OSS - CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSONNEL MATTERS/ ZIONISM: AIMS AND PROSPECTS/EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS/PALESTINIAN JEWS SERVING IN THE BRITISH ARMY, 1942

[ William J. Donovan. (Sep. 07, 1942). OSS Correspondence re. personnel, zionism, jews, british, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270001-4. CIA FOIA Archives. ]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270001-4

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Links
September 7, 1943.

To: Director Naval Air Arm Procurement, Los Angeles.


Subject: Notification of active duty orders.


Replies: (1) Reference (a).

Paragraph 2 of basic orders is hereby modified to cover confinement of personnel as follows: (b) In that if physically qualified you will proceed to Washington, D.C., and report to the Chief of Naval Operations for active duty in the Office of Strategic Services.

I. C. Jones

J. R. CARLING

Approved.

[Redacted]
August 31, 1962.

Subject: Action duty with Top and aftermove - changeable coach arrangements, ships, submarines and disposition of ship personnel.

Immediately you will regard yourself accordingly posted. Washington, D. C., and report to the Chief of Small Operations for action duty at the office of Small Operations.


Copies:

[Handwritten notes]
FROM: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

To:     Mark (MN) Kenneth R. Johnson D-VP(R), USNR,
        Los Angeles, California.

Via:    Los Angeles Naval Procurement Center.

Subject: Active duty with pay and allowances—chargeable against appropriation, "Pay, Subsistence and Transportation of Naval Personnel."

References: (a) Executive Order of September 8, 1939.
(b) Naval Appropriation Act for current fiscal year
(c) INRC 171, dated November 22, 1940.

Memorandum:
(a) Affirmative re pension or disability allowance. 
(b) Perm. Perm. 17.

3. Upon acceptance of appointment as
RN(R), and in accordance with the references, proceed at once to the place
and report to such medical officer as may be designated by the Director of Naval
Medical Procurement in your District, for physical examination. You are hereby
ordered to active duty for this purpose and will be considered in an active duty
status during the time required for physical examination and for travel necessary
for compliance with these orders.

4. If found not physically qualified, you will immediately return
to the above address and upon arrival consider yourself released from active
duty. In this event, the examining medical officer will advise the Bureau
of Naval Personnel by dispatch, stating the defects in detail, together with his
recommendation.

9. 1939

[Signature]
December 30, 1942.

Major Frank R. James, Assistant to the Adjutant General,  \nSt. Louis, MO.

2. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to appoint Captain L. M. Seely, \nActing Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Served as Agent of \nthe Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., until January 1, \n1943, and thereafter, to serve in New York, unless \nreplaced by the Secretary of the Interior, for the purpose of \nreleasing the time of the Secretary of the Interior, and \nassisting in the completion of this temporary duty return to Washington, \nD.C.

3. Due to travel involved in connection to FD M.R. 42-02-02, \nA 020:40.

4. The above authorities being herein given in conjunction \nwith the authority given by the Secretary of the Interior, will be \nsubject to the control and direction of the Assistant to the \nAdjutant of the Interior, in accordance with the regulations of the \nDepartment of Justice, as well as the decision of the Secretary of \nInterior.

J. F. McGhee, Assistant Adjutant General.

OFFICER BRANCH, MAJOR INVESTIGATIVE POLICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Signature]
AD 285 -- June 27, 1941

Adjutant General

November 19, 1940

Maj. Frank E. Greene, O.R., Infantry
Adjutant of Strategic Service

1. You are authorized delegation of authority for a period of the (2) copies, effective on or before November 27, 1940, for the purpose of processing from Washington, D.C., to New York, New York, and return, in accordance with instructions of the Office of Strategic Service.

2. No additional copies to the Government will be issued by reason of this authority.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[Signature]

Adjutant General

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

Distribution

[Address]

[Signature]

[Address]

[Paragraph 1]

The Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Navy have approved an order dated November 6, 1963, transferring 800 men to Naval Station, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from the Panama Canal. All of this will be done in an effort to streamline our operations and improve the efficiency of the troops on duty.

[Paragraph 2]

The transfer will be made in order to make room for new personnel arriving in the next two weeks. The new men will report to the base as scheduled.

[Paragraph 3]

In order to ensure smooth operations, all personnel involved will be given a detailed briefing on the new procedures. This will be done by the current personnel and the incoming men will be expected to follow the rules and regulations as they are explained.

[Signature]

[Name]

[Title]

[Address]
Detached Service.

October 8, 1942.

Major Franklin F. Jones 0-7462, Infantry,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

I. You are authorized detached service for a period of eight (8) days, effective on or about October 10, 1942,
for the purpose of proceeding from Washington, D.C., to Sommecourt, Massachusetts, in connection with the activities of the Office of Strategic Services.

II. No additional expense to the government will be incurred by reason of this authority.

By order of the Secretary of War:

R F Pigou
Adj. Gen.

Distribution:
Officers Branch, Maj. Acquire tel 3059.

Office of Strategic Services, 25th and E Sts, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Mr. Taddy, Room 1206, Monte Carlo
WAR DEPARTMENT

3D 201, James, Preston

Everett (8-1-42) EF

WASHINGTON

AUG 17 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have your letter of August 1, 1942, in which you recommend the promotion of Captain Preston Everett James, Military Intelligence, to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United States.

Under existing War Department policies, this case was submitted to the War Department Personnel Board for consideration. The Board returned this recommendation with the statement, "recommendation for the promotion of Captain Preston Everett James is approved for promotion to the grade of Major, AOF, only."

The promotion of Captain James to the grade of major was announced in paragraph 21, War Department Special Orders 217, August 13, 1942.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War
WASHINGTON

AUG 13 1942

Honorable William J. Donovan,
Director of the Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Donovan:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 1 in which you request the promotion of Captain Preston S. James, (O-172462) M.I. Reserve, to the grade of lieutenant colonel.

In consideration of your desire to promote certain officers now assigned to duty with your office, a copy of War Department Circular No. 161, 1942 is enclosed. The provisions of this circular govern present promotions in the Army. Your particular attention is invited to paragraphs 2, 6 and 9b, Section I thereof.

The records of this Department show Captain James was promoted to present grade on May 15, 1934. He allowed his appointment to terminate five years later without having complied with any of the requisites for promotion to the next higher grade. On May 15, 1939 Captain James was reappointed. His record does not show, prior to his being ordered to active duty, that he had performed any type of military duty subsequent to his reappointment.

In view of present promotion policies and the foregoing information, it is not believed that this promotion will be viewed with favor by the Personnel Board, to whom I have delegated authority in such matters. However, your request is being forwarded to the Board for such consideration as the case merits.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
AUG 13 1942

Honorable William J. Donovan,
Director of the Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Donovan:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 1 in which you request the promotion of Captain Preston E. James, O-1722662, M.I. Reserve, to the grade of lieutenant colonel.

In consideration of your desire to promote certain officers now assigned to duty with your office, a copy of War Department Circular No. 161, 1942 is enclosed. The provisions of this Circular govern present promotions in the Army. Your particular attention is invited to paragraphs 2, 6 and 9, Section I thereof.

The records of this Department show Captain James was promoted to present grade on May 15, 1934. He allowed his appointment to terminate five years later without having complied with any of the requirements for promotion to the next higher grade. On May 15, 1939 Captain James was reappointed. His record does not show prior to his being ordered to active duty, that he had performed any type of military duty subsequent to his reappointment.

In view of present promotion policies and the foregoing information, it is not believed that this promotion will be viewed with favor by the Personnel Board, to whom I have delegated authority in such matters. However, your request is being forwarded to the Board for such consideration as it may merit.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STimson

Secretary of War.
Circular
No. 161
War Department,
Washington, May 26, 1942

Promotion of officers in the Army of the United States

Special promotion system, Appendix B, MR 14-3...

1. Promotion of officers in the Army of the United States.- Section I, Circular No. 111, War Department, 1942, as amended by section I, Circular No. 113 and section IV, Circular No. 114, War Department, 1942, is revised in the following substantial respects:

4. The temporary promotion system provided for officers of the National Guard, the officers' Reserve Corps, and retired regular Army officers covered thereunder. All previous instructions on the subject of promotion of officers enrolled by Circular No. 1, War Department, 1942, remain in effect. Other provisions of Circular No. 1, War Department, 1942, are revised.

b. The temporary promotion system applicable to all officers of the Army of the United States provided in Appendix B, "Special Promotion System," War Order 100, October 30, 1942 (see II of this circular), as modified hereinafter.

c. Except as mentioned in (b) above, recommendations for promotion will be forwarded direct to the Adjutant General by the following for elements under their jurisdiction who are not granted authority herein to forward recommendations: set to the War Department:

(1) Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.
(2) Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
(3) Commanding General, Services of Supply.
(4) Army commanders (see d below).
(5) Department commanders.
(6) Division command commanders.
(7) Corps area commanders.
(8) Independent Army corps commanders (see d below).
(9) Theater commanders.
(10) Chiefs of supply services.
(11) Independent tank force commanders (see d below).
(12) Provost Marshal General.
(13) Chief of the Armored Force (see d below).
(14) Other commanders of field force units who are responsible directly to the War Department and who are not authorized to promote officers on their own initiative.

(15) Heads of divisions of the War Department General Staff and other War Department agencies and activities not otherwise provided for.

d. All recommendations for promotions of officers to grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel from units and activities under control of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, will be forwarded through headquarters, Army Ground Forces. Recommendations for promotions of officers to lower grades from these units may be forwarded direct to the Adjutant General by the authorities listed in (c) above.

6. a. Recommendations for promotion will be limited to existing position vacancies (see par. 6, app. B, MR 1-3, Section III of this order). Recommendations for promotion to grades for which no authorized position vacancies exist will not be forwarded. Position vacancies are those positions...
Orders.

July 31, 1942.

Captain Preston E. Jones, OX7462, N. Y.,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the
military service than you proceed on or about August 1, 1942,
from Washington, D. C., to Ameen Hill, Virginia, an temporary
duty for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of the
Secretary of War, and upon completion of this temporary duty
return to your proper station.

2. The travel involved is chargeable to SD No. 444-42
and 444-43.

3. The Finance Officer making payment in connection
with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher,
showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number
and mention of this order. The copy of the voucher will be
accompanied by letter of explanation to the Adjutant General's
Office,iii, stating that the included copy of voucher is furnished
for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the office of
strategic services.

J. F. McGrath
Adjutant General.

 Officers Branch, JFM-65, 2059

[Signature]
The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is to bring to your attention the case of Capt. Preston E. James, a reserve officer who was called to active duty on August 1 and assigned to this office. Capt. James has been on my staff since August 13, 1944, as Chief of the Latin American Section in the Branch of Research and Analysis. In civilian life Capt. James is professor of geography at the University of Michigan, and is a recognized authority in the field of Latin America. He has been a full professor at that university since 1934, and during the year 1940-41 his salary was over $6,000. Capt. James is 43 years old, and was employed in this office at the grade of F-6 until August 1.

After serving for a brief time in 1918 in the Officers Training School at Camp Lee, Capt. James became a reserve second lieutenant in the Military Intelligence Division early in the 1920's, and continued active in the reserve up to the grade of captain. He became inactive, however, about 1935. During the period since 1935 Capt. James has been in close touch with the officers of the Latin American Section of G-2, especially Col. W. Townsend Heard, now Chief of the American Intelligence Command, N.I.C. Capt. James furnished G-2 with the advance manuscript of his recently published book on Latin America as it was prepared. Col. Heard will, I believe, recommend him to you highly.

I wrote you about this officer on July 5, saying that his previous orders to active duty in June
The Secretary of War - 2 -
August 1, 1942

be revoked. It was also requested at that time that
Captain James be called to active duty with the rank of
lieutenant colonel and assigned to this office.
Thereafter Captain James' previous orders to active duty
in Ohio were revoked, and he was ordered to active
duty and assigned to this office as Chief of the Latin
American Section. I understand that the War Department
would not comply with the request that he be given the
rank of lieutenant colonel because it was necessary
when called to active duty that he take his reserve
rank of captain.

In view of the foregoing circumstances it is
respectfully recommended that Captain James be
promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. I believe
that his professional standing, his long service as a
reserve officer, and his continued interest in the
work of the Intelligence Division after he became
inactive, qualify him for this grade. In his dealings
with other agencies in Washington in the Latin American
field it would be of great assistance to him to hold
the rank of lieutenant colonel which would be more
nearly commensurate with his previous professional
position.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

P E James
Paragraph 20. DP following officer ordered to AD MP from home to sta on date indicated.

EMP. IND 31, PA 31-01-22-07-07-08-8 0426-23. All dates are 1942 and personnel of AUS unless otherwise indicated:

<table>
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<th>Grade, Name, Section and Home Address</th>
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<td>Capt Preston Everett James</td>
<td>1 Aug.</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Serv</td>
<td>1 Aug.</td>
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By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. U. H.,
Major General.

July 1, 1943
Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS AREA
Office of the Commanding General
U. S. Post Office Building
Chicago, Illinois.

In reply refer to:
AG (CGA) (Res) 201 - James, Preston Everett

June 25, 1942.

Subjects: Physical Examination.

To: Captain Preston Everett James, M.D. - Res.,
Dept. of Geography,
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

1. It is desired that you report at the earliest practicable
date for a final type physical examination. It is recommended that this
examination be given for General and/or Limited Military Service.

2. Present a copy of this letter and request the Medical Ex-
aminers to forward WD AGO Form #63 to this headquarters without delay.
For your information, the nearest station for a final type physical ex-
amination is

The Station Hospital, Fort Wayne, Detroit, Michigan.

Travel in connection with this examination is to be performed without
expense to the Government.

3. CONTACT PRESIDENT OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD AT THE
ABOVE STATION FOR APPOINTMENT PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO STATION FOR EX-
AMINATION.

4. Request acknowledgment of receipt with information as to
date you will report for physical examination.

My command of Major General CHUNERT:

[Signatures]
The Honorable  
The Secretary of War  
Washington, D.C.  

July 1, 1942.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is to bring to your attention the case of Dr. Reuben C. James, a reserve officer recently called to active duty. Dr. James has been on my staff since August 1, 1941, as Chief of the Latin American Section in the Branch of Research and Analysis. In civilian life Dr. James is professor of geography at the University of Michigan, and is a recognized authority in the field of Latin America. He has been a full professor at that university since 1934, and during the year 1940-41 his salary was over $6,000. Dr. James is 43 years old; he is employed in this office at the grade of C-3.

After serving for a brief time in 1938 in the Officers Training School at Camp Lee, Dr. James became a reserve second lieutenant in the military intelligence division early in the 1939's, and continued active in the reserves up to the grade of captain. He became inactive, however, about 1940. During the period since 1936 Dr. James has kept in close touch with the officers of the Latin American Section of G-2, especially Col. R. Waymond Beard, present Chief of the American Intelligence Division, U.S. Navy. Dr. James furnished G-2 with the advance manuscript of his recently published book on Latin America as it was prepared. Col. Beard will, I believe, recommend him to you highly.

Dr. James has received orders to report for active duty on July 7 at Ft. Meade in Columbus, Ohio. I would like to recommend that these orders be recalled, and that instead of being assigned to continue his important work as Chief of the Latin American Section in this office, it would be very difficult for me to replace him, and I feel that the services he has made with the
The Secretary of War  - 2 -  July 3, 1942

Officers of the American Intelligence Service will greatly facilitate the close cooperation of this office with the War Department in the Latin American field.

I want also to recommend that Dr. James be commissioned with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. I believe that his professional standing, his long service as a reserve officer, and his continued interest in the work of the Intelligence Division after he became inactive qualify him for this grade. This grade would also compare more favorably with his civilian financial status.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

P.S./James/jow
June 11, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just had the attached report from General Menchab concerning the case of Captain Albert Henry Jenkins concerning which you wrote me recently.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure
Even No. roll.
Exposure is 25 C/6.3
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just had the attached report from General Malcom concerning the case of Captain Albert Henry Jenkins concerning which you wrote me recently.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Application for reappointment to commissioned rank in the Marine Corps Reserve, case of former Captain Albert Henry Jenkins.

1. Mr. Jenkins's case has been referred to the Marine Corps Reserve Examining Board with the recommendation that he be reappointed in the Marine Corps Reserve in the rank of Captain for duty in the office of Colonel William J. Donovan, U. S. Army, Coordinator of Information.

T. WOLCOMBE
May 26, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I respectfully request that Mr. Albert H. Jenkins be commissioned as a Major in the Marine Corps Reserve detailed to serve as instructor and liaison officer in our school for training special intelligence agents to give instructions particularly in the identification and dissection of military matériel.

At the outbreak of the last war Mr. Jenkins was an ensign in one of the University divisions. He was in active service in the Navy from 1917 to 1919, resigning in 1919 as a Lieutenant. During the war he did rifle range work and built and commanded a number of ranges, the largest one being that at Caldwell, New Jersey. After the war he built up a prosperous advertising business in New York. Since he had been trained as a chemical engineer he spent two years in Russia working in one of the plants of the Soviet Government for the construction of railway equipment. He reads and writes Russian practically as well as English.

In 1926 he entered the Marine Corps Reserve as a Captain and had various tours of active duty until 1936, when he resigned because of the pressure of his private business.
I respectfully ask that he be given the rank of Major because the higher rank will greatly facilitate his liaison duties between the school and the armed forces. In view of his age and professional attainments he seems well qualified to be a Major.

Dr. Baker, who is now Executive Officer and chief instructor of the school, needs urgently the assistance which Mr. Jenkins can give him in administrative responsibility.

The granting of this request would greatly facilitate the work of our school.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: [Name]

TO: [Name]

SUBJECT: [Subject]

• It is not clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Department of Defense should coordinate or approve.

• A special directive, covering a range of issues, has been issued, and it's possible that it may have implications for coordination.

• The Joint Staff is ready to coordinate.

• The preliminary list of tasks is as follows:
  - [Task 1]
  - [Task 2]

• There are two reasons why it is not a major action:
  1. The Joint Staff would greatly benefiting.
  2. Joint Staff officer responsible for [specific area(s)]

[Attachment]
J. R. Hayden

Colonel William J. Donovan

May 23, 1943

Request for Commissioning of Mr. Albert H. Jenkins as Major, Marine Corps Reserve, on detail to Office of Coordinator

It is recommended that you request that Mr. Albert H. Jenkins be commissioned as a major in the Marine Corps Reserve and detailed to serve as instructor and liaison officer in our school for training special intelligence agents.

As a special directive, probably from the Secretary of the Navy, would be required to commission Mr. Jenkins as a major because customarily a man who has been a reserve officer in the Marines will not be recommissioned at a higher rank than that which he held upon his separation from the Corps. Mr. Jenkins was a reserve captain from 1938 until 1939. I understand that the Marine Corps is ready to recommission him at that rank and that the preliminary steps have been taken. Since 1937 to 1938 Mr. Jenkins was in active service in the Navy, resigning in 1939 as a lieutenant.

There are two reasons why the rank of major seems to be desirable for Mr. Jenkins.

(a) The higher rank would greatly facilitate the liaison between the School and the Fleet and the Navy. In my official professional attainments Mr. Jenkins would qualify for appointment as a major.

(b) Mr. Jenkins' financial responsibilities are not as a captain's pay.
J. R. Hayden

Colonel William J. Donovan

Information concerning Mr. Albert H. Jenkins

May 23, 1942

1. In accordance with your request I am submitting information concerning Mr. Albert H. Jenkins in addition to that which is contained in the memorandum recommending that you request his appointment as a major in the Marine Corps Reserve, and his detail to serve as instructor and liaison officer in our school for training special intelligence agents.

2. Mr. Jenkins was an ensign in one of the university divisions, Michigan Naval Militia, at the outbreak of the last war. At Great Lakes he was more or less designated to rifle range work and was so successful that he was kept at it until after the war was over. He built and remodeled a number of ranges, the last one being the great range at Caldwell, New Jersey, at the time the largest range in the world. Mr. Jenkins' wartime service having been arduous rather than arduous, he entered the Marine Corps Reserve in 1926 as a captain and took over all the work, including various tours of active duty until 1936 when he resigned because of the pressure of his private business.

3. After the war, Mr. Jenkins built up a prosperous advertising business in New York. Trained as a chemical engineer, however, he spent two years in Russia working for the State Department in one of their large plants for the construction of railway equipment. During this period he learned to speak Russian and reads and writes it practically as well as English.

4. Since 1934, Mr. Jenkins has been employed as one of the editors of "Labor", the weekly newspaper of the National Railroad Union. You doubtless know Mr. Edward Hendler, the editor and manager, and of course, are aware that he represents a very conservative labor viewpoint. As far as I know, Mr. Jenkins has never been accused of bolshevism, or been under the adverse scrutiny of agencies who are interested in ferreting out people with communist tendencies.
Information concerning Mr. Albert H. Jenkins

5. Mr. Jenkins is a man of really extraordinary drive and ability. His training in the Navy and Marine Corps has given him a considerable knowledge of Naval and Military material. He was highly successful in directing instructions in small arms during the war, and as the commanding officer of large rifle ranges, has had administrative experience in the commanding of large groups of military personnel.

6. I believe that Mr. Jenkins is ideally equipped to develop the work of our N. T. School in the identification and description of military material, and to give instruction in this and other fields. He is also competent to assume administrative responsibility in connection with the School. Dr. Baker, who is now executive officer and chief instructor of the School, urgently needs the assistance which Mr. Jenkins will be able to give him.
HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON

October 28, 194?.

From: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
To: The Director,
Office of Strategic Services.
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Temporary promotion of Major Albert H. Jenkins,
USMC, for duty with the Office of Strategic Services.

1. It is requested that if and when the subject
named officer is detached from the duty for which he was
temporarily promoted to his present rank, this office, and
the officer carrying his pay accounts, be so informed, as
under the conditions of his appointment he will revert at
that time to his permanent rank.

L. CRONMILLER, JR.,
By direction.

...
My dear Colonel:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 31, 1942 requesting the temporary promotion of Captain Albert H. Jenkins.

I am informed by the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, that steps will be taken to effect the promotion of Captain Jenkins to Major after the findings of the Selection Board now in session have been approved by me.

Yours very truly,

[Signature]

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.
To: Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Captain Albert H. Jenkins, USMC, has been
on duty with this office for the past two months, and
is now the Executive Officer and instructor in mili-
tary subjects at one of our special training schools.
He has demonstrated unusual energy and capacity for
hard and effective work.

Captain Jenkins was an officer in the Naval
Reserve during the last war, and advanced from the
grade of Ensign to Lieutenant/Senior Grade. For a
period of ten years from 1924 through 1934 he held the
rank of Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve.

It would appear that Captain Jenkins' previous
service would entitle him to the rank of Major, and
such rank would greatly increase his value to the
...be advanced to the grade of Major, U.S.A...

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM

July 13, 192

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Dr. J. R. Hayden

Would you please have Captain Jenkins prepare a proper form of letter to the Secretary of the Navy for the Colonel's signature asking that he be given a Majority.
Colonel William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter of August 6, relative to the assignment of Captain William H. Jackson of the First Air Force to your organization for some special and confidential duties in London, has been received.

A number of graduates of the Air Intelligence School were assigned to the First Air Force upon their graduation August 6. I have been informed that Captain Jackson can therefore be released to you on the issuance of proper orders. I am taking the necessary steps to have those orders issued.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

A. H. Arnold
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
August 6, 1942

General H. H. Arnold
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Attention: A-2

Dear General Arnold:

I am attaching herewith copy of a letter which
I wrote under date of August 6, 1942, to Major General
James E. Chaceey regarding the transfer to this organi-
sation of Captain William H. Jackson, Serial Number O-900440.

As you know General Chaceey is temporarily absent from
New York, and Major Bruce of my office discussed this
matter today with Colonel Glenn, General Chaceey's Chief
of Staff, who stated to Major Bruce that the First Army
Air Corps would be agreeable to this transfer, provided
that a replacement would be assigned from the next class
graduating from the Harfordburg School to replace Captain
Jackson.

If A-2 would make such a replacement, I would greatly
appreciate their courtesy in the matter, as I am
anxious to have Captain Jackson carry out some special
and confidential duties in our London office for which he is particularly qualified.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Donovan
Director
FROM:  David Bruce
TO:    Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: Captain William H. Jackson

Captain William H. Jackson, Serial Number 0-900440, of the Army Air Corps, reported for duty on March 6, 1942. He is an Assistant S-2 at the headquarters of the First Bomber Command, 90 Church Street, New York City. His immediate superior is Lieutenant-Colonel Howard Moore, and the Commander of the First Bomber Command is Brigadier-General Larsen. The commanding officer of the First Air Force is Major-General Chaney.

You will recall that, when we were in London, we discussed with General Chaney the use of officers as Liaison with various British Service Intelligence and General Chaney agreed to it in principle.

Captain Jackson would be very glad to work for us, provided he was assured of being sent to London. It occurred to me that, in connection with the conversation that you were going to have with Colonel McDonald, Captain Jackson would be useful to act as
a second for McDonald. He is not doing a job at the present time at which he could not easily be replaced, and, if we line up McDonald, it would seem to me advisable to have Jackson go with him.

A. B.
David Bruce
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 18, 1943

201—Johnson, James E.
[6-18-43]

Subject: Promotion.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of Circular No. 161, War Department, May 30, 1943, it is recommended that:

James E. Johnson
1st Lieutenant
O-314227
Infantry

be promoted to the grade of Captain and that he remain on duty at his present assignment with the Coordinator of Information Service Unit (C.O.I.S.U.), Washington, D. C.

2. Lieutenant Johnson ranks from July 7, 1940. His assignment with the C. O. I. S. U. is of great importance and is in connection with the select training and operating unit which has been approved by the Chief of Staff. He has clearly demonstrated to the satisfaction of his superiors the ability to perform the duties of the next higher grade. He has been assigned and performed the duties of the next higher grade for more than six months.

3. A position vacancy exists, and the promotion of this officer and those previously recommended will not exceed the authorized officer quota.

William J. Donovan
Director

By C. Howard Bantman
Acting Director
SECRET

The following is from Richard Kohman under date of February 25, 1942:

"The American labor movement is anxious to bring Leon Jouhaux, President of the French General Confederation of Labor, out of unoccupied France into the United States. M. Jouhaux is reluctant to leave his country, but his usefulness there to the Allied cause is virtually nil because of his prominence and because of constant surveillance.

"M. Jouhaux, from here, would prove invaluable to the Allied cause. On short-wave broadcasts to his own country and in many other connections, involving action as well as propaganda, his freedom would be a great asset to us.

"Can M. Jouhaux be brought out of France clandestinely? If not, could he be brought out of a neutral country, say, Switzerland or Spain? These questions are predicated on the certainty that Vichy France will not grant him an exit visa.

"Can your agency, or some other, arrange for M. Jouhaux's entry into the United States, provided his friends on the other side make possible the necessary first steps you may care to suggest? I shall be very much obliged if you will let me know the possibilities."
I happened to see Mr. Bullitt, the former Ambassador to Paris, at luncheon. I asked him his opinion of Jouhaux. He described Jouhaux as "an old-fashioned trade union leader" and said that the old-line French labor unions were, after all "pretty good stuff." In Mr. Bullitt's opinion, while a trade union politician, he was 100% against the Axis. Moreover, he was a man of considerable intelligence, a lot of acumen, and, so far as Mr. Bullitt knew, he might be considered in the present situation as entirely reliable. Jouhaux had belonged to the more or less conservative right-wing of the labor movement and had resisted Communist control of French trade unions firmly. Jouhaux was extremely stubborn, however, had his own ideas and, incidentally, used to have a very good opinion of himself. In conclusion, Mr. Bullitt said that sometime ago he had discussed "with certain people in Washington" the possibility of bringing Jouhaux to the United States. He thought Jouhaux might be useful here.

Copied to: Mr. Bruce
Col. Solborg

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION: FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH
November 6, 1941

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is requested that Lieutenant Leonard T. Jones, United States Coast Guard, recently transferred to you from the Treasury Department, be granted authority to make a trip from Washington, D.C., to London, England and points within the British Isles on a confidential mission for the Coordinator of Information.

Lieutenant Jones will leave New York by Navy transportation on or about November 11, 1941, and will return to the United States on or about December 11, 1942.

We would appreciate your having the necessary Navy orders issued to cover the travel for Lieutenant Jones, allowing travel by plane, ship, or other carrier, including bomber ferry service.

Reimbursement for the expense of the trip may be claimed from the Coordinator of Information upon presentation of an adjustment voucher by the Navy Department attesting a copy of the paid voucher for Lieutenant Jones.

Very truly yours,

Phillip J. Domenow
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Richard Rohman
TO: Mr. John C. Wiley
SUBJECT: Mr. Jeremias and Alfredo Sagre

DATE June 2, 1942

In connection with several of his proposed broadcasts to France, Prof. Paul Vignaux was turned over by F.I.S. in New York to a Mr. Jeremias as his collaborator. Mr. Jeremias frankly informed Prof. Vignaux that he is an adherent of the "Neu Beginnen" group, headed by Paul Hagen. Mr. Jeremias informed Prof. Vignaux that he was in charge of all labor broadcasts to all Europe.

Prof. Vignaux was disturbed by two facts: 1 - That an adherent of a small radical German political group should be in charge of this Agency's labor broadcasts to Europe via short-wave. Prof. Vignaux knew that the Hagen group had created considerable misgivings in Washington and he does not know how to proceed; 2 - Prof. Vignaux was equally disturbed by the fact that labor broadcasts to all of Europe have been entrusted to a German, no matter how blameless an individual that German might be. Prof. Vignaux felt that European workers listening to the radio at the risk of their lives were entitled to broadcasts guided by men, above reproach, of their own nationality.
The incident of Mr. Jeremias followed closely upon the admission by F.I.S. that it has employed an Italian by the name of Alfredo Segre (not to be confused with Lassino Segre). Segre was expelled from the Mazzini Society when he openly approved the Russian invasion of Finland for the first time. Segre had alarmed the Mazzini Society by pursuing the Communist line shortly before the invasion of Finland and he has been doing the same since his expulsion from the Society. In the interval, according to one reliable report, Segre has married a girl employee of the "Daily Worker". Segre was brought from the West Coast for a job in the Radio Section of the Office of Coordinator of Information.

R. R.
February 5, 1942

Colonel Arthur V. Mallinnett
Director, Selective Service
1 East 40th Street
New York, N. Y.

My dear Colonel Mallinnett:

I am sending you herewith the proper form
for draft deferment in the case of Mr. Ned Johnson.

Mr. Johnson is in charge of a highly specialized and technical operation which involves the expert monitoring of all foreign short wave broadcasts, the training of personnel for that work, and the writing of reports based upon the short wave material. The type of work he does is so highly unique that to lose him would constitute a serious interference with our short wave activities. For this reason, I want to make this urgent request for favorable consideration to be given to the deferment application.

I shall greatly appreciate anything you can do in the matter.

Yours very truly,

[Signature]

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
21ST STREET AND C STREET N W
WASHINGTON, D.C.

25 1942

IN REPLY ADDRESS
THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE
AND REFER TO NO

WAR

State Director of Selective Service
State Office Building
Richmond, Virginia

Subject: Earl E. Jenkins
Local Board No. 2
Arlington County, Va.

Dear Colonel Hall:

We have been advised by the Coordinator of
Information that it is desired to send the above-named
registrant, who is a key employee of that Office, on an
assignment which would require that he leave the United
States.

The activities of the Office of the Coordinator of
Information may be considered as necessary in the
promotion of the war effort. Will you kindly request
the registrant's local board to give serious considera-
tion to an exceptional classification for the subject
registrant unless he is already so classified or is in
the armed forces. Also please request that they in-
clude with their report the registrant's request for the
registrant to leave the United States.

In the absence of permits, it is suggested the
Registrar should consider the

Plains State College Application for a temporary period of absence. The

Application, numbered 2, 3, and 4, should

be sent by return mail to Nos. 1, 2, and 3, January

3, 1942.

The period covering the above registrant should

be noted by permission of the Coordinator of Information,

Washington, D.C.

For The Director,

O. H. BAKER

Deputy Director, Information

Coordinator of Information

Major, Specialist

Assistant Director
April 18, 1942

Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey
Director, National Selective Service System
21st and C Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Hershey:

One of my key employees, Karl E. Jansen, is being sent abroad on a special assignment.

Some time ago, a letter was directed to Local Board No. 2, Arlington County, Virginia, asking that permission to leave the country be granted Mr. Jansen. The Board replied that additional information, including itinerary and the nature of his duties, would be required before the request could be considered and if this information could not be disclosed that Col. Mills F. Neal, State Director of Selective Service, would be the proper person to contact. Col. Neal, in turn, informed us that the request should be made directly to National Headquarters of Selective Service.

It is respectfully requested that permission to leave the country for an indefinite period be granted this individual.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Coordinator
January 14, 1941

Dear Senator Johnson:

Thank you for your letter of January 6.

I have a good many doubts regarding the effectiveness of this scheme. One of the difficulties is that it is a game which two can play. Germany's economic controls and rationing restrictions are so nearly complete that even a large increase in the amount of money, legal or counterfeit, held by the German people would have a comparatively small inflationary effect. Civilian spending in Germany is determined predominantly by allowable rations and other direct restrictions rather than by the amount of money at the disposal of consumers.

In Great Britain, although rationing and other controls have assumed increased importance, there are large groups of the population whose spending would be increased if, say, large quantities of counterfeit British bank notes were dropped by German planes over British cities. For this reason and others, this suggestion seems to me a dangerous one to try out on Germany.

Even though I am skeptical of the usefulness of this particular suggestion, I fully share your view that all schemes, including apparently "crack pot" ones, deserve careful examination in these times.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

The Honorable Lindy C. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Murphy, Roy
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:  Emile Despres

TO:  Dr. James F. Baxter

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator E. C. Johnson (Colorado) to Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 1, 1940

The proposal to flood Germany with counterfeit marks is not a new one. It is usually suggested that the counterfeit money be dropped from planes over German cities in large quantities. It does not seem to me a promising proposal.

The idea underlying the scheme is that Germans coming into possession of these counterfeit marks, indistinguishable from legal currency, would rush to convert them into goods, and that this increased flow of expenditure would produce a violent inflation and weaken Germany's war effort. Of the criticisms of this proposal, the most important is that it is a game which two could play. Economic controls in Germany are more complete and effective than in any other belligerent country, and the civilian's expenditures for goods and services are almost entirely divorced from the volume of money at his disposal. Rationing and other restrictions, rather than the amount of money on hand, set the effective upper limit to civilian spending. Thus, it is doubtful that even a marked increase in the amount of money, legal or counterfeit, in German hands would have any substantial effect on the German economy. This is less clearly the case in Great Britain, where a considerable proportion of the working class has insufficient money income to purchase the food permitted to them under existing rations.

Attached is a suggested draft of a reply to Senator Johnson.

EP

Attachment
January 6, 1942

Col. Wm. J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & F -- North Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Col. Donovan:

One of my constituents who is a very able publisher of a Colorado newspaper has advanced a novel secret weapon to be used against Hitler.

At first blush, it seems like another "Crack pot" proposal, but as one thinks it through, he is impressed with its possibilities.

Briefly, it is this: Flood Germany with counterfeit German marks.

What do you think of it?

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Note: The handwriting appears to be ornate and possibly a cursive script.]
January 21, 1942

Mr. G. F. Allen, Chief Disbursing Officer
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Miss Johnson

Dear Mr. Allen:

Reference is made to my letter of December 15, 1941, advising that A. Sax Johnson has been authorized to sign as certifying officer for all expense vouchers and vouchers for advance of funds for employees of this office.

This is to advise that Dr. A. Sax Johnson is no longer associated with the office of the Coordinator of Information, and the authority granted in my letter of December 15th is hereby revoked.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan
December 15, 1941

Mr. G. V. Allen,
Chief disbursing officer,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Miss Johnson

Dear Mr. Allen,

This is to advise that A. Rex Johnson has been authorized to sign as certifying officer for all expense vouchers and vouchers for advance of funds for employees of this office.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

arifnal
FROM: Sherman Kent
To: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: Mr. Goodhue Livingston, Jr.

DATE 28 March 1942

Mr. Goodhue Livingston, Jr., who called your office from Florida, was connected with me in your absence.

Mr. Livingston has had a considerable experience in South Africa and is anxious to return there as a representative of this office. He was an officer in the last war, has had a great deal of experience in New York politics, and is now holding an important post in the New York Public Health Service. In the light of these experiences and his knowledge of the country he feels qualified for any sort of observational work which this office might commission him to do.

He will return from Florida in about a week and has told me that he will call my office upon arrival in Washington. I am sending Lieutenant McSaine a copy of this memorandum and am asking him if he would be so kind as to see that Mr. Livingston sees the interested persons.

Sherman Kent, Chief
Mediterranean Section

cc—Lt. Turner McSaine
Major David Bruce
Col. Robert A. Solborg
Mr. H. Dorsey Newsom
Mr. Conyers Reed
December 29, 1941

Mr. Goodman Livingston, Jr.
125 North Street
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Livingston:

Doctor Sherman Kent of this office is going to be in New York today, and I believe he will call you up in connection with your suggestion that someone in this office interview your brother-in-law, Owen D. Johnson. Doctor Kent is an expert on Morocco himself, and I am sure will be very interested in talking with Mr. Johnson.

Colonel Donovan has asked me to reply to your letter of December 22 and to say that he is sorry to tell you that at the present time there is no opening here wherein we can avail ourselves of your services. This organization is made up of a small administrative staff comprised of a number of specialists in certain limited fields, and we do not at the present time need additional staff.

Colonel Donovan asked me to tell you that he appreciates the way you feel about wanting to help in the present emergency, and he only wishes that he could offer you something here.

Yours sincerely,

Kenneth Mygatt
Assistant to Colonel Donovan
Col. William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
25th St. & K Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:-

My brother-in-law, Owen D. Johnson, age 24, a graduate of St. Paul's School, Concord, New Hampshire, after spending two years at Yale University, went out to Morocco three years ago and has been living there ever since. He returned to this country within the last week and expects to join the United States Army shortly.

Yesterday I had quite a talk with him regarding general conditions in Morocco and it occurred to me that it might be worthwhile for some member of your staff to have an informative talk with him regarding Moroccan conditions. He has been in close association with many Arabs of importance and naturally, has picked up a certain amount of Arabic. He knows definitely where certain air fields are located because he has seen them. He seems to know where other air fields are located from information he has heard.

I have asked him to write down, within the next few days, in as short and concise a manner as possible, all the information which might be of use, heading it under three titles, military, economic, and political. If you believe it is worthwhile for some member of your bureau to talk with him, I can arrange to have him come to Washington immediately after New Year's, or even before.

It occurred to me that possibly his information checked against other information which you and G-2 probably have, might be of value. I have written to Brigadier General Sherman Miles along the same lines.

Incidentally, if you are looking for additional assistants in your Bureau, I would like to be considered. I seem to be rather an old man in Army eyes, being nearly forty-five, but I served in the regular Army in the last war in the 15th Field Artillery, 2nd Division, going through all actions with them until wounded in July, 1918. After leaving the hospital, I was assigned to a rather confidential job in General Harbach's office in Tours and then was attached to Army Intelligence in Paris, my primary job being in charge of the passport office as well as the Intelligence Police operating in the various social service agencies such as the American Red Cross, the YWCA, etc.
Col. William J. Donovan

Since then, the only other thing I have done that might have some bearing on this type of work, besides holding some administrative business jobs, the last one being Secretary of the Department of Health of the City of New York, is the fact that I spent two years in the Rhodesias and South Africa. This particular part of the world is somewhat removed, for the time being, from military operations but it seems possible that in time it may very well become important.

Sincerely,

Goodhue Livingston, Jr.

red
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Dewitt C. Poole

TO: Mrs. O'Donnell
   (Colonel Donovan's Office)

DATE January 12, 1942

SUBJECT: File on Jewish War Effort.

The file of papers relating to the Jewish War Effort is returned to you herewith.

Since the file contains a copy of Dr. Wright's memorandum entitled "ZIONISM--AIMS AND PROSPECTS," I am taking the liberty of retaining in our files another copy of this same memorandum which has been labeled in your office as follows:

Jewish War Effort,
Zionist 1043

I hope this is all right.
December 26, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

This was sent to me at the urgent request of Chain Wagner.

Henry Field

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field.

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3
A JEWISH MILITARY FORCE

- Serve Under British Command in the Defense of Palestine and the Middle East

Summary Statement on the History and Present Status of the Project
(December, 1941)

1. The desire of the Jewish people to place a military force in the field to fight with the British against the common enemy, is based on the elementary human right of self-defense. The same right is being exercised by Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Free French and others who are fighting under British command under their own flags and insignia. The Jews are at a loss to understand why this right should be denied to them. They feel they have a special claim to it in view of the fact that they were the first people to be singled out by the common enemy for persecution and terror. The Jews regard it a matter of right and honor to meet that challenge as Jews.

2. The present demand for a Jewish military force to fight for the defense of Palestine is not without precedent. A similar force was created during the first World War. Popularly known as the Jewish Legion, it consisted of the Zion Transport Corps, which served in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, and, later, of the 38th, 39th, 40th and 42nd Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, E. F., which saw active service in the Palestine Campaign under General Allenby in 1917. The majority of the thousands of men who enlisted for the Jewish
Legion came from countries other than Palestine, many of them from the United States, the Jewish population of Palestine being at that time less than 60,000. Today that population exceeds half a million, and is prepared to furnish an army of about three divisions or approximately 50,000 men.

3. No objection, moreover, on technical political grounds can be sustained against the proposal. Under the terms of the Mandate the Jewish National Home is to all intents and purposes a recognized political entity. Its blue-and-white banner is its flag. Its language, Hebrew, is one of the official languages of the country. Recognition is also accorded to its representative body, the Jewish National Council (Vaad Leumi). Another body, the Jewish Agency, is recognized by the Mandatory Power as representing the interests of the Jewish people at large in the National Home. A Jewish military force, recruited primarily in the National Home, is entitled to the same status as the units representing Free France, Free Belgium, or any of the other European nations that are fighting the common enemy.

4. On August 29, 1939, when war between Germany and Britain appeared imminent, the leaders of the World Zionist Movement, pursuant to action taken by the Zionist Congress held earlier that month in Geneva, presented to Prime Minister Chamberlain a proposal for the formation of Jewish military units within the British army for the defense of Palestine and the Middle East and for service wherever required. The reply was courteous by non-committal. As soon as war broke
out, the responsible leaders of the Palestine Jewish Community called upon their people to register as volunteers for war services. The call was answered by 136,000 men and women out of a population numbering slightly over half a million. The Palestine Government expressed appreciation of this response but availed itself of it only to a very limited extent.

5. The first offer of the Government was enlistment in two Jewish-Arab units of non-combatant pioneers, a form of service for which the Jews did not ask; and even that on condition that the number of Jews to be accepted was not to exceed the number of Arabs who might enlist. Eventually, the combatant services were also opened to them. Since the keenness for enlistment among the Arabs was not very great, the principle of parity restricted the number of Jewish volunteers to a small fraction of those who were available. The parity restriction was subsequently relaxed, but only with respect to the non-combatant units. Nevertheless, in spite of the restrictions, nearly 12,000 Jews are now serving with the British forces, and recruitment is continuing. These men have participated in military operations in France, Libya, Eritrea, Abyssinia, Greece, Crete and Syria. They have rendered honorable service and have been cited for gallantry by General Wavell, General Ball and Vice Air Marshall S'Albiac among others.

6. When in the summer of 1940 the Chamberlain Government was replaced by that of Churchill, the Zionist leaders again
presented their proposal for a Jewish military force to fight with Britain under its own flag and insignia. In September of that year the offer received the explicit approval of the Government. Preparations were started and the indications were that a formidable Jewish fighting force would soon come into existence. In March 1941, however, a letter came from the Colonial Secretary stating that, owing to lack of equipment, the project would be delayed for six months, with the assurance, nevertheless, that the postponement was not to be construed as a reversal of the previous decision. Towards the end of the six-months postponement another communication from the Colonial Secretary was received, again postponing action but offering to reconsider the proposal in three months. The same reason - technical difficulties - was given for the new postponement. Naturally, the plan involved a number of technical problems - training centers, transportation, equipment - and since those problems would always exist, the Zionist leaders pressed for a definite decision. The reply which came on October 15, was a virtual retraction of the promise made in September 1940 and repeated in March 1941.

7. The technical difficulty which has been officially cited as responsible for the abandonment by the Government of the plan for a Jewish military force is "a lack of equipment" (statement by Lord Moyne, Secretary for Colonies, in House of Lords, November 25th, 1941). According to all the reports however, that lack is being effectively supplied by ever-increasing shipments of American lease-lend material to the
Mr. Churchill has stated that a force of 75,000 men has been equipped for the new Libyan offensive in which Czech, Polish and other units representing nations conquered by Nazi Germany are fighting under their own flags. In so huge an army room and equipment could have been found for two or three divisions representing the Jewish National Home.

Surely American lend-lease material is not being shipped with the proviso that it may be used to equip the units of all peoples with the exception of the Jews. Moreover, even the lack of equipment need not have delayed the formation of a Jewish military force. The new American army has been created in spite of such a lack: soldiers in maneuvers have frequently had to use token weapons; and after Dunkirk many men in the new armies raised in Britain went through their drills for a time with broomsticks.

Outstanding American leaders have supported the demand for a Jewish military force. At a public meeting held in Carnegie Hall November 1, 1941, Senator Alben W. Barkley, Majority Leader of the U. S. Senate, said:

"Already thousands of them (the young Jews of Palestine) have joined the ranks of the fighters of freedom and they have been serving on many fronts: in Libya, in Ethiopia, in Greece and in Syria, and their gallantry has won the praise of their commanders. But there are many thousands more who are anxious to be admitted into those ranks to fight with the British as a Jewish army under their own flag, even as the armies of the conquered nations, the
Free French, the Czechs, the Poles, and others are fighting.
I trust that the aspirations for the establishment of a Jewish
army in defense of liberty may be realized."

Senator Robert F. Wagner, as Chairman of the American
Palestine Committee, a body comprising some 700 outstanding
non-Jewish leaders in every sphere of American life, has stated:

"As an important bastion of the allied front, the Jews of
Palestine should be allowed to place a substantial military
force in the field of fight with the other defenders of freedom in the Middle East. It is to be regretted that the re-
peated offers of such a force made by the Jewish community in
Palestine have not yet been accepted."

In England, the proposal for a Jewish Army in the Middle
East has had notable support, including that of the Manchester
Guardian and of the London Times. An editorial in the Manch-
chester Guardian of November 10th, 1941 called the failure of
the negotiations for a Jewish military force "a disturbing
story" and urged that Britain should welcome Jewish troops
with the British forces under their own flag. The London
Times pointed out that the Jewish volunteers had rendered
good service in Greece, Lybia and Syria although in the ci-
tations these Jews were described only as Palestinians.

9. The failure to grant the Jews of Palestine the ele-
mental right of self-defense and the Jewish people generally
the right to vindicate their honor against their ruthless op-
pressor, should be considered in the light of the general
policy with respect to the Jewish National Home pursued by
the British Government since 1939. That policy, embodied in
the White Paper issued that year by the Chamberlain Government, denies the Jews the two rights that are indispensable to the development of their National Home, the right of immigration and the right of land purchase. In the Parliamentary debate on May 23rd, 1939, Mr. Winston Churchill characterized that policy as a "repudiation" of the Balfour Declaration. "As one intimately and responsibly concerned in the earlier stages of that policy," he said, "I could not stand by and see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for reasons of administrative convenience or - and it will be a vain hope - for the sake of a quiet life."

10. The White Paper policy was motivated by a desire to appease the Arab terrorist who, under the leadership of the former Mufti of Jerusalem, now at last conducting his activities from Rome and Berlin, were instigated and financed by the Abis. Appeasement, however, has been a failure in the Near East, as it has been everywhere else. It has failed to secure for Great Britain the support of the Arab world, whose attitude to the democratic cause has ranged from indifference and luke-warmness, as in the case of Egypt, to disaffection and rebellion, as in the case of Iraq. Jewish rights in Palestine are not an important factor in the attitude of the Arab countries towards Britain and the democratic cause. That attitude is, in the case of each of them, determined by its local interests. The democratic tradition among the Arabs is primitive and weak
and the British cause among them would gain vastly more by British determination than by the policy of appeasement and surrender represented by the repudiation of Jewish rights in Palestine.

11. The war has made it clear that the only element able and willing to contribute substantial strength to Britain in the Near East is the Palestine Jewish Community. The fact confirms the contention not only of Zionists but of many farsighted Englishmen, that a strong Jewish Palestine is vital for the stabilization of the Middle East and the protection of the Suez Canal. While the Jews have laid emphasis on their desire to contribute their full military share to the common cause, Jewish Palestine has proved also an important agricultural and industrial asset to the British war effort.

12. In a speech in London on November 9, 1941, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization said:

"For a long time we have been pressing the demand for a Jewish fighting force in which the Jew could enlist as a Jew for service in the British forces under a Jewish name and flag.... Passing to the last chapter, I am unable to record anything except disappointment and frustration....The Jews have been penalized for their loyalty and devotion. It is apparently felt that the Jews do not require encouragement and may be refused the right of every nation to a name and a flag."

"It is bitter for me to say this," Dr. Weizmann concluded, "but we do not lose hope nor do we renounce the claim for a
Jewish fighting force serving under its own standard." Addressing himself finally to the Palestine Jews, Dr. Weizmann said: "Enlist in ever-growing numbers! Work and fight, even if nameless...whatever others do to us, we must not default in our duty to the common cause."
December 8, 1941

Mr. David Ben-Gurion
Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs
41 East 42nd Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Ben-Gurion:

Many thanks for sending me

the memorandum on the Jewish War Effort and War Offers.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

CC
Jews 1943
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Dr. Walter L. Right, Jr.  
TO: Dr. James F. Ecker, 3rd  
DATE: December 15, 1941

SUBJECT: Comments on a memorandum regarding the Zionist affairs sent to Colonel Nivov by Dr. David Ben-Gurion

This memorandum deals with negotiations of the Jewish Agency representing the Zionist-Jewish colony in Palestine with the British government regarding the Agency’s proposal to form a Jewish army in the Near East.

The aim of the memorandum is to convince the reader that Jews in Palestine and elsewhere in the world are being denied an opportunity to fight against the Axis, and in particular under the British government which is prominent against Jews in general. The facts are, however, rather different from what is presented in this memorandum. The British government has already offered an army of 30 to 50,000 Jewish volunteers from Palestine who are said to be available, trained and equipped by the British and authorized to fight under their own flag. The real question is, therefore, whether Britain is prepared to accept the implications of recognizing a Zionist army with its own flag. The memorandum makes clear that such recognition implies a status for the Zionist army and hence an equivalent status of the Polish, Free French, and other "exile" governments and armies, all of which represent nations with sovereign claims to territory. Consequently, if the British government accepts the Zionist offer of an army, the recognition of a Zionist state in Palestine is clearly implied.

Rather than discuss in detail the specific statements of the memorandum, I am attaching a copy of the sketch of the Zionist question which I have just finished preparing. If further comment on the memorandum of Dr. Ben-Gurion is desired, I shall be glad to furnish it.

Attachment
To Col. Donovan,

Wright's attached memo:
"Zionism -- News and Notes" is well worth reading.

Jim

James P. Baxter, 3rd

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ZIONINE—AIMS AND PROSPECTS

The World Zionist Organization is pressuring the British Government to arm Zionists in Palestine and send them into battle against Hitler under their own flag. Churchill and his advisers have not yet done this, so the Zionists have begun to exert pressure on Britain through stirring up Jewish and gentile public opinion. After all, what could be more appropriate than Jewish volunteers fighting on the front against Hitlerism? Some 50,000 Zionist volunteers are said to be available in Palestine, precisely where Britain has the greatest need of troops, where Arabs are flirting with Axis promises, where loyalty to the Empire is at a premium. Why does Churchill hesitate?

Outstanding among reasons for Churchill’s hesitation is the demand for use of a Zionist flag. Use of Zionist troops fighting under their own flag would imply recognition of a Zionist state. Zionist leaders speciously assert that the "exile" governments of today are in a somewhat similar position. But Britain is not at the moment ready to settle the Zionist problem in this backdoor way, although the history of British diplomacy in Palestine could provide examples of equally devices dealing. Britain must consider the reactions to be expected among Arabs and Indians. The United States must also be consulted. If the peace ending this war is to
Last longer than the peace of Versailles it must have strong American backing, and Americans are suspicious of commitments made by Britain in the heat of battle. At Paris in 1919 we had unfortunate experience of this sort of thing. The British are not forgetting our disillusionment and the consequent era of isolationism. If the Near East is to have peace, the Zionist problem must somehow be set on the road to solution. Sooner or later the United States will have to establish a policy of its own regarding Zionism. If we allow matters to drift we will end up as supporters of whatever policy or policies the British Government may adopt.

Meanwhile, Palestinian Jews who are more concerned with defeating Hitler than in establishing a Zionist state are welcomed as volunteers and to their honor it should be noted that 10,000 are already serving with the Imperial forces.

In formulating a policy on the problem of Zionism we must first define our objective. We presumably desire a relatively permanent settlement in the Near East. This must meet the "legitimate" as distinguished from the "illegitimate" interests and ambitions of the peoples and governments involved. Assuming that the Axis will eventually be defeated, the interests and ambitions to be considered will be those of the Arabs, the Zionist Jews, the British Empire, and the French Empire.
The French Empire in the Near East has already in appearance achieved practical liquidation by recognition of independent Syrian and Lebanese Republics, although it will remain to be seen whether this independence, which is subject to the condition that the "paramount interests" of France will be protected, is real or fictitious.

Zionism should first be examined from the point of view of Jews in general. Jews living in Axis-dominated Europe are frantically seeking havens of refuge. Their first choice of refuge is usually the United States, their second a British possession far distant from Europe, their third South America, and their fourth Palestine. Only because Palestine seems to be somewhat less inaccessible than other lands have many Jews turned in that direction. Their numbers may run into the millions--far greater numbers than Palestine could support, even if Transjordan were annexed and the Arab population expelled.

Jews outside of Axis-dominated Europe regard Palestine as their spiritual homeland, a land to which they are as much attached as Americans of pre-Revolutionary Scotch-Irish ancestry are to Ulster, whence their forebears came to the United States. But only a small minority are sufficiently enthusiastic in Jerusalem to contribute toward its support, just as
gentiles contribute toward Christian missionary work. A
small but exceedingly active group of zealots head the
Zionist organizations and conducts their superlative propaganda,
performing the same functions as Church missionary boards.
But very few Jews from the United States have been willing
to settle permanently in Palestine, perhaps 9,000 out of
900,000 Zionist colonists.

Many American and European Jews have foreseen the
danger to their people of a Jewish nationalistic movement and
have therefore opposed Zionism. Zionist propaganda intended
for gentile consumption gives the impression that the Zionist
program is supported by all the Jews of the world, whereas
it actually represents the desire of a small but active
minority. Zionist appeals directed toward a Jewish audience
are often pathetic in their attempts to interest the vast
unorganized majority of Jews. Anti-Jewishists have pointed
out that the Zionist movement gives color to the suspicion
that Jews are not loyal citizens of the countries in which
they live but are secretly disloyal.

Yet the Zionist dream-state in Palestine cannot consis-
tently solve the problem facing the Jews of the world.
Palestine is too small and barren even for the Jews of Eastern
and Central Europe who might be willing to settle there. That
many Jews from the United States or England or France or
Holland or even a non-Jew German would go there unless
feasibly deported is most improbable. If Judaism is to become under Zionist leadership a new nationalism, rather than a religion, it can expect no better fate than that of other social groups which have competed with the centralized modern state, an organization which tolerates only with reluctance and suspicion even the mildest forms of divided loyalty.

Furthermore, the world Jewish community is actually a religious, not a cultural unity, for Jews have no common language, no common way of life. Hebrew is no more widely used among Jews than Latin among Catholic Christians, and in Zionist Palestine heroic efforts have been necessary to produce a renaissance of spoken Hebrew. Wherever Jews possess any semblance of cultural unity, as distinguished from the Christians or Moslems among whom they live, this unity is something forced upon them by persecution and segregation. Even the Jews expelled from Germany by Hitler remain essentially Germans in thought and feeling as well as in language. The future of Judaism would seem to lie in development as a religious community along the lines followed by Christian sects. Political Zionism on any scale greater than that of a new Luxembourg is almost certain to have tragic results for world Jewry.

The Arab world, in contrast with the Jewish, constitutes a cultural unity, extending from Morocco to Iraq, from the
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southern borders of Turkey to Aden and Muscat. But this
cultural unity does not imply complete cultural uniformity.
The Arabic language of newspapers and books is not spoken
anywhere, but bears a relationship to spoken dialects similar
to that of medieval Latin to the Italian of Dante. Yet
literary Arabic is very definitely a living language, under-
stood and used by all literate Arabs, not declining in use
or giving way to written versions of the widely varying
Arabic dialects spoken in Morocco, Egypt, or Iraq. Social
conditions in the Arab world differ as widely as dialects.
The nomads of Ibn Saud's Arabian Kingdom would seem to have
little in common with the highly educated urban classes of
Cairene and Damascene. Yet the urban Arab is so familiar with
the literary tradition derived from nomad life that he feels
no further removed from the Beduin than the New Yorker is
from the Tuxedo pedestrian. The universal literary language,
the universal familiarity with Arab tradition, and the almost
universal religion of Islam are potent forces today. The unity
of the Arab world is no less real because it is not the type
of unity with which we are familiar in modern European states.
This unity expresses itself in the vague and inchoate move-
ment called Pan-Arabism. There is no Pan-Arab political
organisation, yet the French and Spanish rulers of Morocco
have to reckon with the same Arab and Moslem susceptibilities
regarding Palestine and union as the British overlords of
India. In Egypt the strong local nationalism is organised
in the predominant Nile Party, which includes the vast
majority of both Moslem and Coptic Christian elements in
the population. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq there are still
too many divisive factors for strong local nationalisms to
develop, but beginnings are apparent and growth inevitable.

The non-Jewish population of Palestine is Arab in
language and predominantly Moslem in religion. The Jews
resident in the country before Zionist colonies were estab-
lished numbered not over 60,000 and were culturally assimilated
to their Arab neighbors. The Arabs are far more purely Semitic
than the Jews, have been in Palestine for well over a thousand
years and regard the country as theirs by immemorial right.
They are as unwilling to be ousted to make room for Zionist
colonists as are the farmers of New York State to clear out
on behalf of the Indian Five Nations. Jerusalem is a holy
city to Moslems, second in sanctity only to Mecca and Medina.
Abraham is the traditional ancestor, through his son Ishmael,
of all Arabs, and Mecca is honored by Moslems as a forerunner
of Mecca. The attitude of Moslems in general toward Jews
is one of contemptuous toleration. The Jews of Mecca's
day rejected him just as they had rejected Christ six centuries
earlier.

The Zionist colonists are to native Palestinians and
to Arabs everywhere not simply followers of a despised religion;
they are the most dangerous type of imperialists. They do not
always govern the country directly, although Sir Herbert Samuel was a Jewish governor, but they have the backing of the British Empire. They come with all the economic and industrial techniques of western civilization into a traditional medieval society of large landowners, of peasants and artisans. They enjoy financial backing which appears to the Arabs to be unlimited. Much money has been spent in buying land, from which Arab peasants were evicted to make room for Zionist agricultural colonies. That this land is then made more productive only serves to intensify the bitterness of the evicted peasants, who imagine that they could do as well if they had the necessary capital. Arab landowners, politicians, and professional men watch with alarm the increase of Jewish population and savagery, as do the Zionists themselves, in a not very distant future when the majority of possible voters in the country will be Jews. Thus the Arab upper classes, who have often profited by land sales to Zionists, have joined the peasants in opposition to Zionism, for they fear that one day they will be a minority dominated by a highly nationalistic Jewish majority operating through the respectable machinery of democracy. So great is this fear that Moslems and Christians have shelved traditional animities and united in opposition to Zionism. Since Zionist immigration has been forced on an unwilling country by Britain, the British Government is hated almost as viscerally as the Zionists themselves, and the names of Balfour and Lloyd George are
Arabs living outside of Palestine share the feelings of Palestinians toward Jews, and regard their fellow Arabs with more sympathy, even to the extent of contributing funds for anti-Zionist use. Arabs everywhere cherish the dream of seeing established some day a Pan-Arab Federation, including all of the Arabic-speaking peoples. They resent the prospect of a Zionist wedge cutting off the Arabs of Africa from those of Asia and dividing permanently into two parts Syria and Palestine, which are a single natural geographical and economic unit. Wherever the Arabic language is spoken Arabs regard the British support of Zionism in Palestine, no matter how insufficient this support may seem to ardent Zionists, as an injustice and as evidence that Britain is no friend to Arabs in general. They remember how Great Powers have repeatedly exploited Oriental minorities, Slavs, Armenians and Arabs, for their own imperial advantage. Axis propagandists are exploiting skilfully this anti-British and anti-Zionist feeling, which is shared by non-Arab Moslems even in India.

The British government and public are involved in a maze of conflicting promises and sympathies. Balfour and Lloyd George promised the Jews of the world a "National Home" in Palestine and did this partly to obtain Zionist support during the last World War. At almost the same time, responsible British officials, Macdonald and Lawrence for example, were making vague but far-reaching promises to Arab leaders, such as the Late King Gasim of Iraq. Arab states were to be
eared out of the old Ottoman Empire and "self-determination" was to be encouraged, and at that time Palestine was almost solidly Arab. With Arab, not Zionist, military help the Turks were driven out of Palestine, and after the war an uneasy balance of semi-independent Arab states was set up under the mandates system. Unfulfilled promises to the Arabs have plagued British (and French) statesmen ever since, and Palestine has been the most poisonous focus of Arab discontent and rebellion, for there the Zionists were steadily increasing, while the government, although supposed to be a "mandate," remained an unrepresentative of the people as that of any crown colony.

Anti-British feeling among the Arabs is now so bitter that they either are pro-Axis or seem so. The head of the Palestinian Arabs, Haj Amin al-Husayni, is in Berlin.

British imperialists have appreciated the advantage of holding Palestine as a buttress to the Suez Canal and have sought desirable a nicely balanced mixture of quarrelling populations. Some of the British public have thought the Jews entitled to monopolize the country. Others have sympathized with the Arabs. Still others have opposed both Jews and Muslims on the ground that Palestine is most appropriately the homeland of Christians. The British government has had no consistent policy toward Zionism; unless confusion and contradiction can constitute a policy. No better example of weakness can be found.
The Axis Governments are using British support of Zionism as a trenchant weapon in attacking the British Empire. Nazi anti-Semitism is sufficiently demonstrated to convince all Arabs that the Axis would make short shrift of Zionism in Palestine. Axis propaganda implies that Axis defeat of Britain would result in Arab independence—an implication which we are at liberty to doubt, for a victorious Germany, "thinking with its blood," is hardly likely to distinguish between Arab Semite and Jewish Semite. Meanwhile Arabs regard Britain as the immediate enemy and count on their own skill and luck to gain at least some advantage from her collapse.

The United States Government and non-Jewish Public have given little serious attention to Zionism. Support of it has often seemed a good way to express sympathy for the persecuted Jewry of Europe. The Jew has been the underdog; he thinks apparently that Zionism is what he wants; let him have it. The propaganda machine of the World Zionist Movement has done a superb job of exploiting the readiness of American public figures to endorse "good causes." Jews prominent in American life who sympathize with Zionism have encouraged gentle friends to do likewise. In the American press such space has been devoted to the Zionist case, while little or none has been given to the case of the Arabs or to the contradictions of British policy. We have not realized
that only about 250,000 of the 4,500,000 Jews of the United States are active supporters of Zionism, and that many Zionist spokesmen are not even naturalised. Zionist propaganda strives to have it appear that Anti-Zionism, which is actually opposition to a synthetic political program, is exactly equivalent to Anti-Semitism, a cultural perversion popularly identified with Hitlerism. This assumption is just as false as the companion assumption that almost all American Jews are Zionists. Zionist propaganda has, however, frightened many Anti-Zionist Jews into silence.

The United States has become the partner of a British Empire which is fighting for its life—and Britain needs also the support of every people under her flag. Most emphatically she lacks the support of the Arabs, largely because of Zionism. The Arabs are disaffected; how disaffected is evidenced by the popular support accorded Rashid Ali in Iraq. The United States must some day give attention to this aspect of the general question whether or not support of Britain against the Axis implies support of the British Empire throughout the world with its existing territories and policies. If the Axis should invade the Near East, Arab disloyalty will assume great practical importance.

Propaganda, the United States is not yet identified in Arab eyes with support of Zionism or of other unpopular British policies. We have a "bad press" in the Arab world, in proportion of the El-Battro of the West, as mechanical propagandists, as educators, as the only remaining hope of peoples
that appeal to principles of fairness and justice, as friends of oppressed nationalities. If Arab sympathies can be weaned away from the Axis, we can do it. If anything approximating a fair settlement of the Arab-Zionist problem can be made acceptable to the less-fanatical elements among Arabs and Zionists, our Government will have to do it. But the Arab is intelligent and cynical. He suspects that we are committed to support the British Empire, whatever its errors may be. Therefore, if we are to counteract Axis influence and lay the foundations of a lasting peace in the Near East we must be clear in our own minds as to our aims. Obviously our policy must not be anti-British but must represent an understanding with London. On the other hand, the United States could be ill-advised to become committed to unquestioning support of existing British policies toward Arabs and Zionists.

The conflicting interests which center around the problem make it difficult to outline a policy for the United States. Yet we must make the attempt, keeping in mind that there are some situations in which any decision is better than none. We at least have before us the sad spectacle of Britain's indecision. Certain considerations are fundamental to any constructive thinking on the problem: (1) Political Zionism, which demands a Palestine enlarged to include Transjordan, solidly populated by Jews and ruled by Jews as an independent state, cannot solve the Jewish problem of the world. (2) Such a state, surrounded on every hand by Arabs,
cannot singlehandedly maintain its independence indefinitely.  
(3) Zionist Jews in Palestine can never be expelled by 
governments professing humanitarian principles.  (4) The 
ambitions of both Arab and Zionist extremists must be dis- 
regarded.  (5) The British Empire need not be permitted by 
as to exploit confusion in Palestine for its own imperial 
purposes.  (6) Any settlement envisaged by the United States 
must attempt to give satisfaction to reasonable persons, 
whether Arab, Jew, or Briton, and must be along lines accept- 
able to humanitarian world opinion.  (7) In the Moslem 
Orient democracy is only a name for a system of government 
which is unfamiliar and misunderstood.

So far as the Arab world is concerned, its obvious 
trend of development is toward a loose federal union. Such a 
union would have to allow the fullest freedom to each compo- 
ment state to determine its own type of government, and we 
would have to expect that most of the governments would be 
ecclesiastical absolutisms, thinly veiled by Parliamentary forms. 
The Federation should constitute a customs union, with suffi- 
cient revenues from import tariffs to support the central 
government and enable it to maintain a few necessary services, 
such as a secretariat and diplomatic representation abroad. 
Once a Federation is established, with states represented in 
regular meetings of a Federal Council, development toward a 
closer union may take place.
In such a Federation, an autonomous Christian Lebanon and an autonomous Zionist area in Palestine might be represented within the delegation of a united Syrian-Palestinian state. Zionist immigration into Palestine would have to cease entirely for a period sufficiently long to convince reasonable Arabs that they would not be swamped by Jews. Jews and Christians living within the territories of the Federation must receive the most complete guarantees of minority rights.

Such a Federation could not prosper or perhaps even exist without the support of a great power, for ambitious rulers and divergent interests would provide centrifugal tendencies. Britain is the power best able to support and regulate the experiment, provided that American financial support is available and the potential American criticism is always in the offing. Britain would thus not lose her prestige in the Near East, for she would be responsible for wider territories than ever before. The experience of her trained public servants would be utilised in a work better suited to their abilities than that of maintaining the Old Empire. The responsibilities of the United States would not be so great as to constitute a serious problem of internal American politics. The Arabs of Palestine would lose their fear of becoming an exploited and landless minority. The political Zionists would have on a reduced scale the state which they now desire to set up and govern. Relations between Zionist...
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colonists and Arabs would have a chance to cool off and
moderate elements would have an opportunity for cooperation
in developing along rational lines the potentialities of the
country. The Semites of the West, versed in all the skills
of the Occident, would be able to contribute to the develop-
ment of the Semites of the East and of lands which need
capital and industrial techniques with which Jews are
familiar in Europe and America. and perhaps most important
of all, the pitiable remnant of the Jews of the world would
be saved from the fate which is being prepared for them by a
small minority of misguided enthusiasts—the Political Zionists.
Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs

December 5, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of Coordination and Information
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In accordance with the very kind suggestion which you made when I met you the other day together with Mr. Neumann, I am sending you herewith a memorandum on the Jewish War Effort and War Offers, as well as a brief summary thereof.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank you for your kindness in giving us an opportunity to present to you the case for the Jewish Army.

Faithfully yours,

David Ben-Gurion
Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine
The Jewish war effort and the negotiations of the Jewish Agency and the British Government for the formation of a Jewish Army fall under two headings:

1) Palestine: Mobilisation of Palestinian Jews for the defense of the country and of the British positions in the Middle East.

2) Outside Palestine: Mobilisation of Jews in neutral and friendly countries who are willing and free to do so, to fight in a Jewish unit on any front.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE

Palestine is a small country, but with the Middle East once again becoming a war theatre of the greatest importance, it is a factor of unique value for Britain in that part of the world for two reasons:

a) Its central geographical position in relation to Egypt to the South, Syria and Turkey to the North, Iraq and Iran to the East, and the Mediterranean to the West.

b) The fact that it provides Britain, in the Jewish National Home, with a trusted ally, and a considerable war-potential, both in men and material.

At the outbreak of the war Great Britain had three formal Allies in the Middle East; Egypt, Iraq and Turkey. All of these were bound to her by treaty and might have been expected to fight on her side. So far not a single soldier from any of them is fighting for the Allied cause. Egypt remains neutral, even under Axis attack, and constant danger of invasion; Iraq has taken up arms on the wrong side, and has had to be reconquered. The only country in the Middle East which has so far given any help at all to the British war effort is Jewish Palestine.
From this strip of land, 10,000 Jews were serving last year in different units of the land, sea and air forces of the British Empire in the Middle East. The Jewish economy of Palestine has set itself to provide the British army with supplies and services essential to the war effort. To this end it enjoys certain special advantages: a) a supply of modern technicians and skilled labor; b) a number of modern plants; c) scientific institutions of European standards; d) a considerable free capital brought in by immigrants and available for the expansion of agricultural and industrial enterprises. It has one other unique asset from the war point of view. Among the recent immigrants into Palestine there are many who have a thorough knowledge of the industrial life of the various enemy countries — Germany, Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, etc. Some even had such information about military inventions and military preparations there. This information was collated and sifted, and eventually found its way through the appropriate channels, to the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the War Office, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Ever since the outbreak of the war the Jewish Agency realized that it was of the utmost importance that the Palestine economy should be placed on a war footing and that the production of foodstuffs should be expanded to the maximum to meet the needs of the military, etc. It was obviously important that military supplies should if possible be provided on the spot in order to save both time and shipping space, and especially so in the case of urgently needed goods and accessories whose transport from England would have been too slow for military exigencies. The same applies to repairs, which by the nature of the work, had to be done on the spot.

Unfortunately the industrial effort of Jewish Palestine has had to be made without Government assistance, and (at the beginning of the war) even in spite of some obstruction from the Palestine Administration. Our economic
effort had further to contend from the outset with certain serious shortages in raw materials. The military authorities, happily, unlike the civil administration, were constantly helpful.

The stationing in Palestine of numerous Army Units, called for very extensive public works, including the building of camps, the erection of fortifications, the building of hospitals, construction of roads, etc. Many of these works had to be completed on very short notice, and it was fortunate that a large Jewish labor force, skilled in building and constructional work and organized in a special contracting organization — the "Solel Boneh" — was on the spot and proved equal to the most exacting tasks, which it carried through to the full satisfaction of the military authorities.

Immediately on the outbreak of the war, the Hebrew University communicated with the appropriate authorities and offered the services of its scientific staff in the interests of the war effort. The Hebrew Technical Institute in Haifa has been cooperating, since the outbreak of the war, with the Royal Engineers in the Northern District in the testing of construction materials, and has carried out all kinds of research work for the army. The electrical laboratories build and repair instruments and motors for the Army and Navy as well as for industries supplying the troops.

**TEMPORARY ARM IN PALESTINE**

At the outbreak of the war the Jewish Agency issued a call to the Jews in Palestine for general registration for National Service. Eighty thousand men and fifty thousand women between the ages of 18 and 50 responded to that call. The greater part of the men of military age expressed their readiness for military service. The Jewish Agency then submitted to the Government, in Jerusalem and in London, an offer to form Jewish units for service with the British Army. Under the Chamberlain Government these offers were rejected.
out of hand. The Palestine Administration seemed scarcely to know there was a war on, its main attention at that time being devoted to obstructing the growth of the Jewish National Home.

With the fall of the appeasement government, and the approach of the war to the Middle East, some change was noticeable. Jewish recruits were not only accepted but were even asked for, in growing numbers, though at first only for service units, and not in combatant formations. As the requirements of the war grew more urgent, the prejudices of the Palestine Administration had to give way, and the services of the Jews were requested for the R.A.F., and later also for the infantry. In June of this year, Jewish units to a number of some 10,000 men, were serving with the British forces in Palestine and the Middle East—in the R.A.F., Royal Engineers, Pioneers, Motor Transport Units, Naval Auxiliary Units, Royal Artillery (A.A. Defence), and the Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment). They have taken part in the campaigns in Libya, Egypt, Abyssinia, Greece, Crete and Syria.

This is by no means the limit of the help which Jewish Palestine can give, either in the economic field or by way of manpower. There are at least another 30,000 or 40,000 young men who are eager to serve. The agricultural and industrial expansion of Palestine can be much further increased—and with the spread of the war the supply question becomes more and more acute. Manpower may then perhaps be a principal concern. Many Australian and New Zealand soldiers now serving in Palestine wonder why they should have been torn from their homes and transported with great difficulty to the Middle East (and this at a time when Australia itself is not free from danger) when already on the spot in Palestine is a people eager to fight and who have already proved their value in the campaigns in which they have been allowed to take part. Even more do the Jews of Palestine wonder why their help was at first completely rejected, and later half-heartedly and grudgingly accepted—never acknowledged, or recog-
nized, or reciprocated. The name "Jew" is never mentioned in any dispatch—
even when thousands of Jews may have taken part in a battle or a campaign.

**Jewish War Offer Outside Palestine**

The help which Palestine can give is, of course, limited. But besides the actual Palestine, there is another "potential Palestine" which has much larger possibilities. If Jewish manpower in Palestine were to be used to the full—and this can be done only if they are enabled to fight as Jews in Jewish units—then not only the Jews of Palestine but also those of other neutral countries and especially of the Americas, would come in large numbers of join their Palestinian fellows and fight in the Middle East or wherever else they may be needed.

Having in mind therefore the services which might be rendered by
outside Palestine as well as those of Palestine itself, the Jewish
agency offered also a Jewish fighting unit for service with Britain and her allies on any front. This offer was first made in a concrete form at the beginning of December 1939, but it was rejected by the Chamberlain Government. It was then renewed when the Churchill Government came into power. That Government definitely accepted the proposal and a decision was taken to organize a Jewish fighting unit. Various matters of detail were discussed, and a General to command the unit was even appointed.

After the death of Lord Lloyd, in February 1943, the formation of the
unit was postponed and the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Moyne, in a letter to Dr. Weizmann dated March 4, 1941, wrote: "I am very sorry that I have to tell you that the raising of a Jewish contingent is to be postponed owing to lack of equipment. The project must at present be put off for six months, but may be considered again in four months." Lord Moyne added, "I can assure you that this postponement is in no sense a reversal of the previous decision in
favor of your proposal.

Lord Moyne has last week told the House of Lords that owing to lack of equipment there is no prospect of accepting the proposal under present conditions. The statement that lack of equipment prevents the formation of a Jewish unit is unconvincing; the same state of equipment did not prevent, and fortunately so, the formation and equipment prevents the formation of a Jewish unit is unconvincing; the same state of equipment did not prevent, and fortunately so, the formation and equipment of British armies of millions of men throughout the world. The recent assurance given by Lord Moyne to the House of Lords that "encouragement is being given to recruitment of Palestine Jews" is even more amazing. Until now everything was done by the Palestine Administration to discourage the enlistment of Jews. Jewish units were denied a Jewish name and the use of their Jewish flag. Their services were recognized only under the anonymous term "Palestinians" and no direct mention was made of the part played by thousands of Palestinian Jews in the battles of the Middle East. For a long time the Jews were accepted only in service units, and when finally Jewish units were formed because war needs made it necessary to seek the use of Jewish man-power, the so-called "parity" principle was laid down - meaning that Jews could enlist only in such numbers as the Arabs would choose to do - it being known beforehand that Arabs were unwilling to serve. Later war necessities forced a relaxation of this principle of parity, and the enlistment of Jews was accepted even when Arabs refused to do so. But for these Jewish units, a peculiar organization without parallel in the British Army came into being. They are organized as unrelated Jewish companies, hanging in the air, not attached to any division or brigade or battalion - lest apparently a Jewish Battalion or a Jewish Brigade should emerge!

But in spite of this discouragement the Jews in Palestine will do
their best to fight Hitler and help England and the allies win the war, and they are confident that when the true facts are made known to the British and American peoples, this unfair and unwise treatment, unworthy as it is of the great moral cause for which Great Britain is fighting, will be changed, and the Jews will be given a fair opportunity to contribute to the maximum of their ability in Palestine and abroad, and fight as Jews in a Jewish Army possessing the same status as that of other allies of England.
SUMMARY NOTE ON JEWISH WAR EFFORT

1. PALESTINE

   1. At the end of July 1941, some 10,000 Palestinian Jews were serving in various units of the British army: the R. A. F., Royal Engineers, Transport Pioneers, Infantry, Navy Auxiliaries and Anti-Aircraft Defense. They participated in all campaigns in the Middle East, Abyssinia, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Crete, Syria. There are at least another 30,000 to 40,000 young Palestinian Jews who are eager to fight as Jews, by the side of England.

   2. While Jewish volunteers are placed in Jewish units, with the exception of those serving with the R. A. F., the Jewish units are denied their Jewish name, and the Jewish flag. Their existence is officially ignored. Never were their services mentioned in an official dispatch, their identity being hidden under the name of "Palestinians".

   3. The different Jewish units are all disjointed. The Jewish infantry companies, for instance, are not attached to any division, brigade or battalion. They can, therefore, not have proper military training and their military usefulness is greatly impaired.

   4. Jewish volunteers serving in the R. A. F. - their number is 1300 - are confined to ground-work, although many of them have the necessary technical qualifications.

   5. A possible Nazi invasion of Palestine is a much graver menace to the Jewish community there than to the population of any other invaded country, for obvious reasons, and Palestinian Jews are entitled to defend their country to the maximum of their ability and to participate in the defense of the British positions in the Middle East, of course under British command, but under their own name, the Jewish flag, as an ally of England, enjoying the same status as other allies - the Poles, Czechs, Free French, etc.

2. OUTSIDE PALESTINE

   1. In September 1940 the British Cabinet agreed to the formation of a Jewish military unit consisting of Jews from neutral countries, with a nucleus from Palestine, to be trained in England and serve on any front. A General to command the unit was appointed at that time.

   2. After the death of Lord Lloyd, in February 1941, the formation of the unit was postponed and the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Moyne, in a letter to Dr. Weizmann dated March 4, 1941, wrote: "I am very sorry that I have to tell you that the raising of a Jewish contingent is to be postponed owing to lack of equipment. The project must at present be put off for six months, but may be considered again in four months."

   Last week Lord Moyne informed the House of Lords that owing to lack of equipment the proposal for a Jewish unit was under present conditions dropped.
It is difficult to understand that the formation of a single Jewish division was prevented by lack of equipment during last year, when the same state of equipment did not prevent - very fortunately - the formation and equipment of British armies of millions of men throughout the world.