Mussolini promise not to enter the war.

Germany is disarmed and the Russians have the power and the determination
to see to it that she is not rearmed; except to the extent, of course, that Russia
controls the rearmed forces for all practical purposes. Any Germans who fight
in a Russo-American war will fight with Russia; since she can overrun Germany
quickly and wipe any unwilling Germans out of existence in short order. The
French, too, will see to it that Germany is not rearmed; the prime condition
on which France signed the "North Atlantic Pact"—as Schuman assured the French
people on his return from the signing ceremony. The French fear a rearmed Ger-
many above all else. Not even West Germans can be rearmed—as an American
ally.

Spain is utterly impotent today and does not have any basis—economic or other-
wise—for the creation of a substantial military force. Nor could Spain, even if
possessed of a huge army, serve as a base for American forces in a Russo-
American war because Russia's air power, quickly based in France, and even oper-
ating from her present bases (including in Albania), would control the air over
Spain and therefore dominate ground operations too. Air supremacy, over a

90614-49—pt. 3—28
given area, virtually controls ground operations there. United States military chiefs think Spain could last 30 days, reported.

The remainder of Europe is divided into various small, widely separated, nations; all so insignificant militarily, compared to Russia's steadily growing might—especially her air power—as to be unworthy of discussion in connection with Russia's capacity to overrun Europe. Besides, the two nations which could put up some real fight are confirmed neutrals, Sweden and Switzerland; some real fight, that is, in brief local defense efforts.

Overwhelming, incontrovertible evidence is available that there is no basis for assuming that Russia cannot overrun Europe at will; and that all military leaders know it full well.

With Germany, even when restored economically, counted out militarily, and Sweden and Switzerland too, for purposes of armed resistance to Russia in terms of vast preparations therefore, there is no basis in all the rest of Europe economically for the creation and support of a vast war machine capable of offering more than token resistance to Russia's invading forces. Such a force would have to constitute a single organization—ready for quick action at all times, ready to put up massive resistance continually with the aid of air supremacy over west Europe; in these and other respects being able to match Russia's vast power. Russia's instant seizure of the oil fields of the Mid-East would alone strangle west Europe's economy and prevent any mechanized forces it might have from operating more than briefly with fuel stocks on hand at the outbreak of war.

Even if France and the Low Countries could hold out for a while—not the case, of course—this would be of no basic significance because the United States does not possess the manpower sufficient to provide ground forces in the millions, which would be necessary even to fight against the Russian forces in west Europe; even if America could establish them in Europe after hostilities commence, which would be impossible. Note that America had only 1,500,000 foot soldiers in World War II because of the need of a huge navy and air forces which would be needed to invade Eurasia again. Britain's small forces moreover, could not and would not fight; for a controlling reason which will be discussed shortly; namely, the British Isles are indefensible against Russia's air weapons—powerless against Russia, therefore, in war.

This has to do in part with Russia's capacity to exercise air supremacy over west Europe at will today; and continually. Her mighty air force, second to none in technical respects according to reliable reports or rather estimates—since accurate information regarding it is lacking, due to her tight blockade on information—has the benefit of all German research in the past, the aid of many top German experts since the war, and the use of many of Germany's factories devoted to aircraft development and manufacture. Aided by her spy system in America, it must be assumed that she has the benefit of the most advanced scientific developments and, in part through east Germany, the most advanced techniques. Russia's air force today is overwhelmingly superior to all others in any terms of its primary mission—controlling the air over Russia and being able, next, to exercise air supremacy over west Europe.

West Europe has no air force today and Britain's is small. Russia will certainly see to it that she maintains her vast supremacy in this regard; which will be easy in any event and doubly so for the reason that bankrupt Britain and Europe cannot afford, do not have the resources, to build, and keep on renewing with constantly improving models, a vast air force. Nor can America fill that need, besides her own.

This air supremacy would be exercised on the day war would commence, at the Kremlin's signal; giving Russia the benefit of complete "surprise." Throughout west Europe, and in Britain, fifth columns could easily sabotage all military airfield runways just before dawn—rendering them useless for a few hours at least. So no defending planes, or few at best, could take to the air to oppose the quickly following Russian bombers, at dawn, which would help to make those runways useless for the time being. Suicide airborne forces would aid in this work. In west Europe, fifth-column fighting forces (France has some 1,000,000 Communists and Italy 2,000,000, respectively, for instance), aided by Russian airborne troops, would seize key military airfields for their own use; quickly repairing any damage—while the initial air battle would be going on between any west-defending aircraft which might get into the air, only to meet overwhelming Russian superiority. Any British air force would, at best, be concentrating on trying to make Britain secure; helpless, at best, to aid west Europe, and unwilling to risk it under such circumstances, as in 1940.
With air opposition in west Europe eliminated at the outset, and with her air-fuel supplies provided by east Europe sources, it would be easy for Russia to maintain air-control over Europe continually. And Britain could not, therefore would not, seek to contest that control there because the British Isles are indefensible.

(b) The British Isles Are indefensible, Against Russia

In 1946, if not earlier, the British Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Government that the British Isles are indefensible against the Russians' V-2 alone, of the 1945 German type with a nonatomic warhead. It has since been greatly improved, reportedly, by Russia; she having captured the manufacturing facilities therefore and the personnel for making them; and has had the aid of top German experts in this field. Russia has been steadily manufacturing them since the war; no doubt having a large supply already. There is no known defense to this weapon; and the development of any defense seems to be a long-range and problematical matter, at best. Quickly establishing launching sites in west Europe (even if she cannot fire them into Britain from east Europe), Russia would shower them on densely populated Britain. This would support greatly the continuing attempt of the massive Russian forces to gain air supremacy over Britain; even if not gained quickly in the manner mentioned above.

The people of the British Isles cannot, and therefore will not, fight against Russia under these circumstances. This is the practical meaning of that 1946 decision of the British military leaders that the British Isles are indefensible against the V-2 alone. It is worse than futile to assume otherwise; indeed, dangerous in the extreme. Any such false assumption can serve as nothing but a trap—for America.

(c) The Mideast can be seized by Russia at will

A reliable report from Turkey in 1948 stated that no one there expected the fighting to last more than a few days if Russian forces should attack; aided, of course, by immediately establishing control over the air there. The military airfields in the Mideast, if any, then possessed by Britain and America, would be quickly put out of use by fifth column action supplemented by Russian air attack. There can be no effective, substantial opposition in war to Russia in the mid-east; and it is admitted by our military authorities, officially; according to a Senate investigating committee report.

(d) Russia-over-Europe means Russia-over-north Africa

From air bases in southern Europe, at the outset in Albania and Bulgaria, Russia could easily knock out any British-American air bases in the Mediterranean and north Africa; with the potent aid in the latter place particularly of fifth columnists. With airfield runways sabotaged on the day war would start, this would be easy to accomplish.

(e) Japan is indefensible, like Britain

For the same reasons that the British Isles are powerless against Russia's air weapons—notably the V-2, Japan is indefensible. More so, in fact, because of the density of Japan's population; the fact that Russia's air bases and V-2 launching sites are now within easy reach of Japan—on the mainland and on Sakhalin Island to the north; and because of the substantial and rapidly growing Communist fifth column in Japan. Russian Communist (Chinese) forces overrunning middle China in recent months has merely emphasized this post-VJ-day situation.

Japan is bound by her constitution not to rearm; and it is silly to assume that Russia would sit idly by and permit her to rearm or to be rearmed by America. Some military planners for a time advocated that America rearms Japan and plan to use her as an "ally" against Russia; but this "summer madness" has now passed. America's military authorities, and political chiefs, now recognize the obvious—that Japan is indefensible; a condition existing on VJ-day and never changed. It is just more obvious now to more people.

America's military leaders now expect Japan to remain neutral, at best, in any Russo-American war. As General MacArthur put it, Japan is expected to be "the Switzerland" of the Far East; according to a report in recent months.

(f) No air bases for America there; no fighting allies either

The foregoing means that, in war, America would not have the use of any air bases in Britain, Japan, north Africa or Eurasia, Russia's powersphere. Worse still, America would have no fighting allies in those regions.
EUROPE DOES NOT HAVE THE WILL TO FIGHT RUSSIA

The peoples of Europe do not have the will to fight Russia; in part because they know that they do not now have, and can never have, the capacity to do so effectively. Sweden and Switzerland cling fast to their traditional neutrality. French, Italian and Spanish pro-Communist or Communist sections of the population are so great in those countries that any attempt to fight Russia would bring on bitter and disastrous civil wars. It has already been noted that the Italian Premier said so recently with respect to Italy; while French officials make no bones about it regarding their country also—there being some two million Italian Communists and one million more or less in France. Even if they had the capacity to fight effectively, which is lacking, the non-Communist Socialists of west Europe have little stomach for war; and less for war against other Socialists (like the Communists) and with capitalist America, judging by reliable reports at hand. The fact that the defeated forces in Spain's civil war are silent under the iron control of Franco does not by any means prove that they could not ably sabotage any war effort by Franco's regime against Russian forces.

The remainder of the peoples of Europe, so separated and small and conscious of their helplessness against Russia—despite brave talk in order to get on America's list of favored nations, recipients of American largesse in the many millions—that they too lack the substance of the will to make war on America's side against Russia.

All Europe knows that America cannot save them against Russian invading forces; and that, at best, America could try to liberate them after years of Russian occupation. As the French Premier has said in protest against this prospect, any liberating America might prove able to do would have the effect of "liberating" a corpse. The evidence available is conclusive—that the peoples of Europe are lacking this will to fight.

The lack of the will to fight under these circumstances is most understandable, and it cannot be cured by any amount of arms—doomed, to be inadequate, against Russia's vast war power, no matter how great.

AMERICA'S ATOMIC BOMB IS NO ANSWER

America's atomic bomb cannot save Europe from Russia's air blitz and overrunning ground forces, when the Kremlin gives the signal. It could only have the effect of pressuring Russia to withdraw from Europe to prevent disastrous use against targets in Russia; that is, if America could deliver the bomb effectively, in fact decisively, against Russia targets—which is impossible in wartime, for the following reasons, in part.

Russia would be the one to start the war, so would do so only when she would be completely prepared to counter America's air attacks effectively. These air attacks would have to be trans-Arctic, since America would not have the use of any bases in Britain or Eurasia or north Africa or Japan, as previously explained. Due to the vast distances involved, from North American bases to Russian targets, the United States bombers would arrive over Russia without protecting escort fighters, and in fairly small numbers—being limited by the limited supply of atomic bombs. They would arrive in daylight, which would continue, because in summer there is no real night in north Russia—only a few hours of twilight, and Russia would no doubt take advantage of this season. This would facilitate air defense operations immensely. Russian high-flying big-bomber-type planes, carrying special radar-patrol equipment and keeping the entire northern borders of Russia well patrolled—supplemented by some ground installations also—would easily detect the invading United States bombers; and the radar-scout planes would then trail the invaders so as to be able to direct defending aircraft against them. The invaders could not escape or hide; and the effect of the aurora borealis in the extreme north would not impair this spotting-trailing operation of the Russian planes, as they would operate in the region not seriously affected thereby—to the south of the region where this phenomenon impairs the operation of radar.

As the invading planes would move south over Russia's vast distances in search of their targets, they would encounter relays of massed defending planes fully capable of equally high-flying (perhaps of bomber size) and equally fast or faster, being free of the weight and other handicaps incident to bomb-carrying. They would be armed moreover, with rocket-firing weapons, shooting rockets with "homing" devices (which make them search out and follow the target-plane unerringly) and proximity fuses (causing the rocket to explode when in the near
The hideous fact of Russia’s power-dominance over Eurasia and vicinity, her powersphere, has equally hideous implications in relation to the pact. A few of them will be mentioned, briefly.

1. All armaments furnished by America to Europe, and all armaments which Europe may manufacture with American aid (raw materials and money), will be Russia’s for the taking whenever she chooses. In effect, they are doomed to be in the same class as it put in a warehouse there, with the key in Russia’s possession. They will incessantly increase Russia’s war-potential at the expense of America’s already limited, over strained war-potential. The increasing armaments will be an increasing “bait” and excuse for Russia.

2. Any manufacturing facilities in Europe will, in war, be available for Russia’s use; continuously so, because America would certainly not use the atomic bomb on Europe to “aid” Europe—not even on Europe’s manufacturing establishments which, in all but a few cases, are in her heavily populated areas. This applies chief of all to the most important manufacturing facilities there—those of Germany, including the Ruhr steel industry. Even if America’s military leaders should desire to bomb Europe’s industrial centers, this would be extremely difficult in view of the fact that it would have to be done from bases in North America and vicinity—for reasons previously stated; and in opposition to complete air supremacy over Europe held by Russia from the outset of war.

3. All protests to the contrary by some Senators, such as Senator Vandenberg; to the contrary notwithstanding, the entire history of the pact’s development—and all the evidence regarding the basis on which it was accepted by the governments of Europe, prove that through the pact America has led the peoples of Europe to believe that America not only has the will to make them secure militarily against Russia but the power too. This is a fraud so gross as to pass the vicinity of the target-plane), thus making almost certain a fatal attack on the invading bombers—having in mind the shower of rockets each defending plane would fire and the large number of such planes to be encountered in relays, the more the farther Russian territory is penetrated. Once in the general area of any prime target, moreover, if successful in getting there, massed air defenses would be encountered plus vastly improved ground defenses (anti-aircraft) using similar missiles with immense effectiveness compared to World War II conditions. It is believed that these and other factors compel the conclusion that invading bombers cannot effectively, much less decisively, “deliver” bombs in wartime from North America against the effective defenses which Russia must be assumed to have; or against the equally effective defenses which America certainly must have, at all costs.

American bombers invading Russia, in addition, encounter another problem which is well nigh fatal to precision bombing of a specified target, this is, the lack of air maps which alone permit such bombing with accuracy. No such maps exist with respect to Russia, except in Russia’s possession, and she will certainly see to it that they are never obtained in the only way in which this is possible—by air-mapping Russia. Targets’ precise location is impracticable by enough miles to make effective bombing improbable, even atomic bombing.

Under these conditions, and under other handicaps which will not be mentioned, United States bombers are believed to be incapable of “delivering” the bombs against Russian targets in wartime effectively, decisively. This is why bombers are obsolete for purposes of intercontinental air war; either way—assuming effective use of all available defenses.

America’s atomic bomb is, therefore, not an effective—much less controlling—deterrent against Russia’s resorting to force, when it best suits her, to counter any pressure America may seek to apply against her by way of rearming Europe and Britain. Certainly Russia’s possession of the atomic bomb, in the not distant future, would rob America of any seeming advantage in this regard; and, in the meantime, America could not possibly arm Europe and Britain massively even by entering upon a huge armaments manufacturing program, which is not feasible or prospective.

It is disastrous self-delusion for America not to face these facts. It is fatal self-delusion for America to make the mistake of underrating the potential enemy (Russia) by inexcusably assuming that she, aided by all German technical experts, is lacking in this or that major respect.
all condemnation, because America, alone or with any others who might be fighting allies in a Russo-American war (chilly New World 1 nations), lacks the power to protect them now and every day that goes by gives Russia's power greater comparative value in this respect—through the consolidation of her control in Eurasia, the development of advanced weapons like the atomic bomb, etcetera. Her already huge air force and mechanized forces, key factors, are leaping ahead daily.

4. By inducing—even outright “pressuring” in some cases—the governments of signatory nations to sign the pact, in part through the use of United States largesse in the many millions (billions in the aggregate) to gain their adherence to the British-American plan formulated in August 1941 (previously mentioned) for British-American policing of the world—to the exclusion of Russia, we have in effect forced a taking of sides by governments, and in effect in substantial degree within each country among the peoples themselves, which is the most dangerous possible development from their standpoint. This taking of sides, if completed by the pact’s becoming operative, will produce a situation fraught with the most ghastly consequences for the peoples of Europe—in due course: consequences against which America is powerless to save them harmless. By ratifying, and putting into operation, this pact, America will thus be exercising power without any sense of moral responsibility; creating a situation which invites, if not impels, harsh Russian retaliation against which America is powerless to defend them—even in civil wars and those evil conditions which over a period bring civil strife to the “hot” phase.

5. The futility of the European rearmament program's attempt to create military security for Europe, under the pact, is doubly appalling when one considers the deadly weight of this phase of bankrupting militarism upon the economies of Europe and upon the impoverished lives of her peoples. Even if America should foot the entire cost of equipping and keeping equipped a vast army in Europe, which is inconceivable over the years in endless billions, the upkeep alone would be sufficient of a drain to keep the nations there bankrupt. For America to trap them into indulging in the illusion of “prosperity through rearmament”—through enabling them to manufacture great quantities of arms themselves—would be cruel deception of the peoples, however much it might please the existing regimes there.

6. Any armaments furnished or made possible for existing regimes in Europe, to enable them to maintain themselves in power and block the coming to power of regimes favorably inclined toward the Kremlin, by methods short of violence (perhaps a la Czechoslovakia), would be as ill-advised as they would be incapable of being effective to this end in the long run. This cannot but fan the fires of internal division and bitterness which breed civil war and would help in time to create the very condition which it would be designed to prevent. The frankly declared purpose of the first year's rearmament program, to make existing regimes secure internally, is believed to be the most evil and sinister aspect of the pact: judged by America's traditional policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other nations, a basic New World concept, which has been made a part of the United Nations Charter. The fact that the incurably bankrupt regimes of Europe are now living on, being maintained in power in effect by, the American dole of billions, only enhances the inherent evil. Russia's evil course is no example for America.

7. As regards Britain, any armaments furnished her and any armaments—production capacity made possible for her by America cannot benefit America's war potential—strength in war—because of the helplessness of Britain against Russia's air weapons alone, previously discussed. Any part of America's resources poured into Britain for this purpose will be at the expense of our war—potential and without any compensating offset though increased national security, therefore to Russia's gain. Just as ERP billions are keeping in power the Socialist regime in Britain, and keeping out of power their opponents who are advocates of America's non-Socialist philosophy (the Churchill party)—through helping the Socialists to hide the bankruptcy inherent in socialism—so will the pact's program of continuing this aid, in the guise of aiding prosperity through rearmament production, in effect make ERP a long-term program with no end in sight.

1 Including presumably Australia, New Zealand, perhaps South Africa.
THE FACT WILL, IN PRACTICE, GUT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY

8. By stripping America of sorely needed resources, already dangerously stripped by World War II’s profligacy especially, for the benefit of Russia’s war-potential as above explained, the pact’s operation will gut our national security. This will be without adding an ounce of effective military deterrent, so far as offering any block to Russia’s overrunning Europe at will and exercising her potential power dominance over the British Isles by air weapons and perhaps otherwise (the dangers of biological and bacteriological warfare exceeding those of atomic warfare, perhaps). Thus to fatten the goose for the Kremlin’s killing and delection, making Europe’s conquest—by a gigantic Dunkerque—all the more to her liking and benefit, amounts to a planned Pearl Harbor of monstrous proportions. So to do is to “criminally gamble with our inheritance” indeed, to borrow the Vandenberg words.

THE KREMLIN IS SECRETLY OVERJOYED WITH THE PACT

A few of the reasons why the Kremlin is delighted with the prospect of the pact’s operations, listed below, indicate part of the basis why it should not be filed as a millstone to America’s neck. These reasons are:

1. It will give the Kremlin the perfect excuse within Russia for a greater and never-ending effort, by the enslaved Russian people, in support of the Kremlin’s program. Without the pact, the Kremlin despots might be hard put to it in future years to keep the Russian people in harness psychologically and spiritually, working at fever pitch to build up her economic and war potential; although there is no sound basis for assuming, it seems, that the Kremlin’s iron grip can or will be broken in the forseeable future.

2. It gives Russia’s despots the perfect propaganda weapon for use among the peoples of the satellite nations: “Russia and her friendly neighbors surrounded by an armed camp bent on conquest.” In this respect, it should be repeated: our intentions, however good, do not control, any military alliance’s aggressive character being determined by the excluded nations so far as they are concerned.

3. It feeds the suspicions of a vast portion of the non-Communist people in the various countries of the Old World—those especially who hold to the dreams of socialism of which, many believe, Russia is the motherland and great hope despite “temporary” methods of tyranny—that America, capitalist America, is through the pact merely shopping for allies for another war which will merely victimize Europe, no matter who wins. The many reports from the most reliable sources to this effect make it foohardly in the extreme for America to assume that the pact will be well received and continually approved over the years by the non-Communist within the nations of Europe—preponderantly Socialists. Ex-Premier Blum of France, dean of French Socialists, for example, has expressed publicly almost equally bitter condemnation of capitalist America and Communist Russia. It is believed that the operations of the pact over the years will aggravate this.

4. The pact will directly benefit Russia’s war potential at the expense of America’s, increasing her power sphere’s military and economic strength.

5. The pact’s operation will commit America officially, inescapably, and far beyond the 20-year stated limitation thereof, to the astounding military principle that America’s security frontier is in Europe; not even on the Rhine but on the Elbe and even farther east; and, by the same token, on the Euphrates, too, and even the Ganges, as southern Asia is brought into the scope of the pact’s logical twin arrangement reportedly now scheduled. This forces America’s military chiefs by treaty commitment (on a par with the Constitution itself), beyond the veto of any succeeding Congresses, for 20 years at least, to plan their military operations and military budgets on the premise that each and every signatory nation is—for defense purposes—an integral part of America’s defense territory, apropos of Russia. This automatically, inescapably, follows from the pact’s basic intent and wording: that an attack on any member nation is to be deemed an attack on every one, including America. The pact thus forces our military leaders, beyond the veto of their judgment, to plan military disaster for America at a time determined by any member nation—worse, at the Kremlin’s signal.

6. The pact not only can add nothing to America’s national security militarily but guts it in these respects and various others of major consequence.
7. America's economic soundness can be wrecked by the pact's operations and will be if we fulfill its commitments to the other signatories, thus playing into the Kremlin's hands through aiding conquest through bankruptcy of the United States of America.

8. The pact's economic program, for continuing American billions unlimited to be spent in building up Europe's economy and Britain's next world-wide system (per Smuts, 1943)—especially the Middle East and East Africa—is to the Kremlin's order; precisely as Communist Bowlader specified in that 1944 book previously mentioned. Not only will this help to bankrupt the United States of America, but it will directly enrich Russia's power sphere, including East Africa, which can easily be dominated militarily from the Middle East whenever Russia desires to overrun that latter region, which she can do at will.

9. The pact's political program, aiming at ever-closer political union between the United States of America and Britain and her Commonwealth nations and European allies, to the ultimate end of common citizenship (per Churchill), also pleases the Kremlin. This cannot but tend to further the program of the Socialists (including the Communists) in America to have America progress through the welfare state into benevolent socialism, in keeping with the program (though presumably not the intent) of the Roosevelt-Truman regimes. Since the communism of the Kremlin is the extreme degree of the state-over-man system of socialism, embodying violence and tyranny in place of the inescapably temporary benevolence of intermediate socialism, the Kremlin is pleased indeed with having America set on this road, abandoning her traditions and basic principles, all words to the contrary notwithstanding. The pact's marriage politically, in effect in the long run, of young and vital America, to the decrepit old woman of the Old World (Britain and Europe), is enough to make the Kremlin guffaw. They could not have planned it better. History will marvel at the insanity of America's suicide.

**The Armament Program's Cost**

Not to tell the American people the full truth about the inescapable cost involved in the rearrainment of our pact "allies" is to trap them inexcessably, morally: and, presumably, many Members of Congress who are likewise uninformed of the actual cost which cannot be avoided, once the pact is ratified by the Senate.

A few factors involved will be mentioned. With all weapons, especially the key and most expensive ones, constantly and rapidly changing through new developments—a process which will be endless—there will never come a time when we or our "allies" can be said to be effectively rearmed; in relation to Russia. A warplane, for example, and a tank—two of the key weapons—are outdated in some key respect as soon as they begin to come off the assembly lines; because at that time new developments are already well advanced in the designing and test-product stages. Therefore, for this reason, the outpouring of billions per year will be endless, even after vast armaments have been built up in Britain and Europe.

Since Russia's superiority in every department of warfare is today completely unquestioned, apropos of Europe—in quantity and quality, and since Russia can overrun Europe at will today (previously discussed), any attempt to rearm Europe against Russia (so as to provide some security against her) will not be a real armaments race. That term implies some degree of equality, which is lacking in this case in every respect, not only as to arms but the basic economic strength and war-minded manpower potential capable of sustaining a long-term struggle in arms competition. Even Britain's jet planes cannot soundly be assumed to be in advance of the Russians, who have the benefit of Germany's extremely advanced scientific and experimental work at the end of the war and since then, through capturing her experimental facilities and experts in the main. Note that "High Air Force officials disclosed today that America's vaunted supersonic rocket plane, the Bell X-1, is 'nothing but a beefed-up copy' of a captured German wartime fighter which was brought to this country aboard an Army C-54 cargo plane in 1945 " (per New York Herald Tribune dispatch, June 13, 1948).

The very impossibility of Europe's catching up with Russia in any respect having to do with military security in any real degree, respecting Russian invasion, is the measure of the unlimited nature of the commitment when America undertakes to rearm Europe so as to provide some real measure of such security. Likewise respecting Britain—indefensible since VJ-day and continually against Russia's air weapons alone, notably the V-2, as previously mentioned.
America's left-over World War II equipment and planes are useless for this purpose because outmoded. Even America's heaviest tank is nothing but a medium tank in Russia's categories of armored vehicles or weapons; and, according to reliable reports, our heaviest tank is not superior to the comparable weight tank of the Russians—perhaps inferior. Russia's tank-manufacturing has been going ahead at a great rate since the war but not ours. To rearm Europe with any effective tanks—capable of standing up in competition with Russia's especially her heavies—America must design and manufacture vastly improved models in vast quantity for use in Europe. This would be futile, of course, because Europe cannot provide armies adequate to stand up before Russia's vast hordes of great fighters; in part because of the lack of will to fight of European peoples, in part because of Russia's present and continuing air supremacy. Europe prospects for peace, if any, are remote, at best.

To rearm Europe with any real degree of potency, America would have to revert to a wartime manufacturing program and continue it endlessly; because of constantly changing models, et cetera. This, too, would be futile because Russia is constantly geared to go into wartime production instantly, so could easily stay ahead of us in any such competition, with the aid of the tremendous new resources added to her manufacturing capacity, in east Germany and Poland and especially Czechoslovakia (the Skoda works); not to mention the rest of east Europe and potent Manchuria.

Some idea of the cost of providing Europe with a large force, one large enough to offer an appearance of possible temporary opposition to Russian invading forces, is gained when one considers the actual cost, per unit, multiplied by the units needed for such a "show." Reliable estimates put the cost of fully equipping a "divisional slice" (in Europe, 10,000 men in the fighting division with all reserves, supporting organizations of supply, etc., great stock piles of ammunition and supplies, etc.) at a quarter of a million dollars; costs being greatly advanced over wartime costs. Even with a fighting force of 2,000,000 in Europe so armed—utterly inadequate against the great millions Russia could march across Europe, with the aid of air supremacy—this would mean 200 divisions and a cost initially of some $50,000,000,000 plus the cost of endlessly replacing the equipment with new parts (replacements) and even with new and improved models of weapons etc. Not to mention the vast potential liability and for other reasons.

In addition, the cost of an air force for Europe, in size only a modest part of Russia's steadily increasing air force, would skyrocket these figures sky high in billions, due to the huge cost of ever-changing planes, of the supporting ground organizations needed to operate an air force, and so on.

Even apart from the almost bankrupting needs of America's own military establishment, directly related to making North America itself relatively secure militarily apropos of possible attack from the north, these figures indicate why the pact holds the threat for America of forced bankruptcy, once we undertake the obligations of the pact. These obligations it must be remembered, are what Europe is led to expect, promised secretly but officially over the past year and a half or more (by the secret United States military mission to France in January 1948, and otherwise) per reports.

Indeed, such reports are available in quantity; reports of the most reliable nature. Not only do our "allies" expect such substantial support militarily, with the latest equipment in every category—they demand it.

Not long ago, Foreign Minister Schuman of France described the pact as providing the contractual basis for a United States supply of arms to Europe; and they mean for security against invasion, not just a halt for Russia to invade them with the possibility of later liberation—of a corpse, as Premier Queuille has put it.

All pretensions to the contrary, that the pact does not contemplate such a huge armaments program as Europe expects, constitute a fraud on either them or on the American people. To lull the people to overlook these disastrous implications of the pact, with talk about only the first year's cost, the height of deceit. In this connection, faced with the truth—the full facts—the American people would ask with Senator Connally (per his remarks on January 10, 1948):

"We can't go on supporting these people for the rest of their lives. Why is it our responsibility to raise their level of production above prewar? It is not our obligation to restore all their foreign investments."

That was regarding EHP billions; on top of which will come the pact costs—wth even assurance today that Europe will not have closed the dollar gap by 1952, by billions. One is reminded of Senator Vandenberg's declaration against
postwar lend-lease, in the Senate in the spring of 1945; stating that America has her own problems and that she cannot be permanent almoner to the world—not and stay solvent. Not unless we wish to continue to play into the Kremlin's hands—as the pact will force us to do, endlessly.

UNITED STATES TROOPS FOR EUROPE—"THE THIRD AEF"

"With the third AEF" was the headline over Newsweek's May 16, 1949, account of the American Air Force units in Britain now; the plan calling for permanent stationing there of such units. Plans for the use of United States troops now in Europe as part of the west Europe defense plans have been 'actively, approved' by the United States; and the British and French have secretly agreed that an American general will be commander in chief in case of fighting; per reliable reports. Some months ago, ex-Chairman Eaton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that 'we might save ourselves some money' if United States troops should be sent to Greece to help clean up the situation. 'Why don't we send our soldiers into Greece and clean up the guerrillas?' he asked. And also said: "* * * Sooner or later, we're going to have to do something there. As it is, we're just building up the economy so the guerrillas will have something to take. * * * " He added that he was raising the question for debate. (New York Times, February 14, 1949.) Only last month, Army Secretary Royal's secret report to the House Appropriations Committee last March was revealed, in part, showing that not only do west Europe nations' leaders 'unanimously' demand that the United States troops now in Europe stay there but that they be increased, per his talks with them while in Europe. Those leaders made 'an insistent request for additional troops,' he said, and he recommended keeping United States troops in Germany even after Germans are given control of their government. Paul Reynard, former French premier and now member of parliament, declared in New York recently that America would create a favorable psychology in Europe by increasing its armed forces 'west of the Iron curtain' (using that term of Goebbels, not originated by Churchill," reported). In December last, General Collins, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, admitted in America, calls for similar pacts to cover other regions: in line with official psychology in Europe by increasing its armed forces. Montgomery's west Europe forces. The influential London Times said in 1948 that United States forces needed 'in France, Holland, and on the Rhine * * * *'. These samples indicate the prospect.

THE FACT TO BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER FACTS

The evidence is adequate and convincing that the basic plan, not yet officially admitted in America, calls for similar pacts to cover other regions; in line with that 1941 agreement of Churchill and Roosevelt for British-American forces to police the postwar world: a global undertaking. Pretensions to the contrary by some are merely designed to fool the American people; except in the case of those ignorant or naive souls whose opinions are not worthy of respect.

For instance, last March Foreign Minister Schuman of France stated that the impending past would not cover the Mediterranean but that a subsidiary pact would have to be made for this purpose. (N. Y. Times March 2, 1949). Foreign Secretary Bevin's planning was made clear, in guarded comments, by Foreign Minister Tsaldarlis of Greece, after the two had conversed in London last February; the latter having long advocated a Mediterranean alliance—now contemplated as being a next step after the completion of the "North Atlantic Pact" whose "great power" signatories, he feels, are alone capable of giving the Mediterranean pact reality through power. This is merely part, of course, of the long-standing British (Bevin) program to have America assume Britain's burdens in the Mediterranean; concerning which the record is replete with persuasive evidence—as brought into the open in connection with the "Truman doctrine" maneuvers secretly in 1946 and openly, officially, in March 1947. The similar plans regarding Asiatic areas are also substantially prepared; awaiting only the step-by-step timing process by which America is being drawn deeper and deeper into the British-Old World manipulations. For instance, a most reliable report by

---

2 Per Walter Winchell.

Joseph Alsop, from London, in the New York Herald Tribune of February 16, 1949 stated in part:

"** * * (Bever) * * * was on the eve of forming India and southeast Asia into another regional grouping like Western Union, when the Dutch attack on Indonesia spoiled his plans * * * (after saying that the British lack the resources to fight communism in that region) * * * This is why men on lower levels here are beginning to talk of the organization of 'fire brigades,' led by America and Britain, for both the Middle and Far East. It is thought that the famous 'Point Four' in President Truman's inaugural address provides the basis for American action, and joint Anglo-American efforts are proposed * * *!"

So even if delayed for some time, with regard to this or that region, there can be no doubt that the British and others—including of course some of our own officials—are secretly planning additional pacts to supplement the impending one. Pretensions to the contrary are false.

This enhances the danger for America inherent in the "North Atlantic Pact"—an entering wedge to more of the same; ultimately spreading America's limited strength, economic and military, so thin as to be wholly lacking in potency. Even the impending pact will do this to such great degree as to be extremely dangerous; while more "global" overlapping will complete the undermining of America's capacity to be effective in international relations apropos of Russia's well-integrated, concentrated Eurasian operations. Not to mention overstraining America's capacity to be effective, even with regard to her basic defense needs in the New World; thus undermining her national security.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PACT

It has previously been noted that an America-backed British-Europe alliance, to the exclusion of Russia, was not contemplated when the United Nations Charter was being drafted and ratified by the United States and other nations that is, except perhaps secretly by a few; so that the pact has no sound support in the UN Charter or spirit.

The striking fact about this pact is that it will in effect make the letters "UN" stand not for United Nations but for "Union Now"—the prewar scheme to have America back Britain and her European allies; and join with them in the kind of collaboration and amalgamation now contemplated under the "North Atlantic Pact." That is, in substantial respects; though the Clarence Streit plan for "Union Now" went even further then—and still does—toward political merger than is seemingly envisaged by the pact; at least for the time being.

This pact, falsely claimed to be sanctioned by the basic intentions originally of the UN member people and nations, in 1945, is in fulfillment of the 1941 Churchill-Roosevelt plan to have any new league of nations (like the UN) function as a cloak to cover for the British-American world-policing (after the war) agreed upon at their Atlantic Charter meeting previously mentioned.

According to the sworn testimony of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who attended the meeting, President Roosevelt told him about this agreement with Churchill for world policing by British-American forces after the war; and, when Welles, concerned about this power-politics program, asked about the role of a future league of nations, the President replied that nothing could be more futile than another assembly like the League of Nations. According to Welles notes made at the time, which served in part as the basis of his testimony, he urged that there be an assembly in which the smaller nations could make their voice heard and participate in formulating the policy, regarding world policing, which the great powers would execute. Agreeing, the President nevertheless said that after the war, in the transition period, no league council or assembly could exercise the powers in question—such as those possessed by the old League of Nations; regarding world policing and so on. Welles also suggested the inclusion, in these police responsibilities, of other nations like the other American Republics, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium (those being named by Welles in his notes). Then, according to Welles notes:

"The President replied that he felt that a solution for this difficulty could probably be found through the ostensible joining of those powers to Great Britain and the United States but that it would have to be recognized that this must be only ostensible, since none of the nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or at least considerable part in the task involved." [Italics added.]
This word "ostensible" means appearing to be what it is not; falsely appearing; appearing to be true but not true. In other words, fake.

The record of the UN since it started operating in January 1946 shows that this plan of 1941—to have small-nation members of the UN serve as a "front" for British-American policing of the postwar world, to the exclusion of Russia, without the smaller nations having any control over the policing policy or operations, has been largely fulfilled. The pact proposes to make official, controlling, this secret 1941 deal. With negligible exceptions, Britain and America have carried out their plans within the UN, in keeping with that 1941 deal; any disagreement of the smaller nations with respect thereto being unavailing. The sudden springing of the "Truman doctrine"—a long-predetermined arrangement between Washington and London—in 1947 without any pretense of recognition of the existence, much less the function, of the UN, was a clear indication of the disregard for the UN which is basic to that 1941 deal and all subsequent steps in fulfillment thereof— including the impending pact. The later attempt, in March 1947, to cover the nakedness of that "Truman doctrine" power-politics play with the cloak of the UN Charter—by pious resolutions—only made the mockery more complete.

In November 1945, only a few weeks after VJ-day and long before the first UN Assembly meeting in January 1946, Bevin adopted officially and publicly, in a Parliament speech, that Churchill-Roosevelt deal of August 1941. This was soon after the close of the disastrous meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, when British and Communist Russian imperialisms came to grips for the first time in the postwar period, the fight being bitter. In this Parliament speech Bevin said that Britain would have close ties with her European neighbors, matching Russia's close ties with her own neighbors; and, in a remarkably frank statement, said:

"* * * Britain's policy is to keep on policing the world as she has always tried to do—until a league of nations is developed which can be trusted with the atomic bomb. * * *"

In this same speech Bevin said: "Sometimes in these negotiations—I make the confession—power politics seems to me to be naked and unashamed. * * *

A few days later, and long before any conflict over the veto power had developed in the UN—even months before the first UN Assembly meeting—this Old World power-politics atmosphere was so apparent and widely discussed as being the death potentially of the UN, that the magazine Newsweek was able to report thus (November 12, 1945), re Washington opinion:

"* * * officials now admit the possibility that the postwar world will divide itself into two major blocs, one Anglo-American and one Russian * * If Russia solidifies an eastern European bloc by rigging the Polish and Balkan elections and dominating the resulting governments, the United States probably will support the British plan for organization of a western European bloc. Then, if the Russian bloc operates within the UN system, so will the Anglo-American bloc; otherwise on the outside." [Trailer]

Some claim that the UN was still-born; infected with the deadly poison of power politics at the start. Certainly both Britain and Russia intended to use it as a pawn or tool in their centuries-old game of imperialistic rivalry and power competition. If not still-born, it was barely gasping for life in the fall of 1945; months before its first Assembly meeting permitted it to have even the appearance of life. And surely the Truman Doctrine episode above-mentioned cut its jugular vein. The North Atlantic Pact will not kill the UN—as a genuine organization functioning, in spirit and letter, as contemplated by the American people in 1945; because the UN, as so conceived, has long since been dead. The pact just takes the shroud and seeks to cloak with it the false pretensions of this typical Old World military alliance into which America is now asked to enter; falsely pretending to be in keeping with the 1945 spirit of the UN's basic aim in 1945 of Russo-American cooperation primarily. The evil, power-politics schemes of Russia and Britain cannot excuse America.

THE PLAN FOR A BRITISH-LED EUROPE BLOC TO BALANCE THE POWER OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

In entering into the pact, if she does, America will be on notice that Britain and her European allies are not committing themselves fully to stand with America in all matters; not by any means. Highest British officials have repeatedly stated formally and publicly that their aim and hope is to lead Europe in forming an ultimately powerful bloc which will then serve to balance the power of the United States against the power of Russia and vice versa.
Prime Minister Smuts in 1943, then No. 2 man in the British War Cabinet, called for precisely this arrangement in a speech before a secret meeting of British officials; which he repeated in March 1948. Again, as recently as May 1948, Smuts repeated the same plan for Britain:

"* * * If Western Union, with British membership, is thus consummated, a third or middle power group will arise, at least equal to either of the other two (United States, Russia), the security set-up of the world will rest on a triangle of power. That is how I see the future basis of security and world peace."

Note that in that 1943 speech Smuts expressly called for a British-led Western Union movement.

Beevin publicly joined in this "Third Force" balance-of-power plea, in September 1948; saying in Parliament that Britain hopes for a revived western Europe which, with the British Commonwealth, "* * * a force of peace, equality, and equilibrium * * *" (between United States and Russia) will result; creating "* * * a better equilibrium and a better balance in the world between the three powers." At the same time, Eden, deputy leader of the Conservative (Churchill) Party, spoke likewise; saying:

"I am certain that the essential thing in the world today is that the major force should not largely reside in either one or two powers with gigantic resources—the United States or the Soviet Union. It is a fundamentally dangerous position for the world * * *

And he called for Britain's leadership of Commonwealth and Western Union to balance power between Russia and America. In the following month, October 1948, he emphasized the intermediate aim—pending the creation of the capacity of this "Third Force" to serve as the balance of power—of lining up the British-led group with the United States against Russia, in keeping with the pact's program. A few days later, Beevin, in Parliament, reiterated his "Third Force" aim, of creating a solid combination of Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and France, and probably other countries, with the Middle East, Pakistan, India, South Africa, and southeast Asia, to serve "as a great equilibrium in the world which may result—and I believe will result—in generations and generations of peaceful development"; permitting this group to serve as the balancing factor between east and west. Russia and the United States.

On September 6, 1948, the Newsweek London Bureau chief reported that "Some American circles in London * * * feel that 'Third Force' Socialists in Britain want to build a European bloc of resistance to the United States as well as to Russia." [Italics added.]

General de Gaulle, of France, has repeatedly urged that Europe balance power between Russia and the United States; and a French-led bloc of course. Among other occasion, he so stated in July 1947 and July 1948. Any such bloc will be British led, as history shows, especially of late.

British leaders thus make no bones about seeking, in time, to be powerful enough, with their European allies primarily, to deal at arm's length with both America and Russia; playing one against the other. This is fair warning to America of the trap of Old World alliances, power politics.

THE PACT GIVES OUR "ALLIES" A BLANK CHECK

A chief danger of any alliance such as this pact will constitute, if ratified, lies in its blank-check character: a check signed by America, drawn on all our resources—economic and human, the tools of war—with each of our "allies" having the unfettered power to fill in the date and amount at will. The payee is Mars. The policies and actions of any one of our "allies," over which we have no control, can induce or impel an attack by Russia, for example; thus starting what America would be obligated by the terms of the pact to finish—through war with Russia. Her complete power dominance and impregnability in her power sphere, all Eurasia and vicinity, make this situation dangerous in the extreme.

Even short of war, the pact will marry America to the Old World with all its evil power-politics practices; especially British balance-of-power policies and practices in the Old World which, throughout our life as a nation, we have scorned and rejected as a fit standard for America. This can have the most evil consequences for America, even short of war.

British policies, and balance-of-power manipulations, are a strictly British concern so far as America is concerned; except when it comes to America's being drawn into the British web of power politicking. Then it becomes the direct and immediate concern of every citizen—to make sure that America's course is
wise and sound and true to American interests, to American ideals and traditions and basic principles and posterity's just heritage for which we are merely temporary trustees.

A sharp warning lies in the fact that the pact itself is the direct outgrowth of skilful maneuvering by British leaders, chiefly Churchill, to draw America into that web. Note, for instance, the 1941 Churchill-Roosevelt deal for British-American world policing, before mentioned; the March 1946 public proclamation of this as a British-American policy—by Churchill at Fulton, Mo., with the President's approval—frankly against Russia; the implementation thereof by the March 1947 declaration of the Truman Doctrine as a prelude to the previously planned Marshall plan publicly announced in June 1948—as a first step to be succeeded by the March 1948 Truman declaration of support for the alliance of Britain and her west European allies (Brussels Pact); all as intermediate steps, taken in most intimate collaboration with British leaders, preceding the now impending North Atlantic Pact alliance—of America with this same group of Britain and her European allies primarily. The preceding discussion, and the chronological listing of events in the appendix hereto (exhibit B) clarify this picture. Not to heed it will be to "criminalgamble with our inheritance"—to borrow the phrasing of Senator Vandenberg's 1926 book: The Trail of a tradition.

PERSPECTIVE IS THE NEED

Hindsight is a great aid to foresight. Perspective is essential to wise decision. That Vandenberg book will bear reading in relation to this pact, to each Senator's consideration of the issue. It holds good today.

It should be noted, briefly, that this pact is not the outgrowth of postwar conditions but of prewar and wartime planning by the British and some American leaders—as the chronology (exhibit B) makes clear. Russia's post-VJ-day course is being utilized as the excuse therefore: but that course is not the reason for the pact. In my 1945 book manuscript, for instance, in the guiding principles for a proposed traditional American foreign policy which I suggested in the light of the power facts of this Russo-American era which started on VE-day, I stated that if America tries to oppose Russia's imperialistic aims in the old world and to support the competing British aims, "this will in time logically lead to the American people's coming to believe that this is not only their right but their duty and to believe that they have a mission to fight Russia in Europe in order to enforce this policy—perhaps under Hitler's former slogan: 'Save Europe from Bolshevism' * * *" and that America should guard against being involved in any such course, especially stumbling unwittingly along this course. I also warned therein against America's being involved in any alliance such as this pact:

"* * * America's power must not, for the sake of her own welfare and of world peace, be in effect placed directly or indirectly at the disposal of Britain for use by her in playing her age-old game of war-breeding balance-of-power politics in Eurasia; that to permit this would logically, inescapably, lead to America's being placed in the position of challenging Russia—first with words and policies, later with bayonets; that America's cooperation with Britain to this end—either through an open alliance, or by means of a cabal within the United Nations or any other association or league of nations, or otherwise * * *" would in time have evil results.

Written in the summer of 1945, this volume of mine warned at length and vigorously against the dangers stemming from Communists—in America and elsewhere—and against the world-rule aims of the godless despots of the Kremlin. The program for America therein proposed was in keeping with the principles stated in the following exhibit A, in general.

It is noteworthy that in July 1945 former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles warned, in his syndicated column, that powerful influences were at work in Britain to restore Germany's strength for use against Russia; repeating the mistake Britain made in the thirties in restoring Germany's strength (helping her to rearm, etc.) to balance France's power and the reviving Russian might—having started even in the twenties, in seeking to offset in such ways the great French Army's power dominance in Europe. In his 1942 book, America's Strategy in World Politics, N. J. Spykman, of Yale University, not only predicted such use by Britain of the defeated Germany, after the war, but said America's approval would probably be gained by the British, Spykman approving of this course.
Nothing could be clearer than the fact that Russia's post-VJ-day course is just the excuse, not the cause, of the developments culminating in the now impending North Atlantic Pact.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE VERSUS THE CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT-TRUMAN DOCTRINE

This pact can legitimately, with complete accuracy, be said to be the expression, in part, of the program initiated by Churchill—reaching back to 1941—and "sold" to Roosevelt and Truman, of which the so-called Truman doctrine was just partial evidence. Hence the term, "the Churchill-Roosevelt-Truman doctrine."

Further and invaluable perspective regarding the pact can be gained by noting briefly how the Roosevelt-Truman course contrasts with that of the Monroe administration in 1823. We are today falling into the very British trap which America avoided skillfully in that year, if the pact is ratified.

British Foreign Secretary Canning suggested that America join with Britain in blocking the Holy Alliance's aim of aiding Spain in reconquering her former South American colonies, the newly independent republics whose independence Britain had not recognized. The American Minister in London, Rush, passed the suggestion on to Washington for consideration but meanwhile pressed Canning to determine whether he was primarily interested in the freedom of those republics or was merely using it as bait to draw America into support of Britain in her maneuverings against the Holy Alliance and Spain. He quickly decided that the latter was the case and so advised President Monroe, recommending that America have absolutely nothing to do with the scheme, just part of Britain's old balance-of-power maneuvering.

Meanwhile Monroe had consulted various advisers, including former President Jefferson. Note that somewhat earlier, on June 11, 1823, before this matter was initiated by Canning, Jefferson had written Monroe about the power politics and oppressions of liberty in Europe, in this letter condemning British balance-of-power politics and treachery in international dealings in the most scathing terms. His recitals fully explain why Britain has well earned, throughout the centuries, the name Perfidious Albion. In keeping with his never-changing hostility to America's participating in any way at any time in the power politics maneuverings in the Old World, he warned that President Monroe should avoid mixing therein:

"...I have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States never to take active part in the quarrels of Europe. Their mutual jealousies, their balance of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and principles of government, are all foreign to us. They are nations of eternal war * * *

In line therewith, holding fast to the eternal value for America of what Senator Vanderburg called the second Declaration of American Independence, as previously noted, Jefferson wrote Monroe on October 24, 1823, about the Canning proposal; stating at the outset that: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to meddle with its-Atlantic affairs * * *

There, in a nutshell, is the spirit of then soon-to-be-announced Monroe Doctrine's two basic and inseparable principles. Not having been advised, at the time of his October 24 letter (due to delay in mails from England in those days) that Canning's real aim was to have America violate those principles stated by Jefferson, the latter told Monroe that he was willing to see America cooperate with Britain in furtherance of America's aims in the New World only; but never to mix in Britain's power politics in the Old World. Since Canning never had any idea of playing America's New World game and had dropped the subject cold when he saw that Rush was not to be fooled, the Canning scheme died aborning and the Monroe Doctrine was announced as a strictly American doctrine having solely to do with the Independence of the New World—expressly rejecting any idea of America's mixing in the power politics, alliances, and wars of the Old World. Monroe and every one of his advisers were in agreement at all times in hostility to the latter idea; Jefferson most of all. The record, even the foregoing small sample thereof, exposes the falsity of statements to the contrary.

The North Atlantic Pact will settle the second Declaration of American Independence, the twin principle of the Monroe Doctrine (against America's interference in Old World power politics, through alliances, etc.), and will fly in the face of the advice and consistent policies of the Founders—Jefferson chief of all. This furnishes food for thought indeed; doubly so when one con-
EXHIBIT A

A TRADITIONIST'S 10 AMERICAN PRINCIPLES OF A SOUND FOREIGN POLICY IN THIS RUSSO-AMERICAN ERA

(By Hamilton A. Long)

1. America can be effective in foreign affairs only by being so sound and strong—spiritually, socially, economically, governmentally, militarily—as to be always adequately prepared for the relative, reasonable, security of her power sphere (where her power can remain dominant despite any Old World challenge), embracing the New World (Iceland to Alaska, and south), and the mid-Pacific and Australia.

2. America must face the hideous fact that the war gave despotic Russia power-dominance over all Eurasia and vicinity—her power sphere (where her power can remain dominant despite any New World challenge); that Russia can seize Europe, the Mid-East and China's east coast quickly; that her Continent-based air weapons (the V-2 especially) make indefensible and neutralize Britain, Japan, north Africa, and other adjacent areas; and that America must restrict her policy to fit her power's limits fixed by these power-facts, to avoid overextension and certain disaster.

3. America can and should live with all nations, especially Russia in this Russo-American Era, as amicably as possible and work with them as fully as possible; and should take the lead in using constructively all international agencies like the United Nations and not help to pervert them into tools of never changing Old World balance of power politics—as Britain and Russia, for example, always do.

4. America should understand, and be on guard against, the dangers of war-breeding Old World power politics, especially Britain's ceaseless balance of power scheming to use other nation's power as her tool in opposing her strongest rival on the Continent, and the dangers of bankrupting, Old World, militarism and military alliances; never permitting America's course to fit into this disastrous, evil pattern.

5. America can and should live by her New World, American, principles despite—no, because of—the loathsome, cancerous disease, communism, which has attained great potency in the Old World after feeding on its inner decay for a century; and, to have a sound foreign policy and be safeguarded internally, we must understand the Communists' aim of world-rule, the creeping paralysis nature of communism, the fact that it is basically socialism with despotism added (so it cannot be defeated by fostering Socialist regimes, whose state-over-man system paves the way for the despotic degree of state-over-man under tyrant-Socialists, such as Communists), and we must understand that the state-over-man program in America now, of ever-increasing Government controls and welfare-state measures and killing taxes, is part of the initial program of all Socialists, Including Communists.

6. America must not start a "preventive" war; nor act in Russia's power sphere in a manner which America would never tolerate at Russia's hands in our power sphere for security reasons, nor do anything in Russia's power sphere which is conducive to armed action by her there in self-defense, as she sees her security need there—her view controlling her actions there, like America's in her own power sphere—because a contrary course will victimize the helpless peoples of Russia's power sphere, whom we cannot defend against her, and plight civilization if war results.

7. America must not increase Russia's Eurasion war-potential, certainly not at the expense of our own—of our dangerously depleted, limited, natural resources constituting mainly a vital part of the just heritage of all future generations of Americans, for whom our generation is merely temporary trustee, nor permit the Kremlin's tactic of conquest through bankruptcy to succeed, in America.
8. America can have a sound, American, foreign policy only by living faithfully by our uniquely American traditions and principles underlying the New World dream, a practical program, of a New World civilization made secure and ever Letter despite the Old World's inner decay and decline which America is powerless to cure.

9. America has a moral obligation thus to remain America in the richest and fullest sense of that inspiring word; husbanding her limited strength—spiritual and material—to insure fulfillment of her primary mission as the main pillar of New World civilization and the beacon light and citadel of individual liberty, which can be transmitted to other peoples by example only, not by sword or dollar.

10. America's obligation and need to live by American principles are such that any who favor their abandonment in any respect have the burden of proof, of persuasion; and they should respect American standards in the process of making their case before the people, entitled to the full truth at all times, especially from their public servants, and to be treated as the sovereign authority under genuine self-government and not victimized by false propaganda by them or anyone else.

Exhibit B

Chronological Recital of Some High Lights Re the Background of the North Atlantic Pact

1941

August.—Churchill and Roosevelt agreed, at the Atlantic Charter meeting, that British-United States forces would police the postwar world (excluding Russia deliberately, so far as Churchill at least is concerned, beyond questions). Roosevelt then told Sumner Welles, at the meeting as Under Secretary of State, that nothing could be more futile than another Assembly like the League of Nations in the postwar period; and, if there should be one, other nations (like Norway and Belgium and the other American Republics) would be invited to participate only "ostensibly"—Welles' word, recording what Roosevelt said, because Britain and America would have the power and do this world-policing job. (See discussion pp. 23-24.)

These secret agreements in the main explain the postwar British-United States policy. Still earlier in 1941 the Roosevelt administration "objectives" had been secretly stated as including prevention of the disruption of the British Empire and "eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balance of power by sword or dollar."

This would seem to indicate that Roosevelt, as well as Churchill, had in mind at this time British-American military collaboration to offset the prospective power dominance in Eurasia of Russia—with Japan and Germany eliminated by defeat in the war.

Churchill's attitude toward the prospective United Nations Organization at this time—that it could not be relied upon to be effective—continued without change; as indicated in his statement in 1949 that: "I had always felt during the war that the structure of world security could be founded only on regional organizations." [Italics added.]

This ties in with the statement regarding the United States attitude continually, by then ex-Under Secretary of State (now Secretary) Acheson—in October 1948, in an address. He said that unity among the great western powers was essential to world peace, and that the United States worked toward that goal through and immediately after World War II—1944 set the pattern.

1943

Churchill, at Harvard, called for continuation after the war of the British-American Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff sitting in Washington. (He won.) Secretary Knox reportedly had discussed with Churchill earlier at Quebec his plan for British-United States control of the seven seas after the war pending permanent peace arrangements, and Knox got approval of the plan in London later, with Russia to be allowed to participate to some extent.

Governor Dewey, of New York, called for a postwar British-United States alliance.

Prime Minister Smuts, of South Africa, as No. 2 man in British War Cabinet, speaking before secret meeting of officialdom in London, said Britain would be bankrupt after the war; Germany, France, and Italy would be powerless; Russia would be mistress of Eurasian Continent, and called for a British-led western
Europe bloc (in effect, Western Union) as the basis of “the next world-wide British system”—to balance the power of the United States and Russia. The reported reaction of the Netherlands Government-in-exile, in London, was that an Atlantic bloc to control Germany and offset Russia should be composed of America as the arsenal, Britain the base, western Europe the beachhead.

Churchill and Eden in Paris lining up France for western Europe bloc; in response to which DeGaulle and Bidault, French chiefs, invited to Moscow. Similar British bids made to Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway.

Churchill obtained promise from Roosevelt of 5½ billion dollars of first year of postwar lend-lease for Britain (see p. 7).

Earl Browder (Communist chief in United States) book published, advocating plan closely paralleling President Truman's “Point 4” program (see p. 8).

July.—Potsdam Conference—Russia’s expansionist aims and tactics made clear. Attlee regime succeeds Churchill's. Summer. Welles warned Britain getting ready to rebuild Germany for use against Russia (see p. 27).

August.—Bevin prepared his "peoples, not pushers" memorandum—plan for new British Empire technique and development in Mid-East and Africa (see pp. 7-8).

September.—First Foreign Ministers Conference, London; bitter fight between Bevin and Molotov, with Byrnes backing Bevin (in line with his plan before the meeting, per his book); in effect backing British Empire's Eurasian aims against Russia's. The Balkans were the chief issue, the real contest being for power dominance there, though talk all about "elections."

Attlee secretly arranged with President Truman later (November) conference in Washington with Canada re "atomic bomb"; widely taken to be an attempt to "secure" Russia (not present) into being good.

Churchill-Truman arrangements made about this time for the visit of Churchill to the United States in 1946; to make the March 1946 address at Fulton, Mo.

Truman began to formulate, about this time, his ideas which took the form of the "Truman doctrine" in March 1947; according to a most reliable report, in the spring of 1947.

These arrangements and plans were secret, of course.

Field Marshal Wilson, in Washington as British chief of Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff, called on Congress, in effect, to halt demobilization and bringing troops home lest the Balkans be left to Russia; thus revealing the real nature of the struggle at the Foreign Ministers meeting.

October.—United States planes and ships moved Chiang Kai-shek's armies to the north, in an attempt to give them control over North China and Manchuria—against Reds. Military lend-lease had previously been extended into 1946 for Chiang.

November 7.—In Parliament, Bevin and Churchill made quite similar speeches, indicating determination to line up western Europe with Britain, to lean on United States support—especially the atom bomb, and in general to prepare to fight the power-struggle with Russia vigorously. Churchill cried for atomic bombs for Britain (from the United States). Bevin admitted power-politics was "naked and unashamed" in the recent Foreign Ministers Conference; and in effect wrote off the United Nations entirely (months before its first Assembly meeting), saying "... Britain's policy is to keep on policing the world as she has always tried to do—not a league of nations is developed which can be trusted with the atomic bomb."

November 15.—Washington "atomic bomb" conference; United States, Britain, Canada.

November 24.—In Parliament, Bevin said in effect he proposed to work for a western Europe alignment with Britain. (Offset to Russia's eastern Europe bloc.) Note Newsweek report (see p. 24) about this time that United States officials about ready to back British plan for western Europe bloc to match Russia's (in or out United Nations).

Churchill addressed Belgian Parliament in support of western Europe bloc; asserting that British-United States relations getting steadily closer.

DeGaulle working in this period to have French leadership of this bloc; and referred to France as "beachhead" for Britain and United States—"the bridge.
head of the West in Europe"; referring to looming power-contest with Russia in Europe. That is a military term, landing place for invaders. Much backing and filling and confusion in Washington re China policy.

\textbf{December.}—DeGaulle continued his espousal of role for France of balancing power between Russia and United States.

General Marshall sent to China to foster coalition regime.

\textbf{1946}

\textbf{January.}—Churchill, in Florida, "vacationing"; publicly expressed the hope that United States troops "are not all going home because we (the British) are not numerous enough to handle postwar Europe alone" (against Russia, of course). This was the month in which first United Nation Assembly meeting convened. In this general period, even earlier, perhaps, British financing of Greece scheduled to end at end of British fiscal year 1947 (on March 31).

\textbf{February.}—Secretary Byrnes and Barney Baruch visited Churchill in Florida; doubtless to discuss the forthcoming Fulton, Mo., address by Churchill. Reliable reports state that Churchill also had a hand in preparing the Byrnes speech, made soon after returning from Florida, widely referred to as the "get tough with Russia" speech; in which he said, in effect, that Britain and the United States and their friends in the United Nations would work together within the United Nations, "veto or no veto," so to speak. Vandenberg also indicated at this time that it was time for a "firmer" attitude toward Russia, though he declared that the success of the United Nations depended on Russo-American cooperation. Churchill reportedly (a later report) visited the White House to discuss with the President his coming Fulton speech. In this period Stalin made an aggressive speech; clarifying the power struggle.

\textbf{March.}—Churchill speech at Fulton, Mo.; in substance calling for continuing United States-British military collaboration; in effect a working military alliance featuring cooperation around the globe. Russia was clearly the target. President Truman denied he knew in advance what Churchill was going to say but reliable reports show he was informed in advance.

Bad press and public reaction to the alliance proposal; but a British correspondent in Washington cabled London that the White House and State Department had advised him the people would be "educated" to acceptance of this program (in reality fulfilling the August 1941 deal for British-United States policing of the postwar world). This "education" took the form of the fictitious "sudden" crisis of March 1947 and the equally fictitious war scare of March 1948, in part.

\textbf{June.}—Reports of United States plans for eastern Mediterranean base, British withdrawing defenses from Mediterranean to East Africa.

\textbf{September.}—Public official discussion in London of plans to withdraw troops from Greece.

\textbf{Fall of 1946.}—This was the period in which the British and United States officials worked out their plans regarding the Greek-Turkey aid program sprung "suddenly" as a "crisis" in February-March 1947. Long continued consultations with Greek officials in Greece; and with Tsaldaris, Greek premier, in Washington in December 1946. As previously noted, these plans, culminating in the "Truman doctrine" in 1947, had roots reaching back reportedly to about September 1945.

In this period, also, plans were being discussed between London and Washington regarding, or looking toward, the Marshall plan program and United States backing of the British plans for development of a new empire in the Middle East and Africa—per the Bevin August 1945 "peoples, not pashas" memorandum; in line with the Truman point-four proposal of January 1949.

\textbf{1947}

\textbf{January.}—Marshall returned to Washington, replacing Byrnes. Had top-secret communications with Bevin regarding Bevin pleas for more billions for Britain. Marshall said not possible unless aid for Britain made part of aid to Europe; because American people would not stand for it (per H. J. Taylor, Cosmopolitan, March 1948). Bevin pleas continued, for about 5½ billions.

Churchill article in Collier's (January 4 issue) urged creation of United States of Europe backed by United States power—the atomic bomb. Declared that Russia could overrun Europe at will; but the bomb was "the new balancing factor." Expressly defied Communists and Russia in urging the plan.

Franco-British military alliance announced; and United States approval thereof.
Pursuant to his earlier speeches advocating a united Europe, Churchill formed a committee to promote it. On same day, announcement made that Dulles—with approval of Vandenberg and Dewey—favored United States backing of economic federation of western Europe based on international control of Germany's industrial resources; expressly in competition with Russia.

New Republican Congress met with great plans for budget cutting; especially the military budget.

February.—Economy plans knocked into a cocked hat by sudden springing of the "crisis" regarding Greece and Turkey; privately at first, with key Members of Congress. Full plans made for the melodramatic public moves; including a joint session of Congress to be addressed by the President, etc.

March.—The Truman doctrine program suddenly sprung on the public before a joint session, addressed by the President. Promptly Tsaldaris of Greece cabled the President thanking him for carrying out his promises of the preceding December, when he was in Washington. The crisis was spurious; repeated announcements having been made over 6 months and more of the planned gradual withdrawal of British troops from Greece and the British plans to stop financing Greece on March 31 having been long fixed and published as previously mentioned (in London if not elsewhere); per press reports.

A year later, in March 1948, President Truman admitted that this "Truman Doctrine" announcement was just a preliminary to the later announcement of the "Marshall plan" (really the Bevin-Marshall plan) in the following June.

Press reports about this time of impending new financial aid for Britain.

The "Truman Doctrine" announcement at first did not take the United Nations into consideration at all; a later resolution pertaining to it. In the midst of this excitement, at the beginning of the month (or February 28) Secretary of the Navy Forrestal made clear the extent of British-United States fulfillment of the "Marshall plan, Fulton, Mo., plea; saying in an address that: "Our fleet, in conjunction with the British, is now doing what the British did alone for 100 years." Especially in the Mediterranean and Middle East area, he might have added. Yet note the following item.

Although in this month of the announcement of the "Truman Doctrine," when the Senate asked questions of the State Department regarding the true picture behind it, the State Department, through Under Secretary Acheson, asserted that the Greek-Turkey aid program was "not connected with any oil concessions which American companies may have in the Near or Middle East." But in the following November, it was asserted in a speech that the United States is striving to keep the oil fields of the Middle East out of the hands of an "unfriendly great power." (This means underwriting long-standing British policy in that area; yet Acheson in March denied that the United States was underwriting British policy there.) This speech was by the State Department's chief of Middle-East Affairs.

April.—In Moscow, Secretary Marshall reportedly asked Bevin for a copy of his August 1945 "peoples, not passions" memorandum. A clear break with the Kremlin was made at this meeting; paving the way for British-United States organization of west Germany, putting through the already planned "Marshall plan," preparing for the developments leading to the military alliances program and so on.

May.—Acheson's Cleveland, Miss., speech outlined in general what was coming in the "Marshall plan," the following month; discussions about it being conducted with London officials secretly.

June.—Announcement of the Marshall plan, pretending that there had been no prearrangements with London; but this proved to be false, the London Press "spilling the beans," causing Bevin to protest publicly. This was carrying out the January 1947 Bevin-Marshall plans.

July.—Press reports from Britain indicated that the British public took it for granted that the Marshall plan was just an excuse for more aid for Britain, to broaden the coverage to make it more pleasing to the American public; just about what Marshall had told Bevin was necessary in those January communications.

Summer-fall.—Great pressure applied by United States officials to force into line Marshall-plan nations, to make the program acceptable to Congress; but the British share (the 5½ billions asked for by Bevin in January, being the amount promised Churchill by Roosevelt in 1944) remained fixed.

November-December.—At Foreign Ministers' Conference, complete break with Russia made; and way paved by Marshall and Bevin for the forthcoming Bevin call for a European military alliance (to be the Brussels Pact). Temporary or
Interim "aid" voted at this time, with much Communist scare, just as the London Times had predicted; though the Marshall plan was said at first not to be anti-Communist or anti-Russia. Chairman Eaton of House Foreign Affairs Committee made the first public admission by an official that Russia could overrun Europe at will, he saying in 24 hours. Also, progress being made in building up Germany and Japan, preliminarily, as bulwarks in the contest with Russia, in line with the Acheson speech of May 1947 at Cleveland, Miss., forerunner of the Marshall-plan announcement.

1948

January.—Belgium called for Brussels Pact alliance, with United States immediate blessing. In hearings on Marshall-plan aid, much heard of a United States military alliance with Britain and her continental allies and also about military lend-lease to rearm Britain and Europe against Russia. Much scare-mongering, as prelude to the fictitious war scare of March-April; part of the melodramatic atmosphere of the Truman address to the joint session of Congress (on the day the Brussels Pact was signed) promising United States backing to the Brussels Pact allies.

Before the House Armed Services Committee, in April, I denounced the war scare as a fake, which was admitted to be true later in the year.

April.—The long-prepared program for military aid to Britain and her allies was almost announced by the President; but he finally put it off, as being premature, the public not having been sufficiently "educated" to accept it readily. It was officially admitted in various quarters, however, that the lend-lease program was being readied. It was just a question of timing.

May.—Finally decided to confine the immediate step to that embodied in the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239), which was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee without any bearings. This resolution was addressed to article 51 of the United Nations Charter primarily, in line with what Senator Vandenberg had written H. F. Armstrong in October 1948, was under active consideration.

June.—The Vandenberg resolution, brought out only a few weeks before adjournment for the political conventions, in the midst of all the political jockeying for the presidential nominations, received scanty attention in the debating process, only a few hours being allowed for this purpose on the crowded Senate calendar. During the debate that took place, few Senators were present much of the time, according to the record, it being difficult to get quorums to respond. On the whole, under these conditions, with many key Senators not present at all for various reasons, the resolution received woefully inadequate debate.

July to November.—Nothing in particular was heard about the proposed North Atlantic Pact during the campaign. It was given the silent treatment. With no issue presented, the popular vote was no test of approval or disapproval, not one voter in a hundred even knowing anything about the existence of the Vandenberg resolution it is believed, and not one in a thousand knowing about the substance of it.

Meanwhile, however, United States officials, military and otherwise, were conferring with those of British and western Europe nations, preparatory to the planned 1949 development of the project. Great pressure was applied, according to reliable reports, on various of the nations to bring them into line with British-United States plans, notably on the Scandinavian countries—most of all on Sweden. Typical power-politics techniques were employed in preparing to bring America, by this means, into this alliance with the Old World.

NOTE

The foregoing gives just a sample of the background developments which are of interest in this connection. All of the above items can be documented if needed; like the facts stated in the main part hereof.  

HAMILTON A. LONG.
INDEX

INDEX OF WITNESSES BY INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

A

Acheson, Hon. Dean G., Secretary of State.
Allen, Oliver S., vice chairman, Progressive Party of Massachusetts.
American China Policy Association. (See Kohlberg, Alfred.)
American Farm Bureau Federation. (See Kline, Allan B.)
American Labor Party. (See Rubinstein, Dr. Annette.)
American Legion. (See Wilson, Don.)
American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association. (See Eicke, Mrs. Anna Steelman.)
American Veterans Committee. (See Harrison, Gilbert A.)
American Veterans of World War II. (See Newcomb, Elliott.)
American War Mothers. (See Falsey, Mrs. Loretta.)
Americans for Democratic Action. (See La Follette, Charles.)
Army, United States, Chief of Staff of. (See Bradley, Gen. Omar.)
Arts, Sciences, and Professions, Council of. (See Warne, Prof. Colston E., and Forbes, Rev. Kenneth Ripley.)
Atlantic Union Committee. (See Roberts, Hon. Owen J.; Patterson, Hon. Robert P.; and Clayton, Hon. Will L.)
Austin, Hon. Warren R., United States Representative to the United Nations.

B

Backus, Mrs. Dana C., interim national chairman, Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace.
Baptist Fellowship. (See Howe, Rev. Lee A.)
Beggs, Mrs. Frederick, committee on international relations, General Federation of Women's Clubs.
Bender, Mrs. Clifford, Woman's Division of Christian Service, the Methodist Church.
Boss, Rev. Charles F., Jr., executive secretary, Commission on World Peace, the Methodist Church.
Bradford, Joseph L.
Bradley, Gen. Omar, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
Brethren Service Commission. (See Curry, A. Stauffer.)
Brickjilk, John.
Brown, H. W., international president, International Association of Machinists.
Broy, Mrs. Cecil Norton.
Burr, Rev. Dudley H., chairman, the Peoples Party of Connecticut.

C

Cadbury, Prof. Henry J., the Friends Committee on National Legislation.
Canfield, Cass, United World Federalists.
Carney, James B., secretary-treasurer, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Clayton, Hon. Will L., vice president, Atlantic Union Committee.
Church of the Brethren. (See Curry, A. Stauffer.)
Church, Methodist. (See Boss, Rev. Charles F., Jr., and Bender, Mrs. Clifford.)
Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform. (See Culbertson, Ely.)
Cockrell, Ewing, president, United States Federation of Justice.
Collegiate Council for United Nations Reform. (See Schwab, Stephen M.)
Committee on National Affairs. (See McKee, Frederick C.)
Congress of American Women. (See Draper, Muriel.)
Congress of Industrial Organizations. (See Carey, James B.; Henderson, Donald; and Tyler, A. L.)

Cotton, Rev. J. Paul.

Council on African Affairs. (See Hunton, W. A.)

Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions. (See Warne, Prof. Colston E., and Forbes, Rev. Kenneth Ripley.)

Culbertson, Ely, chairman, Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform.

Curry, A. Stauffer, Brethren Service Commission, Church of the Brethren.

D

D'Aquino, Carl.

Detroit Peace Council. (See Wahlberg, Rev. Edgar M.)

Defense, Secretary of. (See Johnson, Hon. Louis.)

Dobbs, Farrell, national chairman, Socialist Worker's Party.

Draper, Muriel, Congress of American Women.

Dulles, Hon. John Foster, member of the United States delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Durr, Clifford, president, National Lawyers Guild.

E

Elcke, Mrs. Anna Steelman, American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association.

Elliott, Dr. Phillips, Fellowship of Reconciliation.

Ely, Robert B., Ill.

Emerson, El. A., Middletown Citizens Committee.

F

Fadler, William F., Jr., Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia.

Falsey, Mrs. Loretta, national legislative chairman, American War Mothers.

Farnam, Fyka.

Fellowship of Reconciliation. (See Elliott, Dr. Phillips.)

Fish, Hon. Hamilton.

Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers Union, CIO. (See Henderson, Donald.)

Forbes, Rev. Kenneth Ripley, Philadelphia Council, the Arts, Sciences, and Professions.

Friends, Committee on National Legislation. (See Cadbury, Prof. Henry J.)

Friends, Social Order Committee. (See Parshall, G. Burton.)

G

General Federation of Women's Clubs. (See Beggs, Mrs. Frederick.)

Gerard, Hon. James W.

Griffith, H. M., vice president, National Economic Council.

H

Harriman, Hon. W. Averell, United States special representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration.

Harrison, Gilbert A., national chairman, American Veterans Committee.

Harrison, Mrs. Robert R.

Hartman, George, chairman, War Resisters League.

Hayford, Mrs. Jane L., director, World Organization of Mothers of All Nations.

Henderson, Donald, president, Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union, CIO.

Howe, Lee A., president, Baptist Fellowship.


I

Imbrie, James, chairman, Progressive Party of New Jersey.

International Association of Machinists. (See Brown, H. W.)

J

Jewish War Veterans of the United States. (See Weitzer, Bernard.)

Johnson, Hon. Louis, Secretary of Defense.
INDEX

K

Keyes, Scott.
Kline, Allan B., president, American Farm Bureau Federation.
Kohler, Alfred, chairman, American China Policy Association.

L

Laird, George.
League of Women Voters. (See Stone, Mrs. Kathryn.)
Libby, Frederick J., executive secretary, National Council for the Prevention of War.
Linfield, Seymour, executive secretary, Young Progressives of America.
Lovett, Hon. Robert A., former Under Secretary of State.

M

Mallory, Lawrence R., Jr.
McKee, Frederick C., chairman, Committee on National Affairs.
Methodist Church. (See Boss, Rev. Charles F., Jr., and Bender, Mrs. Clifford.)
Middletown Citizens Committee. (See Emerson, E. A.)

N

National Council for Prevention of War. (See Libby, Frederick J.)
National Council of American Soviet Friendship. (See Morford, Richard.)
National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions. (See Warne, Prof. Colston E.)
National Economic Council. (See Griffith, H. M.)
National Lawyers Guild. (See Durr, Clifford.)
Nettels, Prof. Curtis P.
Newcomb, Elliott, national director, American Veterans of World War II.
Nowak, Hon. Stanley.

O

Ordower, Sidney L., legislative director, Progressive Party of Illinois.
Oswalt, Grace L.

P

Patterson, Robert P., vice president, Atlantic Union Committee.
Peacemakers. (See Peters, R. H., Jr.)
Peoples Mandate Committee. (See Vernon, Miss Mabel.)
Peoples Party of Connecticut. (See Burr, Rev. Dudley H.)
Peters, R. H., Jr., Peacemakers.
Philadelphia Council, the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. (See Forbes, Rev. Kenneth Ripley.)
Progressive Party. (See Wallace, Henry; Allen, Oliver S.; McDaniel, Winston; Ordower, Sidney L.; Burr, Rev. Dudley H.; Rhoads, Paul L.; Imbrie, James.)
Progressive Party of Central Pennsylvania. (See Rhoads, Paul L.)
Progressive Party of Illinois. (See Ordower, Sidney L.)
Progressive Party of Massachusetts. (See Allen, Oliver S.)
Progressive Party of New Jersey. (See Imbrie, James.)
Progressive Party of Wisconsin. (See McDaniel, Winston.)
Progressives, Young. (See Linfield, Seymour.)

R

Beardon, Thomas J., United States Constitutional Defense Committee.
Richie, David S.
Roberts, Hon. Owen J., president, Atlantic Union Committee.
Boggs, O. John.
Rubinstein, Dr. Annette, American Labor Party.
S
Scherbak, H.
Sneddy, Frederick C.
Socialist Workers Party. (See Dobbs, Farrell.)
State Department. (See Acheson, Dean and Lovett, Robert A.)
Stewert, Mrs. Alexander, president, Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom.
Stewart, Mrs. Carolyn Hill.
Stone, Mrs. Kathryn, first vice president, League of Women Voters.
T
Taft, Hon. Charles P.
Thomas, Dr. Joe T., president, United Congo Improvement Association, Inc.
Thomas, Norman.
Tittman, A. O.
Topping, Nicholas.
Tyler, Alcott L., Chemical Workers of America, CIO.
U
United Chemical Workers of America, CIO. (See Tyler, Alcott L.)
United Congo Improvement Association. (See Thomas, Dr. Joe T.)
United Nations. (See Austin, Hon. Warren R.)
United Nations Reform, Committee for. (See Culbertson, Ely.)
United Nations Reform, Collegiate Council for. (See Schwebel, Stephen A.)
United States Constitutional Defense Committee. (See Reardon, Thomas J.)
United States Federation of Justice. (See Cockrell, Ewing.)
United World Federalists. (See Canfield, Cass.)
V
Vernon, Mabel, Peoples Mandate Committee.
Veterans Committee, American. (See Harrison, Gilbert A.)
Veterans of World War II. (See Newcomb, Elliott.)
Veterans of the United States, Jewish War. (See Weltzer, Barnard.)
W
Wallis, Bishop William J., African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church.
War Resisters League. (See Hartman, George.)
Warburg, James P.
Warne, Prof. Colston E., National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions.
Waters, Mrs. Agnes.
Weltzer, Bernard, national legislative representative, Jewish War Veterans of
the United States.
Whitley, David.
Wilson, Don, American Legion.
Woman's Division of Christian Service, the Methodist Church. (See Bender,
Mrs. Clifford.)
Women, Congress of American. (See Draper, Muriel.)
Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace. (See Backus, Mrs. Dana C.)
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. (See Stewart, Mrs.
Alexander.)
Women's Clubs, General Federation of. (See Beggs, Mrs. Frederick.)
Women Voters, League of. (See Stone, Mrs. Kathryn.)
World Organization of Mothers of All Nations. (See Hayford, Mrs. Jane L.)
Y
Young Democratic Club of the District of Columbia. (See Fadler, Wm. F., Jr.)
Young Progressives of America. (See Linfield, Seymour.)
# INDEX

## SUMMARY INDEX OF PARTS 2 AND 3

### A

| African colonies (see also colonies, Congo) | 484, 964-967 |
| African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church | 1023 |
| Aggression, definition of (see also armed attack) | 875, 1079 |
| Aggressive nature of treaty (see also provocativeness of treaty) | 469-470, 479-480, 802-803, 896, 955, 1046-1047, 1102 |
| Allen, Oliver S | 815-818 |
| Alternatives to treaty | 359, 491, 485, 654-655, 900, 937-938, 978, 1063-1066 |
| Ambassadors, attitude of former | 460-493 |
| American Bar Association | 124 |
| American China Policy Association | 847 |
| American Cotton Shippers Association | 1185 |
| American Council of Christian Churches | 1188-1189 |
| American Farm Bureau Federation | 574, 575, 578, 579-582 |
| American Federation of Labor | 790, 1137, 1194-1197 |
| American Labor Party | 479, 1214 |
| American League for an Undivided Ireland | 1226-1233 |
| American Legion | 1171, 1191, 1194, 1233 |
| American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association | 792 |
| American Shrew Congress | 1040 |
| American Veterans Committee | 817 |
| American Veterans of World War II | 925 |
| American War Mothers | 927 |
| Americans for Democratic Action | 939 |
| Anglo-Soviet Treaty (also Franco-Soviet Treaty) | 1109-1110 |
| Armament, reduction of | 357-358, 437, 496, 732-738, 739, 757, 790, 799-798, 892-894, 900, 937, 990-993, 995, 998, 1011, 1019, 1020, 1140, 1142-1144, 1158 (see also military budgets) |
| Arms, standardization of | 498-499, 508 |
| Armstrong proposal | 631, 655-657, 658-659, 681-684 |
| Atlantic community | 339-340, 345, 665, 674, 912 |
| Atlantic Union Committee | 376, 393-398, 528, 530-542, 608, 612-613, 647 |
| Atomic Energy control | 475-477, 486, 733, 735-738, 767-768, 800, 892-893, 1018, 1143-1144 |

### B

| Backus, Mrs. Dana C | 624-633 |
| Balance of power (see also Alliances, military) | 841-842, 853-854, 1007-1008 |
| Baptist Peace Fellowship | 1041 |
| Bender, Mrs. Frederic | 597-607 |
| Belgium | 968-974 |
| Bender, Mrs. Clifford A | 1005-1014 |
| Berlin, (See Germany) | 1216 |
| Bloch in the United Nations (See also Division of world into spheres) | 352, 354, 625-626 |
| Borchard, Edwin | 631-635 |
| Boss, Charles F. | 608-610 |
| Bradford, Joseph L. | 1002-1014 |
| Bradley, Omar | 696-698, 589-599 |
| Brethren Service Commission, Church of the Brethren | 834 |
| Bricklin, John | 1017-1018 |
| Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees | 1189-1191 |
| Brown, Harvey W. | 983-986 |
| Brown, Philip B. | 1006-1011 |
| Broyles, Mrs. Cecil Norton | 713-716 |
| Brussels Pact | 309, 569, 699, 672, 1170-1177 |
| Burr, Rev. Dudley H | 708-712 |

**C**

| Cadbury, Dr. Henry J | 758-784 |
| Cadman, Cass | 941-947 |
| Capitalism | 482-484, 486-487 |
| Carey, James B. | 413-415 |
| Catholic Association for International Peace | 1193-1194 |
| Chamber of Commerce of the United States | 1137-1138 |
| Chemical Workers of America, CIO | 1163 |
| China | 418, 426, 430, 497, 785, 802, 1064, 1088-1089 |
| Churchill, Winston | 418, 435-438, 455, 471, 672, 715 |
| Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform, Inc. | 974, 977-978 |
| City Club of Chicago | 1168 |
| Civil Liberties: In Soviet Union | 472-473 |
| In United States (see also Democracy, strengthening of) | 429, 473, 484, 709, 711, 865, 930, 1064, 1073, 1125 |
| Clark, J. Reuben | 492-493 |
| Clarification of Treaty | 676-684, 699-699, 699 |
| Clay, Gen. Lucius | 452 |
| Clayton, Will L. | 316-313 |
| Clergyman, statement by | 739-750, 589-849 |
| Cockrell, Ewing | 1015-1023 |
| Cold War (see also United States, Relations With Soviet Union) | 371-378, 380-387, 400-405, 410-411, 426, 484, 400-405, 709-711, 718, 728, 732, 741, 750-760, 766, 998, 1132-1134, 1135 |
| Collegiate Council for the United Nations | 693, 663-666 |
| Colonies (see also Indonesia) | 705, 732, 904-967, 1024-1028, 1049-1050 |
| Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church | 896, 990-991 |
| Committee on National Affairs | 588, 590-592 |
| Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Commission on Administration and Finance | 1225-1226 |
| Communism (see also Soviet Union, Communist coup) | 341, 345, 346, 350-360, 379, 401, 405, 431, 462-483, 468, 458, 673-674, 703-704, 710, 713, 731, 736-737, 742, 751-752, 758-790, 808, 897-898, 999, 913, 918, 947, 949-950, 593, 968, 1042, 1046, 1113, 1127, 1167 |
| Communist coup | 444-446, 449-450, 517-518, 556-557, 558, 569-570, 703, 704, 751-752, 1008, 1014, 1033, 1037, 1113-1114 |
| Communist Party, United States | 784-785 |
| Competition, economic | 409-410 |
| Congo, Belgian | 968-974 |
| Congress of American Women | 727, 728-729 |
| Congress of Industrial Organizations | 413, 414, 496, 721, 953, 966, 967, 1163, 1208 |
| Connally resolution | 3017-3018 |
| Constitutional procedure (see also Presidential powers; War declaration) | 373-374 |
| 424, 497, 519-520, 521-525, 546, 548-549, 621-622, 724-726, 923-925 |
| Constitutionality of treaty | 713-722, 1000-1010, 1077, 1060, 1061, 1112-1113, 1122, 1123-1125, 1180-1181, 1183-1184 |
INDEX VII

Consultation under treaty (see also Council under Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4) ........................................ 344, 347, 352-355, 358, 371

523-525, 655, 657, 705, 877, 1009

Containment of Russia (see also Soviet Union) ........................................ 418, 497-498, 672-673, 712, 806, 868, 1043-1045

Contributions of signatories ........................................................................ 347-348, 459-460

Cotton, Rev. J. Paul ........................................................................................ 1121-1131

Council under Treaty (see also consultation; North Atlantic Treaty, article 9) ........................................ 657, 728-729, 886, 848, 877, 1131

Council of Foreign Ministers ......................................................................... 341, 423, 718, 798, 799, 800, 812, 866, 877

Council on African Affairs .............................................................................. 983

Cox, Oscar ........................................................................................................ 1068-1071

Cubertson, Elv .................................................................................................. 974-981

Cultural and Scientific Conference on World Peace, resolution of ............................ 796-797

Currencies, convertibility of ........................................................................... 388-389

Curry, A. Stauffer ............................................................................................... 884-887

Customs Union ................................................................................................ 387-388

Cutler, Lloyd N .................................................................................................. 1068-1071

Czechoslovakia ................................................................................................. 444-446, 569

Dawes, Charles G ............................................................................................. 909-911

Day, Stephen A ................................................................................................ 813-814

Declaration of War. (See War, declaration of.) .............................................. 361, 502, 551, 984, 1016, 1180

Defense, common .............................................................................................. 427-428, 553, 554

Defense of Europe ............................................................................................. 674-675, 697, 898, 950

Defensive frontier (see also geographic scope).................................................. 526

Defensive nature of treaty ................................................................................. 348-349, 356-358, 386, 415, 448, 500-501, 530, 577, 899, 912, 913, 915, 916-917, 920, 922-928, 938, 941, 944-945

Demobilization, United States .......................................................................... 470, 766-767

Democracy: Comparison to autocracy ................................................................ 550, 552

Increasing the effectiveness of ........................................................................... 379-380

528, 559-564, 801-802, 864-865, 897, 1035, 1043, 1044, 1093, 1132-1133

Denmark ............................................................................................................ 340

Dennis, Eugene .................................................................................................. 784-790

Detroit Peace Council ....................................................................................... 1186

Dickerson, R. C. ................................................................................................. 1187

Disarmament. (See Armament, reduction of.) ................................................. 341, 348-350, 386, 424, 528, 544-545, 553, 558, 588, 598, 606-609, 619, 771-772, 835, 912, 916-917, 920, 922-923

926, 938, 941, 944-946, 985, 1036, 1055, 1108, 1169

Dobbs, Farrel ..................................................................................................... 481-487

Douglas, Moses H ............................................................................................... 1185-1187

Draper, Muriel .................................................................................................... 727-730

Dulles, John Foster ............................................................................................ 339-379, 421, 447, 556, 590, 572, 574, 669, 730, 797, 806, 823-825, 878

Duration .............................................................................................................. 371, 555-557, 696, 944-945, 1114

Durr, Clifford ..................................................................................................... 870-883

East-west trade .................................................................................................. 809-811

Economic conflicts (see also North Atlantic Treaty, article 2) ............................ 405-407, 705-706

Economic Cooperation Administration (see also European Recovery Program) ........................................ 368, 369, 384-385, 387-388, 392, 506, 562, 810


926, 938, 941, 944-946, 985, 1036, 1055, 1108, 1169

Eicke, Mrs. Anna Steeleman .............................................................................. 792-794

Elliott, Dr. Phillips .............................................................................................. 756-758

Ely, Robert B., III ............................................................................................... 630-631

Emerson, E. A. .................................................................................................. 1063-1069

Endorsement of Atlantic Treaty ......................................................................... 489-493, 527-528, 668
Europe, unification of ........................................ 360, 366-370, 388, 389-391, 394-397, 398-505, 504-505, 613, 715, 731
Expulsion from treaty ........................................ 517-518, 556-557, 558-559, 619, 621, 704, 751-752, 947, 958-959, 988, 991, 1127, 1166, 1176.

Fadler, William F., Jr. ........................................ 635-636
Falsey, Mrs. Loretta ............................................ 927-928
Farmer, Fyke .................................................. 1074-1081
Farmers' Union ............................................... 791
Fear in Europe. (See Morale.) ................................
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Inc .................. 495, 1198-1199
Federal Union (see also Atlantic Union; Europe, unification of) .... 377, 379, 398, 401, 492, 548-550, 647-648, 713, 824, 909, 1074-1075
Fellowship of Reconciliation ................................ 793
Financial burden on United States (see also Military Assistance Program, cost of; Military budget, United States.) .................. 386-387, 400-402, 413, 484, 487, 603, 717-718, 739, 756, 890-901, 810, 899-900, 954, 990, 1031, 1066, 1082-1083, 1093, 1167, 1170.
Fish, Hamilton .................................................... 949-951
Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union, CIO .......... 952
Forbes, Kenneth Ripley ....................................... 790-792
Foreign policy:
- Of cosignatories ................................. 516-517
- Traditional American ............... 400, 813, 848, 853, 1100, 1111, 1115-1117
France .................................................. 359-360, 397, 1095-1096, 1135
Fransco. (See Spain.) ........................................
Friends Committee on National Legislation ...................... 768, 778-783
Friends Social Order Committee of Philadelphia .................. 967, 1072
Furriers Joint Council of New York ................................ 1203

G
General Federation of Women's Clubs .................................. 597
Geographic scope ........................................... 358, 429, 585, 609, 675, 1095-1096
Gerard, James W ............................................ 489-490
Gilman, John .............................................. 1222, 1223
Great Britain ............................................. 1093, 1117-1118
Greece (see also Truman Doctrine) ................................ 429-430, 433, 802, 941, 1012, 1064-1170
Green, William ............................................. 1137, 1197
Grey, Sir Edward ........................................... 771-772, 808, 898
Griffith, Dr. H. M ........................................... 851-861

H
Harrison, George M ........................................... 1189-1191
Harrison, Gilbert A ........................................... 917-925
Harrison, Mrs. Robert R ..................................... 1086-1089
Hayford, Mrs. Jane L ......................................... 838-839
Henderson, Donald ........................................... 982-983
Hoarding in Europe ......................................... 392
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union ........................................... 1200
Howe, Rev. Lee A ........................................... 1041-1044
Hunting, W. A .............................................. 963-967
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>716-719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on domestic economy (see also financial burden)</td>
<td>709-711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>1068, 1090-1092, 1103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>483, 484, 485, 726, 732, 743-744, 802, 920, 996, 1125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Cancer Research</td>
<td>1197-1198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference in internal affairs of other states</td>
<td>1033-1034, 1037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Machinists</td>
<td>883, 986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International courts</td>
<td>637-644, 649-651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law</td>
<td>363, 557, 649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations Committee, A. F. of L</td>
<td>1195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International trade. (See Economic conflicts; ITO; North Atlantic treaty, article 2; reciprocal trade agreements.)</td>
<td>406, 594, 603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade Organization</td>
<td>1216-1222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron curtain, breaking through</td>
<td>775, 889-895, 997-998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>356, 358, 426, 771, 1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>384, 585, 660, 690, 707, 752, 875-876, 897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1112-1114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessup, Philip</td>
<td>451-452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish War Veterans of the United States</td>
<td>1212-1213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Clifford R</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Howard</td>
<td>1102-1107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>574-597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohlberg, Alfred</td>
<td>847-851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladnis Garment Center, American Labor Party</td>
<td>1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafollette, Charles M</td>
<td>989-994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laird, George R</td>
<td>1182-1183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Women Voters of the United States</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend-lease</td>
<td>775, 894-895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libby, Frederick J</td>
<td>893-908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linfield, Seymour</td>
<td>1028-1038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1183-1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacBeth, Gilbert</td>
<td>818-834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailley, Lawrence R, Jr</td>
<td>1187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Plan. (See European Recovery Program.)</td>
<td>1183-1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McColister, Parker</td>
<td>1183-1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDaniel, Winston</td>
<td>1187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKee, Frederick C</td>
<td>588-592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist Church</td>
<td>308-309, 791, 886, 1008, 1101, 1213-1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middletown Citizens Committee</td>
<td>1053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assistance program</td>
<td>343, 344-345, 349, 370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assistance program: Cost (see also Financial burden on United States)</td>
<td>401, 402-403, 426, 478-490, 630, 632, 675-677, 682, 709, 728, 806, 898, 989, 933, 1090-1092, 1098-1108, 1128, 1195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity for</td>
<td>344, 497-498, 508-520, 577-578, 625, 916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military bases</td>
<td>500, 514-515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military budgets</td>
<td>342, 349-350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European (see also Financial burden on United States)</td>
<td>1008, 1102-1103, 1112-1114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>403, 426, 585, 690, 712, 732, 787, 793, 995, 997-998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Establishment. (See National Military Establishment.)</td>
<td>408-409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military missions</td>
<td>576, 689, 838-840, 1112, 1126-1127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**INDEX**

Morford, Richard.................................................. 804-814

Multilateral security arrangement. *(See Armstrong proposal.)*

**N**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Council for Prevention of War</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of American-Soviet Friendship</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of Jewish Women, Inc.</td>
<td>1192-1193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defense <em>(see also Security, United States)</em></td>
<td>969-1002-1004, 1067-1068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economic Council</td>
<td>851-852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Farmers Union</td>
<td>1203-1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Lawyers Guild</td>
<td>870, 881-883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Military Establishment <em>(see also Military budget, United States)</em></td>
<td>342, 349, 365, 427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religion and Labor Foundation</td>
<td>1190-1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>79, 503, 507, 512-514, 724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nettels, Curtis P.</td>
<td>1107-1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcomb, Elliott H.</td>
<td>925-927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York State Bar Association</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 1</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 2</td>
<td>405-410, 685, 703, 706-708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 3</td>
<td>509, 511, 529-525, 555-556, 576, 622, 670-671, 685, 686-690, 700-707, 830, 845, 1000-1001, 1062, 1128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 4</td>
<td>344, 352-355, 358, 371, 670-671, 686, 705, 738, 918, 964-965, 1009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5</td>
<td>362, 372-374, 502, 509, 519-525, 547-549, 551, 583, 598, 606, 617-619, 668, 686, 687, 836, 872, 876, 918, 924-925, 954, 1000-1001, 1113, 1123, 1125, 1179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 6</td>
<td>872, 875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 8</td>
<td>458, 523-525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 9</td>
<td>670-671, 686, 876-877, 1001, 1170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives behind</td>
<td>455-456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for</td>
<td>389, 543-544, 575, 593, 913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>777, 863, 933-935, 1013, 1014, 1129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowak, Stanley</td>
<td>1063-1071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**O**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obligations</td>
<td>340-341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogg, W. R.</td>
<td>574, 583-587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to treaty</td>
<td>482, 523-525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>529, 542-543, 728, 790-791, 815-816, 918-919, 1039, 1045-1046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordower, Sidney L.</td>
<td>861-870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oswalt, Miss Grace</td>
<td>1156-1160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**P**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Alliance</td>
<td>848, 849-850, 926-927, 1080, 1126, 1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifism</td>
<td>481-482, 485, 1044-1045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>777-778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsell, G. Burton</td>
<td>1072-1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterson, Robert P.</td>
<td>608-624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patton, James G.</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace policy</td>
<td>379-380, 405, 432, 437, 481, 576, 595, 712, 900, 955, 958, 993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemakers</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Mandate Committee</td>
<td>1142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Party of Connecticut</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peters, Robert R.</td>
<td>1044-1048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, annual conference, Methodist Church</td>
<td>1213-1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Council, the Arts, Sciences, and Professions</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pirinsky, George</td>
<td>1040-1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point 4. (See Truman, Inaugural address of.)</td>
<td>978, 980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police force, proposed under treaty</td>
<td>431, 483, 484, 532, 648, 674, 701-702, 732, 747, 750, 803, 875-876, 1064, 1112, 1208-1212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postponement of action on treaty</td>
<td>423, 718, 999, 1036, 1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potsdam agreement</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell-Martin-Barrett Post, American Legion</td>
<td>1194-1195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential power (see also Constitutional procedure; War, declara-</td>
<td>372-374, 519-520, 521-525, 548-549, 551, 552, 573-574, 600-607, 621-622, 623, 923-925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Central Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Illinois</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Massachusetts</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of New Jersey</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Wisconsin</td>
<td>1165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda (see also Cold War)</td>
<td>463-467, 740-742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provocativeness of treaty</td>
<td>371-372, 514-515, 588, 662-663, 1122, 1129-1130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisetion, effect of failure of</td>
<td>368, 365-366, 385-386, 401, 489, 499-495, 730, 742, 743, 791-792, 914, 978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reardon, Thomas J</td>
<td>1059-1063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal trade agreements</td>
<td>406, 594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reendet, Christian F</td>
<td>1208-1212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richel, David S</td>
<td>857-960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks of treaty</td>
<td>342-345, 370-372, 559-569, 913-914, 960-960, 996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts, Owen J</td>
<td>560-574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogge, O. John</td>
<td>1131-1135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia. (See Soviet Union)</td>
<td>479-481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubenstein, Annette</td>
<td>446-447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>772, 1140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salazar. (See Portugal.)</td>
<td>419, 438-440, 610, 875, 878, 929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Conference</td>
<td>414-418, 438-450, 568-572, 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scherbak, H.</td>
<td>1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwebel, Stephen M</td>
<td>653-672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>772, 1140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (see also National Defense)</td>
<td>415, 575, 578, 589, 899, 900, 914-915, 944, 1903-1904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### INDEX

| Self-defense | 376, 420-421, 577, 587, 607, 610, 872-874, 880-881 |
| Self-help and mutual aid (see also North Atlantic Treaty, Article 3) | 562, 509-511, 555, 576, 685-687 |
| Senate debate of February 14, 1949 | 629-700, 921 |
| Senate resolution | 229, 457, 636, 913, 916, 920-922, 930, 1122-1123 |
| Shipman, Elizabeth and Merl | 1206 |
| Smedley, Frederick C | 900-903 |
| Smith, Kingsbury | 422, 434, 490, 606, 865-866 |
| Social Service Employees Union | 1209-1210 |
| Socialism | 482-484, 485-487, 531-532 |
| Socialist Workers Party | 483, 486-487 |
| Sovereignty | 367-368, 377, 564-565 |
| Agreement with | 421-424, 432, 438-439, 468, 474-475, 741, 757, 759-760 |
| Armed Forces of | 769, 809-811, 842, 865-866, 898-899, 894, 1010-1011, 1138 |
| Spain | 431, 483, 674, 731-732, 754, 743, 744, 747-749, 863, 886-897, 909, 964, 1170 |
| Stalin (see also Soviet Union) | 434, 440, 441, 453, 467-468, 475, 734, 736-737, 926 |
| State College Friends meeting, statement of | 1106-1107 |
| Stettinus, Edward R | 410, 875 |
| Stewart, Mrs. Alexander | 928-930 |
| Stewart, Mrs. Carolyn Hill | 1048-1062 |
| Stone, Mrs. Kathryn H | 507-509 |

### T

| Taft, Charles P | 465-526 |
| Tariffs (see also Reciprocal trade agreements) | 407-410 |
| Taylor, Gen. John Thomas | 1171-1172 |
| Thomas, Dr. Joe T | 907-974 |
| Thomas, Norman | 790-793 |
| Tehran Conference | 482-483, 486 |
| Temporary nature of treaty | 391-392, 531-562, 594, 842, 920 |
| Tippitt, A. O | 1094-1102 |
| Topping, Nicholas | 1168-1171 |
| Truman, Harry S, inaugural address of | 698, 752, 988, 1010 |
| Truman Doctrine (see also Greece) | 417, 433, 785, 795, 808, 895, 966, 1106 |
| Tyler, Alcott L | 1163-1165 |

### U

| Unemployment, United States | 428-429, 438, 709, 884-885 |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see also Soviet Union) | 907 |
| United Congo Improvement Association, Inc | 907 |
| United Nations | 907 |
| Ability to maintain security | 596, 610, 633, 662-663, 999, 1016 |
| Accomplishments | 367-368 |
| Article 49 | 627 |
| Article 51 | 420-421, 557 |
| 588, 598, 600, 601-602, 607, 610, 625, 654, 656, 667-669, 786, 871-877, 880, 1011, 1013, 1029-1030, 1076, 1104, 1170 |
| Article 52 | 420, 582-585 |
| 601-667, 670, 786, 876, 1029-1030, 1170 |
| Article 53 | 454-455, 490, 601, 668, 786, 871, 1099 |
| Article 54 | 596, 601, 668, 796, 876 |
| Broadcasting proceedings of | 473-474 |
| Chapter VIII (see also Regionalism; United Nations, articles 52-54) | 654-655, 668, 1194 |
INDEX

United Nations—Continued

Compatibility with North Atlantic Treaty ........................................... 344, 350-354
371, 418, 419-420, 421, 449, 454-455, 480, 481, 577, 588, 596, 598, 609
610, 617, 624-626, 634-356, 657-658, 670-671, 709, 728, 738-739, 772
773, 784-785, 797, 806, 815, 838, 849, 871-883, 929-930, 981, 911-942
954, 1009-1007, 1013, 1029-1030, 1075-1077, 1082, 1104, 1157, 1170
1178.

General Assembly ........................................................................ 659, 660, 662

Police force ........................................................................ 826, 783, 737, 977, 1018-1019, 1143-1144, 1157-1158

Relationship to Atlantic Union .............................................................. 382

Security Council ....................................................................... 586, 596, 610
618-619 625, 659-660, 663, 667-668, 723, 796, 836, 871-877, 936, 1179

Strengthening of ....................................................................... 383, 437, 449, 457, 575,
594, 633, 661-663, 665, 673, 674, 702, 733, 737-739, 802-803, 837, 842
843, 879, 900, 929, 938-939, 977, 980, 988, 1006, 1011, 1054, 1056.

Support for ........................................................................... 757, 730-761, 768, 864, 871, 959, 992, 1009

Veto ................................................................................... 411, 414, 437-440, 453, 457,
616, 659-660, 662, 760, 770, 802-803, 977, 999, 1127, 1176

United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO ........................... 1208

United States:

Armed forces to Europe (see also Obligations) ....................... 424-425, 554-555, 620,

Relations with Soviet Union (see also Cold War, propaganda, Soviet
Union) ........................................................................... 421-424, 433-435, 1128-1129

United States Constitutional Defense Foundation ..................... 1059

United States Federation of Justice ...................................................... 1015

United States Junior Chamber of Commerce ............................. 1138-1139

United World Federalists ................................................................. 814

V

Vandenberg resolution. (See S. Res. 239.) ................................. 1142-1144

Vernon, Miss Mabel ................................................................... 1191

Volunteer Center for the United Nations, Trinity College .................. 1191

W

Wahlberg, Rev. Edgar M .............................................................. 1139-1142

Wallace, Henry ...................................................................... 417-478, 1223

Walls, William J ...................................................................... 1023-1028

War:
Cost of .............................................................................. 983-984

Declaration of ...................................................................... 347.

362-363, 373-374, 418, 424, 480, 519-520, 522-525, 548, 549, 551,
573-574, 621-622, 687-688, 699-701, 709, 724-725, 728, 756, 793, 799,
806, 817, 923-925, 934, 1064, 1113, 1123-1124, 1126-1127, 1130-1131

Measures short of .................................................................. 362, 363, 374

Possibility of ....................................................................... 943, 965-966, 377-
378, 384, 399, 404, 421-422, 570, 787, 797, 806, 867, 975, 980, 987, 1029

War Resisters League ................................................................. 1081

Warsburg, James P ................................................................. 672-708

Warne, Prof. Colston E ............................................................ 704-804

Washington Post, communication to ........................................... 1068-1071

Waters, Mrs. Agnes ................................................................ 1144-1154

We, The People, Inc .................................................................. 813

Weitz, Bernard ..................................................................... 901-917

Welfare legislation in United States (see also Democracy, strengthen-
ing of) .................................................................. 428-429

Whatley, David ...................................................................... 719-725

White, Philip R. ...................................................................... 1198

Willard Straight Post, American Legion ........................................ 1191

Wilson, Don ........................................................................ 1171-1182

Wilson, E. Raymond ................................................................ 778-779

Withdrawal (see also Expulsion) .............................................. 556, 619, 696, 701-702, 947-948

Well, Matthew ....................................................................... 1185-1197

Woman's Division of Christian Service, the Methodist Church 1005
| Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace | 624, 626–633 |
| Women's International League for Peace and Freedom | 928 |
| World Organization of Mothers of All Nations | 938 |
| World War III (see also War, possibility of) | 825, 832 |
| Yalta Agreement | 461–462, 569, 1093 |
| Young Democratic Club of District of Columbia | 635 |
| Young Progressives of America | 1028–1029 |
| Youngdale, James M | 1200 |