

MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ augments an organization's internal security

One of the most frequently asked questions about MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ by network security engineers is: *Why do I need it since I already have encryption in my network security?*

Leaving the issue of the vulnerabilities of particular encryption protocols aside, MySQLIF™ provides a critical new element to a secure internal network.

MySQLIF™ mathematicians and engineers have advised and supported many of the world's largest networks. They have applied that knowledge to the engineering of MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ that uses powerful polymorphic mathematics to make its encryption impenetrable using one-time, unique key fingerprints.




Figure 1: MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ helps keep your network secure during a breach event.

All organizations experience network security breaches. Breaches are a fact of life. Breaches can allow an attacker unrestricted access to the organization's communications until the breach is discovered and repaired.

For individual users, if companies with big information technology budgets cannot protect themselves, how does an individual user stand a chance against predators?

Individual users are less likely to be targeted, because attackers view businesses as big scores. But, there are attackers who bet on large numbers of individuals over small numbers of businesses, precisely because individuals have less resources to spend on security. Once communication has left the business network the business loses most of the control over its security... until that is, MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ emerged.

Files sent using MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ remains secure even during a breach. This means that during a breach event, the organization will still have a secure mode of communications within the network. See Figure 1 above.

Whether or not the organization's data is valuable ("I have nothing to hide"), it is nobody's business according to human morality as well as the Fourth Amendment nonetheless. MySQLIF™ can help maintain a significant degree of secure communications even *during* a breach.

During a breach event, MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ can give engineers more time to determine the best solution. Normally during a breach security engineers are under the gun to close the breach quickly. A hasty fix often inadvertently opens new vulnerabilities for attackers.

Engineers working on the breach need to communicate and collaborate to resolve the problem. Obviously, they cannot communicate using their network until the breach is fixed. MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ gives them a means of communications where the attacker cannot listen in. This means attackers are less likely to know what solutions are being considered and implemented, making it far less likely that they can follow up with another successful attack after the breach is closed.

What is so special about MySQLIF™ Privacy App™'s polymorphic encryption approach? Why haven't others implemented it before now?



Figure 2: MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ can protect the senior management discussions on recovery plans in order to prevent a follow on breach from intercepting those discussions by the attacker.

To answer this question, we need to compare the MySQLIF™ approach to the current gold standard named Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is a specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001. AES has been adopted by the U.S. government. It supersedes the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which was published in 1977. Since most information technology vendors do business with the U.S. government, they are forced by default to use AES.

All encryption or cryptography makes readable data random. Then, that random data can only be reversed back into the original readable data by having the encryption key.

For example:

<i>Readable data:</i>	➔	<i>Encrypted version:</i>
May God bless you and keep you.		êZ*7+EĂÍ× ò~ðò)Xi5ϣ-s'+ WktA,ĚÁ°.u³ið•dç³e)p!W÷ 4SñÖÂ-X€h+iö?‡8Ōú”ŽÓüí<S.²rĀ¼&îí™&çP!ĚÑ- PsĀ ž"šō,,jĪÓPáfÖW»[âd•ë~Āš...ü«ª†üö°ÿ... .

The magic is the *randomness* of the encrypted version.

A truly random number is essentially not crackable. By contrast, most crackable encryption is pseudo-random. This means some characteristic exists in the number that make it predictable. Once that attribute is known (the key), the item can be decrypted.

To be uncrackable, the random numbers created each time an encryption occurs must satisfy two requirements:

1. The next-bit test
2. State extension compromise resistance

Huh? Ackkkk. What does this mean in English?

1. The next-bit test:

Even if 999 out of 1000 bits are known, the last bit can prevent decryption. Actually, AES does this very well as does MySQLIF™.

2. “State extension compromise resistance:”

Even if an attacker knows the inner workings of the MySQLIF™ PRNG (Polymorphic Random Number Generator), he or she cannot simply run it in reverse to decrypt a previously encrypted file.

This is because the MySQLIF™ PRNG randomly selects from a wide array of possible choices of unique fingerprints from the sender and receiver devices that they must try. Then, each step

backwards to crack the next bit requires an exponentially larger set of choices: 1, 2, 4, 16, 192, 36864, 1358954496, 1.85e¹⁸...

AES's keys are static and do not do this. Once one AES RNG bit is cracked, all others in that file can be decrypted with ease. This is how AES was cracked by a MySQLIF™ principal.

Encryption has been a banker-usury-spy-propaganda battleground since Babylon

In addition, an AES shortcoming involves a widely-published set of pseudo-random number generators fronted by an algorithm known as the Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm—a cryptographic or kleptographic backdoor advantageous to those who know about it—British & Commonwealth GCHQ and American NSA—and no one else.

The highly classified program to crack encryption of online communications and data was developed jointly by British and American intelligence programs named BULLRUN and EDGEHILL. Edward Snowden revealed that British BULLRUN had a \$800 million per year budget.

Access to BULLRUN was limited to a group of top personnel at Five Eyes (FVEY)—the U.S. NSA and the signals intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom (GCHQ), Canada (CSE), Australia (ASD), and New Zealand (GCSB).

This Five Eyes conspiracy was of the highest secrecy from its formation on [Mar. 05, 1946](#) until its first disclosure on Apr. 8, 2010—64 years later. The British still hide most of their peers, knights, and aristocrats who led the setup of Five Eyes.

Needless to say, this British-Commonwealth-American conspiracy of spies, merchant-banks, and their “public-private” organizations has been sedition and treason from its formation. These secret alliances are managed by the British Pilgrims Society by their Babylonian merchant-bankers in the City of London since 1902.

GCHQ and NSA ordered all their technology companies to add the Dual_EC-DRBG algorithm to all hardware, software, and firmware. It was/is a pseudo-random RNG that enabled an *intentional* side channel attack on all vendor software to make all software hackable—a universal, kleptographic backdoor. By 2014, the NSA was forced to say that they are no longer requiring it, but few believe them. A duck renamed a dog is still a duck.

Five Eyes NSA-GCHQ-MI6-CIA-FBI-MI5 = Treasonous Kleptographic Backdoors Я Us.

The bottom line is that reliable encryption requires secure random number generation, which has not been the case since our spy agencies have led the drive for a kleptocracy.

The NSA required technology vendors to embed the encryption-cracking Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm into all hardware, software, and firmware that contained a flaw known only to the NSA.

That flaw can be exploited at any time to decrypt AES-encrypted files—it is a universal back door. They claim it has been replaced, but that claim appears dubious since NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) registration is still being required

By contrast, MySQLIF™ PRNG contains no such predictability, and therefore, is exponentially safer. No “backdoor key” is possible with MySQLIF™ hence this is probably why polymorphic mathematics has not been used in encryption prior to MySQLIF.™

Why haven't others implemented polymorphic encryption? You'll have to ask them! As with everything, someone had to be the first to invent. This is true both for our MySQLIF™-encryption algorithm and for our key swapping mechanics.

The key swapping mechanics is difficult to engineer, which might be another part of the reason no one has tried it. What we did at MySQLIF™ to program such an environment is not trivial, but with Michael McKibben leading the charge, we did it along with world-class mathematicians and engineers.

We have additional uniqueness for how we harden our state extension compromise resistance, but we do not wish to reveal them. Even if they are known, it will not matter, but we choose to keep attackers guessing.

AN IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATION TO FELLOW NETWORK SECURITY SPECIALISTS

QUESTION: I am a computer network specialist. I have told my management that we are using state-of-the-art encryption. How do I introduce MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ without destroying my credibility when I am supposed to be the expert?!

Be honest. Do not pretend to know what you do not know.

First, encryption algorithms don't last forever. They are only secure and "state-of-the-art" until someone figures out how to break them. Explain this to your management, and then tell them that you have learned that AES has been broken. [WHEN].

Second, never claim to know something you do not know. Did you ever really know that AES (or whatever other encryption you are using) is secure, or did you just trust others who told you it was? Cite sources instead of claiming authority you do not actually have. The NSA said AES was good. If you say that, then when it is broken, the NSA was wrong, not you. Don't claim to be a cryptography expert when you are not. You can be a computer security expert while still admitting that you do not know the deep mathematics behind encryption and have to consult the mathematics and cryptography experts for that.

If you are honest about your expertise, you will never end up in an embarrassing situation like that. Granted, the entire network security community is making dubious claims to be “secure,” “un-hackable,” “trusted,” and “safe.” For example, here are examples of the plethora of online claims:



We realize that in an environment of systemic deception, it is difficult to be the odd man out. Once your company puts out sales ads that are not true, what do you do? Go along, correct the pitch, or add tools to your tool box?

This is the general state of the network security business today. We get it. Honesty is often a lonely row to hoe. We propose a third way to handle this circumstance below, one that uses MySQIF™ as a complement rather than a competitor to the encryption that you already have implemented.

Third, come to your management with solutions. If you are the computer security expert, and you discover a flaw, work out the solution, then approach management.

If you follow these rules, instead of an embarrassing conversation that harms your credibility, you will identify a problem you cannot reasonably have been expected to know about previously, and you demonstrate that you are proactive and *really are* the security expert you claim to be, because you already have found a solution to the problem.

Say something like "Hey, you should know that someone recently figured out how to break AES, which we are using for a lot of our encryption. I have taken the liberty of looking for suitable alternatives that will improve our security. It is going to cost a bit, but it will give us better security than we had even before AES was broken."

If management responds with: "But you said it was secure," you can tell them that "it was secure, according to the NSA and other major organizations, until it was broken. That is just how encryption works. Our AES is still reasonably secure until someone breaks our implementation. If we are lucky, the hacker who breaks it will not be malicious, and we will have time to close that hole with an upgrade before a new attack starts, one that might be malicious."

If the computer sending a message is compromised, no system can stop that message from being read. In that case, the attacker is acting as the sender and he/she can see the original contents. No system, including MySQIF™, can protect against that circumstance. That said, MySQIF™

makes this unlikely since such predator activity can be discovered and deleted during the key exchange before damage is done.

In addition, MySQLIF™ can protect against insider bad apple attacks where network-level

security has more difficulty protecting, especially during a breach. Generally, while any employee can use intercepted credentials, it will more likely be an information technology employee who knows better how to bypass network access logs and intercept sensitive communications between senior managers.



If the senior managers are using MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ to exchange files and messages, insider attackers would have to attack their individual workstations directly to gain access to those communications, rather than intercepting network traffic. Further, if those MySQLIF™ communications are stored on removable USB storage media during the breach, then **the possibility of interception drops to near zero.**

In conclusion, MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ is an important tool in the network security toolbox to protect sending communications over the Internet where network engineers cannot rely on the internal networking securities to protect messages to and from the “wild” Internet.

The strong polymorphic security of MySQLIF™ remains even outside of the organization’s network.



Figure 3: MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ can be an important tool in your network security toolbox while recovering from a breach event.

About MySQLIF™ Privacy App™

MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ uses polymorphic encryption that generates tens of thousands of one-time, unclonable keys for a single encrypted file. These one-time key clusters or "shards" are based upon unique hardware fingerprints on the sending and receiving devices.

MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ keys dissolve after one-time use. Hypothetically, in the unlikely event that the master key was somehow intercepted in the *split-second* it exists, decryption can only occur on the sender's and receiver's devices.


Mathematically, "average" encryption being cracked on a powerful computer takes about 10 to the 300th power in seconds -- just 5-10 minutes at best. AES-256, the current gold standard, takes several seconds.

By comparison, a MySQLIF™-encrypted file takes 10 to the 1500th power seconds --three lifetimes of the universe. The way MySQLIF™ works mathematically, backdoors are impossible.

MySQLIF™ also grants you a legal Leader® license to use social networking that was stolen from Leader® Technologies, on all your devices. See [Legal Social](#). This license is for paying MySQLIF™ subscribers only. Your message to the world can then be: "I am enjoying the use of social networking legally!"

For more information, contact:

MySQLIF™ Customer Service
<https://www.mysqif.com>
 (614) 890-1986
customerservice@leader.com



TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS for MySQLIF™ Privacy App™

- Sign Up at <https://www.mysqif.com>
- **Microsoft Windows 10 (Build 19041) and higher.** Requires Windows Updates to be current and WinAppRuntime.Singleton, .Main.1.5, Webp Image Extensions, App Installer installed from the Microsoft Store
- COMODO Code Signing Certificate
- Runs on **Apple Mac with Parallels** (Windows virtual machine) installed
- Runs on **Linux with Virtual Box by ORACLE** (Windows virtual machine) installed
- Before installing, either approve MySQLIF.com, or temporarily disable malware, anti-virus, firewalls, VPN, Windows Defender, McAfee, Norton, Symantec, etc. so that MySQLIF™ Privacy App™ will be able to be downloaded and installed successfully. Once installed, turn back on any disabled security applications
- **Maximum file size: 4 Gigabyte** in this version. Encrypting a
- **Subscription options: Yearly (\$120), Quarterly (\$40), Monthly (\$15), Decrypt-only | seven days free, no credit card required during trial**
- Enterprise site license possible
- Full set of technical [citations](#):
- Selected citations:
 - [Albert-Carlson et al. \(Dec. 01-04, 2021\)](#). Evaluating True Cryptographic Key Space Size. IEEE 12th Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON), 10.1109/UEMCON53757.2021.9666530. IEEE.
 - NEW: [Mandeep Singh, Albert Carlson. \(May 31, 2024\)](#). An Approach to Watermarking Using Polymorphic Algorithms For Increased Data Security. Austin Community College/IEEE.

- [McKibben et al. \(Nov. 21, 2006\)](#). U.S. Patent No. 7,139,761, *Dynamic Association of Electronic Stored Information with Iterative Workflow Changes*. USPTO. Source: <https://image-ppubs.uspto.gov/dirsearch-public/print/downloadPdf/7139761>
- [McKibben et al. \(Jun. 05, 2012\)](#). U.S. Patent No. 8,195,714, *Context Instantiated Application Protocol*. USPTO. Source: <https://image-ppubs.uspto.gov/dirsearch-public/print/downloadPdf/8195714>
- [McKibben et al. \(Jun. 05, 2012\)](#). U.S. Patent No. 7,925,246, *Radio/Telephony Interoperability System*. USPTO. Source: <https://image-ppubs.uspto.gov/dirsearch-public/print/downloadPdf/7925246>
- [FIRST AMENDED MILLER ACTNOTICE. \(Apr. 25, 2019\)](#). *Leader Technologies, Inc. to the U.S. Executive* pursuant to 40 U.S.C. §3131 et seq. Leader Technologies, Inc.
- [Petition for Writ of Certiorari. \(Nov. 16, 2012\)](#). *Leader Technologies Inc. v. Facebook Inc.*, No-12-617. U.S. Supreme Court.